26 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot e48308c5b6 fix: the first wallet's first address is active as soon as it is added (closes #512)
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The popup picked an active address only when it opened, so after the first
wallet was created nothing was active until a reopen: Home had no headline,
and Send and Receive refused. Each of the three import paths on AddWallet now
makes the new wallet's first address active when no address is. When the
phrase or xprv scan then replaces the address list with one that leaves that
address out, the new list's first address becomes active and the background
is told, as when the user picks an address on Home. The address scan stand-in
in the popup test boot now answers in the real scan's shape, which the phrase
and xprv imports read.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-16 07:15:29 +02:00
clawbot aa10a2a5f5 fix: each browser-suite run builds and removes an image of its own (closes #547)
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script/test-e2e and script/test-e2e-firefox tagged their image with one
fixed name. When two clones ran a suite at once, the second build moved
that tag, the image store deleted the first run's now-untagged image, and
that suite exited 125 without running a test. Each run now tags its image
with the suite's name and twelve random hex digits and runs it by that
tag. The cleanup that runs on exit, Ctrl-C, kill and a closed terminal
removes the run's container if docker's client left it running, then the
image. The image-ID file that guarded against a moving tag is gone.
README.md's End-to-End Tests section says which endings clean up.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-16 06:51:08 +02:00
clawbot 2c0888e112 fix: approval windows open as wide as the page (closes #518)
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The approval window opened 360 pixels wide while the page is 396, cutting
off the Reject button; it now opens at 396. The browser counts the
window's frame in that width, and a tall screen gives some of it to a
vertical scrollbar, so once the approval's screen is up the page widens
its own window by however far it would scroll sideways, times the zoom of
its own tab. Firefox draws some zoom steps a little larger than it
reports, so the page measures again after each widening, three times at
most. The toolbar popup's window is left alone. The Firefox suite checks
that the sign prompt fits at 170%. README's Visual Style line now gives
the page's real width.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-16 05:44:50 +02:00
clawbot f857bb0a3f fix: a request whose origin has no host is refused, not treated as a site (closes #527)
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A page with an opaque origin, such as one its server sandboxes with a
Content-Security-Policy, is reported to the background with the origin
"null", and Chrome reports a local file as "file://". The background took
either as a site, so every such page was one site: a connection remembered
for one covered them all, and the phishing check never matched. The
background now parses the reported origin and, when it has no host, refuses
the request with 4100 like one with no origin, before any method runs.
tests/rpcOrigin.test.js sends both, and README's SiteApproval says what is
refused.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-16 04:44:49 +02:00
clawbot 70a41ed70e fix: typed data with a missing field or a bool that is not true or false is refused (closes #552)
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ethers signs a bool field by whether its value is truthy, so the string
"false" was shown as false and signed as true, and a bool field left out
was shown as nothing and signed as false. The sign screen now refuses
typed data whose message leaves out a declared field, at any level of
nesting, or holds a bool that is not true or false: the error line names
the field and Sign is disabled. The background refuses a signature for it
too. Presence is an own-key test, so a field named like a built-in
property such as constructor is not found by accident. signedPrimaryType()
moves to the shared module so the background reads the message as the
same type.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-16 03:33:39 +02:00
clawbot f9f32ab32d fix: a slow answer to an approval still reaches the site (closes #540)
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Chrome stopped the background worker about six minutes after a site's
request even with the approval window open, and the approval and the
site's waiting request went with it. Every approval is now added through
addPendingApproval(), which starts a timer in the worker that calls
runtime.getPlatformInfo() every 20 seconds while any approval is
pending; Chrome counts each call as activity.

tests/e2e/slowApproval.js, run by make test-e2e, leaves a transaction
and a signature approval open for seven minutes in minimized windows and
requires the site to receive both results. It drives Chromium over the
DevTools pipe because Playwright keeps DevTools attached to the worker.
Its loopback dApp server, shared with the Firefox suite, moves to
tests/e2e/dapp.js.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-16 03:27:53 +02:00
clawbot bad6494e43 fix: a V4 swap action not in the deployed shape is shown as not decoded (closes #358)
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The four V4 swap actions are read only as the structs deployed on mainnet
and Sepolia. ethers read the newer v4-periphery structs, which add
minHopPriceX36, as the deployed ones, and the newer multi-hop exact-in
struct showed the offset of its hop-price array as the swap amount. A
decode now counts only when encoding it again gives back the same bytes.
A swap action that fails that marks its step "V4 Swap (could not be
decoded)", and a side its SETTLE or TAKE did not name reads "Unknown
(could not be decoded)". The wait and error screens no longer show the
ETH value as the amount of a swap whose amount was not read, unless the
swap is paid in native ETH.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-16 03:00:32 +02:00
clawbot f4551dcb67 chore: bring the token-list enrichment tooling into script/lib (closes #495)
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The two node programs and the data file from f7a2437 regenerate the name and
url of each token in src/shared/tokenList.js. They are now CommonJS under
script/lib/ and read ethereum-lists at a pinned commit. The apply step also
rewrites an entry that already has a name and url, so it runs on the current
list, and stops on an address that matches no list entry. Exported as
applyEnrichment, it is run by tests/applyEnrichment.test.js, which fails when
the committed list differs from what it writes. Its table of websites now gives
FLOKI and TURBO a URL. make enrich-tokens and make apply-enrichment run the
programs. script/check-censored allows the MUSD token's on-chain name in the
data file.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 20:10:30 +02:00
clawbot 575f1658ae fix: estimate a request even when the site sends its gas limit (closes #554)
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ethers asks the node for a gas estimate only when the request has no gas
limit, and that estimate is the wallet's only check that a transaction
does not revert. Since a site's `gas` became the gas limit, a reverting
request carrying one opened the approval window and could be signed and
mined to fail. Such a request is now estimated first, with the site's
limit and under the same timeout; a failure goes back to the site with no
window, and the site's gas limit is still the one shown and signed. A
limit too low for the call now fails the same way.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 19:46:01 +02:00
clawbot c40c7432a5 fix: sign and export with each address's own derivation index (closes #510)
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Sending, site transactions, site signatures and private key export
derived the key at the address's position in the wallet's list. After
an import whose scan passed over an unused index, or after removing an
address that was not the last, that position named another address's
key.

Each HD and xprv address record now stores the index it was derived at
(at wallet creation, by the import scan, by "+"). getSignerForAddress()
derives at that index, refuses a record without one, and refuses any key
whose address differs from the record's. The confirmation screen signs
as the From address it shows, not the selected one. The export screen
reports a refusal instead of calling the password wrong.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 18:22:12 +02:00
clawbot 8e20a4e21c fix: the connection prompt shows the shared address whole (closes #517)
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The element holding the address on the connection prompt was a flex row,
so the title line and the address that renderAddressHtml() returns sat
side by side and the address got only the width left over, which hid its
last nine characters. It is now a plain block, as on the signature
screen, so the address has a row of its own. The Chrome browser suite's
connection test now measures that row with the check the other screens
already use.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 17:11:34 +02:00
clawbot f283a5bb91 fix: the typed data screen shows only the message fields that are signed (closes #539)
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ethers signs only the fields a type declares and drops any other key, but
the Message section listed every key the site sent, so an added key read
as signed. The Message section now follows the signed type, at every level
of nesting and in the type's order. Typed data with other keys is not
refused: those keys are listed after the message under "Not part of the
signature", by their place in the message. README SignApproval says so.
The operator/spender test now also checks the Message section, and new
tests cover an added key in a nested struct and in a list item.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 16:41:13 +02:00
clawbot cb27281b21 fix: the transaction detail screen decodes a token transfer against the token contract (closes #515)
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The screen decoded a transaction's data against the history entry's `to`,
which for a token transfer row is the transfer's recipient. The decoded
Token line named the recipient, and the amount read "decimals unknown" for
a token the wallet tracks. It now decodes against the address the
explorer's answer for that transaction says it was sent to, which is the
right address for every kind of row. tests/tokenTransferDetail.test.js
opens a row made by the real history parser and checks the Token,
Recipient and Amount lines.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 16:37:55 +02:00
clawbot 00d1fecc36 fix: eth_sign's warning and the README say what it signs (closes #409)
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eth_sign is signed as an EIP-191 personal message over its data, which is
what the Ethereum JSON-RPC specification defines it to return. Its warning
on the signature prompt said the site was asking to sign a raw hash that
could drain funds, and the README said the same; neither was true. The
warning now says the site used the older eth_sign method and that the data
will be signed as a personal message, and the README's SignApproval section
says so too. Tests pin that the background reads eth_sign address first and
data second, and that the sign screen answers it with the personal message
signature over the data.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 15:41:22 +02:00
clawbot dfc3a35fe3 fix: Sign & Send refuses a transfer reviewed on another network (closes #524)
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Settings is reachable from the confirmation screen, and Back from it only
unhides the screen as it was drawn. Sign & Send took the network at the
click, so a transfer reviewed on Sepolia went out on mainnet after a switch
in between. show() now records the chain id of the network it draws for.
Sign & Send refuses with a message on the screen when the active network
differs, and the send carries that chain id, so ethers will not populate it
for a provider on any other network.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 15:31:50 +02:00
clawbot 2442441830 fix: use the gas limit a site sends as gas (closes #207)
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Sites send the gas limit under its JSON-RPC name, `gas`. ethers only
reads `gasLimit`, so the field was dropped and the node's estimate was
shown and signed instead. The page's request now takes `gas` as the gas
limit, and the existing ceiling, display and comparison with the signed
transaction cover it as they already did `gasLimit`. A request that
gives both with different values is refused.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 13:48:52 +02:00
clawbot f1a13a50a6 fix: the defective xprv wallet notice names the keys that still reach its addresses (closes #255)
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The notice told the user that these addresses are reachable by software
that repeats the same derivation, while the same wallet blocks Export
Private Key, so there was no way to take that route from here. The
second paragraph now names private key export among the disabled
controls and says the addresses can be reached outside this wallet with
the extended private key the user imported, if they kept a copy of it,
or with the master extended private key or recovery phrase it came
from. No behaviour changes. A test checks the new wording.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 11:48:46 +02:00
clawbot b4059af827 fix: a listed site ending in a dot gets the phishing warning (closes #534)
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The blocklist check hashed the hostname as the page gave it, so
"myetheywallet.com." and every subdomain written that way hashed
differently from the listed "myetheywallet.com" and opened approval
prompts with no warning. The browser and DNS treat both spellings as
one host. hostnameVariants() now drops one trailing dot before
building the hostname and its parent domains, so the check sees the
name the list holds.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 10:48:41 +02:00
clawbot 8c08b3d467 docs: say what a closed window does to a tx or sign approval (closes #505)
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The approval port's disconnect handler leaves a transaction or signing
approval pending, and its comments said that was so the user could reopen
the toolbar popup. Those approvals open in their own window. When that
window closes, the windows.onRemoved listener rejects the approval, unless
an approved attempt is still running, in which case that attempt answers
the page. Both comments now say so. No code changed.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 09:48:41 +02:00
clawbot fd5921f62e fix: make fmt refuses to run without the repo's own prettier (closes #509)
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In a clone where script/bootstrap has not run, node_modules/ is empty and
yarn falls back to whatever prettier is on the PATH, which can format files
differently from the version yarn.lock pins. script/fmt and script/fmt-check
now stop with a message telling the user to run script/bootstrap when
node_modules/.bin/prettier is missing. After bootstrap they behave as
before. The README Entrypoints entries say so.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 09:31:47 +02:00
clawbot 83f3549d37 fix: typed data for another chain cannot be signed (closes #519)
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EIP-712 has a wallet refuse typed data whose domain chainId is not the
active chain, because the signature is valid on the chain it names. The
sign screen now shows such a request with the reason on its error line
and Sign disabled, the same way it refuses a mismatched primary type.
The background checks again when the signature comes back, against the
network active then, and answers the site with that refusal instead of
the signature. A chain id is read as ethers signs it, so 1, "1" and
"0x1" are one chain. Typed data with no chainId signs as before.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 08:31:44 +02:00
clawbot eb012b9eb3 fix: Chrome draws the popup's text at the 14px text-sm declares (closes #456)
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Chrome gives extension pages a stylesheet of its own that sets body to
75%, outside any cascade layer, so it beat Tailwind's text-sm and Chrome
drew the popup at 12px where Firefox draws 14px. body now carries
text-sm!, the important form, as it already carries font-mono!. Both
browser suites check that body computes to 14px.

At 14px the recovery phrase instruction on the add wallet screen takes a
third line, which pushed Import below the fold at 360x600. The die button
now shares the instruction's row instead of taking a row of its own.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 08:02:14 +02:00
clawbot adff1e0b9d docs: a change adds no Completed Steps entry to TODO.md (closes #222)
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Every change used to add an entry at the top of Completed Steps in its
own commit, so each merge into `next` left every other open PR
conflicting on that list. The Workflow section now says to add no
entry: what landed is recorded on the tracker and in `git log`, where
each commit title names the issue it closes. The step that moved Next
Step into Completed Steps and pulled the top of Future Steps into Next
Step goes with it. The entries already in Completed Steps stay.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 05:15:05 +02:00
clawbot 8e52528f8b test: wait until the page shows a screen, not only until it lays out (closes #502)
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The browser suites' wait for a screen passed as soon as the element laid
out. Until the page's stylesheet has applied, every view lays out, so an
approval test could read the prompt before the page's script had filled
it. visible() in the Chrome harness and waitVisible() in the Firefox
driver now also wait for the page to finish loading and for neither the
element nor anything around it to carry the hidden class that showView()
keeps on every view but the current one. Both also require the element's
computed visibility to be visible, as the browser library's own check in
Chrome did. No caller changed.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-08 12:49:43 +02:00
clawbot b8b13ef5cd fix: switching the network in Settings tells open pages (closes #500)
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Once Settings has saved the new network it asks the background to send
chainChanged with the new chain id to every open tab, through the same
function an approved site switch request uses. Only the extension's own
pages can ask for that. Choosing the network already active changes
nothing and sends nothing.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-08 09:13:16 +02:00
clawbot ff05bd50f7 fix: only the user switches the wallet's network (closes #408)
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A connected site's wallet_switchEthereumChain request for the other
supported network now opens a prompt in its own window, through the
existing approval machinery, naming the site and both networks. The
network, endpoints, balances and caches change, and chainChanged is
sent, only when the user approves it; rejecting or closing the prompt
answers 4001. One such prompt per site at a time; a request for the
active network needs none. The approval window no longer shows the
connection prompt while it waits for the approval's description,
since both prompts answer on the same port.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-08 07:30:16 +02:00
65 changed files with 7666 additions and 418 deletions
+2 -2
View File
@@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ on: [push]
jobs:
e2e-chrome:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Bounds the image build, a cold cache included, and both Chrome
# Bounds the image build, a cold cache included, and the three Chrome
# programs, so a hung browser frees the shared runner. README.md
# "In CI" has the measured times.
timeout-minutes: 20
timeout-minutes: 40
steps:
# actions/checkout v4.2.2, 2026-02-22
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
+15 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check check-censored docker hooks build build-debug package vendor-blocklist icons clean dev
.PHONY: bootstrap setup install test test-e2e test-e2e-firefox lint fmt fmt-check check check-censored docker hooks build build-debug package vendor-blocklist icons enrich-tokens apply-enrichment clean dev
# Standard targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
# per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
@@ -111,6 +111,20 @@ vendor-blocklist:
icons:
@node script/lib/icons.js
# Fetch a name and a website for every token in src/shared/tokenList.js into
# script/lib/token-enrichment.json. Run deliberately, land the diff: the names
# come from live data, so a later run can return different ones.
enrich-tokens:
@node script/lib/enrich-tokens.js
# Write the names and websites in script/lib/token-enrichment.json into
# src/shared/tokenList.js. Commit the result with the data file:
# tests/applyEnrichment.test.js fails while the list differs from what this
# writes, or while an address in the data or in the script's table of websites
# matches no entry in the list.
apply-enrichment:
@node script/lib/apply-enrichment.js
clean:
@rm -rf dist/ release/
+279 -71
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@@ -239,18 +239,24 @@ provide:
`make check` stays non-mutating. Linting runs only in the container, because
an ESLint result that depends on whichever ESLint the host happens to have is
not a result, so docker is required to lint.
- `script/fmt` — format all files (writes), on the host
- `script/fmt-check` — check formatting (read-only), on the host
- `script/fmt` — format all files (writes), on the host, with the `prettier`
that `script/bootstrap` installs in `node_modules/`; when that one is missing
it fails and says to run `script/bootstrap`, instead of using a `prettier`
from the `PATH`
- `script/fmt-check` — check formatting (read-only), on the host, with the same
`prettier` and the same refusal
- `script/check` — run `script/test`, `script/lint` and `script/fmt-check`
- `script/check-censored` — assert the competitor name RULES.md bars appears
nowhere in the working tree or under `dist/` outside its documented
exceptions: the pinned source reference in `script/vendor-blocklist`, the two
provider-shim identifiers in `src/content/inpage.js`, and one ERC-20's
on-chain name in `src/shared/tokenList.js`. Each is scoped to that path and
fails anywhere else. Run by the `lint` phase, so part of `make check`; it
inspects `dist/` when there is one and says loudly when there is not, and the
build context of that phase never has one. `make build` re-runs it with
`--require-dist`, so a build artifact is always covered
on-chain name in `src/shared/tokenList.js` and in
`script/lib/token-enrichment.json`, the fetched data that file's names are
written from. Each is scoped to the paths named and fails anywhere else. Run
by the `lint` phase, so part of `make check`; it inspects `dist/` when there
is one and says loudly when there is not, and the build context of that phase
never has one. `make build` re-runs it with `--require-dist`, so a build
artifact is always covered
- `script/package` — produce the release artifacts: `make build` first, so the
archives can only ever be made from a `dist/` that has been verified against
that build's own receipt as a RELEASE build, then one self-contained,
@@ -322,6 +328,19 @@ The Makefile shims to those. It also carries a few targets that have no
that already holds the drawn image, the same IHDR and every pixel, is left
untouched. Commit the files with the drawing: `make check` fails while their
image differs from what it draws
- `make enrich-tokens` — fetch the name of each token in
`src/shared/tokenList.js` from CoinGecko's coin list and its website from the
`ethereum-lists/tokens` repository, at a pinned commit, into
`script/lib/token-enrichment.json`, by running `script/lib/enrich-tokens.js`.
CoinGecko's list is live and has no fixed version, so a later run can return
different names
- `make apply-enrichment` — write the names and URLs in
`script/lib/token-enrichment.json` into `src/shared/tokenList.js`, by running
`script/lib/apply-enrichment.js`, taking a URL from the table of project
websites in that script only where the fetched data has none. Commit the list
with the data file: `make check` fails while the list differs from what this
writes. Neither target changes which tokens are on the list, and no build runs
either
- `make clean` — remove `dist/` and `release/`
- `make dev` — run the build `make build` runs, without the checks that follow
it, then run it again after every change to a file under `src/`, `manifest/`
@@ -343,6 +362,14 @@ are outside `make check`. Neither opens the popup from the toolbar button: both
load its page in an ordinary tab, so what the toolbar popup itself adds, its
size and its closing when it loses focus, is covered by neither.
Each run builds its image under a tag of its own, `autistmask-e2e-chrome:` or
`autistmask-e2e-firefox:` followed by twelve random hex digits, so two clones
can run the same suite at once without one build taking the other's image away.
The run removes that image, and its container if one is still running, after the
suite passes or fails, on Ctrl-C, on `kill`, and when the terminal or SSH
session it runs in closes. A run killed outright (`kill -9`) cannot clean up:
its image stays under its tag until removed by hand with `docker image rm`.
### Chrome (`make test-e2e`)
`make test-e2e` builds `dist/chrome/` and drives the **real popup in a real
@@ -414,17 +441,20 @@ content script, the inpage provider, the background worker and the approval
popup all have to work together. A local test page is served by the route
handler on a reserved-TLD origin, gets `window.ethereum` from the shipped
`MAIN`-world content script like any other page, and drives
`eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`, `eth_signTypedData_v4` and
`eth_sendTransaction` through the real prompts. Every signature is recovered in
the runner and compared against the active address, the transaction assertions
run against the raw signed transaction captured at `eth_sendRawTransaction`
rather than against anything the extension reported, rejecting each prompt is
required to return a rejection to the page rather than hang or resolve, a prompt
raised while another approval window has focus is required to open a window of
its own, and the password is required to be absent from every message the
approval window sends to the background — with the message that would carry it
required to be present, so that check cannot pass by observing nothing. That
last one is the standing floor under
`eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`, `eth_signTypedData_v4`,
`eth_sendTransaction` and `wallet_switchEthereumChain` through the real prompts.
Every signature is recovered in the runner and compared against the active
address, the transaction assertions run against the raw signed transaction
captured at `eth_sendRawTransaction` rather than against anything the extension
reported, rejecting each prompt is required to return a rejection to the page
rather than hang or resolve, a network switch request is required to leave the
stored network unchanged and send no `chainChanged` until it is approved, a
network switch in Settings is required to send the page `chainChanged` with the
new chain id, a prompt raised while another approval window has focus is
required to open a window of its own, and the password is required to be absent
from every message the approval window sends to the background — with the
message that would carry it required to be present, so that check cannot pass by
observing nothing. That last one is the standing floor under
[#157](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/157).
The limits of that coverage and of the rest of the Chrome suite, none of them
@@ -457,6 +487,9 @@ papered over:
forced by clicking Reveal and the settings gear in one page task, which a
person cannot do; the case a person can hit, the first decrypt after the popup
opens while libsodium is still loading, is not driven.
- Approval windows open at 1280x720 whatever size the extension asks for, so
whether an approval screen fits its window is checked in the Firefox suite
only.
Any test that drives a failure path on purpose declares the `console.error` it
is about to provoke, via `errors.expect()`. That is not a mute: the declaration
@@ -520,21 +553,47 @@ one profile yields a single extension id, not two: Chrome does not load a second
copy of an id it already has. The assertions are annotated as observations, so a
Chrome that ever changes this fails the run instead of passing it.
Last, `make test-e2e` runs `tests/e2e/slowApproval.js`, which leaves a
transaction approval and a signature approval open for seven minutes with both
windows minimized, then restores and approves both and requires the site to
receive the hash of the transaction the stub node received and a signature that
recovers to the address. Before the background worker kept itself running while
an approval is pending, Chrome stopped it about six minutes in and neither
request was ever answered
([#540](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/540)). The windows are
minimized through the DevTools protocol (`Browser.setWindowBounds`), and the run
fails unless both pages then report themselves hidden: Chrome slows a hidden
page's timers to once a minute, so anything the window did to keep the worker
running would fail here. It is its own program and does not use Playwright:
Playwright keeps DevTools attached to the background worker, and Chrome never
stops a worker DevTools is attached to, so no wait in the suite above can show
the worker stopping. It starts Chromium itself, speaks the DevTools protocol
over `--remote-debugging-pipe`, and attaches to pages only. Before raising the
approvals it requires the worker to stop on its own with nothing pending, so a
run in which something else keeps the worker running fails. The site is
connected and the RPC endpoint set through the extension's own screens, against
the loopback dApp page and stub node the Firefox suite also uses
(`tests/e2e/dapp.js`). Unlike the suite above, it does not fail on page errors.
### Firefox (`make test-e2e-firefox`)
`make test-e2e-firefox` builds `dist/firefox/` and drives the **real popup in a
real Firefox**, installed as an unpacked MV2 temporary add-on via geckodriver.
It covers popup load, the StateRecovery screen (the same cases as the Chrome
suite), wallet creation through the UI, the Add Token screen, and the four dApp
round trips — `eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`, `eth_sendTransaction`, and
a closed approval window rejecting with EIP-1193 4001 — driven through the real
content script, background page and approval windows.
suite), wallet creation through the UI, the Add Token screen, and the dApp round
trips — `eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`, `wallet_switchEthereumChain`
rejected and then approved, `eth_sendTransaction`, and a closed approval window
rejecting with EIP-1193 4001 — driven through the real content script,
background page and approval windows. The `personal_sign` prompt is also
required to fit its window without scrolling sideways, with the extension's
pages at 170% zoom.
The suite lives in `tests/e2e/firefox/`. Its WebDriver client (`driver.js`) has
**no npm dependencies at all**: it is built on global `fetch` and
`child_process` against geckodriver's HTTP API. The dApp fixture (`dapp.js`) and
the assertions do use `ethers`, and have to — a signature is recovered in the
runner rather than believed from the extension, and the stub node has to answer
`child_process` against geckodriver's HTTP API. The dApp fixture
(`tests/e2e/dapp.js`, shared with `tests/e2e/slowApproval.js`) and the
assertions do use `ethers`, and have to — a signature is recovered in the runner
rather than believed from the extension, and the stub node has to answer
`eth_sendRawTransaction` with the hash `ethers` computes for the artifact it
sent, or `provider.broadcastTransaction()` refuses the answer.
@@ -640,16 +699,16 @@ Three limits are worth knowing, all real differences from the Chrome suite:
- **Almost nothing is stubbed, which inverts the coverage of network-dependent
code.** The container still runs with `--network none`, so the run is offline
and no request can escape. The one thing it can reach is the loopback fixture
in `tests/e2e/firefox/dapp.js`, which serves the dApp page and a JSON-RPC node
and which the extension's `rpcUrl` is pointed at for the dApp steps; a
JSON-RPC method that fixture does not model fails the run rather than
answering `null`. Everything else, Blockscout and the price feed among it, has
no fixture and simply fails, and the extension swallows its own fetch
failures, so only the _failure_ branches of that code are ever executed. A
`ReferenceError` in the success path of `renderTransactions`, or of price
rendering, passes this suite green. The offline run is also weaker than the
Chrome suite's interception for those calls: it proves nothing got out, but it
cannot report which requests were attempted.
in `tests/e2e/dapp.js`, which serves the dApp page and a JSON-RPC node and
which the extension's `rpcUrl` is pointed at for the dApp steps; a JSON-RPC
method that fixture does not model fails the run rather than answering `null`.
Everything else, Blockscout and the price feed among it, has no fixture and
simply fails, and the extension swallows its own fetch failures, so only the
_failure_ branches of that code are ever executed. A `ReferenceError` in the
success path of `renderTransactions`, or of price rendering, passes this suite
green. The offline run is also weaker than the Chrome suite's interception for
those calls: it proves nothing got out, but it cannot report which requests
were attempted.
- **The site-connection prompt always opens in a window of its own.** The
profile turns off `extensions.openPopupWithoutUserGesture.enabled`, so
`src/background/index.js` falls back from the toolbar popup, which WebDriver
@@ -699,11 +758,13 @@ installing Firefox, geckodriver and their system libraries. Both scripts now
build their image with `--no-cache`, so every run pays the cold figure. Those
`e2e-chrome` runs predate the cases that wait in real time for a receipt to end
in error. `make test-e2e` took 3m51s locally with its image cached, so with the
image rebuilt every run, an `e2e-chrome` run comes to about seven minutes.
image rebuilt every run, an `e2e-chrome` run comes to about seven minutes. The
approvals left open for seven minutes (`tests/e2e/slowApproval.js`) add about
eight more, so about fifteen.
Each e2e job has a `timeout-minutes` cap, so a hung build or browser ends the
job instead of holding the shared runner: `e2e-firefox` 15 minutes and
`e2e-chrome` 20, each over two and a half times the job's slowest cold run. A
`e2e-chrome` 40, each over two and a half times the job's slowest cold run. A
job that reaches its cap has hung; read it as a hang, not as a slow run to
retry. The `check` job has no cap: `.gitea/workflows/check.yml` is the canonical
copy from `sneak/prompts`, kept byte-identical.
@@ -798,8 +859,22 @@ on the next event. Two consequences shape every recurring job in the background:
service worker at all — the one remaining user of it, `src/shared/ens.js`,
runs only in the popup and is marked as such.
The job also carries a freshness guard, and a guard must never be timed to the
alarm period it gates. The guard is measured from the moment the last run
Pending approvals are the exception: an approval waiting for the user, and the
site's request waiting on it, live only in the worker's memory, and only the
worker that received the request can answer it. Left alone, Chrome stopped the
worker about six minutes after a site's request even with the approval window
still open, and the user's answer then reached nobody. So the worker keeps
itself running while any approval is pending: every approval is added through
`addPendingApproval()`, which starts a `setInterval` that calls
`runtime.getPlatformInfo()` every 20 seconds, and Chrome counts each extension
call as activity. The timer stops itself once nothing is pending, and the worker
then stops as it otherwise would. The timer is the worker's own, so it does not
depend on the approval window being visible; a timer in the window would,
because Chrome slows a hidden page's timers to once a minute. A worker that
stops for another reason, a crash say, still loses the approvals open in it.
The balance refresh carries a freshness guard, and a guard must never be timed
to the alarm period it gates. The guard is measured from the moment the last run
finished, which is one run-duration after the alarm that started it, so a guard
of exactly one period vetoes the very next tick and the real cadence becomes two
periods. The balance refresh guard exists to skip work an open popup has already
@@ -885,8 +960,16 @@ discoverable.
enough that vanilla JS with simple view switching is sufficient. A framework
would add bundle size, build complexity, and attack surface for no benefit at
this scale.
- **360x600 popup**: Standard browser extension popup dimensions. The UI is
designed for this fixed viewport.
- **396x600 popup**: The page is 396 pixels wide (`body` in
`src/popup/styles/main.css`), and 600 pixels is as tall as the browser lets
the toolbar popup grow. The UI is designed for this fixed viewport. The window
an approval opens in is given the same size. The browser counts the window's
frame in that width, and a screen taller than the window gives some of it to a
vertical scrollbar, so once the approval's screen is up the page widens its
window by however far it would scroll sideways, scaled by the browser's zoom.
Firefox draws some zoom steps a little larger than the zoom it reports, so the
page measures again once the window has grown, and widens it again while it
still falls short.
#### No Layout Shift
@@ -1102,14 +1185,18 @@ read:
The swap's `Token In` and `Token Out` lines name a currency, not an amount; each
reads `Unknown (not named in the calldata)` when the decoder found no token for
that side. An `UNWRAP_WETH` step makes `Token Out` ETH only when the output side
is WETH, on mainnet or Sepolia, or when no step set the output side; a WETH
`Min. received` figure then reads in ETH. Otherwise `Token Out` and
`Min. received` keep the output side's own token and figure, whether the swap
was paid in ETH or in a token: a V2 exact-out swap that buys USDC and then
unwraps the WETH it did not spend shows USDC. The token permission warning on
the signature screen has its own amount wording, including `Unknown`; the
SignApproval section below describes it.
that side, or `Unknown (could not be decoded)` instead when a V4 swap action in
the transaction could not be read (see Transaction Decoding below). A V4 step
whose swap action could not be read still sets each side as a swap step does,
and a side its `SETTLE` or `TAKE` did not name is then unknown: no other step's
token or figure is shown for it. An `UNWRAP_WETH` step makes `Token Out` ETH
only when the output side is WETH, on mainnet or Sepolia, or when no step set
the output side; a WETH `Min. received` figure then reads in ETH. Otherwise
`Token Out` and `Min. received` keep the output side's own token and figure,
whether the swap was paid in ETH or in a token: a V2 exact-out swap that buys
USDC and then unwraps the WETH it did not spend shows USDC. The token permission
warning on the signature screen has its own amount wording, including `Unknown`;
the SignApproval section below describes it.
The swap's `Deadline` line is the router's deadline as a UTC date and time, e.g.
`2026-02-27 08:25:51`. A JavaScript date reaches only to 275760-09-13 00:00:00
@@ -1184,7 +1271,16 @@ The core hierarchy is **Wallets → Addresses**:
of its stored `xpub` by `src/shared/walletDefects.js`, explained in the
wallet list, and blocked from signing, sending and private-key export. It
is never deleted or rewritten.
- An **address** holds ETH and ERC-20 tokens.
- An **address** holds ETH and ERC-20 tokens. In an HD or xprv wallet each
address record also stores `index`, the derivation index it was made at: 0 for
the first address, the index the import scan found it at, or `nextIndex` when
"+" added it. An address's `index` and its position in the wallet's list
differ once the scan has passed over an unused index or an address has been
removed. Sending, site transactions, site signatures and private-key export
derive the key at `index`, and refuse it unless it is that address's own key;
an HD or xprv address with no valid `index` is refused before anything is
derived (`getSignerForAddress()` in `src/shared/wallet.js`). Each refusal is a
full sentence naming the address.
- The user can have multiple wallets, each with multiple addresses (HD) or a
single address (key).
@@ -1456,8 +1552,14 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- **Transitions**:
- "Import" with a valid entry and a matching password of at least 12
characters → creates the wallet, clears the navigation stack, and →
**Home**. The phrase and xprv modes then scan for further used addresses
and report the count as a flash message.
**Home**. When no address is active yet, as on the first wallet, the new
wallet's first address becomes the active one. The phrase and xprv modes
then scan for further used addresses and report the count as a flash
message. When the scan finds two or more used addresses, they replace the
wallet's list, which then holds the first address only if it was used. If
the first address was active and is not in the new list, the new list's
first address becomes the active one and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` is
broadcast.
- "Import" with a missing, short or mismatched password → full-sentence
error on the error line, no screen change
- "Import" with an invalid entry or a duplicate wallet or address → flash
@@ -1510,6 +1612,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
change)
- "Reveal" (wrong password) → full-sentence error on the error line, nothing
revealed (no screen change)
- "Reveal" (correct password, but this address's key is refused, see Data
Model) → full-sentence error saying why, nothing revealed (no screen
change)
- "Back" → previous screen (AddressDetail)
- Settings gear → **Settings**, whose "Back" goes to AddressDetail: leaving
drops the address the screen was showing, so it also takes the screen off
@@ -1637,8 +1742,21 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
the contract's own answer is read at signing time only to be compared with
it, and a disagreement is a refusal rather than a preference for either
value (`src/shared/transferAmount.js`)
- "Sign & Send" after the active network was switched in Settings while this
screen was open → nothing is signed; "The active network changed after
this transaction was reviewed, so it was not sent. Please go back and
review it again." in the errors box, no screen change. The transaction
carries the chain id of the network the screen was shown for, so it cannot
be signed for another
- "Sign & Send" (wrong password) → "Wrong password." on the password error
line, no screen change
- "Sign & Send" signs as the From address above, not as whichever address is
selected: the two are saved separately, so the popup can reopen onto this
screen with another address selected. When the selected wallet does not
hold the From address → full-sentence error on the password error line,
nothing sent (no screen change)
- "Sign & Send" (correct password, but the From address's key is refused,
see Data Model) → nothing is signed → **ErrorTx** saying why
- "Back" → **Send**
#### WaitTx (`wait-tx`)
@@ -1646,7 +1764,11 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- **When**: Transaction has been broadcast, waiting for on-chain confirmation.
- **Elements**:
- "Transaction Broadcast" heading (no back button — tx is irreversible)
- Amount + symbol
- Amount + symbol. For a swap the approval screen showed no `Amount` for,
such as one whose V4 swap action could not be read or a V4 exact-out swap,
`Unknown (could not be decoded)` with no symbol, not the transaction's ETH
value. When that swap's `Token In` is `ETH (native)`, the transaction's
ETH value in the network's currency, as for any other transaction
- To: color dot + full address + etherscan link; for a contract creation,
which has no recipient, "This transaction creates a new contract. It has
no recipient." instead
@@ -1693,7 +1815,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- **When**: Transaction broadcast failed, or timed out waiting for confirmation.
- **Elements**:
- "Transaction Failed" heading
- Amount + symbol
- Amount + symbol, or for a swap the approval screen showed no `Amount` for,
the same as on WaitTx: `Unknown (could not be decoded)`, unless its
`Token In` is `ETH (native)`
- To: color dot + full address + etherscan link, or for a contract creation
the same sentence as on WaitTx
- Error message (dashed border box)
@@ -1782,8 +1906,12 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
plus a "+ Add token" button
- Display: "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" checkbox, "UTC
Timestamps" checkbox, and a Theme selector (System / Light / Dark)
- Network: network selector (Ethereum Mainnet / Sepolia Testnet); switching
resets the RPC and Blockscout endpoints to that network's defaults
- Network: network selector (Ethereum Mainnet / Sepolia Testnet). The
network changes only here, or when the user approves a site's request on
**NetworkApproval**; either way, switching restores the RPC and Blockscout
endpoints last used on that network, or that network's defaults if it has
none, and sends `chainChanged` with the new chain id to every open tab.
Choosing the network already active changes nothing and sends nothing
- Ethereum RPC: endpoint URL input + "Save" button (validated against
`eth_chainId` before being saved)
- Blockscout API: endpoint URL input + "Save" button (validated against
@@ -2028,14 +2156,19 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
`wallet_requestPermissions` and is on neither the allowed nor the denied list.
A site is its full origin, `scheme://host[:port]`, on both lists and for a
connection allowed without "Remember": a choice for `https://dapp.example`
says nothing about `http://dapp.example` or another port of that host. The
background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and falls
back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
`requestApproval()`). Only one exists per site at a time: a further connection
request from a site whose prompt is still unanswered is refused with EIP-1193
code `-32002` and opens no new prompt. If that prompt was in a toolbar popup
that closed before it connected, and the toolbar popup has since been set to
open something else, the refused request shows that prompt again.
says nothing about `http://dapp.example` or another port of that host. A
request whose origin has no host names no site, so it is refused with EIP-1193
code `4100` and opens no prompt. Two such origins are `null`, which the
browser reports for a page with an opaque origin, such as one its server
sandboxes with a Content-Security-Policy, and `file://`, which Chrome reports
for a local file. The background script prefers the toolbar popup
(`action.openPopup()`) and falls back to a separate popup window
(`src/background/index.js`, `requestApproval()`). Only one exists per site at
a time: a further connection request from a site whose prompt is still
unanswered is refused with EIP-1193 code `-32002` and opens no new prompt. If
that prompt was in a toolbar popup that closed before it connected, and the
toolbar popup has since been set to open something else, the refused request
shows that prompt again.
- **Elements**:
- "Connection Request" heading
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
@@ -2063,7 +2196,11 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
artifact can be compared with it field for field. A nonce the site supplies is
ignored: the nonce is always the account's next nonce from the node, so a site
cannot replace one of the user's pending transactions or leave this one stuck
behind a gap. A request that cannot be populated — unreachable node, reverting
behind a gap. A gas limit the site supplies, as `gas` or `gasLimit`, is the
one shown and signed in place of the node's estimate, but the node still
estimates the transaction with that limit, as the check that it neither
reverts nor runs out of gas; a request that gives both with different values
is refused. A request that cannot be populated — unreachable node, reverting
gas estimate — opens no window and is failed back to the site. Only one
transaction approval exists at a time: populating fixes the nonce, so a second
`eth_sendTransaction` arriving while one is unanswered is refused with
@@ -2071,7 +2208,10 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
no window and takes no nonce, and the site can send it again once the pending
one is answered. The window is centred on the browser window the user was last
in; if that was another approval window, or the browser refuses the centred
position, the browser picks the position.
position, the browser picks the position. The network shown is the one the
transaction was populated on, and a site cannot switch it without the user:
its `wallet_switchEthereumChain` request changes the network only when the
user approves it on **NetworkApproval**.
- **Elements**:
- "Transaction Request" heading
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
@@ -2095,6 +2235,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
shown, exactly as shown, hands the signed transaction to the background to
broadcast, then → **WaitTx** in the same popup window
- "Confirm" (wrong password) → error line, no screen change
- "Confirm" (correct password, but the From address's key is refused, see
Data Model) → full-sentence error on the error line saying why, nothing
signed (no screen change)
- "Reject" → closes popup (returns rejection to background)
- Popup window closed without answering → the request is rejected with
EIP-1193 code 4001
@@ -2113,7 +2256,12 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
blocklist)
- Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants you to sign a
message"
- Danger warning box (shown for `eth_sign`, which signs a raw hash)
- Warning box, shown for `eth_sign`: "This site used the older eth_sign
method. The data will be signed as a personal message." An `eth_sign`
request names the address first and the data second. Its data is signed
exactly as a `personal_sign` message is, as an EIP-191 personal message,
which is what the Ethereum JSON-RPC specification defines `eth_sign` to
return.
- Type: "Personal message" or "Typed data (EIP-712)"
- From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
- Message: for `personal_sign` and `eth_sign`, the text the message's bytes
@@ -2128,7 +2276,12 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
Bytes that are not UTF-8 are shown as "This message is not text." For
typed data, formatted domain/type/message fields (EIP-712). The primary
type shown is the one ethers signs, derived from the typed data's `types`,
not the type the site states.
not the type the site states. The message shows only the fields that type
declares, at every level of nesting and in the type's order: ethers signs
those and drops any other key. Typed data carrying other keys is not
refused; each such key is listed after the message under "Not part of the
signature", by its place in the message (`details.note`,
`details[1].note`) and its value.
- Token permission warning, at the top of the message (typed data whose
primary type is `Permit`, as in EIP-2612, or one of Permit2's signature
types): "⚠️ TOKEN PERMISSION: Signing this lets the spender below take the
@@ -2149,6 +2302,20 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- Typed data that states no primary type, or one other than the type it
would be signed as, or that cannot be read → shown with the error line
saying so and "Sign" disabled; only "Reject" remains
- Typed data whose message leaves out a field its type declares, at any
level of nesting, or gives a `bool` field a value other than `true` or
`false` → shown with the error line naming the field and "Sign" disabled;
only "Reject" remains. ethers signs a `bool` by whether its value is
truthy, so the string `"false"` would be signed as true and a field left
out as false. The background refuses such a signature too and answers the
site with the same sentence
- Typed data whose domain `chainId` names a chain other than the active
network's → shown with the error line naming both chain ids and "Sign"
disabled; only "Reject" remains. EIP-712 asks for this, because the
signature is valid on the chain the domain names. Typed data with no
`chainId` is not refused. The background refuses such a signature too,
against the network active when the signature reaches it, and answers the
site with the same sentence
- A `personal_sign` or `eth_sign` message that is not hex (`0x` or `0X` and
an even number of hex digits, the form ethers' `getBytes` reads when
signing) → shown as plain text, with the error line "This message is plain
@@ -2162,6 +2329,40 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- Popup window closed without answering → the request is rejected with
EIP-1193 code 4001
#### NetworkApproval (`approve-network`)
- **When**: A connected website asks to switch the network with
`wallet_switchEthereumChain`, naming a supported network other than the active
one. Only the user switches the network: until the user approves the request
here, it changes nothing — not the network, the RPC and Blockscout endpoints,
the balances or the cached token data — and no page is sent `chainChanged`.
Opened the same way as TxApproval, in a separate popup window. Only one exists
per site at a time: a further switch request from a site whose switch request
is still unanswered is refused with EIP-1193 code `-32002` and opens no
window. A request naming the network already active is answered at once and
opens nothing; one naming an unsupported chain is refused with code `4902`,
and one from a site that is not connected with code `4100`.
`wallet_addEthereumChain` never switches the network.
- **Elements**:
- "Network Switch Request" heading
- Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
blocklist)
- Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants to switch the
wallet's network."
- Current network: its name
- Requested network: its name
- A line saying that switching changes the network for the whole wallet and
for every site
- "Switch" / "Reject" buttons
- **Transitions**:
- "Switch" → closes popup; the background switches the network as
**Settings** does, restoring the RPC and Blockscout endpoints last used on
that network (or that network's defaults if it has none), sends
`chainChanged` to every open tab, and answers the site with success
- "Reject" → closes popup; the site is answered with EIP-1193 code 4001 and
nothing changes
- Popup window closed without answering → the same as "Reject"
#### StateRecovery (`state-recovery`)
- **When**: the stored profile fails `assertStateUsable()`. At open, that is
@@ -2456,6 +2657,8 @@ logged.
- Sign transactions requested by connected sites (`eth_sendTransaction`)
- Sign messages (`personal_sign`, `eth_sign`)
- Sign typed data (`eth_signTypedData_v4`, `eth_signTypedData`)
- Switch network at a connected site's request, once the user approves it
(`wallet_switchEthereumChain`)
- Human-readable transaction decoding (ERC-20, Uniswap Universal Router)
- ETH/USD and token/USD price display
- Configurable RPC endpoint and Blockscout API
@@ -2605,7 +2808,8 @@ plaintext list of anyone's domain names.
When a dApp on a blocklisted domain requests a wallet connection, transaction
approval, or signature, the approval popup displays a prominent red warning
banner alerting the user. The domain checker matches exact hostnames and all
parent domains (subdomain matching).
parent domains (subdomain matching), and checks a hostname written with a
trailing dot (`name.`) as `name`.
#### Transaction Decoding
@@ -2631,7 +2835,11 @@ Currently supported:
or recipient, and amount.
- **Uniswap Universal Router**: `execute()` calls — shows swap direction (e.g.
"Swap USDT → ETH"), token addresses, amounts, execution steps, and deadline.
Decodes Permit2, V2/V3/V4 swaps, wrap/unwrap, and balance checks.
Decodes Permit2, V2/V3/V4 swaps, wrap/unwrap, and balance checks. A V4 swap
action is read only in the parameter shape deployed on mainnet and Sepolia,
not in the newer one on `v4-periphery` `main`, which adds a `minHopPriceX36`
field. An action in any other shape is not read, and its step is listed as
`V4 Swap (could not be decoded)`.
### Non-Goals Forever
@@ -2715,7 +2923,7 @@ exact URL, the commit it is pinned to and the sha256 of the bytes that commit
serves, because a source reference nobody can verify is not a source reference.
`script/check-censored` reads the name back out of that one file and fails the
build wherever else it appears, save for three shipped-code literals it cannot
avoid — each permitted only at the one path that carries it, and listed in that
avoid — each permitted only at the paths that carry it, and listed in that
script's header.
## Author
+36 -4
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,9 @@
- `git pull` `next` and cut a branch from it — one branch per issue, named
`issue-<N>-<slug>`. Never branch from `main`.
- Do the work as one commit whose title ends with ` (closes #N)`, with the
`TODO.md` update in that same commit.
- Move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps; move the top item of Future
Steps into Next Step.
- Do the work as one commit whose title ends with ` (closes #N)`.
- Add no entry to Completed Steps. What landed is recorded on the tracker and in
`git log`, where each commit title names the issue it closes.
- Run `make fmt`, then `make check`. A feature branch may be red; `next` and
`main` may not.
- Rebase onto current `next` immediately before pushing — other branches land on
@@ -44,6 +43,39 @@ then continue tagging as milestones land.
# Completed Steps
- 2026-10-08: The browser suites no longer read a screen before the page has
shown it ([#502](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/502)). Their wait
for a screen used to pass as soon as the element laid out, which every view
does until the page's stylesheet has applied, so an approval test could read
the prompt's fields before the page's script had filled them. `visible()` in
`tests/e2e/harness.js` and `waitVisible()` in `tests/e2e/firefox/driver.js`
now also wait for the page to finish loading and for neither the element nor
anything around it to carry the `hidden` class that `showView()` puts on every
view but the current one. No caller changed.
- 2026-10-08: Switching the network in Settings now tells open pages
([#500](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/500)). Once the switch is
saved, Settings asks the background to send `chainChanged` with the new chain
id to every open tab, through the same function an approved site request uses.
Choosing the network already active changes nothing and sends nothing. Only
the extension's own pages can ask for this. `tests/chainSwitchGate.test.js`
drives the real Settings view against the background, and the Chrome suite
checks that the test page hears both switches.
- 2026-10-07: A site can no longer switch the wallet's network by itself
([#408](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/408)). A connected site's
`wallet_switchEthereumChain` request for the other supported network opens a
prompt in its own window, through the same approval machinery as the
transaction and signature prompts, naming the site, the current network and
the requested one. The network, its endpoints, the balances and the caches
change, and `chainChanged` is sent, only when the user approves it; rejecting
or closing the prompt answers 4001. One such prompt per site at a time. The
approval window no longer shows the connection prompt while it waits for the
background to describe the approval, because that prompt's "Allow" answers on
the same port as the new one; `tests/approvalWindow.test.js` checks that it
shows no screen until then. `tests/chainSwitchGate.test.js` and both browser
suites drive the prompt.
- 2026-10-07: Two contradictions between the documents and the code are resolved
as ruled on [#165](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/165). The
README's 1.0 non-goal now puts Ethereum mainnet and the Sepolia testnet in
+4 -2
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
# (src/shared/balances.js), and this contract's on-chain name is that
# string, so censoring the repo cannot stop the wallet displaying it.
# Dropping the entry instead would cost the user MUSD spoof detection.
# script/lib/token-enrichment.json, the fetched data tokenList.js's names
# are written from, carries the same name for the same reason.
#
# Everything else fails, in the working tree and under dist/. The last two are
# literals rather than whole files, so they are enforced by counting, and each
@@ -102,8 +104,8 @@ allowed_literals_for() {
src/content/inpage.js | dist/*/src/content/inpage.js)
printf 'is%s\n_%s\n' "$NAME" "$NAME" >"$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE"
;;
src/shared/tokenList.js | dist/*/src/background/index.js | \
dist/*/src/popup/index.js)
src/shared/tokenList.js | script/lib/token-enrichment.json | \
dist/*/src/background/index.js | dist/*/src/popup/index.js)
printf '%s USD\n' "$NAME" >"$ALLOWED_LITERALS_FILE"
;;
esac
+7
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ run_yarn() {
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
# Without the repo's own prettier, yarn runs whatever prettier is on
# the PATH, which may be a version that formats files differently.
if [ ! -x node_modules/.bin/prettier ]; then
echo "fmt: this repo's prettier is not installed in node_modules/," \
"so run script/bootstrap first." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Formatting..."
run_yarn run fmt
}
+7
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,13 @@ run_yarn() {
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
# Without the repo's own prettier, yarn runs whatever prettier is on
# the PATH, which may be a version that formats files differently.
if [ ! -x node_modules/.bin/prettier ]; then
echo "fmt-check: this repo's prettier is not installed in" \
"node_modules/, so run script/bootstrap first." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Checking formatting..."
run_yarn run fmt-check
}
+159
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
// Writes the names and URLs in script/lib/token-enrichment.json, which
// script/lib/enrich-tokens.js fetches, into the matching entries of
// src/shared/tokenList.js: the name and url an entry already has are replaced,
// and an entry without them gets them after its decimals. Where the fetched
// data has no URL for a token, EXTRA_URLS below supplies one. An entry the data
// does not mention is left as it is. An address in the data or in EXTRA_URLS
// that matches no entry in tokenList.js, capitals included, is an error naming
// that address. Run by
// `make apply-enrichment`; no build runs it. tests/applyEnrichment.test.js
// checks that the committed tokenList.js is exactly what this writes from the
// committed data.
"use strict";
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const TOKEN_LIST = path.join(__dirname, "..", "..", "src/shared/tokenList.js");
// Project websites by token address, each spelled as tokenList.js spells it. A
// token gets its URL here only where the fetched data has none, so an address
// the data has a URL for is never used.
const EXTRA_URLS = {
"0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2": "https://weth.io",
"0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7": "https://tether.to",
"0xB8c77482e45F1F44dE1745F52C74426C631bDD52": "https://www.bnbchain.org",
"0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48": "https://www.circle.com/usdc",
"0xdC035D45d973E3EC169d2276DDab16f1e407384F": "https://sky.money",
"0x2AF5D2aD76741191D15Dfe7bF6aC92d4Bd912Ca3": "https://www.bitfinex.com",
"0x514910771AF9Ca656af840dff83E8264EcF986CA": "https://chain.link",
"0x4c9EDD5852cd905f086C759E8383e09bff1E68B3": "https://ethena.fi",
"0x8d0D000Ee44948FC98c9B98A4FA4921476f08B0d":
"https://www.worldlibertyfinancial.com",
"0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F": "https://makerdao.com",
"0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8":
"https://www.paypal.com/us/digital-wallet/manage-money/crypto/pyusd",
"0x95aD61b0a150d79219dCF64E1E6Cc01f0B64C4cE": "https://shibatoken.com",
"0xdA5e1988097297dCdc1f90D4dFE7909e847CBeF6":
"https://www.worldlibertyfinancial.com",
"0xA0b73E1Ff0B80914AB6fe0444E65848C4C34450b": "https://crypto.com",
"0x582d872A1B094FC48F5DE31D3B73F2D9bE47def1": "https://ton.org",
"0x68749665FF8D2d112Fa859AA293F07A622782F38": "https://gold.tether.to",
"0x196C20DA81Fbc324EcdF55501e95Ce9f0bD84d14": "https://polkadot.network",
"0x1f9840a85d5aF5bf1D1762F925BDADdC4201F984": "https://uniswap.org",
"0x45804880De22913dAFE09f4980848ECE6EcbAf78":
"https://www.paxos.com/paxgold",
"0x3c3a81e81dc49A522A592e7622A7E711c06bf354": "https://www.mantle.xyz",
"0x7Fc66500c84A76Ad7e9c93437bFc5Ac33E2DDaE9": "https://aave.com",
"0x75231F58b43240C9718Dd58B4967c5114342a86c": "https://www.okx.com",
"0x6982508145454Ce325dDbE47a25d4ec3d2311933": "https://www.pepe.vip",
"0x5A98FcBEA516Cf06857215779Fd812CA3beF1B32": "https://lido.fi",
"0xC18360217D8F7Ab5e7c516566761Ea12Ce7F9D72": "https://ens.domains",
"0xD533a949740bb3306d119CC777fa900bA034cd52": "https://curve.fi",
"0x111111111117dC0aa78b770fA6A738034120C302": "https://1inch.io",
"0x163f8C2467924be0ae7B5347228CABF260318753": "https://worldcoin.org",
"0xC011a73ee8576Fb46F5E1c5751cA3B9Fe0af2a6F": "https://synthetix.io",
"0xBBbbCA6A901c926F240b89EacB641d8Aec7AEafD": "https://loopring.org",
"0xC669928185DbCE49d2230CC9B0979BE6DC797957": "https://bitstable.finance",
"0xfAbA6f8e4a5E8Ab82F62fe7C39859FA577269BE3": "https://ondo.finance",
"0x6De037ef9aD2725EB40118Bb1702EBb27e4Aeb24": "https://www.render.com",
"0x4a220E6096B25EADb88358cb44068A3248254675": "https://www.quant.network",
"0xba5BDe662c17e2aDFF1075610382B9B691296350": "https://superrare.com",
"0xc00e94Cb662C3520282E6f5717214004A7f26888": "https://compound.finance",
"0xE41d2489571d322189246DaFA5ebDe1F4699F498": "https://0x.org",
"0x0bc529c00C6401aEF6D220BE8C6Ea1667F6Ad93e": "https://yearn.fi",
"0x6fB3e0A217407EFFf7Ca062D46c26E5d60a14d69": "https://iotex.io",
"0xF57e7e7C23978C3cAEC3C3548E3D615c346e79fF": "https://immutable.com",
"0x0F5D2fB29fb7d3CFeE444a200298f468908cC942": "https://decentraland.org",
"0x3845badAde8e6dFF049820680d1F14bD3903a5d0": "https://www.sandbox.game",
"0x6810e776880C02933D47DB1b9fc05908e5386b96": "https://gnosis.io",
"0x5f98805A4E8be255a32880FDeC7F6728C6568bA0": "https://www.liquity.org",
"0x0D8775F648430679A709E98d2b0Cb6250d2887EF":
"https://basicattentiontoken.org",
"0xc944E90C64B2c07662A292be6244BDf05Cda44a7": "https://thegraph.com",
"0x853d955aCEf822Db058eb8505911ED77F175b99e": "https://frax.finance",
"0x0000000000085d4780B73119b644AE5ecd22b376": "https://www.trueusd.com",
"0x3432B6A60D23Ca0dFCa7761B7ab56459D9C964D0": "https://frax.finance",
"0xf939E0A03FB07F59A73314E73794Be0E57ac1b4E": "https://curve.fi",
"0x808507121B80c02388fAd14726482e061B8da827": "https://pendle.finance",
"0xCa14007Eff0dB1f8135f4C25B34De49AB0d42766": "https://starknet.io",
"0x8457CA5040ad67fdebbCC8EdCE889A335Bc0fbFB": "https://alt.layer",
"0xB50721BCf8d664c30412Cfbc6cf7a15145234ad1": "https://arbitrum.io",
"0x6985884C4392D348587B19cb9eAAf157F13271cd": "https://layerzero.network",
"0xFe0c30065B384F05761f15d0CC899D4F9F9Cc0eB": "https://ethfi.org",
"0x5283D291DBCF85356A21bA090E6db59121208b44": "https://blur.io",
"0x43Dfc4159D86F3A37A5A4B3D4580b888ad7d4DDd": "https://dydx.exchange",
"0xcf0C122c6b73ff809C693DB761e7BaeBe62b6a2E": "https://floki.com",
"0xe53EC727dbDEB9E2d5456c3be40cFF031AB40A55": "https://superfarm.com",
"0x32353A6C91143bfd6C7d363B546e62a9A2489A20": "https://www.agora.finance",
"0x1aBaEA1f7C830bD89Acc67eC4af516284b1bC33c": "https://www.euro-coin.com",
"0xA35923162C49cF95e6BF26623385eb431ad920D3": "https://www.turbo-eth.com",
"0x1151CB3d861920e07a38e03eEAd12C32178567F6": "https://bonk.com",
"0x090185f2135308BaD17527004364eBcC2D37e5F6": "https://spell.club",
"0xAf5191B0De278C7286d6C7CC6ab6BB8A73bA2Cd6": "https://stargate.finance",
};
// Returns tokenList, the text of tokenList.js, with the name and url of each
// token in enrichment, the parsed data file, written into its entry.
function applyEnrichment(tokenList, enrichment) {
for (const addr of Object.keys(EXTRA_URLS)) {
if (!tokenList.includes(`address: "${addr}"`)) {
throw new Error(
`No entry in src/shared/tokenList.js has the address ${addr} from EXTRA_URLS.`,
);
}
}
let result = tokenList;
for (const [addr, data] of Object.entries(enrichment)) {
// Escape special regex characters in the address
const escaped = addr.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&");
// Match the token block: { address: "...", symbol: "...", decimals: N, }
// and the name: "...", url: "..." after decimals when it has them.
// The closing }, may have trailing whitespace
const blockRe = new RegExp(
`(\\{\\s*address:\\s*"${escaped}",\\s*symbol:\\s*"[^"]+",\\s*decimals:\\s*\\d+)` +
`(?:,\\s*name:\\s*"(?:[^"\\\\]|\\\\.)*",\\s*url:\\s*"(?:[^"\\\\]|\\\\.)*")?` +
`,?(\\s*\\})`,
);
const match = result.match(blockRe);
if (!match) {
throw new Error(
`No entry in src/shared/tokenList.js matches the address ${addr} from script/lib/token-enrichment.json.`,
);
}
// A URL from EXTRA_URLS only where the fetched data has none.
const url = data.url || EXTRA_URLS[addr] || "";
// Build replacement: original fields + name + url
const nameEscaped = data.name
.replace(/\\/g, "\\\\")
.replace(/"/g, '\\"');
const urlEscaped = url.replace(/\\/g, "\\\\").replace(/"/g, '\\"');
const replacement =
match[1] +
`,\n name: "${nameEscaped}",` +
`\n url: "${urlEscaped}",` +
match[2];
// A function, so a "$" in a name is not read as a replacement pattern.
result = result.replace(blockRe, () => replacement);
}
return result;
}
if (require.main === module) {
const enrichment = JSON.parse(
fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, "token-enrichment.json"), "utf8"),
);
const original = fs.readFileSync(TOKEN_LIST, "utf8");
fs.writeFileSync(TOKEN_LIST, applyEnrichment(original, enrichment));
}
module.exports = { applyEnrichment };
+115
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
// Fetches a name and a website for every token in src/shared/tokenList.js and
// writes them, keyed by address, to script/lib/token-enrichment.json, which
// script/lib/apply-enrichment.js then writes into tokenList.js. Run by
// `make enrich-tokens`; no build runs it and nothing here is shipped.
//
// Names come from CoinGecko's coin list, fetched whole in one request, matched
// on the token's Ethereum contract address. A token CoinGecko does not list
// gets its symbol as its name. The list is live data with no fixed version, so
// a later run can return different names.
//
// Websites come from the ethereum-lists/tokens repository, one file per token,
// read at a pinned commit. Most tokens have no file there and get an empty URL.
// A file that is missing is not an error; any other failed request stops the
// run, so a network fault cannot quietly empty a URL.
"use strict";
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const TOKEN_LIST = path.join(__dirname, "..", "..", "src/shared/tokenList.js");
const OUTPUT = path.join(__dirname, "token-enrichment.json");
const COINGECKO_LIST =
"https://api.coingecko.com/api/v3/coins/list?include_platform=true";
// ethereum-lists/tokens at its master of 2026-02-27, when the committed
// token-enrichment.json was made.
const ETHEREUM_LISTS =
"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum-lists/tokens/c3560d499a380a38e94caa7c4968d59aeffde59a/tokens/eth";
const CONCURRENT = 10;
const sleep = (ms) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
async function main() {
const src = fs.readFileSync(TOKEN_LIST, "utf8");
const tokens = [];
const re =
/\{\s*address:\s*"(0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40})",\s*symbol:\s*"([^"]+)",\s*decimals:\s*(\d+)/g;
let m;
while ((m = re.exec(src)) !== null) {
tokens.push({ address: m[1], symbol: m[2], decimals: parseInt(m[3]) });
}
console.error(`Parsed ${tokens.length} tokens`);
// --- Names from CoinGecko ---
console.error("Fetching CoinGecko coins list...");
const listResp = await fetch(COINGECKO_LIST);
if (!listResp.ok) throw new Error(`CoinGecko list HTTP ${listResp.status}`);
const coins = await listResp.json();
const addrMap = new Map();
for (const coin of coins) {
const eth = (coin.platforms?.ethereum || "").toLowerCase().trim();
if (eth && eth.startsWith("0x")) {
addrMap.set(eth, { name: coin.name, id: coin.id });
}
}
console.error(`CoinGecko map: ${addrMap.size} Ethereum tokens`);
const enriched = new Map();
let namesMatched = 0;
for (const t of tokens) {
const info = addrMap.get(t.address.toLowerCase());
if (info) namesMatched++;
enriched.set(t.address, { name: info?.name || t.symbol, url: "" });
}
console.error(`Matched ${namesMatched}/${tokens.length} names`);
// --- Websites from ethereum-lists ---
console.error("Fetching URLs from ethereum-lists GitHub...");
let urlsFound = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < tokens.length; i += CONCURRENT) {
const batch = tokens.slice(i, i + CONCURRENT);
await Promise.all(
batch.map(async (t) => {
const r = await fetch(`${ETHEREUM_LISTS}/${t.address}.json`);
if (r.status === 404) return;
if (!r.ok) {
throw new Error(
`ethereum-lists HTTP ${r.status} for ${t.address}`,
);
}
const data = await r.json();
const website = (data.website || "").trim();
if (website && website !== "https://") {
enriched.get(t.address).url = website;
urlsFound++;
}
}),
);
if (i % 100 === 0) {
console.error(
` GitHub: ${Math.min(i + CONCURRENT, tokens.length)}/${tokens.length}, ${urlsFound} URLs`,
);
}
await sleep(200);
}
console.error(`Found ${urlsFound} URLs in ethereum-lists`);
// --- Output, in the layout prettier gives it ---
const output = {};
for (const [addr, e] of enriched) {
output[addr] = { name: e.name, url: e.url };
}
fs.writeFileSync(OUTPUT, JSON.stringify(output, null, 4) + "\n");
console.error(`Done! ${tokens.length} names, ${urlsFound} URLs.`);
}
main().catch((err) => {
console.error(`enrich-tokens: ${err.message}`);
process.exit(1);
});
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+41 -16
View File
@@ -22,13 +22,29 @@ set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
IMAGE="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-e2e-chrome"
IIDFILE=""
# Each run builds, runs and then removes an image under a tag of its own.
# Under one tag shared by every run, a second clone's build moves the tag
# off this run's image, and the image store can then delete that untagged
# image before or while this run uses it. The tag is random rather than
# $$ because CI jobs share one docker daemon, but each job's container
# numbers its processes from scratch.
SUFFIX="$(od -An -N6 -tx1 /dev/urandom | tr -d ' \n')"
NAME="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-e2e-chrome"
IMAGE="$NAME:$SUFFIX"
# Each docker run below uses this container name: docker run --rm returns
# only once its container is removed, so no run meets the one before it.
CONTAINER="$NAME-$SUFFIX"
cleanup() {
if [ -n "$IIDFILE" ]; then
rm -f "$IIDFILE"
# After a third Ctrl-C docker's client exits whether or not the
# container has stopped, and a container still running keeps the image
# in use.
if docker container inspect "$CONTAINER" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
docker container rm -f "$CONTAINER" >/dev/null
fi
# No image to remove when the build failed or was interrupted.
if docker image inspect "$IMAGE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
docker image rm "$IMAGE" >/dev/null
fi
}
@@ -40,22 +56,16 @@ main() {
exit 1
fi
IIDFILE="$(mktemp)"
trap cleanup EXIT
trap 'cleanup; exit 130' INT TERM
# HUP: the terminal or SSH session running the suite closed.
trap 'cleanup; exit 130' HUP INT TERM
echo "Building the Chrome e2e image (extension included)..."
# --no-cache: the image build runs make build and its checks, and a
# cached layer is a check that did not run.
docker build --no-cache --iidfile "$IIDFILE" -t "$IMAGE" \
-f tests/e2e/Dockerfile .
docker build --no-cache -t "$IMAGE" -f tests/e2e/Dockerfile .
echo "Running e2e suite in the pinned Playwright container..."
# The image is run by ID, not by tag: where two clones of this repo run
# the suite at once, the other build can move the tag between this
# build and this run, and the suite would then silently test the other
# checkout.
#
# --ipc=host: Chromium's shared-memory needs more than the default
# 64MB /dev/shm or renderers crash.
# HOME=/tmp: the image's root home is not a reliable place for the
@@ -75,11 +85,12 @@ main() {
# probe. The image is pinned by digest, so this can only ever bite
# on a deliberate bump.
docker run --rm \
--name "$CONTAINER" \
--ipc=host \
-e HOME=/tmp \
-e PW_EXPERIMENTAL_SERVICE_WORKER_NETWORK_EVENTS=1 \
-e "E2E_TRACE_NETWORK=${E2E_TRACE_NETWORK:-0}" \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
"$IMAGE" \
node tests/e2e/run.js
# Where chrome.storage.local lives, and what moves it: two unpacked loads
@@ -93,10 +104,24 @@ main() {
# --host-resolver-rules=MAP * ~NOTFOUND so nothing it does can leave.
echo "Running the extension-id and storage-partition observations..."
docker run --rm \
--name "$CONTAINER" \
--ipc=host \
-e HOME=/tmp \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
"$IMAGE" \
node tests/e2e/storagePartition.js
# Approvals left open for seven minutes in minimized windows, past the
# point where Chrome stopped the background worker when nothing kept it
# running. Its own program, without Playwright: Playwright keeps DevTools
# attached to the worker, and Chrome never stops a worker DevTools is
# attached to. It reaches nothing but its own loopback server.
echo "Running the approvals left open for seven minutes..."
docker run --rm \
--name "$CONTAINER" \
--ipc=host \
-e HOME=/tmp \
"$IMAGE" \
node tests/e2e/slowApproval.js
}
main "$@"
+22 -16
View File
@@ -21,13 +21,23 @@ set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
IMAGE="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-e2e-firefox"
IIDFILE=""
# A tag and a container name of this run's own, as in script/test-e2e,
# which says why.
SUFFIX="$(od -An -N6 -tx1 /dev/urandom | tr -d ' \n')"
NAME="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-e2e-firefox"
IMAGE="$NAME:$SUFFIX"
CONTAINER="$NAME-$SUFFIX"
cleanup() {
if [ -n "$IIDFILE" ]; then
rm -f "$IIDFILE"
# After a third Ctrl-C docker's client exits whether or not the
# container has stopped, and a container still running keeps the image
# in use.
if docker container inspect "$CONTAINER" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
docker container rm -f "$CONTAINER" >/dev/null
fi
# No image to remove when the build failed or was interrupted.
if docker image inspect "$IMAGE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
docker image rm "$IMAGE" >/dev/null
fi
}
@@ -39,22 +49,16 @@ main() {
exit 1
fi
IIDFILE="$(mktemp)"
trap cleanup EXIT
trap 'cleanup; exit 130' INT TERM
# HUP: the terminal or SSH session running the suite closed.
trap 'cleanup; exit 130' HUP INT TERM
echo "Building the pinned Firefox e2e image (extension included)..."
# --no-cache: the image build runs make build and its checks, and a
# cached layer is a check that did not run.
docker build --no-cache --iidfile "$IIDFILE" -t "$IMAGE" \
-f tests/e2e/firefox/Dockerfile .
docker build --no-cache -t "$IMAGE" -f tests/e2e/firefox/Dockerfile .
echo "Running the Firefox e2e suite..."
# The image is run by ID, not by tag: where two clones of this repo run
# the suite at once, the other build can move the tag between this
# build and this run, and the suite would then silently test the other
# checkout.
#
# --shm-size=1g: Firefox needs more than the default 64MB /dev/shm.
# --network none: the suite stubs nothing, so this is what keeps the
# run offline and deterministic. The extension swallows its own
@@ -69,10 +73,11 @@ main() {
# "CanCreateUserNamespace() clone() failure: EPERM" on startup here;
# it is cosmetic and headless Firefox runs fine without it.
docker run --rm \
--name "$CONTAINER" \
--shm-size=1g \
--network none \
-e HOME=/tmp \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
"$IMAGE" \
node tests/e2e/firefox/run.js dist/firefox
# The install/uninstall/re-install property, against the packaged XPI
@@ -82,10 +87,11 @@ main() {
# and the suite above shares one session throughout.
echo "Running the Firefox re-install suite against the packaged XPI..."
docker run --rm \
--name "$CONTAINER" \
--shm-size=1g \
--network none \
-e HOME=/tmp \
"$(cat "$IIDFILE")" \
"$IMAGE" \
node tests/e2e/firefox/reinstall.js
}
+169 -35
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ const { debugFetch, log } = require("../shared/log");
const {
verifySignedTx,
verifySignature,
signedPrimaryType,
typedDataMessageRefusal,
typedDataChainRefusal,
failureIsRetryable,
describeTxFailure,
sameAddress,
@@ -43,6 +46,7 @@ const {
const {
actionApi,
getPlatformInfo,
runtimeApi,
tabsQuery,
tabsSendMessage,
@@ -66,6 +70,33 @@ const connectedSites = {};
// Pending approval requests: { id: { origin, resolve } }
const pendingApprovals = {};
// An approval, and the site's request waiting on it, exist only in this
// worker's memory. Left alone, Chrome stopped the worker about six minutes
// after the site's request while the user was still deciding, and the approval
// was lost with it. Chrome counts an extension call as activity, so while any
// approval is pending this worker makes one every 20 seconds, inside Chrome's
// 30-second idle limit. It is the worker's own timer, so it runs whether or not
// the approval window is visible, and it stops itself once nothing is pending.
let keepRunningTimer = null;
// Add an approval waiting for the user, and start the timer above if it is not
// running. This is the ONLY place an approval is added, as settleApproval() is
// the only place one is removed, so every kind of approval keeps the worker
// running while it waits.
function addPendingApproval(approval) {
pendingApprovals[approval.id] = approval;
if (keepRunningTimer) return;
keepRunningTimer = setInterval(() => {
if (Object.keys(pendingApprovals).length === 0) {
clearInterval(keepRunningTimer);
keepRunningTimer = null;
return;
}
// Only the call matters; its answer is not used.
getPlatformInfo().catch(() => {});
}, 20000);
}
// One transaction approval at a time, wallet-wide.
//
// The transaction a site asks for is populated before its approval window
@@ -137,11 +168,12 @@ function releaseTxApprovalSlotFor(approvalId) {
}
}
// One site-connection approval and one sign approval per site at a time: a
// page that asks again before the user has answered is refused with the code
// above instead of opening another window, so it cannot bury the user in
// prompts. The pending approval itself holds the place, so a caller must test
// this and raise its approval with nothing awaited in between.
// One site-connection approval, one sign approval and one network-switch
// approval per site at a time: a page that asks again before the user has
// answered is refused with the code above instead of opening another window,
// so it cannot bury the user in prompts. The pending approval itself holds the
// place, so a caller must test this and raise its approval with nothing awaited
// in between.
function findPendingApproval(origin, type) {
return Object.values(pendingApprovals).find(
(approval) => approval.origin === origin && approval.type === type,
@@ -348,8 +380,9 @@ function settleApproval(id, result, options) {
// What a pending approval resolves to when it is given up on rather than
// answered: the window was closed, or could not be opened at all. A tx or sign
// approval answers the requesting page in EIP-1193 shape; a site-connection
// approval answers the connection handler in its own.
// approval answers the requesting page in EIP-1193 shape; a site-connection or
// network-switch approval answers its handler in the shape the popup's
// decision has, as a refusal.
function abandonedResult(approval, code, message) {
if (approval.type === "tx" || approval.type === "sign") {
return { error: { code, message } };
@@ -420,7 +453,10 @@ function releaseApproval(approval) {
// the result on the floor, so a rejection here would be unhandled.
async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
const popupUrl = runtime.getURL("src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id);
const popupWidth = 360;
// As wide as the page: body in src/popup/styles/main.css. The browser
// counts the window's frame in this width; the page itself adds back
// whatever the frame takes (src/popup/index.js).
const popupWidth = 396;
const popupHeight = 600;
let currentWin = null;
@@ -440,7 +476,7 @@ async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
// Centred on a browser window only. The last focused window can be
// another approval window still open, and centring on one can give a
// position the browser refuses ("Bounds must be at least 50% within
// visible screen space"): headless Chrome reports this 360x600 popup as
// visible screen space"): headless Chrome reports this 396x600 popup as
// 1280x720. The request then failed with no window at all. Over a popup,
// the browser picks the position.
if (currentWin && currentWin.type === "normal") {
@@ -511,7 +547,7 @@ async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
function requestApproval(origin) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, resolve, type: "site" };
addPendingApproval({ id, origin, resolve, type: "site" });
if (actionNs && typeof actionNs.openPopup === "function") {
showInToolbarPopup(id);
@@ -554,14 +590,14 @@ function showInToolbarPopup(id) {
function requestTxApproval(origin, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
pendingApprovals[id] = {
addPendingApproval({
id,
origin,
approvedTx,
approvedFrom,
resolve,
type: "tx",
};
});
if (slot) slot.approvalId = id;
openApprovalWindow(id);
@@ -575,14 +611,34 @@ function requestTxApproval(origin, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
function requestSignApproval(origin, signParams, approvedFrom) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
pendingApprovals[id] = {
addPendingApproval({
id,
origin,
signParams,
approvedFrom,
resolve,
type: "sign",
};
});
openApprovalWindow(id);
});
}
// Open a network-switch approval popup and return a promise that resolves with
// { approved }. Opened in a window, as tx and sign approvals are, because a
// site's request is not a user gesture. The popup answers on the approval port,
// as a site-connection approval does.
function requestNetworkApproval(origin, currentNetworkId, requestedNetworkId) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
addPendingApproval({
id,
origin,
currentNetworkId,
requestedNetworkId,
resolve,
type: "network",
});
openApprovalWindow(id);
});
@@ -597,8 +653,8 @@ function isExtensionSender(sender) {
}
// The approval popup's port: it carries the user's decision on a
// site-connection approval, and its disconnect is how that approval learns the
// popup closed without one.
// site-connection or network-switch approval, and its disconnect is how that
// approval learns the popup closed without one.
//
// The decision travels this port rather than a one-off runtime.sendMessage()
// for exactly one reason: the port is also what the popup's window.close()
@@ -610,8 +666,9 @@ function isExtensionSender(sender) {
// had refused.
//
// TX and sign approvals do not decide here. They stay pending across a
// disconnect — the user can reopen the toolbar popup — and are rejected by the
// windows.onRemoved listener below.
// disconnect. When their window closes, the windows.onRemoved listener below
// rejects them, unless an approved attempt is still running, in which case
// that attempt answers the page.
runtime.onConnect.addListener((port) => {
if (port.name.startsWith("approval:")) {
const id = port.name.split(":")[1];
@@ -639,7 +696,9 @@ runtime.onConnect.addListener((port) => {
const approval = pendingApprovals[id];
if (approval) {
if (approval.type === "tx" || approval.type === "sign") {
// Keep pending — user can reopen the toolbar popup
// When its window closes, windows.onRemoved rejects it,
// unless an approved attempt is still running, in which
// case that attempt answers the page.
return;
}
settleApproval(id, { approved: false, remember: false });
@@ -806,6 +865,10 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
// tab is served from, so a page the user never connected to must
// not be able to do it. Ungated, any page could clear the
// [TESTNET] banner under a user who believed they were on Sepolia.
//
// A connected site does not switch it either: only the user does,
// by approving the request on the prompt below
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/408).
const s = await getState();
const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
@@ -827,6 +890,27 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
}
if (SUPPORTED_CHAIN_IDS.has(chainId)) {
const target = networkByChainId(chainId);
if (findPendingApproval(origin, "network")) {
return {
error: {
code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
message: APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
},
};
}
const decision = await requestNetworkApproval(
origin,
s.networkId,
target.id,
);
if (!decision.approved) {
return {
error: {
code: APPROVAL_REJECTED_CODE,
message: APPROVAL_REJECTED_MESSAGE,
},
};
}
// Read-modify-write against storage. The old path went through
// onChainSwitch(), which mutates the singleton and then persists
// every field of it — on an unloaded worker that wrote empty
@@ -937,9 +1021,8 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
if (method === "eth_sign") {
signParams.dangerWarning =
"\u26a0\ufe0f DANGER: This site is requesting to sign a raw hash. " +
"This can be used to sign transactions that drain your funds. " +
"Only proceed if you fully understand what you are signing.";
"This site used the older eth_sign method. " +
"The data will be signed as a personal message.";
}
if (findPendingApproval(origin, "sign")) {
@@ -1345,20 +1428,21 @@ startBackgroundJobs();
// which then fails retryably settles instead of waiting in a window that no
// longer exists.
//
// A site-connection approval whose popup connected its port is not decided
// here. That popup approves and closes in the same breath, and this event
// races the decision on a channel of its own — the same race the port exists
// to end. Its port disconnect says the same thing this event does, in an order
// that is defined, so the disconnect is left to say it. The window closing
// before any port connected is the one case with nothing else to speak for it,
// and is rejected here so the dApp is not left waiting on a window that is
// gone.
// A site-connection or network-switch approval whose popup connected its port
// is not decided here. That popup approves and closes in the same breath, and
// this event races the decision on a channel of its own — the same race the
// port exists to end. Its port disconnect says the same thing this event does,
// in an order that is defined, so the disconnect is left to say it. The window
// closing before any port connected is the one case with nothing else to speak
// for it, and is rejected here so the dApp is not left waiting on a window that
// is gone.
if (windowsNs && windowsNs.onRemoved) {
windowsNs.onRemoved.addListener((windowId) => {
for (const [id, approval] of Object.entries(pendingApprovals)) {
if (approval.windowId !== windowId) continue;
const isSite = approval.type !== "tx" && approval.type !== "sign";
if (isSite && approval.portConnected) continue;
const decidedOnPort =
approval.type !== "tx" && approval.type !== "sign";
if (decidedOnPort && approval.portConnected) continue;
const rejection = abandonedResult(
approval,
APPROVAL_REJECTED_CODE,
@@ -1376,7 +1460,14 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
// the message carries. Firefox before 126 gives no sender.origin, so
// the origin of sender.url is used: the frame that sent the message,
// not the tab's page, which may be another site embedding that
// frame. With neither, the request is refused.
// frame.
//
// A site is scheme://host[:port], so a request is refused when its
// origin has no host, as when it has no origin at all, rather than
// credited to the site its URL names. The browser reports "null" for
// a page with an opaque origin, such as one its server sandboxes with
// a Content-Security-Policy, and Chrome reports "file://" for a local
// file.
let trustedOrigin = sender.origin;
if (!trustedOrigin && sender.url) {
try {
@@ -1385,7 +1476,13 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
// an unparseable URL leaves the origin unknown
}
}
if (!trustedOrigin) {
let host = "";
try {
host = new URL(trustedOrigin).host;
} catch {
// no origin, or "null", is not a URL and so has no host
}
if (!host) {
sendResponse({
error: {
code: 4100,
@@ -1423,6 +1520,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
"AUTISTMASK_ADDRESSES_REMOVED",
"AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES",
"AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE",
"AUTISTMASK_NETWORK_CHANGED",
];
if (POPUP_ONLY_TYPES.includes(msg.type) && !isExtensionSender(sender)) {
sendResponse({ error: "Unauthorized sender" });
@@ -1446,6 +1544,11 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
resp.signParams = approval.signParams;
resp.approvedFrom = approval.approvedFrom;
}
if (approval.type === "network") {
resp.type = "network";
resp.currentNetworkId = approval.currentNetworkId;
resp.requestedNetworkId = approval.requestedNetworkId;
}
// Flag if the requesting domain is on the phishing blocklist.
resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(
extractHostname(approval.origin),
@@ -1710,7 +1813,8 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
(async () => {
try {
const activeAddress = await getActiveAddress();
const s = await getState();
const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
// Same as the transaction path: the address the approval named
// is the one that must have signed, and a switch since then is
// a refusal rather than a signature from another account.
@@ -1729,6 +1833,29 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
signature,
approval.approvedFrom,
);
// The sign screen refuses typed data whose message ethers
// would sign differently from how it is shown, or whose
// domain names another chain. A signature for it that arrives
// anyway is refused here, against the network active now.
const sp = approval.signParams;
if (
sp.method === "eth_signTypedData_v4" ||
sp.method === "eth_signTypedData"
) {
const data = JSON.parse(sp.typedData);
const refusal =
typedDataMessageRefusal(
data.types,
signedPrimaryType(data.types),
data.message,
"",
) ||
typedDataChainRefusal(
data.domain,
networkById(s.networkId),
);
if (refusal) throw new ApprovalMismatchError(refusal);
}
settleApproval(msg.id, { signature }, { holdsClaim: true });
sendResponse({ signature });
} catch (e) {
@@ -1801,6 +1928,13 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
broadcastSiteRemoved(msg.origin);
return false;
}
// Settings switched the network and has saved it. Open tabs are told the
// new chain id the same way as after a site's approved switch request.
if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_NETWORK_CHANGED") {
broadcastChainChanged(msg.chainId);
return false;
}
});
module.exports = { PROXY_METHODS };
+61 -12
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,10 @@
<link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.css" />
</head>
<!-- Chrome gives extension pages a stylesheet of its own that sets the
font on body, and a Tailwind class beats it only when marked
important: hence font-mono! rather than font-mono. -->
<body class="bg-bg text-fg font-mono! text-sm">
font and its size on body, and a Tailwind class beats it only when
marked important: hence font-mono! and text-sm! rather than
font-mono and text-sm. -->
<body class="bg-bg text-fg font-mono! text-sm!">
<div id="app" class="p-2 pr-5 overflow-x-hidden">
<!-- ============ GLOBAL TITLE BAR ============ -->
<div
@@ -87,11 +88,14 @@
<!-- Mnemonic form section -->
<div id="add-wallet-section-mnemonic">
<p class="mb-2">
Enter your 12 or 24 word recovery phrase below, or click
the button to roll the die for a new one.
</p>
<div class="mb-1 flex justify-end">
<!-- The die button shares the instruction's row: on a row
of its own it pushes Import below the fold at
360x600. -->
<div class="mb-2 flex justify-between items-start gap-2">
<p>
Enter your 12 or 24 word recovery phrase below, or
click the button to roll the die for a new one.
</p>
<button
id="btn-generate-phrase"
class="border border-border px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer text-xs"
@@ -1712,10 +1716,7 @@
<div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">
Address that will be shared:
</div>
<div
id="approve-address"
class="text-xs flex items-center mb-2"
></div>
<div id="approve-address" class="text-xs mb-2"></div>
</div>
<div class="mb-3">
<label
@@ -1741,6 +1742,54 @@
</div>
</div>
<!-- ============ NETWORK SWITCH APPROVAL ============ -->
<div id="view-approve-network" class="view hidden">
<h2 class="font-bold mb-2">Network Switch Request</h2>
<div
id="approve-network-phishing-warning"
class="mb-3 p-2 text-xs font-bold hidden bg-red-100 text-red-800 border-2 border-red-600 rounded-md"
>
⚠️ PHISHING WARNING: This site is on a known phishing
blocklist. Proceed with extreme caution.
</div>
<p class="mb-2">
<span id="approve-network-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
wants to switch the wallet's network.
</p>
<div class="mb-3">
<div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Current network</div>
<div
id="approve-network-current"
class="text-xs font-bold"
></div>
</div>
<div class="mb-3">
<div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Requested network</div>
<div
id="approve-network-requested"
class="text-xs font-bold"
></div>
</div>
<p class="mb-3 text-xs">
Switching changes the network for the whole wallet and for
every site, not only for this one.
</p>
<div class="flex justify-between">
<button
id="btn-approve-network"
class="border border-border px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer"
>
Switch
</button>
<button
id="btn-reject-network"
class="border border-border px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer"
>
Reject
</button>
</div>
</div>
<!-- ============ STATE RECOVERY ============ -->
<!--
Shown when the stored profile cannot be read at all. Every
+43 -3
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ const {
goBack,
} = require("./views/helpers");
const { applyTheme } = require("./theme");
const {
tabsGetCurrent,
tabsGetZoom,
windowsGetCurrent,
windowsUpdate,
} = require("../shared/browserApi");
// Renders a view the popup lands on without having navigated to it forward:
// on restore here, and on Back. Only the views that can be fully re-rendered
// from persisted state (RESTORABLE_VIEWS, src/shared/restorableViews.js) go
@@ -163,6 +169,40 @@ function fallbackView() {
showView("main");
}
// The background opens the approval window as wide as the page, but the
// browser counts the window's frame in that width, and a screen taller than
// the window takes a vertical scrollbar out of it too. So once the screen is
// up, the window is widened by however far the page would scroll sideways.
// That distance is in page pixels and the window's width in screen pixels:
// at 150% zoom one page pixel is 1.5 screen pixels. The zoom is read for this
// page's own tab, because asked without a tab id Firefox answers for the
// window focused last. Firefox draws some zoom steps a little larger than the
// zoom it reports, 170% among them, so once the page has its new width (its
// resize event) it is measured again, and the window widened again while the
// page still falls short, three times at most. A window that cannot grow sends
// no resize event, and the page stops there. The connection prompt can also
// show in the toolbar popup, whose window is the user's browser window; that
// one is left alone.
async function widenApprovalWindow() {
const page = document.documentElement;
if (page.scrollWidth <= page.clientWidth) return;
const win = await windowsGetCurrent();
if (win.type !== "popup") return;
const tab = await tabsGetCurrent();
const zoom = await tabsGetZoom(tab.id);
let width = win.width;
for (let tries = 0; tries < 3; tries++) {
const sideways = page.scrollWidth - page.clientWidth;
if (sideways <= 0) return;
width += Math.ceil(sideways * zoom);
const resized = new Promise((resolve) =>
window.addEventListener("resize", resolve, { once: true }),
);
await windowsUpdate(win.id, { width });
await resized;
}
}
async function init() {
// First, before anything can save: showView() saves on every navigation
// without awaiting, so a save that fails from here on has somewhere to be
@@ -238,9 +278,9 @@ async function init() {
// rejection rather than an uncaught error — measured as still failing
// the run on both harnesses (Playwright `pageerror`, and the Firefox
// driver's console-service drain), so nothing is lost by leaving it
// on that path.
approval.show(approvalId);
showView("approve-site");
// on that path. show() puts the approval's own screen up once the
// background has described it; the window is widened to fit it then.
approval.show(approvalId).then(widenApprovalWindow);
return;
}
+39 -2
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ const {
const { encryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { scanForAddresses } = require("../../shared/balances");
const { notify } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
/**
* Check if an address already exists in ANY wallet (hd, xprv, or key).
@@ -184,11 +185,19 @@ async function importMnemonic(ctx) {
encryptedSecret: encrypted,
nextIndex: 1,
addresses: [
{ address: firstAddress, balance: "0.0000", tokenBalances: [] },
{
address: firstAddress,
index: 0,
balance: "0.0000",
tokenBalances: [],
},
],
};
state.wallets.push(wallet);
state.hasWallet = true;
if (state.activeAddress === null) {
state.activeAddress = firstAddress;
}
await saveState();
clearViewStack();
ctx.renderWalletList();
@@ -205,12 +214,21 @@ async function importMnemonic(ctx) {
if (scan.addresses.length > 1) {
wallet.addresses = scan.addresses.map((a) => ({
address: a.address,
index: a.index,
balance: "0.0000",
tokenBalances: [],
}));
wallet.nextIndex = scan.nextIndex;
// The new list leaves out the first address when the scan found it
// unused. If it was the active one, the new list's first takes over,
// and the background is told as when the user picks one on Home.
const activeMoved =
state.activeAddress === firstAddress &&
wallet.addresses[0].address !== firstAddress;
if (activeMoved) state.activeAddress = wallet.addresses[0].address;
await saveState();
ctx.renderWalletList();
if (activeMoved) notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED" });
showFlash("Found " + scan.addresses.length + " addresses.");
} else {
showFlash("Ready.", 1000);
@@ -248,6 +266,9 @@ async function importPrivateKey(ctx) {
addresses: [{ address: addr, balance: "0.0000", tokenBalances: [] }],
});
state.hasWallet = true;
if (state.activeAddress === null) {
state.activeAddress = addr;
}
await saveState();
clearViewStack();
ctx.renderWalletList();
@@ -299,11 +320,19 @@ async function importXprvKey(ctx) {
encryptedSecret: encrypted,
nextIndex: 1,
addresses: [
{ address: firstAddress, balance: "0.0000", tokenBalances: [] },
{
address: firstAddress,
index: 0,
balance: "0.0000",
tokenBalances: [],
},
],
};
state.wallets.push(wallet);
state.hasWallet = true;
if (state.activeAddress === null) {
state.activeAddress = firstAddress;
}
await saveState();
clearViewStack();
ctx.renderWalletList();
@@ -320,12 +349,20 @@ async function importXprvKey(ctx) {
if (scan.addresses.length > 1) {
wallet.addresses = scan.addresses.map((a) => ({
address: a.address,
index: a.index,
balance: "0.0000",
tokenBalances: [],
}));
wallet.nextIndex = scan.nextIndex;
// As for a recovery phrase: an active first address the scan left
// out gives way to the new list's first.
const activeMoved =
state.activeAddress === firstAddress &&
wallet.addresses[0].address !== firstAddress;
if (activeMoved) state.activeAddress = wallet.addresses[0].address;
await saveState();
ctx.renderWalletList();
if (activeMoved) notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED" });
showFlash("Found " + scan.addresses.length + " addresses.");
} else {
showFlash("Ready.", 1000);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
// This address's private key can be derived from the stored key,
// but export goes through getSignerForAddress, which refuses a key
// that is not a master key. Without this the export screen would
// take a password and then report that refusal as a wrong password.
// take a password and then refuse.
const defect = selectedWalletDefect();
if (defect) {
showFlash(defect.shortMessage);
+138 -42
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ const {
formatFee,
tokenLabel,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const {
networkById,
networkByChainId,
nativeCurrencyByChainId,
} = require("../../shared/networks");
@@ -26,7 +27,6 @@ const {
Interface,
MaxUint256,
toUtf8String,
TypedDataEncoder,
} = require("ethers");
const { getPrice, formatUsd } = require("../../shared/prices");
const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../../shared/constants");
@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ const {
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
const { describeSigningFailure } = require("../../shared/approvalVerify");
const {
describeSigningFailure,
signedPrimaryType,
typedDataMessageRefusal,
typedDataChainRefusal,
} = require("../../shared/approvalVerify");
const txStatus = require("./txStatus");
const uniswap = require("../../shared/uniswap");
const { notify, runtimeApi, sendMessage } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
@@ -294,6 +299,23 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
sources,
);
}
// A swap the decoder read no amount for, such as one whose V4 swap
// action could not be read or a V4 exact-out swap. The wait and error
// screens say the amount could not be decoded, with no currency after
// it, rather than show the transaction's ETH value as the amount. A
// swap paid in native ETH keeps that value: it is the ETH the swap
// pays (for an exact-out swap, the most it pays), not a figure that
// had to be read from the calldata.
const tokenIn = decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === "Token In");
if (
tokenIn &&
tokenIn.value !== "ETH (native)" &&
!decoded.details.some((d) => d.label === "Amount")
) {
pendingTxDetails.amount = "Unknown (could not be decoded)";
pendingTxDetails.token = null;
pendingTxDetails.tokenSymbol = null;
}
}
// Carry decoded calldata info through to success/error views
@@ -328,9 +350,9 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
const ethUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(ethValueFormatted) * ethPrice : null;
const usdStr = formatUsd(ethUsd);
// In the native currency of the network the transaction is for, which the
// Network line names, not the active network's: a site can switch the
// active network after this transaction is prepared and back before it is
// signed.
// Network line names, not the active network's: the active network can
// change, in Settings or when the user approves a site's request, after
// this transaction is prepared and change back before it is signed.
$("approve-tx-value").textContent =
ethValueFormatted +
" " +
@@ -428,21 +450,12 @@ function markInvisibleCharacters(text) {
);
}
// The type ethers will sign typed data as. ethers does not read the page's
// `primaryType`: it takes the one struct in `types` that no other struct
// refers to. Throws when the types name no such single struct, which ethers
// would refuse to sign as well.
function signedPrimaryType(types) {
const structs = { ...types };
// ethers derives EIP712Domain itself and rejects it as an input.
delete structs.EIP712Domain;
return TypedDataEncoder.getPrimaryType(structs);
}
// Why a signature request cannot be signed, as a sentence for the error line,
// or null when it can. Only typed data is refused: the `primaryType` the page
// states has to be the type ethers will sign, or this screen would name one
// message while another is signed.
// message while another is signed. Its message has to hold every declared
// field, with each `bool` true or false, and its domain may name no chain but
// the active network's.
function typedDataRefusal(sp) {
if (sp.method === "personal_sign" || sp.method === "eth_sign") return null;
let data;
@@ -465,7 +478,10 @@ function typedDataRefusal(sp) {
", so it cannot be signed."
);
}
return null;
return (
typedDataMessageRefusal(data.types, signed, data.message, "") ||
typedDataChainRefusal(data.domain, currentNetwork())
);
}
// The largest amount a Permit2 allowance can hold, a uint160. Permit2 treats
@@ -621,10 +637,38 @@ function permitWarningHtml(types, primaryType, domain, message) {
return html;
}
// What ethers signs of a message value of type `type`: a struct keeps only
// the fields its type declares, in the type's order, and a list is read item
// by item. ethers drops every other key, so each one is added to `notSigned`
// with its place in the message and its value, for the screen to list apart.
function signedValue(types, type, value, path, notSigned) {
const itemType = type.replace(/\[\d*\]$/, "");
if (itemType !== type) {
if (!Array.isArray(value)) return value;
return value.map((item, i) =>
signedValue(types, itemType, item, `${path}[${i}]`, notSigned),
);
}
const fields = types[type];
if (!fields || !value || typeof value !== "object") return value;
const at = (name) => (path ? `${path}.${name}` : name);
for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(value)) {
if (!fields.some((f) => f.name === key)) notSigned.push([at(key), val]);
}
return Object.fromEntries(
fields.map((f) => [
f.name,
signedValue(types, f.type, value[f.name], at(f.name), notSigned),
]),
);
}
// The typed data as the screen shows it. The primary type shown is the one
// ethers signs, never the page's word for it; typedDataRefusal() keeps the two
// from differing on anything that can be signed. Only typed data that cannot
// be read at all is shown as raw text, and typedDataRefusal() refuses it.
// from differing on anything that can be signed. The Message section shows
// only what is signed, and any other key the page sent is listed after it as
// not part of the signature. Only typed data that cannot be read at all is
// shown as raw text, and typedDataRefusal() refuses it.
function formatTypedDataHtml(jsonStr) {
let data;
let primaryType;
@@ -658,12 +702,30 @@ function formatTypedDataHtml(jsonStr) {
html += `<div class="mb-2"><div class="text-muted">Primary type</div>`;
html += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(primaryType)}</div></div>`;
const lineHtml = (key, val) =>
`<div><span class="text-muted">${escapeHtml(key)}:</span> <span class="break-all">${escapeHtml(display(val))}</span></div>`;
if (data.message) {
const notSigned = [];
const message = signedValue(
data.types,
primaryType,
data.message,
"",
notSigned,
);
html += `<div class="mb-2"><div class="text-muted">Message</div>`;
for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(data.message)) {
html += `<div><span class="text-muted">${escapeHtml(key)}:</span> <span class="break-all">${escapeHtml(display(val))}</span></div>`;
for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(message)) {
html += lineHtml(key, val);
}
html += `</div>`;
if (notSigned.length > 0) {
html += `<div class="mb-2"><div class="text-muted">Not part of the signature</div>`;
for (const [key, val] of notSigned) {
html += lineHtml(key, val);
}
html += `</div>`;
}
}
return html;
@@ -720,7 +782,7 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
"This message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed.";
}
// Display danger warning for eth_sign (raw hash signing)
// The warning the background attaches to an eth_sign request.
const warningEl = $("approve-sign-danger-warning");
if (warningEl) {
if (sp.dangerWarning) {
@@ -752,9 +814,29 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
);
}
function showNetworkApproval(details) {
showPhishingWarning(
"approve-network-phishing-warning",
details.isPhishingDomain,
);
$("approve-network-origin").textContent = details.origin;
$("approve-network-current").textContent = networkById(
details.currentNetworkId,
).name;
$("approve-network-requested").textContent = networkById(
details.requestedNetworkId,
).name;
showView("approve-network");
}
// Awaited by nobody: the popup entry point calls this and moves on. It
// therefore has to absorb its own failure, and a background that cannot
// describe the approval is the same outcome as an approval that is gone.
//
// Nothing is on screen until the background has described the approval, so
// the screen shown is always the one for the approval this window answers:
// the connection prompt's "Allow" and the network switch prompt's "Switch"
// answer on the same port, and either would approve the other.
async function show(id) {
approvalId = id;
approvalPort = runtimeApi().connect({ name: "approval:" + id });
@@ -778,6 +860,10 @@ async function show(id) {
showSignApproval(details);
return;
}
if (details.type === "network") {
showNetworkApproval(details);
return;
}
// Site connection approval
showPhishingWarning(
"approve-site-phishing-warning",
@@ -787,6 +873,7 @@ async function show(id) {
$("approve-address").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(state.activeAddress);
attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-site");
$("approve-remember").checked = state.rememberSiteChoice;
showView("approve-site");
}
let approvalId = null;
@@ -837,15 +924,15 @@ function gateOnWalletDefect(errorId, buttonId, address) {
return true;
}
// Locate the wallet and the address index owning an address. Returns null when
// no wallet holds it. Approvals look up the address they were raised for, not
// whichever address is active now: the approval named one account, and signing
// with another is what verification refuses.
// Locate the wallet and the stored address record owning an address. Returns
// null when no wallet holds it. Approvals look up the address they were raised
// for, not whichever address is active now: the approval named one account,
// and signing with another is what verification refuses.
function findWalletFor(address) {
for (const wallet of state.wallets) {
for (let i = 0; i < wallet.addresses.length; i++) {
if (wallet.addresses[i].address === address) {
return { wallet, addrIndex: i };
return { wallet, addr: wallet.addresses[i] };
}
}
}
@@ -866,20 +953,21 @@ function clearSignPassword() {
hideError("approve-sign-error");
}
// Answer a site-connection approval and close. The decision goes out on the
// approval port — see approvalPort above for why — and carries no approval id,
// because the port name already names the approval the background will settle.
// The post is guarded because a throw must not cost the close: posting on a
// port whose background worker has been torn down throws, and the approval it
// would have settled died with that worker, so the only thing left to do is
// what the user asked for — go away.
function decideSite(approved) {
// Answer a site-connection or network-switch approval and close. The decision
// goes out on the approval port — see approvalPort above for why — and carries
// no approval id, because the port name already names the approval the
// background will settle. `remember` means something only for a site
// connection. The post is guarded because a throw must not cost the close:
// posting on a port whose background worker has been torn down throws, and the
// approval it would have settled died with that worker, so the only thing left
// to do is what the user asked for — go away.
function decide(approved, remember) {
if (approvalPort) {
try {
approvalPort.postMessage({
type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_DECISION",
approved,
remember: $("approve-remember").checked,
remember,
});
} catch {
// Nothing to report it to; the window closes either way.
@@ -898,11 +986,19 @@ function init(_ctx) {
});
$("btn-approve").addEventListener("click", () => {
decideSite(true);
decide(true, $("approve-remember").checked);
});
$("btn-reject").addEventListener("click", () => {
decideSite(false);
decide(false, $("approve-remember").checked);
});
$("btn-approve-network").addEventListener("click", () => {
decide(true, false);
});
$("btn-reject-network").addEventListener("click", () => {
decide(false, false);
});
$("btn-approve-tx").addEventListener("click", async () => {
@@ -963,7 +1059,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
try {
const signer = getSignerForAddress(
active.wallet,
active.addrIndex,
active.addr,
decryptedSecret,
);
// Sign the approved transaction exactly as it was displayed. The
@@ -1091,7 +1187,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
try {
const signer = getSignerForAddress(
active.wallet,
active.addrIndex,
active.addr,
decryptedSecret,
);
const sp = pendingSignParams;
+35 -10
View File
@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ function show(txInfo) {
feeStatus = FEE_PENDING;
feeWei = null;
maxSendFees = null;
// The network this screen is drawn for, and the only one it sends on:
// Settings can switch the active network while the screen is open. The
// wait, success and error screens label the amount by it too.
txInfo.chainId = currentNetwork().chainId;
const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH";
// The raw symbol is the price-table key; the capped one is what the
@@ -490,7 +494,12 @@ async function populateVerifyAndSend(connectedSigner, tx, fees = null) {
);
request = await contract.transfer.populateTransaction(tx.to, amount);
}
const populated = await connectedSigner.populateTransaction(request);
// The chain id of the network the screen was drawn for: ethers refuses to
// populate it for a provider on any other network.
const populated = await connectedSigner.populateTransaction({
...request,
chainId: tx.chainId,
});
assertWithinCeilings(populated);
return connectedSigner.sendTransaction(populated);
}
@@ -547,6 +556,30 @@ function init(_ctx) {
return;
}
// Back from Settings only unhides this screen, still drawn for the
// network that was active when it was shown.
if (currentNetwork().chainId !== pendingTx.chainId) {
showSendError(
"The active network changed after this transaction was" +
" reviewed, so it was not sent. Please go back and review" +
" it again.",
);
return;
}
// Sign as the From address this screen shows. The selection is saved
// apart from this screen, so the popup can reopen onto it with another
// address selected.
const addr = wallet.addresses.find((a) => a.address === pendingTx.from);
if (!addr) {
showError(
"confirm-tx-password-error",
"The selected wallet does not hold the From address above, " +
"so nothing was sent. Please go back and send again.",
);
return;
}
const password = $("confirm-tx-password").value;
if (!password) {
showError(
@@ -575,17 +608,9 @@ function init(_ctx) {
$("btn-confirm-send").disabled = true;
$("btn-confirm-send").classList.add("text-muted");
// The network it is sent on. The wait, success and error screens
// label its amount by this, not by the network active when they draw.
pendingTx.chainId = currentNetwork().chainId;
let tx;
try {
const signer = getSignerForAddress(
wallet,
state.selectedAddress,
decryptedSecret,
);
const signer = getSignerForAddress(wallet, addr, decryptedSecret);
const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
const connectedSigner = signer.connect(provider);
+12 -1
View File
@@ -135,7 +135,18 @@ async function reveal() {
// decrypt ran, the wipe has already happened, so the key is not
// even derived, let alone written.
if (!isCurrentReveal(generation)) return;
const signer = getSignerForAddress(wallet, addressIndex, secret);
let signer;
try {
signer = getSignerForAddress(
wallet,
wallet.addresses[addressIndex],
secret,
);
} catch (e) {
// The password was right; it is the key that was refused.
showError("export-privkey-password-error", e.message);
return;
}
$("export-privkey-password").value = "";
$("export-privkey-password-section").classList.add("hidden");
$("export-privkey-value").textContent = signer.privateKey;
+1
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ const VIEWS = [
"approve-site",
"approve-tx",
"approve-sign",
"approve-network",
"export-privkey",
"show-phrase",
// Shown by src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js when the stored profile
+1
View File
@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ function render(ctx) {
);
wallet.addresses.push({
address: newAddr,
index: wallet.nextIndex,
balance: "0.0000",
tokenBalances: [],
});
+4
View File
@@ -316,7 +316,11 @@ function init(ctx) {
const networkSelect = $("settings-network");
networkSelect.addEventListener("change", async () => {
const newId = networkSelect.value;
if (newId === state.networkId) return;
const net = await onChainSwitch(newId);
// Open pages are told by the background, as after a site's approved
// switch request.
notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_NETWORK_CHANGED", chainId: net.chainId });
$("settings-rpc").value = state.rpcUrl;
$("settings-blockscout").value = state.blockscoutUrl;
showFlash("Switched to " + net.name + ".");
+9 -5
View File
@@ -84,8 +84,9 @@ function show(tx) {
contractAddress: tx.contractAddress || null,
// The network the history entry was read from. The type line and
// the fee are in its native currency, not the active network's:
// a site can switch the active network before a later popup
// shows this screen again.
// the active network can change, in Settings or when the user
// approves a site's request, before a later popup shows this
// screen again.
chainId: tx.chainId,
},
};
@@ -182,7 +183,7 @@ function render() {
if (el) el.classList.add("hidden");
}
loadFullTxDetails(tx.hash, tx.to, tx.chainId);
loadFullTxDetails(tx.hash, tx.chainId);
const isoStr = isoDate(tx.timestamp);
$("tx-detail-time").innerHTML =
@@ -290,7 +291,7 @@ function populateOnChainDetails(txData, chainId) {
}
}
async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress, chainId) {
async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, chainId) {
const section = $("tx-detail-calldata-section");
const actionEl = $("tx-detail-calldata-action");
const detailsEl = $("tx-detail-calldata-details");
@@ -312,7 +313,10 @@ async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress, chainId) {
const inputData = txData.raw_input || txData.input || null;
if (!inputData || inputData === "0x") return;
const decoded = decodeCalldata(inputData, toAddress || "");
// Decoded against the address the transaction was sent to, as the
// explorer reports it, not the history entry's `to`: for a token
// transfer that is the transfer's recipient, not the token contract.
const decoded = decodeCalldata(inputData, txData.to?.hash || "");
if (decoded) {
// Render decoded calldata matching approval view style
actionEl.textContent = decoded.name;
+31 -17
View File
@@ -89,13 +89,19 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
// A native amount, here and on the success and error screens, is in the
// native currency of txInfo.chainId, the network the transaction was sent
// on, not the active network's: a site can switch the active network
// while this screen is open or before a later popup resumes it.
const symbol =
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId)
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
$("wait-tx-summary").textContent = txInfo.amount + " " + symbol;
// on, not the active network's: the active network can change, in
// Settings or when the user approves a site's request, while this screen
// is open or before a later popup resumes it. A null token is a swap whose
// amount was not decoded (see showTxApproval() in approval.js): the amount
// says so, and no symbol follows it.
let symbol = "";
if (txInfo.token === "ETH") {
symbol = nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId);
} else if (txInfo.token !== null) {
symbol = displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
}
$("wait-tx-summary").textContent =
txInfo.amount + (symbol ? " " + symbol : "");
$("wait-tx-to").innerHTML = toAddressHtml(txInfo.to);
$("wait-tx-hash").innerHTML = txHashHtml(txHash);
attachCopyHandlers("view-wait-tx");
@@ -230,10 +236,13 @@ function restoreWait() {
function showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, blockNumber) {
endWait();
const symbol =
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId)
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
// As on the wait screen, a null token has no symbol.
let symbol = "";
if (txInfo.token === "ETH") {
symbol = nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId);
} else if (txInfo.token !== null) {
symbol = displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
}
state.viewData = {
amount: txInfo.amount,
symbol: symbol,
@@ -293,7 +302,8 @@ function renderSuccess() {
} else {
summarySection.classList.remove("hidden");
toSection.classList.remove("hidden");
$("success-tx-summary").textContent = d.amount + " " + d.symbol;
$("success-tx-summary").textContent =
d.amount + (d.symbol ? " " + d.symbol : "");
$("success-tx-to").innerHTML = toAddressHtml(d.to);
}
@@ -316,10 +326,13 @@ function renderSuccess() {
function showError(txInfo, txHash, message) {
endWait();
const symbol =
txInfo.token === "ETH"
? nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId)
: displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
// As on the wait screen, a null token has no symbol.
let symbol = "";
if (txInfo.token === "ETH") {
symbol = nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId);
} else if (txInfo.token !== null) {
symbol = displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
}
state.viewData = {
amount: txInfo.amount,
symbol: symbol,
@@ -333,7 +346,8 @@ function showError(txInfo, txHash, message) {
function renderError() {
const d = state.viewData;
if (!d || !d.message) return;
$("error-tx-summary").textContent = d.amount + " " + d.symbol;
$("error-tx-summary").textContent =
d.amount + (d.symbol ? " " + d.symbol : "");
$("error-tx-to").innerHTML = toAddressHtml(d.to);
$("error-tx-message").textContent = d.message;
+53 -15
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
// Preparation of the transaction an approval screen displays.
//
// A dApp's eth_sendTransaction normally fixes only `to`, `value` and `data`.
// The nonce, the gas limit and the fees have to be filled in from the network
// before anything can be signed, and whoever fills them in decides what the
// user is shown. That work used to happen in the popup, after the user had
// already approved: the numbers on the approval screen came from the popup and
// were compared against nothing, so a compromised popup could display one fee
// and sign another, and the ceilings in approvalVerify.js were all that stood
// between the user and a fee that hands the validator the balance.
// A dApp's eth_sendTransaction normally fixes `to`, `value` and `data`, and
// sometimes the gas limit. The nonce, the fees, and the gas limit when the
// site gives none have to be filled in from the network before anything can
// be signed, and whoever fills them in decides what the user is shown. That
// work used to happen in the popup, after the user had already approved: the
// numbers on the approval screen came from the popup and were compared against
// nothing, so a compromised popup could display one fee and sign another, and
// the ceilings in approvalVerify.js were all that stood between the user and a
// fee that hands the validator the balance.
//
// So it happens here instead, in the background, before the approval window is
// opened. The background populates the transaction, shows that object, and
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ const {
VoidSigner,
accessListify,
getAddress,
getBigInt,
getBytes,
hexlify,
toQuantity,
@@ -47,10 +49,11 @@ const {
// minutes long, which is not a wait anyone will sit through.
const POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20000;
// The request fields taken from the page. Anything else is dropped rather than
// passed to ethers: the object is page-controlled, and a future ethers that
// learns to carry a new transaction field must not start picking one up out of
// it without this module knowing.
// The request fields taken from the page, plus `gas`, which requestFrom()
// takes as the gas limit. Anything else is dropped rather than passed to
// ethers: the object is page-controlled, and a future ethers that learns to
// carry a new transaction field must not start picking one up out of it
// without this module knowing.
//
// The nonce is not taken from the page; it is always the account's next nonce
// from the network. A page that chose it could replace one of the user's
@@ -84,6 +87,16 @@ function present(v) {
return v !== null && v !== undefined && v !== "";
}
// Whether two quantities from the page are the same number. One that is not a
// number matches nothing.
function sameQuantity(a, b) {
try {
return getBigInt(a) === getBigInt(b);
} catch {
return false;
}
}
// These strings reach the user through the requesting page, so they are full
// sentences even when the tail of one came from ethers or from the node.
function sentence(text) {
@@ -111,6 +124,20 @@ function requestFrom(txParams, from) {
for (const key of REQUEST_FIELDS) {
if (present(txParams[key])) request[key] = txParams[key];
}
// JSON-RPC calls the gas limit `gas`, and that is the name sites send.
// ethers only reads `gasLimit`: left as `gas` it would be dropped and an
// estimate signed in its place.
if (present(txParams.gas)) {
if (
present(request.gasLimit) &&
!sameQuantity(request.gasLimit, txParams.gas)
) {
throw fail(
"The site asked for two different gas limits for this transaction.",
);
}
request.gasLimit = txParams.gas;
}
if (
present(request.type) &&
!ALLOWED_TX_TYPES.includes(Number(request.type))
@@ -174,6 +201,7 @@ async function prepareApprovalTx(provider, from, txParams) {
throw fail("There is no active address to send this transaction from.");
}
const request = requestFrom(txParams || {}, from);
const signer = new VoidSigner(getAddress(from), provider);
let populated;
try {
@@ -181,10 +209,20 @@ async function prepareApprovalTx(provider, from, txParams) {
// nonce, gas, fee and chain id are populated exactly as they were when
// the popup did this. VoidSigner cannot sign, which is the point: the
// background prepares, the popup signs.
//
// ethers asks the node for a gas estimate only when the request has
// no gas limit, and that estimate is the only check that the
// transaction does not revert. So a request carrying the site's gas
// limit is estimated first, with that limit: one that reverts, or
// needs more gas than the site gave it, fails here as well. The
// site's gas limit is still the one populated.
populated = await withTimeout(
new VoidSigner(getAddress(from), provider).populateTransaction(
request,
),
(async () => {
if (present(request.gasLimit)) {
await signer.estimateGas(request);
}
return signer.populateTransaction(request);
})(),
POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS,
"The transaction could not be prepared: the network did not answer in time.",
);
+89
View File
@@ -53,8 +53,10 @@ const {
accessListify,
formatEther,
getAddress,
getBigInt,
getBytes,
toQuantity,
TypedDataEncoder,
verifyMessage,
verifyTypedData,
} = require("ethers");
@@ -635,6 +637,90 @@ function verifySignature(signParams, signature, expectedFrom) {
return recovered;
}
// The type ethers will sign typed data as. ethers does not read the page's
// `primaryType`: it takes the one struct in `types` that no other struct
// refers to. Throws when the types name no such single struct, which ethers
// would refuse to sign as well.
function signedPrimaryType(types) {
const structs = { ...types };
// ethers derives EIP712Domain itself and rejects it as an input.
delete structs.EIP712Domain;
return TypedDataEncoder.getPrimaryType(structs);
}
// Why a typed data message cannot be signed as the screen shows it, as a
// sentence, or null when it can. ethers signs a `bool` field by whether its
// value is truthy, so the string "false" is signed as true and a field left
// out as false. Each field that `type` declares, at every level of nesting,
// must be one of the value's own keys, and each `bool` must be true or false.
// Called with the type ethers signs, the message, and a `path` of "".
function typedDataMessageRefusal(types, type, value, path) {
const itemType = type.replace(/\[\d*\]$/, "");
if (itemType !== type) {
// ethers refuses to sign a list field that is not a list.
if (!Array.isArray(value)) return null;
for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {
const refusal = typedDataMessageRefusal(
types,
itemType,
value[i],
`${path}[${i}]`,
);
if (refusal) return refusal;
}
return null;
}
if (type === "bool" && value !== true && value !== false) {
return `The field "${path}" is not true or false, so this typed data cannot be signed.`;
}
for (const field of types[type] || []) {
const at = path ? `${path}.${field.name}` : field.name;
// An own key only: a plain lookup of `constructor` finds a function.
const present =
value !== null &&
typeof value === "object" &&
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(value, field.name);
if (!present) {
return `The field "${at}" is missing from the message, so this typed data cannot be signed.`;
}
const refusal = typedDataMessageRefusal(
types,
field.type,
value[field.name],
at,
);
if (refusal) return refusal;
}
return null;
}
// Why typed data cannot be signed while `network` is the active network, as a
// sentence, or null when it can. EIP-712 has a wallet refuse typed data whose
// domain names another chain, because the signature is valid on that chain.
// ethers signs no chain id when the domain's is null or absent, and reads any
// other with getBigInt(), so 1, "1" and "0x1" are the same chain here too.
function typedDataChainRefusal(domain, network) {
const chainId = domain?.chainId;
if (chainId === undefined || chainId === null) return null;
let named;
try {
named = getBigInt(chainId);
} catch {
return "This typed data cannot be read, so it cannot be signed.";
}
const active = getBigInt(network.chainId);
if (named === active) return null;
return (
"This typed data is for chain id " +
named +
", but the active network is " +
network.name +
" (chain id " +
active +
"), so it cannot be signed."
);
}
// The stage a transaction approval failed at. Which stage it is decides
// whether the approval survives the failure.
const TX_STAGE_SIGN = "sign";
@@ -796,6 +882,9 @@ function describeSigningFailure(response, fallbackMessage) {
module.exports = {
verifySignedTx,
verifySignature,
signedPrimaryType,
typedDataMessageRefusal,
typedDataChainRefusal,
assertNoForbiddenFields,
assertNothingUnchecked,
assertCanonicalBytes,
+45
View File
@@ -145,6 +145,14 @@ function sendMessage(message) {
return invoke(runtimeApi(), "sendMessage", message);
}
/**
* @returns {Promise<Object>} the operating system and processor the browser
* runs on.
*/
function getPlatformInfo() {
return invoke(runtimeApi(), "getPlatformInfo");
}
/**
* Send a message nobody is expected to answer, and swallow the fact that
* nobody did.
@@ -235,6 +243,22 @@ function tabsSendMessage(tabId, message) {
return invoke(tabsApi(), "sendMessage", tabId, message);
}
/**
* @returns {Promise<Object|undefined>} the tab the calling page is in, or
* undefined for a page not in a tab, such as the toolbar popup.
*/
function tabsGetCurrent() {
return invoke(tabsApi(), "getCurrent");
}
/**
* @param {number} tabId
* @returns {Promise<number>} that tab's zoom: 1.5 at 150%.
*/
function tabsGetZoom(tabId) {
return invoke(tabsApi(), "getZoom", tabId);
}
/**
* @param {Object} createData
* @returns {Promise<Object>} the created window.
@@ -250,6 +274,22 @@ function windowsGetLastFocused() {
return invoke(windowsApi(), "getLastFocused");
}
/**
* @returns {Promise<Object>} the window the calling page is in.
*/
function windowsGetCurrent() {
return invoke(windowsApi(), "getCurrent");
}
/**
* @param {number} windowId
* @param {Object} updateInfo
* @returns {Promise<Object>} the updated window.
*/
function windowsUpdate(windowId, updateInfo) {
return invoke(windowsApi(), "update", windowId, updateInfo);
}
/**
* @param {number} windowId
* @returns {Promise<void>}
@@ -262,6 +302,7 @@ module.exports = {
actionApi,
alarmsApi,
extensionApi,
getPlatformInfo,
hasBrowserNamespace,
notify,
runtimeApi,
@@ -271,10 +312,14 @@ module.exports = {
storageRemove,
storageSet,
tabsApi,
tabsGetCurrent,
tabsGetZoom,
tabsQuery,
tabsSendMessage,
windowsApi,
windowsCreate,
windowsGetCurrent,
windowsGetLastFocused,
windowsRemove,
windowsUpdate,
};
+4 -1
View File
@@ -110,11 +110,14 @@ function hashListed(hash) {
* Generate hostname variants for subdomain matching.
* "sub.evil.com" yields ["sub.evil.com", "evil.com"].
*
* A trailing dot is dropped: "evil.com." is the fully qualified spelling of
* "evil.com", and the browser loads the same site from either.
*
* @param {string} hostname
* @returns {string[]}
*/
function hostnameVariants(hostname) {
const h = hostname.toLowerCase();
const h = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
const variants = [h];
const parts = h.split(".");
// Parent domains: a.b.c.d -> b.c.d, c.d
+2 -2
View File
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ const TOKENS = [
symbol: "FLOKI",
decimals: 9,
name: "FLOKI",
url: "",
url: "https://floki.com",
},
{
address: "0x7420B4b9a0110cdC71fB720908340C03F9Bc03EC",
@@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@ const TOKENS = [
symbol: "TURBO",
decimals: 18,
name: "Turbo",
url: "",
url: "https://www.turbo-eth.com",
},
{
address: "0xA27EC0006e59f245217Ff08CD52A7E8b169E62D2",
+69 -18
View File
@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ function formatAmount(raw, decimals) {
// on a scale — not as a token name, and not as a quantity.
const UNNAMED_CURRENCY = "Unknown (not named in the calldata)";
// The same refusal when a V4 swap action could not be read (see
// decodeExactly()). That action names both of its currencies, so saying the
// calldata did not name one would be false.
const UNDECODED_CURRENCY = "Unknown (could not be decoded)";
// Explicit presence, never truthiness. Every gate in this file that guards a
// decoded value goes through here: an address is never falsy once set, but an
// amount of 0n is, and a gate that cannot tell a genuine zero from an absent
@@ -295,6 +300,24 @@ function v4ExactInAmount(raw) {
return raw === 0n ? OPEN_DELTA : raw;
}
// The V4 swap actions are read only in the parameter structs V4Router has
// deployed on mainnet and Sepolia. v4-periphery `main` has since added a
// `minHopPriceX36` field to all four (`src/interfaces/IV4Router.sol`), and
// reading a shape nobody has deployed would be guessing. ethers alone would
// read the newer structs anyway: it takes whatever word sits where a
// deployed field would be, ignores bytes left over, and holds back an error
// in a field until that field is used. The newer multi-hop exact-in struct
// then yields the offset of its hop-price array as `amountIn`. So a decode
// counts only when encoding the result again gives back the same bytes;
// otherwise this throws, and decodeV4Swap() marks the step as not decoded.
function decodeExactly(types, data) {
const decoded = coder.decode(types, data);
if (coder.encode(types, decoded) !== data) {
throw new Error("Not in the deployed V4 parameter shape.");
}
return decoded;
}
// Decode V4_SWAP (command 0x10) input bytes.
// The input is ABI-encoded as (bytes actions, bytes[] params).
// We extract token addresses from SETTLE (input) and TAKE (output) sub-actions,
@@ -309,6 +332,10 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
let takeToken = null;
let amountIn = null;
let amountOutMin = null;
// Set when a swap action's parameters are not in the deployed shape
// (see decodeExactly()), so nothing was read from that action. SETTLE
// and TAKE may still name both currencies.
let swapUndecoded = false;
for (let i = 0; i < actions.length; i++) {
const actionId = actions[i];
@@ -337,7 +364,7 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
// tuple(address,uint24,int24,address,bytes)[] path,
// uint128 amountIn, uint128 amountOutMin)
try {
const s = coder.decode(
const s = decodeExactly(
[
"tuple(address,tuple(address,uint24,int24,address,bytes)[],uint128,uint128)",
],
@@ -355,13 +382,13 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
amountOutMin = s[0][3];
}
} catch {
// Fall through — SETTLE/TAKE will provide tokens
swapUndecoded = true;
}
} else {
// ExactInputSingleParams: (tuple(address,address,uint24,int24,address) poolKey,
// bool zeroForOne, uint128 amountIn, uint128 amountOutMin, bytes hookData)
try {
const s = coder.decode(
const s = decodeExactly(
[
"tuple(tuple(address,address,uint24,int24,address),bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)",
],
@@ -384,7 +411,7 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
amountOutMin = s[0][3];
}
} catch {
// Fall through
swapUndecoded = true;
}
}
} else if (
@@ -393,7 +420,7 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
) {
if (actionId === V4_SWAP_EXACT_OUT) {
try {
const s = coder.decode(
const s = decodeExactly(
[
"tuple(address,tuple(address,uint24,int24,address,bytes)[],uint128,uint128)",
],
@@ -405,11 +432,11 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
settleToken = path[path.length - 1][0];
}
} catch {
// Fall through
swapUndecoded = true;
}
} else {
try {
const s = coder.decode(
const s = decodeExactly(
[
"tuple(tuple(address,address,uint24,int24,address),bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)",
],
@@ -426,7 +453,7 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
? poolKey[1]
: poolKey[0];
} catch {
// Fall through
swapUndecoded = true;
}
}
}
@@ -440,6 +467,7 @@ function decodeV4Swap(input) {
tokenOut: takeToken,
amountIn,
amountOutMin,
swapUndecoded,
};
} catch {
return null;
@@ -465,6 +493,7 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
let minOutput = null;
let hasUnwrapWeth = false;
let hasV2ExactOut = false;
let swapUndecoded = false;
const commandNames = [];
// THE INVARIANT: an amount and the token it is counted in always come
@@ -567,7 +596,20 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
if (cmdId === 0x10) {
const v4 = decodeV4Swap(inputs[i]);
if (v4) {
if (v4 && v4.swapUndecoded) {
// The unread swap action named this step's currencies
// and amounts, so the step is marked and still sets
// both sides as a swap step does. A side its SETTLE or
// TAKE did not name is set undetermined, not left to
// an earlier or later step's token and figure.
swapUndecoded = true;
commandNames[i] += " (could not be decoded)";
if (!inputEstablished) {
setInput(v4.tokenIn, v4.amountIn);
}
outputToken = v4.tokenOut;
minOutput = v4.amountOutMin;
} else if (v4) {
setInputOnce(v4.tokenIn, v4.amountIn);
// Always update output: last swap step wins. A step
// that carries the Min. received figure but decoded no
@@ -591,16 +633,19 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
}
}
// Resolve token info. A null token on either side means the calldata
// named no currency for it; tokenInfo() refuses rather than calling it
// ETH. UNWRAP_WETH turns WETH into ETH, so it makes the output ETH
// when the output side is WETH, or when no step set the output side.
// Any other output keeps its own token and figure: a swap that buys
// USDC and then unwraps the WETH it did not spend receives USDC.
// Resolve token info. A null token on either side means no step named
// a currency for it, or a V4 step whose swap action went unread left
// it undetermined; tokenInfo() refuses rather than calling it ETH.
// UNWRAP_WETH turns WETH into ETH, so it makes the output ETH when the
// output side is WETH, or when no step set the output side. A step
// whose swap action went unread did set it, to undetermined. Any other
// output keeps its own token and figure: a swap that buys USDC and
// then unwraps the WETH it did not spend receives USDC.
const outputIsWeth =
present(outputToken) &&
WETH_ADDRESSES.includes(outputToken.toLowerCase());
const outputUnset = !present(outputToken) && !present(minOutput);
const outputUnset =
!present(outputToken) && !present(minOutput) && !swapUndecoded;
const inInfo = tokenInfo(inputToken, sources);
const outInfo =
hasUnwrapWeth && (outputIsWeth || outputUnset)
@@ -640,7 +685,10 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
// rather than going missing or naming a token by default. Same
// wording as the Token Out refusal below: the two sides of this
// screen must not describe the same condition in two ways.
details.push({ label: "Token In", value: UNNAMED_CURRENCY });
details.push({
label: "Token In",
value: swapUndecoded ? UNDECODED_CURRENCY : UNNAMED_CURRENCY,
});
}
if (present(inputAmount)) {
@@ -703,7 +751,10 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
// rather than going missing or naming a token by default, and a
// Min. received figure below it is never attached to a token the
// calldata did not state.
details.push({ label: "Token Out", value: UNNAMED_CURRENCY });
details.push({
label: "Token Out",
value: swapUndecoded ? UNDECODED_CURRENCY : UNNAMED_CURRENCY,
});
}
if (present(minOutput)) {
+32 -6
View File
@@ -110,16 +110,33 @@ function addressFromPrivateKey(key) {
return w.address;
}
function getSignerForAddress(walletData, addrIndex, decryptedSecret) {
// The signer for `addr`, one of the wallet's stored address records. An HD or
// xprv address is derived at its own `index`, never at its position in the
// wallet's list: the two differ once an import scan passes over an unused
// index, or once an address that is not the last is removed. An HD or xprv
// record without a valid `index` is refused before anything is derived.
// Whatever the wallet type, the key is refused unless it is the key of
// `addr.address`.
function getSignerForAddress(walletData, addr, decryptedSecret) {
if (
(walletData.type === "hd" || walletData.type === "xprv") &&
!(Number.isInteger(addr.index) && addr.index >= 0)
) {
throw new Error(
"No derivation index is stored for " +
addr.address +
", so its key cannot be derived.",
);
}
let signer;
if (walletData.type === "hd") {
const node = HDNodeWallet.fromPhrase(
decryptedSecret,
"",
BIP44_ETH_PATH,
);
return node.deriveChild(addrIndex);
}
if (walletData.type === "xprv") {
signer = node.deriveChild(addr.index);
} else if (walletData.type === "xprv") {
// Checked here rather than through masterXprvOrThrow so the message
// fits the situation: nobody is importing anything at signing time,
// and this wallet is already in storage. src/shared/walletDefects.js
@@ -137,9 +154,18 @@ function getSignerForAddress(walletData, addrIndex, decryptedSecret) {
"is not a master key, so it cannot sign.",
);
}
return node.derivePath(BIP44_ETH_PATH).deriveChild(addrIndex);
signer = node.derivePath(BIP44_ETH_PATH).deriveChild(addr.index);
} else {
signer = new Wallet(decryptedSecret);
}
return new Wallet(decryptedSecret);
if (signer.address.toLowerCase() !== addr.address.toLowerCase()) {
throw new Error(
"The key this wallet holds for " +
addr.address +
" belongs to a different address, so it was not used.",
);
}
return signer;
}
function isValidMnemonic(mnemonic) {
+7 -5
View File
@@ -36,11 +36,13 @@ const DEFECTS = {
"derivation path beneath that key instead of from a master " +
"key, so the addresses listed here are not the ones that key " +
"produces under the standard path.",
"Signing and sending are disabled for this wallet. The addresses " +
"do descend from the extended private key you imported, so " +
"anything they hold is still reachable by software that " +
"repeats the same non-standard derivation. Check them in a " +
"block explorer before deciding what to do.",
"Signing, sending and private key export are disabled for this " +
"wallet. Anything these addresses hold can be reached outside " +
"this wallet with the extended private key you imported, if " +
"you kept a copy of it, or with the master extended private " +
"key or recovery phrase it came from, in software that " +
"repeats the same non-standard derivation. Check the " +
"addresses in a block explorer before deciding what to do.",
"To see the addresses this key produces under the standard path, " +
"import the master extended private key, or the recovery " +
"phrase it came from, as a new wallet. Nothing here has been " +
+490
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,490 @@
// Sending, a site's transaction and signature requests and private key export
// each use the key of the address they name: the key at the index that address
// was derived at, not the one at its position in the wallet's list. The two
// differ after an import whose scan passed over an unused index, and after an
// address that is not the last is removed
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/510). A send is signed by the
// From address its confirmation screen shows, whichever address is selected.
//
// Driven through the real import, "+" button, address removal, confirmation
// screen, transaction and signature approval screens and export screen, with
// the node, the vault and the DOM stubbed.
"use strict";
// The addresses the stub node reports a balance for, and the signed
// transactions it was handed.
const mockNode = { funded: new Set(), broadcast: [] };
jest.mock("ethers", () => {
const actual = jest.requireActual("ethers");
class StubProvider {
async getBalance(address) {
return mockNode.funded.has(address) ? 1n : 0n;
}
async getTransactionCount() {
return 0;
}
async estimateGas() {
return 21000n;
}
async getFeeData() {
return {
maxFeePerGas: 20000000000n,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
gasPrice: 10000000000n,
};
}
async getNetwork() {
return { chainId: 1n };
}
async getCode() {
return "0x";
}
async lookupAddress() {
return null;
}
async broadcastTransaction(signed) {
mockNode.broadcast.push(signed);
return { hash: "0x" + "ab".repeat(32) };
}
}
return { ...actual, JsonRpcProvider: StubProvider };
});
// No password is hashed: what the wallet stores is the phrase itself.
jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
encryptWithPassword: async (secret) => secret,
decryptWithPassword: async (secret) => secret,
}));
// The wait screen polls for a receipt; these tests stop at the broadcast.
jest.mock("../src/popup/views/txStatus", () => ({
showWait: jest.fn(),
showError: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.mock("ethereum-blockies-base64", () => () => "");
global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
});
const {
HDNodeWallet,
Mnemonic,
Transaction,
getBytes,
verifyMessage,
} = require("ethers");
// Publicly known development phrase; never fund it.
const PHRASE = "test test test test test test test test test test test junk";
// PHRASE's master extended private key, as the xprv import takes it.
const XPRV = HDNodeWallet.fromSeed(
Mnemonic.fromPhrase(PHRASE).computeSeed(),
).extendedKey;
const PASSWORD = "correct horse battery staple";
const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
// "Hello", as the hex a page sends.
const MESSAGE = "0x48656c6c6f";
// The address and key at derivation index `index` of PHRASE, worked out with
// ethers directly rather than through the wallet's own code.
function derived(index) {
return HDNodeWallet.fromPhrase(PHRASE, "", "m/44'/60'/0'/0/" + index);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ DOM stub
function makeElement(id) {
const classes = new Set();
const el = {
id,
textContent: "",
title: "",
value: "",
innerHTML: "",
disabled: false,
style: {},
dataset: {},
listeners: {},
classList: {
add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
toggle: (n, force) => {
const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
if (on) classes.add(n);
else classes.delete(n);
return on;
},
},
addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
el.listeners[name].push(fn);
},
querySelectorAll: () => [],
appendChild: () => {},
};
// Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
});
return el;
}
function makeDocument() {
const els = new Map();
return {
getElementById(id) {
// The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
// is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
return els.get(id);
},
createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
addEventListener: () => {},
body: { prepend: () => {} },
};
}
function node(id) {
return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
}
function click(element) {
const event = { stopPropagation: () => {} };
return Promise.all((element.listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn(event)));
}
// show() starts the fee estimate without awaiting it; this lets it settle.
async function settle() {
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ harness
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const { removeAddressFromState } = require("../src/shared/walletDelete");
const addWallet = require("../src/popup/views/addWallet");
const home = require("../src/popup/views/home");
const confirmTx = require("../src/popup/views/confirmTx");
const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
const exportPrivkey = require("../src/popup/views/exportPrivkey");
const txStatus = require("../src/popup/views/txStatus");
// What the background answers when the approval window asks which approval it
// was opened for, and every message the popup sent it.
let approvalDetails;
let sent;
// The "+" button of the wallet list's last render. Each render attaches the
// handler to the buttons it drew, as the browser's fresh list would have.
let plusButton;
beforeEach(() => {
approvalDetails = null;
sent = [];
mockNode.broadcast = [];
globalThis.document = makeDocument();
globalThis.window = { close: () => {} };
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
runtime: {
connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
sent.push(msg);
if (!reply) return;
reply(
msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL"
? approvalDetails
: null,
);
},
},
};
node("wallet-list").querySelectorAll = (selector) => {
if (selector !== ".btn-add-address") return [];
plusButton = makeElement("btn-add-address");
plusButton.dataset.wallet = "0";
return [plusButton];
};
// The explorer and price lookups these screens start fail offline, and
// say so; that is not under test.
for (const method of ["log", "warn", "error"]) {
jest.spyOn(console, method).mockImplementation(() => {});
}
txStatus.showError.mockClear();
state.wallets = [];
state.rpcUrl = "https://rpc.example.invalid";
state.networkId = "mainnet";
state.viewStack = [];
state.currentView = "main";
addWallet.init({
renderWalletList: () => {},
doRefreshAndRender: () => {},
pageClosed: new AbortController().signal,
});
confirmTx.init({});
approval.init({});
exportPrivkey.init();
});
afterEach(() => {
jest.restoreAllMocks();
});
// Import PHRASE on the add-wallet screen, with the stub node reporting a
// balance at each of `fundedIndices`, and wait for the address scan.
async function importPhrase(fundedIndices) {
mockNode.funded = new Set(fundedIndices.map((i) => derived(i).address));
await click(node("tab-mnemonic"));
node("wallet-mnemonic").value = PHRASE;
node("add-wallet-password").value = PASSWORD;
node("add-wallet-password-confirm").value = PASSWORD;
await click(node("btn-add-wallet-confirm"));
}
// The same, importing XPRV on the add-wallet screen's xprv tab.
async function importXprv(fundedIndices) {
mockNode.funded = new Set(fundedIndices.map((i) => derived(i).address));
await click(node("tab-xprv"));
node("import-xprv-key").value = XPRV;
node("add-wallet-password").value = PASSWORD;
node("add-wallet-password-confirm").value = PASSWORD;
await click(node("btn-add-wallet-confirm"));
}
// Press the wallet's "+" button on Home.
async function addAddress() {
home.render({
doRefreshAndRender: () => {},
pageClosed: new AbortController().signal,
});
await click(plusButton);
}
// The key the export screen reveals for the address at `position`.
async function exportedKey(position) {
exportPrivkey.show(0, position);
node("export-privkey-password").value = PASSWORD;
await click(node("btn-export-privkey-confirm"));
return node("export-privkey-value").textContent;
}
// Confirm a send whose From line shows `from`, with the address at position
// `selected` selected; resolves to the signed transaction the node was handed,
// or undefined when none was.
async function confirmSend(from, selected) {
state.selectedWallet = 0;
state.selectedAddress = selected;
confirmTx.show({
from,
to: RECIPIENT,
amount: "0.5",
token: "ETH",
balance: "1.0",
});
await settle();
node("confirm-tx-password").value = PASSWORD;
await click(node("btn-confirm-send"));
return mockNode.broadcast.pop();
}
// Send from the address at `position`, with that address selected, as the Send
// button leaves it.
function sendFrom(position) {
return confirmSend(state.wallets[0].addresses[position].address, position);
}
// A site asks the address at `position` to sign MESSAGE; resolves to the
// response the approval window sent the background.
async function signFor(position) {
const address = state.wallets[0].addresses[position].address;
approvalDetails = {
type: "sign",
origin: "https://dapp.example",
isPhishingDomain: false,
approvedFrom: address,
signParams: {
method: "personal_sign",
message: MESSAGE,
from: address,
},
};
await approval.show(1);
node("approve-sign-password").value = PASSWORD;
await click(node("btn-approve-sign"));
return sent.find((msg) => msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE");
}
// A site asks the address at `position` to send RECIPIENT a transaction of no
// value; resolves to the response the approval window sent the background.
async function transactFor(position) {
const address = state.wallets[0].addresses[position].address;
approvalDetails = {
type: "tx",
origin: "https://dapp.example",
isPhishingDomain: false,
approvedFrom: address,
approvedTx: {
type: 2,
from: address,
chainId: "0x1",
nonce: "0x0",
gasLimit: "0x5208",
maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
to: RECIPIENT,
value: "0x0",
data: "0x",
accessList: [],
},
};
await approval.show(1);
node("approve-tx-password").value = PASSWORD;
await click(node("btn-approve-tx"));
return sent.find((msg) => msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE");
}
describe.each([
[
"a recovery phrase import whose scan found only the first address",
async () => {
await importPhrase([0]);
},
// The address the import stores before its scan.
{ position: 0, index: 0 },
],
[
"an xprv import whose scan found only the first address",
async () => {
await importXprv([0]);
},
{ position: 0, index: 0 },
],
[
"an import whose scan passed over index 3",
async () => {
await importPhrase([0, 1, 2, 4]);
},
// Address 4 on Home, derived at index 4.
{ position: 3, index: 4 },
],
[
"an xprv import whose scan passed over index 3",
async () => {
await importXprv([0, 1, 2, 4]);
},
{ position: 3, index: 4 },
],
[
"removing the middle one of three addresses",
async () => {
await importPhrase([0]);
await addAddress();
await addAddress();
removeAddressFromState(state, 0, 1);
},
// Address 2 on Home after the removal, derived at index 2.
{ position: 1, index: 2 },
],
])("after %s", (_name, setUp, { position, index }) => {
beforeEach(setUp);
test("the wallet lists the address derived at that index there", () => {
expect(state.wallets[0].addresses[position].address).toBe(
derived(index).address,
);
});
test("export reveals that address's key", async () => {
expect(await exportedKey(position)).toBe(derived(index).privateKey);
});
test("a send is signed by that address", async () => {
const signed = await sendFrom(position);
expect(Transaction.from(signed).from).toBe(derived(index).address);
});
test("a site's signature is made by that address", async () => {
const response = await signFor(position);
expect(verifyMessage(getBytes(MESSAGE), response.signature)).toBe(
derived(index).address,
);
});
test("a site's transaction is signed by that address", async () => {
const response = await transactFor(position);
expect(Transaction.from(response.rawSignedTx).from).toBe(
derived(index).address,
);
});
});
// The selection and the confirmation screen are saved apart, so the popup can
// reopen onto the screen with another address selected than its From line
// shows.
describe("a confirmation screen whose From is not the selected address", () => {
beforeEach(async () => {
await importPhrase([0, 1]);
});
test("the send is signed by the From address shown", async () => {
const signed = await confirmSend(derived(1).address, 0);
expect(Transaction.from(signed).from).toBe(derived(1).address);
});
test("nothing is sent when the selected wallet does not hold it", async () => {
expect(await confirmSend(derived(5).address, 0)).toBeUndefined();
expect(node("confirm-tx-password-error").textContent).toBe(
"The selected wallet does not hold the From address above, " +
"so nothing was sent. Please go back and send again.",
);
});
});
describe("an address whose stored index derives a different address", () => {
function refusal() {
return (
"The key this wallet holds for " +
derived(0).address +
" belongs to a different address, so it was not used."
);
}
beforeEach(async () => {
await importPhrase([0]);
state.wallets[0].addresses[0].index = 1;
});
test("export reveals nothing and says why", async () => {
expect(await exportedKey(0)).toBe("");
expect(node("export-privkey-password-error").textContent).toBe(
refusal(),
);
});
test("nothing is sent", async () => {
expect(await sendFrom(0)).toBeUndefined();
expect(txStatus.showError).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.anything(),
null,
refusal(),
);
});
test("nothing is signed", async () => {
const response = await signFor(0);
expect(response.signature).toBeUndefined();
expect(response.error).toBe(refusal());
});
});
+19
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
// The token names and URLs in src/shared/tokenList.js are written from
// script/lib/token-enrichment.json by script/lib/apply-enrichment.js
// (`make apply-enrichment`). This fails when the committed list differs from
// what the script writes from the committed data, and when the data or the
// script's table of websites has an address that no entry in the list matches.
const fs = require("fs");
const path = require("path");
const enrichment = require("../script/lib/token-enrichment.json");
const { applyEnrichment } = require("../script/lib/apply-enrichment");
test("src/shared/tokenList.js is what make apply-enrichment writes from the committed data", () => {
const committed = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, "..", "src/shared/tokenList.js"),
"utf8",
);
expect(applyEnrichment(committed, enrichment)).toBe(committed);
});
+3 -1
View File
@@ -136,7 +136,9 @@ async function openTxApproval(approvedTx) {
xpub: "xpub-wallet-1",
encryptedSecret: "encrypted-secret-1",
nextIndex: 1,
addresses: [{ address: FROM, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
addresses: [
{ address: FROM, index: 0, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] },
],
},
];
approval.init({});
+24 -2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
// The connection, transaction and signature prompts name the site by its full
// origin, scheme and port included, not by its bare hostname
// The connection, transaction, signature and network switch prompts name the
// site by its full origin, scheme and port included, not by its bare hostname
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402). A page served over http,
// or on another port, of a host the user trusts over https must not raise a
// prompt that reads as that trusted site.
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ beforeEach(() => {
test("the connection prompt shows the origin", async () => {
await openApproval({});
expect(node("approve-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
expect(node("view-approve-site").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(false);
});
test("the transaction prompt shows the origin", async () => {
@@ -138,3 +139,24 @@ test("the signature prompt shows the origin", async () => {
});
expect(node("approve-sign-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
});
test("the network switch prompt shows the origin and both networks", async () => {
await openApproval({
type: "network",
currentNetworkId: "mainnet",
requestedNetworkId: "sepolia",
});
expect(node("approve-network-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
expect(node("approve-network-current").textContent).toBe(
"Ethereum Mainnet",
);
expect(node("approve-network-requested").textContent).toBe(
"Sepolia Testnet",
);
// Its own screen, and not the connection prompt, whose "Allow" answers
// on the same port.
expect(node("view-approve-network").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
false,
);
expect(node("view-approve-site").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(true);
});
+91 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
// requesting page or the RPC node can say turns it into an approval that
// should never have been raised.
const { Network, Wallet } = require("ethers");
const { Network, Transaction, Wallet, toQuantity } = require("ethers");
const {
prepareApprovalTx,
serializeApprovedTx,
@@ -138,6 +138,49 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
expect(approved.maxFeePerGas).toBe("0x12a05f200");
});
// `gas` is the JSON-RPC name for the gas limit and the one sites send.
// The node is still asked for its estimate, with the site's gas limit,
// because the estimate is the check that the transaction does not revert.
// It estimates 21000; the site's 200000 is what is shown and what is
// signed.
test("uses the gas limit a site sends as gas", async () => {
const estimateGas = jest.fn(async () => 21000n);
const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
providerWith({ estimateGas }),
signer.address,
{ ...TX_PARAMS, gas: "0x30d40" },
);
expect(estimateGas).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ gasLimit: 200000n }),
);
expect(approved.gasLimit).toBe("0x30d40");
const signed = Transaction.from(
await signer.signTransaction({ ...approved }),
);
expect(signed.gasLimit).toBe(200000n);
});
test("accepts gas and gasLimit that name the same number", async () => {
const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
providerWith(),
signer.address,
{ ...TX_PARAMS, gas: "0x30d40", gasLimit: 200000 },
);
expect(approved.gasLimit).toBe("0x30d40");
});
test("refuses gas and gasLimit that disagree", async () => {
await expect(
prepareApprovalTx(providerWith(), signer.address, {
...TX_PARAMS,
gas: "0x30d40",
gasLimit: "0x5208",
}),
).rejects.toThrow(
"The site asked for two different gas limits for this transaction.",
);
});
test("carries an access list the request asked for", async () => {
const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
providerWith(),
@@ -212,6 +255,15 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
).rejects.toThrow(/gas limit no network this wallet supports/);
});
test("refuses a gas limit the site sent above the ceiling", async () => {
await expect(
prepareApprovalTx(providerWith(), signer.address, {
...TX_PARAMS,
gas: toQuantity(MAX_GAS_LIMIT + 1n),
}),
).rejects.toThrow(/gas limit no network this wallet supports/);
});
// The combined bound at population: a gas limit and a fee that are each
// under their own ceiling but multiply to thousands of ETH is refused
// before the approval window opens, so the user is never shown a
@@ -251,6 +303,22 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
expect(thrown.message).toMatch(/^[A-Z].*\.$/);
});
test("fails back a reverting request that sends its own gas limit", async () => {
const reverting = providerWith({
estimateGas: async () => {
throw new Error("execution reverted: ERC20: transfer amount");
},
});
await expect(
prepareApprovalTx(reverting, signer.address, {
...TX_PARAMS,
gas: "0x30d40",
}),
).rejects.toThrow(
/^The transaction could not be prepared: execution reverted/,
);
});
// Without a bound, an unreachable node leaves the page's promise pending
// with nothing on screen to explain it.
test("gives up on a node that never answers", async () => {
@@ -273,6 +341,28 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
jest.useRealTimers();
}
});
// The estimate of a request carrying the site's gas limit is a call of its
// own, made before populating, and is bounded the same way.
test("gives up on a node that never answers the estimate of a request that sends its own gas limit", async () => {
jest.useFakeTimers();
try {
const hanging = providerWith({
estimateGas: () => new Promise(() => {}),
});
const pending = prepareApprovalTx(hanging, signer.address, {
...TX_PARAMS,
gas: "0x30d40",
});
const settled = expect(pending).rejects.toThrow(
/did not answer in time/,
);
await jest.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS + 1);
await settled;
} finally {
jest.useRealTimers();
}
});
});
describe("serializeApprovedTx", () => {
+10 -3
View File
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ const TX_PARAMS = {
to: RECIPIENT,
value: "0x2386f26fc10000",
data: "0xdeadbeef",
gas: "0x5208",
};
// The values populateTransaction() fills in when the dApp fixed none of them.
@@ -1455,7 +1454,11 @@ describe("background population to popup signing to verification", () => {
// What the popup does with it: signs it as given, populating nothing.
async function popupSigns(approvedTx) {
const localSigner = getSignerForAddress(walletData, 0, SIGNER_KEY);
const localSigner = getSignerForAddress(
walletData,
{ address: signer.address },
SIGNER_KEY,
);
return localSigner.signTransaction({ ...approvedTx });
}
@@ -1550,7 +1553,11 @@ describe("background population to popup signing to verification", () => {
// address the user has switched to.
test("the approved from stops the popup signing with another key", async () => {
const approvedTx = await backgroundPrepares(TX_PARAMS);
const otherSigner = getSignerForAddress(walletData, 0, OTHER_KEY);
const otherSigner = getSignerForAddress(
walletData,
{ address: other.address },
OTHER_KEY,
);
await expect(
otherSigner.signTransaction({ ...approvedTx }),
).rejects.toThrow(/from address mismatch/);
+176
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
// The approval window shows no screen until the background has described the
// approval it answers (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/408). The
// connection prompt's "Allow" and the network switch prompt's "Switch" answer
// on the same port, so a window that showed the connection prompt while it
// waited could approve a network switch.
//
// Booted through the real popup entry point, which is where the connection
// prompt used to be put up before the background had answered.
const {
bootPopup,
cleanupPopup,
settle,
unversionedValidProfile,
} = require("./support/popupBoot");
afterEach(cleanupPopup);
test("the approval window shows no screen until the background describes the approval", async () => {
// The background's answer, held until the test gives it.
let answer = null;
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile(), {
search: "?approval=approval-1",
runtime: {
connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") answer = reply;
},
},
});
expect(answer).not.toBeNull();
// No screen at all, the connection prompt included.
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual([]);
answer({
type: "network",
origin: "https://dapp.example",
currentNetworkId: "mainnet",
requestedNetworkId: "sepolia",
isPhishingDomain: false,
});
await settle();
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["approve-network"]);
expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
});
// The background opens the approval window as wide as the page, but the
// browser counts the window's frame in that width, and a screen taller than
// the window takes a vertical scrollbar out of it too
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/518). The browser suites run
// without frames, and only the Firefox suite's sign prompt at a zoom other
// than 100%, so the widening is checked here too.
//
// A window 396 screen pixels wide whose page is drawn at `drawn` screen pixels
// to the page pixel. Widening it gives the page its new width, less the 15
// screen pixels of the scrollbar the approval screen has, and then calls the
// page's resize listeners, each of which asked to be called once.
function windowsStub(type, drawn) {
const updates = [];
return {
updates,
getCurrent: (done) => done({ id: 7, type, width: 396 }),
update: (id, info, done) => {
updates.push({ id, info });
done({});
globalThis.document.documentElement.clientWidth = Math.floor(
(info.width - 15) / drawn,
);
const resized = globalThis.window.listeners.resize || [];
globalThis.window.listeners.resize = [];
for (const fn of resized) fn();
},
};
}
// The approval page's own tab is at `zoom`. Asked without a tab id, Firefox
// answers for the window focused last, here a site's tab at 100%.
function tabsStub(zoom) {
return {
getCurrent: (done) => done({ id: 11 }),
getZoom: (...args) => {
const done = args.pop();
done(args[0] === 11 ? zoom : 1);
},
};
}
// An approval window at `zoom`, `clientWidth` page pixels wide before its
// screen is up, whose background holds its answer until the test gives it.
async function bootZoomedApprovalWindow(windows, zoom, clientWidth) {
let answer = null;
const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile(), {
search: "?approval=approval-1",
runtime: {
connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") answer = reply;
},
},
windows,
tabs: tabsStub(zoom),
documentElement: { scrollWidth: 396, clientWidth },
});
return { env, answer };
}
test("at 150% zoom the approval window widens by what its screen lacks, scrollbar included", async () => {
const windows = windowsStub("popup", 1.5);
// At 150% a window 396 screen pixels wide shows 264 page pixels.
const { env, answer } = await bootZoomedApprovalWindow(windows, 1.5, 264);
// Not before there is a screen to fit.
expect(windows.updates).toEqual([]);
// The screen is taller than the window, so once it is up a vertical
// scrollbar takes 15 screen pixels, 10 page pixels at 150%.
env.document.documentElement.clientWidth = 254;
answer({
type: "network",
origin: "https://dapp.example",
currentNetworkId: "mainnet",
requestedNetworkId: "sepolia",
isPhishingDomain: false,
});
await settle();
// 396 - 254 = 142 page pixels short, which at 150% is 213 screen pixels.
// At the 100% of the site's tab it would be 142, and the screen would
// still not fit.
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["approve-network"]);
expect(windows.updates).toEqual([{ id: 7, info: { width: 609 } }]);
expect(env.document.documentElement.clientWidth).toBe(396);
expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
});
test("at 170% the approval window is widened again while its screen still falls short", async () => {
// Firefox reports 170% as 1.7 but draws a page pixel about 1.714 screen
// pixels wide, so a window 396 wide shows 231 page pixels.
const windows = windowsStub("popup", 1.714);
const { env, answer } = await bootZoomedApprovalWindow(windows, 1.7, 231);
// Less the scrollbar once the screen is up.
env.document.documentElement.clientWidth = 222;
answer({
type: "network",
origin: "https://dapp.example",
currentNetworkId: "mainnet",
requestedNetworkId: "sepolia",
isPhishingDomain: false,
});
await settle();
// 174 page pixels short, so 296 screen pixels wider at 1.7. That shows 394
// page pixels, still 2 short, so 4 screen pixels wider again.
expect(windows.updates).toEqual([
{ id: 7, info: { width: 692 } },
{ id: 7, info: { width: 696 } },
]);
const page = env.document.documentElement;
expect(page.scrollWidth).toBeLessThanOrEqual(page.clientWidth);
expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
});
test("a connection prompt in the toolbar popup leaves the browser window alone", async () => {
const windows = windowsStub("normal", 1.5);
const { env, answer } = await bootZoomedApprovalWindow(windows, 1.5, 264);
answer({ origin: "https://dapp.example", isPhishingDomain: false });
await settle();
expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["approve-site"]);
expect(windows.updates).toEqual([]);
expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
});
+186 -6
View File
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
connectListener = fn;
},
},
getPlatformInfo: jest.fn((cb) => cb({ os: "linux" })),
lastError: null,
},
windows: {
@@ -384,20 +385,26 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
// The same through eth_signTypedData_v4, whose params name the address
// first and the typed data second.
function requestTypedData() {
function requestTypedData(typedData = TYPED_DATA) {
let rpcResult = null;
messageListener(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
method: "eth_signTypedData_v4",
params: [signer.address, TYPED_DATA],
params: [signer.address, typedData],
},
{ origin: ORIGIN },
(r) => {
rpcResult = r;
},
);
return { result: () => rpcResult };
return {
id: () =>
new URL(created[created.length - 1].url).searchParams.get(
"approval",
),
result: () => rpcResult,
};
}
// A dApp asking to connect. The origin defaults to one the persisted
@@ -872,6 +879,45 @@ describe("one transaction approval at a time", () => {
});
});
// Chrome stops an idle worker, and the approvals in it go with it
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/540). tests/e2e/slowApproval.js
// shows the worker kept running in Chrome; this shows the calls stop once the
// approval is answered, so the worker can stop again. Every kind of approval is
// added through addPendingApproval(), which starts the calls, so a transaction
// approval stands for all of them.
describe("the worker keeps running while an approval is pending", () => {
test("an extension call every 20 seconds until the approval is answered", async () => {
const startTimer = jest
.spyOn(global, "setInterval")
.mockImplementation(() => 1);
const stopTimer = jest
.spyOn(global, "clearInterval")
.mockImplementation(() => {});
try {
const bg = loadBackground();
const calls = global.chrome.runtime.getPlatformInfo;
bg.requestTx();
await settle();
expect(startTimer).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(startTimer.mock.calls[0][1]).toBe(20000);
const tick = startTimer.mock.calls[0][0];
tick();
expect(calls).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// The user closes the approval window, which rejects it.
bg.closeWindow(1);
await settle();
tick();
expect(calls).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(stopTimer).toHaveBeenCalledWith(1);
} finally {
startTimer.mockRestore();
stopTimer.mockRestore();
}
});
});
// A page that asks again before the user has answered its last connection or
// signature request is refused, instead of opening one more window per call.
describe("one connection and one signature approval per site at a time", () => {
@@ -1484,6 +1530,91 @@ describe("what the approval is verified against", () => {
});
});
// Typed data whose domain names another chain is refused on the sign
// screen; a signature for it that reaches the background anyway is not
// handed to the page (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/519).
// TYPED_DATA names mainnet.
async function answerTypedData(bg, pending, typedData = TYPED_DATA) {
const { domain, types, message } = JSON.parse(typedData);
delete types.EIP712Domain;
const signature = await signer.signTypedData(domain, types, message);
const answer = bg.send(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
id: pending.id(),
approved: true,
signature,
},
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
await settle();
return { answer, signature };
}
test("typed data for the active chain is handed back signed", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestTypedData();
await settle();
const { answer, signature } = await answerTypedData(bg, pending);
expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ signature });
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: signature });
});
test("typed data for another chain is refused, not handed back", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
bg.setNetwork(SEPOLIA);
const pending = bg.requestTypedData();
await settle();
const { answer } = await answerTypedData(bg, pending);
const refusal =
"This typed data is for chain id 1, but the active network is Sepolia Testnet (chain id 11155111), so it cannot be signed.";
expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
error: refusal,
retryable: false,
});
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ error: { message: refusal } });
});
// ethers signs a `bool` field sent as the string "false" as true, and one
// left out as false. The sign screen refuses both; a signature for either
// that reaches the background anyway is not handed to the page
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/552).
test.each([
[
'"false"',
"false",
'The field "approved" is not true or false, so this typed data cannot be signed.',
],
[
"left out",
undefined,
'The field "approved" is missing from the message, so this typed data cannot be signed.',
],
])(
"typed data with a bool %s is refused, not handed back",
async (_, approved, refusal) => {
const data = JSON.parse(TYPED_DATA);
data.types.Note.push({ name: "approved", type: "bool" });
data.message.approved = approved;
const typedData = JSON.stringify(data);
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestTypedData(typedData);
await settle();
const { answer } = await answerTypedData(bg, pending, typedData);
expect(answer.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
error: refusal,
retryable: false,
});
expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ error: { message: refusal } });
},
);
test("a sign request from another address raises no approval at all", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const pending = bg.requestSign(other.address);
@@ -1551,6 +1682,55 @@ describe("what the approval is verified against", () => {
});
});
// eth_sign names the address first and the data second, the reverse of
// personal_sign, and is answered as the JSON-RPC specification defines it:
// with an EIP-191 personal message signature over the data, the same
// signature personal_sign returns
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/409). The signature below is
// made by the test; that the sign screen makes the same one is tested in
// tests/ethSign.test.js.
describe("eth_sign", () => {
test("is read address first, and returns a personal message signature over the data", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const page = bg.send(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
method: "eth_sign",
params: [signer.address, MESSAGE],
},
{ origin: ORIGIN },
);
await settle();
const id = approvalIdIn(bg.created.map((c) => c.url));
const details = bg.send(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id },
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
const { signParams } = details.sendResponse.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(signParams).toMatchObject({
method: "eth_sign",
message: MESSAGE,
from: signer.address,
});
expect(signParams.dangerWarning).toBe(
"This site used the older eth_sign method. " +
"The data will be signed as a personal message.",
);
const signature = await signer.signMessage(
Buffer.from(MESSAGE.slice(2), "hex"),
);
bg.send(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE", id, approved: true, signature },
{ url: bg.fromPopup.url },
);
await settle();
expect(page.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ result: signature });
});
});
// The interlock must not cost the retry the approval exists to allow.
describe("the interlock releases a failed attempt", () => {
test("a retryable failure before the broadcast leaves the approval usable", async () => {
@@ -2750,7 +2930,7 @@ describe("where an approval window opens", () => {
await settle();
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
expect(bg.created[0]).toMatchObject({ left: 460, top: 60 });
expect(bg.created[0]).toMatchObject({ left: 442, top: 60 });
});
test("not centred on an approval window the user was last in", async () => {
@@ -2767,7 +2947,7 @@ describe("where an approval window opens", () => {
bg.requestSign();
await settle();
// Centred, it would be at left 900, the position the browser refused.
// Centred, it would be at left 882, the position the browser refused.
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
expect(bg.created[0].left).toBeUndefined();
expect(bg.created[0].top).toBeUndefined();
@@ -2789,7 +2969,7 @@ describe("where an approval window opens", () => {
await settle();
expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
expect(bg.created[0]).toMatchObject({ left: 1520, top: 750 });
expect(bg.created[0]).toMatchObject({ left: 1502, top: 750 });
expect(bg.created[1].left).toBeUndefined();
expect(bg.created[1].top).toBeUndefined();
+14 -14
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
const { Wallet } = require("ethers");
const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
const { applyChainSwitchFields } = require("../src/shared/chainSwitchFields");
const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
const SIGNER_KEY =
@@ -240,8 +241,8 @@ describe("a chain switch under a transaction already committed to a chain", () =
// The artifact is verified against the chain read at the top of the
// attempt. Whatever endpoint it is then broadcast to has to be that same
// chain's — otherwise the wallet checks a transaction against Sepolia and
// sends it to a mainnet node. A connected site can switch the chain at any
// moment, including this one.
// sends it to a mainnet node. The user can switch the network in Settings
// at any moment, including this one.
test("the artifact is broadcast to the endpoint of the chain it was verified against", async () => {
const bg = loadWorker("sepolia");
@@ -264,9 +265,9 @@ describe("a chain switch under a transaction already committed to a chain", () =
populated(Number(SEPOLIA.networkVersion)),
);
// A connected site switches the chain while the attempt is running,
// and the switch is committed to storage in full before the attempt
// goes any further.
// The user switches the network in Settings while the attempt is
// running: the popup writes the switched record to storage in full
// before the attempt goes any further.
//
// It is fired from inside the attempt's SECOND state read, because
// that is where the window used to be: the chain id was captured at
@@ -277,18 +278,18 @@ describe("a chain switch under a transaction already committed to a chain", () =
// this to fire on, and the switch below runs after the attempt is
// done instead — which is the point.
let reads = 0;
let switched = null;
const doSwitch = async () => {
switched = bg.rpc("wallet_switchEthereumChain", [
{ chainId: MAINNET.chainId },
]);
await settle();
let switched = false;
const doSwitch = () => {
const record = bg.persisted();
applyChainSwitchFields(record, MAINNET.id);
global.chrome.storage.write("autistmask", record);
switched = true;
};
bg.setGetHook(async () => {
reads++;
if (reads !== 2) return;
bg.setGetHook(null);
await doSwitch();
doSwitch();
});
const attempt = bg.send(
@@ -303,8 +304,7 @@ describe("a chain switch under a transaction already committed to a chain", () =
await settle();
bg.setGetHook(null);
if (!switched) await doSwitch();
expect(switched.result()).toEqual({ result: null });
if (!switched) doSwitch();
expect(bg.persisted().networkId).toBe("mainnet");
await settle();
+328 -42
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,24 @@
// Who may move the active chain.
// Who may move the active chain, and when.
//
// wallet_switchEthereumChain used to be answered for any origin at all, with
// no connection check and no prompt, so a page the user had never connected
// to could clear the [TESTNET] banner under someone who believed they were
// on Sepolia (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/308). The refusal
// is asserted as a refusal to ACT — the state unmoved and no chainChanged
// broadcast — because an error code alone would not distinguish a gate from
// a switch that happened and then reported a failure.
// on Sepolia (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/308). Gated on the
// connection, a connected site could still move the wallet between mainnet and
// Sepolia without asking. Only the user switches the network: a connected
// site's request opens a prompt, and nothing changes unless the user approves
// it there (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/408).
//
// The endpoint half of that issue lives in tests/networkEndpoints.test.js,
// which covers the popup's chain switch; this file covers the background's,
// which goes through storage rather than the shared state singleton.
// Every refusal is asserted as a refusal to ACT — the stored record unmoved
// and no chainChanged broadcast — because an error code alone would not
// distinguish a refusal from a switch that happened and then reported a
// failure.
//
// The endpoint half of #308 lives in tests/networkEndpoints.test.js, which
// covers the popup's chain switch; this file covers the background's, which
// goes through storage rather than the shared state singleton. The last block
// covers what the background tells open tabs when the user switches the
// network in Settings.
const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
@@ -21,18 +29,23 @@ const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
const STRANGER_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
// The user's own node, so a switch that happens is visible as the loss of it.
const CUSTOM_RPC = "http://127.0.0.1:8545";
// A balance a switch would clear, so a switch that happens is visible here too.
function walletFixture() {
return [
{
name: "Wallet 1",
type: "hd",
addresses: [{ address: ADDRESS, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
addresses: [
{ address: ADDRESS, balance: "1.5", tokenBalances: [] },
],
},
];
}
@@ -47,10 +60,6 @@ afterEach(() => {
delete global.chrome;
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// The gate: which origins the background will switch the chain for.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Load the background worker against stubbed browser APIs, with the real
// chain-switch and persistence modules behind it, and return the handles to
// drive it.
@@ -91,30 +100,46 @@ function loadBackground() {
const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: persisted });
let messageListener = null;
let connectListener = null;
let windowRemovedListener = null;
// The URL of every approval window the background opened. The approval id
// is in it, and that is how the popup learns which approval it answers.
const opened = [];
// Every message the background pushed at a content script. chainChanged
// is what tells a page the wallet moved, so an ungated switch is visible
// here as well as in the state.
// is what tells a page the wallet moved, so a switch is visible here as
// well as in the state.
const toTabs = [];
global.chrome = {
storage,
runtime: {
getURL: (path) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + path,
getURL: (path) => EXT_URL + path,
onMessage: {
addListener: (fn) => {
messageListener = fn;
},
},
onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
onConnect: {
addListener: (fn) => {
connectListener = fn;
},
},
lastError: null,
},
windows: {
getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(null),
create: (options, cb) => cb({ id: 1 }),
create: (options, cb) => {
opened.push(options.url);
cb({ id: opened.length });
},
remove: (id, cb) => {
if (cb) cb();
},
onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} },
onRemoved: {
addListener: (fn) => {
windowRemovedListener = fn;
},
},
},
tabs: {
query: (queryInfo, cb) => cb([{ id: 1 }]),
@@ -128,6 +153,8 @@ function loadBackground() {
require("../src/background/index");
// A page's request. Its answer is read with result(), which is null for as
// long as the request is waiting on the user.
async function switchChain(chainId, origin) {
let result = null;
messageListener(
@@ -142,55 +169,309 @@ function loadBackground() {
},
);
await settle();
return result;
return { result: () => result };
}
function promptId() {
return new URL(opened[opened.length - 1]).searchParams.get("approval");
}
// What the popup is told to show for the prompt.
function describePrompt() {
let reply = null;
messageListener(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL", id: promptId() },
{ url: EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html" },
(r) => {
reply = r;
},
);
return reply;
}
// The user's answer, as the popup sends it: on the port named for the
// approval, from the extension's own page, and then the window closes.
async function answerPrompt(approved) {
const onMessage = [];
const onDisconnect = [];
const port = {
name: "approval:" + promptId(),
sender: { url: EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html" },
onMessage: { addListener: (fn) => onMessage.push(fn) },
onDisconnect: { addListener: (fn) => onDisconnect.push(fn) },
};
connectListener(port);
for (const fn of onMessage) {
fn(
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_DECISION",
approved,
remember: false,
},
port,
);
}
for (const fn of onDisconnect) fn(port);
await settle();
}
// The user closes the prompt window without answering it.
async function closePrompt() {
windowRemovedListener(opened.length);
await settle();
}
return {
switchChain,
describePrompt,
answerPrompt,
closePrompt,
opened,
// A message to the background from `sender`, and its answer.
send: (msg, sender) => {
let reply = null;
messageListener(msg, sender, (r) => {
reply = r;
});
return reply;
},
walletState: () => storage.read("autistmask"),
chainChangedEvents: () =>
toTabs.filter((m) => m.eventName === "chainChanged"),
};
}
const USER_REJECTED = { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." };
describe("wallet_switchEthereumChain is gated on the connection", () => {
test("an origin the wallet was never connected to is refused with 4100", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const before = bg.walletState();
const result = await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, STRANGER_ORIGIN);
const request = await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, STRANGER_ORIGIN);
expect(result.error).toEqual({ code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" });
expect(result.result).toBeUndefined();
expect(request.result().error).toEqual({
code: 4100,
message: "Unauthorized",
});
expect(request.result().result).toBeUndefined();
// The refusal has to be a refusal to ACT, not just an error string:
// the wallet is still on mainnet, still on the user's own node, and
// no page was told the chain moved.
expect(bg.walletState().networkId).toBe("mainnet");
expect(bg.walletState().rpcUrl).toBe(CUSTOM_RPC);
// no page was told the chain moved. Nor was the user asked.
expect(bg.walletState()).toEqual(before);
expect(bg.chainChangedEvents()).toEqual([]);
expect(bg.opened).toEqual([]);
});
test("an unconnected origin is refused even for the chain already active", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const result = await bg.switchChain(MAINNET.chainId, STRANGER_ORIGIN);
const request = await bg.switchChain(MAINNET.chainId, STRANGER_ORIGIN);
expect(result.error).toEqual({ code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" });
expect(request.result().error).toEqual({
code: 4100,
message: "Unauthorized",
});
});
test("an unconnected origin is refused before the unsupported-chain answer", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const result = await bg.switchChain("0x89", STRANGER_ORIGIN);
const request = await bg.switchChain("0x89", STRANGER_ORIGIN);
expect(result.error.code).toBe(4100);
expect(request.result().error.code).toBe(4100);
});
});
describe("only the user switches the network", () => {
test("a connected site's request changes nothing while the prompt is open", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const before = bg.walletState();
const request = await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
// Waiting on the user, with one prompt on screen naming the site and
// both networks.
expect(request.result()).toBeNull();
expect(bg.opened).toHaveLength(1);
expect(bg.describePrompt()).toMatchObject({
origin: CONNECTED_ORIGIN,
type: "network",
currentNetworkId: "mainnet",
requestedNetworkId: "sepolia",
});
// The network, the endpoints and the balances are as they were, and
// no page was told otherwise.
expect(bg.walletState()).toEqual(before);
expect(bg.chainChangedEvents()).toEqual([]);
});
test("a connected origin switches the chain", async () => {
test("approving the prompt switches the network", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const result = await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
const request = await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
await bg.answerPrompt(true);
expect(request.result()).toEqual({ result: null });
const after = bg.walletState();
expect(after.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
expect(after.rpcUrl).toBe(SEPOLIA.defaultRpcUrl);
expect(after.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance).toBe("0");
expect(bg.chainChangedEvents()).toEqual([
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_EVENT",
eventName: "chainChanged",
data: SEPOLIA.chainId,
},
]);
});
test("rejecting the prompt changes nothing and answers 4001", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const before = bg.walletState();
const request = await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
await bg.answerPrompt(false);
expect(request.result()).toEqual({ error: USER_REJECTED });
expect(bg.walletState()).toEqual(before);
expect(bg.chainChangedEvents()).toEqual([]);
});
test("closing the prompt without answering changes nothing and answers 4001", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const before = bg.walletState();
const request = await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
await bg.closePrompt();
expect(request.result()).toEqual({ error: USER_REJECTED });
expect(bg.walletState()).toEqual(before);
expect(bg.chainChangedEvents()).toEqual([]);
});
test("a request for the chain already active opens no prompt", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const before = bg.walletState();
const request = await bg.switchChain(MAINNET.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
expect(request.result()).toEqual({ result: null });
expect(bg.opened).toEqual([]);
expect(bg.walletState()).toEqual(before);
expect(bg.chainChangedEvents()).toEqual([]);
});
test("a second request while the prompt is open is refused with -32002", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const first = await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
const second = await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
expect(second.result().error.code).toBe(-32002);
expect(bg.opened).toHaveLength(1);
// The first prompt still decides.
await bg.answerPrompt(true);
expect(first.result()).toEqual({ result: null });
expect(bg.walletState().networkId).toBe("sepolia");
});
test("a request for an unsupported chain still gets 4902 and no prompt", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const request = await bg.switchChain("0x89", CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
expect(request.result().error.code).toBe(4902);
expect(bg.opened).toEqual([]);
expect(bg.walletState().networkId).toBe("mainnet");
});
test("an approved switch keeps the user's endpoint", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
await bg.answerPrompt(true);
expect(bg.walletState().rpcUrl).toBe(SEPOLIA.defaultRpcUrl);
await bg.switchChain(MAINNET.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
await bg.answerPrompt(true);
expect(bg.walletState().rpcUrl).toBe(CUSTOM_RPC);
});
});
// Switching the network in Settings tells open pages, as an approved site
// request does (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/500). These drive
// the real Settings view over the background's storage, with what it sends
// delivered to the background from the extension's own page.
describe("switching the network in Settings tells every open tab", () => {
const POPUP = { url: EXT_URL + "src/popup/index.html" };
// A stand-in for one DOM node: enough of an element for init() to set
// properties on it and hang listeners off it.
function fakeElement() {
return {
value: "",
checked: false,
textContent: "",
style: {},
dataset: {},
classList: { add() {}, remove() {} },
listeners: {},
addEventListener(event, handler) {
this.listeners[event] = handler;
},
querySelectorAll: () => [],
};
}
// Settings, opened the way the popup opens it. Returns its network
// selector.
async function openSettings(bg) {
const elements = {};
const element = (id) => (elements[id] ||= fakeElement());
jest.doMock("../src/popup/views/helpers", () => ({
$: element,
showView: () => {},
updateDebugBanner: () => {},
showFlash: () => {},
escapeHtml: (s) => s,
flashCopyFeedback: () => {},
goBack: () => {},
pushCurrentView: () => {},
onViewLeave: () => {},
VIEWS: [],
}));
global.chrome.runtime.sendMessage = (msg) => {
bg.send(msg, POPUP);
};
await require("../src/shared/state").loadState();
require("../src/popup/views/settings").init({
pageClosed: new AbortController().signal,
});
const select = element("settings-network");
select.value = "mainnet";
return select;
}
// The user picks `networkId` in the selector.
async function choose(select, networkId) {
select.value = networkId;
await select.listeners.change();
await settle();
}
afterEach(() => {
jest.dontMock("../src/popup/views/helpers");
});
test("switching to the other network sends chainChanged once, with its chain id", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const select = await openSettings(bg);
await choose(select, "sepolia");
expect(result).toEqual({ result: null });
expect(bg.walletState().networkId).toBe("sepolia");
expect(bg.chainChangedEvents()).toEqual([
{
@@ -201,22 +482,27 @@ describe("wallet_switchEthereumChain is gated on the connection", () => {
]);
});
test("a connected origin asking for an unsupported chain still gets 4902", async () => {
test("choosing the network already active changes nothing and sends nothing", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
const select = await openSettings(bg);
const before = bg.walletState();
const result = await bg.switchChain("0x89", CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
await choose(select, "mainnet");
expect(result.error.code).toBe(4902);
expect(bg.walletState().networkId).toBe("mainnet");
expect(bg.walletState()).toEqual(before);
expect(bg.chainChangedEvents()).toEqual([]);
});
test("a switch by a connected origin keeps the user's endpoint", async () => {
test("a page cannot make the background send chainChanged", async () => {
const bg = loadBackground();
await bg.switchChain(SEPOLIA.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
expect(bg.walletState().rpcUrl).toBe(SEPOLIA.defaultRpcUrl);
const reply = bg.send(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_NETWORK_CHANGED", chainId: SEPOLIA.chainId },
{ url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/" },
);
await settle();
await bg.switchChain(MAINNET.chainId, CONNECTED_ORIGIN);
expect(bg.walletState().rpcUrl).toBe(CUSTOM_RPC);
expect(reply).toEqual({ error: "Unauthorized sender" });
expect(bg.chainChangedEvents()).toEqual([]);
});
});
+44 -2
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@
// itself: the handler has to do it. tests/chainSwitchGate.test.js mocks the
// state module wholesale and tests/networkEndpoints.test.js always loads
// first, so neither can see this.
//
// A site's switch happens only once the user approves it on a prompt
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/408), so every switch here is
// approved the way the popup approves one.
const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
@@ -90,6 +94,9 @@ function loadColdWorker(networkId) {
const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: storedProfile(networkId) });
let messageListener = null;
let connectListener = null;
// The URL of every approval window opened; the approval id is in it.
const opened = [];
const toTabs = [];
global.chrome = {
@@ -101,12 +108,19 @@ function loadColdWorker(networkId) {
messageListener = fn;
},
},
onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
onConnect: {
addListener: (fn) => {
connectListener = fn;
},
},
lastError: null,
},
windows: {
getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(null),
create: (options, cb) => cb({ id: 1 }),
create: (options, cb) => {
opened.push(options.url);
cb({ id: opened.length });
},
remove: (id, cb) => {
if (cb) cb();
},
@@ -124,6 +138,32 @@ function loadColdWorker(networkId) {
require("../src/background/index");
// The user approves the prompt the request opened, as the popup does: a
// decision on the port named for the approval, from the extension's own
// page.
function approvePrompt() {
const id = new URL(opened[opened.length - 1]).searchParams.get(
"approval",
);
let onDecision = null;
const port = {
name: "approval:" + id,
sender: { url: "chrome-extension://autistmask/src/popup/" },
onMessage: {
addListener: (fn) => {
onDecision = fn;
},
},
onDisconnect: { addListener: () => {} },
};
connectListener(port);
onDecision(
{ type: "AUTISTMASK_APPROVAL_DECISION", approved: true },
port,
);
}
// A connected site asks for `chainId`, and the user approves it.
async function switchChain(chainId) {
let result = null;
messageListener(
@@ -138,6 +178,8 @@ function loadColdWorker(networkId) {
},
);
await settle();
approvePrompt();
await settle();
return result;
}
+259
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
// A transfer is sent only on the network its confirmation screen was drawn for
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/524).
//
// Settings is reachable from the confirmation screen, and Back from it only
// unhides the screen, still labelled for the network it was drawn for. Sign &
// Send used to take the network at the moment of the click, so 1 SepoliaETH
// reviewed on Sepolia went out as 1 ETH on mainnet once mainnet was chosen in
// Settings in between.
//
// Driven through the real confirmation screen, signer and chain switch, with
// only the node and the DOM stubbed. The stub node is on the network its
// provider was built for, so a broadcast records the network it went to.
"use strict";
// The signed transactions the stub node was handed, with its network's chain id.
const mockNode = { broadcast: [] };
jest.mock("ethers", () => {
const actual = jest.requireActual("ethers");
class StubProvider {
constructor(url, network) {
this.network = network;
}
async getNetwork() {
return this.network;
}
async getFeeData() {
return {
maxFeePerGas: 20000000000n,
maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
gasPrice: 10000000000n,
};
}
async estimateGas() {
return 21000n;
}
async getCode() {
return "0x";
}
async getTransactionCount() {
return 1;
}
async lookupAddress() {
return null;
}
async broadcastTransaction(signed) {
mockNode.broadcast.push({ chainId: this.network.chainId, signed });
return { hash: "0x" + "ab".repeat(32) };
}
}
return { ...actual, JsonRpcProvider: StubProvider };
});
jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
log: {
debugf: () => {},
infof: () => {},
warnf: () => {},
errorf: () => {},
},
debugFetch: jest.fn(async () => ({
ok: true,
status: 200,
json: async () => ({ items: [] }),
})),
urlOrigin: () => "",
setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
isDebug: () => false,
}));
// The wait screen polls for a receipt; these tests stop at the broadcast.
jest.mock("../src/popup/views/txStatus", () => ({
showWait: jest.fn(),
showError: jest.fn(),
}));
global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
});
const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
global.chrome = { storage: makeStorageStub(), runtime: { sendMessage() {} } };
// A stub DOM: every id resolves to a recording element.
const elements = new Map();
function makeEl(id) {
const handlers = new Map();
return {
id,
textContent: "",
innerHTML: "",
value: "",
disabled: false,
style: {},
dataset: {},
classList: {
add() {},
remove() {},
toggle() {},
contains: () => false,
},
handlers,
addEventListener(name, fn) {
handlers.set(name, fn);
},
querySelectorAll: () => [],
querySelector: () => null,
remove() {},
focus() {},
};
}
global.document = {
getElementById(id) {
if (!elements.has(id)) elements.set(id, makeEl(id));
return elements.get(id);
},
createElement: (tag) => makeEl(tag),
body: { prepend() {}, appendChild() {} },
addEventListener() {},
};
global.navigator = { clipboard: { writeText() {} } };
const { BaseWallet, Transaction, Wallet } = require("ethers");
const { encryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
const { state, loadState } = require("../src/shared/state");
const { onChainSwitch } = require("../src/shared/chainSwitch");
const { NETWORKS } = require("../src/shared/networks");
const txStatus = require("../src/popup/views/txStatus");
const confirmTx = require("../src/popup/views/confirmTx");
const PRIVATE_KEY = "0x" + "11".repeat(32);
const HOLDER = new Wallet(PRIVATE_KEY).address;
const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
const PASSWORD = "correct horse battery staple";
function el(id) {
return global.document.getElementById(id);
}
let encryptedSecret;
let signTransaction;
beforeAll(async () => {
await loadState();
encryptedSecret = await encryptWithPassword(PRIVATE_KEY, PASSWORD);
});
beforeEach(() => {
elements.clear();
mockNode.broadcast = [];
txStatus.showWait.mockClear();
txStatus.showError.mockClear();
signTransaction = jest.spyOn(BaseWallet.prototype, "signTransaction");
});
afterEach(() => {
signTransaction.mockRestore();
});
// Show the confirmation screen for 1 of the native token on `networkId`, as
// Review on the Send screen does, with its fee estimate settled.
async function review(networkId) {
await onChainSwitch(networkId);
state.wallets = [
{
type: "key",
name: "Wallet 1",
encryptedSecret,
addresses: [{ address: HOLDER, balance: "5.0" }],
},
];
state.selectedWallet = 0;
state.selectedAddress = 0;
confirmTx.init({});
confirmTx.show({
from: HOLDER,
to: RECIPIENT,
ensName: null,
amount: "1",
token: "ETH",
balance: "5.0",
tokenSymbol: null,
tokenBalance: null,
tokenDecimals: null,
max: false,
});
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
}
async function signAndSend() {
el("confirm-tx-password").value = PASSWORD;
await el("btn-confirm-send").handlers.get("click")();
}
test("a transfer reviewed on Sepolia and sent goes out on Sepolia", async () => {
await review("sepolia");
expect(el("confirm-type").textContent).toBe("Native SepoliaETH transfer");
expect(el("btn-confirm-send").disabled).toBe(false);
await signAndSend();
expect(mockNode.broadcast).toHaveLength(1);
expect(mockNode.broadcast[0].chainId).toBe(11155111n);
expect(Transaction.from(mockNode.broadcast[0].signed).chainId).toBe(
11155111n,
);
expect(txStatus.showWait).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
describe.each([
["sepolia", "mainnet", "SepoliaETH"],
["mainnet", "sepolia", "ETH"],
])(
"a transfer reviewed on %s, with %s chosen in Settings before Sign & Send",
(reviewedOn, switchedTo, symbol) => {
test("is neither signed nor sent, and the screen says why", async () => {
await review(reviewedOn);
expect(el("confirm-type").textContent).toBe(
"Native " + symbol + " transfer",
);
// Settings' network select, then Back, which only unhides the
// screen as it was drawn.
await onChainSwitch(switchedTo);
await signAndSend();
expect(signTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mockNode.broadcast).toEqual([]);
expect(txStatus.showWait).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(txStatus.showError).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(el("confirm-errors").style.visibility).toBe("visible");
expect(el("confirm-errors").innerHTML).toContain(
"The active network changed after this transaction was" +
" reviewed, so it was not sent. Please go back and review" +
" it again.",
);
});
},
);
// The check in the click handler tells the user; the send itself carries the
// chain id the screen was drawn for, so a signer on another network's node
// cannot sign it even if the network changes after that check.
test("the send is refused by a signer on another network's node", async () => {
const { getProvider } = require("../src/shared/balances");
const signer = new Wallet(PRIVATE_KEY).connect(
getProvider("https://rpc.example.invalid", "mainnet"),
);
await expect(
confirmTx.populateVerifyAndSend(signer, {
token: "ETH",
to: RECIPIENT,
amount: "1",
chainId: NETWORKS.sepolia.chainId,
}),
).rejects.toThrow("transaction chainId mismatch");
expect(signTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mockNode.broadcast).toEqual([]);
});
+24 -20
View File
@@ -1,25 +1,29 @@
// A loopback dApp origin and stub Ethereum node for the Firefox suite.
// A loopback dApp origin and stub Ethereum node, used by the two browser
// programs that have no Playwright to answer the browser's requests for them:
// the Firefox suite (tests/e2e/firefox/run.js) and the Chrome program that
// leaves approvals open for seven minutes (tests/e2e/slowApproval.js). The
// Chrome suite in run.js answers its requests through network.js instead.
//
// The Firefox container runs with --network none, and the harness note in
// driver.js records the consequence: with no http:// origin in reach, no
// content script was ever injected, so content-script behaviour was
// firefox/driver.js records the consequence: with no http:// origin in reach,
// no content script was ever injected, so content-script behaviour was
// UNVERIFIED and the dApp flows could not be driven at all.
//
// --network none removes every interface except loopback, and loopback is
// enough. This serves the page and the JSON-RPC endpoint from 127.0.0.1
// inside the same container Firefox runs in, so the dApp round trips execute
// against a real http:// origin and the run stays as offline as it was: the
// only reachable peer is this process.
// inside the same container the browser runs in, so the dApp round trips
// execute against a real http:// origin and the run stays as offline as it
// was: the only reachable peer is this process.
//
// The page itself is not written twice. DAPP_HTML comes from the Chrome
// suite's fixture, so both harnesses drive the same __dapp API and the same
// message log.
// suite's fixture, so every browser program drives the same __dapp API and
// the same message log.
//
// Unlike driver.js this file does use ethers, and it has to: the node has to
// answer eth_sendRawTransaction with the hash ethers computes for the
// Unlike firefox/driver.js this file does use ethers, and it has to: the node
// has to answer eth_sendRawTransaction with the hash ethers computes for the
// artifact it was handed, or provider.broadcastTransaction() refuses the
// answer, and the suite recovers signatures itself rather than believing the
// extension's own verdict.
// answer, and both programs recover signatures themselves rather than
// believing the extension's own verdict.
"use strict";
@@ -27,7 +31,7 @@ const http = require("http");
const { Transaction } = require("ethers");
const { DAPP_HTML } = require("../network");
const { DAPP_HTML } = require("./network");
// The same fee shape the Chrome suite uses, for the same reason: it has to
// pass the ceilings in src/shared/approvalVerify.js and it has to leave the
@@ -170,11 +174,11 @@ async function startDappServer() {
const payload = JSON.stringify(handleRpcBody(body, state));
res.writeHead(200, {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
// The extension fetches this from its background
// page, whose origin is moz-extension://. Without CORS
// the fetch fails and every transaction assertion
// fails for a reason that has nothing to do with the
// wallet.
// In Firefox the extension fetches this from its
// background page, whose origin is moz-extension://.
// Without CORS the fetch fails and every transaction
// assertion fails for a reason that has nothing to do
// with the wallet.
"Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
});
res.end(payload);
@@ -193,8 +197,8 @@ async function startDappServer() {
}
// An empty favicon rather than a 404: a 404 is a page error in
// Firefox's console under some settings, and the suite fails the run
// on those.
// Firefox's console under some settings, and the Firefox suite fails
// the run on those.
if (url.pathname === "/favicon.ico") {
res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "image/x-icon" });
res.end("");
+9 -3
View File
@@ -279,12 +279,18 @@ class Driver {
// Shown means shown: in the popup a view is switched by toggling a
// "hidden" class, and an element that is present but collapsed is not
// the thing a test means by visible.
// the thing a test means by visible. Until the page's stylesheet has
// applied that class hides nothing and every view lays out, so the page
// must also have finished loading, which it does only after its
// stylesheet, and neither the element nor anything enclosing it may
// carry the class (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/502).
async waitVisible(selector, timeout = DEFAULT_WAIT_MS) {
return this.waitFor(
"selector " + selector + " to be visible",
`const el = document.querySelector(arguments[0]);
if (!el) return false;
if (document.readyState !== "complete" || !el) return false;
if (el.closest(".hidden")) return false;
if (getComputedStyle(el).visibility !== "visible") return false;
const r = el.getBoundingClientRect();
return r.width > 0 && r.height > 0;`,
[selector],
@@ -461,7 +467,7 @@ class Driver {
// src/background/index.js, which kills the background page outright, fails
// the run.
//
// Content scripts ARE now exercised: tests/e2e/firefox/dapp.js serves a page
// Content scripts ARE now exercised: tests/e2e/dapp.js serves a page
// from loopback, which survives --network none, and the suite drives the
// EIP-1193 round trips through the content script injected into it. What is
// still unproven is the CAPTURE, not the execution — no probe has forced a
+205 -4
View File
@@ -17,13 +17,13 @@
// note in driver.js), so the two backends have no common substrate to
// abstract over. Duplicated steps do not pay for a shim; revisit if this
// suite grows to where they do. What IS shared is the dApp page fixture
// itself — DAPP_HTML, served here from loopback by dapp.js — so an assertion
// about the __dapp API means the same thing on both browsers.
// itself — DAPP_HTML, served here from loopback by tests/e2e/dapp.js — so an
// assertion about the __dapp API means the same thing on both browsers.
//
// The dApp steps need an http:// origin, which --network none was thought to
// rule out. It does not: loopback survives it, so the page and the stub node
// are served from 127.0.0.1 inside the container and the run reaches nothing
// but this process. See tests/e2e/firefox/dapp.js.
// but this process. See tests/e2e/dapp.js.
//
// LIMITATION, and the difference from the Chrome suite worth knowing: error
// capture here is POLL-BASED, not event-streamed. The console service is
@@ -61,8 +61,9 @@ const {
} = require("ethers");
const { ConsoleErrors, EXTENSION_ORIGIN, start, sleep } = require("./driver");
const { startDappServer } = require("./dapp");
const { startDappServer } = require("../dapp");
const { STUB_COUNTERPARTY } = require("../network");
const { NETWORKS } = require("../../../src/shared/networks");
const {
STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
stateProblem,
@@ -127,6 +128,18 @@ step("the popup is drawn in the monospace font it declares", async (env) => {
);
});
// The same check as the Chrome suite's (#456), so both browsers are held to
// the same size.
step("the popup's text is drawn at the 14px text-sm declares", async (env) => {
const size = await env.driver.execute(
"return getComputedStyle(document.body).fontSize;",
);
assert(
size === "14px",
"the popup's text is drawn at " + size + ", not at the 14px of text-sm",
);
});
// The recovery screen (#361): the Chrome suite's four cases, run before any
// wallet exists for the same reason. With no wallet nothing saves on a timer,
// so no save can write a good record over the unreadable one. The last of them
@@ -381,6 +394,26 @@ async function waitForApprovalWindow(d, timeout = 30000) {
}
}
// Firefox keeps one zoom per site, so a zoom set on the popup's tab holds for
// every page of the extension, the approval windows included.
async function setExtensionZoom(env, zoom) {
const d = env.driver;
await d.switchToWindow(env.popupWindow);
const outcome = await d.executeAsync(
`const done = arguments[arguments.length - 1];
const zoom = arguments[0];
browser.tabs
.getCurrent()
.then((tab) => browser.tabs.setZoom(tab.id, zoom))
.then(() => done({}), (e) => done({ error: String(e) }));`,
[zoom],
);
assert(
outcome && !outcome.error,
"could not set the extension's zoom: " + (outcome && outcome.error),
);
}
function startRequest(d, key, method, params) {
return d.execute(
"window.__dapp.start(arguments[0], arguments[1], arguments[2]);" +
@@ -620,6 +653,14 @@ step(
"personal_sign returns a signature that recovers to the address",
async (env) => {
const d = env.driver;
// The window is opened as wide as the page, and widened once the
// screen is up if it still scrolls sideways
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/518). This suite is
// where that is checked: the Chrome suite's approval windows open at
// 1280x720 whatever width the extension asks for. At 170%, one of
// Firefox's zoom steps, the page is drawn a little larger than the
// 1.7 Firefox reports, so a single widening leaves it a pixel short.
await setExtensionZoom(env, 1.7);
await d.switchToWindow(env.dappWindow);
await startRequest(d, "sign", "personal_sign", [SIGN_HEX, env.address]);
@@ -627,6 +668,12 @@ step(
await d.switchToWindow(popup);
await d.waitVisible("#view-approve-sign");
await d.waitFor(
"the sign prompt to fit its window without scrolling sideways",
"return document.documentElement.scrollWidth <=" +
" document.documentElement.clientWidth;",
);
const screen = await d.execute(
`return {
origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
@@ -661,6 +708,7 @@ step(
await d.switchToWindow(env.dappWindow);
const outcome = await settleRequest(d, "sign");
await setExtensionZoom(env, 1);
assert(
outcome.settled === "resolved",
"personal_sign did not resolve: " + JSON.stringify(outcome),
@@ -684,6 +732,159 @@ step(
},
);
// The network fields of the stored record, read on the popup page, the one
// moz-extension:// document the suite has open.
async function storedNetwork(env) {
const d = env.driver;
await d.switchToWindow(env.popupWindow);
const stored = await d.executeAsync(
`const done = arguments[arguments.length - 1];
const api = typeof browser !== "undefined" ? browser : chrome;
Promise.resolve(api.storage.local.get("autistmask")).then(
(r) => done({
networkId: r.autistmask.networkId,
rpcUrl: r.autistmask.rpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl: r.autistmask.blockscoutUrl,
}),
(e) => done({ error: String((e && e.message) || e) }),
);`,
);
assert(
stored && !stored.error,
"could not read the stored network: " + (stored && stored.error),
);
return stored;
}
// Every chainChanged event the test page has been sent, waiting up to
// `timeout` for there to be `count` of them: the background sends the event
// alongside its answer to the request, so it can arrive just after it. Leaves
// the driver on the page.
async function chainChangedEvents(env, count = 0, timeout = 5000) {
const d = env.driver;
await d.switchToWindow(env.dappWindow);
const deadline = Date.now() + timeout;
for (;;) {
const events = (await dappMessages(d, "AUTISTMASK_EVENT")).filter(
(m) => m.eventName === "chainChanged",
);
if (events.length >= count || Date.now() > deadline) return events;
await sleep(100);
}
}
// Ask, from the page, to switch from network `from` to network `to`, and
// return the prompt that opens, checked to name the site and both networks.
// Leaves the driver on the prompt.
async function openNetworkPrompt(env, key, from, to) {
const d = env.driver;
await d.switchToWindow(env.dappWindow);
await startRequest(d, key, "wallet_switchEthereumChain", [
{ chainId: to.chainId },
]);
const popup = await waitForApprovalWindow(d);
await d.switchToWindow(popup);
await d.waitVisible("#view-approve-network");
const screen = {
origin: await d.text("#approve-network-origin"),
current: await d.text("#approve-network-current"),
requested: await d.text("#approve-network-requested"),
};
assert(
isDeepStrictEqual(screen, {
origin: env.server.origin,
current: from.name,
requested: to.name,
}),
"the network switch prompt shows " + JSON.stringify(screen),
);
return popup;
}
// Only the user switches the network. A connected site's request opens a
// prompt, and until the user approves it the stored network does not move and
// no page is told it did (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/408).
// The wallet goes back to mainnet the same way at the end, for the transaction
// step after this one.
step(
"a site's network switch changes nothing until the user approves it",
async (env) => {
const d = env.driver;
const { mainnet, sepolia } = NETWORKS;
const before = await storedNetwork(env);
assert(
before.networkId === "mainnet",
"this step starts on mainnet, not on " + before.networkId,
);
const eventsBefore = (await chainChangedEvents(env)).length;
const rejected = await openNetworkPrompt(
env,
"switch-reject",
mainnet,
sepolia,
);
assert(
isDeepStrictEqual(await storedNetwork(env), before),
"the network moved while its prompt was still open",
);
// Nothing else closes this window, so a click that did not land
// leaves the request unanswered and the assertion below fails.
await d.switchToWindow(rejected);
await d.click("#btn-reject-network");
await d.switchToWindow(env.dappWindow);
await assertUserRejection(
d,
"switch-reject",
"the network switch rejection",
);
assert(
isDeepStrictEqual(await storedNetwork(env), before),
"a rejected network switch moved the network",
);
assert(
(await chainChangedEvents(env)).length === eventsBefore,
"a rejected network switch told the page the chain changed",
);
await openNetworkPrompt(env, "switch-approve", mainnet, sepolia);
await d.click("#btn-approve-network");
await d.switchToWindow(env.dappWindow);
let outcome = await settleRequest(d, "switch-approve");
assert(
outcome.settled === "resolved" && outcome.result === null,
"the approved network switch did not resolve: " +
JSON.stringify(outcome),
);
assert(
(await storedNetwork(env)).networkId === "sepolia",
"the approved network switch did not move the network",
);
const events = await chainChangedEvents(env, eventsBefore + 1);
assert(
events.length === eventsBefore + 1 &&
events[events.length - 1].data === sepolia.chainId,
"the page was not told of the approved switch: " +
JSON.stringify(events),
);
await openNetworkPrompt(env, "switch-restore", sepolia, mainnet);
await d.click("#btn-approve-network");
await d.switchToWindow(env.dappWindow);
outcome = await settleRequest(d, "switch-restore");
assert(
outcome.settled === "resolved",
"switching back to mainnet did not resolve: " +
JSON.stringify(outcome),
);
assert(
isDeepStrictEqual(await storedNetwork(env), before),
"switching back did not restore the mainnet network and endpoints",
);
await d.switchToWindow(env.dappWindow);
},
);
step(
"eth_sendTransaction shows the transaction and returns its hash",
async (env) => {
+26 -1
View File
@@ -333,8 +333,33 @@ async function launch(routeOpts) {
const PASSWORD = "e2e-harness-password";
// Waits until the page shows `selector`, not only until it lays out. Until the
// page's stylesheet has applied, the `hidden` class that showView() keeps on
// every view but the current one hides nothing and every view lays out, so a
// test could read a screen before the page's script had filled it
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/502). So the page must also
// have finished loading, which it does only after its stylesheet, and neither
// the element nor anything enclosing it may carry `hidden`. Polled on a timer:
// animation frames are not guaranteed to a window that is not in front.
async function visible(page, selector, timeout = 15000) {
await page.waitForSelector(selector, { state: "visible", timeout });
await page
.waitForFunction(
(sel) => {
const el = document.querySelector(sel);
if (document.readyState !== "complete" || !el) return false;
if (el.closest(".hidden")) return false;
if (getComputedStyle(el).visibility !== "visible") return false;
const r = el.getBoundingClientRect();
return r.width > 0 && r.height > 0;
},
selector,
{ polling: 50, timeout },
)
.catch((e) => {
throw new Error(
"the page did not show " + selector + ": " + e.message,
);
});
}
// An empty WebAssembly module: magic number and version header, no
+1 -1
View File
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ function word(value) {
// is the real inpage provider and not a copy the harness wired up.
//
// DAPP_HTML below is exported and served verbatim by the Firefox suite too
// (tests/e2e/firefox/dapp.js), from a loopback origin rather than through a
// (tests/e2e/dapp.js), from a loopback origin rather than through a
// route handler. The two suites drive different browsers over different
// protocols, but the page they drive — the __dapp API, the message log — is
// one fixture, so an assertion written against it means the same thing on
+207 -7
View File
@@ -113,6 +113,18 @@ test("the popup is drawn in the monospace font it declares (#418)", async (env)
);
});
// The same stylesheet sets the size on body to 75%, which would draw the
// popup at 12px.
test("the popup's text is drawn at the 14px text-sm declares (#456)", async (env) => {
const size = await env.page.evaluate(
() => getComputedStyle(document.body).fontSize,
);
assert(
size === "14px",
"the popup's text is drawn at " + size + ", not at the 14px of text-sm",
);
});
// The empirical half of #182. The manifest change is only a claim about
// what the CSP permits; this is the observation. Two things have to hold
// together, and the run covers both: the popup realm compiles WASM (here),
@@ -3499,7 +3511,7 @@ async function closeApprovalPages(ctx) {
}
// Click a button whose own handler closes the window it lives in — every
// Reject, and Allow on the site prompt.
// Reject, Allow on the site prompt, and Switch on the network switch prompt.
//
// page.click() dispatches the click and then waits for the renderer to
// acknowledge it, and a page torn down by the handler never gets to. The
@@ -3514,12 +3526,13 @@ async function closeApprovalPages(ctx) {
// #btn-reject-sign, #btn-reject-tx — their disconnect leaves the approval
// pending, so a click that never landed leaves the dApp promise unsettled
// and the assertion after the call fails on its own.
// #btn-approve — only a decision resolves the promise, and a swallowed click
// cannot produce settled === "resolved".
// #btn-reject on the site prompt — NOT self-proving. A page that went away
// without the click landing disconnects the approval port, the background
// settles that as 4001, and 4001 is exactly what assertUserRejection
// accepts. Both call sites arm the click trace below and assert it.
// #btn-approve, #btn-approve-network — only a decision resolves the promise,
// and a swallowed click cannot produce settled === "resolved".
// #btn-reject on the site prompt, #btn-reject-network — NOT self-proving. A
// page that went away without the click landing disconnects the approval
// port, the background settles that as 4001, and 4001 is exactly what
// assertUserRejection accepts. Every call site arms the click trace below
// and asserts it.
//
// A button that is missing or unclickable raises a different error, which is
// rethrown.
@@ -3844,6 +3857,9 @@ test("eth_requestAccounts approved returns the selected address (#183)", async (
shown.toLowerCase().includes(env.expectedAddress.toLowerCase()),
"the site prompt shows the wrong address: " + JSON.stringify(shown),
);
// The text above is there even when the row is too narrow to show it
// all; this measures that the whole address is visible (#517).
await assertAddressesFit(popup, "the connection prompt");
// Remembered, so the connection survives a background worker that MV3
// terminates after 30 seconds idle. The in-memory connectedSites map
@@ -4389,6 +4405,190 @@ test("a prompt raised while another approval window has focus opens its own (#29
await assertUserRejection(env.dapp, "focus-sign", "the sign prompt");
});
// The network fields of the stored record.
async function storedNetwork(page) {
const s = await storedRecord(page);
return {
networkId: s.networkId,
rpcUrl: s.rpcUrl,
blockscoutUrl: s.blockscoutUrl,
};
}
// Every chainChanged event the test page has been sent, waiting up to
// `timeout` for there to be `count` of them: the background sends the event
// alongside its answer to the request, so it can arrive just after it.
async function chainChangedEvents(page, count = 0, timeout = 5000) {
const deadline = Date.now() + timeout;
for (;;) {
const events = (await dappMessages(page, "AUTISTMASK_EVENT")).filter(
(m) => m.eventName === "chainChanged",
);
if (events.length >= count || Date.now() > deadline) return events;
await sleep(50);
}
}
// Ask, from the test page, to switch from network `from` to network `to`, and
// return the prompt that opens, checked to name the site and both networks.
async function openNetworkPrompt(env, key, from, to) {
await startRequest(env.dapp, key, "wallet_switchEthereumChain", [
{ chainId: to.chainId },
]);
const popup = await waitForApprovalWindow(env.ctx);
await visible(popup, "#view-approve-network");
const screen = await popup.evaluate(() => ({
origin: document.getElementById("approve-network-origin").textContent,
current: document.getElementById("approve-network-current").textContent,
requested: document.getElementById("approve-network-requested")
.textContent,
}));
assert(
isDeepStrictEqual(screen, {
origin: DAPP_ORIGIN,
current: from.name,
requested: to.name,
}),
"the network switch prompt shows " + JSON.stringify(screen),
);
return popup;
}
// Only the user switches the network. A connected site's request opens a
// prompt, and until the user approves it the stored network does not move and
// no page is told it did (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/408).
// The wallet goes back to mainnet the same way at the end, for the tests after
// this one.
test("a site's network switch changes nothing until the user approves it (#408)", async (env) => {
const { mainnet, sepolia } = NETWORKS;
const before = await storedNetwork(env.page);
assert(
before.networkId === "mainnet",
"this test starts on mainnet, not on " + before.networkId,
);
const eventsBefore = (await chainChangedEvents(env.dapp)).length;
const rejected = await openNetworkPrompt(
env,
"switch-reject",
mainnet,
sepolia,
);
try {
assert(
isDeepStrictEqual(await storedNetwork(env.page), before),
"the network moved while its prompt was still open",
);
// Closing the prompt unanswered is also a rejection, so the click
// itself is witnessed.
await armClickTrace(env, rejected, "#btn-reject-network");
await clickAndClose(rejected, "#btn-reject-network");
await assertClickLanded(env, "#btn-reject-network");
await assertUserRejection(
env.dapp,
"switch-reject",
"the network switch rejection",
);
} finally {
await closeApprovalPages(env.ctx);
}
assert(
isDeepStrictEqual(await storedNetwork(env.page), before),
"a rejected network switch moved the network",
);
assert(
(await chainChangedEvents(env.dapp)).length === eventsBefore,
"a rejected network switch told the page the chain changed",
);
const approved = await openNetworkPrompt(
env,
"switch-approve",
mainnet,
sepolia,
);
let outcome;
try {
await clickAndClose(approved, "#btn-approve-network");
outcome = await settleRequest(env.dapp, "switch-approve");
} finally {
await closeApprovalPages(env.ctx);
}
assert(
outcome.settled === "resolved" && outcome.result === null,
"the approved network switch did not resolve: " +
JSON.stringify(outcome),
);
assert(
(await storedNetwork(env.page)).networkId === "sepolia",
"the approved network switch did not move the network",
);
const events = await chainChangedEvents(env.dapp, eventsBefore + 1);
assert(
events.length === eventsBefore + 1 &&
events[events.length - 1].data === sepolia.chainId,
"the page was not told of the approved switch: " +
JSON.stringify(events),
);
const restored = await openNetworkPrompt(
env,
"switch-restore",
sepolia,
mainnet,
);
try {
await clickAndClose(restored, "#btn-approve-network");
outcome = await settleRequest(env.dapp, "switch-restore");
} finally {
await closeApprovalPages(env.ctx);
}
assert(
outcome.settled === "resolved",
"switching back to mainnet did not resolve: " + JSON.stringify(outcome),
);
assert(
isDeepStrictEqual(await storedNetwork(env.page), before),
"switching back did not restore the mainnet network and endpoints",
);
});
// Switching the network in Settings tells the page too, as an approved site
// request does (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/500). The wallet
// goes back to mainnet the same way at the end.
test("a network switch in Settings tells the page (#500)", async (env) => {
const { mainnet, sepolia } = NETWORKS;
const before = await storedNetwork(env.page);
assert(
before.networkId === "mainnet",
"this test starts on mainnet, not on " + before.networkId,
);
const eventsBefore = (await chainChangedEvents(env.dapp)).length;
await openSettings(env.page);
await env.page.selectOption("#settings-network", "sepolia");
let events = await chainChangedEvents(env.dapp, eventsBefore + 1);
assert(
events.length === eventsBefore + 1 &&
events[events.length - 1].data === sepolia.chainId,
"the page was not told of the switch to Sepolia: " +
JSON.stringify(events),
);
await env.page.selectOption("#settings-network", "mainnet");
events = await chainChangedEvents(env.dapp, eventsBefore + 2);
assert(
events.length === eventsBefore + 2 &&
events[events.length - 1].data === mainnet.chainId,
"the page was not told of the switch back to mainnet: " +
JSON.stringify(events),
);
assert(
isDeepStrictEqual(await storedNetwork(env.page), before),
"switching back did not restore the mainnet network and endpoints",
);
});
// The closing pass over both boundaries at once. Every message the section
// put on either channel is re-read here and required to be free of the
// password — and required to be there at all, method by method, so the
+530
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,530 @@
// A transaction approval and a signature approval the user leaves open for
// seven minutes, their windows minimized, are still answered, and the site
// receives both results (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/540).
//
// Both approvals, and the site's requests waiting on them, live only in the
// background worker's memory. With nothing else going on, Chrome stopped that
// worker about six minutes after the site's request, while the window was
// still open, and the user's answer then reached nobody. While an approval is
// pending, the worker now makes an extension call every 20 seconds, which
// keeps it running (addPendingApproval() in src/background/index.js). The
// windows are minimized for the wait because
// Chrome slows a hidden page's timers to once a minute after a few minutes,
// so anything the window itself did to keep the worker running would fail
// here.
//
// A separate program from run.js, and not driven by Playwright: Playwright
// keeps DevTools attached to the background worker, and Chrome never stops a
// worker DevTools is attached to, so in run.js the worker outlives any wait
// and a wait there proves nothing. This program starts Chromium itself and
// speaks the DevTools protocol over the pipe Chromium opens for it
// (--remote-debugging-pipe), attaching to pages only, never to the worker.
// Before the approvals are raised it watches the worker stop on its own, so a
// run in which something else keeps the worker running cannot pass.
//
// The dApp page and the stub node are the loopback ones the Firefox suite also
// uses (tests/e2e/dapp.js). The site is connected and the node chosen
// through the extension's own screens, so nothing is written to its storage
// from outside.
//
// Run through script/test-e2e, which builds the extension and the pinned
// container.
//
// node tests/e2e/slowApproval.js
"use strict";
const fs = require("fs");
const os = require("os");
const path = require("path");
const { spawn } = require("child_process");
const { chromium } = require("playwright-core");
const {
Transaction,
getAddress,
getBytes,
hexlify,
parseEther,
toQuantity,
toUtf8Bytes,
verifyMessage,
} = require("ethers");
const { PASSWORD } = require("./harness");
const { STUB_COUNTERPARTY } = require("./network");
const { startDappServer } = require("./dapp");
const DIST_CHROME = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..", "dist", "chrome");
// Chrome stopped the worker six minutes after the site's request when nothing
// kept it running, so the approvals are left open for longer than that.
const APPROVAL_WAIT_MS = 7 * 60 * 1000;
// With nothing pending, Chrome stops the worker 30 seconds after its last
// event; this is how long the program waits to see that.
const IDLE_STOP_TIMEOUT_MS = 90000;
const SIGN_HEX = hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("AutistMask e2e: a slow signature"));
const checks = [];
let failed = 0;
function check(name, cond, detail) {
checks.push(name);
if (cond) {
console.log("ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
} else {
failed += 1;
console.log("not ok " + checks.length + " - " + name);
if (detail) console.log(" " + detail);
}
}
function sleep(ms) {
return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
}
// Poll `probe` until it returns something truthy, and return that.
async function until(what, probe, timeout = 30000) {
const deadline = Date.now() + timeout;
for (;;) {
const value = await probe().catch(() => null);
if (value) return value;
if (Date.now() > deadline) {
throw new Error(
"gave up after " + timeout + "ms waiting for " + what,
);
}
await sleep(250);
}
}
// The DevTools protocol over Chromium's pipe: commands go to its fd 3, and
// replies and events come back on its fd 4, each one JSON message ended by a
// NUL byte. Events are not used and are dropped. Returns send(method, params,
// sessionId), which resolves with the command's result.
function devtools(browser) {
const waiting = new Map();
let nextId = 1;
let pending = "";
const replies = browser.stdio[4];
replies.setEncoding("utf8");
replies.on("data", (chunk) => {
pending += chunk;
let end;
while ((end = pending.indexOf("\0")) !== -1) {
const message = JSON.parse(pending.slice(0, end));
pending = pending.slice(end + 1);
const caller = waiting.get(message.id);
if (!caller) continue;
waiting.delete(message.id);
if (message.error) {
caller.reject(
new Error(caller.method + ": " + message.error.message),
);
} else {
caller.resolve(message.result);
}
}
});
replies.on("close", () => {
for (const caller of waiting.values()) {
caller.reject(new Error("the browser exited"));
}
waiting.clear();
});
return (method, params = {}, sessionId) =>
new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const id = nextId++;
waiting.set(id, { method, resolve, reject });
browser.stdio[3].write(
JSON.stringify({ id, method, params, sessionId }) + "\0",
);
});
}
// Attach to a page and return a function that evaluates an expression in it,
// awaiting a promise it returns, and resolves with the value.
async function attach(send, targetId) {
const { sessionId } = await send("Target.attachToTarget", {
targetId,
flatten: true,
});
return async (expression) => {
const r = await send(
"Runtime.evaluate",
{ expression, awaitPromise: true, returnByValue: true },
sessionId,
);
if (r.exceptionDetails) {
throw new Error(
"evaluating " +
expression.slice(0, 80) +
" threw: " +
JSON.stringify(r.exceptionDetails.exception || {}),
);
}
return r.result.value;
};
}
// Whether the page has loaded and shows the element with this id: the
// `hidden` class showView() keeps on every other view is on neither it nor
// anything around it.
function shows(id) {
return (
"document.readyState === 'complete' &&" +
" !!document.getElementById(" +
JSON.stringify(id) +
") && !document.getElementById(" +
JSON.stringify(id) +
").closest('.hidden')"
);
}
// Set an input's value and fire the input event typing would fire.
function typeInto(id, value) {
return (
"(() => { const el = document.getElementById(" +
JSON.stringify(id) +
"); el.value = " +
JSON.stringify(value) +
"; el.dispatchEvent(new Event('input', { bubbles: true })); })()"
);
}
function click(id) {
return "document.getElementById(" + JSON.stringify(id) + ").click()";
}
// The outcome of a request the dApp page started with __dapp.start(), or
// {settled: "pending"} if it has not settled within `timeout`.
function settled(key, timeout = 30000) {
return (
"Promise.race([window.__dapp.settle(" +
JSON.stringify(key) +
"), new Promise((r) => setTimeout(() => r({ settled: 'pending' }), " +
timeout +
"))])"
);
}
async function main() {
if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(DIST_CHROME, "manifest.json"))) {
console.error(
"slowApproval: no unpacked build at " +
DIST_CHROME +
" — run make build first",
);
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
const node = await startDappServer();
const profile = fs.mkdtempSync(
path.join(os.tmpdir(), "autistmask-slow-approval-"),
);
const browser = spawn(
chromium.executablePath(),
[
"--headless",
// The container runs unprivileged, as in harness.js.
"--no-sandbox",
"--remote-debugging-pipe",
"--user-data-dir=" + profile,
"--disable-extensions-except=" + DIST_CHROME,
"--load-extension=" + DIST_CHROME,
// Nothing but the loopback dApp page and stub node can be reached.
"--host-resolver-rules=MAP * ~NOTFOUND, EXCLUDE 127.0.0.1",
"about:blank",
],
{ stdio: ["ignore", "ignore", "ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] },
);
try {
const send = devtools(browser);
const targets = async () =>
(await send("Target.getTargets")).targetInfos;
const worker = await until("the background worker", async () =>
(await targets()).find(
(t) =>
t.type === "service_worker" &&
t.url.startsWith("chrome-extension://"),
),
);
// The extension id is the host of the worker's URL, as in harness.js.
const popupUrl =
"chrome-extension://" +
new URL(worker.url).host +
"/src/popup/index.html";
const workerRunning = async () =>
(await targets()).some((t) => t.url === worker.url);
const openPage = async (url) => {
const { targetId } = await send("Target.createTarget", { url });
return { targetId, evaluate: await attach(send, targetId) };
};
const approvalPages = async () =>
(await targets()).filter(
(t) => t.type === "page" && t.url.includes("?approval="),
);
// A wallet, through the popup's own screens, and the stub node as its
// RPC endpoint, through Settings.
const popup = await openPage(popupUrl);
await until("the welcome screen", () =>
popup.evaluate(shows("view-welcome")),
);
await popup.evaluate(click("btn-welcome-add"));
await until("the add wallet screen", () =>
popup.evaluate(shows("view-add-wallet")),
);
await popup.evaluate(click("btn-generate-phrase"));
await until("a generated recovery phrase", () =>
popup.evaluate(
"document.getElementById('wallet-mnemonic').value.trim()" +
".split(/\\s+/).length >= 12",
),
);
await popup.evaluate(typeInto("add-wallet-password", PASSWORD));
await popup.evaluate(typeInto("add-wallet-password-confirm", PASSWORD));
await popup.evaluate(click("btn-add-wallet-confirm"));
await until(
"the main screen",
() => popup.evaluate(shows("view-main")),
60000,
);
await popup.evaluate(click("btn-settings"));
await until("the settings screen", () =>
popup.evaluate(shows("view-settings")),
);
await popup.evaluate(typeInto("settings-rpc", node.rpcUrl));
await popup.evaluate(click("btn-save-rpc"));
await until("the stub node saved as the RPC endpoint", () =>
popup.evaluate(
"new Promise((resolve) => chrome.storage.local.get(" +
"'autistmask', (r) => resolve(r.autistmask.rpcUrl === " +
JSON.stringify(node.rpcUrl) +
")))",
),
);
await send("Target.closeTarget", { targetId: popup.targetId });
// The site, connected through the real prompt with "Remember", so
// the connection is stored rather than held by the worker.
const dapp = await openPage(node.url);
await until("the injected provider", () =>
dapp.evaluate("!!window.ethereum && !!window.__dapp"),
);
await dapp.evaluate(
"window.__dapp.start('accounts', 'eth_requestAccounts', [])",
);
const prompt = await until(
"the connection prompt",
async () => (await approvalPages())[0],
);
const inPrompt = await attach(send, prompt.targetId);
await until("the connection prompt's screen", () =>
inPrompt(shows("view-approve-site")),
);
await inPrompt(
"document.getElementById('approve-remember').checked = true",
);
// The prompt closes itself on the click.
await inPrompt(click("btn-approve")).catch(() => {});
const accounts = await dapp.evaluate(settled("accounts"));
if (accounts.settled !== "resolved") {
throw new Error(
"the site could not be connected: " + JSON.stringify(accounts),
);
}
const address = getAddress(accounts.result[0]);
console.log("# address " + address + ", site " + node.origin);
// The control: with nothing pending, the worker stops on its own.
// Were something else keeping it running, the wait below would
// prove nothing.
const idleStart = Date.now();
const stoppedWhenIdle = await until(
"the idle worker to stop",
async () => !(await workerRunning()),
IDLE_STOP_TIMEOUT_MS,
).catch(() => false);
check(
"with nothing pending, Chrome stops the background worker on its own",
stoppedWhenIdle,
"the worker was still running " +
IDLE_STOP_TIMEOUT_MS / 1000 +
"s after its last event, so something other than the " +
"approval windows is keeping it running",
);
console.log(
"# idle worker stopped after " +
Math.round((Date.now() - idleStart) / 1000) +
"s",
);
// A transaction approval and a signature approval, both open at once.
await dapp.evaluate(
"window.__dapp.start('tx', 'eth_sendTransaction', [" +
JSON.stringify({
from: address,
to: STUB_COUNTERPARTY,
value: toQuantity(parseEther("0.01")),
}) +
"])",
);
await until("the transaction approval window", async () =>
(await approvalPages()).length === 1 ? true : null,
);
await dapp.evaluate(
"window.__dapp.start('sign', 'personal_sign', [" +
JSON.stringify(SIGN_HEX) +
", " +
JSON.stringify(address) +
"])",
);
const windows = await until("both approval windows", async () => {
const pages = await approvalPages();
return pages.length === 2 ? pages : null;
});
let txWindow = null;
let signWindow = null;
const windowIds = [];
for (const page of windows) {
const evaluate = await attach(send, page.targetId);
const view = await until("an approval screen", () =>
evaluate(
"(" +
shows("view-approve-tx") +
") ? 'tx' : (" +
shows("view-approve-sign") +
") ? 'sign' : null",
),
);
if (view === "tx") txWindow = evaluate;
if (view === "sign") signWindow = evaluate;
const { windowId } = await send("Browser.getWindowForTarget", {
targetId: page.targetId,
});
windowIds.push(windowId);
}
if (!txWindow || !signWindow) {
throw new Error("the two windows are not one of each kind");
}
const setWindowState = (windowState) =>
Promise.all(
windowIds.map((windowId) =>
send("Browser.setWindowBounds", {
windowId,
bounds: { windowState },
}),
),
);
// The user minimizes both windows while deciding.
await setWindowState("minimized");
const bothHidden = await until(
"both approval pages hidden",
async () =>
(await txWindow("document.visibilityState")) === "hidden" &&
(await signWindow("document.visibilityState")) === "hidden",
).catch(() => false);
check(
"both approval windows are minimized, and their pages are hidden",
bothHidden,
"a page still reports itself visible, so the wait below would " +
"not show what happens to a minimized approval",
);
// The user takes seven minutes. The worker is checked every two
// seconds, and the wait ends early if Chrome stops it.
const opened = Date.now();
let stoppedAfter = null;
while (Date.now() - opened < APPROVAL_WAIT_MS) {
if (!(await workerRunning())) {
stoppedAfter = Math.round((Date.now() - opened) / 1000);
break;
}
await sleep(2000);
}
check(
"the background worker keeps running while both approvals wait in minimized windows",
stoppedAfter === null,
"Chrome stopped the worker " +
stoppedAfter +
"s after the approvals opened",
);
// Back on screen to be answered.
await setWindowState("normal");
await txWindow(typeInto("approve-tx-password", PASSWORD));
await txWindow(click("btn-approve-tx"));
await signWindow(typeInto("approve-sign-password", PASSWORD));
// The window closes itself once the signature is handed over.
await signWindow(click("btn-approve-sign")).catch(() => {});
const tx = await dapp.evaluate(settled("tx"));
const broadcast = node.broadcast.map((raw) => Transaction.from(raw));
check(
"the transaction approved after seven minutes reaches the site",
tx.settled === "resolved" &&
broadcast.length === 1 &&
tx.result === broadcast[0].hash &&
getAddress(broadcast[0].from) === address,
"the page got " +
JSON.stringify(tx) +
" and the node received " +
broadcast.length +
" transaction(s)",
);
const sign = await dapp.evaluate(settled("sign"));
check(
"the signature approved after seven minutes reaches the site",
sign.settled === "resolved" &&
getAddress(verifyMessage(getBytes(SIGN_HEX), sign.result)) ===
address,
"the page got " + JSON.stringify(sign),
);
} catch (e) {
failed += 1;
console.log("# ERROR: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
} finally {
if (browser.exitCode === null && browser.signalCode === null) {
const exited = new Promise((resolve) =>
browser.once("exit", resolve),
);
browser.kill();
await exited;
}
await node.close();
// Chromium's helper processes can still be writing to the profile
// for a moment after the browser process itself has exited.
fs.rmSync(profile, { recursive: true, force: true, maxRetries: 5 });
}
console.log("1.." + checks.length);
if (checks.length === 0) {
console.log("# FAILED: this program asserted nothing");
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
console.log(
"# " +
(checks.length - failed) +
"/" +
checks.length +
" checks passed",
);
if (failed > 0) {
console.log("# FAILED");
process.exitCode = 1;
}
}
main().catch((e) => {
console.error("slowApproval: " + (e && e.stack ? e.stack : e));
process.exitCode = 1;
});
+102
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
// The sign screen signs an eth_sign request the way it signs personal_sign: as
// an EIP-191 personal message over the bytes of the data
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/409). Booted through the real
// popup entry point as the approval window. The background's half, which reads
// the address first and the data second and checks the signature, is tested in
// tests/backgroundApproval.test.js.
// Mocked so that no password has to be hashed: the stored secret decrypts to
// the test key below.
jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
encryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
}));
const { Wallet, getBytes } = require("ethers");
const {
bootPopup,
cleanupPopup,
unversionedValidProfile,
} = require("./support/popupBoot");
// A published test key, never used for real funds.
const SIGNER_KEY =
"0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
// "Hello AutistMask", as the hex a page sends.
const MESSAGE = "0x48656c6c6f204175746973744d61736b";
const ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
afterEach(cleanupPopup);
test("the sign screen answers eth_sign with a personal message signature over the data", async () => {
const sent = [];
const page = await bootPopup(
unversionedValidProfile({
wallets: [
{
type: "key",
name: "Wallet 1",
encryptedSecret: "encrypted-key",
addresses: [
{
address: signer.address,
balance: "0.0000",
tokenBalances: [],
},
],
},
],
activeAddress: signer.address,
allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [ORIGIN] },
}),
{
search: "?approval=approval-1",
runtime: {
connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
// Answered as the background answers: with the eth_sign
// approval this window was opened for, and by handing back
// the signature the popup sends.
sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
sent.push(msg);
if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
reply({
type: "sign",
origin: ORIGIN,
isPhishingDomain: false,
approvedFrom: signer.address,
signParams: {
method: "eth_sign",
message: MESSAGE,
from: signer.address,
},
});
} else if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE") {
reply({ signature: msg.signature });
} else {
reply(undefined);
}
},
},
},
);
globalThis.window.close = jest.fn();
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue(SIGNER_KEY);
expect(page.visibleViews()).toEqual(["approve-sign"]);
page.node("approve-sign-password").value = "any password";
await page.click("btn-approve-sign");
expect(
sent.filter((msg) => msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE"),
).toEqual([
{
type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
id: "approval-1",
approved: true,
signature: await signer.signMessage(getBytes(MESSAGE)),
},
]);
expect(globalThis.window.close).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
+141
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
// Adding the first wallet left no address active until the popup was reopened,
// so Send and Receive on Home only said "No active address selected."
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/512). Each test adds a wallet
// through one of the three import tabs and checks which address is active by
// opening Receive from Home in the same popup.
const { HDNodeWallet, Mnemonic, Wallet } = require("ethers");
const {
bootPopup,
cleanupPopup,
unversionedValidProfile,
ADDRESS,
} = require("./support/popupBoot");
const PHRASE =
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon " +
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about";
const PRIVATE_KEY = "0x" + "11".repeat(32);
// The master key of PHRASE, so its first address is the phrase's.
const XPRV = HDNodeWallet.fromSeed(
Mnemonic.fromPhrase(PHRASE).computeSeed(),
).extendedKey;
const PASSWORD = "correct horse battery staple";
const PHRASE_ADDRESS = HDNodeWallet.fromPhrase(PHRASE).address;
// Addresses 1 and 2 of PHRASE used, address 0 not: a scan that answers these
// replaces the wallet's list with one that leaves out its first address.
const account = HDNodeWallet.fromPhrase(PHRASE, "", "m/44'/60'/0'/0");
const used = [1, 2].map((index) => ({
address: account.deriveChild(index).address,
index,
}));
const TABS = [
{
tab: "tab-mnemonic",
field: "wallet-mnemonic",
secret: PHRASE,
address: PHRASE_ADDRESS,
},
{
tab: "tab-privkey",
field: "import-private-key",
secret: PRIVATE_KEY,
address: new Wallet(PRIVATE_KEY).address,
},
{
tab: "tab-xprv",
field: "import-xprv-key",
secret: XPRV,
address: PHRASE_ADDRESS,
},
];
// Fills in the open AddWallet screen and presses "Import".
async function importOn(page, { tab, field, secret }) {
await page.click(tab);
page.node(field).value = secret;
page.node("add-wallet-password").value = PASSWORD;
page.node("add-wallet-password-confirm").value = PASSWORD;
await page.click("btn-add-wallet-confirm");
}
afterEach(() => {
cleanupPopup();
});
describe("the first wallet's first address is active right away", () => {
test.each(TABS)("added from $tab, Receive opens on it", async (entry) => {
const page = await bootPopup(undefined);
expect(page.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
await page.click("btn-welcome-add");
await importOn(page, entry);
expect(page.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
await page.click("btn-main-receive");
expect(page.visibleViews()).toEqual(["receive"]);
expect(page.node("receive-address-block").dataset.full).toBe(
entry.address,
);
});
});
describe("a scan that leaves out the first address", () => {
// The key tab runs no scan.
test.each(TABS.filter((t) => t.tab !== "tab-privkey"))(
"added from $tab, the scan's first address is active",
async (entry) => {
const page = await bootPopup(undefined);
const { scanForAddresses } = require("../src/shared/balances");
scanForAddresses.mockResolvedValueOnce({
addresses: used,
nextIndex: 3,
});
await page.click("btn-welcome-add");
await importOn(page, entry);
expect(page.storage.read("autistmask").activeAddress).toBe(
used[0].address,
);
expect(globalThis.chrome.runtime.sendMessage).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED",
});
await page.click("btn-main-receive");
expect(page.node("receive-address-block").dataset.full).toBe(
used[0].address,
);
},
);
});
describe("adding a wallet while an address is active", () => {
test.each(TABS)(
"added from $tab, the active address is unchanged",
async (entry) => {
const page = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
expect(page.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
// The phrase and xprv scans leave out the new wallet's first
// address, which was never active here. The key tab runs no scan.
const { scanForAddresses } = require("../src/shared/balances");
scanForAddresses.mockResolvedValueOnce({
addresses: used,
nextIndex: 3,
});
await page.click("btn-add-wallet-bottom");
await importOn(page, entry);
expect(page.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(page.storage.read("autistmask").activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
expect(
globalThis.chrome.runtime.sendMessage,
).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith({ type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED" });
await page.click("btn-main-receive");
expect(page.node("receive-address-block").dataset.full).toBe(
ADDRESS,
);
},
);
});
+4 -4
View File
@@ -345,10 +345,10 @@ describe.each([
});
// A transaction's value and fee are in the native currency of the network the
// transaction is on, which need not be the active one. A site can switch the
// active network after its transaction is prepared and back before it is
// signed, and a popup opened after a switch shows a sent or listed transaction
// again. The wallet's balances follow the active network; these do not.
// transaction is on, which need not be the active one. The active network can
// change, in Settings or when the user approves a site's request, after a
// transaction is prepared and change back before it is signed, and a popup
// opened after a switch shows a sent or listed transaction again. The wallet's balances follow the active network; these do not.
describe.each([
["mainnet", "sepolia", "ETH"],
["sepolia", "mainnet", "SepoliaETH"],
+13
View File
@@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ describe("vendored blocklist", () => {
expect(isPhishingDomain(LISTED[0].toUpperCase())).toBe(true);
});
test("a hostname ending in a dot is the same host", () => {
expect(isPhishingDomain(LISTED[1] + ".")).toBe(true);
expect(isPhishingDomain("wallet." + LISTED[1] + ".")).toBe(true);
expect(isPhishingDomain(CLEAN[0] + ".")).toBe(false);
});
test("returns false for an empty or missing hostname", () => {
expect(isPhishingDomain("")).toBe(false);
expect(isPhishingDomain(null)).toBe(false);
@@ -133,6 +139,13 @@ describe("hostnameVariants", () => {
test("lowercases hostnames", () => {
expect(hostnameVariants("Evil.COM")).toEqual(["evil.com"]);
});
test("drops the trailing dot of a fully qualified hostname", () => {
expect(hostnameVariants("sub.evil.com.")).toEqual([
"sub.evil.com",
"evil.com",
]);
});
});
describe("domain hashing", () => {
+47 -2
View File
@@ -8,8 +8,15 @@
// and a request the browser said nothing about was credited to whatever the
// page wrote (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/407).
//
// Every sender here lacks sender.origin, as on old Firefox. The connection
// check on eth_accounts is what shows which site a request was credited to.
// An origin with no host names no site, so its request is refused
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/527). The browser reports
// "null" for a page with an opaque origin, such as one its server sandboxes
// with a Content-Security-Policy, and Chrome reports "file://" for a local
// file.
//
// Every other sender here lacks sender.origin, as on old Firefox. The
// connection check on eth_accounts is what shows which site a request was
// credited to.
const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
@@ -144,3 +151,41 @@ describe("a request the browser does not say the sender of", () => {
});
});
});
describe("a request whose origin has no host", () => {
test("from a page with an opaque origin is refused, whatever its URL says", async () => {
const accounts = loadBackground();
const result = await accounts({
origin: "null",
url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/sandboxed.html",
tab: { url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/sandboxed.html" },
});
expect(result).toEqual({
error: {
code: 4100,
message:
"The wallet could not tell which site sent this request.",
},
});
});
test("from a local file is refused", async () => {
const accounts = loadBackground();
const result = await accounts({
origin: "file://",
url: "file:///home/user/page.html",
tab: { url: "file:///home/user/page.html" },
});
expect(result).toEqual({
error: {
code: 4100,
message:
"The wallet could not tell which site sent this request.",
},
});
});
});
+34 -3
View File
@@ -238,6 +238,17 @@ async function settle() {
* @param {object} [options]
* @param {object} [options.storage] a storage stub from makeStorageStub(), for
* a test that needs to make writes fail or to watch the round trips.
* @param {string} [options.search] the page URL's query string, such as
* "?approval=" and an id for the popup opened as an approval window.
* @param {object} [options.runtime] members of chrome.runtime that replace the
* stub's own, for a test that has to answer the background's messages.
* @param {object} [options.windows] chrome.windows, for a test of the approval
* window resizing itself.
* @param {object} [options.tabs] chrome.tabs, for the same test: the page's
* tab and its zoom.
* @param {object} [options.documentElement] members of document.documentElement
* that replace the stub's own: scrollWidth and clientWidth, which are equal
* unless a test says otherwise, so the page does not scroll sideways.
* @returns {Promise<object>} handles onto the booted page.
*/
async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
@@ -254,12 +265,17 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
formatAddressTotal: () => "",
getAddressValue: () => ({ usd: null, partial: false }),
}));
// scanForAddresses() answers in the real one's shape, a scan that found
// no used address: AddWallet reads `addresses` from it.
jest.doMock("../../src/shared/balances", () => ({
fetchTokenBalances: jest.fn(async () => []),
refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
lookupTokenInfo: jest.fn(async () => null),
getProvider: () => ({}),
scanForAddresses: jest.fn(async () => []),
scanForAddresses: jest.fn(async () => ({
addresses: [],
nextIndex: 1,
})),
}));
// filterTransactions() answers in the real one's shape: Home,
// AddressDetail and AddressToken read both fields, and a bare list makes
@@ -273,7 +289,13 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
(options && options.storage) ||
makeStorageStub(stored === undefined ? {} : { autistmask: stored });
const document = makeDocument(POPUP_HTML);
Object.assign(
document.documentElement,
{ scrollWidth: 396, clientWidth: 396 },
options && options.documentElement,
);
const reloads = [];
const windowListeners = {};
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: storage.local },
@@ -281,12 +303,15 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
sendMessage: jest.fn(async () => ({})),
getURL: (p) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + p,
onMessage: { addListener: () => {} },
...(options && options.runtime),
},
windows: options && options.windows,
tabs: options && options.tabs,
};
globalThis.document = document;
globalThis.window = {
location: {
search: "",
search: (options && options.search) || "",
href: "chrome-extension://autistmask/src/popup/index.html",
reload: () => reloads.push(Date.now()),
},
@@ -295,7 +320,13 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
addEventListener: () => {},
removeEventListener: () => {},
}),
addEventListener: () => {},
// Recorded, as the document's are, so a test that widens the approval
// window can call the page's resize listeners.
listeners: windowListeners,
addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
windowListeners[name] = windowListeners[name] || [];
windowListeners[name].push(fn);
},
};
// The ten-second refresh init() starts, and a transaction wait's timers,
// would outlive the test. So every interval is recorded rather than
+342
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,342 @@
// The amount the wait and error screens show for a swap whose amount the
// decoder did not read (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/358).
//
// A V4 swap action not in the deployed shape is not read, and a V4 exact-out
// action is read for its currencies only, so the approval screen has no
// Amount line for either. The wait and error screens then showed the
// transaction's ETH value as the amount, in the swap's input token when the
// calldata named one ("0.0000 WETH" for a swap of 1 WETH) and in ETH when it
// did not ("0.0000 ETH"). They now say the amount could not be decoded. A swap
// paid in native ETH still shows the transaction's ETH value there: that value
// is the ETH the swap pays.
//
// Driven through the real approval screen, password and Confirm included,
// against a minimal DOM stub in the shape tests/approvalNonce.test.js uses.
// The vault is mocked so that no password has to be hashed.
jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
}));
// The wait screen polls for a receipt, which is there once mockReceipt is set.
let mockReceipt = null;
jest.mock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
getProvider: () => ({ getTransactionReceipt: async () => mockReceipt }),
refreshBalances: () => {},
}));
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
const { AbiCoder, Interface } = require("ethers");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
const txStatus = require("../src/popup/views/txStatus");
// A well-known test phrase, and its first address.
const PHRASE = "test test test test test test test test test test test junk";
const FROM = "0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266";
const TX_HASH = "0x" + "4".repeat(64);
const ROUTER = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
const ZERO = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
// Both in the bundled list: WETH at 18 decimals, USDC at 6.
const WETH = "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2";
const USDC = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
const ONE_WETH = 1000000000000000000n;
const coder = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
const routerIface = new Interface([
"function execute(bytes commands, bytes[] inputs, uint256 deadline)",
]);
// V4 action ids and their parameters, each swapping WETH for USDC.
const POOL_KEY = "tuple(address,address,uint24,int24,address)";
const WETH_USDC_POOL = [WETH, USDC, 100, 1, ZERO];
const SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE = 0x06;
const SWAP_EXACT_OUT_SINGLE = 0x08;
const SETTLE = 0x0b;
const SETTLE_ALL = 0x0c;
const TAKE = 0x0e;
const TAKE_ALL = 0x0f;
// The struct V4Router has deployed on mainnet and Sepolia.
const exactInSingle = coder.encode(
[`tuple(${POOL_KEY},bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)`],
[[WETH_USDC_POOL, true, ONE_WETH, 990000n, "0x"]],
);
// The one v4-periphery `main` has moved to, with a `minHopPriceX36` field.
const newerExactInSingle = coder.encode(
[`tuple(${POOL_KEY},bool,uint128,uint128,uint256,bytes)`],
[[WETH_USDC_POOL, true, ONE_WETH, 990000n, 0n, "0x"]],
);
// Deployed shape: buys 990000 base units of USDC for at most 1 WETH.
const exactOutSingle = coder.encode(
[`tuple(${POOL_KEY},bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)`],
[[WETH_USDC_POOL, true, 990000n, ONE_WETH, "0x"]],
);
const settleWeth = coder.encode(
["address", "uint256", "bool"],
[WETH, 0n, true],
);
const takeUsdc = coder.encode(
["address", "address", "uint256"],
[USDC, FROM, 0n],
);
const settleAllWeth = coder.encode(["address", "uint256"], [WETH, ONE_WETH]);
const takeAllUsdc = coder.encode(["address", "uint256"], [USDC, 990000n]);
// The same swaps paid in native ETH, which V4 names as the zero address.
const ETH_USDC_POOL = [ZERO, USDC, 500, 10, ZERO];
const ONE_ETH = 1000000000000000000n;
const ethExactOutSingle = coder.encode(
[`tuple(${POOL_KEY},bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)`],
[[ETH_USDC_POOL, true, 990000n, ONE_ETH, "0x"]],
);
const newerEthExactInSingle = coder.encode(
[`tuple(${POOL_KEY},bool,uint128,uint128,uint256,bytes)`],
[[ETH_USDC_POOL, true, ONE_ETH, 990000n, 0n, "0x"]],
);
// The router pays it from the ETH the transaction sends.
const settleEth = coder.encode(
["address", "uint256", "bool"],
[ZERO, 0n, false],
);
// execute() with one V4_SWAP step of these actions, given as [id, params].
function v4SwapData(actions) {
const input = coder.encode(
["bytes", "bytes[]"],
[new Uint8Array(actions.map((a) => a[0])), actions.map((a) => a[1])],
);
return routerIface.encodeFunctionData("execute", [
"0x10",
[input],
9999999999n,
]);
}
function makeElement(id) {
const classes = new Set();
const el = {
id,
textContent: "",
value: "",
innerHTML: "",
disabled: false,
style: {},
dataset: {},
listeners: {},
classList: {
add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
toggle: (n, force) => {
const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
if (on) classes.add(n);
else classes.delete(n);
return on;
},
},
addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
el.listeners[name].push(fn);
},
querySelectorAll: () => [],
appendChild: () => {},
};
// Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
});
return el;
}
function makeDocument() {
const els = new Map();
return {
getElementById(id) {
// The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
// is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
return els.get(id);
},
createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
body: { prepend: () => {} },
};
}
function node(id) {
return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
}
function click(id) {
return Promise.all((node(id).listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn()));
}
// Open the approval screen for this calldata, sent to the router with `value`
// wei (no ETH unless given), and confirm it. The background answers the signed
// transaction with `response`.
async function approveSwap(data, response, value = 0n) {
globalThis.document = makeDocument();
globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" }, close: () => {} };
globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
if (!reply) return;
if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(response);
reply({
type: "tx",
origin: "https://dapp.example",
isPhishingDomain: false,
approvedFrom: FROM,
approvedTx: {
type: 2,
from: FROM,
chainId: "0x1",
nonce: "0x7",
gasLimit: "0x30d40",
maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
to: ROUTER,
value: "0x" + value.toString(16),
data,
accessList: [],
},
});
},
};
state.activeAddress = FROM;
state.trackedTokens = [];
state.wallets = [
{
type: "hd",
name: "Wallet 1",
xpub: "xpub-wallet-1",
encryptedSecret: "encrypted-secret-1",
nextIndex: 1,
addresses: [
{ address: FROM, index: 0, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] },
],
},
];
txStatus.init({ doRefreshAndRender: () => {} });
approval.init({});
await approval.show(1);
decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue(PHRASE);
node("approve-tx-password").value = "any password";
await click("btn-approve-tx");
}
afterEach(() => {
txStatus.endWait();
mockReceipt = null;
});
describe.each([
[
"a swap action in the deployed shape",
[
[SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE, exactInSingle],
[SETTLE, settleWeth],
[TAKE, takeUsdc],
],
"1.0000 WETH",
],
[
"a swap action in the newer shape, with SETTLE naming WETH",
[
[SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE, newerExactInSingle],
[SETTLE, settleWeth],
[TAKE, takeUsdc],
],
"Unknown (could not be decoded)",
],
[
"a swap action in the newer shape, with SETTLE_ALL and TAKE_ALL",
[
[SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE, newerExactInSingle],
[SETTLE_ALL, settleAllWeth],
[TAKE_ALL, takeAllUsdc],
],
"Unknown (could not be decoded)",
],
[
"an exact-out swap action, which is read for its currencies only",
[
[SWAP_EXACT_OUT_SINGLE, exactOutSingle],
[SETTLE, settleWeth],
[TAKE, takeUsdc],
],
"Unknown (could not be decoded)",
],
])("%s", (_name, actions, expected) => {
test("the wait screen's amount", async () => {
await approveSwap(v4SwapData(actions), { txHash: TX_HASH });
expect(node("wait-tx-summary").textContent).toBe(expected);
});
test("the error screen's amount", async () => {
await approveSwap(v4SwapData(actions), {
error: "The transaction could not be sent.",
retryable: false,
});
expect(node("error-tx-summary").textContent).toBe(expected);
});
// The success screen shows the approval screen's decoded lines in place
// of the amount, so the ETH value is not on it either.
test("the success screen has no amount line of its own", async () => {
await approveSwap(v4SwapData(actions), { txHash: TX_HASH });
mockReceipt = { blockNumber: 1 };
// A later popup resumes the wait, and the receipt is there.
txStatus.restoreWait();
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
}
const summary = node("success-tx-summary").parentElement;
expect(summary.classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(true);
expect(node("success-tx-decoded").innerHTML).not.toContain("0.0000");
});
});
// A swap paid in native ETH has a Token In of "ETH (native)" and no Amount
// line, and sends 1 ETH.
describe.each([
[
"an exact-out swap action paid in ETH, in the deployed shape",
[
[SWAP_EXACT_OUT_SINGLE, ethExactOutSingle],
[SETTLE, settleEth],
[TAKE, takeUsdc],
],
],
[
"a swap action in the newer shape paid in ETH, with SETTLE naming ETH",
[
[SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE, newerEthExactInSingle],
[SETTLE, settleEth],
[TAKE, takeUsdc],
],
],
])("%s", (_name, actions) => {
test("the wait screen shows the ETH the transaction sends", async () => {
await approveSwap(v4SwapData(actions), { txHash: TX_HASH }, ONE_ETH);
expect(node("wait-tx-summary").textContent).toBe("1.0000 ETH");
});
test("the error screen shows the ETH the transaction sends", async () => {
await approveSwap(
v4SwapData(actions),
{
error: "The transaction could not be sent.",
retryable: false,
},
ONE_ETH,
);
expect(node("error-tx-summary").textContent).toBe("1.0000 ETH");
});
});
+176
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
// The decoded details on the transaction detail screen of a token transfer
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/515).
//
// A history row for a token transfer holds the transfer's recipient as its
// `to`, not the contract the transaction was sent to. The screen used to decode
// the transaction's data against that `to`, so its Token line named the
// recipient, and the amount read "decimals unknown" for a token the wallet
// tracks. It decodes against the address the explorer reports the transaction
// was sent to.
//
// The row is the one the real history parser makes from the explorer's answer,
// opened through transactionDetail.show(), which is what a click on the row
// calls. Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
// tests/contractCreation.test.js uses.
const { Interface } = require("ethers");
jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
log: {
debugf: () => {},
infof: () => {},
warnf: () => {},
errorf: () => {},
},
debugFetch: async (url) => ({
ok: true,
json: async () => mockExplorerAnswer(url),
}),
setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
isDebug: () => false,
}));
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const { fetchRecentTransactions } = require("../src/shared/transactions");
const transactionDetail = require("../src/popup/views/transactionDetail");
const EXPLORER = "https://explorer.example/api/v2";
const HOLDER = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
const RECIPIENT = "0x711e691962E5c054b78071C789A0C8CE657377aD";
// A token the wallet tracks and the bundled token list does not name.
const TOKEN = "0x74de5d4FCbf63E00296fd95d33236B9794016631";
const TX_HASH =
"0x85215772ed26ea8b39c2b3b18779030487efbe0b5fd7e882592b2f62b837be84";
// HOLDER sends 1234.5 of the 6-decimal token to RECIPIENT.
const TRANSFER_DATA = new Interface([
"function transfer(address to, uint256 amount)",
]).encodeFunctionData("transfer", [RECIPIENT, 1234500000n]);
// The explorer's answers: the transfer in HOLDER's token transfers, and the
// transaction itself, sent to the token contract.
function mockExplorerAnswer(url) {
if (
url ===
EXPLORER + "/addresses/" + HOLDER + "/token-transfers?type=ERC-20"
) {
return {
items: [
{
transaction_hash: TX_HASH,
block_number: 100,
timestamp: "2026-10-01T00:00:00Z",
from: { hash: HOLDER },
to: { hash: RECIPIENT },
total: { value: "1234500000", decimals: "6" },
token: {
address_hash: TOKEN,
symbol: "TDOL",
holders_count: "5000",
},
},
],
};
}
if (url === EXPLORER + "/transactions/" + TX_HASH) {
return { to: { hash: TOKEN }, raw_input: TRANSFER_DATA };
}
return { items: [] };
}
function makeElement(id) {
const classes = new Set();
const el = {
id,
textContent: "",
value: "",
innerHTML: "",
style: {},
dataset: {},
classList: {
add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
toggle: () => false,
},
addEventListener: () => {},
querySelectorAll: () => [],
appendChild: () => {},
};
// Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
});
return el;
}
function makeDocument() {
const els = new Map();
return {
getElementById(id) {
// The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
// is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
return els.get(id);
},
createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
body: { prepend: () => {} },
};
}
function node(id) {
return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
}
// One line of the decoded details: its label and what is drawn under it.
function decodedLine(label) {
return node("tx-detail-calldata-details")
.innerHTML.split('<div class="mb-2">')
.find((line) =>
line.startsWith(`<div class="text-muted">${label}</div>`),
);
}
beforeEach(() => {
globalThis.document = makeDocument();
globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
state.blockscoutUrl = EXPLORER;
state.wallets = [
{
name: "Main",
type: "key",
addresses: [{ address: HOLDER, balance: "0.0000" }],
},
];
state.trackedTokens = [{ address: TOKEN, symbol: "TDOL", decimals: 6 }];
state.viewData = {};
state.viewStack = [];
state.currentView = null;
});
test("a token transfer's decoded details name the token contract and the amount at its scale", async () => {
const [row] = await fetchRecentTransactions(HOLDER, EXPLORER, 1);
expect(row.to).toBe(RECIPIENT);
expect(row.contractAddress).toBe(TOKEN.toLowerCase());
transactionDetail.show(row);
// The decoded details are drawn once the explorer has answered.
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
expect(node("tx-detail-calldata-action").textContent).toBe(
"Token Transfer",
);
const token = decodedLine("Token");
expect(token).toContain('<div class="font-bold">TDOL</div>');
expect(token).toContain(TOKEN);
expect(token).not.toContain(RECIPIENT);
expect(decodedLine("Recipient")).toContain(RECIPIENT);
expect(decodedLine("Amount")).toContain(
'<div class="font-bold">1234.5000 TDOL</div>',
);
});
+236 -2
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
const { getAddress, MaxUint256 } = require("ethers");
const { getAddress, MaxUint256, TypedDataEncoder } = require("ethers");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
@@ -233,6 +233,26 @@ function warningOf(data) {
return html.slice(0, html.indexOf(">Domain<"));
}
const NOT_SIGNED = ">Not part of the signature<";
// The Message section alone, without the keys listed after it as not part of
// the signature.
function messageOf(data) {
const html = formatTypedDataHtml(JSON.stringify(data));
const end = html.indexOf(NOT_SIGNED);
return html.slice(
html.indexOf(">Message<"),
end === -1 ? html.length : end,
);
}
// The keys listed as not part of the signature, or "" when there are none.
function notSignedOf(data) {
const html = formatTypedDataHtml(JSON.stringify(data));
const start = html.indexOf(NOT_SIGNED);
return start === -1 ? "" : html.slice(start);
}
function request(data) {
return { method: "eth_signTypedData_v4", typedData: JSON.stringify(data) };
}
@@ -240,6 +260,7 @@ function request(data) {
beforeEach(() => {
state.trackedTokens = [];
state.wallets = [];
state.networkId = "mainnet";
});
describe("a token permission is warned about, naming spender and amount", () => {
@@ -311,7 +332,8 @@ describe("the warning reads only the fields the signed type declares", () => {
});
// A Permit whose type names its spender `operator`; the page adds a
// `spender` key the type does not declare.
// `spender` key the type does not declare. The Message section names
// only the operator, and the added key is listed apart as not signed.
test("an added key is not named as the spender", () => {
const data = {
...PERMIT,
@@ -330,6 +352,10 @@ describe("the warning reads only the fields the signed type declares", () => {
const warning = warningOf(data);
expect(warning).toContain(WARNING);
expect(warning).not.toContain(DECOY);
expect(messageOf(data)).toContain(SPENDER);
expect(messageOf(data)).not.toContain(DECOY);
expect(notSignedOf(data)).toContain("spender:");
expect(notSignedOf(data)).toContain(DECOY);
});
// The permit for a Uniswap v3 position NFT: a `Permit` with no amount
@@ -370,6 +396,47 @@ describe("the warning reads only the fields the signed type declares", () => {
});
});
// ethers signs only the declared fields at every level of nesting, so an
// added key inside a struct is not signed either. Such typed data is not
// refused; the added key is listed apart, with where it sits in the message.
describe("the Message section shows only the fields that are signed", () => {
const NOTE = "This signature only signs you in";
test("an added key inside a nested struct is listed as not signed", () => {
const data = {
...PERMIT_SINGLE,
message: {
...PERMIT_SINGLE.message,
details: { ...PERMIT_SINGLE.message.details, note: NOTE },
},
};
expect(messageOf(data)).toContain("expiration");
expect(messageOf(data)).not.toContain(NOTE);
expect(notSignedOf(data)).toContain("details.note:");
expect(notSignedOf(data)).toContain(NOTE);
expect(typedDataRefusal(request(data))).toBeNull();
});
test("an added key inside a list item is listed with its index", () => {
const [first, second] = PERMIT_BATCH.message.details;
const data = {
...PERMIT_BATCH,
message: {
...PERMIT_BATCH.message,
details: [first, { ...second, note: NOTE }],
},
};
expect(messageOf(data)).not.toContain(NOTE);
expect(notSignedOf(data)).toContain("details[1].note:");
expect(notSignedOf(data)).toContain(NOTE);
});
test("nothing is listed apart when every key is declared", () => {
expect(notSignedOf(PERMIT_SINGLE)).toBe("");
expect(notSignedOf(LOGIN)).toBe("");
});
});
describe("the primary type shown is the one ethers signs", () => {
// A drain stated as a sign-in: the page says Login, the types say
// PermitSingle, and ethers would sign PermitSingle.
@@ -532,3 +599,170 @@ describe("the sign screen refuses a mismatched primary type", () => {
expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
});
});
// EIP-712: a wallet refuses typed data whose domain names a chain other than
// the active one, because the signature is valid on the chain it names
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/519). The wallet is on Sepolia
// and the site asks for a mainnet USDC Permit.
describe("the sign screen refuses typed data for another chain", () => {
const REFUSAL =
"This typed data is for chain id 1, but the active network is Sepolia Testnet (chain id 11155111), so it cannot be signed.";
function withChainId(chainId) {
return { ...PERMIT, domain: { ...PERMIT.domain, chainId } };
}
beforeEach(() => {
decryptWithPassword.mockClear();
state.networkId = "sepolia";
});
test("another chain shows the error, with Sign disabled", async () => {
await openSignScreen(PERMIT);
expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(REFUSAL);
expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
});
test("Sign clicked anyway decrypts and signs nothing", async () => {
const sent = await openSignScreen(PERMIT);
node("approve-sign-password").value = "any password";
await click("btn-approve-sign");
expect(decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(sent.map((msg) => msg.type)).not.toContain(
"AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
);
expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(REFUSAL);
});
// ethers signs 1, "1" and "0x1" as the same chain id.
test("the chain id is refused in each form ethers signs", () => {
for (const chainId of [1, "1", "0x1"]) {
expect(typedDataRefusal(request(withChainId(chainId)))).toBe(
REFUSAL,
);
}
});
test("a chain id that is not a number is refused", () => {
expect(typedDataRefusal(request(withChainId("mainnet")))).toBe(
"This typed data cannot be read, so it cannot be signed.",
);
});
test("the active chain leaves Sign enabled", async () => {
await openSignScreen(withChainId("0xaa36a7"));
expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe("");
expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(false);
});
test("no chain id leaves Sign enabled", async () => {
await openSignScreen(withChainId(undefined));
expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe("");
expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(false);
});
});
// ethers signs a `bool` field by whether its value is truthy in JavaScript:
// the string "false" is signed as true, and a field left out as false. The
// screen would show one value while another is signed, so such typed data is
// refused, and so is any declared field left out of the message
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/552). DAI's older permit
// declares the `bool` field `allowed`.
describe("the sign screen refuses a message ethers would sign differently", () => {
const NOT_A_BOOL =
'The field "allowed" is not true or false, so this typed data cannot be signed.';
const MISSING =
'The field "allowed" is missing from the message, so this typed data cannot be signed.';
function daiPermit(allowed) {
return { ...DAI_PERMIT, message: { ...DAI_PERMIT.message, allowed } };
}
const withoutAllowed = {
...DAI_PERMIT,
message: { ...DAI_PERMIT.message },
};
delete withoutAllowed.message.allowed;
beforeEach(() => {
decryptWithPassword.mockClear();
});
test('ethers signs "false" as true, and a bool left out as false', () => {
const hash = (data) =>
TypedDataEncoder.hash(
data.domain,
{ Permit: data.types.Permit },
data.message,
);
expect(hash(daiPermit("false"))).toBe(hash(daiPermit(true)));
expect(hash(withoutAllowed)).toBe(hash(daiPermit(false)));
});
test('a bool sent as the string "false" shows the error, with Sign disabled', async () => {
await openSignScreen(daiPermit("false"));
expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(NOT_A_BOOL);
expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
});
test("a bool left out shows the error, with Sign disabled", async () => {
await openSignScreen(withoutAllowed);
expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(MISSING);
expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
});
test("Sign clicked anyway decrypts and signs nothing", async () => {
const sent = await openSignScreen(daiPermit("false"));
node("approve-sign-password").value = "any password";
await click("btn-approve-sign");
expect(decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(sent.map((msg) => msg.type)).not.toContain(
"AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
);
expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(NOT_A_BOOL);
});
test("a well-formed message leaves Sign enabled", async () => {
for (const allowed of [true, false]) {
await openSignScreen(daiPermit(allowed));
expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe("");
expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(false);
}
});
test("a field left out inside a list item is named by its place", () => {
const [first, second] = PERMIT_BATCH.message.details;
const withoutNonce = { ...second };
delete withoutNonce.nonce;
const data = {
...PERMIT_BATCH,
message: {
...PERMIT_BATCH.message,
details: [first, withoutNonce],
},
};
expect(typedDataRefusal(request(data))).toBe(
'The field "details[1].nonce" is missing from the message, so this typed data cannot be signed.',
);
});
// A plain lookup of a field named after a built-in object property reads
// back a function, which ethers would sign as true.
test("a field named after a built-in object property is missing when left out", () => {
const data = {
...LOGIN,
types: {
...LOGIN.types,
Login: [
...LOGIN.types.Login,
{ name: "constructor", type: "bool" },
],
},
};
expect(typedDataRefusal(request(data))).toBe(
'The field "constructor" is missing from the message, so this typed data cannot be signed.',
);
});
});
+269 -3
View File
@@ -163,6 +163,122 @@ function encodeV4ExactInSingle(currency0, currency1, amountIn, amountOutMin) {
);
}
// Each V4 swap action's parameters in two shapes: the struct V4Router has
// deployed on mainnet and Sepolia, and the one v4-periphery `main` has since
// moved to, which adds a `minHopPriceX36` field. Each swaps WETH for USDC.
const POOL_KEY = "tuple(address,address,uint24,int24,address)";
const PATH_KEY = "tuple(address,uint24,int24,address,bytes)";
const WETH_USDC_POOL = [WETH_ADDR, USDC_ADDR, 100, 1, ZERO_ADDR];
const ONE_WETH = 1000000000000000000n;
const V4_SWAP_ACTION_SHAPES = [
{
action: "SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE",
id: 0x06,
deployed: coder.encode(
[`tuple(${POOL_KEY},bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)`],
[[WETH_USDC_POOL, true, ONE_WETH, 990000n, "0x"]],
),
newer: coder.encode(
[`tuple(${POOL_KEY},bool,uint128,uint128,uint256,bytes)`],
[[WETH_USDC_POOL, true, ONE_WETH, 990000n, 0n, "0x"]],
),
},
{
action: "SWAP_EXACT_IN",
id: 0x07,
deployed: coder.encode(
[`tuple(address,${PATH_KEY}[],uint128,uint128)`],
[
[
WETH_ADDR,
[[USDC_ADDR, 100, 1, ZERO_ADDR, "0x"]],
ONE_WETH,
990000n,
],
],
),
newer: coder.encode(
[`tuple(address,${PATH_KEY}[],uint256[],uint128,uint128)`],
[
[
WETH_ADDR,
[[USDC_ADDR, 100, 1, ZERO_ADDR, "0x"]],
[],
ONE_WETH,
990000n,
],
],
),
},
{
action: "SWAP_EXACT_OUT_SINGLE",
id: 0x08,
deployed: coder.encode(
[`tuple(${POOL_KEY},bool,uint128,uint128,bytes)`],
[[WETH_USDC_POOL, true, 990000n, ONE_WETH, "0x"]],
),
newer: coder.encode(
[`tuple(${POOL_KEY},bool,uint128,uint128,uint256,bytes)`],
[[WETH_USDC_POOL, true, 990000n, ONE_WETH, 0n, "0x"]],
),
},
{
action: "SWAP_EXACT_OUT",
id: 0x09,
deployed: coder.encode(
[`tuple(address,${PATH_KEY}[],uint128,uint128)`],
[
[
USDC_ADDR,
[[WETH_ADDR, 100, 1, ZERO_ADDR, "0x"]],
990000n,
ONE_WETH,
],
],
),
newer: coder.encode(
[`tuple(address,${PATH_KEY}[],uint256[],uint128,uint128)`],
[
[
USDC_ADDR,
[[WETH_ADDR, 100, 1, ZERO_ADDR, "0x"]],
[],
990000n,
ONE_WETH,
],
],
),
},
];
// Helper: execute() with one V4_SWAP step holding the swap action, then
// SETTLE of WETH and TAKE of USDC.
function v4SwapCalldata(actionId, swapParams) {
return buildExecute(
"0x10",
[
encodeV4Swap(new Uint8Array([actionId, V4_SETTLE_ID, V4_TAKE_ID]), [
swapParams,
encodeV4Settle(WETH_ADDR),
encodeV4Take(USDC_ADDR),
]),
],
9999999999n,
);
}
// V4 SETTLE_ALL (currency, maxAmount) and TAKE_ALL (currency, minAmount). The
// decoder reads neither, so in a V4_SWAP of a swap action and these, only the
// swap action names the currencies.
const V4_SETTLE_ALL_ID = 0x0c;
const V4_TAKE_ALL_ID = 0x0f;
function encodeV4SettleAll(currency, maxAmount) {
return coder.encode(["address", "uint256"], [currency, maxAmount]);
}
function encodeV4TakeAll(currency, minAmount) {
return coder.encode(["address", "uint256"], [currency, minAmount]);
}
function detail(result, label) {
return result.details.find((d) => d.label === label);
}
@@ -203,9 +319,157 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
result.details.find((d) => d.label === "Min. received").value,
).toBe("0.0002 ETH");
// Real mainnet calldata is in the deployed shape, so its V4 step is
// not said to be undecoded.
const steps = result.details.find((d) => d.label === "Steps");
expect(steps.value).toContain("Permit2 Permit");
expect(steps.value).toContain("V4 Swap");
expect(steps.value).toBe("Permit2 Permit → V4 Swap");
});
test.each(V4_SWAP_ACTION_SHAPES)(
"a V4 $action in the deployed shape is read",
({ id, deployed }) => {
const result = uniswap.decode(
v4SwapCalldata(id, deployed),
ROUTER_ADDR,
);
expect(detail(result, "Steps").value).toBe("V4 Swap");
},
);
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/358 — before it, all four
// newer structs decoded as the deployed ones without an error, and the
// newer SWAP_EXACT_IN showed the offset of its hop-price array as Amount
// ("0.0000000000000004 WETH") and its amountIn as Min. received.
test.each(V4_SWAP_ACTION_SHAPES)(
"a V4 $action in the newer periphery shape is shown as not decoded",
({ id, newer }) => {
const result = uniswap.decode(
v4SwapCalldata(id, newer),
ROUTER_ADDR,
);
expect(detail(result, "Amount")).toBeUndefined();
expect(detail(result, "Min. received")).toBeUndefined();
expect(detail(result, "Steps").value).toBe(
"V4 Swap (could not be decoded)",
);
// SETTLE and TAKE keep their own shape and still name both sides.
expect(detail(result, "Token In").address).toBe(WETH_ADDR);
expect(detail(result, "Token Out").address).toBe(USDC_ADDR);
},
);
// Only the unread swap action names the currencies here. The token lines
// must not say the calldata did not name them.
test.each(V4_SWAP_ACTION_SHAPES)(
"a V4 $action in the newer shape, then SETTLE_ALL and TAKE_ALL, says both tokens could not be decoded",
({ id, newer }) => {
const data = buildExecute(
"0x10",
[
encodeV4Swap(
new Uint8Array([id, V4_SETTLE_ALL_ID, V4_TAKE_ALL_ID]),
[
newer,
encodeV4SettleAll(WETH_ADDR, ONE_WETH),
encodeV4TakeAll(USDC_ADDR, 990000n),
],
),
],
9999999999n,
);
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
expect(detail(result, "Steps").value).toBe(
"V4 Swap (could not be decoded)",
);
expect(detail(result, "Token In").value).toBe(
"Unknown (could not be decoded)",
);
expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe(
"Unknown (could not be decoded)",
);
},
);
// The user receives the V4 step's USDC, which only its unread swap
// action names. The V3 step's WETH and its Min. received figure were
// shown instead.
test.each(V4_SWAP_ACTION_SHAPES)(
"a V3 step, then a V4 $action in the newer shape and TAKE_ALL, does not show the V3 step's output",
({ id, newer }) => {
const data = buildExecute(
solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x00, 0x10]),
[
encodeV3SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 2000000n, ONE_WETH, [
USDT_ADDR,
WETH_ADDR,
]),
encodeV4Swap(new Uint8Array([id, V4_TAKE_ALL_ID]), [
newer,
encodeV4TakeAll(USDC_ADDR, 990000n),
]),
],
9999999999n,
);
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
expect(result.name).toBe("Uniswap Swap");
expect(detail(result, "Amount").value).toBe("2.0000 USDT");
expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe(
"Unknown (could not be decoded)",
);
expect(detail(result, "Min. received")).toBeUndefined();
},
);
// The user pays the V4 step's WETH, which only its unread swap action
// names. The V3 step's USDC and its amount were shown instead.
test.each(V4_SWAP_ACTION_SHAPES)(
"a V4 $action in the newer shape and SETTLE_ALL, then a V3 step, does not show the V3 step's input",
({ id, newer }) => {
const data = buildExecute(
solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x10, 0x00]),
[
encodeV4Swap(new Uint8Array([id, V4_SETTLE_ALL_ID]), [
newer,
encodeV4SettleAll(WETH_ADDR, ONE_WETH),
]),
encodeV3SwapExactIn(
USER_ADDR,
990000n,
980000000000000000n,
[USDC_ADDR, DAI_ADDR],
),
],
9999999999n,
);
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
expect(result.name).toBe("Uniswap Swap");
expect(detail(result, "Token In").value).toBe(
"Unknown (could not be decoded)",
);
expect(detail(result, "Amount")).toBeUndefined();
expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.9800 DAI");
},
);
// UNWRAP_WETH makes Token Out ETH when no step set the output side. An
// unread swap action's step did set it, to undetermined.
test("an UNWRAP_WETH after an unread V4 swap action does not make Token Out ETH", () => {
const { id, newer } = V4_SWAP_ACTION_SHAPES[0];
const data = buildExecute(
solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x10, 0x0c]),
[
encodeV4Swap(new Uint8Array([id, V4_TAKE_ALL_ID]), [
newer,
encodeV4TakeAll(USDC_ADDR, 990000n),
]),
encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH, same encoding
],
9999999999n,
);
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe(
"Unknown (could not be decoded)",
);
});
test("decodes V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN with known tokens", () => {
@@ -548,9 +812,11 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
// The V4 swap action's parameters are empty, so that step is said to
// be undecoded.
const steps = result.details.find((d) => d.label === "Steps");
expect(steps.value).toBe(
"Permit2 Permit \u2192 V4 Swap \u2192 Unwrap WETH",
"Permit2 Permit \u2192 V4 Swap (could not be decoded) \u2192 Unwrap WETH",
);
});
+5 -1
View File
@@ -97,7 +97,11 @@ describe("an execute() whose input currency never decoded", () => {
]);
test("says the input token is unknown instead of naming ETH", () => {
expect(detail(data(), "Token In").value).toBe(REFUSAL);
// The swap action that would name it could not be read, so the line
// says that rather than REFUSAL's "not named in the calldata".
expect(detail(data(), "Token In").value).toBe(
"Unknown (could not be decoded)",
);
});
test("keeps a Token In line, so the screen never omits what is paid", () => {
+49 -5
View File
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ describe("extended key depth", () => {
expect(() =>
wallet.getSignerForAddress(
{ type: "xprv" },
0,
{ address: VECTOR_ADDRESSES[0], index: 0 },
accountXprv(VECTOR_PHRASE),
),
).toThrow(/master/i);
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ describe("getSignerForAddress", () => {
test.each([0, 1, 2])("hd wallet, address index %i", (index) => {
const signer = wallet.getSignerForAddress(
{ type: "hd" },
index,
{ address: VECTOR_ADDRESSES[index], index },
VECTOR_PHRASE,
);
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ describe("getSignerForAddress", () => {
test.each([0, 1, 2])("xprv wallet, address index %i", (index) => {
const signer = wallet.getSignerForAddress(
{ type: "xprv" },
index,
{ address: VECTOR_ADDRESSES[index], index },
masterXprv(VECTOR_PHRASE),
);
@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ describe("getSignerForAddress", () => {
for (const index of [0, 1, 2]) {
const signer = wallet.getSignerForAddress(
{ type: "privkey" },
index,
{ address: VECTOR_ADDRESSES[1], index },
VECTOR_PRIVATE_KEYS[1],
);
@@ -535,10 +535,54 @@ describe("getSignerForAddress", () => {
}
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/510: an address whose stored
// index does not derive it, or a private key that is not its key.
test.each([
["hd", { address: VECTOR_ADDRESSES[2], index: 1 }, VECTOR_PHRASE],
[
"xprv",
{ address: VECTOR_ADDRESSES[2], index: 1 },
masterXprv(VECTOR_PHRASE),
],
["privkey", { address: VECTOR_ADDRESSES[2] }, VECTOR_PRIVATE_KEYS[1]],
])(
"%s wallet refuses a key that is not the address's own",
(type, addr, secret) => {
expect(() =>
wallet.getSignerForAddress({ type }, addr, secret),
).toThrow(
"The key this wallet holds for " +
VECTOR_ADDRESSES[2] +
" belongs to a different address, so it was not used.",
);
},
);
// An HD or xprv address record without a usable `index` is refused in a
// sentence, not with what ethers says about the value it was handed.
test.each([
["hd", VECTOR_PHRASE],
["xprv", masterXprv(VECTOR_PHRASE)],
])("%s wallet refuses an address with no valid index", (type, secret) => {
for (const index of [undefined, null, -1, 1.5, "1"]) {
expect(() =>
wallet.getSignerForAddress(
{ type },
{ address: VECTOR_ADDRESSES[1], index },
secret,
),
).toThrow(
"No derivation index is stored for " +
VECTOR_ADDRESSES[1] +
", so its key cannot be derived.",
);
}
});
test("the returned signer signs recoverably as the expected address", async () => {
const signer = wallet.getSignerForAddress(
{ type: "hd" },
1,
{ address: VECTOR_ADDRESSES[1], index: 1 },
VECTOR_PHRASE,
);
const message = "AutistMask derivation test";
+20 -4
View File
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ function healthyXprvWallet(name = "Master") {
xpub,
nextIndex: 1,
encryptedSecret: "irrelevant-to-these-tests",
addresses: [{ address: firstAddress, balance: "0.0000" }],
addresses: [{ address: firstAddress, index: 0, balance: "0.0000" }],
};
}
@@ -74,7 +74,11 @@ function brokenXprvWallet(name = "Imported xprv") {
nextIndex: 1,
encryptedSecret: "irrelevant-to-these-tests",
addresses: [
{ address: node.deriveChild(0).address, balance: "0.0000" },
{
address: node.deriveChild(0).address,
index: 0,
balance: "0.0000",
},
],
};
}
@@ -153,6 +157,18 @@ describe("the explanatory copy", () => {
expect(all).not.toMatch(/\blost\b|\bstolen\b|\bgone\b/i);
});
// The wallet holds the imported key but will not export it, so the copy
// must name every key the user may hold that reaches the addresses
// outside it.
test("it names the keys that reach the addresses outside this wallet", () => {
const body = defect.paragraphs.join(" ");
expect(body).toMatch(/private key export are disabled/);
expect(body).toMatch(
/with the extended private key you imported, if you kept a copy of it, or with the master extended private key or recovery phrase it came from, in software that repeats the same non-standard derivation/,
);
});
test("it says the wallet is not deleted and what the user can do", () => {
const body = defect.paragraphs.join(" ");
@@ -558,7 +574,7 @@ describe("no path throws an unhandled error for a defective wallet", () => {
try {
wallet.getSignerForAddress(
{ type: "xprv" },
0,
brokenXprvWallet().addresses[0],
accountXprv(VECTOR_PHRASE),
);
} catch (e) {
@@ -573,7 +589,7 @@ describe("no path throws an unhandled error for a defective wallet", () => {
test("a healthy xprv wallet signs as it always did", () => {
const signer = wallet.getSignerForAddress(
{ type: "xprv" },
0,
healthyXprvWallet().addresses[0],
masterXprv(VECTOR_PHRASE),
);