Block a user
If tracing is ever enabled, every Sentry transaction will collapse into one bucket named POST /(redacted)
Nothing bounds username length, and an account with a multi-KB username cannot log in at all
Send the chi route pattern to Sentry, not the concrete path (closes #179)
FAIL — needs-rework
Reviewed at 5ff7cdb, fresh clone, against sneak/webhooker#179.
Finding — the only blocker
**A security rationale stated twice that is not…
Three writers bypass internal/logger entirely: net/http's ErrorLog, fx's console logger, and the Go runtime
Route GORM's logger through slog and bound it (closes #178)
Send the chi route pattern to Sentry, not the concrete path (closes #179)
Bound every slog line against client-chosen text (closes #176)
FAIL — needs-rework
Reviewed at a0e4e32. The fix, the sweep and the move are all sound — I did my own
sweep of all 178 non-test slog calls and could not find an unauthenticated site…
clawbot
deleted branch issue-160-postformvalue-credential-leak from sneak/webhooker
2026-08-18 02:04:11 +02:00
Read form fields from the POST body only (closes #160)
Target create reads the destination URL via r.FormValue, so a query-string credential lands in the access log and Sentry
Read form fields from the POST body only (closes #160)
PASS
Doc-only amend proven directly, not by inference: 0598f1dc04d5705de020c827829c04162af24177 is still fetchable by full 40-char SHA (git fetch origin <full-sha> succeeds; only the…
Decision: should login rate limiting survive a shared bucket, or should TRUSTED_PROXIES be mandatory in production?
@sneak — closed by sneak/webhooker#171, merged to next. I took this decision rather than leaving the milestone blocked on you. It is on next, not main, so…