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base: sneak/smallwebwaf:766cfceac42ca8a0535ac1b47398b04a4f379092
sneak/smallwebwaf:main sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-220-apps-by-hostname sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-235-wordpress-ordinary-requests sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-211-viper-config sneak/smallwebwaf:next sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-216-oci-labels sneak/smallwebwaf:readme-rewrite-155
sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc2 sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc1
...
compare: sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-211-viper-config
sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-220-apps-by-hostname sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-235-wordpress-ordinary-requests sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-211-viper-config sneak/smallwebwaf:next sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-216-oci-labels sneak/smallwebwaf:main sneak/smallwebwaf:readme-rewrite-155
sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc2 sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc1
9 Commits
766cfceac4 ... issue-211-viper-config
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 85ef2038cb Read every setting through viper and rename the settings (closes #211)
check / check (push) Failing after 1m14s
Details 
Every setting of discriminator and rproxy is read through viper, in place
of the os.LookupEnv function Main passed down. NewViper turns AutomaticEnv
and AllowEmptyEnv on, so a setting that is set but empty reads as set. A
setting may also be given as a file, the _FILE form, which rproxy's
settings now have too; rproxy still writes nothing to disk.

The settings are renamed. Discriminator's take the prefix SWW_WAF_,
rproxy's take SWW_RPROXY_, and the shared SWW_COMMAND keeps SWW_. The Core
Rule Set's settings take SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ rather than SWW_WAF_WAF_.

Model: deepseek-v4-pro (first version); opus-5-5 (rework)
 2026-11-09 07:54:36 +00:00
clawbot 719691d1e8 Name log fields, metrics and the Core Rule Set package for what they are (closes #192)
check / check (push) Failing after 3m22s
Details 
The first half of the naming audit: names now say what they are. `internal/waf` is `internal/coreruleset`. Log fields, the action `blocked_by_core_rule_set`, the metric and the alert event say Core Rule Set. Timings end `_ms`. Percentages say of what, as `rate_limit_percent` and `bytes_limit_percent`. Setting names follow in #234.

Judgement call: `blocked_by_core_rule_set`, not the audit's `core_rule_set_blocked`, to match `blocked_by_block_rule`.
Trips a reader: an existing state file holding `waf_blocked` or the anomaly scope `watch` stops the start and must be removed. `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` listing `waf_block` must list `core_rule_set_match`.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-11-09 08:47:26 +01:00
clawbot aede434f6a Name request log actions so they say what they mean (closes #229)
check / check (push) Successful in 6m30s
Details 
The request log's `action` values now say what they mean, as sneak named them: `request_header_too_large`, `client_is_rate_limited`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and `client_denied`, with no aliases. `banned` splits into `temporarily_banned` and `permanently_banned`, by whether the ban runs out. When a permanent ban also covers a client, that ban is the one reported.

Trips a reader: a request over a rate limit stays `client_is_rate_limited` even when the ban it makes is permanent.
Disclosure: the offence key `rule_blocked` is renamed in `clients.json` too, so an existing file holding it stops the start and must be removed. Its `version` stays 1.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-11-09 06:48:26 +01:00
clawbot 6850cb0e9f Add asn= and prefix= tags from a routewatch instance (closes #204)
check / check (push) Successful in 5m0s
Details 
With `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` set, a new heuristic, `routewatch_tags`, adds `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>` to a request from what a routewatch instance answers about the client. New package `internal/routewatch` asks in the background, never on a request's path, and keeps answers 1 hour in memory. The request log gains `routewatch_tags_missing`, saying why a request has none. `prefix=` works in `SWW_TAG_DENY` and `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT`.

Trips a reader: a client's first request has no routewatch tags, so `prefix=` refuses from its next request after the answer comes.
Judgement call: with `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE=off` and `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` set, an `asn=` tag no longer stops the start.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-11-09 05:47:34 +01:00
clawbot d7c62f2854 Say which bytes the byte limits count, and what passing one does (closes #203)
check / check (push) Failing after 3m48s
Details 
sneak asked for every document to be audited for sentences that do not say what they mean. The byte limits now say which bytes count (response bodies, request bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says, WebSocket traffic included) and what passing one does. Other unclear or false sentences in `README.md`, `SPEC.md`, `EVALUATION.md` and `docs/` are rewritten.

Documents only. `REPO_POLICIES.md` is shared policy text and stayed out.

Model: fable-5-1 (first audit); opus-5-5 (rework)
 2026-11-09 04:03:17 +01:00
clawbot c66277b111 Request tags, with refusing and limits per tag (closes #175)
check / check (push) Failing after 5m8s
Details 
Each request gets tags, logged as `tags`: `asn=`, `country=`, one per `SWW_TAG_LISTS` list holding the client, `crowdsec`, `dnsbl=<zone>`, `abuseipdb` and `exploitsignature`. `SWW_TAG_DENY` refuses by tag and `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` lowers limits by tag. They replace `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT`, `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` and `SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES`, with no aliases. A tag in those settings that nothing configured can give stops the start.

Judgement call: `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` stays, its entries counting like `asn=` tags.
Judgement call: `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` also lowers byte limits, as the settings it replaces did.
Trips a reader: `sww_country_list_refusals_total` now counts only `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` refusals.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-11-09 03:30:49 +01:00
sneak f6435b1a73 Add make publish: build the image on the Docker host and push it to the registry
check / check (push) Successful in 3m23s
Details 
`script/publish` runs `script/docker` against the Docker host and pushes the image to the registry under four tags: the UTC date, the short commit hash, the branch name and `latest`. It refuses a working tree with uncommitted changes, since the hash tag names a commit.

Also carries sneak's `golines -m 77` line wrapping in three files, with no code change.

Unverified: a real build on the Docker host and a real push from this commit.
Deviation: sneak's FIXME comments are out, because the linter refuses them; they are #227, #228 and #229.

Model: opus-5-5
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
 2026-11-09 02:03:39 +01:00
clawbot 2349b2a081 discriminator: each decision heuristic is its own module (closes #195)
check / check (push) Failing after 1m53s
Details 
Each discriminator check is now a type in its own file behind one small interface, listed in `heuristics.go`. Adding a heuristic is one file and one line. Behaviour does not change.

Refusal and ban log lines gain `heuristic` and `heuristic_figures`. A ban after the answer, by `refusal_limit` or `byte_limits`, logs `after_answer_heuristic` and its figures, so one line can name both.

Deviation: four lists, not the planned three, so `refusal_limit` still bans at the decision.
Rule suppressed: `//nolint:lll` on one struct tag.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-11-09 01:14:24 +01:00
clawbot 42e06bf298 Quiet the update-alternatives man page warnings in the image build (closes #222) (#226)
check / check (push) Successful in 5m24s
Details 
xz-utils, which nix-bin depends on, links its man pages with update-alternatives when it installs, and the image's dpkg config drops man pages, so each link printed a warning. A config file re-includes only the man1 pages for this install; the same step deletes them, their dangling links in /etc/alternatives and the config file. No man page or package is added or removed.

Model: deepseek-v4-pro
 2026-11-07 15:21:18 +01:00
125 changed files with 6790 additions and 3399 deletions
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Dockerfile
+13 -4
View File
@@ -136,10 +136,19 @@ RUN mkdir /etc/sysusers.d \
# ca-certificates, nix-bin and runit, from Ubuntu's archive. apt fetches
# them over plain HTTP and checks each one against the archive's signed
# package lists, so no CA certificates are needed.
RUN apt-get update \
#
# nix-bin depends on xz-utils, whose install links man pages with
# update-alternatives. The image's dpkg config drops man pages, so each
# link warns. z-man, read after /etc/dpkg/dpkg.cfg.d/excludes, re-includes
# the man1 pages for this install alone; the same step deletes them again,
# so no man page or package is added.
RUN echo 'path-include=/usr/share/man/man1/*' > /etc/dpkg/dpkg.cfg.d/z-man \
&& apt-get update \
&& DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install --yes --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates nix-bin runit \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* /etc/dpkg/dpkg.cfg.d/z-man \
&& find /usr/share/man/man1 ! -type d -delete \
&& find /etc/alternatives -type l -xtype l -delete
# Nix run by root expects a group of build users, which nix-bin does not
# create; with the setting empty, root's builds run without them.
@@ -175,12 +184,12 @@ RUN groupadd --system --gid 65532 sww \
--gid sww --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin \
sww
# The state files' directory, SWW_STATE_DIR by default, where a volume
# The state files' directory, SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR by default, where a volume
# is mounted to keep them across deploys. The run script gives it to the
# sww user at each start of discriminator.
RUN mkdir /var/lib/sww
# The default rule file, in SWW_RULES_DIR by default, where a Dockerfile
# The default rule file, in SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR by default, where a Dockerfile
# built FROM this image can copy rule files of its own beside it.
COPY share/rules.d/00-default.rules /etc/sww/rules.d/00-default.rules
EVALUATION.md
+56 -44
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
- R1: rate limits per minute, per hour and per day
- R2: netblocks that bypass rate limiting
- R3: alerts on attacks through webhook, Slack or ntfy
- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests or bytes per minute or hour, for given IPs
or netblocks, crossing a threshold
- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests made or bytes transferred per minute or
hour, for given IPs or netblocks, crossing a threshold
- R5: temporary blocks for abusers, permanent bans for repeat offenders
- R6: one or more RBLs or IP reputation APIs
- R7: AS number lookup
@@ -24,14 +24,19 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
## Verdict
Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8 (scaling limits by AS
number or country) or the bytes half of R4 at all, and the tools that come
closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML or a web UI.
The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar; `SPEC.md` in this
directory begins that spec. It reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field as
libraries and data sources (Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set for attack
detection, DNSBLs, AbuseIPDB, optionally a CrowdSec decision feed) instead of
reimplementing them.
Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8, which asks for limits
scaled by AS number or country. None meets R4's alerts on bytes transferred. The
tools that come closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML
or a web UI. The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar;
`SPEC.md` in this directory begins that spec.
The sidecar reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field instead of
reimplementing them. It takes these as libraries and data sources:
- Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set, for attack detection
- DNSBLs
- AbuseIPDB
- optionally, a CrowdSec decision feed
Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
@@ -45,13 +50,16 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
external blacklist URLs, optional CrowdSec), R7 partly (AS number used for
blacklist and whitelist decisions), R9 (ModSecurity with the Core Rule
Set, or Coraza plugin), env-var settings.
- Fails: R8 (AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a
limit), R4 (no volume or byte threshold alerts in the free edition;
reporting is a paid feature), R5 escalation, and R10 in spirit: since 1.6
it needs a `bunkerweb` container plus a `bw-scheduler` container and a
database, or the all-in-one image that bundles nginx, scheduler, UI and
Redis in one container. It is designed to be the front door for many
sites, not a per-app sidecar. AGPL-3.0.
- Fails:
- R8: AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a limit.
- R4: no alerts on request-count or byte thresholds in the free edition;
reporting is a paid feature.
- R5: no escalation for repeat offenders.
- R10: since 1.6 it is not one plain sidecar. It needs a `bunkerweb`
container, a `bw-scheduler` container and a database, or the
all-in-one image that bundles nginx, the scheduler, the UI and Redis.
- It is designed as the proxy in front of many sites, not as a sidecar for
one app. AGPL-3.0.
- Unverified: whether several rates (minute, hour, day) can be stacked on
the same URL pattern; the documented design is one rate per URL pattern.
- CrowdSec is the strongest detection and ban engine, but it is not a proxy.
@@ -66,16 +74,20 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
listed AS numbers is possible, but each is a hand-written YAML scenario,
it reacts after the fact by banning, and it is not an inline limiter that
answers 429.
- Fails: R10 (needs the security engine container with persistent state, log
acquisition from traefik, a bouncer such as the traefik plugin, and YAML
for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications), bytes half of R4.
- Fails:
- R10, because it needs:
- the security engine container with persistent state
- log acquisition from traefik
- a bouncer such as the traefik plugin
- YAML for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications
- R4's alerts on bytes.
- CrowdSec plus traefik's own `rateLimit` middleware is the best combination
with no new code. It gives inline limiting (one window per middleware, keyed
by IP, with `sourceCriterion` exclusions), bans with escalation, alerts and
reputation. It still fails R8, the bytes half of R4, R1's three stacked
windows only by chaining three middlewares per router, and R10 entirely: the
configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not in
one sidecar's environment.
reputation lookups. It still fails R8, R4's alerts on bytes, and R10 entirely:
the configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not
in one sidecar's environment. It meets R1's three windows only by chaining
three middlewares per router.
## Candidate by candidate
@@ -87,10 +99,10 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
cached, streamed decision list (recommended), standalone against the
central API, or AppSec only. Supports captcha remediation.
- Covers: R5, R6, R9, R3 and R7 through the engine (see Verdict).
- Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4 bytes.
- Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4's alerts on bytes.
- Configuration: traefik static config to load the plugin, dynamic config or
labels for the middleware, CrowdSec YAML for everything else.
- Sidecar fit: no. It lives inside traefik, plus a separate engine
- Sidecar fit: no. It runs inside traefik and needs a separate engine
container.
- Maturity: widely used (about 900 stars, listed in the traefik plugin
catalog, documented by CrowdSec itself), actively maintained. Traefik
@@ -115,7 +127,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- What it is: nginx-derived (Tengine) reverse proxy with a proprietary
semantic detection engine and a web console. About 22,000 stars.
- Covers: R9 well, basic per-IP rate limiting with block duration, bot
challenge, authentication gate.
challenge, authentication in front of the app.
- Misses: R8, R7, R4; R1 has one window per rule. Country blocking, alert
messages, syslog forwarding and the better reputation database are paid
(Lite about 10 USD per month, Pro about 100 USD per month); the free
@@ -128,7 +140,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- Coraza (`corazawaf/coraza`) and Coraza-based proxies
- What it is: a Go library that implements the ModSecurity rule language and
runs the OWASP Core Rule Set. OWASP project, actively maintained, the
successor path now that ModSecurity is in maintenance only.
successor to ModSecurity, which is now in maintenance only.
- Packagings: `coraza-caddy` (Caddy module), `coraza-spoa` (HAProxy),
`coraza-proxy-wasm` (Envoy), a traefik WASM plugin, and
`coreruleset/coraza-crs-docker` (Caddy plus Coraza plus the Core Rule Set,
@@ -142,7 +154,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- ModSecurity Core Rule Set containers (`owasp/modsecurity-crs`)
- What it is: official images of Apache or nginx with ModSecurity and the
Core Rule Set, as a reverse proxy configured by env vars (`BACKEND`,
paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images carry
paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images contain
ModSecurity 2.9.x on Apache and Core Rule Set 4.x.
- Covers: R9, and R10 (single container, env vars, one backend).
- Misses: R1 to R8.
@@ -152,8 +164,8 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- Anubis (`TecharoHQ/anubis`), 1.27 current
- What it is: a single-binary reverse proxy that makes browsers solve a
proof-of-work challenge before passing them to `TARGET`. Aimed at
scrapers, which is likely a large share of unwanted traffic on a public
code forge.
scrapers, which are likely a large share of the unwanted traffic on a
public code forge.
- Covers: R10 well (one container, env vars for listener, target,
difficulty, cookies). Policy rules can match on path, user agent, headers,
IP ranges, and with the vendor's hosted data service also AS number and
@@ -180,13 +192,13 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
temporary ban, no escalation, state lost on traefik restart) and R2
(allowlist). Nothing else.
- `juitde/traefik-plugin-fail2ban`, fail2ban connector plugins, GeoBlock
plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): same
shape, each one small feature, configured in traefik, state in memory.
plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): each adds
one small feature, is configured in traefik and keeps its state in memory.
- Sidecar fit: no; they live inside traefik.
- Traefik built-in middlewares
- `rateLimit` (one average-and-burst window per middleware, optional Redis
in traefik 3.x), `inFlightReq`, `ipAllowList`. No bans, alerts, reputation
or AS number awareness.
lookups or AS number lookups.
- caddy-waf (`fabriziosalmi/caddy-waf`), 0.4.x
- What it is: a Caddy module with regex rules and anomaly scoring, per-IP
and per-path rate limiting with one configurable window, IP and DNS
@@ -198,12 +210,12 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
- open-appsec (Check Point)
- Machine-learning WAF agent attached to nginx, Kong, Envoy or similar, with
a declarative policy file or the vendor's cloud console. Covers R9 only;
rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. Not a sidecar in the
required sense.
rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. It attaches to an
existing proxy, so it is not the sidecar R10 asks for.
- iocaine
- Serves generated garbage pages to clients the fronting proxy classifies as
scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope except as a
curiosity for scraper traffic.
scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope, and only of
passing interest for scraper traffic.
- Pangolin
- A tunnelled access platform that bundles traefik and optionally CrowdSec.
Replaces the ingress rather than adding a sidecar; out of scope.
@@ -214,17 +226,17 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
Everyone else offers one window per rule or none.
- R2 bypass netblocks: BunkerWeb, CrowdSec, traefik, fail2ban plugins.
- R3 alerts: CrowdSec (best), BunkerWeb (denied requests only), SafeLine (paid).
- R4 volume and byte anomalies: none. CrowdSec can approximate request-count
anomalies with a custom scenario; nothing handles bytes.
- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb has fixed or permanent,
not both by history.
- R4 alerts on request counts and bytes: none. CrowdSec can approximate alerts
on request counts with a custom scenario; no surveyed tool alerts on bytes.
- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb's ban is either one
fixed length or permanent, and does not change with a client's history.
- R6 reputation: CrowdSec, BunkerWeb, go-away, caddy-waf (static lists).
- R7 AS number lookup: CrowdSec (enrichment), BunkerWeb and caddy-waf (allow or
deny), Anubis (hosted service).
- R8 biased thresholds: none.
- R9 attack detection: Coraza or ModSecurity with the Core Rule Set (open,
standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps the
first).
standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps Coraza
or ModSecurity).
- R10 env-var sidecar: `owasp/modsecurity-crs`, `coraza-crs-docker`, Anubis.
None of these covers anything beyond its one job.
Makefile
+7 -3
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
.PHONY: bootstrap setup test lint fmt fmt-check tidy check docker hooks build \
run example-app
.PHONY: bootstrap setup test lint fmt fmt-check tidy check docker publish \
hooks build run example-app
# Makefile targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
# per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
# of README.md). tidy writes go.mod and go.sum as `go mod tidy` does,
# which test checks. build and run are for working on the code by hand;
# example-app checks the image with an app built on it.
# example-app checks the image with an app built on it; publish builds
# the image on the Docker host and pushes it to the registry.
bootstrap:
@script/bootstrap
@@ -34,6 +35,9 @@ check:
docker:
@script/docker
publish:
@script/publish
hooks:
@script/install-precommit
README.md
+246 -207
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ shipped in one image, with two commands that do this together:
- `sww rproxy` is a small reverse proxy in front of one app. traefik routes to
it. It asks `discriminator` about each request, passes the allowed ones to the
app, and passes the app's answers back. It keeps nothing and never touches
disk.
app, and passes the app's answers back. It keeps nothing between requests and
writes nothing to disk.
- `sww discriminator` decides. It runs the checks and keeps the bans, the
counters and each client's history. One `discriminator` serves many sites: a
client banned through one site is refused on all of them, and its requests on
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ without an answer in time, `rproxy` passes the request to the app.
It protects against:
- Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Each client gets a limit on
requests and on bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults leave
room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that keeps up
one request every 2 seconds. A client over a limit is refused and banned: for
a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently when
it keeps at it.
requests and on body bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults
leave room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that
keeps up one request every 2 seconds. A client that breaks a limit is banned:
for a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently
when it keeps at it.
- Scanners that probe for secrets, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`. The
default rule file bans such a client at its first probe, and its next request
during the ban makes the ban permanent. Your own rules, or a list of trap
@@ -68,8 +68,9 @@ Not built, and not planned:
### The image
No image is published. Build it from a clone. `make docker` runs the tests and
the linter, then builds the image, tagged `smallwebwaf`.
The image is published at `git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf`. You can also build it
from a clone. `make docker` runs the tests and the linter, then builds the
image, tagged `smallwebwaf`.
```sh
git clone https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf.git
@@ -90,8 +91,9 @@ the app accepts connections, whether or not `discriminator` answers; in
The usual setup is three containers on one private network:
- the app;
- `rproxy`, in front of the app, which traefik routes to: `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND`
names `discriminator` and `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` names the app;
- `rproxy`, in front of the app, which traefik routes to:
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` names `discriminator` and `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`
names the app;
- `discriminator`, with `SWW_COMMAND=discriminator` and a volume at
`/var/lib/sww` for its state files.
@@ -100,8 +102,8 @@ Point traefik's labels at port 8080 of `rproxy`
of the app or of `discriminator`. Anything on that network can reach the app
around `rproxy`, and can ask `discriminator` questions, so the network holds
only what you trust. Each further app adds its own container and its own
`rproxy`, whose `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` names the same `discriminator`. The "Smallest
setup" example below shows this shape.
`rproxy`, whose `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` names the same `discriminator`. The
"Smallest setup" example below shows this shape.
### `rproxy` in the app's container
@@ -114,7 +116,7 @@ by digest, and adds:
- the packages the app needs, from the nixpkgs in the image;
- a user for the app;
- a `run` script that starts the app listening on `127.0.0.1:8081`, the default
of `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`.
of `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`.
```dockerfile
# The smallwebwaf image, pinned by digest.
@@ -150,8 +152,8 @@ main "$@"
Leave `ENTRYPOINT` and `USER` out of the app's `Dockerfile`. The image's own
entrypoint starts `rproxy` and the app side by side, each as its own user. Run
the app's image with `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` set. `deploy/example-app` is such an
app, and the "`rproxy` beside the app" example below runs one.
the app's image with `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` set. `deploy/example-app` is such
an app, and the "`rproxy` beside the app" example below runs one.
The app sees the headers traefik sent, with traefik's address added to
`X-Forwarded-For`, from a TCP peer that is `rproxy`. So the app must trust
@@ -171,12 +173,12 @@ does.
`https://<site>/_sww/healthz` answers `ok`. `discriminator`'s log lines about
the request have `"action":"forward"`.
- To see a refusal without banning yourself, run `discriminator` with
`SWW_MODE=observe` and ask for `/.env`. The request reaches the app.
`discriminator`'s log lines have `"would_action":"banned"` and
`SWW_WAF_MODE=observe` and ask for `/.env`. The request reaches the app.
`discriminator`'s log lines have `"would_action":"temporarily_banned"` and
`"rule_ids":["env-file"]`. A ban you get in `enforce` mode is lifted as
"Clients and bans" below describes.
- With `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` set, this answers with the metrics, from a host on
`discriminator`'s network:
- With `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` set, this answers with the metrics, from a host
on `discriminator`'s network:
`curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" http://discriminator:8080/_sww/metrics`.
- `make example-app` builds the image and an app on it, runs them, and checks
the whole exchange (see "Entrypoints").
@@ -184,18 +186,18 @@ does.
## Configuration
Every setting is an environment variable, read once at start; changing one means
restarting the container. `rproxy` reads only the `SWRP_` settings, and
`discriminator` only the `SWW_` ones. Every setting but `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` has a
default, chosen for a service on the open internet. A setting that needs an
account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
restarting the container. `rproxy` reads only the `SWW_RPROXY_` settings, and
`discriminator` only the `SWW_WAF_` ones. Every setting but
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` has a default, chosen for a service on the open
internet. A setting that needs an account, a key, a token or an alert
destination stays off until you give one.
- Any `SWW_` setting can be given as a file instead, for secrets and long lists:
`SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE` names the file that holds `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN`. The file's
contents are the value, less one newline at the end. Setting both forms stops
the start. `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` and
`SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` already name a file, so they have no
`_FILE` form. `SWW_COMMAND` cannot be given as a file. No `SWRP_` setting has
one, since `rproxy` never touches disk.
- Any `SWW_WAF_` or `SWW_RPROXY_` setting can be given as a file instead, for
secrets and long lists: `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE` names the file that holds
`SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN`. The file's contents are the value, less one newline at
the end. Setting both forms stops the start. `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE`
and `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` already name a file, so they have
no `_FILE` form. `SWW_COMMAND` cannot be given as a file.
- A duration is Go's syntax, with `d` for days: `90s`, `15m`, `24h`, `7d`.
- A size is a number of bytes with an optional `K`, `M` or `G`, in powers of
1024: `512K`, `100M`, `5G`.
@@ -209,128 +211,134 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100. A path prefix starts with `/`.
- `off` switches a limit, a threshold or a timeout off where the table says a
setting takes it.
- The byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count only body bytes: the
app's response bodies, the visitors' request bodies, or both, as
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted. What the visitor sent
over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response
bytes.
- An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the
variable and what is wrong with the value. The settings in effect are logged
on one line at start, with tokens, keys and webhook paths shown as `********`.
Every setting the code reads, with its default:
| Variable | Default | What it does |
| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `502`, or cut off once it has started. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | How long the visitor may take to send its request line and headers, and then the whole request to reach the app, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
| `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
| `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse. |
| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes a client past any byte limit bans it. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in an hour, a size or `off`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a day, a size or `off`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | Which body bytes the byte limits count: `response`, `request` or `both`. |
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals by a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set a client may get in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A limit broken again within this time after the last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs`, a web service, `file`, or `off`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
| `SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES` | empty | Countries whose clients are refused, such as `cn,ru`. |
| `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | AS numbers whose clients get a percentage of every request and byte limit, such as `AS14061:50,AS16276:25`. |
| `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | The same by country, such as `cn:25`. |
| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT`. |
| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT`. |
| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; where it and `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` both give a percentage, the lower applies. |
| `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
| `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
| `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
| `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
| `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
| `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
| `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
| `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
| `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
| `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
| `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
| `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
| `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
| `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
| `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| Variable | Default | What it does |
| -------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
| `SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
| `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
| `SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
| `SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
| `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
| `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
| `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
| `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` | unset | The URL of a routewatch instance, which gives each client's `asn=` and `prefix=` tags. Unset, nothing asks routewatch. |
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
| `SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
| `SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
| `SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
| `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
| `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
| `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
| `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
| `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
| `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WAF_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. |
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
@@ -357,8 +365,8 @@ services:
rproxy:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://discriminator:8080
SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:8081
SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND: http://discriminator:8080
SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:8081
ports:
- "8080:8080"
@@ -393,8 +401,8 @@ services:
rproxy:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://discriminator:8080
SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:8081
SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND: http://discriminator:8080
SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:8081
ports:
- "8080:8080"
@@ -403,23 +411,22 @@ services:
environment:
SWW_COMMAND: discriminator
# Monitoring skips every check.
SWW_ALLOW_NETS: 192.0.2.10
SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS: 192.0.2.10
# The office and the automation host are never rate limited.
SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS: 203.0.113.0/24,198.51.100.7
SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS: 203.0.113.0/24,198.51.100.7
# A netblock that sends nothing wanted.
SWW_DENY_NETS: 198.51.100.128/25
SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS: 198.51.100.128/25
# Tighter limits for everyone else: a small static site.
SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE: "60"
SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR: "600"
SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY: "3000"
SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE: "60"
SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR: "600"
SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY: "3000"
# Hosting networks and one country get a share of those limits.
SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT: AS14061:50,AS16276:25
SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT: cn:25
SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT: asn=14061:50,asn=16276:25,country=CN:25
# Paths only scanners ask for; one request bans the client.
SWW_TRAP_PATHS: /wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php
SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS: /wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php
# Answer a refused client with 429 rather than 403.
SWW_BAN_RESPONSE: "429"
SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION: 30m
SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE: "429"
SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION: 30m
volumes:
- discriminator-state:/var/lib/sww
@@ -445,9 +452,9 @@ services:
# A Dockerfile built FROM the smallwebwaf image, with rproxy inside.
build: ./app
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://discriminator:8080
SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND: http://discriminator:8080
# Answer 503 rather than pass a request on while discriminator is down.
SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION: deny
SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION: deny
ports:
- "8080:8080"
@@ -455,16 +462,16 @@ services:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SWW_COMMAND: discriminator
SWW_INSTANCE_NAME: fsn1/discriminator
SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME: fsn1/discriminator
# Refuse nothing yet; log what enforce mode would have done.
SWW_MODE: observe
SWW_WAF_MODE: observe
# Look addresses up in a local IPinfo Lite database, never GeoJS.
SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE: file
SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH: /var/lib/ipinfo/ipinfo_lite.mmdb
SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE: file
SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH: /var/lib/ipinfo/ipinfo_lite.mmdb
# Alerts to an ntfy topic, with its token read from a file.
SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL: https://ntfy.example/smallwebwaf
SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN_FILE: /etc/sww/tokens/ntfy
SWW_ALERT_EVENTS: ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,source_failure,file_error
SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL: https://ntfy.example/smallwebwaf
SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN_FILE: /etc/sww/tokens/ntfy
SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS: ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,source_failure,file_error
volumes:
- discriminator-state:/var/lib/sww
- /srv/ipinfo:/var/lib/ipinfo:ro
@@ -501,46 +508,51 @@ of the request reaches the app.
1. The health check, `GET /_sww/healthz`, is answered at once.
2. The visitor's address is worked out from `X-Forwarded-For`, believed only
from `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES`. `rproxy` sends `discriminator` the request as
the visitor sent it, with the first 64 KiB of its body.
from `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES`. `rproxy` sends `discriminator` the request
as the visitor sent it, with the first 64 KiB of its body.
`discriminator` takes the checks:
3. The static lists, `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` and `SWW_DENY_NETS`.
4. The bans.
5. The lookup of the client's AS number and country.
6. The country lists.
7. The reputation sources.
8. The client's limit percentage, from its AS number, its country or a
reputation hit.
9. The rate limits.
10. The trap paths.
11. The rule files.
12. The header limits, and then the Core Rule Set.
13. A path under `/_sww/` is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that
3. The tag lists.
4. The static lists, `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` and `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS`.
5. The bans.
6. The lookup of the client's AS number and country.
7. The country list.
8. The reputation sources.
9. The tag refusals of `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY`.
10. The client's limit percentage, from its tags, its AS number, its country or
a reputation hit.
11. The rate limits.
12. The trap paths.
13. The rule files.
14. The header limits, and then the Core Rule Set.
15. The tag refusals again, so that `exploitsignature` can refuse too.
16. A path under `/_sww/` is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that
prefix.
`rproxy` takes the rest, with `discriminator` counting at the end:
14. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
15. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `discriminator` a report with the status
and the bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts the
bytes toward the byte limits and adds the request to the client's history.
17. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
18. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `discriminator` a report with the status
and the body bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts
the bytes `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` names toward the byte limits, bans the
client if they take it past one, and adds the request to the client's
history.
A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a Core
Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has false
positives; such refusals count toward `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` instead. A
request over the header limits of step 12 is answered `431`, and bans nobody
either. `rproxy` itself answers `405` to a method it does not pass on, and the
status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a
Core Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has
false positives; such refusals count toward `SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`
instead. A request over the header limits of step 14 is answered `431`, and bans
nobody either. `rproxy` itself answers `405` to a method it does not pass on,
and the status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
### Clients and bans
- A client is one IPv4 address or one IPv6 netblock of `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX`,
since one abuser usually controls a whole /64.
- A client is one IPv4 address or one IPv6 netblock of
`SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX`, since one abuser usually controls a whole /64.
- Each limit is counted over a sliding window with a few integers per client.
The table of clients and the table of bans each have a bound
(`SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, `SWW_MAX_BANS`), so memory is bounded too.
(`SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`), so memory is bounded too.
- A ban refuses every request from its netblock until it ends. Requests refused
under a ban count toward no limit. A permanent ban ends only when an admin
lifts it.
@@ -549,19 +561,36 @@ status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
bans. An admin adds, keeps or lifts a ban by editing `bans.json` or through
the ban endpoints (see [`docs/admin-endpoints.md`](docs/admin-endpoints.md)).
### Request tags
Each request gets tags from what `discriminator` knows of its client, written in
the `tags` field of its log line:
- `asn=<number>` and `country=<code>`, from the lookup;
- one tag per list of `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` that holds the client, such as
`torexit` or `vpn=mullvad`;
- `crowdsec`, `dnsbl=<zone>` and `abuseipdb`, when that reputation source lists
the client;
- `exploitsignature`, when a rule file or the Core Rule Set matched the request;
- `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>`, from a routewatch instance, while
`SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set.
`SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` refuses requests by tag, and `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT`
lowers a client's limits by tag. See "Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md).
### Attack detection
- The Core Rule Set reads the method, the URL with its query string, and the
headers of every request, and no body unless `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` is set. In
front of a code forge, bodies carry what people write and publish, which the
rules take for attacks.
headers of every request, and no body unless
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is set. In front of a code forge, bodies
carry what people write and publish, which the rules take for attacks.
- `smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set in eight ways so that it lets ordinary
requests to a code forge through, such as git over HTTP and sign-in through
Git Credential Manager. On gitea's own paths, its searches, file names and
branch names get through too. No setting undoes the changes; "Attack
detection" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists them.
- `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` switches single rules off for an app's own
fields or paths.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` switches single rules off for an app's
own fields or paths.
- Rule files are plain text, one rule to a line, edited by hand and read again
while `discriminator` runs. The image ships one file of probes no real visitor
sends (see [`docs/rules.md`](docs/rules.md)).
@@ -569,7 +598,7 @@ status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
### State files
`discriminator` keeps everything in memory, and the five JSON files in
`SWW_STATE_DIR` hold a copy: `bans.json`, `clients.json`, `lookups.json`,
`SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` hold a copy: `bans.json`, `clients.json`, `lookups.json`,
`reputation.json` and `alerts.json`. Each is written whole, to a temporary file
renamed over the real one, so a crash leaves a complete file. `discriminator`
notices a file edited on disk and takes the edit in; an edit that does not parse
@@ -606,9 +635,10 @@ is set aside as `<name>.bad`, and never stops the running process (see
- `internal/rproxy`: the reverse proxy in front of one app.
- `internal/discriminator`: `discriminator`'s server, which runs the checks and
answers its own endpoints.
- `internal/ratelimit`, `internal/bans`, `internal/rules`, `internal/waf`,
`internal/lookup`, `internal/reputation`, `internal/anomaly` and
`internal/alerts`: one check or source each.
- `internal/ratelimit`, `internal/bans`, `internal/rules`,
`internal/coreruleset`, `internal/lookup`, `internal/reputation`,
`internal/routewatch`, `internal/anomaly` and `internal/alerts`: one check or
source each.
- `internal/state`, `internal/requestlog`, `internal/remotelog` and
`internal/metrics`: the state files, the log lines, the syslog sender and the
metrics.
@@ -665,6 +695,15 @@ on the host.
`make check`.
- `script/docker`: builds the image, whose build runs the tests and the linter
first. `make docker`.
- `script/publish`: runs `script/docker`, whose build happens on the Docker host
named by `DOCKER_HOST` (`ssh://root@fsn1app1` unless set). It then pushes the
image to `PUBLISH_IMAGE` (`git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf` unless set). It
refuses a working tree with uncommitted changes. `make publish`. It pushes
four tags:
- the UTC date as `YYYY-MM-DD`;
- the short commit hash;
- the branch name;
- `latest`.
- `script/cibuild`: what CI runs: `script/bootstrap`, `script/check`, then the
image build.
- `script/precommit`: run by the git pre-commit hook; runs `script/check`.
SPEC.md
+532 -429
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File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
docs/admin-endpoints.md
+7 -7
View File
@@ -5,16 +5,16 @@ The endpoints under `/_sww/`, what each takes and what each answers.
"Admin endpoints" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how their tokens work.
- `GET /_sww/healthz`: `200` and `ok`, to anyone.
- `GET /_sww/metrics`: the metrics, for `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` (see
- `GET /_sww/metrics`: the metrics, for `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` (see
[`metrics.md`](metrics.md)).
- `GET /_sww/bans`: every ban held, under `bans`, each as `bans.json` lists it.
Needs `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN`, as do the three below.
Needs `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN`, as do the three below.
- `POST /_sww/bans`: bans a netblock. The body is a JSON object of `netblock`,
`duration` and, if you like, `reason`. `netblock` is a netblock such as
`203.0.113.0/24`, or a client's address, which bans its IPv4 netblock
(`SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX`) or its IPv6 group. `duration` is a duration such
as `1h` or `7d`, or `permanent`. A bad body is answered `400`, saying what is
wrong:
(`SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX`) or its IPv6 group. `duration` is a duration
such as `1h` or `7d`, or `permanent`. A bad body is answered `400`, saying
what is wrong:
- one that is not such an object, or has another field;
- one longer than 4 KiB;
- one that names an IPv4-mapped netblock, or an address with a zone.
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## Examples
With `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` set, the token in `$TOKEN`, and `discriminator` reached
as `discriminator:8080` on its network:
With `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` set, the token in `$TOKEN`, and `discriminator`
reached as `discriminator:8080` on its network:
```sh
# Every ban.
docs/alerts.md
+8 -8
View File
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ back or dropped.
- `ban`: a ban `discriminator` made.
- `permanent_ban`: a permanent ban it made, or an existing ban made permanent by
a request.
- `waf_block`: the Core Rule Set scored a request at or over the threshold. The
request was refused unless the alert's `detail` gives `mode`: `detect` or
`observe`.
- `core_rule_set_match`: the Core Rule Set scored a request at or over the
threshold. The request was refused unless the alert's `detail` gives `mode`:
`detect` or `observe`.
- `anomaly`: a count over an anomaly threshold.
- `reputation_hit`: a request from a client on a blocklist, the CrowdSec
decision list or a DNS blocklist, or with an AbuseIPDB score that is a hit.
@@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ on one line:
}
```
- `instance`: `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME`. `time`: when the alert was raised. `event`:
one of the events above.
- `instance`: `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME`. `time`: when the alert was raised.
`event`: one of the events above.
- `host`: the site of the request that raised the alert, since one
`discriminator` serves many sites. It is left out of `source_failure`,
`file_error` and `summary`.
@@ -122,15 +122,15 @@ Slack gets the title in bold and the text below it, with `&`, `<` and `>`
escaped. ntfy gets the text as the message, with these headers:
- `Title`: the title;
- `Authorization`: the token, as `Bearer <token>`, while `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN`
is set;
- `Authorization`: the token, as `Bearer <token>`, while
`SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` is set;
- `Priority` and `Tags`: by event, as listed below.
The priority and tag by event:
- `ban`: priority `default`, tag `no_entry`.
- `permanent_ban`: priority `high`, tag `no_entry`.
- `waf_block`: priority `default`, tag `shield`.
- `core_rule_set_match`: priority `default`, tag `shield`.
- `anomaly`: priority `high`, tag `chart_with_upwards_trend`.
- `reputation_hit`: priority `low`, tag `label`.
- `source_failure` and `file_error`: priority `high`, tag `warning`.
docs/metrics.md
+10 -6
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ What `GET /_sww/metrics` answers with, at `discriminator`'s own address.
keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
`honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
Every `sww_*request_bytes_total` and `sww_*response_bytes_total` series counts
body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says.
## Traffic
- `sww_requests_total`, `sww_request_bytes_total` and
@@ -25,11 +28,12 @@ keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
## Attack detection
- `sww_rule_matches_total`, by `rule_id` and `action`, and `sww_rules_loaded`;
- `sww_waf_matches_total`, by `mode` and `rule_id`, for the rules that fired.
- `sww_core_rule_set_matches_total`, by `mode` and `rule_id`, for the rules that
fired.
## Countries and AS numbers
For the `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` busiest of each, the rest as `other`:
For the `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N` busiest of each, the rest as `other`:
- `sww_country_requests_total`, `sww_country_request_bytes_total`,
`sww_country_response_bytes_total` and `sww_country_list_refusals_total`, by
@@ -40,8 +44,8 @@ For the `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` busiest of each, the rest as `other`:
## Lookups
- `sww_geojs_requests_total` and `sww_geojs_failures_total`;
- `sww_geojs_unanswered_total`: the requests that needed an answer and went on
without it;
- `sww_requests_without_geojs_answer_total`: the requests that needed an answer
and went on without it;
- with the file source, `sww_lookup_database_last_read_timestamp_seconds` and
`sww_lookup_database_read_failures_total`.
@@ -67,8 +71,8 @@ By `file`:
## Remote log, alerts and the process
- while a syslog server is set, `sww_remote_log_lines_sent_total`,
`sww_remote_log_lines_dropped_total` and `sww_remote_log_buffer_depth`;
- by `destination`, `sww_alerts_sent_total`, `sww_alerts_failed_total`,
`sww_remote_log_lines_dropped_total` and `sww_remote_log_lines_waiting`;
- by `destination`, `sww_alerts_sent_total`, `sww_alert_send_failures_total`,
`sww_alerts_suppressed_total` and `sww_alerts_dropped_total`;
- Go's own `go_` metrics and the process's `process_` metrics.
docs/request-log.md
+85 -40
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ These questions write no line:
A `report` line:
```
{"type":"request","discriminator_line":"report","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","instance":"fsn1/discriminator","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","method":"GET","scheme":"https","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","forwarded_for":"203.0.113.9","client_group":"203.0.113.9/32","asn":"AS64496","as_name":"Example Net","country":"DE","request_headers":{"accept":"*/*"},"action":"forward","counts":{"minute":1,"hour":12,"day":40,"minute_bytes":5120,"hour_bytes":61440,"day_bytes":204800},"waf_score":0,"duration_total":3.217,"duration_checks":0.041,"duration_waf":0.029,"duration_upstream_total":3.104}
{"type":"request","discriminator_line":"report","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","instance":"fsn1/discriminator","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","method":"GET","scheme":"https","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","forwarded_for":"203.0.113.9","client_group":"203.0.113.9/32","asn":"AS64496","as_name":"Example Net","country":"DE","request_headers":{"accept":"*/*"},"action":"forward","counts":{"minute":1,"hour":12,"day":40,"minute_bytes":5120,"hour_bytes":61440,"day_bytes":204800},"core_rule_set_score":0,"duration_total_ms":3.217,"duration_checks_ms":0.041,"duration_core_rule_set_ms":0.029,"duration_upstream_total_ms":3.104}
```
### Every line
@@ -37,14 +37,14 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- the standard web log fields;
- `request_id`, `peer_ip` and `client_group`;
- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`;
- `action` and `duration_total`.
- `action` and `duration_total_ms`.
### Standard web log fields
- `time`: when `discriminator` had read the question's body, RFC 3339 with
milliseconds, in UTC. The `report` line gives the same time as the `decision`
line.
- `instance`: `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME`.
- `instance`: `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME`.
- `client_ip`: the visitor's address, as `rproxy` worked it out.
- `method`, `path` and `query`: the visitor's request.
- `scheme`: how the visitor reached `rproxy` or the trusted proxy in front of
@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- GeoJS had not answered by the time `discriminator` answered.
- `content_type`: the visitor's `Content-Type`.
- `content_length`: the body length the visitor announced.
- `request_headers`: the headers listed in `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS`, by name in
lower case.
- `request_headers`: the headers listed in `SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS`, by
name in lower case.
- `has_authorization` and `has_cookie`: true when the request had those headers.
Their values are never logged.
@@ -96,49 +96,94 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- `action`: what was done:
- `forward`: answered `allow`, so that `rproxy` passes it to the app;
- `denied`: refused for `SWW_DENY_NETS`, or for a reputation source with the
action `deny`;
- `banned`: refused under a ban, or for a `ban` rule, a trap path or a
CrowdSec decision, each of which bans the client;
- `country_denied`, `rate_limited`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`:
refused by that check;
- `too_large`: over a header limit;
- `admin`: answered at one of `discriminator`'s own endpoints, or `404` for
a path under `/_sww/`.
- `client_denied`: refused for `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS`, for a reputation source
with the action `deny`, or for a tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY`;
- `temporarily_banned`: refused under a ban that runs out, or for a `ban`
rule, a trap path or a CrowdSec decision that made such a ban;
- `permanently_banned`: refused under a ban that never runs out, including a
ban this request made or made permanent;
- `country_denied`, `client_is_rate_limited`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and
`blocked_by_core_rule_set`: refused by that check;
- `request_header_too_large`: over a header limit;
- `own_endpoint`: answered at one of `discriminator`'s own endpoints, or
`404` for a path under `/_sww/`.
- `would_action`: in `observe` mode, what `enforce` mode would have done with a
request it would have refused. `action` then names what was done, normally
`forward`.
- `limit_percent` and `limit_percent_setting`: the client's percentage of the
rate limits and the setting that lowered it, when one did. `bytes_percent` and
`bytes_percent_setting` do the same for the byte limits.
- `heuristic`: the heuristic that refused the request, in `observe` mode too. It
is left out when none did.
- `heuristic_figures`: an object of the figures that heuristic acted on. Each
heuristic and its figures:
- `deny_nets`: `netblock`, the entry of `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` the client is
in;
- `active_ban`: `netblock`, the ban's netblock, and `ban_expires`;
- `countries`: `country`, and `setting`, the country list that refused it;
- `tag_deny`: `tag`, the tag of `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` the request carries;
- `blocklists`: `lists`, the blocklist URLs that list the client;
- `crowdsec`: `scenario`, the decision's scenario, and `expires`, when the
decision ends;
- `dnsbl`: `zones`, the DNS blocklist zones that list the client, their keys
masked;
- `abuseipdb`: `score`, and `min_score`, `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE`;
- `rate_limits`: `window`, `count` and `limit`;
- `trap_paths`: `path`, the trap path asked for;
- `rule_files`: `rule_id` and `rule_action`, of the rule that refused it;
- `header_limits`: `fields`, `fields_limit`, `cookies` and `cookies_limit`;
- `core_rule_set`: `score`, and `threshold`,
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD`;
- `refusal_limit`: `window`, `count` and `limit`, of the error burst;
- `byte_limits`: `window`, `count` and `limit`, the count in bytes.
- `after_answer_heuristic`: the heuristic that banned the client after
`discriminator` answered the request, in `observe` mode too: `refusal_limit`
or `byte_limits`.
- `after_answer_heuristic_figures`: an object of the figures that heuristic
acted on, as listed above.
`byte_limits` bans when the report comes, so only the `report` line names
it.
- `rate_limit_percent` and `rate_limit_percent_setting`: the client's percentage
of the rate limits and the setting that lowered it, when one did.
`bytes_limit_percent` and `bytes_limit_percent_setting` do the same for the
byte limits.
- `counts`: the client's totals as rate limiting counts them, this request
included. It is left out when rate limiting did not count the request. It
holds:
- `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests;
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: bytes.
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: the body bytes
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` names, in that window.
A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes of an allowed request are counted when
its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the bytes are without this
request's.
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes counted for an allowed request and its
response are added when its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the
three byte totals leave them out.
- `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
- `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit;
- `error_burst`.
- `minute_refusals` for the error burst (`SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`).
A request whose bytes broke a limit was passed on whole, so its `action`
stays `forward`. Only its `report` line gives that limit.
When the bytes counted for a request and its response break a limit, the
request has been passed on whole, so its `action` stays `forward`. Only its
`report` line gives that limit.
- `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that
refused.
- `waf_score` and `waf_rule_ids`: the Core Rule Set's score and the rules that
matched, for a request it inspected.
- `core_rule_set_score` and `core_rule_set_rule_ids`: the Core Rule Set's score
and the rules that matched, for a request it inspected.
- `reputation`: the sources the client is on, in this order:
- blocklist URLs;
- the CrowdSec decision list's URL;
- DNS blocklist zones;
- `abuseipdb`.
- `tags`: the request's tags, sorted, left out when it has none. Each tag and
where it comes from is under "Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md).
- `routewatch_tags_missing`: why the request got no tags from routewatch,
present only while `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set:
- `no_answer_yet`: routewatch has not answered about this client yet;
- `request_failed`: a query to routewatch failed within the last minute, and
the process log says why;
- `no_route`: routewatch knows no live route for the address.
- `offence`: `limit`, for a request that broke a limit.
- `ban_expires`: when the client's ban ends, for a request that made one or was
refused under one: a time, or `permanent`.
@@ -147,14 +192,14 @@ Every one of these lines has:
All in milliseconds:
- `duration_total`:
- `duration_total_ms`:
- on the `decision` line, from `discriminator` having read the question's
body to the line;
- on the `report` line, from `rproxy` having read the request's headers to
the end of the answer.
- `duration_checks`: to the end of the checks;
- `duration_waf`: the part of that the Core Rule Set took;
- `duration_upstream_total`: on the `report` line of an allowed request, from
- `duration_checks_ms`: to the end of the checks;
- `duration_core_rule_set_ms`: the part of that the Core Rule Set took;
- `duration_upstream_total_ms`: on the `report` line of an allowed request, from
the hand-over to the app to the end of the answer.
### Requests to its own endpoints
@@ -167,8 +212,8 @@ these meanings where they differ:
- `scheme`: `http`.
- `time`: when the request's headers had been read.
- `request_bytes`: the bytes read of a ban to add, and otherwise `0`.
- `action`: `admin`.
- `duration_total`: from the request's headers being read to the line.
- `action`: `own_endpoint`.
- `duration_total_ms`: from the request's headers being read to the line.
## `rproxy`'s line
@@ -186,22 +231,22 @@ these meanings where they differ:
a WebSocket carried from the visitor.
- `response_bytes`: the bytes of the answer's body, with what a WebSocket
carried from the app.
- `duration_request`: milliseconds from the request's headers being read until
the app had been sent the whole request, or the answer started if that was
sooner. It includes the wait for `discriminator`.
- `duration_response`: milliseconds from then until the end of the answer.
- `duration_request_ms`: milliseconds from the request's headers being read
until the app had been sent the whole request, or the answer started if that
was sooner. It includes the wait for `discriminator`.
- `duration_response_ms`: milliseconds from then until the end of the answer.
- `disposition`: what was done with the request: `allow`, `deny` or `close`. It
is `discriminator`'s answer, or the value of `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION`. It is
left out when:
is `discriminator`'s answer, or the value of `SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION`.
It is left out when:
- `discriminator` was not asked, as for the health check;
- the visitor went away while `discriminator` was being asked;
- `discriminator`'s answer had no valid `X-Sww-Disposition`;
- `rproxy` could not pass on `discriminator`'s answer, and answered `502`.
- `default_disposition`: `true` when `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` gave
- `default_disposition`: `true` when `SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` gave
`disposition`, and otherwise left out.
For example:
```
{"type":"request","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","host":"app.example","method":"GET","path":"/","query":"","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"duration_request":1.204,"duration_response":3.104,"disposition":"allow"}
{"type":"request","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","host":"app.example","method":"GET","path":"/","query":"","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"duration_request_ms":1.204,"duration_response_ms":3.104,"disposition":"allow"}
```
docs/settings.md
+288 -223
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ Every setting, its default and the values it takes, in the groups of "Settings"
in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md). That section gives the conventions, the settings
that take `off`, the `_FILE` form, and what each group does and why.
The settings that start with `SWW_` are `discriminator`'s. Those that start with
`SWRP_` are `rproxy`'s, and are under "`rproxy`" below. `SWW_COMMAND` chooses
between the two (see "The image's command" below).
The settings that start with `SWW_WAF_` are `discriminator`'s. Those that start
with `SWW_RPROXY_` are `rproxy`'s, and are under "`rproxy`" below. `SWW_COMMAND`
chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## Forms of values
@@ -28,277 +28,341 @@ between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## Core
- `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `discriminator` listens: `:` and a
port, such as `:9000`. Leave the host out (see "Ports" in
- `SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `discriminator` listens: `:`
and a port, such as `:9000`. Leave the host out (see "Ports" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` (default: the container's host name): the `instance` name
in each line `discriminator` logs, and in each alert and metric, such as
- `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` (default: the container's host name): the `instance`
name in each line `discriminator` logs, and in each alert and metric, such as
`fsn1/discriminator`. Valid UTF-8. No control character while
`SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` is set. 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a
space while `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set and `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` is not.
- `SWW_MODE` (default `enforce`): `enforce` or `observe`.
- `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` (default `64`): the prefix length of an IPv6 client's
group, from 32 to 128.
- `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` (default `20000`): the most clients kept, a whole
number above zero.
- `SWW_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): how many of its own bans `discriminator`
`SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` is set. 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a
space while `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set and `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME`
is not.
- `SWW_WAF_MODE` (default `enforce`): `enforce` or `observe`.
- `SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` (default `64`): the prefix length of an IPv6
client's group, from 32 to 128.
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` (default `20000`): the most clients kept, a
whole number above zero.
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): how many of its own bans `discriminator`
keeps, a whole number above zero.
## Tokens
- `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for the ban endpoints and
- `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for the ban endpoints and
`/_sww/clients/<ip>`. At least 32 characters.
- `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for `/_sww/metrics`. At least
32 characters.
- `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for `/_sww/metrics`. At
least 32 characters.
## State files
- `SWW_STATE_DIR` (default `/var/lib/sww`): the directory of the state files, an
absolute path that exists and can be written.
- `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` (default `10s`): how long `bans.json` waits to be
- `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` (default `/var/lib/sww`): the directory of the state
files, an absolute path that exists and can be written.
- `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` (default `10s`): how long `bans.json` waits to be
written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. A duration.
- `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` (default `15m`): how often every state file is
written. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` (default `15m`): how often every state file
is written. A duration.
## Logging
- `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` (default `info`): the least severe of `discriminator`'s own
messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`.
- `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` (default
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL` (default `info`): the least severe of `discriminator`'s
own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`.
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` (default
`accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range`): the
request headers recorded in the log line, in either case. `Host` and
`Transfer-Encoding` are refused; the host is the field `host`.
- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` (default unset): a syslog server that also gets every
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` (default unset): a syslog server that also gets every
line written to stdout: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://`,
each with a host and a port and nothing more.
- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` (default unset): a file of PEM certificates that
a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own.
A file that cannot be read, or holds no certificate, is refused.
- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` (default `10000`): the most lines held while they wait
to be sent, a whole number above zero.
- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` (default `local0`): the syslog facility: `kern`,
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` (default unset): a file of PEM certificates
that a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's
own. A file that cannot be read, or holds no certificate, is refused.
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` (default `10000`): the most lines held while they
wait to be sent, a whole number above zero.
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` (default `local0`): the syslog facility: `kern`,
`user`, `mail`, `daemon`, `auth`, `syslog`, `lpr`, `news`, `uucp`, `cron`,
`authpriv`, `ftp`, or `local0` to `local7`.
- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` (default: `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME`): the app name in each
syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space.
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` (default: `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME`): the app name
in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space.
## Metrics
- `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` (default `50`): how many AS numbers and how many countries
get series of their own. A whole number above zero.
- `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N` (default `50`): how many AS numbers and how many
countries get series of their own. A whole number above zero.
## Static lists
- `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` (default empty): netblocks you trust, such as your monitoring
(see step 3 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are
- `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` (default empty): netblocks you trust, such as your
monitoring (see step 4 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are
exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits.
- `SWW_DENY_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are refused (see step
3 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are refused (see
step 4 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## Request rate limits, per client
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a
client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
The request past one of these limits is refused, and the client is banned.
- `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests
a client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
person opening two pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files each.
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `1500`): the most requests a client may
- `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `1500`): the most requests a client may
make in an hour. A count or `off`. It is the main limit against scrapers. A
person reading a site for an hour, a page every 20 seconds, makes about 900. A
scraper making one request every 2 seconds makes 1,800 an hour, more than the
limit.
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `6000`): the most requests a client may make
in a day. A count or `off`. The default is four hours at the hour limit. A
scraper making one request every 10 seconds makes 8,640 a day, more than the
- `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `6000`): the most requests a client may
make in a day. A count or `off`. The default is four hours at the hour limit.
A scraper making one request every 10 seconds makes 8,640 a day, more than the
limit.
- A CI runner asks its code forge for work all day and can pass the limits. Put
the runners' addresses in `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`. Do the same for a
the runners' addresses in `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`. Do the same for a
network where many people share one address, such as an office.
- Counting cannot catch a client that stays under all three limits (see "Request
rate limits, per client" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes exempt from rate
limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`.
- `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes exempt from
rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`.
## Byte limits, per client
- `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `50G`) and `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes
counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
`response`, `request` or `both`.
These count body bytes, never headers. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. The bytes
counted for a request and its response are added to the client's total once the
response has ended. The request that takes a client's total past a limit is not
cut off; the client is banned.
- `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`),
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `50G`) and
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes counted for a
client in each window, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes
count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the
limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends.
- `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): what the byte limits and the byte
anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`,
the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a
WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
## Lookup of AS number and country
- `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` (default `geojs`): `geojs`, `file` or `off`. `off` stops
the start while a setting that needs a lookup is set:
- the two country lists;
- `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`;
- the four biased threshold lists and `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`;
- `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` below `100`;
- `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` (default `geojs`): `geojs`, `file` or `off`. `off`
stops the start while a setting that needs a lookup is set:
- `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES`;
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`;
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` or `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` naming a `country=` tag,
or an `asn=` tag while `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is unset;
- the two byte percentage lists and `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`;
- `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` below `100`;
- an anomaly threshold per AS number.
- `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` (default empty): the IPinfo Lite database file, in its
`.mmdb` form, for `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file`.
- `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` (default `800ms`): how long a request waits for its
- `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` (default empty): the IPinfo Lite database file, in
its `.mmdb` form, for `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file`.
- `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` (default `800ms`): how long a request waits for its
client's first answer from GeoJS, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. A
duration; never `off`.
- `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` (default `false`): `true` has `rproxy` pass the app
the client's AS number in `X-Client-ASN` and its country in
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` (default `false`): `true` has `rproxy` pass the
app the client's AS number in `X-Client-ASN` and its country in
`X-Client-Country`.
## Country lists
## Country list
- `SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): countries whose clients are refused,
such as `cn,ru,kp`.
- `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): when set, the only
countries whose clients get through, such as `us,de`. A country on both lists
stops the start.
- `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): when set, the only
countries whose clients get through, such as `us,de`. A country whose
`country=` tag is in `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` stops the start.
## Request tags
Every request gets tags from what `discriminator` knows of its client. See
"Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md).
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` (default empty): address lists that each add a tag, as
`name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. A name is the
tag, and may hold `=`, such as `vpn=mullvad`. Each list is an `http` or
`https` URL fetched like a blocklist. A name or URL listed twice is refused.
So is a URL that is also in `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS`,
`SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`, or the CrowdSec decision list.
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` (default empty): tags whose requests are refused, such as
`torexit,country=CN`. A tag listed twice, an `asn=` tag without a number, or a
`country=` tag without a country, is refused.
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default empty): tags that lower a client's
limits, as tag and percentage pairs, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`. A
percentage is from `1` to `99`, of every rate limit and byte limit. The lowest
percentage among a client's tags applies. A tag listed twice is refused. So is
`exploitsignature`: a request gets that tag after the rate limits have counted
it.
- `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` (default unset): the `http` or `https` URL of a
routewatch instance. [routewatch](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/routewatch) is a
service that gives an address's announced netblock and origin AS.
`discriminator` asks it about each client, in the background, and adds the
tags `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>` from its answer. While it is
unset, nothing asks routewatch and no request gets a `prefix=` tag.
`SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` and `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` accept tags in either case. A
tag that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
- a name in `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS`;
- an `asn=` or `country=` tag;
- a `prefix=` tag with a netblock, while `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set. It
matches only that exact announced netblock, such as `prefix=192.0.2.0/24`;
- a `dnsbl=` tag of a zone in `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES`, in lower case, with a key
masked as the `reputation` field shows it;
- `abuseipdb`, while `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` is set;
- `exploitsignature`, in `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` only, while `SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED`
is `true`, or while neither `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` nor
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` is `off`.
`crowdsec` stops the start in both settings, because a CrowdSec decision refuses
the request first.
## Biased thresholds
- `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default empty): a list of AS numbers, each with `:`
and a percentage, such as `AS14061:50,AS16276:50,AS45102:25`. An AS number
listed twice is refused.
- `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default empty): the same by country, such as
`cn:25,ru:50`.
- `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` and `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` (default empty): the
same, for the byte limits alone.
- `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default `100`): the percentage for a client the
lookup cannot place.
- `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` (default unset): the `http` or `https` URL of a
text file with one AS number and percentage on each line, such as
`AS64496:50`. A URL that is also in `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` is refused.
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` and `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` (default
empty): a percentage of the byte limits alone, for the AS numbers or countries
listed, such as `AS14061:50` or `cn:25`. It takes the place of the percentage
`SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` gives their `asn=` or `country=` tag. An AS number
or country listed twice is refused.
- `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default `100`): the percentage for a client
the lookup cannot place.
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` (default unset): the `http` or `https` URL of
a text file with one AS number and percentage on each line, such as
`AS64496:50`. Each entry counts like an `asn=` tag in
`SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT`. A URL that is also in `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` is
refused.
## Attack detection
- `SWW_RULES_DIR` (default `/etc/sww/rules.d`): the directory of the rule files.
- `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` (default `true`): `false` reads no rule file.
- `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` (default empty): paths only scanners ask for, such as
- `SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR` (default `/etc/sww/rules.d`): the directory of the rule
files.
- `SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED` (default `true`): `false` reads no rule file.
- `SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS` (default empty): paths only scanners ask for, such as
`/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`. Each starts with `/` and holds no `?`.
- `SWW_WAF_MODE` (default `block`): `off`, `detect` or `block`.
- `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` (default `1`): the Core Rule Set's paranoia level,
from 1 to 4.
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` (default `5`): the score at which a request is a
match. A whole number above zero, or `off`.
- `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` (default
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` (default `block`): `off`, `detect` or `block`.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL` (default `1`): the Core Rule Set's
paranoia level, from 1 to 4.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` (default `5`): the score at which a
request is a match. A whole number above zero, or `off`.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES` (default
`920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140`): the ids of Core Rule Set rules
to switch off. Each a whole number above zero. An id from 900000 to 900999 is
refused: those are the rules that set the Core Rule Set up, and
`smallwebwaf`'s own.
- `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes the Core Rule Set does
not inspect.
- `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` (default `off`): `off`, or how much of a request body the
Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `64K`. A question carries no more of a
body than 64 KiB, and the Core Rule Set reads at most 64 KiB less one byte of
it, whatever the value (see "The answer" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` (default unset): a file of Core Rule Set
exclusions, written as Coraza directives. It is loaded before the Core Rule
Set's rules, so it holds only `SecAction` and `SecRule` lines that exclude
with `ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById` or `ctl:ruleRemoveById`. A file that cannot be
read or does not parse stops the start, whatever `SWW_WAF_MODE` is. So does a
file that names a number from 900000 to 900999 outside a comment, alone or in
a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client in
a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes the Core
Rule Set does not inspect.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` (default `off`): `off`, or how much of a
request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `64K`. A question
carries no more of a body than 64 KiB, and the Core Rule Set reads at most 64
KiB less one byte of it, whatever the value (see "The answer" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` (default unset): a file of Core Rule
Set exclusions, written as Coraza directives. It is loaded before the Core
Rule Set's rules, so it holds only `SecAction` and `SecRule` lines that
exclude with `ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById` or `ctl:ruleRemoveById`. A file that
cannot be read or does not parse stops the start, whatever
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` is. So does a file that names a number from
900000 to 900999 outside a comment, alone or in a range. So does a directive
that removes or changes rules as the file loads, such as `SecRuleRemoveById`,
since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
- `SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may
get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or
`off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
## Ban lengths, response and scope
- `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` (default `403`): `403`, `429` or `close`.
- `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` (default `1h`): the ban for a first broken limit. A
duration.
- `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` (default `24h`): the time after a ban ends
- `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE` (default `403`): `403`, `429` or `close`.
- `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` (default `1h`): the ban for a first broken limit.
A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` (default `24h`): the time after a ban ends
within which breaking a limit again lengthens the next ban. A duration.
- `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the longest ban for a broken limit; one
that would be longer is permanent. A duration.
- `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the ban for a first clear sign of
attack. A duration.
- `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` (default `32`): how much a ban on an IPv4 client
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the longest ban for a broken limit;
one that would be longer is permanent. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the ban for a first clear sign
of attack. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` (default `32`): how much a ban on an IPv4 client
covers: the prefix length of its netblock, from 0 to 32.
## Reputation
- `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` (default empty): blocklists to fetch, such as
- `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` (default empty): blocklists to fetch, such as
`https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. Each an `http` or `https` URL
without a user or a fragment. A URL listed twice is refused.
- `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` (default `24h`): how long a list waits after its last
try before it is fetched again. A duration of `1h` or more.
- `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` (default `deny`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`.
- `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` (default empty): the DNS blocklists to ask, such as
- `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` (default `24h`): how long a list waits after its
last try before it is fetched again. A duration of `1h` or more.
- `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` (default `deny`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or
`log`.
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES` (default empty): the DNS blocklists to ask, such as
`dnsbl.dronebl.org`. Each a DNS name of at most 189 characters. A Spamhaus
zone carries its key, as in `<key>.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net`. A zone listed twice
is refused, whatever its case or key.
- `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` (default unset): the resolver to ask the zones through,
such as `192.0.2.53` or `[2001:db8::53]:5353`. An IP address with an optional
port, 53 when none is given. Unset, the host's resolver is used.
- `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` (default unset): the key of your AbuseIPDB account. A
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER` (default unset): the resolver to ask the zones
through, such as `192.0.2.53` or `[2001:db8::53]:5353`. An IP address with an
optional port, 53 when none is given. Unset, the host's resolver is used.
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` (default unset): the key of your AbuseIPDB account. A
control character in it is refused.
- `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` (default `75`): the least abuse confidence score,
from 0 to 100, that is a hit.
- `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` (default `900`): the most checks made in a day, a
whole number above zero. AbuseIPDB's free accounts may make 1,000.
- `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` (default unset): the local API of a CrowdSec engine
you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`. An `http` or `https` URL without a
user or a fragment; its decision list is at `v1/decisions` under it. Set
without the key, it is refused. So is a decision list URL that is also in
`SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS`, or that is `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`.
- `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` (default unset): the key the engine gave for
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` (default `75`): the least abuse confidence
score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit.
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` (default `900`): the most checks made in a
day, a whole number above zero. AbuseIPDB's free accounts may make 1,000.
- `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` (default unset): the local API of a CrowdSec
engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`. An `http` or `https` URL
without a user or a fragment; its decision list is at `v1/decisions` under it.
Set without the key, it is refused. So is a decision list URL that is also in
`SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS`, or that is `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`.
- `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` (default unset): the key the engine gave for
`smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it. Set without the
URL, it is refused.
- `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` (default `limit:25`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or
- `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION` (default `limit:25`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or
`log`, for DNS blocklist and AbuseIPDB hits.
- `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` (default `24h`): how long a zone's verdict or
- `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` (default `24h`): how long a zone's verdict or
AbuseIPDB's score is used. A duration.
- `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` (default `2s`): how long a query to a zone or a check
with AbuseIPDB may take. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` (default `2s`): how long a query to a zone or a
check with AbuseIPDB may take. A duration.
## Alerting
- `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the webhook that receives each alert
as a JSON object. An `http` or `https` URL without a user or a fragment.
- `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` (default empty): headers sent with each post, such
as `Authorization:Bearer 0123456789abcdef`. A list of name, `:` and value. A
value cannot hold a comma.
- `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the Slack incoming webhook that
receives each alert as a message, checked as the webhook URL is.
- `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` (default unset): the ntfy topic that receives each alert,
as the topic's full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`, checked as the
webhook URL is.
- `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` (default unset): an ntfy access token. A control
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the webhook that receives each
alert as a JSON object. An `http` or `https` URL without a user or a fragment.
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` (default empty): headers sent with each post,
such as `Authorization:Bearer 0123456789abcdef`. A list of name, `:` and
value. A value cannot hold a comma.
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the Slack incoming webhook
that receives each alert as a message, checked as the webhook URL is.
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` (default unset): the ntfy topic that receives each
alert, as the topic's full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`, checked
as the webhook URL is.
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` (default unset): an ntfy access token. A control
character in it is refused.
- `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` (default
`ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error`):
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS` (default
`ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error`):
the event types alerts are sent for, from those in [`alerts.md`](alerts.md)
but `summary`. Any other name is refused.
- `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` (default `15m`): how long after an alert is sent its
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` (default `15m`): how long after an alert is sent its
repeats are held back. A duration or `off`.
- `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` (default `60`): the most alerts sent in an hour. A
whole number above zero, or `off`.
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` (default `60`): the most alerts sent in an hour.
A whole number above zero, or `off`.
## Anomaly thresholds
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most bytes counted in
a minute and in an hour. Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by
default. The four thresholds per client are:
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most body bytes
counted in a minute and in an hour. The bytes are those `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT`
names. Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by default. The four
thresholds per client are:
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`;
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`;
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`;
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR`.
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`;
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`;
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`;
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR`.
The other scopes' names have another prefix before the same four endings, such
as `REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`:
- `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_...`: per netblock around a client. Two settings give the
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_...`: per netblock around a client. Two settings give the
netblock's length:
- `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` (default `24`, from 0 to 32) for an IPv4
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` (default `24`, from 0 to 32) for an IPv4
client;
- `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` (default `48`, from 0 to 128) for an IPv6
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` (default `48`, from 0 to 128) for an IPv6
client.
- `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_...`: per AS number.
- `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_...`: the whole service.
- `SWW_WATCH_...`: each netblock in `SWW_WATCH_NETS`, as a whole.
`SWW_WATCH_NETS` (default empty) is a list of name, `=` and netblock, such as
`office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. An item without `=` or a
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_...`: per AS number.
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_...`: the whole service.
- `SWW_WAF_WATCH_...`: each netblock in `SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS`, as a whole.
`SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS` (default empty) is a list of name, `=` and netblock, such
as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. An item without `=` or a
name, or with a bad netblock, is refused. So is a name used twice.
## Settings given as files
@@ -319,7 +383,7 @@ Then mount its directory into the container read-only, and name the file:
docker run \
-v /srv/app/tokens:/etc/sww/tokens:ro \
-e SWW_COMMAND=discriminator \
-e SWW_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE=/etc/sww/tokens/metrics \
-e SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE=/etc/sww/tokens/metrics \
...
```
@@ -343,51 +407,52 @@ A few limits are fixed rather than settings:
## `discriminator`'s answer and `rproxy`'s wait
`SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` is the longest a question waits on an outside source. Keep
it well under `rproxy`'s `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, as the default is. No question waits
for `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT`, since the DNS blocklists and AbuseIPDB are asked
in the background (see "Answering in time" under "`discriminator`" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
`SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` is the longest a question waits on an outside source.
Keep it well under `rproxy`'s `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`, as the default is. No
question waits for `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT`, since the DNS blocklists and
AbuseIPDB are asked in the background (see "Answering in time" under
"`discriminator`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## `rproxy`
`sww rproxy` reads the settings below and no others. They are read once at
start, and an invalid value stops the start. None can be given as a file, since
`rproxy` never touches disk. "`rproxy`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says what
they do.
start, and an invalid value stops the start. Any can be given as a file, as a
`SWW_WAF_` setting can. "`rproxy`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says what they do.
A time here is a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as `2000`.
- `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` (required, no default): `discriminator`'s URL. An `http` or
`https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more. `rproxy`
speaks HTTP/1.1 to it.
- `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long `rproxy` waits for
- `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` (required, no default): `discriminator`'s URL. An
`http` or `https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more.
`rproxy` speaks HTTP/1.1 to it.
- `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long `rproxy` waits for
`discriminator`'s answer, to a question and to a report. A time; never `off`.
- `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` (default `allow`): what is done with a request when
`discriminator` cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not
answer within `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`. `allow` passes it to the app, and `deny`
answers `503`. It does not apply to an answer `discriminator` gives, such as
an error.
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` (default `100M`): the largest request body. A size or
`off`.
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` (default `1G`): the largest response body. A size or
`off`.
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` (default `60000`): how long the visitor may take to
send its request line and headers. It then also bounds, from the end of the
headers, the time until the app has been sent the whole request. A time or
`off`.
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` (default `1800000`): how long the answer may take,
from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor. A time or
`off`.
- `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `rproxy` listens, such as `:9000`.
- `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` (default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`): the app. An `http` or
`https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more.
- `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` (default `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`):
the netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` is believed. Set but empty, it trusts
nothing. A client outside these netblocks cannot claim another address. Where
other containers reach `rproxy` directly, or visitors on a private network
reach traefik, they can name another address in the header. Narrowing the
setting to traefik's own network closes that gap.
- `SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` (default `allow`): what is done with a
request when `discriminator` cannot be connected to, does not answer at all,
or does not answer within `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`. `allow` passes it to the
app, and `deny` answers `503`. It does not apply to an answer `discriminator`
gives, such as an error.
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` (default `100M`): the largest request body. A
size or `off`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` (default `1G`): the largest response body. A
size or `off`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` (default `60000`): how long the visitor may
take to send its request line and headers. It then also bounds, from the end
of the headers, the time until the app has been sent the whole request. A time
or `off`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` (default `1800000`): how long the answer may
take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor. A
time or `off`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `rproxy` listens, such as
`:9000`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` (default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`): the app. An
`http` or `https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more.
- `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` (default
`10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`): the netblocks whose
`X-Forwarded-For` is believed. Set but empty, it trusts nothing. A client
outside these netblocks cannot claim another address. Where other containers
reach `rproxy` directly, or visitors on a private network reach traefik, they
can name another address in the header. Narrowing the setting to traefik's own
network closes that gap.
## The image's command
@@ -399,14 +464,14 @@ check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator` (see "Deployment" in
Nothing reads these names any more:
- `SWW_UPSTREAM_URL` is `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`.
- `SWW_TRUSTED_PROXIES` is `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
- `SWW_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` is `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE`.
- `SWW_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` is `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE`.
- `SWW_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` are
`SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
- `SWW_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` are
`SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
- `SWW_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES` have no
setting. `rproxy` closes a kept-open connection idle for 120 seconds, and
takes a request line and headers of at most 32 KiB.
- `SWW_WAF_UPSTREAM_URL` is `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`.
- `SWW_WAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES` is `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
- `SWW_WAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` is `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE`.
- `SWW_WAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` is `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE`.
- `SWW_WAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_WAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` are
`SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
- `SWW_WAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_WAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` are
`SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
- `SWW_WAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_WAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES`
have no setting. `rproxy` closes a kept-open connection idle for 120 seconds,
and takes a request line and headers of at most 32 KiB.
docs/state-files.md
+12 -11
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
# State files
The five JSON files in `SWW_STATE_DIR`, and what each holds. "Persistent state"
in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how they are written, read and edited. Each has
a top-level `version` of 1.
The five JSON files in `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR`, and what each holds. "Persistent
state" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how they are written, read and edited.
Each has a top-level `version` of 1.
## `bans.json`
Active and past bans: every ban an admin made, and up to `SWW_MAX_BANS` of those
`discriminator` made. Per entry:
Active and past bans: every ban an admin made, and up to `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` of
those `discriminator` made. Per entry:
- `netblock`, `start` and `expires` (`null` for a permanent ban);
- `cause`: `attack`, `limit`, `admin` or `crowdsec`;
@@ -61,10 +61,11 @@ since it was first seen:
- the first and last time seen;
- the AS number, AS name and country last looked up, and when;
- total requests, and how many were forwarded and how many refused;
- bytes in each direction;
- body bytes of its requests, and of the responses it was sent;
- responses by status class;
- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`. A file
may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which nothing adds to.
- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and
`blocked_by_core_rule_set`. A file may also hold `token_refused`, which is
kept, and which nothing adds to.
## `lookups.json`
@@ -93,10 +94,10 @@ GeoJS answers, one per line:
## Sizes
- `clients.json`: about 1 KiB per client, about 20 MiB at the default
`SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`. Written every 15 minutes, that is under 2 GiB of
disk writes a day.
`SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`. Written every 15 minutes, that is under 2 GiB
of disk writes a day.
- `bans.json`: about 1.2 KiB per ban, at most about 2.5 KiB, so about 6 MiB at
the default `SWW_MAX_BANS`. Written every 15 minutes, a full file comes to
the default `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`. Written every 15 minutes, a full file comes to
about 600 MiB of writes a day, and a hundred new bans a day add about 600 MiB
more.
- `lookups.json`: about 150 bytes per answer, under 1.5 GiB of writes a day when
go.mod
+10
View File
@@ -10,12 +10,14 @@ require (
github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0
github.com/oschwald/maxminddb-golang/v2 v2.7.0
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1
github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0
)
require (
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect
github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3 // indirect
github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.4.0 // indirect
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5 // indirect
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2 // indirect
github.com/gotnospirit/makeplural v0.0.0-20180622080156-a5f48d94d976 // indirect
@@ -25,14 +27,22 @@ require (
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 // indirect
github.com/magefile/mage v1.17.0 // indirect
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 // indirect
github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.2.4 // indirect
github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20250424160509-463d218d4745 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 // indirect
github.com/sagikazarmark/locafero v0.11.0 // indirect
github.com/sourcegraph/conc v0.3.1-0.20240121214520-5f936abd7ae8 // indirect
github.com/spf13/afero v1.15.0 // indirect
github.com/spf13/cast v1.10.0 // indirect
github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.10 // indirect
github.com/subosito/gotenv v1.6.0 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1 // indirect
github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3 // indirect
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5 // indirect
go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba // indirect
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0 // indirect
go.sum
+24
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,12 @@ github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3 h1:NhbXKRfRpqKzBMzv8zpCcnjyEw7BCVhBO
github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3/go.mod h1:Ik/+w3UmTWH9yn366RgS9D95K3y7Atb5m/H/gXzzPCk=
github.com/foxcpp/go-mockdns v1.2.0 h1:omK3OrHRD1IWJz1FuFBCFquhXslXoF17OvBS6JPzZF0=
github.com/foxcpp/go-mockdns v1.2.0/go.mod h1:IhLeSFGed3mJIAXPH2aiRQB+kqz7oqu8ld2qVbOu7Wk=
github.com/frankban/quicktest v1.14.6 h1:7Xjx+VpznH+oBnejlPUj8oUpdxnVs4f8XU8WnHkI4W8=
github.com/frankban/quicktest v1.14.6/go.mod h1:4ptaffx2x8+WTWXmUCuVU6aPUX1/Mz7zb5vbUoiM6w0=
github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1 h1:b0/UzAf9yR5rhf3RPm9gf3ehBPpf0oZKIjtpKrx59Ho=
github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1/go.mod h1:TLheqan6HD6GBK6PrDWyDPBaEV8LspOxvPSjC+bVfgo=
github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.4.0 h1:EBsztssimR/CONLSZZ04E8qAkxNYq4Qp9LvH92wZUgs=
github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.4.0/go.mod h1:oJDH3BJKyqBA2TXFhDsKDGDTlndYOZ6rGS0BRZIxGhM=
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5 h1:Fq85nIqj+gXn/S5ahsiTlK3TmC85qgirsdTP/+DeaC4=
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5/go.mod h1:oq7eo15ShAhp70Anwd5lgX2pLfOS3QCiwU/PULtXL6M=
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2 h1:PmFC1S6h8ljIz6gMRBopkjP1TVT7xuwrButHID66PoM=
@@ -34,6 +38,10 @@ github.com/kaptinlin/jsonschema v0.4.6 h1:vOSFg5tjmfkOdKg+D6Oo4fVOM/pActWu/ntkPs
github.com/kaptinlin/jsonschema v0.4.6/go.mod h1:1DUd7r5SdyB2ZnMtyB7uLv64dE3zTFTiYytDCd+AEL0=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1 h1:VsB4HPswih7mmZ8WleSFQ75c/Ui1M4trX5oAsJnhSlk=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1/go.mod h1:cwPg85FWrGar70rWktvGQj8/hthj3wpl0PGDogxkrSQ=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1 h1:flRD4NNwYAUpkphVc1HcthR4KEIFJ65n8Mw5qdRn3LE=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1/go.mod h1:hoEshYVHaxMs3cyo3Yncou5ZscifuDolrwPKZanG3xk=
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 h1:5Nx0Ya0ZqY2ygV366QzturHI13Jq95ApcVaJBhpS+AY=
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0/go.mod h1:eLer722TekiGuMkidMxC/pM04lWEeraHUUmBw8l2grE=
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 h1:RPNrshWIDI6G2gRW9EHilWtl7Z6Sb1BR0xunSBf0SNc=
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0/go.mod h1:9/0rRGxNHcop5bhtWyNeEfOS8JIWk580+fNqagV/RAw=
github.com/magefile/mage v1.17.0 h1:dS4tkq997Ism03akafC8509iqDjeE7TNTexI25Y7sXM=
@@ -58,8 +66,24 @@ github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 h1:1HvjP4D5oL3t8RsPlwxA9onvvStjtIHYE5XuuwOi
github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1/go.mod h1:VdFUQDMZK3VLkurFUVhia6uys/0suUp86TJz5qbJRhc=
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 h1:GljZCt+zSTS+NZq88cyQ1LjZ+RCHp3uVuabBWA5+OJI=
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1/go.mod h1:aB55Cww9pdSJVHk0hUf0inxWyyjPogFIjmHKYgMKmtY=
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.9.0 h1:73kH8U+JUqXU8lRuOHeVHaa/SZPifC7BkcraZVejAe8=
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.9.0/go.mod h1:WtVeX8xhTBvf0smdhujwtBcq4Qrzq/fJaraNFVN+nFs=
github.com/sagikazarmark/locafero v0.11.0 h1:1iurJgmM9G3PA/I+wWYIOw/5SyBtxapeHDcg+AAIFXc=
github.com/sagikazarmark/locafero v0.11.0/go.mod h1:nVIGvgyzw595SUSUE6tvCp3YYTeHs15MvlmU87WwIik=
github.com/sourcegraph/conc v0.3.1-0.20240121214520-5f936abd7ae8 h1:+jumHNA0Wrelhe64i8F6HNlS8pkoyMv5sreGx2Ry5Rw=
github.com/sourcegraph/conc v0.3.1-0.20240121214520-5f936abd7ae8/go.mod h1:3n1Cwaq1E1/1lhQhtRK2ts/ZwZEhjcQeJQ1RuC6Q/8U=
github.com/spf13/afero v1.15.0 h1:b/YBCLWAJdFWJTN9cLhiXXcD7mzKn9Dm86dNnfyQw1I=
github.com/spf13/afero v1.15.0/go.mod h1:NC2ByUVxtQs4b3sIUphxK0NioZnmxgyCrfzeuq8lxMg=
github.com/spf13/cast v1.10.0 h1:h2x0u2shc1QuLHfxi+cTJvs30+ZAHOGRic8uyGTDWxY=
github.com/spf13/cast v1.10.0/go.mod h1:jNfB8QC9IA6ZuY2ZjDp0KtFO2LZZlg4S/7bzP6qqeHo=
github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.10 h1:4EBh2KAYBwaONj6b2Ye1GiHfwjqyROoF4RwYO+vPwFk=
github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.10/go.mod h1:McXfInJRrz4CZXVZOBLb0bTZqETkiAhM9Iw0y3An2Bg=
github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0 h1:x5S+0EU27Lbphp4UKm1C+1oQO+rKx36vfCoaVebLFSU=
github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0/go.mod h1:P0lhsswPGWD/1lZJ9ny3fYnVqxiegrlNrEmgLjbTCAY=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1 h1:EuwCh5fleGS7H32xRwO3wRGT7DxrDhLAT6FF8MpWDWE=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1/go.mod h1:MDEgiDPPsNp5cuIrHPPCyornHKgEVbtFUmoNlxoYthg=
github.com/subosito/gotenv v1.6.0 h1:9NlTDc1FTs4qu0DDq7AEtTPNw6SVm7uBMsUCUjABIf8=
github.com/subosito/gotenv v1.6.0/go.mod h1:Dk4QP5c2W3ibzajGcXpNraDfq2IrhjMIvMSWPKKo0FU=
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0 h1:FIDeeyB800efLX89e5a8Y0BNH+LOngJyGrIWxG2FKQY=
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0/go.mod h1:/wbyibRr2FHMks5tjHJ5F8dMZh3AcwJEMf5vlfC0lxk=
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 h1:+Ho715JplO36QYgwN9PGYNhgZvoUSc9X2c80KVTi+GA=
internal/alerts/alerts.go
+42 -40
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
// Package alerts sends alerts on bans, on traffic over an anomaly
// threshold, on a source that fails and on a file with an error to each
// destination set: to the webhook
// SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names, each as one JSON object, as "The JSON
// SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names, each as one JSON object, as "The JSON
// object" in docs/alerts.md describes, to the Slack incoming
// webhook SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names, as a message, and to the
// ntfy topic SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL names. A repeat within
// SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN is held back, and so is an alert past
// SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary. The others wait in a
// webhook SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names, as a message, and to the
// ntfy topic SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL names. A repeat within
// SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN is held back, and so is an alert past
// SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary. The others wait in a
// bounded queue of each destination's own, so that a destination that is
// slow or unreachable holds up neither the others nor any request. The
// state is written to alerts.json and read from it by the state package.
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ import (
"time"
)
// The events an alert is for, as SWW_ALERT_EVENTS names them.
// The events an alert is for, as SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS names them.
const (
// EventBan is a ban sww made.
EventBan = "ban"
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ const (
// EventAnomaly is a count of requests or bytes over an anomaly
// threshold.
EventAnomaly = "anomaly"
// EventWAFBlock is a request the Core Rule Set scored at or over
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, refused in block mode, let through in
// EventCoreRuleSetMatch is a request the Core Rule Set scored at or over
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, refused in block mode, let through in
// detect mode.
EventWAFBlock = "waf_block"
EventCoreRuleSetMatch = "core_rule_set_match"
// EventReputationHit is a request whose client a blocklist, the
// CrowdSec decision list or a DNSBL zone lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score
// is a hit.
@@ -61,18 +61,18 @@ const (
// cannot be read, or a state file that cannot be written.
EventFileError = "file_error"
// EventSummary is the summary sent as an hour ends: of the alerts held
// back in it past SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, and of the repeats held
// back in it past SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, and of the repeats held
// back by the cooldowns dropped as it ends, which no alert let through
// has given. It is sent with SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR off too, for
// those repeats. SWW_ALERT_EVENTS does not name it.
// has given. It is sent with SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR off too, for
// those repeats. SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS does not name it.
EventSummary = "summary"
)
// Events returns every event SWW_ALERT_EVENTS can name, which is its
// Events returns every event SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS can name, which is its
// default.
func Events() []string {
return []string{
EventBan, EventPermanentBan, EventWAFBlock, EventAnomaly,
EventBan, EventPermanentBan, EventCoreRuleSetMatch, EventAnomaly,
EventReputationHit, EventSourceFailure, EventFileError,
}
}
@@ -80,12 +80,12 @@ func Events() []string {
// The destinations alerts are sent to, as the metrics and alerts.json
// name them.
const (
// DestinationWebhook is the webhook SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names.
// DestinationWebhook is the webhook SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names.
DestinationWebhook = "webhook"
// DestinationSlack is the Slack incoming webhook
// SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names.
// SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names.
DestinationSlack = "slack"
// DestinationNtfy is the ntfy topic SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL names.
// DestinationNtfy is the ntfy topic SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL names.
DestinationNtfy = "ntfy"
)
@@ -121,26 +121,26 @@ var (
// NtfyURL set, no alert is sent.
type Params struct {
// WebhookURL is where each alert is posted as JSON
// (SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset. WebhookHeaders
// are sent with each (SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS).
// (SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset. WebhookHeaders
// are sent with each (SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS).
WebhookURL *url.URL
WebhookHeaders http.Header
// SlackURL is the Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a
// message (SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset.
// message (SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset.
SlackURL *url.URL
// NtfyURL is the ntfy topic each alert is published to
// (SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL), nil while it is unset. NtfyToken, unless
// empty, is sent with each as a bearer token (SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN).
// (SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL), nil while it is unset. NtfyToken, unless
// empty, is sent with each as a bearer token (SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN).
NtfyURL *url.URL
NtfyToken string
// Events are the events alerts are sent for (SWW_ALERT_EVENTS).
// Events are the events alerts are sent for (SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS).
Events []string
// Cooldown is how long a repeat of an alert is held back
// (SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN), 0 for no time. MaxPerHour is the most alerts
// sent in an hour (SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR), 0 for no limit.
// (SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN), 0 for no time. MaxPerHour is the most alerts
// sent in an hour (SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR), 0 for no limit.
Cooldown time.Duration
MaxPerHour int
// Instance is SWW_INSTANCE_NAME, which every alert gives.
// Instance is SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME, which every alert gives.
Instance string
// Now tells the time of an alert, normally time.Now in UTC.
Now func() time.Time
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ type State struct {
// requests to it failed, and how many alerts were dropped from its full
// queue or given up as it refused them.
type Counts struct {
Sent, Failed, Dropped int64
Sent, SendFailures, Dropped int64
}
// Queue takes the alerts raised, holds back those it must, and sends the
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ type destination struct {
// waiting are the alerts waiting to be sent, oldest first.
waiting []*Alert
sent, failed, dropped atomic.Int64
sent, sendFailures, dropped atomic.Int64
}
// cooldownKey is what makes an alert a repeat of another: the same event
@@ -301,17 +301,17 @@ func New(params Params) *Queue {
}
if params.WebhookURL != nil {
q.addDestination(DestinationWebhook, "SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL",
q.addDestination(DestinationWebhook, "SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL",
params.WebhookURL, q.webhookMessage)
}
if params.SlackURL != nil {
q.addDestination(DestinationSlack, "SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL",
q.addDestination(DestinationSlack, "SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL",
params.SlackURL, slackMessage)
}
if params.NtfyURL != nil {
q.addDestination(DestinationNtfy, "SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL",
q.addDestination(DestinationNtfy, "SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL",
params.NtfyURL, q.ntfyMessage)
}
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ func New(params Params) *Queue {
}
// Raise sends alert, which names its event and what is particular to it,
// unless no destination is set or SWW_ALERT_EVENTS leaves its event
// unless no destination is set or SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS leaves its event
// out. It gives alert the instance and the time. An alert that repeats
// the last one let through less than Cooldown before is held back and
// counted. The next one let through gives that count, unless an hour of
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ func (q *Queue) Raise(alert Alert) {
}
// WouldSend reports whether Raise would let an alert for event on
// netblock through now: a destination is set, SWW_ALERT_EVENTS chooses
// netblock through now: a destination is set, SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS chooses
// event, no alert for event on netblock was let through less than
// Cooldown before, and fewer than MaxPerHour alerts have been let through
// in the hour under way. Unlike Raise, it counts nothing.
@@ -426,7 +426,9 @@ func (q *Queue) Counts(name string) Counts {
for _, d := range q.destinations {
if d.name == name {
return Counts{
Sent: d.sent.Load(), Failed: d.failed.Load(), Dropped: d.dropped.Load(),
Sent: d.sent.Load(),
SendFailures: d.sendFailures.Load(),
Dropped: d.dropped.Load(),
}
}
}
@@ -606,13 +608,13 @@ func (q *Queue) endHour(now time.Time) {
if heldBack > 0 {
reasons = append(reasons, fmt.Sprintf("%d alerts held back in the hour from %s, "+
"past the %d an hour SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows", heldBack,
"past the %d an hour SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows", heldBack,
q.hour.Start.Format(time.RFC3339), q.params.MaxPerHour))
}
if repeats > 0 {
reasons = append(reasons, fmt.Sprintf("%d repeats held back by "+
"SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives", repeats))
"SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives", repeats))
}
if len(reasons) > 0 {
@@ -675,7 +677,7 @@ func (d *destination) run(ctx context.Context) {
retryAt = time.Time{}
case errors.Is(err, errRefused):
d.remove(alert)
d.failed.Add(1)
d.sendFailures.Add(1)
d.dropped.Add(1)
retryDelay = 0
@@ -684,7 +686,7 @@ func (d *destination) run(ctx context.Context) {
d.processLog.Warn("gave up an alert "+d.setting+" refused",
"event", alert.Event, "error", err.Error())
case ctx.Err() == nil: // not cut off as sww stops
d.failed.Add(1)
d.sendFailures.Add(1)
retryDelay = min(max(retryDelayFactor*retryDelay, firstRetryDelay),
maxRetryDelay)
@@ -871,7 +873,7 @@ func ntfyPriority(event string) string {
return "high"
case EventReputationHit:
return "low"
default: // ban, waf_block and summary
default: // ban, core_rule_set_match and summary
return "default"
}
}
@@ -882,7 +884,7 @@ func ntfyTag(event string) string {
switch event {
case EventBan, EventPermanentBan:
return "no_entry"
case EventWAFBlock:
case EventCoreRuleSetMatch:
return "shield"
case EventAnomaly:
return "chart_with_upwards_trend"
internal/alerts/alerts_test.go
+17 -17
View File
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ func TestWouldSendOnlyForTheChosenEvents(t *testing.T) {
if q.WouldSend(alerts.EventBan, netblock(1)) ||
q.WouldSend(alerts.EventPermanentBan, netblock(1)) {
t.Error("a ban alert would be sent, though SWW_ALERT_EVENTS leaves it out")
t.Error("a ban alert would be sent, though SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS leaves it out")
}
if !q.WouldSend(alerts.EventFileError, netip.Prefix{}) {
@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ func TestWouldSendWithOnlySlackOrOnlyNtfySet(t *testing.T) {
onlyNtfy.NtfyURL = parseURL(ntfyURL)
for setting, params := range map[string]alerts.Params{
"SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL": onlySlack,
"SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL": onlyNtfy,
"SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL": onlySlack,
"SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL": onlyNtfy,
} {
if !alerts.New(params).WouldSend(alerts.EventBan, netblock(1)) {
t.Errorf("a ban alert would not be sent with only %s set", setting)
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ func TestAlertsPastTheHourlyLimitAreRolledIntoOneSummary(t *testing.T) {
"as_name": "",
"country": "",
"reason": "3 alerts held back in the hour from 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z, " +
"past the 2 an hour SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows",
"past the 2 an hour SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows",
"detail": map[string]any{
"hour": started,
"count": float64(3),
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ func TestFailedRequestIsSentAgainWithBackoff(t *testing.T) {
wantCounts(t, q, 0, int64(len(want)), 0, 0)
if !strings.Contains(log.String(),
`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) {
`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) {
t.Errorf("process log %q names no failure", log.String())
}
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ func TestRefusedAlertIsGivenUpAndTheNextSent(t *testing.T) {
wantCounts(t, q, 1, 3, 0, 1)
if !strings.Contains(log.String(),
`"msg":"gave up an alert SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL refused"`) {
`"msg":"gave up an alert SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL refused"`) {
t.Errorf("process log %q names no alert given up", log.String())
}
})
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ func TestFailedRequestIsLoggedWithoutTheURL(t *testing.T) {
logged := log.String()
if !strings.Contains(logged,
`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
strings.Contains(logged, "alerts.example") || strings.Contains(logged, "team=ops") {
t.Errorf("process log %q names no failure, or names the URL", logged)
}
@@ -782,8 +782,8 @@ func TestSlackAndNtfyAreSentTheSummaryAndTheRepeatsHeldBack(t *testing.T) {
}
const summary = "1 alerts held back in the hour from 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z, " +
"past the 1 an hour SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows; 1 repeats held back " +
"by SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives\nsuppressed repeats: 1"
"past the 1 an hour SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows; 1 repeats held back " +
"by SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives\nsuppressed repeats: 1"
wantSlackMessage(t, slack[1], "*"+instance+": summary*\n"+summary)
wantNtfyMessage(t, ntfy[1], instance+": summary", "default bar_chart", summary)
@@ -897,11 +897,11 @@ func TestDestinationThatDoesNotAnswerHoldsUpNeitherOther(t *testing.T) {
synctest.Wait()
wantDestinationCounts(t, q, alerts.DestinationSlack,
alerts.Counts{Sent: 3, Failed: 1})
alerts.Counts{Sent: 3, SendFailures: 1})
logged := log.String()
if !strings.Contains(logged,
`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
strings.Contains(logged, "hooks.slack.example") ||
strings.Contains(logged, "T0123") {
t.Errorf("process log %q names no failure, or names the URL", logged)
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ func TestDropsAreCountedForEachDestination(t *testing.T) {
for destination, want := range map[string]alerts.Counts{
alerts.DestinationWebhook: {Sent: all},
alerts.DestinationSlack: {Dropped: 1},
alerts.DestinationNtfy: {Failed: all, Dropped: all},
alerts.DestinationNtfy: {SendFailures: all, Dropped: all},
} {
wantDestinationCounts(t, q, destination, want)
}
@@ -1223,12 +1223,12 @@ func wantEvents(t *testing.T, webhook *standIn, want ...string) {
// requests to it that it counts as failed, the alerts it counts as held
// back, and those it counts as dropped for the webhook.
func wantCounts(
t *testing.T, q *alerts.Queue, sent, failed, suppressed, dropped int64,
t *testing.T, q *alerts.Queue, sent, sendFailures, suppressed, dropped int64,
) {
t.Helper()
wantDestinationCounts(t, q, alerts.DestinationWebhook,
alerts.Counts{Sent: sent, Failed: failed, Dropped: dropped})
alerts.Counts{Sent: sent, SendFailures: sendFailures, Dropped: dropped})
if q.Suppressed() != suppressed {
t.Errorf("%d alerts held back, want %d", q.Suppressed(), suppressed)
@@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ type eventMessage struct {
title, priorityAndTag, text string
}
// anAlertForEachEvent returns an alert for each event SWW_ALERT_EVENTS
// anAlertForEachEvent returns an alert for each event SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS
// names, the first in observe mode, each with its message.
func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
return []eventMessage{
@@ -1281,12 +1281,12 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
},
{
alerts.Alert{
Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock, Client: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"),
Event: alerts.EventCoreRuleSetMatch, Client: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"),
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32"),
Reason: "refused by the Core Rule Set",
Host: "app.example",
},
"fsn1app1/blog: waf_block", "default shield",
"fsn1app1/blog: core_rule_set_match", "default shield",
"refused by the Core Rule Set\nhost: app.example\nclient: 192.0.2.1\n" +
"netblock: 192.0.2.1/32",
},
internal/anomaly/anomaly.go
+16 -16
View File
@@ -28,22 +28,22 @@ const maxCounters = 20000
// alerts name them.
const (
// ScopeClient is one client: an IPv4 address, or an IPv6 netblock of
// SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX.
// SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX.
ScopeClient = "client"
// ScopeNet is the netblock around a client, SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX
// or SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX long.
// ScopeNet is the netblock around a client, SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX
// or SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX long.
ScopeNet = "net"
// ScopeASN is an AS number.
ScopeASN = "asn"
// ScopeTotal is the whole service.
ScopeTotal = "total"
// ScopeWatch is a named netblock of SWW_WATCH_NETS.
ScopeWatch = "watch"
// ScopeWatchedNet is a named netblock of SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS.
ScopeWatchedNet = "watched_net"
)
// Scopes returns every scope.
func Scopes() []string {
return []string{ScopeClient, ScopeNet, ScopeASN, ScopeTotal, ScopeWatch}
return []string{ScopeClient, ScopeNet, ScopeASN, ScopeTotal, ScopeWatchedNet}
}
// The windows a counter counts in, as the alerts name them.
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ type Thresholds struct {
BytesPerHour int64
}
// NamedNetblock is a netblock SWW_WATCH_NETS names.
// NamedNetblock is a netblock SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS names.
type NamedNetblock struct {
Name string
Netblock netip.Prefix
@@ -70,14 +70,14 @@ type NamedNetblock struct {
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
// The thresholds of each scope: SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_*,
// SWW_ANOMALY_NET_*, SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_*, SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_* and
// SWW_WATCH_*.
// The thresholds of each scope: SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_*,
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_*, SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_*, SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_* and
// SWW_WAF_WATCH_*.
Client, Net, ASN, Total, Watch Thresholds
// NetV4Prefix and NetV6Prefix are the lengths of the netblock around a
// client (SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX and SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX).
// client (SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX and SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX).
NetV4Prefix, NetV6Prefix int
// NamedNetblocks are SWW_WATCH_NETS.
// NamedNetblocks are SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS.
NamedNetblocks []NamedNetblock
// Alerts receive the anomaly alerts.
Alerts *alerts.Queue
@@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ type Request struct {
Host string
// Client is the client's address, and ClientGroup the client it is
// counted as: its IPv4 address, or the IPv6 netblock of
// SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX its address is in.
// SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX its address is in.
Client netip.Addr
ClientGroup netip.Prefix
// ASN, ASName and Country are the client's as looked up, each "" when
// unknown.
ASN, ASName, Country string
// Bytes are the request's bytes, as SWW_BYTES_COUNT counts them.
// Bytes are the request's bytes, as SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT counts them.
Bytes int64
}
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ func (c *Counters) scopesOf(r Request) []scope {
for _, named := range p.NamedNetblocks {
if named.Netblock.Contains(client) {
all = append(all, scope{
key{scope: ScopeWatch, netblock: named.Netblock, name: named.Name}, p.Watch,
key{scope: ScopeWatchedNet, netblock: named.Netblock, name: named.Name}, p.Watch,
})
}
}
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ func alertFor(r Request, k key, o overThreshold) alerts.Alert {
detail["asn"] = k.asn
case ScopeTotal:
counted = "the whole service"
default: // watch
default: // watched_net
counted = "the named netblock " + k.name + ", " + k.netblock.String()
detail["name"] = k.name
}
internal/bans/admin_test.go
+59 -14
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ func TestBanWithoutACauseIsAnAdmins(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{{Netblock: netblock, Start: midnight()}})
if got := ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Cause; got != bans.CauseAdmin {
@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ func TestBanWithoutACauseIsAnAdmins(t *testing.T) {
func TestAdminsBansAreNeverDroppedAndDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rules := defaultRules()
rules.MaxBans = 1
ledger := bans.New(rules)
params := defaultParams()
params.MaxBans = 1
ledger := bans.New(params)
adminsOnly := netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")
both := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
second := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ func TestAdminsBansAreNeverDroppedAndDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
func TestEarlierBansCountABanDroppedAfterAnAdminsBan(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rules := defaultRules()
rules.MaxBans = 2
ledger := bans.New(rules)
params := defaultParams()
params.MaxBans = 2
ledger := bans.New(params)
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
other := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ func TestEarlierBansCountABanDroppedAfterAnAdminsBan(t *testing.T) {
func TestEarlierBansCountABanAnAdminKeepsOnce(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
// The netblock breaks a limit twice, the second time after its first
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ func TestEarlierBansCountABanAnAdminKeepsOnce(t *testing.T) {
func TestReasonOfTheBansSwwMakes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
limit, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32"), midnight(),
bans.Notes{Kind: "requests", Limit: 1000, Window: "minute"})
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ func TestLiftedBanForALimitRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {
Lifted: midnight().Add(10 * time.Minute),
}
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{lifted})
// While it would still last, it refuses nothing, and a limit broken
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ func TestLiftedBanForAnAttackRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {
// A permanent ban for a clear sign of attack, lifted.
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{{
Netblock: netblock,
Start: midnight(),
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ func TestLiftedBanForAnAttackRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {
func TestLoadEditCountsTheBansAnAdminMade(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
made, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32"), midnight(),
bans.Notes{})
atStart := bans.Ban{
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ func TestAdminsBanIsMadeWhileAnotherLasts(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
// An hour's ban for a broken limit.
ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ func TestLiftLiftsEveryActiveBanCoveringTheClient(t *testing.T) {
wide := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
other := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{
// Ended an hour ago.
{
@@ -341,3 +341,48 @@ func TestLiftLiftsEveryActiveBanCoveringTheClient(t *testing.T) {
wantChanged(t, ledger, false)
}
func TestPermanentBanOnAWiderNetblockIsReturnedOverATemporaryBan(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
client := netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9")
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
// The temporary ban is made first, so that its netblock is looked at first.
ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), midnight(), bans.Notes{})
ledger.BanForAdmin(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24"), midnight(), time.Time{},
"for good")
wantPermanentBan(t, ledger, client, midnight().Add(time.Minute))
}
func TestOlderPermanentBanIsReturnedOverANewerTemporaryBan(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
ledger.BanForAdmin(netblock, midnight(), time.Time{}, "for good")
ledger.BanForAdmin(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), midnight().Add(time.Hour),
"for an hour")
wantPermanentBan(t, ledger, netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(2*time.Minute))
}
// wantPermanentBan checks that Find and Check return a permanent ban for
// client at now.
func wantPermanentBan(
t *testing.T, ledger *bans.Ledger, client netip.Addr, now time.Time,
) {
t.Helper()
for name, look := range map[string]func(netip.Addr, time.Time) (bans.Ban, bool, bool){
"Find": ledger.Find,
"Check": ledger.Check,
} {
ban, banned, _ := look(client, now)
if !banned || !ban.Permanent() {
t.Errorf("%s returned %+v and banned %v, want a permanent ban", name, ban, banned)
}
}
}
internal/bans/bans.go
+43 -21
View File
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ const repeatFactor = 3
// maxTextBytes is how much of each text in a ban's notes is kept.
const maxTextBytes = 256
// Rules are how long a ban lasts, and how many bans are held.
type Rules struct {
// Params are how long a ban lasts, and how many bans are held.
type Params struct {
// LimitBanDuration is how long a first ban for a broken limit lasts.
LimitBanDuration time.Duration
// LimitBanRepeatWindow is how soon after the end of the netblock's
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ type Notes struct {
LimitPercentSetting string `json:"limit_percent_setting,omitempty"`
// RuleID and Target are, for a ban for a clear sign of attack, the id
// of the rule file rule that matched, and its target; TrapPath is, for
// one for a request for a path in SWW_TRAP_PATHS, that path as the
// one for a request for a path in SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS, that path as the
// client sent it.
RuleID string `json:"rule_id,omitempty"`
Target string `json:"target,omitempty"`
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ type Request struct {
// Ledger holds the bans. It is safe for concurrent use.
type Ledger struct {
rules Rules
params Params
// changed receives a value when a ban is made, unless one is waiting
// already.
changed chan struct{}
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ type Ledger struct {
// Find make each netblock they find the most recently seen.
netblocks *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, *[]Ban]
// held is how many bans netblocks holds whose cause is not CauseAdmin,
// at most rules.MaxBans.
// at most params.MaxBans.
held int
// made is how many bans have been made since the start, by cause: by
// the ledger, and by an admin, through BanForAdmin or in an edit of
@@ -199,13 +199,13 @@ type Ledger struct {
// v4Lengths and v6Lengths are the lengths of the IPv4 and IPv6
// netblocks that have been banned. Check looks for a ban at each of
// them, so that a ban read from bans.json refuses every client in its
// netblock even when it was made with another SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX,
// netblock even when it was made with another SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX,
// or another length of an IPv6 client's netblock.
v4Lengths, v6Lengths []int
}
// New returns a Ledger with no ban yet.
func New(rules Rules) *Ledger {
func New(params Params) *Ledger {
// The ledger drops bans itself, and never those whose cause is
// CauseAdmin, however many there are, so the LRU has no limit of its
// own: it keeps the netblocks in the order they were last seen.
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ func New(rules Rules) *Ledger {
}
return &Ledger{
rules: rules,
params: params,
changed: make(chan struct{}, 1),
netblocks: netblocks,
made: map[string]int{},
@@ -274,16 +274,27 @@ func (l *Ledger) Find(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) (Ban, bool, bool) {
// activeBan returns the ban in bans, a netblock's bans oldest first, that
// is active at now, or nil when none is. If several are, it returns the
// one that started last. Every ban is looked at, since a ban an admin adds
// to bans.json can start before the netblock's others and outlast them.
// newest permanent one, or the newest when none is permanent. Every ban is
// looked at, since a ban an admin adds to bans.json can start before the
// netblock's others and outlast them.
func activeBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) *Ban {
var newest *Ban
for i := len(bans) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
if bans[i].ActiveAt(now) {
if !bans[i].ActiveAt(now) {
continue
}
if bans[i].Permanent() {
return &bans[i]
}
if newest == nil {
newest = &bans[i]
}
}
return nil
return newest
}
// BanForLimit bans netblock at now for a broken limit, with notes, and
@@ -743,13 +754,16 @@ func (l *Ledger) markChanged() {
}
// active returns the ban active at now on a netblock client is in, or
// nil.
// nil. If several netblocks have one, it returns a permanent ban when
// there is one.
func (l *Ledger) active(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) *Ban {
lengths := l.v6Lengths
if client.Is4() {
lengths = l.v4Lengths
}
var first *Ban
for _, length := range lengths {
bans, found := l.netblocks.Get(netip.PrefixFrom(client, length).Masked())
if !found {
@@ -757,12 +771,20 @@ func (l *Ledger) active(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) *Ban {
}
ban := activeBan(*bans, now)
if ban != nil {
if ban == nil {
continue
}
if ban.Permanent() {
return ban
}
if first == nil {
first = ban
}
}
return nil
return first
}
// covering returns the bans of each netblock held that client is in,
@@ -790,7 +812,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) covering(client netip.Addr) []*[]Ban {
// unless ban's cause is CauseAdmin, which does not count toward MaxBans.
func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
counted := ban.Cause != CauseAdmin
if counted && l.held == l.rules.MaxBans {
if counted && l.held == l.params.MaxBans {
l.dropOne()
}
@@ -825,7 +847,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
// new ban longer. A ban an admin adds to bans.json can start after
// another and end before it, so that one is looked for among them all.
func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
length := l.rules.LimitBanDuration
length := l.params.LimitBanDuration
var last *Ban
@@ -836,18 +858,18 @@ func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
}
}
if last != nil && now.Sub(last.Expires) <= l.rules.LimitBanRepeatWindow {
if last != nil && now.Sub(last.Expires) <= l.params.LimitBanRepeatWindow {
lastLength := last.Expires.Sub(last.Start)
// This is repeatFactor * lastLength > MaxBanDuration, written so
// that it cannot overflow.
if lastLength > l.rules.MaxBanDuration/repeatFactor {
if lastLength > l.params.MaxBanDuration/repeatFactor {
return time.Time{}
}
length = repeatFactor * lastLength
}
if length > l.rules.MaxBanDuration {
if length > l.params.MaxBanDuration {
return time.Time{}
}
@@ -865,7 +887,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) attackExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
}
}
return now.Add(l.rules.AttackBanDuration)
return now.Add(l.params.AttackBanDuration)
}
// dropOne drops the earliest ban whose cause is not CauseAdmin of the
internal/bans/bans_test.go
+27 -27
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ const day = 24 * time.Hour
func TestRepeatsTripleUntilPermanent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
now := midnight()
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func TestRepeatWindowRunsOut(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
first, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@ func TestRepeatWindowRunsOut(t *testing.T) {
func TestFirstBanLongerThanTheMaximumIsPermanent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rules := defaultRules()
rules.LimitBanDuration = rules.MaxBanDuration + time.Hour
ledger := bans.New(rules)
params := defaultParams()
params.LimitBanDuration = params.MaxBanDuration + time.Hour
ledger := bans.New(params)
ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), midnight(),
bans.Notes{})
@@ -97,9 +97,9 @@ func TestLongestBanSetFarOffDoesNotOverflow(t *testing.T) {
// With bans of up to 100,000 days, the 14th ban in a row, of 3^13
// hours, is within the maximum, and three times as long would not fit
// in a time.Duration. The 15th is permanent.
rules := defaultRules()
rules.MaxBanDuration = 100000 * day
ledger := bans.New(rules)
params := defaultParams()
params.MaxBanDuration = 100000 * day
ledger := bans.New(params)
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
now := midnight()
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ func TestLongestBanSetFarOffDoesNotOverflow(t *testing.T) {
func TestBrokenLimitDuringABanMakesNoOther(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
first, made := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ func TestBrokenLimitDuringABanMakesNoOther(t *testing.T) {
func TestCheckRefusesWhileTheBanLastsAndCountsTheRefusals(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Requests: 5})
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ func TestCheckRefusesWhileTheBanLastsAndCountsTheRefusals(t *testing.T) {
func TestFindCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Requests: 5})
@@ -200,9 +200,9 @@ func TestFindCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
func TestMaxBansDropsTheEarliestBanOfTheNetblockSeenLongestAgo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rules := defaultRules()
rules.MaxBans = 3
ledger := bans.New(rules)
params := defaultParams()
params.MaxBans = 3
ledger := bans.New(params)
a := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
b := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
c := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.3/32")
@@ -239,9 +239,9 @@ func TestFullLedgerDropsTheEarlierBanOfTheNetblockBannedAgain(t *testing.T) {
// With room for one ban, the netblock's ended ban goes to make room for
// its new one, whose notes still count it.
rules := defaultRules()
rules.MaxBans = 1
ledger := bans.New(rules)
params := defaultParams()
params.MaxBans = 1
ledger := bans.New(params)
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
first, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ func TestFullLedgerDropsTheEarlierBanOfTheNetblockBannedAgain(t *testing.T) {
func TestRequestDuringAnAttackBanMakesItPermanent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
notes := bans.Notes{RuleID: "env-file", Target: "path"}
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ func TestRequestDuringAnAttackBanMakesItPermanent(t *testing.T) {
func TestAttackAfterAnAttackBanHasEndedBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
// A ban for a broken limit before does not count.
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ func TestAttackAfterAnAttackBanHasEndedBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
func TestWouldBanGivesTheBanWithoutMakingIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
first, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
wantChanged(t, ledger, true)
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ func TestWouldBanGivesTheBanWithoutMakingIt(t *testing.T) {
func TestWouldBePermanentAnswersAsTheBanWouldBeMade(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
now := midnight()
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ func TestWouldBePermanentAnswersAsTheBanWouldBeMade(t *testing.T) {
func TestAttackBanDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
// Three times the seven days would be permanent; a limit broken as the
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ func TestAttackBanDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
func TestRequestTextsAreCutTo256Bytes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
long := strings.Repeat("a", 300)
request := bans.Request{
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ func TestRequestTextsAreCutTo256Bytes(t *testing.T) {
func TestLookupFillsTheNotesOfTheNetblocksBansWithoutOne(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
other := netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.7/32")
@@ -494,9 +494,9 @@ func TestLookupFillsTheNotesOfTheNetblocksBansWithoutOne(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// defaultRules are the rules at the settings' defaults.
func defaultRules() bans.Rules {
return bans.Rules{
// defaultParams are the params at the settings' defaults.
func defaultParams() bans.Params {
return bans.Params{
LimitBanDuration: time.Hour,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: day,
MaxBanDuration: 7 * day,
internal/bans/crowdsec_test.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ const scenario = "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf"
func TestCrowdSecBanLastsUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func TestCrowdSecBanLastsUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
func TestCrowdSecBanIsNeverMadePermanent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), expires, scenario, bans.Notes{})
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func TestCrowdSecBanIsNeverMadePermanent(t *testing.T) {
func TestCrowdSecBanIsCountedAndDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
// Three times the three days would be permanent; a limit broken as the
internal/bans/snapshot_test.go
+14 -14
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import (
func TestChangedAfterABanIsMade(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
wantChanged(t, ledger, false)
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ func TestChangedAfterABanIsMade(t *testing.T) {
func TestSnapshotListsEveryBanByNetblock(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
v6 := netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64")
high := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
low := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
@@ -67,14 +67,14 @@ func TestSnapshotListsEveryBanByNetblock(t *testing.T) {
func TestLoadedBansCarryOn(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
before := bans.New(defaultRules())
before := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
ban, _ := before.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Limit: 1})
// Loaded into a new ledger, as across a restart, the ban still refuses
// while it lasts, and once it has ended a broken limit bans for three
// times as long, with the loaded ban counted among the earlier ones.
after := bans.New(defaultRules())
after := bans.New(defaultParams())
after.Load(before.Snapshot())
_, banned, _ := after.Check(netblock.Addr(), ban.Expires.Add(-time.Second))
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ func TestLoadedBanRefusesEveryClientInItsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
// Two entries as an admin might write them, with addresses not masked
// to their lengths, the IPv6 one shorter than the /64 an IPv6 client's
// ban covers, beside a ban the ledger makes on one IPv4 address.
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{
{Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/24"), Start: midnight()},
{Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::1/48"), Start: midnight()},
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ func TestPermanentBanStartedBeforeAnEndedOneRefuses(t *testing.T) {
Expires: midnight().Add(time.Hour),
}
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{permanent, ended})
now := midnight().Add(2 * time.Hour)
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ func TestNextBanWorkedOutFromTheBanThatEndedLast(t *testing.T) {
Expires: midnight().Add(2 * time.Hour),
}
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{nineHours, admins})
// Once both have ended, a limit broken within the repeat window bans
@@ -219,9 +219,9 @@ func TestLoadKeepsAtMostMaxBansDroppingTheEarliest(t *testing.T) {
Cause: bans.CauseLimit,
}
rules := defaultRules()
rules.MaxBans = 1
ledger := bans.New(rules)
params := defaultParams()
params.MaxBans = 1
ledger := bans.New(params)
ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{later, earlier})
held := ledger.Snapshot()
@@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ func TestLoadReplacesTheBansHeld(t *testing.T) {
// Room for three bans, so that the second load, were it added to the
// two bans held, would drop none of them to make room.
rules := defaultRules()
rules.MaxBans = 3
ledger := bans.New(rules)
params := defaultParams()
params.MaxBans = 3
ledger := bans.New(params)
kept := bans.Ban{
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64"),
Start: midnight(),
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ func TestLoadCutsTheTextsTo256Bytes(t *testing.T) {
}},
}
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{ban})
cut := long[:256]
internal/config/config.go
+701 -301
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
internal/config/config_test.go
+445 -186
View File
@@ -17,105 +17,109 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config/configtest"
)
// The settings, by name.
const (
listenAddr = "SWW_LISTEN_ADDR"
mode = "SWW_MODE"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWW_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWW_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerHour = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
bytesLimitPerHour = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
bytesLimitPerDay = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
bytesCount = "SWW_BYTES_COUNT"
lookupSource = "SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
deniedCountries = "SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
allowedCountries = "SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
asnLimitPercent = "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
countryLimitPercent = "SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnBytesPercent = "SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
countryBytesPercent = "SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
unknownLimitPercent = "SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnLimitPercentURL = "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"
blocklistURLs = "SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS"
blocklistRefresh = "SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH"
blocklistAction = "SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"
dnsblZones = "SWW_DNSBL_ZONES"
dnsblResolver = "SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER"
abuseIPDBKey = "SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
abuseIPDBMinScore = "SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE"
abuseIPDBDailyBudget = "SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET"
reputationAction = "SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION"
reputationCacheTTL = "SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL"
reputationTimeout = "SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT"
crowdSecURL = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
banResponse = "SWW_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
attackBanDuration = "SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWW_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
stateDir = "SWW_STATE_DIR"
stateWriteDelay = "SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY"
stateCounterInterval = "SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL"
adminToken = "SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsToken = "SWW_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsTopN = "SWW_METRICS_TOP_N"
instanceName = "SWW_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
logLevel = "SWW_LOG_LEVEL"
rulesDir = "SWW_RULES_DIR"
rulesEnabled = "SWW_RULES_ENABLED"
wafMode = "SWW_WAF_MODE"
wafParanoiaLevel = "SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL"
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
exclusionsFile = "SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"
trapPaths = "SWW_TRAP_PATHS"
errorBurstThreshold = "SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
logRemoteURL = "SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL"
logRemoteTLSCAFile = "SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"
logRemoteBuffer = "SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER"
logRemoteFacility = "SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY"
logRemoteAppName = "SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME"
alertWebhookURL = "SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertWebhookHeaders = "SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS"
alertSlackWebhookURL = "SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertNtfyURL = "SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL"
alertNtfyToken = "SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
alertEvents = "SWW_ALERT_EVENTS"
alertCooldown = "SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN"
alertMaxPerHour = "SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
watchNets = "SWW_WATCH_NETS"
listenAddr = "SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR"
mode = "SWW_WAF_MODE"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerHour = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
bytesLimitPerHour = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
bytesLimitPerDay = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
bytesCount = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT"
lookupSource = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
allowedCountries = "SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
tagLists = "SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS"
tagDeny = "SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY"
tagLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnBytesPercent = "SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
countryBytesPercent = "SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
unknownLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnLimitPercentURL = "SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"
blocklistURLs = "SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS"
blocklistRefresh = "SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH"
blocklistAction = "SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"
dnsblZones = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES"
dnsblResolver = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER"
abuseIPDBKey = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
abuseIPDBMinScore = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE"
abuseIPDBDailyBudget = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET"
reputationAction = "SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION"
reputationCacheTTL = "SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL"
reputationTimeout = "SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT"
routeWatchURL = "SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL"
crowdSecURL = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
banResponse = "SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
attackBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
stateDir = "SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR"
stateWriteDelay = "SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY"
stateCounterInterval = "SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL"
adminToken = "SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsToken = "SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsTopN = "SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N"
instanceName = "SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
logLevel = "SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL"
rulesDir = "SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR"
rulesEnabled = "SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED"
wafMode = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE"
wafParanoiaLevel = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL"
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT"
exclusionsFile = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"
trapPaths = "SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS"
errorBurstThreshold = "SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
logRemoteURL = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"
logRemoteTLSCAFile = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"
logRemoteBuffer = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER"
logRemoteFacility = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY"
logRemoteAppName = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME"
alertWebhookURL = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertWebhookHeaders = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS"
alertSlackWebhookURL = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertNtfyURL = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL"
alertNtfyToken = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
alertEvents = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS"
alertCooldown = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN"
alertMaxPerHour = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
watchNets = "SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS"
)
// The anomaly thresholds: each of the prefixes below, which name a scope,
// followed by each of the four ends.
const (
anomalyClient = "SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
anomalyNet = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_"
anomalyASN = "SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_"
anomalyTotal = "SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
watch = "SWW_WATCH_"
anomalyClient = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
anomalyNet = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_"
anomalyASN = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_"
anomalyTotal = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
watch = "SWW_WAF_WATCH_"
requestsPerMinute = "REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE"
requestsPerHour = "REQUESTS_PER_HOUR"
@@ -156,21 +160,21 @@ func loggedAnomalyDefaults() map[string]string {
return logged
}
// defaultAlertEvents is the default of SWW_ALERT_EVENTS, and
// defaultAlertCooldown that of SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN.
// defaultAlertEvents is the default of SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS, and
// defaultAlertCooldown that of SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN.
const (
defaultAlertEvents = "ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit," +
defaultAlertEvents = "ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit," +
"source_failure,file_error"
defaultAlertCooldown = "15m"
)
// defaultReputationCacheTTL is the default of SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL.
// defaultReputationCacheTTL is the default of SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL.
const defaultReputationCacheTTL = "24h"
// defaultWAFDisabledRules is the default of SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES.
// defaultWAFDisabledRules is the default of SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES.
const defaultWAFDisabledRules = "920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140"
// defaultLogRequestHeaders is the default of SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS.
// defaultLogRequestHeaders is the default of SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS.
const defaultLogRequestHeaders = "accept,accept-language,accept-encoding," +
"content-type,origin,range"
@@ -195,8 +199,8 @@ const (
otherToken = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
)
// instance is an SWW_INSTANCE_NAME that is a valid app name too, and
// remoteURL an SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL, for the tests that send the lines.
// instance is an SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME that is a valid app name too, and
// remoteURL an SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, for the tests that send the lines.
const (
instance = "fsn1app1/blog"
remoteURL = "syslog+udp://192.0.2.1:514"
@@ -208,7 +212,10 @@ const off = "off"
// enabled is true, as a setting's value.
const enabled = "true"
// defaultLookupSource is the default of SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE, and
// disabled is false, as a setting's value.
const disabled = "false"
// defaultLookupSource is the default of SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE, and
// fileSource the source that is the lookup database.
const (
defaultLookupSource = "geojs"
@@ -218,18 +225,16 @@ const (
// environment is a set of environment variables, for FromEnvironment.
type environment map[string]string
// lookupEnv reads one of the variables, as os.LookupEnv does.
func (e environment) lookupEnv(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := e[name]
return value, ok
// viper returns a viper holding each of the variables.
func (e environment) viper() *viper.Viper {
return configtest.Viper(e)
}
// fromEnvironment reads the settings from env, which must be valid.
func fromEnvironment(t *testing.T, env environment) *config.Config {
t.Helper()
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(env.lookupEnv)
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(env.viper())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", env, err)
}
@@ -274,9 +279,13 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.AllowNets)
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets)
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.DenyNets)
wantCountries(t, deniedCountries, cfg.DeniedCountries)
wantCountries(t, allowedCountries, cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries)
if len(cfg.TagLists) != 0 || len(cfg.TagDeny) != 0 || len(cfg.TagLimitPercent) != 0 {
t.Errorf("tag settings %v, %v and %v by default, want all empty",
cfg.TagLists, cfg.TagDeny, cfg.TagLimitPercent)
}
hostname, err := os.Hostname()
if err != nil || hostname == "" || cfg.InstanceName != hostname {
t.Errorf("%s is %q, want the host's name %q (%v)", instanceName,
@@ -327,7 +336,6 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
rateLimitPerMinute: "60",
rateLimitPerHour: "600",
rateLimitPerDay: "6000",
deniedCountries: "cn, RU,kp,Xk",
allowedCountries: "de",
banResponse: "429",
limitBanDuration: "15m",
@@ -342,7 +350,7 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
metricsToken: token,
metricsTopN: "10",
rulesDir: "/srv/waf-rules",
rulesEnabled: "false",
rulesEnabled: disabled,
})
wantSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
@@ -370,7 +378,6 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.AllowNets, "192.0.2.7/32")
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets, "2001:db8::/48", "10.9.8.7/32")
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.DenyNets, "198.51.100.0/24")
wantCountries(t, deniedCountries, cfg.DeniedCountries, "CN", "RU", "KP", "XK")
wantCountries(t, allowedCountries, cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries, "DE")
}
@@ -456,7 +463,7 @@ func TestPathPrefixNotStartingWithSlashStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(
environment{rateLimitExemptPaths: "/favicon.ico,assets/"}.lookupEnv)
environment{rateLimitExemptPaths: "/favicon.ico,assets/"}.viper())
want := rateLimitExemptPaths + `: "assets/" is not a path prefix ` +
`starting with /, such as /assets/`
@@ -511,7 +518,7 @@ func TestInvalidTrapPathOrErrorBurstThresholdStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -640,7 +647,7 @@ func TestInvalidCoreRuleSetSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -765,7 +772,7 @@ func TestInvalidRemoteLogSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{logRemoteAppName, ""}, {logRemoteAppName, "my app"},
{logRemoteAppName, "gitéa"}, {logRemoteAppName, strings.Repeat("a", 49)},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), tc.name+": ") {
t.Errorf("%s=%q: error %v, want one naming it", tc.name, tc.value, err)
}
@@ -782,7 +789,7 @@ func TestRemoteLogCAFileWithoutCertificateStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", caFile, err)
}
_, err = config.FromEnvironment(environment{logRemoteTLSCAFile: caFile}.lookupEnv)
_, err = config.FromEnvironment(environment{logRemoteTLSCAFile: caFile}.viper())
want := logRemoteTLSCAFile + `: "` + caFile + `" holds no PEM certificate`
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -797,7 +804,7 @@ func TestInstanceNameNotAnAppNameStopsTheStartOnlyWhileSending(t *testing.T) {
sending := environment{logRemoteURL: remoteURL, instanceName: spaced}
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(sending.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(sending.viper())
want := logRemoteAppName + `: is unset, and ` + instanceName +
` "fsn1 app1", its default, is not 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters ` +
@@ -827,7 +834,7 @@ func TestAppNameSetStopsTheStartWhileSending(t *testing.T) {
logRemoteURL: remoteURL,
instanceName: instance,
logRemoteAppName: "my app",
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want := logRemoteAppName + `: "my app" is not 1 to 48 printable ASCII ` +
`characters without a space, such as blog`
@@ -958,7 +965,7 @@ func TestWebhookHeadersAreLoggedMaskedAndNeverShown(t *testing.T) {
// An item that is not a header is named by its place, not shown.
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
alertWebhookHeaders: "X-Team:ops," + secret,
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want := alertWebhookHeaders + ": item 2 is not a header name followed by : " +
"and the header's value, such as Authorization:Bearer <token>"
@@ -995,7 +1002,7 @@ func TestWebhookURLIsLoggedWithoutItsPathOrQueryAndNeverShown(t *testing.T) {
"ftp://hooks.example/services/" + secret,
"https://hooks.example/services/%zz" + secret,
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{alertWebhookURL: value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{alertWebhookURL: value}.viper())
want := alertWebhookURL + ": is not an http or https URL without a user or " +
"a fragment, such as https://alerts.example/sww"
@@ -1046,7 +1053,7 @@ func TestNtfyTokenWithAControlCharacterStopsTheStartWithoutShowingIt(t *testing.
"set": {alertNtfyToken: token + "\r"},
"in a file": {alertNtfyToken + "_FILE": writeFile(t, token+"\r\n")},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(env.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(env.viper())
want := alertNtfyToken + ": holds a control character, such as the " +
"carriage return of a Windows line end"
@@ -1063,7 +1070,7 @@ func TestInstanceNameWithAControlCharacterStopsTheStartOnlyWithNtfySet(t *testin
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
instanceName: name, alertNtfyURL: "https://ntfy.example/sww-alerts",
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want := instanceName + `: "fsn1app1\r" holds a control character, such as the ` +
`carriage return of a Windows line end, and is sent to ntfy in a header ` +
@@ -1088,7 +1095,7 @@ func TestInstanceNameNotUTF8StopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
"set": {instanceName: latin1},
"in a file": {instanceName + "_FILE": writeFile(t, latin1+"\n")},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(env.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(env.viper())
want := instanceName + `: "caf\xe9" is not valid UTF-8`
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1097,15 +1104,16 @@ func TestInstanceNameNotUTF8StopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCodeOnBothCountryListsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
func TestCodeInAllowedCountriesAndTagDenyStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
deniedCountries: "cn,ru",
tagDeny: "country=cn,country=ru",
allowedCountries: "de,RU",
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ru on both country lists was accepted")
t.Fatal("ru in SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES and " +
"SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY was accepted")
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), allowedCountries+": ") ||
@@ -1165,7 +1173,7 @@ func TestLookupDBPathGoesWithTheFileSourceAlone(t *testing.T) {
lookupDBPath + ": is set while " + lookupSource + " is off; only file reads it",
},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(tc.env.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(tc.env.viper())
if err == nil || err.Error() != tc.want {
t.Errorf("settings %v: error %v, want %s", tc.env, err, tc.want)
}
@@ -1176,12 +1184,11 @@ func TestSettingNeedingLookupsStopsTheStartWhileTheyAreOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for name, value := range map[string]string{
deniedCountries: "kp",
allowedCountries: "de",
addLookupHeaders: enabled,
tagDeny: "country=KP",
tagLimitPercent: "asn=64496:50",
asnLimitPercentURL: asnURL,
asnLimitPercent: "AS64496:50",
countryLimitPercent: "cn:25",
asnBytesPercent: "AS64496:50",
countryBytesPercent: "cn:25",
unknownLimitPercent: "99",
@@ -1195,7 +1202,7 @@ func TestSettingNeedingLookupsStopsTheStartWhileTheyAreOff(t *testing.T) {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
lookupSource: off, name: value,
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), name+": ") ||
!strings.Contains(err.Error(), lookupSource+" is off") {
t.Errorf("error %v, want one naming %s and %s", err, name, lookupSource)
@@ -1204,12 +1211,13 @@ func TestSettingNeedingLookupsStopsTheStartWhileTheyAreOff(t *testing.T) {
}
// Set empty, the lists need nothing looked up, and nor does
// SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT at 100, which lowers no limit, an anomaly
// threshold per AS number that is off, any other anomaly threshold, or
// a blocklist.
// SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT at 100, which lowers no limit, a tag the
// lookup does not give, an anomaly threshold per AS number that is off,
// any other anomaly threshold, or a blocklist.
env := environment{
lookupSource: off, deniedCountries: "", allowedCountries: "",
asnLimitPercent: "", countryLimitPercent: "", asnBytesPercent: "",
lookupSource: off, allowedCountries: "", asnBytesPercent: "",
tagLists: "torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt,vpn=https://example.com/vpn.txt",
tagDeny: torExitTag, tagLimitPercent: "vpn:50",
countryBytesPercent: "", unknownLimitPercent: "100", asnLimitPercentURL: "",
blocklistURLs: dropURL,
}
@@ -1345,7 +1353,7 @@ func TestInvalidAnomalySettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1355,34 +1363,251 @@ func TestInvalidAnomalySettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// torExitTag, zenTag and exploitTag are tags these tests name.
const (
torExitTag = "torexit"
zenTag = "dnsbl=zen.example"
exploitTag = "exploitsignature"
)
func TestTagSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const torURL = "https://example.com/tor.txt"
// Names and tags in either case, an AS number with leading zeros, and a
// name holding a =.
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{
tagLists: "TorExit=" + torURL +
", vpn=mullvad=https://example.com/mullvad.txt",
dnsblZones: "Zen.example",
tagDeny: "TorExit, Country=kp, asn=014061",
tagLimitPercent: "vpn=mullvad :50, asn=014061:25, COUNTRY=cn:1, dnsbl=zen.example:99",
})
wantLists := []config.TagList{
{Name: torExitTag, URL: torURL},
{Name: "vpn=mullvad", URL: "https://example.com/mullvad.txt"},
}
if !slices.Equal(cfg.TagLists, wantLists) {
t.Errorf("%s gave %+v, want %+v", tagLists, cfg.TagLists, wantLists)
}
wantDeny := []string{torExitTag, "country=KP", "asn=14061"}
if !slices.Equal(cfg.TagDeny, wantDeny) {
t.Errorf("%s gave %v, want %v", tagDeny, cfg.TagDeny, wantDeny)
}
wantPercents := map[string]int64{
"vpn=mullvad": 50, "asn=14061": 25, "country=CN": 1, zenTag: 99,
}
if !maps.Equal(cfg.TagLimitPercent, wantPercents) {
t.Errorf("%s gave %v, want %v", tagLimitPercent, cfg.TagLimitPercent, wantPercents)
}
}
func TestRouteWatchURLAndPrefixTags(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const rw = "https://routewatch.example"
if cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{}); cfg.RouteWatchURL != "" {
t.Errorf("default %s is %q, want unset", routeWatchURL, cfg.RouteWatchURL)
}
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{
routeWatchURL: rw, tagDeny: "prefix=2001:DB8::/32",
tagLimitPercent: "prefix=192.0.2.0/24:50",
})
wantDeny := []string{"prefix=2001:db8::/32"}
if cfg.RouteWatchURL != rw || !slices.Equal(cfg.TagDeny, wantDeny) ||
cfg.TagLimitPercent["prefix=192.0.2.0/24"] != 50 {
t.Errorf("gave %q, %v, %v", cfg.RouteWatchURL, cfg.TagDeny, cfg.TagLimitPercent)
}
// routewatch gives asn= tags too, so an asn= tag needs no lookups while it is set.
fromEnvironment(t, environment{
lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: rw, tagDeny: "asn=64496",
})
for _, stopped := range []struct {
env environment
name string
}{
{environment{routeWatchURL: "ftp://routewatch.example"}, routeWatchURL},
{environment{routeWatchURL: "routewatch.example"}, routeWatchURL},
{environment{tagDeny: "prefix=192.0.2.0/24"}, tagDeny},
{environment{routeWatchURL: rw, tagDeny: "prefix=nowhere"}, tagDeny},
{environment{routeWatchURL: rw, tagDeny: "prefix=192.0.2.5/24"}, tagDeny},
{
environment{routeWatchURL: rw, tagLimitPercent: "prefix=192.0.2.0/33:50"},
tagLimitPercent,
},
{environment{lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: rw, tagDeny: "country=DE"}, tagDeny},
{environment{lookupSource: off, tagDeny: "asn=64496"}, tagDeny},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(stopped.env.viper())
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), stopped.name+": ") {
t.Errorf("%v gave the error %v, want one naming %s", stopped.env, err, stopped.name)
}
}
badURL := environment{routeWatchURL: "ftp://routewatch.example"}
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(badURL.viper())
want := routeWatchURL + `: "ftp://routewatch.example" is not an http or https URL ` +
"without a user or a fragment, such as https://routewatch.example"
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
}
func TestTagThatNoRequestCanGetIsToldApartFromOneItCan(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
list = "torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt"
key = "abc123"
zone = key + ".xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
masked = "********.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
)
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env environment
want string // "" is accepted
}{
{"a list's name", environment{tagLists: list, tagDeny: torExitTag}, ""},
{
"a mistyped list's name", environment{tagLists: list, tagDeny: "torexti"},
`"torexti"`,
},
{"a masked zone", environment{dnsblZones: zone, tagDeny: "dnsbl=" + masked}, ""},
{
"a zone with its key", environment{dnsblZones: zone, tagDeny: "dnsbl=" + zone},
masked,
},
{"another zone", environment{dnsblZones: zone, tagDeny: zenTag}, zenTag},
{
"abuseipdb with a key",
environment{abuseIPDBKey: "k", tagLimitPercent: "abuseipdb:50"}, "",
},
{"crowdsec, though a list has its name", environment{
tagLists: "crowdsec=https://example.com/c.txt", tagDeny: "crowdsec",
}, `"crowdsec" cannot be used`},
{exploitTag, environment{tagDeny: exploitTag}, ""},
{
exploitTag + " with rule files off",
environment{tagDeny: exploitTag, rulesEnabled: disabled}, "",
},
{
exploitTag + " with the Core Rule Set off",
environment{tagDeny: exploitTag, wafMode: off}, "",
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(tc.env.viper())
switch {
case tc.want == "" && err != nil:
t.Errorf("error %v, want none", err)
case tc.want != "" && (err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.want)):
t.Errorf("error %v, want one holding %s", err, tc.want)
case err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), key):
t.Errorf("error %v shows the zone's key", err)
}
})
}
}
func TestErrorOfATagSettingLeavesOutAZoneKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
tag = "dnsbl=" + spamhaus
emptyItem = "has an empty item in its list"
twice = `"` + spamhausMasked + `" is listed twice`
)
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value, want string }{
{tagDeny, tag + "," + tag, twice},
{tagDeny, tag + ",,", emptyItem},
{
tagLimitPercent, tag,
`"` + spamhausMasked + `" is not a tag, : and a percentage, ` +
"such as vpn:50 or asn=14061:25",
},
{
tagLimitPercent, "50:" + tag,
`"` + spamhausMasked + `" is not a percentage from 1 to 99`,
},
{tagLimitPercent, tag + ":50," + tag + " :25", twice},
{tagLimitPercent, tag + ":50,,", emptyItem},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("%s=%s gave the error %v, want %s", tc.name, tc.value, err, want)
}
}
}
func TestTagListURLFetchedAsAnotherListStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const lapi = "http://172.17.0.1:8080"
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, listURL string
env environment
}{
{"a blocklist", dropURL, environment{blocklistURLs: dropURL}},
{"the file of AS:percent lines", asnURL, environment{asnLimitPercentURL: asnURL}},
{
"the CrowdSec decision list", lapi + "/v1/decisions",
environment{"SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL": lapi, "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY": "key"},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tc.env[tagLists] = "dup=" + tc.listURL
want := tagLists + `: "` + tc.listURL + `" is in SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS, is ` +
"SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL or is the CrowdSec decision list too"
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(tc.env.viper())
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestBiasedThresholdsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{})
if len(cfg.ASNLimitPercent) != 0 || len(cfg.CountryLimitPercent) != 0 ||
len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) != 0 || len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) != 0 ||
if len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) != 0 || len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) != 0 ||
cfg.UnknownLimitPercent != 100 {
t.Errorf("biased thresholds %v, %v, %v, %v and %d by default, "+
"want four empty lists and 100", cfg.ASNLimitPercent, cfg.CountryLimitPercent,
t.Errorf("biased thresholds %v, %v and %d by default, "+
"want two empty lists and 100",
cfg.ASNBytesPercent, cfg.CountryBytesPercent, cfg.UnknownLimitPercent)
}
// AS numbers and countries in either case, an AS number with leading
// zeros, 0 and 100.
cfg = fromEnvironment(t, environment{
asnLimitPercent: "AS14061:50, as16276:0,AS045102:100",
countryLimitPercent: "cn:25,RU:50",
asnBytesPercent: "as16276:75",
countryBytesPercent: "ru:10",
unknownLimitPercent: "0",
})
for name, tc := range map[string]struct{ got, want map[string]int64 }{
asnLimitPercent: {
cfg.ASNLimitPercent,
map[string]int64{"AS14061": 50, "AS16276": 0, "AS45102": 100},
},
countryLimitPercent: {cfg.CountryLimitPercent, map[string]int64{"CN": 25, "RU": 50}},
asnBytesPercent: {cfg.ASNBytesPercent, map[string]int64{"AS16276": 75}},
countryBytesPercent: {cfg.CountryBytesPercent, map[string]int64{"RU": 10}},
} {
@@ -1406,16 +1631,16 @@ func TestInvalidBiasedThresholdStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
)
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value, want string }{
{asnLimitPercent, "14061:50", `"14061"` + notASN},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS4294967296:50", `"AS4294967296"` + notASN},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS14061", `"AS14061"` + notItem},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS14061:101", `"101"` + notPercent},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS14061:50,as14061:25", `"as14061" is listed twice`},
{asnBytesPercent, "14061:50", `"14061"` + notASN},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS4294967296:50", `"AS4294967296"` + notASN},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061", `"AS14061"` + notItem},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:101", `"101"` + notPercent},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:50,as14061:25", `"as14061" is listed twice`},
{
countryLimitPercent, "nk:25",
countryBytesPercent, "nk:25",
`"nk" is not a two-letter country code such as de or kp`,
},
{countryLimitPercent, "cn:25,CN:50", `"CN" is listed twice`},
{countryBytesPercent, "cn:25,CN:50", `"CN" is listed twice`},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:-1", `"-1"` + notPercent},
{countryBytesPercent, "cn:50%", `"50%"` + notPercent},
{unknownLimitPercent, "101", `"101"` + notPercent},
@@ -1424,7 +1649,7 @@ func TestInvalidBiasedThresholdStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1442,7 +1667,7 @@ const (
asnURL = "https://lists.example/asn.txt"
)
// The actions of SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, as Config gives them.
// The actions of SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, as Config gives them.
const (
actionDeny = "deny"
actionLimit = "limit"
@@ -1521,7 +1746,7 @@ func TestInvalidReputationSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1536,9 +1761,9 @@ func TestASNLimitPercentURLThatIsABlocklistStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
blocklistURLs: dropURL + "," + asnURL, asnLimitPercentURL: asnURL,
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want := asnLimitPercentURL + `: "` + asnURL + `" is in SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS too`
want := asnLimitPercentURL + `: "` + asnURL + `" is in SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS too`
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
@@ -1663,7 +1888,7 @@ func TestInvalidDNSBLSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1731,7 +1956,7 @@ func TestDNSBLZoneKeyIsLoggedMaskedAndNeverShown(t *testing.T) {
{spamhaus + "," + otherZone, `"` + spamhausMasked + `" is listed twice`},
{spamhaus + ",,", "has an empty item in its list"},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{dnsblZones: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{dnsblZones: tc.value}.viper())
want := dnsblZones + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1784,7 +2009,7 @@ func TestInvalidAbuseIPDBSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1841,7 +2066,7 @@ func TestInvalidCrowdSecSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
notLAPIURL = " is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
"such as http://172.17.0.1:8080"
anotherList = `gives the decision list "` + lapi + `/v1/decisions", which is in ` +
`SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS or is SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL too`
`SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS or is SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL too`
)
for _, tc := range []struct {
@@ -1898,7 +2123,7 @@ func TestInvalidCrowdSecSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(tc.env.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(tc.env.viper())
if err == nil || err.Error() != tc.want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, tc.want)
}
@@ -2003,23 +2228,37 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{lookupSource, "ipinfo"}, {lookupSource, "GeoJS"}, {lookupSource, ""},
{lookupTimeout, off}, {lookupTimeout, "0s"}, {lookupTimeout, "1"},
{addLookupHeaders, "yes"},
{deniedCountries, "nk"},
{deniedCountries, "kp,,ir"},
{deniedCountries, "prk"},
{deniedCountries, "408"},
{deniedCountries, "k"},
{deniedCountries, "eu"},
{deniedCountries, "un"},
{deniedCountries, "su"},
{allowedCountries, "nk"},
{allowedCountries, "kp,,ir"},
{allowedCountries, "prk"},
{allowedCountries, "408"},
{allowedCountries, "k"},
{allowedCountries, "eu"},
{allowedCountries, "un"},
{allowedCountries, "su"},
{allowedCountries, "ac"},
{allowedCountries, "uk"},
{allowedCountries, "zz"},
{allowedCountries, "de,germany"},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS14061:50,,AS16276:50"}, {asnLimitPercent, "ASX:50"},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS14061:"}, {asnLimitPercent, "AS14061 :50"},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS14061:1.5"}, {asnLimitPercent, "AS-1:50"},
{countryLimitPercent, "cn"}, {countryLimitPercent, "cn:"},
{countryLimitPercent, "cn:25:50"}, {countryLimitPercent, "china:25"},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:50,,AS16276:50"}, {asnBytesPercent, "ASX:50"},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:"}, {asnBytesPercent, "AS14061 :50"},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:1.5"}, {asnBytesPercent, "AS-1:50"},
{countryBytesPercent, "cn"}, {countryBytesPercent, "cn:"},
{countryBytesPercent, "cn:25:50"}, {countryBytesPercent, "china:25"},
{tagDeny, "a,,b"}, {tagDeny, "country=nk"}, {tagDeny, "asn=abc"},
{tagDeny, "asn="}, {tagDeny, "torexit,TOREXIT"}, {tagDeny, "torexti"},
{tagDeny, zenTag}, {tagDeny, "abuseipdb"}, {tagDeny, "crowdsec"},
{tagLimitPercent, "torexti:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "dnsbl=zen.example:50"},
{tagLimitPercent, "abuseipdb:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "crowdsec:50"},
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn :50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn"}, {tagLimitPercent, ":50"},
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn:"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn:0"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn:100"},
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn:1.5"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn:50,VPN:25"},
{tagLimitPercent, "exploitsignature:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "asn=abc:50"},
{tagLists, torExitTag}, {tagLists, "=https://example.com/a.txt"},
{tagLists, "a,b=https://example.com/a.txt"},
{tagLists, "a=ftp://example.com/a.txt"},
{tagLists, "a=https://example.com/a.txt,A=https://example.com/b.txt"},
{tagLists, "a=https://example.com/a.txt,b=https://example.com/a.txt"},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:101"}, {countryBytesPercent, "su:50"},
{unknownLimitPercent, ""}, {unknownLimitPercent, "-1"},
{unknownLimitPercent, "50%"},
@@ -2031,6 +2270,25 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{logLevel, "INFO"}, {logLevel, "warning"}, {logLevel, "trace"}, {logLevel, ""},
{rulesEnabled, "yes"}, {rulesEnabled, "True"},
})
wantExploitTagStopsTheStartWithRulesAndCoreRuleSetOff(t)
}
// wantExploitTagStopsTheStartWithRulesAndCoreRuleSetOff checks that with rule
// files off, and either setting turning off the Core Rule Set, the tag
// exploitsignature in SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY stops the start.
func wantExploitTagStopsTheStartWithRulesAndCoreRuleSetOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
for _, name := range []string{wafMode, wafAnomalyThreshold} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
tagDeny: exploitTag, rulesEnabled: disabled, name: off,
}.viper())
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), tagDeny+": ") {
t.Errorf("%s=off with rule files off gave the error %v, want one naming %s",
name, err, tagDeny)
}
}
}
func TestInvalidBanOrStateValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
@@ -2058,7 +2316,7 @@ func wantStartStopped(t *testing.T, invalid []struct{ name, value string }) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("%s=%q was accepted", tc.name, tc.value)
}
@@ -2083,7 +2341,7 @@ func TestHostOrTransferEncodingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{logRequestHeaders: value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{logRequestHeaders: value}.viper())
if err == nil || err.Error() != logRequestHeaders+": "+want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s: %s", err, logRequestHeaders, want)
}
@@ -2100,7 +2358,7 @@ func TestShortTokenStopsTheStartWithoutShowingIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(name+"="+value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{name: value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{name: value}.viper())
want := name + ": is shorter than 32 characters"
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -2156,7 +2414,7 @@ func TestSettingFromFileIsCheckedAsTheSettingItself(t *testing.T) {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
bytesLimitPerMinute + "_FILE": writeFile(t, "lots\n"),
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want := bytesLimitPerMinute + `: "lots" is not a size such as 512K, 100M or 5G, or off`
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -2167,7 +2425,7 @@ func TestSettingFromFileIsCheckedAsTheSettingItself(t *testing.T) {
logRemoteURL: remoteURL,
instanceName: instance,
logRemoteAppName + "_FILE": writeFile(t, "my app\n"),
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want = logRemoteAppName + `: "my app" is not 1 to 48 printable ASCII ` +
`characters without a space, such as blog`
@@ -2182,7 +2440,7 @@ func TestSettingAndItsFileBothSetStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
metricsToken: token,
metricsToken + "_FILE": writeFile(t, token),
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want := metricsToken + ": is set, and so is " + metricsToken +
"_FILE; set only one of them"
@@ -2197,7 +2455,7 @@ func TestUnreadableSettingFileStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
for _, path := range []string{filepath.Join(dir, "missing"), dir} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{metricsToken + "_FILE": path}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{metricsToken + "_FILE": path}.viper())
want := metricsToken + "_FILE: cannot be read: "
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), want) {
@@ -2285,11 +2543,11 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
lookupSource: defaultLookupSource,
lookupDBPath: "",
lookupTimeout: "800ms",
addLookupHeaders: "false",
deniedCountries: "",
addLookupHeaders: disabled,
allowedCountries: "",
asnLimitPercent: "",
countryLimitPercent: "",
tagLists: "",
tagDeny: "",
tagLimitPercent: "",
asnBytesPercent: "",
countryBytesPercent: "",
unknownLimitPercent: "100",
@@ -2305,6 +2563,7 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
reputationAction: "limit:25",
reputationCacheTTL: defaultReputationCacheTTL,
reputationTimeout: "2s",
routeWatchURL: "",
crowdSecURL: "",
crowdSecKey: "",
banResponse: "403",
internal/config/configtest/configtest.go
+16
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
// Package configtest gives the tests of the packages that read settings the
// settings they choose.
package configtest
import "github.com/spf13/viper"
// Viper returns a viper holding each of settings, as the viper config.NewViper
// returns holds a process's environment.
func Viper(settings map[string]string) *viper.Viper {
v := viper.New()
for name, value := range settings {
v.Set(name, value)
}
return v
}
internal/config/rproxy.go
+37 -48
View File
@@ -8,38 +8,39 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
)
// RProxy is the settings of `sww rproxy`. A size or time limit of zero
// is off.
type RProxy struct {
// ListenAddr is where rproxy listens (SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR).
// ListenAddr is where rproxy listens (SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR).
ListenAddr string
// UpstreamURL is the app (SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL).
// UpstreamURL is the app (SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL).
UpstreamURL *url.URL
// TrustedProxies are the netblocks whose X-Forwarded-For is believed
// (SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES).
// (SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES).
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// WAFBackend is discriminator's URL (SWRP_WAF_BACKEND).
// WAFBackend is discriminator's URL (SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND).
WAFBackend *url.URL
// Timeout is how long rproxy waits for discriminator's answer to a question,
// and to a report (SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS). It cannot be off.
// and to a report (SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS). It cannot be off.
Timeout time.Duration
// DefaultDisposition is what is done with a request when discriminator cannot be
// connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer within Timeout:
// allow or deny (SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION).
// allow or deny (SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION).
DefaultDisposition string
// MaxRequestSize is the largest request body (SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE), and
// MaxResponseSize the largest response body (SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE).
// MaxRequestSize is the largest request body (SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE), and
// MaxResponseSize the largest response body (SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE).
MaxRequestSize int64
MaxResponseSize int64
// MaxRequestTime bounds sending the whole request: the visitor's request
// line and headers, and then, from their end, its body on its way to the
// app (SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS). MaxResponseTime bounds the answer, from
// app (SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS). MaxResponseTime bounds the answer, from
// the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor
// (SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS).
// (SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS).
MaxRequestTime time.Duration
MaxResponseTime time.Duration
@@ -58,24 +59,26 @@ var (
"is not a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as 60000, or off")
)
// RProxyFromEnvironment reads rproxy's settings with lookupEnv, normally
// os.LookupEnv. A setting that is not set takes its default, and
// SWRP_WAF_BACKEND, which has none, must be set. A setting that is set but
// invalid is an error that names it. Since rproxy never touches disk, its
// settings have no _FILE form.
func RProxyFromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*RProxy, error) {
env := &environment{lookupEnv: withoutFileForms(lookupEnv)}
// RProxyFromEnvironment reads rproxy's settings through v, normally the viper
// NewViper returns, bound to the process's environment. A setting that is not
// set takes its default, and SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND, which has none, must be
// set. A setting may instead be given as a file: the variable named by the
// setting's name with _FILE added names the file, which is read now. A setting
// that is set but invalid is an error that names it.
func RProxyFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*RProxy, error) {
env := &environment{v: v}
cfg := &RProxy{
ListenAddr: env.address("SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"),
UpstreamURL: env.appURL("SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL),
TrustedProxies: env.netblocks("SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
WAFBackend: env.wafBackend("SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"),
Timeout: env.milliseconds("SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS", "2000"),
DefaultDisposition: env.disposition("SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION", "allow"),
MaxRequestSize: env.size("SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE", "100M"),
MaxResponseSize: env.size("SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE", "1G"),
MaxRequestTime: env.millisecondsOrOff("SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS", "60000"),
MaxResponseTime: env.millisecondsOrOff("SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS", "1800000"),
ListenAddr: env.address("SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR"),
UpstreamURL: env.appURL("SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL),
TrustedProxies: env.netblocks("SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
WAFBackend: env.wafBackend("SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND"),
Timeout: env.milliseconds("SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS", "2000"),
DefaultDisposition: env.disposition("SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION", "allow"),
MaxRequestSize: env.size("SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE", "100M"),
MaxResponseSize: env.size("SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE", "1G"),
MaxRequestTime: env.millisecondsOrOff("SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS", "60000"),
MaxResponseTime: env.millisecondsOrOff(
"SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS", "1800000"),
}
if env.err != nil {
@@ -87,15 +90,15 @@ func RProxyFromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*RProxy, erro
return cfg, nil
}
// RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL reads only SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR and
// SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL. The health check in rproxy's container needs no other
// RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL reads only SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR and
// SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL. The health check in rproxy's container needs no other
// setting, so it reads no other.
func RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(
lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
v *viper.Viper,
) (string, *url.URL, error) {
env := &environment{lookupEnv: withoutFileForms(lookupEnv)}
listenAddr := env.address("SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR")
upstreamURL := env.appURL("SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL)
env := &environment{v: v}
listenAddr := env.address("SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR")
upstreamURL := env.appURL("SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL)
if env.err != nil {
return "", nil, env.err
@@ -104,20 +107,6 @@ func RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(
return listenAddr, upstreamURL, nil
}
// withoutFileForms returns lookupEnv finding no setting named with _FILE, since
// rproxy never touches disk.
func withoutFileForms(
lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
) func(string) (string, bool) {
return func(name string) (string, bool) {
if strings.HasSuffix(name, "_FILE") {
return "", false
}
return lookupEnv(name)
}
}
// LogValue makes an RProxy log as each setting's name with the value it was
// given, or its default.
func (c *RProxy) LogValue() slog.Value {
internal/config/rproxy_test.go
+36 -29
View File
@@ -10,20 +10,21 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config/configtest"
)
// rproxy's settings, by name, and their values in these tests.
const (
wafBackend = "SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"
rproxyTimeout = "SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS"
rproxyDefault = "SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION"
rproxyListen = "SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"
rproxyUpstream = "SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL"
rproxyTrusted = "SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
rproxyMaxRequest = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
rproxyMaxResponse = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
rproxyRequestTime = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
rproxyAnswerTime = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
wafBackend = "SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND"
rproxyTimeout = "SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS"
rproxyDefault = "SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION"
rproxyListen = "SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR"
rproxyUpstream = "SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL"
rproxyTrusted = "SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
rproxyMaxRequest = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
rproxyMaxResponse = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
rproxyRequestTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
rproxyAnswerTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
backendURL = "http://discriminator:8080"
rproxyDefaultAddr = ":8080"
rproxyDefaultApp = "http://127.0.0.1:8081"
@@ -32,11 +33,7 @@ const (
// rproxyConfig reads rproxy's settings from env.
func rproxyConfig(env map[string]string) (*config.RProxy, error) {
return config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := env[name]
return value, ok
})
return config.RProxyFromEnvironment(configtest.Viper(env))
}
func TestRProxyDefaults(t *testing.T) {
@@ -177,31 +174,41 @@ func TestRProxyNeedsItsBackend(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRProxyReadsNoFile(t *testing.T) {
func TestRProxySettingReadFromFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "backend")
err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("http://from-a-file:8080\n"), 0o600)
err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(backendURL+"\n"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
_, err = rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend + "_FILE": path})
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), wafBackend+": is required") {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s still required", err, wafBackend)
}
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{
wafBackend: backendURL,
rproxyTimeout + "_FILE": "/nonexistent/timeout",
})
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend + "_FILE": path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v, with the file left unread", err)
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
if cfg.Timeout != 2*time.Second {
t.Errorf("timeout %v, want the default", cfg.Timeout)
if cfg.WAFBackend.String() != backendURL {
t.Errorf("backend %v, want %s", cfg.WAFBackend, backendURL)
}
}
func TestRProxyUnreadableSettingFileStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
for _, path := range []string{filepath.Join(dir, "missing"), dir} {
_, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{
wafBackend: backendURL,
rproxyTimeout + "_FILE": path,
})
want := rproxyTimeout + "_FILE: cannot be read: "
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), want) {
t.Errorf("%s: error %v, want one starting %s", path, err, want)
}
}
}
internal/config/viper.go
+16
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
package config
import "github.com/spf13/viper"
// NewViper returns the viper that reads the settings: each setting's
// environment variable, bound to its own name. Every setting of discriminator
// and rproxy is read through it, and none is read with os.Getenv or
// os.LookupEnv outside it. An environment variable that is set but empty is
// set, as one that holds a value is, which viper does not take for granted.
func NewViper() *viper.Viper {
v := viper.New()
v.AutomaticEnv()
v.AllowEmptyEnv(true)
return v
}
internal/config/viper_test.go
+34
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
package config_test
import (
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
)
// These tests set real environment variables, so none runs in parallel.
func TestTokenSetEmptyInTheEnvironmentStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(adminToken, "")
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(config.NewViper())
want := adminToken + ": is shorter than 32 characters"
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Fatalf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
}
func TestListSetEmptyInTheEnvironmentReplacesItsDefault(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(wafBackend, backendURL)
t.Setenv(rproxyTrusted, "")
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(config.NewViper())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
if len(cfg.TrustedProxies) != 0 {
t.Errorf("trusted proxies %v, want none", cfg.TrustedProxies)
}
}
internal/waf/waf.go → internal/coreruleset/coreruleset.go
+17 -17
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
// Package waf runs the OWASP Core Rule Set 4.25.0, through Coraza, on the
// Package coreruleset runs the OWASP Core Rule Set 4.25.0, through Coraza, on the
// method, the URL with its query and the headers of a request, and on its
// body while SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the eight changes sww
// makes to it and the exclusions in SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, as
// body while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the eight changes sww
// makes to it and the exclusions in SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, as
// "Attack detection" under "Settings" in SPEC.md describes them. It reads no
// response.
//
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
// its no_fs_access tag, as the Dockerfile and script/build build it: of a
// file in a multipart body, Coraza then counts the bytes instead of
// writing them to the system's temporary directory.
package waf
package coreruleset
import (
_ "embed"
@@ -32,16 +32,16 @@ import (
// directives are the Core Rule Set as sww runs it, with the
// paranoia level for %d, bodyDirectives for the first %s while
// SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, the exclusions file for the second, and
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set, the exclusions file for the second, and
// giteaExclusions for the third.
// Each rule sww adds has an id from 900000 to 900999, the ids the
// Core Rule Set keeps for the rules that set it up, which
// SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES and the exclusions file refuse, so that no
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES and the exclusions file refuse, so that no
// setting switches one off. Coraza joins a line ending in \ to the next,
// without the spaces at the start of the next.
const directives = `
# The engine only detects. sww compares the request's anomaly
# score with SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD itself, in block and detect mode
# score with SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD itself, in block and detect mode
# alike. It reads no body, unless bodyDirectives switch that on.
SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly
SecRequestBodyAccess Off
@@ -183,16 +183,16 @@ var cookiesNotRead = []string{"gitea_flash", "redirect_to"}
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
// ParanoiaLevel is SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL, from 1 to 4.
// ParanoiaLevel is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL, from 1 to 4.
ParanoiaLevel int
// DisabledRules are the ids of the rules switched off
// (SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES).
// (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES).
DisabledRules []int
// BodyLimit is the most of a request body the Core Rule Set reads
// (SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT), 0 while it is off and it reads none.
// (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT), 0 while it is off and it reads none.
BodyLimit int64
// ExclusionsFile is the path of a file of exclusions loaded before the
// Core Rule Set's rules (SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE), "" while
// Core Rule Set's rules (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE), "" while
// there is none.
ExclusionsFile string
}
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ var errSwwRuleID = errors.New("an id of sww's own rules")
// SecRuleRemoveById. The Core Rule Set's rules load after the file, so
// the directive finds none of them.
var errChangesNoRule = errors.New("the Core Rule Set's rules load after the file; " +
"switch a rule off with SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES, or on some requests " +
"switch a rule off with SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES, or on some requests " +
"with a ctl exclusion")
// directivesIn returns the directives in text as Coraza reads them: it
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ func checkExclusions(exclusions string) error {
// CoreRuleSet is the Core Rule Set, ready to inspect requests. It is safe
// for concurrent use.
type CoreRuleSet struct {
waf coraza.WAF
engine coraza.WAF
bodyLimit int64
}
@@ -327,14 +327,14 @@ func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
text += "SecRuleRemoveById " + strings.Join(ids, " ") + "\n"
}
waf, err := coraza.NewWAF(coraza.NewWAFConfig().
engine, err := coraza.NewWAF(coraza.NewWAFConfig().
WithRootFS(coreruleset.FS).
WithDirectives(text))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("load the Core Rule Set: %w", err)
}
return &CoreRuleSet{waf: waf, bodyLimit: params.BodyLimit}, nil
return &CoreRuleSet{engine: engine, bodyLimit: params.BodyLimit}, nil
}
// Result is what the Core Rule Set found in a request.
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ type Result struct {
func (c *CoreRuleSet) Inspect(
r *http.Request, client netip.Addr, body io.Reader,
) (Result, []byte, error) {
tx := c.waf.NewTransaction()
tx := c.engine.NewTransaction()
// Closing would remove the files Coraza wrote, and it writes none.
defer func() { _ = tx.Close() }()
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ func (c *CoreRuleSet) Inspect(
}
// readBody reads body, the body of the request in tx, which has run on
// the request's headers, while SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set and the body is
// the request's headers, while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set and the body is
// of a kind the Core Rule Set reads: form data and multipart, of which it
// reads the first c.bodyLimit bytes, and JSON and XML, which it reads only
// when they are no longer than that, since they cannot be read in part.
internal/waf/waf_test.go → internal/coreruleset/coreruleset_test.go
+50 -44
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package waf_test
package coreruleset_test
import (
"net/http"
@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
)
// defaultDisabledRules are the rules SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off
// defaultDisabledRules are the rules SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES switches off
// by default.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
@@ -23,10 +23,12 @@ var defaultDisabledRules = []int{920340, 920420, 920440, 920640, 930130, 930140}
// newCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at paranoia level level, with
// the rules in disabled switched off.
func newCoreRuleSet(t *testing.T, level int, disabled ...int) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
func newCoreRuleSet(t *testing.T, level int, disabled ...int) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
t.Helper()
crs, err := waf.New(waf.Params{ParanoiaLevel: level, DisabledRules: disabled})
crs, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: level, DisabledRules: disabled,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the Core Rule Set: %v", err)
}
@@ -49,7 +51,7 @@ func get(target string, headers ...string) request {
// inspect returns what crs finds in r, sent to git.example by a browser,
// whose Host, User-Agent and Accept r.headers may replace.
func inspect(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request) waf.Result {
func inspect(t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, r request) coreruleset.Result {
t.Helper()
result, _ := inspectBody(t, crs, r, "")
@@ -60,8 +62,8 @@ func inspect(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request) waf.Result {
// inspectBody is inspect for r with body, which is announced with its
// Content-Length unless it is "", and returns what crs read of body too.
func inspectBody(
t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string,
) (waf.Result, string) {
t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string,
) (coreruleset.Result, string) {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), r.method,
@@ -96,7 +98,9 @@ func inspectBody(
}
// wantResult checks what crs finds in r.
func wantResult(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, want waf.Result) {
func wantResult(
t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, r request, want coreruleset.Result,
) {
t.Helper()
if got := inspect(t, crs, r); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
@@ -106,14 +110,14 @@ func wantResult(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, want waf.Result)
// matched is the result of a request that the rules ids match, each of
// them a critical one, which adds 5 to the score.
func matched(ids ...int) waf.Result {
func matched(ids ...int) coreruleset.Result {
const critical = 5
return waf.Result{RuleIDs: ids, Score: critical * len(ids)}
return coreruleset.Result{RuleIDs: ids, Score: critical * len(ids)}
}
// atDefaults returns the Core Rule Set as sww runs it by default.
func atDefaults(t *testing.T) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
func atDefaults(t *testing.T) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
t.Helper()
return newCoreRuleSet(t, 1, defaultDisabledRules...)
@@ -123,11 +127,12 @@ func atDefaults(t *testing.T) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
// the eight changes is for, and still finds result in refused, a request
// like it that the change is not for.
func wantChange(
t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, passes, refused request, result waf.Result,
t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, passes, refused request,
result coreruleset.Result,
) {
t.Helper()
wantResult(t, crs, passes, waf.Result{})
wantResult(t, crs, passes, coreruleset.Result{})
wantResult(t, crs, refused, result)
}
@@ -162,12 +167,12 @@ func TestExpectAndContentEncodingAreAllowed(t *testing.T) {
wantResult(t, crs,
request{http.MethodPost, push, []string{pushType, length, "Expect: 100-continue"}},
waf.Result{})
coreruleset.Result{})
wantResult(t, crs,
request{http.MethodPost, fetch, []string{
fetchType, length, "Content-Encoding: gzip",
}},
waf.Result{})
coreruleset.Result{})
// Every other header on the Core Rule Set's list stays refused.
for _, header := range []string{
@@ -196,7 +201,7 @@ func TestTransferEncodingIsRead(t *testing.T) {
"Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-request",
"Transfer-Encoding: chunked",
}},
waf.Result{})
coreruleset.Result{})
}
func TestMoreParametersThanCorazaKeepsIsAMatch(t *testing.T) {
@@ -250,7 +255,7 @@ func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInSkipTheListsOfFilesPathsAndCommands(t *testi
for _, value := range []struct {
name string
// result is what a parameter that is not one of gitea's gets.
result waf.Result
result coreruleset.Result
}{
// A file on the list of system files.
{".gitignore", matched(930120)},
@@ -271,7 +276,7 @@ func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInSkipTheListsOfFilesPathsAndCommands(t *testi
wantChange(t, crs, get("/?path=|cat%20/etc/passwd"), get("/?q=|cat%20/etc/passwd"),
matched(930120, 932160))
wantResult(t, crs, get("/?path=../../etc/passwd"),
waf.Result{RuleIDs: []int{930100, 930110}, Score: 20})
coreruleset.Result{RuleIDs: []int{930100, 930110}, Score: 20})
wantResult(t, crs, get("/?path=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"), matched(942100))
}
@@ -341,7 +346,7 @@ func TestEmptyHeaderIsRead(t *testing.T) {
// An empty User-Agent is a notice, which adds 2.
wantResult(t, atDefaults(t), get("/", "User-Agent: "),
waf.Result{RuleIDs: []int{920330}, Score: 2})
coreruleset.Result{RuleIDs: []int{920330}, Score: 2})
}
func TestParanoiaLevel(t *testing.T) {
@@ -350,7 +355,7 @@ func TestParanoiaLevel(t *testing.T) {
// Accept-Charset is refused from paranoia level 2.
r := get("/", "Accept-Charset: utf-8")
wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1), r, waf.Result{})
wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1), r, coreruleset.Result{})
wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 2), r, matched(920451))
}
@@ -362,8 +367,8 @@ func TestEachDisabledRuleIsSwitchedOff(t *testing.T) {
r := request{http.MethodTrace, "/", []string{"Host: 192.0.2.1"}}
wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1), r,
waf.Result{RuleIDs: []int{911100, 920350}, Score: 8})
wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1, 920350, 911100), r, waf.Result{})
coreruleset.Result{RuleIDs: []int{911100, 920350}, Score: 8})
wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1, 920350, 911100), r, coreruleset.Result{})
}
func TestImagePushThatReusesALayerIsNotCheckedForCommandNames(t *testing.T) {
@@ -383,8 +388,8 @@ func TestImagePushThatReusesALayerIsNotCheckedForCommandNames(t *testing.T) {
// withExclusions returns the Core Rule Set at the defaults, with the
// exclusions file at path.
func withExclusions(path string) (*waf.CoreRuleSet, error) {
return waf.New(waf.Params{
func withExclusions(path string) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
return coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, ExclusionsFile: path,
})
}
@@ -422,7 +427,7 @@ func TestExclusionsFileIsLoadedBeforeTheRules(t *testing.T) {
func TestRuleSwitchedOffAndNamedInTheExclusionsFileIsOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
crs, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: []int{920500},
ExclusionsFile: exclusionsFile(t, backupFileExclusion),
})
@@ -430,7 +435,7 @@ func TestRuleSwitchedOffAndNamedInTheExclusionsFileIsOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("load the exclusions: %v", err)
}
wantResult(t, crs, get("/notes.txt~"), waf.Result{})
wantResult(t, crs, get("/notes.txt~"), coreruleset.Result{})
}
func TestExclusionsFileMayNameAnyNumberInAComment(t *testing.T) {
@@ -525,7 +530,7 @@ func giteaRequests(t *testing.T) []request {
func TestOrdinaryGiteaRequestsPassAndAttacksAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
crs := atDefaults(t)
@@ -550,7 +555,7 @@ func TestOrdinaryGiteaRequestsPassAndAttacksAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// bodyLimit is SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies.
// bodyLimit is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies.
const bodyLimit = 8 << 10
// The Content-Type headers of the kinds of body the Core Rule Set reads.
@@ -566,10 +571,10 @@ const injection = "1' OR '1'='1"
// readingBodies returns the Core Rule Set as sww runs it by
// default, but reading bodies up to bodyLimit.
func readingBodies(t *testing.T) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
func readingBodies(t *testing.T) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
t.Helper()
crs, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
crs, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: bodyLimit,
})
if err != nil {
@@ -603,7 +608,8 @@ func padded(head, tail string, n int) string {
// wantBody checks what crs finds in r with body, and that what it read of
// body is read.
func wantBody(
t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string, want waf.Result,
t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string,
want coreruleset.Result,
read string,
) {
t.Helper()
@@ -627,7 +633,7 @@ func TestBodiesAreReadOnlyWhileBodyLimitIsSet(t *testing.T) {
{jsonBody, `{"q":"` + injection + `"}`},
{xmlBody, "<q>" + injection + "</q>"},
} {
wantBody(t, off, post(tc.header), tc.body, waf.Result{}, "")
wantBody(t, off, post(tc.header), tc.body, coreruleset.Result{}, "")
wantBody(t, on, post(tc.header), tc.body, matched(942100), tc.body)
}
}
@@ -650,7 +656,7 @@ func TestFormDataAndMultipartAreReadUpToTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
} {
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.attackFirst, matched(942100),
tc.attackFirst[:bodyLimit+1])
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.attackLast, waf.Result{},
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.attackLast, coreruleset.Result{},
tc.attackLast[:bodyLimit+1])
}
@@ -660,7 +666,7 @@ func TestFormDataAndMultipartAreReadUpToTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), atLimit, matched(930120, 932160), atLimit)
pastLimit := padded("pad=", "&q=/etc/passwd", bodyLimit+1)
wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), pastLimit, waf.Result{}, pastLimit)
wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), pastLimit, coreruleset.Result{}, pastLimit)
}
func TestJSONAndXMLAreReadOnlyWhenNoLargerThanTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
@@ -676,7 +682,7 @@ func TestJSONAndXMLAreReadOnlyWhenNoLargerThanTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), fits, matched(942100), fits)
larger := padded(tc.head, tc.tail, bodyLimit+1)
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), larger, waf.Result{}, larger)
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), larger, coreruleset.Result{}, larger)
}
}
@@ -694,7 +700,7 @@ func TestOtherBodiesAreNotRead(t *testing.T) {
"Content-Type: text/plain",
"Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-request",
} {
wantBody(t, crs, post(header), body, waf.Result{}, "")
wantBody(t, crs, post(header), body, coreruleset.Result{}, "")
}
}
@@ -722,8 +728,8 @@ func TestContentEncodingIsRefusedOnTheKindsOfBodyTheCoreRuleSetReads(t *testing.
// It is allowed on a body of any other kind, and on every body while no
// body is read.
fetch := "Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-request"
wantBody(t, crs, post(fetch, gzip), "a", waf.Result{}, "")
wantBody(t, atDefaults(t), post(formData, gzip), "a", waf.Result{}, "")
wantBody(t, crs, post(fetch, gzip), "a", coreruleset.Result{}, "")
wantBody(t, atDefaults(t), post(formData, gzip), "a", coreruleset.Result{}, "")
}
func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInAreLeftOutAmongFormFieldsToo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -734,18 +740,18 @@ func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInAreLeftOutAmongFormFieldsToo(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
body string
want waf.Result
want coreruleset.Result
}{
{"path=.gitignore", waf.Result{}},
{"path=.gitignore", coreruleset.Result{}},
{"q=.gitignore", matched(930120)},
{"redirect_uri=" + local, waf.Result{}},
{"redirect_uri=" + local, coreruleset.Result{}},
{"next=" + local, matched(931100, 934110)},
} {
wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), tc.body, tc.want, tc.body)
}
body := field("path", ".gitignore") + end
wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, waf.Result{}, body)
wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, coreruleset.Result{}, body)
body = field("q", ".gitignore") + end
wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, matched(930120), body)
@@ -869,7 +875,7 @@ func TestCorazaWritesNoFile(t *testing.T) {
func TestBodyLimitOf1GLoads(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := waf.New(waf.Params{ParanoiaLevel: 1, BodyLimit: 1 << 30})
_, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{ParanoiaLevel: 1, BodyLimit: 1 << 30})
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("load the Core Rule Set reading bodies up to 1G: %v", err)
}
internal/waf/gitea.conf → internal/coreruleset/gitea.conf
View File
File renamed without changes.
internal/waf/testdata/gitea-requests.txt → internal/coreruleset/testdata/gitea-requests.txt
Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Ordinary gitea 1.27 requests that the Core Rule Set must let through at the
# defaults. Each line is a path and query, and may end with one header after a
# space. The tests of internal/waf inspect each as a GET. The Core Rule Set reads
# space. The tests of internal/coreruleset inspect each as a GET. The Core Rule Set reads
# the query and the headers the same way for any method.
# Searches with ordinary words and symbols.
internal/discriminator/abuseipdb.go
+58
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic abuseipdb. It reads SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY,
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE and SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION.
import (
"context"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// abuseIPDB adds the tag abuseipdb and notes AbuseIPDB, as noteHit does, with
// the score, when its score of the client is a hit, and refuses the request
// when SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny, as dnsbl does for a zone. While
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is unset it does nothing. A client without a score is
// checked in the background, by the request's address, if its history counts
// an offence, and the request does not wait for the answer. The score is then
// used for each address of the client. Its figures are the score and
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE.
type abuseIPDB struct{}
func (abuseIPDB) name() string { return "abuseipdb" }
func (abuseIPDB) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
if rq.h.config.AbuseIPDBKey == "" {
return nil
}
client := rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client)
held, _ := rq.h.limiter.Client(client)
offender := held.History.Offences != ratelimit.Offences{}
score, hit := rq.h.abuseIPDB.Hit(ctx, client, rq.client, offender)
if !hit {
return nil
}
rq.abuseIPDBHit = true
rq.addTag(config.AbuseIPDBTag)
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource, Score: &score},
"scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE")
if rq.h.config.ReputationAction != deny {
return nil
}
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
figures: map[string]any{
figureScore: score, "min_score": rq.h.config.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
},
}
}
internal/discriminator/admin.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ var (
// answerHealth answers a request for the health endpoint.
func (rq *request) answerHealth() {
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint
// Set here rather than left to Go's server, which would set it only
// after the log line has taken the response's headers.
rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
@@ -51,11 +51,11 @@ func (rq *request) answerHealth() {
// answerAdmin answers a request for one of discriminator's own endpoints. Each
// needs a token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>: the metrics
// SWW_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without it is
// SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without it is
// refused with 401. An endpoint whose token is unset answers 404, as any other
// path does.
func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint
token, answer := rq.endpoint()
internal/discriminator/admin_test.go
+15 -15
View File
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ import (
)
const (
adminToken = "SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
// adminSecret is the SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN the tests set, and adminBearer
adminToken = "SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
// adminSecret is the SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN the tests set, and adminBearer
// how a request carries it.
adminSecret = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
adminBearer = "Bearer " + adminSecret
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
for _, authorization := range []string{adminBearer, bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
s.adminRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusNotFound)
s.ownEndpointRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusNotFound)
}
}
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheAdminToken(t *testing.T) {
for _, authorization := range []string{
"", bearer, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(adminSecret), "Basic " + adminSecret,
} {
got := s.adminRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
got := s.ownEndpointRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
http.StatusUnauthorized)
if got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
t.Errorf("%s %s with %q was answered without WWW-Authenticate: Bearer",
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, discriminator.BansPath, banOtherClient,
http.StatusOK), want)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(expires) {
t.Errorf("the ban ends at %s, want %s", line.BanExpires, expires)
}
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
// limit of two a minute, and bans it.
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
// Asked about by its address in IPv6 form too.
for _, addr := range []string{otherClient, "::ffff:" + otherClient} {
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
})
for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
s.adminRequest("", e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusUnauthorized)
s.ownEndpointRequest("", e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusUnauthorized)
}
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
@@ -337,12 +337,12 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// adminEndpoint is a request to an endpoint SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN opens.
// adminEndpoint is a request to an endpoint SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN opens.
type adminEndpoint struct {
method, path, body string
}
// adminEndpoints returns a request to each endpoint SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN
// adminEndpoints returns a request to each endpoint SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN
// opens: listing the bans, banning otherClient for an hour, lifting the
// bans on otherClient, and asking about otherClient.
func adminEndpoints() []adminEndpoint {
@@ -356,16 +356,16 @@ func adminEndpoints() []adminEndpoint {
// admin sends a request with method for path, with body, to discriminator's own
// address, with the admin token, and checks that it is answered with status, its
// log line's action admin. It returns the answer.
// log line's action own_endpoint. It returns the answer.
func (s *sender) admin(method, path, body string, status int) answer {
s.t.Helper()
return s.adminRequest(adminBearer, method, path, body, status)
return s.ownEndpointRequest(adminBearer, method, path, body, status)
}
// adminRequest is admin with authorization as the request's Authorization header
// unless it is "".
func (s *sender) adminRequest(
// ownEndpointRequest is admin with authorization as the request's Authorization
// header unless it is "".
func (s *sender) ownEndpointRequest(
authorization, method, path, body string, status int,
) answer {
s.t.Helper()
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ func (s *sender) adminRequest(
line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
s.sent++
wantLine(s.t, line, status, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
wantLine(s.t, line, status, requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint)
return got
}
internal/discriminator/alerts_test.go
+11 -9
View File
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ import (
)
const (
alertWebhookURL = "SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertMaxPerHour = "SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
alertWebhookURL = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertMaxPerHour = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
// alertInstance is the instance every alert of these tests gives.
alertInstance = "fsn1app1/blog"
)
@@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ func TestBanForABrokenLimitRaisesABanAlertWithItsNotes(t *testing.T) {
start := clk.Now()
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
ban := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)[0]
// A request refused under the ban raises no other alert.
clk.advance(time.Minute)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantAlerts(t, queue, banAlert(alerts.EventBan, start, client, bans.Ban{
Netblock: netblock, Cause: bans.CauseLimit,
@@ -62,22 +62,24 @@ func TestAttackBanRaisesABanAlertThenAPermanentBanAlert(t *testing.T) {
// The probe bans the client for seven days, and its next request makes
// the ban permanent. The request after that changes nothing.
s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
attackBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)[0]
clk.advance(time.Minute)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
permanentBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)[0]
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
// Another client's probe after its first ban has run out without a
// request makes a permanent ban at once.
s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
clk.advance(7 * 24 * time.Hour)
s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
otherBans := server.Ledger.Bans(other)
internal/discriminator/anomaly_test.go
+13 -13
View File
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ import (
// The anomaly thresholds: the prefix of a scope followed by the end of a
// count.
const (
anomalyClient = "SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
anomalyNet = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_"
anomalyASN = "SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_"
anomalyTotal = "SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
anomalyWatch = "SWW_WATCH_"
anomalyClient = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
anomalyNet = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_"
anomalyASN = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_"
anomalyTotal = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
anomalyWatch = "SWW_WAF_WATCH_"
requestsPerMinute = "REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE"
requestsPerHour = "REQUESTS_PER_HOUR"
@@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ const (
// The other anomaly settings.
const (
anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
watchNets = "SWW_WATCH_NETS"
anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
watchNets = "SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS"
)
const (
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ func TestEachScopeAndWindowOverItsThresholdAlertsOncePerCooldown(t *testing.T) {
{anomalyASN, anomaly.ScopeASN, netip.Prefix{}, asnDE, map[string]any{"asn": asnDE}},
{anomalyTotal, anomaly.ScopeTotal, netip.Prefix{}, "the whole service", nil},
{
anomalyWatch, anomaly.ScopeWatch, netip.MustParsePrefix(clientsNet),
anomalyWatch, anomaly.ScopeWatchedNet, netip.MustParsePrefix(clientsNet),
"the named netblock office, " + clientsNet, map[string]any{"name": "office"},
},
} {
@@ -164,9 +164,9 @@ func TestEveryRequestIsCountedWhateverIsDoneWithIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
allowed = "192.0.2.7" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.10" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
denied = "192.0.2.20" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
allowed = "192.0.2.7" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.10" // in SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
denied = "192.0.2.20" // in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS
)
s, _, _, queue := startAppWithAlerts(t, readAndAnswer, map[string]string{
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ func TestEveryRequestIsCountedWhateverIsDoneWithIt(t *testing.T) {
{allowed, "/", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{exempt, "/", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{client, "/static/app.js", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{denied, "/", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
{denied, "/", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
} {
for range 3 {
s.request(sent.from, sent.path, sent.status, sent.action)
internal/discriminator/answertime_test.go
+49 -31
View File
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ import (
)
const (
// answerTimeLimit is the default of rproxy's SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS, the time
// answerTimeLimit is the default of rproxy's SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS, the time
// discriminator has to answer.
answerTimeLimit = 2 * time.Second
// defaultLookupWait is the default of SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT.
// defaultLookupWait is the default of SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT.
defaultLookupWait = 800 * time.Millisecond
// The header limits SPEC.md gives.
cookieLimit = 50
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ const (
// tooLarge is how discriminator refuses a request over the header limits.
tooLarge = http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge
// silentAbuseIPDBURL is where AbuseIPDB never answers: at the stand-in
// that unansweredGeoJSURL names too.
silentAbuseIPDBURL = "unanswered://abuseipdb/api/v2/check"
// that silentGeoJSURL names too.
silentAbuseIPDBURL = "silent://abuseipdb/api/v2/check"
// wholeLimit is the percentage of a rate limit that lowers it not at all.
wholeLimit = 100
// clientsDecision is the CrowdSec decision list holding client alone.
@@ -84,13 +84,25 @@ func TestSixteenThousandCookiesAreRefusedWellWithinTheTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
if line.DurationWAF != nil {
t.Errorf("the Core Rule Set read the request, for %f ms", *line.DurationWAF)
if line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS != nil {
t.Errorf("the Core Rule Set read the request, for %f ms", *line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS)
}
}
func TestHeaderLimitRefusalNamesItsHeuristicCountsAndLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startDiscriminator(t, "", nil)
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
fillHeaders(req, headerFieldLimit+1)
do(t, req)
wantHeuristic(t, s.out.requestLine(t), "header_limits",
`{"fields": 101, "fields_limit": 100, "cookies": 0, "cookies_limit": 50}`)
}
func TestEachHeaderLimitRefusesARequestOverIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -145,7 +157,7 @@ func TestEachHeaderLimitRefusesARequestOverIt(t *testing.T) {
if tc.refused {
wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
return
}
@@ -153,7 +165,7 @@ func TestEachHeaderLimitRefusesARequestOverIt(t *testing.T) {
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if line.DurationWAF == nil {
if line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS == nil {
t.Error("the Core Rule Set did not read a request within the limits")
}
})
@@ -166,7 +178,7 @@ func TestHeaderLimitsHoldWhateverTheCoreRuleSetSettingsSay(t *testing.T) {
for _, env := range []map[string]string{
{wafMode: off},
{wafMode: "detect"},
{wafMode: block, "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS": "/"},
{wafMode: block, "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS": "/"},
} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprint(env), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -207,9 +219,10 @@ func TestObserveModeAllowsARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsUnread(t *testing.T) {
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
if line.WouldAction != requestlog.ActionTooLarge || line.DurationWAF != nil {
t.Errorf("would_action %q and duration_waf %v, want %q and none",
line.WouldAction, line.DurationWAF, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
if line.WouldAction != requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge ||
line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS != nil {
t.Errorf("would_action %q and duration_core_rule_set_ms %v, want %q and none",
line.WouldAction, line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
}
}
@@ -228,7 +241,7 @@ func TestRequestsOverTheHeaderLimitsCountTowardTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
wantDisposition(t, ask(), http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
}
func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeAfterTheTrapPathsAndTheRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
@@ -237,8 +250,8 @@ func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeAfterTheTrapPathsAndTheRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, path, action string
}{
{"a trap path", "/wp-login.php", requestlog.ActionBanned},
{"a block rule", "/blocked", requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked},
{"a trap path", "/wp-login.php", requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned},
{"a block rule", "/blocked", requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -268,10 +281,10 @@ func TestNotWaitingForGeoJSNeverLowersAClientsLimit(t *testing.T) {
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
if line.LimitPercent != nil {
t.Errorf("limit percentage %d, want none", *line.LimitPercent)
if line.RateLimitPercent != nil {
t.Errorf("limit percentage %d, want none", *line.RateLimitPercent)
}
// The client is under no ban, and GeoJS places it in a country.
@@ -292,7 +305,8 @@ func TestAClientGeoJSPlacedInNoCountryCountsAsUnknownWithoutWaiting(t *testing.T
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
}
func TestObserveModeWaitsForGeoJSForARequestOverTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
@@ -323,10 +337,10 @@ func newDiscriminatorInBubble(
) (*discriminator.Server, *output) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{deniedCountries: "KP"}
settings := map[string]string{tagDeny: "country=KP"}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now, settings)
server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now, settings)
return server, out
}
@@ -399,34 +413,38 @@ func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
action string
}{
{
name: "SWW_DENY_NETS", env: map[string]string{denyNets: client},
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
name: "SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS", env: map[string]string{denyNets: client},
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
},
{
name: "a ban",
prepare: banClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
prepare: banClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
},
{
name: "the rate limits", env: map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"},
prepare: countClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
prepare: countClient, status: forbidden,
action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
},
{
name: "the rate limits, with a biased threshold",
env: map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1", unknownLimitPercent: "50"},
prepare: countClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
prepare: countClient, status: forbidden,
action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
},
{
name: "a blocklist", env: map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL},
prepare: listClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
prepare: listClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
},
{
name: "the CrowdSec decision list",
env: map[string]string{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey},
prepare: decideOnClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
prepare: decideOnClient, status: forbidden,
action: requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
},
{
name: "the header limits", cookie: cookies(cookieLimit + 1),
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: tooLarge, action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: tooLarge,
action: requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -530,7 +548,7 @@ func TestDiscriminatorAnswersWithinTheTimeLimitWhileEveryOutsideSourceHangs(
return discriminator.New(params)
}, held, time.Now, map[string]string{
deniedCountries: "KP", wafMode: block,
tagDeny: "country=KP", wafMode: block,
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: resolver.LocalAddr().String(),
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey,
blocklistURLs: held + "/drop.txt", asnLimitPercentURL: held + "/asn.txt",
internal/discriminator/bans.go
+53 -93
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic active_ban, and the code that makes bans, which several
// heuristics share. active_ban reads SWW_WAF_MODE; the bans are the ban ledger's.
import (
"net/http"
"context"
"net/netip"
"time"
@@ -12,17 +15,21 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// banResponse is a refusal answered with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, and logged
// banResponse is a refusal answered with SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and logged
// with action.
func (rq *request) banResponse(action string) *refusal {
return &refusal{status: rq.h.config.BanResponse, action: action}
}
// banned reports whether a ban on a netblock the client is in covers the
// request at now, and notes for the log line when that ban ends. A
// request that makes the ban permanent, or in observe mode would have,
// raises the alert for it.
func (rq *request) banned(now time.Time) bool {
// activeBan refuses a client a ban covers: a ban on a netblock the client is
// in, in force at now. It notes for the log line when that ban ends. A request
// that makes the ban permanent, or in observe mode would have, raises the alert
// for it. Its figures are the ban's netblock and when it ends.
type activeBan struct{}
func (activeBan) name() string { return "active_ban" }
func (activeBan) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
check := rq.h.ledger.Check
if rq.h.config.Observe {
check = rq.h.ledger.Find // the ban refuses nothing, and stays as it is
@@ -38,90 +45,39 @@ func (rq *request) banned(now time.Time) bool {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
return banned
}
// limitBroken counts the request for the rate limits at now, notes the
// client's counts for the log line, and reports whether the request takes
// the client over a rate limit, as its limit percentage lowers it, which
// breaks it.
func (rq *request) limitBroken(now time.Time) bool {
counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
rq.limitPercent.percent)
rq.line.Counts = counts
if over {
rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.h.config.BanResponse)
if !banned {
return nil
}
return over
}
// countBytes counts the request's bytes, as countedBytes gives them, for
// the byte limits, once its report has come, and notes the client's byte totals
// for the log line; its requests stay there as the rate limits counted them.
// Only an allowed request has them counted, and only one the rate limits
// counted; in observe mode, not one that enforce mode would have refused. Bytes
// that take the client over a byte limit, as its limit percentage for the byte
// limits lowers it, break it; the response was passed on whole.
func (rq *request) countBytes() {
if !rq.counted || rq.line.WouldAction != "" {
return
}
now := rq.h.now()
counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountBytes(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
rq.countedBytes(), rq.bytesPercent.percent)
rq.line.Counts.MinuteBytes = counts.MinuteBytes
rq.line.Counts.HourBytes = counts.HourBytes
rq.line.Counts.DayBytes = counts.DayBytes
if over {
rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.out.status)
return &verdict{
action: banAction(ban.Permanent()),
figures: map[string]any{
figureNetblock: ban.Netblock.String(), "ban_expires": rq.line.BanExpires,
},
}
}
// countRefusal counts the request for the error burst once it has been
// answered, if discriminator refused it after a rule file match, a trap path or a
// Core Rule Set match, and in observe mode if enforce mode would have: more than
// SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD such refusals of the client within a minute
// break a limit. A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, which the checks skip, is
// not counted, and nothing is while the threshold is off.
func (rq *request) countRefusal() {
cfg := rq.h.config
if cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold == 0 {
return
// banAction is the action of a request refused under a ban or for making one:
// permanent says the ban never runs out.
func banAction(permanent bool) string {
if permanent {
return requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned
}
if !rq.attack && !rq.ruleBlocked && !rq.wafBlocked {
return
return requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned
}
// limitFigures are the figures of a heuristic that broke hit, a limit: its
// window, the count and the limit.
func limitFigures(hit ratelimit.Hit) map[string]any {
return map[string]any{
figureWindow: hit.Window, figureCount: hit.Count, figureLimit: hit.Limit,
}
now := rq.h.now()
hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountRefusal(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold)
if !over {
return
}
// What the client was sent, or in observe mode would have been.
status := rq.out.status
switch rq.line.WouldAction {
case requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
status = http.StatusForbidden
case requestlog.ActionBanned:
status = cfg.BanResponse
}
rq.banForLimit(now, hit, status)
}
// countedBytes returns the request's bytes, once it has ended, as the
// byte limits and the anomaly thresholds count them: the response's body
// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWW_BYTES_COUNT says.
// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT says.
func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
response, request := rq.out.bytes, rq.requestBytes
@@ -138,7 +94,7 @@ func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
// banForLimit bans the client's netblock at now for a broken limit, the
// one hit names, notes the offence for the log line and counts the hit in
// the metrics. status is what the client was sent, or is sent:
// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over a rate limit, what the report says for
// SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over a rate limit, what the report says for
// one whose bytes broke a byte limit, the refusal for one that broke the
// error burst. The ban's notes give the client's limit percentage for a
// rate limit or a byte limit; the error burst is not lowered. The ban sets
@@ -150,7 +106,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
case ratelimit.KindBytes:
rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window + "_bytes" // as counts names the byte totals
case ratelimit.KindRefusals:
rq.line.LimitHit = requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst
rq.line.LimitHit = requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals
default:
rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window
}
@@ -178,9 +134,9 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
switch hit.Kind {
case ratelimit.KindRequests:
notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.rateLimitPercent.logged()
case ratelimit.KindBytes:
notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.bytesLimitPercent.logged()
}
if rq.h.config.Observe {
@@ -205,11 +161,11 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
// attack, which notes name: the ban rule that matched, or the trap path
// asked for. It fills in the rest of the notes. In observe mode it makes
// no ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that
// alert would be sent.
func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
// alert would be sent. It returns the action for that ban.
func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) string {
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseAttack) {
return
return banAction(rq.h.ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, now, bans.CauseAttack))
}
notes.ASN = rq.line.ASN
@@ -225,7 +181,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
return
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
}
ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, now, notes)
@@ -234,16 +190,18 @@ func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
if made {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
}
// banForCrowdSec bans the client's netblock at now until decision,
// CrowdSec's decision on the client, ends. In observe mode it makes no
// ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that alert
// would be sent.
func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
// would be sent. It returns the action for that ban.
func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) string {
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
return
return banAction(rq.h.ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec))
}
notes := bans.Notes{
@@ -262,7 +220,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
return
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
}
ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, now, decision.Expires,
@@ -272,12 +230,14 @@ func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
if made {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
}
// wouldAlertBan reports whether the alert for a ban on netblock for cause
// made at now would be sent. In observe mode the ban the request would
// have made is worked out only then, at most once per
// SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN and never with no webhook set: its notes count the
// SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN and never with no webhook set: its notes count the
// netblock's requests, which can mean going through every client.
func (rq *request) wouldAlertBan(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause string,
@@ -343,7 +303,7 @@ func (rq *request) netblockRequests(netblock netip.Prefix) int64 {
}
// netblock is the netblock a ban on client covers: its IPv4 address,
// widened to SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX, or the IPv6 group clientGroup
// widened to SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX, or the IPv6 group clientGroup
// counts it in.
func (h *handler) netblock(client netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
addr := client.Unmap()
internal/discriminator/bans_test.go
+55 -37
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ const (
userAgent = "ban-test/1.0"
// permanent is the log line's ban_expires for a permanent ban.
permanent = "permanent"
// banResponseClose is the SWW_BAN_RESPONSE that closes the connection.
// banResponseClose is the SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE that closes the connection.
banResponseClose = "close"
)
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func TestBrokenLimitBansTheClient(t *testing.T) {
// client for an hour, the default.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit ||
line.BanExpires != expires {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, offence %q and ban_expires %q, "+
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func TestBrokenLimitBansTheClient(t *testing.T) {
// Every request while the ban lasts is refused.
clk.advance(time.Hour - time.Second)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.BanExpires != expires || line.Offence != "" || line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, offence %q and limit_hit %q, "+
"want %s and neither of the others", line.BanExpires, line.Offence,
@@ -78,7 +78,9 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
breakLimit := func() string {
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
return s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited).BanExpires
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
return line.BanExpires
}
wantExpires := func(got string, length time.Duration) {
t.Helper()
@@ -89,19 +91,19 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// A first ban lasts SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION; one within
// SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW after it ended, three times as long.
// A first ban lasts SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION; one within
// SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW after it ended, three times as long.
wantExpires(breakLimit(), 10*time.Minute)
clk.advance(10*time.Minute + time.Hour)
wantExpires(breakLimit(), 30*time.Minute)
// Later than that, SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION again.
// Later than that, SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION again.
clk.advance(30*time.Minute + time.Hour + time.Second)
wantExpires(breakLimit(), 10*time.Minute)
clk.advance(10 * time.Minute)
wantExpires(breakLimit(), 30*time.Minute)
// 90 minutes would be longer than SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION: the ban is
// 90 minutes would be longer than SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION: the ban is
// permanent.
clk.advance(30 * time.Minute)
@@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
}
clk.advance(365 * 24 * time.Hour)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
}
func TestBanIsNotCountedAndResetsTheCounters(t *testing.T) {
@@ -123,10 +125,10 @@ func TestBanIsNotCountedAndResetsTheCounters(t *testing.T) {
// client for an hour.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
for range 3 {
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
// Later the same day the client has its whole allowance again: the
@@ -135,7 +137,7 @@ func TestBanIsNotCountedAndResetsTheCounters(t *testing.T) {
clk.advance(time.Hour)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
banned := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
if len(banned) != 2 || banned[0].Notes.Refused != 3 {
@@ -148,8 +150,8 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
// In the IPv4 cases, client breaks the limit; these two are next to it.
const (
allowed = "203.0.113.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "203.0.113.50" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
allowed = "203.0.113.60" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "203.0.113.50" // in SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
)
for _, tc := range []struct {
@@ -164,7 +166,7 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
nil, []string{otherClient, exempt},
},
{
"the IPv4 netblock SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX sets",
"the IPv4 netblock SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX sets",
map[string]string{banScopeV4Prefix: "24"}, client,
[]string{otherClient, exempt}, []string{"203.0.112.9", allowed},
},
@@ -173,7 +175,7 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
[]string{"2001:db8:5::ffff:1"}, []string{"2001:db8:5:1::1"},
},
{
"the IPv6 netblock SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets",
"the IPv6 netblock SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets",
map[string]string{ipv6GroupPrefix: "48"}, "2001:db8:7::1",
[]string{"2001:db8:7:ffff::1"}, []string{"2001:db8:8::1"},
},
@@ -190,10 +192,10 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", env)
s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
for _, sent := range tc.refused {
s.get(sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
for _, sent := range tc.let {
@@ -211,14 +213,14 @@ func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
// fromDE's ban covers otherClient, which is refused unasked about.
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.Country != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has country %q, want none", line.Country)
}
@@ -228,13 +230,29 @@ func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRefusalUnderABanNamesItsHeuristicNetblockAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: "1", banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
})
expires := requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour))
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "active_ban",
`{"netblock": "`+clientsNet+`", "ban_expires": "`+expires+`"}`)
}
func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS
for _, tc := range []struct {
setting string // "" leaves SWW_BAN_RESPONSE at its default
setting string // "" leaves SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE at its default
status int // 0 is the connection closed without an answer
}{
{"", http.StatusForbidden},
@@ -250,7 +268,7 @@ func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
}
if tc.setting != "" {
@@ -259,11 +277,11 @@ func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, env)
s.get(denied, tc.status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
s.get(fromKP, tc.status, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
s.get(denied, tc.status, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
s.get(fromKP, tc.status, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
})
}
}
@@ -275,15 +293,15 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
start := clk.Now()
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.request(fromDE, "/repo/commits?page=2",
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32")
want := bans.Ban{
@@ -326,7 +344,7 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
// The next ban counts this one among the earlier.
clk.advance(time.Hour)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
got = ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 2 || got[1].Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
@@ -344,12 +362,12 @@ func TestMaxBansDropsTheBanOfTheNetblockSeenLongestAgo(t *testing.T) {
// One ban is held, so otherClient's ban drops client's.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
// clock is the time a test sets, by which sww counts requests and
@@ -397,7 +415,7 @@ func startWithClock(
// sender sends requests to rproxy one after another, each on a connection of its
// own, and checks each one's answer and log line. discriminatorAddr is where
// discriminator's own endpoints are, which adminRequest asks. Every request
// discriminator's own endpoints are, which ownEndpointRequest asks. Every request
// discriminator gets must come through the sender, since the log lines are
// matched to them in order.
type sender struct {
internal/discriminator/biased.go
+43 -32
View File
@@ -17,74 +17,85 @@ type percentage struct {
}
// biasedThresholdsSet reports whether a biased threshold can lower a
// client's limits: one of its lists is not empty,
// SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is below 100, or SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL
// is set. The client's lookup is then needed before its request goes on.
// client's limits by its lookup: SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT or
// SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT is not empty, SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is
// below 100, or SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL is set. The client's lookup is
// then needed before its request goes on.
func biasedThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
return len(cfg.ASNLimitPercent) > 0 || len(cfg.CountryLimitPercent) > 0 ||
len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) > 0 || len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) > 0 ||
return len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) > 0 || len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) > 0 ||
cfg.UnknownLimitPercent < whole || cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL != ""
}
// limitPercentages returns the client's limit percentages, for the rate
// limits and for the byte limits, by its AS number and country as looked
// up, each "" when unknown, and the blocklists, DNSBL zones and AbuseIPDB
// that list it. Each is the lowest of those the settings give it, the
// first of them in the order below when several are lowest: the
// percentage SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its AS number, the one the file
// SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names gives it, the one
// SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its country, for a client without a
// country, unless its request skipped the wait for GeoJS,
// SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist lists, the
// percentage of SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and for a client
// a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is a hit, the
// percentage of SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For the byte
// limits, SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT take the
// place of the first three for an AS number or a country they list.
// limits and for the byte limits, by its tags, its AS number and country
// as looked up, each "" when unknown, and the blocklists, DNSBL zones and
// AbuseIPDB that list it. Each is the lowest of those the settings give
// it, the first of them in the order below when several are lowest: the
// percentage SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its asn= tag, the one the file
// SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names gives its AS number, the one
// SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its country= tag, the lowest it gives its
// other tags, for a client without a country, unless its request skipped
// the wait for GeoJS, SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist
// lists, the percentage of SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and
// for a client a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is
// a hit, the percentage of SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For
// the byte limits, SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT
// take the place of the first three for an AS number or a country they
// list.
func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
cfg := rq.h.config
asn, country := rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country
unknown := percentage{percent: whole}
if country == "" && !rq.skippedLookupWait {
unknown = percentage{cfg.UnknownLimitPercent, "SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"}
unknown = percentage{cfg.UnknownLimitPercent, "SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"}
}
fetched := percentage{percent: whole}
if percent, listed := rq.h.lists.ASNLimitPercent(asn); listed {
fetched = percentage{percent, "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"}
fetched = percentage{percent, "SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"}
}
blocklisted := percentage{percent: whole}
if rq.blocklisted && cfg.BlocklistAction == "limit" {
blocklisted = percentage{cfg.BlocklistLimitPercent, "SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"}
blocklisted = percentage{cfg.BlocklistLimitPercent, "SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"}
}
reputationListed := percentage{percent: whole}
if (rq.dnsblListed || rq.abuseIPDBHit) && cfg.ReputationAction == "limit" {
reputationListed = percentage{cfg.ReputationLimitPercent, "SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION"}
reputationListed = percentage{cfg.ReputationLimitPercent, "SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION"}
}
asnRequests := lowest(given(cfg.ASNLimitPercent, asn, "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"),
fetched)
countryRequests := given(cfg.CountryLimitPercent, country,
"SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT")
const tagSetting = "SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnRequests := lowest(given(cfg.TagLimitPercent, asnTag(asn), tagSetting), fetched)
countryRequests := given(cfg.TagLimitPercent, countryTag(country), tagSetting)
otherTags := percentage{percent: whole}
for _, tag := range rq.line.Tags {
if tag != asnTag(asn) && tag != countryTag(country) {
otherTags = lowest(otherTags, given(cfg.TagLimitPercent, tag, tagSetting))
}
}
asnBytes, countryBytes := asnRequests, countryRequests
if _, listed := cfg.ASNBytesPercent[asn]; listed {
asnBytes = given(cfg.ASNBytesPercent, asn, "SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT")
asnBytes = given(cfg.ASNBytesPercent, asn, "SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT")
}
if _, listed := cfg.CountryBytesPercent[country]; listed {
countryBytes = given(cfg.CountryBytesPercent, country, "SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT")
countryBytes = given(cfg.CountryBytesPercent, country,
"SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT")
}
return lowest(asnRequests, countryRequests, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed),
lowest(asnBytes, countryBytes, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed)
return lowest(asnRequests, countryRequests, otherTags, unknown, blocklisted,
reputationListed),
lowest(asnBytes, countryBytes, otherTags, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed)
}
// given returns the percentage percents, the setting named setting, gives
// code, an AS number or a country, or whole when it does not list code.
// code, an AS number, a country or a tag, or whole when it does not list code.
func given(percents map[string]int64, code, setting string) percentage {
percent, listed := percents[code]
if !listed {
internal/discriminator/biased_test.go
+77 -59
View File
@@ -22,11 +22,10 @@ import (
// The biased thresholds.
const (
asnLimitPercent = "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
countryLimitPercent = "SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnBytesPercent = "SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
countryBytesPercent = "SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
unknownLimitPercent = "SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
tagLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnBytesPercent = "SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
countryBytesPercent = "SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
unknownLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
)
const (
@@ -35,6 +34,11 @@ const (
asnDEHalf = asnDE + ":50"
asnDEQuarter = asnDE + ":25"
countryDEHalf = "de:50"
// The same, as SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT names fromDE's tags.
asnTagDEHalf = "asn=64496:50"
asnTagDEQuarter = "asn=64496:25"
countryTagDEHalf = "country=DE:50"
countryTagDEQuarter = "country=DE:25"
// noCountry is in an AS of its own, AS64500, and in no country.
noCountry = "192.0.2.80"
// fourAMinute is the rate limit these tests set: half of it is 2
@@ -54,8 +58,8 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
setting, value, from string
}{
{asnLimitPercent, asnDEHalf, fromDE},
{countryLimitPercent, countryDEHalf, fromDE},
{tagLimitPercent, asnTagDEHalf, fromDE},
{tagLimitPercent, countryTagDEHalf, fromDE},
{unknownLimitPercent, "50", unplaced},
} {
t.Run(tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -72,17 +76,19 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
}{
{http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
} {
line := s.get(tc.from, sent.status, sent.action)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
"50 from "+tc.setting)
}
// fromKP, which no setting lists, has the whole limit.
for range 3 {
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
none)
}
})
@@ -96,8 +102,8 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheByteLimits(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
setting, value, from string
}{
{asnLimitPercent, asnDEHalf, fromDE},
{countryLimitPercent, "DE:50", fromDE},
{tagLimitPercent, asnTagDEHalf, fromDE},
{tagLimitPercent, "Country=de:50", fromDE},
{unknownLimitPercent, "50", unplaced},
{asnBytesPercent, "as64496:50", fromDE},
{countryBytesPercent, countryDEHalf, fromDE},
@@ -115,7 +121,8 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheByteLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want %s", line.LimitHit, minuteBytes)
}
wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
"50 from "+tc.setting)
// fromKP, which no setting lists, has the whole limit.
@@ -124,7 +131,8 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheByteLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("log line for %s has limit_hit %q, want none", fromKP, line.LimitHit)
}
wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting, none)
wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting, none)
})
}
}
@@ -135,9 +143,9 @@ func TestBytesPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(t *testing.T)
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
// limitPercent and bytesPercent are the log line's, as percentText
// gives them, and limitHit is its limit_hit.
limitPercent, bytesPercent, limitHit string
// rateLimitPercent and bytesLimitPercent are the log line's, as
// percentText gives them, and limitHit is its limit_hit.
rateLimitPercent, bytesLimitPercent, limitHit string
}{
{
"lowering the byte limits alone",
@@ -151,13 +159,13 @@ func TestBytesPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(t *testing.T)
},
{
"raising the byte limits back",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEHalf, asnBytesPercent: asnDE + ":100"},
"50 from " + asnLimitPercent, none, "",
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEHalf, asnBytesPercent: asnDE + ":100"},
"50 from " + tagLimitPercent, none, "",
},
{
"raising the byte limits back, by country",
map[string]string{countryLimitPercent: countryDEHalf, countryBytesPercent: "de:100"},
"50 from " + countryLimitPercent, none, "",
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: countryTagDEHalf, countryBytesPercent: "de:100"},
"50 from " + tagLimitPercent, none, "",
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -173,10 +181,12 @@ func TestBytesPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(t *testing.T)
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want %q", line.LimitHit, tc.limitHit)
}
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
tc.limitPercent)
wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
tc.bytesPercent)
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
tc.rateLimitPercent)
wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
tc.bytesLimitPercent)
})
}
}
@@ -184,19 +194,19 @@ func TestBytesPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(t *testing.T)
func TestZeroPercentIsAZeroAllowance(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDE + ":0"})
s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
// The first request breaks the limit, and bans the client; the log line
// gives the 0.
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
if line.fields["limit_percent"] != float64(0) ||
line.fields["limit_percent_setting"] != asnLimitPercent {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_percent %v from %v, want 0 from %s",
line.fields["limit_percent"], line.fields["limit_percent_setting"],
asnLimitPercent)
line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
if line.fields["rate_limit_percent"] != float64(0) ||
line.fields["rate_limit_percent_setting"] != unknownLimitPercent {
t.Errorf("log line has rate_limit_percent %v from %v, want 0 from %s",
line.fields["rate_limit_percent"], line.fields["rate_limit_percent_setting"],
unknownLimitPercent)
}
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
@@ -206,34 +216,34 @@ func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
name string
env map[string]string
from string
// want is the log line's limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
// want is the log line's rate_limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
want string
}{
{
"the country's",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEHalf, countryLimitPercent: "de:25"},
fromDE, "25 from " + countryLimitPercent,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEHalf + "," + countryTagDEQuarter},
fromDE, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
},
{
"the AS number's",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter, countryLimitPercent: countryDEHalf},
fromDE, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter + "," + countryTagDEHalf},
fromDE, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
},
{
"the AS number's, the first of two alike",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter, countryLimitPercent: "de:25"},
fromDE, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter + "," + countryTagDEQuarter},
fromDE, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
},
{
"that for a client without a country",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: "AS64500:50", unknownLimitPercent: "25"},
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: "asn=64500:50", unknownLimitPercent: "25"},
noCountry, "25 from " + unknownLimitPercent,
},
{
// SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is left at its default, 100.
// SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is left at its default, 100.
"the AS number's, for a client without a country",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: "AS64500:25"},
noCountry, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: "asn=64500:25"},
noCountry, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -246,8 +256,9 @@ func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
// A quarter of 4 requests a minute: the second breaks the limit.
s.get(tc.from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.get(tc.from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
line := s.get(tc.from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
tc.want)
})
}
@@ -265,7 +276,7 @@ func TestUnknownLimitPercentGivesEveryClientWithoutACountryItsPercentage(t *test
for _, from := range []string{unplaced, "10.0.0.8"} {
s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
}
// One in a country has the whole limit.
@@ -280,7 +291,7 @@ func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownLimitPercent(t *testing.T) {
// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
// Once the time the request waits for its answer is up, the client
@@ -289,8 +300,9 @@ func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownLimitPercent(t *testing.T) {
serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodGet, http.NoBody)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
"0 from "+unknownLimitPercent)
})
}
@@ -304,8 +316,12 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
setting, value string
waits bool
}{
{asnLimitPercent, asnDEHalf, true},
{countryLimitPercent, countryDEHalf, true},
{tagLimitPercent, asnTagDEHalf, true},
{tagLimitPercent, countryTagDEHalf, true},
{tagDeny, denyKP, true},
// A tag the lookup does not give needs no answer.
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn:50", false},
{tagDeny, "vpn", false},
{asnBytesPercent, asnDEHalf, true},
{countryBytesPercent, countryDEHalf, true},
{unknownLimitPercent, "99", true},
@@ -319,8 +335,10 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), tc.setting: tc.value})
server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList, tc.setting: tc.value,
})
began := time.Now()
serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodPost, strings.NewReader("ab"))
@@ -363,15 +381,15 @@ func TestBanForALoweredLimitGivesThePercentageInItsNotesAndItsAlert(t *testing.T
{
// A quarter of 12 requests a minute is 3: the fourth breaks it.
"a rate limit",
map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "12", asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter},
3, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
"requests per minute over the limit of 3", "25 from " + asnLimitPercent,
map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "12", tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter},
3, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
"requests per minute over the limit of 3", "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
},
{
// The byte limits' percentage, not the rate limits'.
"a byte limit",
map[string]string{
bytesLimitPerMinute: twoUploads, asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter,
bytesLimitPerMinute: twoUploads, tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter,
asnBytesPercent: asnDEHalf,
},
0, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
@@ -487,7 +505,7 @@ func wantPercent(t *testing.T, what string, percent *int64, setting, want string
}
// percentText gives a limit percentage and the setting that gave it as
// text, such as "50 from SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT", or none when both are
// text, such as "50 from SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT", or none when both are
// left out.
func percentText(percent *int64, setting string) string {
switch {
internal/discriminator/blocklists.go
+41
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic blocklists. It reads SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, and the blocklists
// through the reputation lists.
import (
"context"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// blocklists notes the blocklists that list the client, as noteListed does,
// and refuses the request when SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny. Being limit, it
// lowers the client's limits instead (see limitPercentages), and being log, it
// does nothing more. Its figure is the blocklists that list the client.
type blocklists struct{}
func (blocklists) name() string { return "blocklists" }
func (blocklists) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
listedBy := rq.h.lists.ListedBy(rq.client)
rq.blocklisted = len(listedBy) > 0
rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a blocklist")
if !rq.refusedByBlocklists(listedBy) {
return nil
}
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
figures: map[string]any{"lists": listedBy},
}
}
// refusedByBlocklists reports whether the heuristic blocklists refuses a
// client, given listedBy, the blocklists that list it: it does when one lists
// it and SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny.
func (rq *request) refusedByBlocklists(listedBy []string) bool {
return len(listedBy) > 0 && rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny
}
internal/discriminator/bytelimits.go
+41
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic byte_limits. It reads SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT, and the byte limits
// and biased thresholds through the limiter and limitPercentages.
import (
"context"
"time"
)
// byteLimits counts the request's bytes, as countedBytes gives them, for the
// byte limits, once its report has come, and notes the client's byte totals for
// the log line; its requests stay there as the rate limits counted them. Only
// an allowed request has them counted, and only one the rate limits counted; in
// observe mode, not one that enforce mode would have refused. Bytes that take
// the client over a byte limit, as its limit percentage for the byte limits
// lowers it, break it, which bans the client; the response was passed on whole.
// Its figures are the window, the count and the limit.
type byteLimits struct{}
func (byteLimits) name() string { return "byte_limits" }
func (byteLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
if !rq.counted || rq.line.WouldAction != "" {
return nil
}
counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountBytes(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
rq.countedBytes(), rq.bytesLimitPercent.percent)
rq.line.Counts.MinuteBytes = counts.MinuteBytes
rq.line.Counts.HourBytes = counts.HourBytes
rq.line.Counts.DayBytes = counts.DayBytes
if !over {
return nil
}
rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.out.status)
return &verdict{figures: limitFigures(hit)}
}
internal/discriminator/bytelimits_test.go
+29 -14
View File
@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ import (
// The byte limit settings.
const (
bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
bytesLimitPerHour = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
bytesLimitPerDay = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
bytesCount = "SWW_BYTES_COUNT"
bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
bytesLimitPerHour = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
bytesLimitPerDay = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
bytesCount = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT"
)
// The values of SWW_BYTES_COUNT.
// The values of SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT.
const (
countResponse = "response"
countRequest = "request"
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ const (
// byteLimit is the byte limit these tests set, as a setting: a request
// with a body and its answer, 100 bytes, go over it.
byteLimit = "99"
// minuteBytes is limit_hit for SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE.
// minuteBytes is limit_hit for SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE.
minuteBytes = "minute_bytes"
)
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func TestEachByteLimitBansOnceTheResponseHasEnded(t *testing.T) {
line.BanExpires, tc.window, expires)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{`+
`instance="`+alertInstance+`",kind="bytes",window="`+tc.window+`"}`, 1)
@@ -98,6 +98,21 @@ func TestEachByteLimitBansOnceTheResponseHasEnded(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestByteLimitBanNamesItsHeuristicWindowCountAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit})
line, _ := s.download()
wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t, line, "", "null")
// Two answers of 70 bytes are over the limit of 99.
line, _ = s.download()
wantHeuristic(t, line, "", "null")
wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t, line, "byte_limits",
`{"window": "minute", "count": 140, "limit": 99}`)
}
func TestResponseOverAByteLimitByItselfIsPassedOnWhole(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -110,7 +125,7 @@ func TestResponseOverAByteLimitByItselfIsPassedOnWhole(t *testing.T) {
len(got.body), got.err, line.LimitHit, answerBytes, minuteBytes)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestBytesOfAnAnswerThatBreaksOffAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
@@ -132,7 +147,7 @@ func TestBytesOfAnAnswerThatBreaksOffAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
answerBytes, minuteBytes, expires)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestWebSocketBytesAreCountedOnceItCloses(t *testing.T) {
@@ -161,7 +176,7 @@ func TestWebSocketBytesAreCountedOnceItCloses(t *testing.T) {
line.LimitHit, line.Counts.MinuteBytes, minuteBytes, tc.counted)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
})
}
}
@@ -203,7 +218,7 @@ func TestBytesCountSaysWhichBytesCount(t *testing.T) {
}
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
})
}
}
@@ -212,8 +227,8 @@ func TestByteLimitsLeaveOutWhatTheRateLimitsLeaveOut(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
allowed = "192.0.2.7" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.10" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
allowed = "192.0.2.7" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.10" // in SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
)
s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{
@@ -371,7 +386,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLeavesOutTheBytesOfARequestEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T)
// counted, and the byte limit is not broken. Its line gives the bytes
// counted before it.
line := s.upload()
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Counts.MinuteBytes != bodyBytes+answerBytes {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and minute_bytes %v, want minute and %d",
internal/discriminator/client.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ func scheme(r *http.Request, isQuestion bool) string {
// clientGroup is the client a request is counted toward: its IPv4
// address, or its IPv6 group, the netblock its IPv6 address is in of the
// length SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets, a /64 by default, since one abuser
// length SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets, a /64 by default, since one abuser
// usually holds a whole /64. An IPv4 address in IPv6 form counts as IPv4.
func (h *handler) clientGroup(addr netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
addr = addr.Unmap()
internal/discriminator/coreruleset.go
+42 -29
View File
@@ -1,26 +1,34 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic core_rule_set. It reads SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE,
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS and SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
import (
"context"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
)
// checkCoreRuleSet inspects the request with the Core Rule Set, unless
// SWW_WAF_MODE is off or SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS exempts its path, as
// pathExempt decides, and notes the rules it matched and its score in the
// log line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD is a match: it raises the waf_block alert,
// and in block mode refuses the request, which is an offence its client's
// history counts, and so returns ActionWAFBlocked. It returns "" for a
// request it does not refuse.
func (rq *request) checkCoreRuleSet() string {
// coreRuleSet inspects the request with the Core Rule Set, unless
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is off or SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS
// exempts its path, as pathExempt decides, and notes the rules it matched and
// its score in the log line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD is a match: it adds the tag
// exploitsignature, raises the core_rule_set_match alert, and in block mode
// refuses the request with 403, which is an offence its client's history
// counts. Its figures are the score and the threshold.
type coreRuleSet struct{}
func (coreRuleSet) name() string { return "core_rule_set" }
func (coreRuleSet) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
cfg := rq.h.config
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff || pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.WAFExemptPaths) {
return ""
return nil
}
start := time.Now()
@@ -30,36 +38,40 @@ func (rq *request) checkCoreRuleSet() string {
result, read, _ := rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(rq.in, rq.client, rq.in.Body)
rq.requestBytes = int64(len(read))
rq.line.DurationWAF = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(time.Since(start)))
rq.line.WAFRuleIDs = result.RuleIDs
rq.line.WAFScore = &result.Score
rq.line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(time.Since(start)))
rq.line.CoreRuleSetRuleIDs = result.RuleIDs
rq.line.CoreRuleSetScore = &result.Score
for _, id := range result.RuleIDs {
rq.h.metrics.WAFMatched(cfg.WAFMode, id)
rq.h.metrics.CoreRuleSetMatched(cfg.WAFMode, id)
}
threshold := cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold
if threshold == 0 || result.Score < threshold {
return ""
return nil
}
rq.alertWAFBlock(result)
rq.addTag(config.ExploitSignatureTag)
rq.alertCoreRuleSetMatch(result)
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect {
return ""
return nil
}
rq.wafBlocked = true
rq.blockedByCoreRuleSet = true
return requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet,
figures: map[string]any{figureScore: result.Score, "threshold": threshold},
}
}
// alertWAFBlock raises the waf_block alert for the request, which the Core
// Rule Set scored at result, at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD. Its
// detail gives the rule ids, the score, the method and the path with the
// query, and, for a request that is not refused for it, the mode: detect,
// or observe in observe mode.
func (rq *request) alertWAFBlock(result waf.Result) {
// alertCoreRuleSetMatch raises the core_rule_set_match alert for the request,
// which the Core Rule Set scored at result, at or over
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD. Its detail gives the rule ids, the
// score, the method and the path with the query, and, for a request that is
// not refused for it, the mode: detect, or observe in observe mode.
func (rq *request) alertCoreRuleSetMatch(result coreruleset.Result) {
detail := map[string]any{
"rule_ids": result.RuleIDs,
"score": result.Score,
@@ -75,14 +87,15 @@ func (rq *request) alertWAFBlock(result waf.Result) {
}
rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock,
Event: alerts.EventCoreRuleSetMatch,
Host: rq.site,
Client: rq.client,
Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country,
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over " +
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
})
}
internal/discriminator/coreruleset_test.go
+116 -61
View File
@@ -14,13 +14,13 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The Core Rule Set's settings the tests set, besides SWW_WAF_MODE, and
// The Core Rule Set's settings the tests set, besides SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE, and
// its two modes that inspect requests.
const (
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT"
block = "block"
detect = "detect"
)
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ const (
// formData is the type of a form's body.
const formData = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
// sizeLimit is SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies, 1K as a
// sizeLimit is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies, 1K as a
// setting.
const (
sizeLimit = 1 << 10
@@ -37,30 +37,72 @@ const (
// sqlInjection asks for / with an SQL injection in its query, which only
// the Core Rule Set's rule 942100 matches, with a score of 5, the default
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
const sqlInjection = "/?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"
// wantWAF checks the request log line's waf_rule_ids and waf_score, and
// that it has duration_waf, or with no score, that it has none of the
// three: the Core Rule Set did not inspect the request.
func wantWAF(t *testing.T, line logLine, score *int, ruleIDs ...int) {
// wantCoreRuleSet checks the request log line's core_rule_set_rule_ids and
// core_rule_set_score, and that it has duration_core_rule_set_ms, or with no
// score, that it has none of the three: the Core Rule Set did not inspect the
// request.
func wantCoreRuleSet(t *testing.T, line logLine, score *int, ruleIDs ...int) {
t.Helper()
if !slices.Equal(line.WAFRuleIDs, ruleIDs) {
t.Errorf("log line has waf_rule_ids %v, want %v", line.WAFRuleIDs, ruleIDs)
if !slices.Equal(line.CoreRuleSetRuleIDs, ruleIDs) {
t.Errorf("log line has core_rule_set_rule_ids %v, want %v",
line.CoreRuleSetRuleIDs, ruleIDs)
}
switch {
case score == nil && (line.WAFScore != nil || line.DurationWAF != nil):
t.Errorf("log line has waf_score %v and duration_waf %v, want neither",
line.fields["waf_score"], line.fields["duration_waf"])
case score != nil && (line.WAFScore == nil || *line.WAFScore != *score):
t.Errorf("log line has waf_score %v, want %d", line.fields["waf_score"], *score)
case score != nil && line.DurationWAF == nil:
t.Error("log line has no duration_waf")
case score == nil &&
(line.CoreRuleSetScore != nil || line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS != nil):
t.Errorf("log line has core_rule_set_score %v and "+
"duration_core_rule_set_ms %v, want neither",
line.fields["core_rule_set_score"], line.fields["duration_core_rule_set_ms"])
case score != nil &&
(line.CoreRuleSetScore == nil || *line.CoreRuleSetScore != *score):
t.Errorf("log line has core_rule_set_score %v, want %d",
line.fields["core_rule_set_score"], *score)
case score != nil && line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS == nil:
t.Error("log line has no duration_core_rule_set_ms")
}
}
func TestCoreRuleSetMatchAddsTheExploitSignatureTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
mode string
status int
action string
}{
{block, block, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet},
{detect, detect, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: tc.mode})
wantTags(t, s.request(client, sqlInjection, tc.status, tc.action),
"exploitsignature")
wantTags(t, s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
})
}
}
func TestDetectedAttackIsRefusedByTagDenyLast(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: detect, tagDeny: "exploitsignature",
})
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "exploitsignature"}`)
}
func TestCoreRuleSetRefusesAttacksInBlockModeAndOnlyLogsThemInDetectMode(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -97,19 +139,29 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusesAttacksInBlockModeAndOnlyLogsThemInDetectMode(t *test
mode, action string
status int
}{
{block, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, http.StatusForbidden},
{block, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet, http.StatusForbidden},
{detect, requestlog.ActionForward, http.StatusOK},
} {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: tc.mode})
line := s.requestWithHeader(client, attack.path, attack.header,
tc.status, tc.action)
wantWAF(t, line, &attack.score, attack.ruleIDs...)
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, &attack.score, attack.ruleIDs...)
}
})
}
}
func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalNamesItsHeuristicScoreAndThreshold(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "core_rule_set", `{"score": 5, "threshold": 5}`)
}
func TestOrdinaryRequestIsInspectedAndPassed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -117,7 +169,7 @@ func TestOrdinaryRequestIsInspectedAndPassed(t *testing.T) {
line := s.request(client, "/owner/repo/src/branch/main/README.md?display=source",
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(0))
}
func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
@@ -125,7 +177,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
) {
t.Parallel()
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block,
@@ -134,29 +186,29 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
})
// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, and a path SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS
// A client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS, and a path SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS
// exempts, are not inspected.
line := s.request(allowed, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)
line = s.request(client, "/api/v1/repos?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)
// The prefix is matched as rate limit exempt paths are: a path that
// goes up and out of it is inspected.
line = s.request(client, "/api/../?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, new(25), 930100, 930110, 942100)
requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(25), 930100, 930110, 942100)
// A request a rule file refuses is not inspected.
line = s.request(otherClient, "/blocked?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)
// With SWW_WAF_MODE off, no request is.
// With SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE off, no request is.
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: off})
line = s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)
}
func TestAnomalyThreshold(t *testing.T) {
@@ -170,13 +222,14 @@ func TestAnomalyThreshold(t *testing.T) {
})
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(5), 942100)
}
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafAnomalyThreshold: "5",
})
s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
}
func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
@@ -219,7 +272,7 @@ func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
line, _ := s.requestWithBody(request.method, client, request.path,
request.header, body, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(0))
// A list given replaces the default.
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
@@ -227,12 +280,12 @@ func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
})
score := 5 * len(request.ruleIDs)
line, _ = s.requestWithBody(request.method, client, request.path,
request.header, body, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, &score, request.ruleIDs...)
request.header, body, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, &score, request.ruleIDs...)
// And switches off the rules it lists.
line = s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(0))
})
}
}
@@ -248,14 +301,14 @@ func TestAttackInAFormBodyIsRefusedOnlyWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
line, _ := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(0))
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
})
line, _ = s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(5), 942100)
}
func TestBodiesReachTheAppAsSentWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
@@ -345,32 +398,33 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T)
})
for range 2 {
s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
}
// The third refusal in a minute breaks the error burst, and bans the
// client.
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst ||
requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals ||
line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want error_burst and limit",
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want minute_refusals and limit",
line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
want := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, WAFBlocked: 3}
want := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, BlockedByCoreRuleSet: 3}
if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, want)
}
metrics := s.scrape()
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`sww_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="block",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
`sww_core_rule_set_matches_total{instance="app",mode="block",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="waf_blocked"}`, 3)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="waf_blocked",`+
`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_core_rule_set"}`, 3)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="blocked_by_core_rule_set",`+
`instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 3)
}
@@ -394,9 +448,9 @@ func TestDetectModeMatchIsNoOffenceAndNotCountedTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T
metrics := s.scrape()
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`sww_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="detect",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
`sww_core_rule_set_matches_total{instance="app",mode="detect",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="waf_blocked"}`)
`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_core_rule_set"}`)
}
func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheCoreRuleSetWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -405,17 +459,17 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheCoreRuleSetWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block, mode: observe})
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(5), 942100)
// It is an offence as in enforce mode.
want := ratelimit.Offences{WAFBlocked: 1}
want := ratelimit.Offences{BlockedByCoreRuleSet: 1}
if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, want)
}
}
func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheCoreRuleSetMatchAlert(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
@@ -429,7 +483,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
}{
{
"block", map[string]string{wafMode: block},
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, "",
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet, "",
},
{
"detect", map[string]string{wafMode: detect},
@@ -464,12 +518,13 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
wantAlerts(t, queue, alerts.Alert{
Instance: alertInstance,
Time: clk.Now(),
Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock,
Event: alerts.EventCoreRuleSetMatch,
Host: appHost,
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(client),
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over " +
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
})
if queue.Suppressed() != 1 {
internal/discriminator/countries.go
+23 -9
View File
@@ -1,21 +1,35 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic countries. It reads SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
import (
"context"
"slices"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// countryDenied reports whether the country lists refuse the request, by
// the client's country as it was looked up. A client without a country,
// or whose country cannot be found, is refused only by
// SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
func (rq *request) countryDenied() bool {
denied := rq.h.config.DeniedCountries
// countries refuses a request when SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES is set and
// does not hold the client's country as it was looked up. A client without a
// country, or whose country cannot be found, is refused. Its figures are the
// country and the setting that refused it.
type countries struct{}
func (countries) name() string { return "countries" }
func (countries) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
allowed := rq.h.config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries
country := rq.line.Country
if slices.Contains(denied, country) {
return true
if len(allowed) == 0 || slices.Contains(allowed, country) {
return nil
}
return len(allowed) > 0 && !slices.Contains(allowed, country)
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
figures: map[string]any{
"country": country, "setting": "SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES",
},
}
}
internal/discriminator/countries_test.go
+26 -9
View File
@@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
env map[string]string
refused []string
}{
{"denied", map[string]string{deniedCountries: "kp"}, []string{fromKP}},
{
"exclusively allowed", map[string]string{allowedCountries: "DE"},
[]string{fromKP, unplaced},
},
{
"both", map[string]string{deniedCountries: "kp", allowedCountries: "de,fr"},
"with a country in SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY",
map[string]string{tagDeny: denyKP, allowedCountries: "de,fr"},
[]string{fromKP, unplaced},
},
} {
@@ -90,6 +90,23 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCountryRefusalNamesItsHeuristicCountryAndSetting(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h", allowedCountries: "de",
})
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "countries",
`{"country": "KP", "setting": "SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"}`)
line = s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "countries",
`{"country": "", "setting": "SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"}`)
}
func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -100,9 +117,9 @@ func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
})
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
deniedCountries: "kp",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
allowedCountries: "de",
})
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("a body"))
@@ -185,7 +202,7 @@ func TestPrivateAddressIsNeverLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
env map[string]string
}{
{"no setting needs the lookup", nil},
{"a country list is set", map[string]string{deniedCountries: "kp"}},
{"a tag setting needs it", map[string]string{tagDeny: denyKP}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -245,11 +262,11 @@ func TestExclusiveListRefusesAPrivateAddressUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) {
action string
}{
{
"not in SWW_ALLOW_NETS", "",
"not in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS", "",
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
},
{
"in SWW_ALLOW_NETS", "10.0.0.7,fd00::/8",
"in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS", "10.0.0.7,fd00::/8",
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
},
} {
@@ -279,7 +296,7 @@ func TestExclusiveListRefusesAPrivateAddressUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) {
// startGeoJS starts a stand-in for GeoJS, which places fromDE and fromKP,
// each in an AS of its own, and no other address. It returns its URL, and
// what returns the addresses it has been asked about. A test that needs
// the stand-in to be asked or to answer sets SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT to an
// the stand-in to be asked or to answer sets SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT to an
// hour, whether or not a request waits for the answer: on the default, a
// hold-up of the test process can abandon the request to the stand-in, and
// leave the client unknown.
internal/discriminator/crowdsec.go
+50
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic crowdsec. It reads SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL, and the decisions
// through the reputation lists.
import (
"context"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// crowdSec refuses a request when a decision of the CrowdSec decision list on
// the client is in force at now. It then adds the tag crowdsec, notes the
// list, as noteHit does, and bans the client until that decision ends. Its
// figures are the decision's scenario and when it ends.
type crowdSec struct{}
func (crowdSec) name() string { return "crowdsec" }
func (crowdSec) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
decision, listed := rq.crowdSecDecisionInForce(now)
if !listed {
return nil
}
rq.addTag(config.CrowdSecTag)
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: rq.h.config.CrowdSecDecisionsURL},
"listed by the CrowdSec decision list")
return &verdict{
action: rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision),
figures: map[string]any{
"scenario": decision.Scenario,
"expires": requestlog.FormatTime(decision.Expires),
},
}
}
// crowdSecDecisionInForce returns the decision of the CrowdSec decision list on
// the client that is in force at now, and reports whether there is one, which
// the heuristic crowdsec refuses the request for.
func (rq *request) crowdSecDecisionInForce(
now time.Time,
) (reputation.Decision, bool) {
return rq.h.lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
}
internal/discriminator/crowdsec_test.go
+24 -8
View File
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ import (
// test puts in the copy of its decision list, at decisionsURL, that it
// needs, as reputation.json would at start.
const (
crowdSecURL = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
crowdSecURL = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
lapi = "http://crowdsec.example:8080"
decisionsURL = lapi + "/v1/decisions"
bouncerKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testi
expires := requestlog.FormatTime(fetched.Add(4 * time.Hour))
// Its first request is refused, and bans it until the decision ends.
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
if line.BanExpires != expires {
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testi
// ban, and once it has ended the client is let through.
clk.advance(4*time.Hour - time.Second)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantReputation(t, line)
if line.BanExpires != expires {
@@ -95,6 +95,22 @@ func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testi
float64(fetched.Unix()))
}
func TestCrowdSecBanNamesItsHeuristicScenarioAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server, _ := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
})
loadDecisions(t, server, clk.Now(), `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "crowdsec", `{"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", `+
`"expires": "`+requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(4*time.Hour))+`"}`)
wantTags(t, line, "crowdsec")
}
func TestEndedCrowdSecDecisionNoLongerBansThoughTheCopyStillHoldsIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -113,9 +129,9 @@ func TestEndedCrowdSecDecisionNoLongerBansThoughTheCopyStillHoldsIt(t *testing.T
// Just before its end, the decision bans a client in the netblock, and
// one on an IPv6 address bans the address's group, the /64.
clk.advance(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
s.get("198.51.100.7", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get("2001:db8::9", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get("2001:db8::5", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get("198.51.100.7", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
s.get("2001:db8::9", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
s.get("2001:db8::5", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
// Once it has ended, it bans no other client, and the bans it made end
// with it.
@@ -148,7 +164,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsAndAlertsTheBan(
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
internal/discriminator/denynets.go
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic deny_nets. It reads SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS.
import (
"context"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// denyNets refuses a client in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS. Its figure is the netblock of
// the setting the client is in.
type denyNets struct{}
func (denyNets) name() string { return "deny_nets" }
func (denyNets) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
for _, netblock := range rq.h.config.DenyNets {
if netblock.Contains(rq.client) {
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
figures: map[string]any{figureNetblock: netblock.String()},
}
}
}
return nil
}
internal/discriminator/discriminator.go
+42 -75
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package discriminator
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ const (
// headers and body.
DispositionDeny = "deny"
// DispositionClose tells rproxy to close the visitor's connection
// without an answer, which SWW_BAN_RESPONSE asks for when it is close.
// without an answer, which SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE asks for when it is close.
// discriminator closing the question's connection instead would read as
// discriminator being down, and rproxy would then let the request through.
DispositionClose = "close"
@@ -52,13 +53,6 @@ const ReportPath = "/_sww/report"
// QuestionBodyMaxBytes is the most of a visitor's body a question carries.
const QuestionBodyMaxBytes = 64 << 10
// The header limits: the most cookies and header fields a request may have
// when the checks reach the Core Rule Set. Real clients never reach them.
const (
maxCookies = 50
maxHeaderFields = 100
)
const (
// maxAwaitingReport is the most answered requests held until their
// reports come. Past it, the request answered longest ago is dropped.
@@ -95,12 +89,12 @@ var (
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
type Report struct {
RequestID string `json:"request_id"`
Status int `json:"status"`
RequestBytes int64 `json:"request_bytes"`
ResponseBytes int64 `json:"response_bytes"`
DurationTotal float64 `json:"duration_total"`
DurationUpstreamTotal float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total"`
RequestID string `json:"request_id"`
Status int `json:"status"`
RequestBytes int64 `json:"request_bytes"`
ResponseBytes int64 `json:"response_bytes"`
DurationTotalMS float64 `json:"duration_total_ms"`
DurationUpstreamTotalMS float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total_ms"`
}
// New returns the server `sww discriminator` runs. It answers
@@ -129,6 +123,7 @@ func New(params Params) *Server {
Lists: h.lists,
DNSBL: h.dnsbl,
AbuseIPDB: h.abuseIPDB,
RouteWatch: h.routeWatch,
Metrics: h.metrics,
}
}
@@ -148,48 +143,20 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports whether the request is one that does not wait
// for GeoJS, since the checks will refuse it at now whatever GeoJS answers about
// its client: it is over the header limits, a blocklist lists its client while
// SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny, the CrowdSec decision list lists it, or it is
// over a whole rate limit. In observe mode, which refuses nothing, none is.
// rproxy lets a request through when discriminator answers too late.
// its client: the heuristic crowdsec, header_limits, blocklists or rate_limits
// will refuse it, as a function in that heuristic's file says. In observe mode,
// which refuses nothing, none is. rproxy lets a request through when
// discriminator answers too late.
func (rq *request) refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now time.Time) bool {
if rq.h.config.Observe {
return false
}
lists := rq.h.lists
_, decided := lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
_, decided := rq.crowdSecDecisionInForce(now)
return decided || rq.overHeaderLimits() ||
(rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny && len(lists.ListedBy(rq.client)) > 0) ||
(rq.countedByRateLimits() &&
rq.h.limiter.OverARateLimit(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now))
}
// overHeaderLimits reports whether discriminator refuses the request for its
// headers: it has more than maxHeaderFields fields, each value of a header sent
// twice being one, or more than maxCookies cookies, each part of a Cookie header
// between semicolons being one unless it is empty or only spaces and tabs. The
// Core Rule Set runs each of its rules on each cookie, so that thousands of small
// cookies keep it busy for over a second. It trims only spaces and control
// characters, of which a header value can hold only tabs, so a part of Unicode
// spaces is a cookie to it.
func (rq *request) overHeaderLimits() bool {
fields, cookies := 0, 0
for _, values := range rq.in.Header {
fields += len(values)
}
for _, value := range rq.in.Header.Values("Cookie") {
for part := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
if strings.Trim(part, " \t") != "" {
cookies++
}
}
}
return fields > maxHeaderFields || cookies > maxCookies
return decided || overHeaderLimits(rq.headerCounts()) ||
rq.refusedByBlocklists(rq.h.lists.ListedBy(rq.client)) ||
rq.overAWholeRateLimit(now)
}
// answerQuestion runs the checks on the visitor's request a question
@@ -216,22 +183,22 @@ func (h *handler) answerQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
rq.line.DiscriminatorLine = requestlog.DiscriminatorLineDecision
refused := rq.check(r.Context())
rq.checked = time.Now()
underOwnPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, adminPrefix)
underOwnPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, ownEndpointPrefix)
if refused == nil && !underOwnPrefix {
// In observe mode, what enforce mode would have refused counts here.
defer rq.countRefusal()
defer rq.runAfterAnswer(r.Context())
rq.allow()
return
}
// The last deferred runs first: countRefusal before addToHistory, so that a
// broken error burst is in the client's history.
// The last deferred runs first: runAfterAnswer before addToHistory, so that
// a broken refusal limit is in the client's history.
defer rq.addToHistory()
defer rq.countAnomalies()
defer rq.countRefusal()
defer rq.runAfterAnswer(r.Context())
if refused != nil {
rq.deny(*refused)
@@ -241,7 +208,7 @@ func (h *handler) answerQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// The app never sees this prefix. discriminator's own endpoints are at its
// own address, so this answers as a path with no endpoint does.
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
}
@@ -335,7 +302,7 @@ func asTheVisitorSentIt(r *http.Request, body []byte) *http.Request {
}
// allow answers a question with DispositionAllow and, while
// SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set, the client's AS number and country.
// SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set, the client's AS number and country.
func (rq *request) allow() {
rq.allowed = true
@@ -361,7 +328,7 @@ func (rq *request) deny(r refusal) {
rq.refused = &r
if r.status == 0 {
// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE is close. Written past rq.out, since the log line's
// SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE is close. Written past rq.out, since the log line's
// status stays 0: the visitor is sent nothing.
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionClose)
rq.out.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
@@ -413,7 +380,7 @@ func (h *handler) takeReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Remove reports true to one report only, of several that name the id. A
// question still being handled is held as nil.
if found && held != nil && h.awaitingReport.Remove(report.RequestID) {
h.finishWith(held, report)
h.finishWith(r.Context(), held, report)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
@@ -438,7 +405,7 @@ func readReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (Report, error) {
for _, name := range []string{
"request_id", "status", "request_bytes", "response_bytes",
"duration_total", "duration_upstream_total",
"duration_total_ms", "duration_upstream_total_ms",
} {
value, there := fields[name]
if !there || string(value) == "null" {
@@ -464,11 +431,11 @@ func (report *Report) checkRanges() error {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: request_bytes", errReportValue)
case report.ResponseBytes < 0 || report.ResponseBytes > maxReportedBytes:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: response_bytes", errReportValue)
case report.DurationTotal < 0 || report.DurationTotal > maxReportedMilliseconds:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_total", errReportValue)
case report.DurationUpstreamTotal < 0 ||
report.DurationUpstreamTotal > maxReportedMilliseconds:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_upstream_total", errReportValue)
case report.DurationTotalMS < 0 || report.DurationTotalMS > maxReportedMilliseconds:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_total_ms", errReportValue)
case report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS < 0 ||
report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS > maxReportedMilliseconds:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_upstream_total_ms", errReportValue)
}
return nil
@@ -476,11 +443,11 @@ func (report *Report) checkRanges() error {
// finishWith finishes a request with what its report says, and writes the
// request's last log line, which holds its decision's fields and the report's.
// For an allowed request it first counts the request's bytes, and adds it to its
// client's history, the anomaly counters and the metrics, with the status and
// bytes the report gives. A denied request's counting was finished at its
// decision.
func (h *handler) finishWith(held *decision, report Report) {
// For an allowed request it first runs the heuristics of onReport, and adds the
// request to its client's history, the anomaly counters and the metrics, with
// the status and bytes the report gives. A denied request's counting was
// finished at its decision. ctx is the report's own context.
func (h *handler) finishWith(ctx context.Context, held *decision, report Report) {
rq := &request{
decision: *held,
h: h,
@@ -492,18 +459,18 @@ func (h *handler) finishWith(held *decision, report Report) {
rq.line.Status = report.Status
rq.line.RequestBytes = report.RequestBytes
rq.line.ResponseBytes = report.ResponseBytes
rq.line.DurationTotal = report.DurationTotal
rq.line.DurationTotalMS = report.DurationTotalMS
if rq.allowed {
rq.line.DurationUpstreamTotal = &report.DurationUpstreamTotal
rq.line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS = &report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS
rq.countBytes()
rq.runBanningHeuristics(ctx, onReport())
rq.countAnomalies()
rq.addToHistory()
rq.h.metrics.RequestReported(&rq.line,
time.Duration(report.DurationTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)),
time.Duration(report.DurationUpstreamTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)))
time.Duration(report.DurationTotalMS*float64(time.Millisecond)),
time.Duration(report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS*float64(time.Millisecond)))
}
rq.writeLine()
internal/discriminator/discriminator_test.go
+38 -36
View File
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ const (
// reportBodyLimit is the longest body SPEC.md lets a report have.
reportBodyLimit = 1 << 20
// anomalyClientPerMinute is the anomaly threshold these tests set.
anomalyClientPerMinute = "SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE"
anomalyClientPerMinute = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE"
)
// The fields of a report, as "discriminator" in SPEC.md names them.
@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ const (
reportStatus = "status"
reportRequestBytes = "request_bytes"
reportResponseBytes = "response_bytes"
reportDuration = "duration_total"
reportUpstreamDuration = "duration_upstream_total"
reportDuration = "duration_total_ms"
reportUpstreamDuration = "duration_upstream_total_ms"
)
// Discriminator is a discriminator running for one test, on a clock set to midnight.
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ func (s *Discriminator) history() ratelimit.History {
}
// metrics returns what the metrics endpoint answers, for a server started with
// the token as SWW_METRICS_TOKEN.
// the token as SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN.
func (s *Discriminator) metrics() string {
s.t.Helper()
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ func TestReportNeverReachesAQuestionStillBeingHandled(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, asked, release := startHeldGeoJS(t)
s := startDiscriminator(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h", deniedCountries: "kp", bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit,
lookupTimeout: "1h", tagDeny: denyKP, bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit,
})
first := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ func TestQuestionDeniedGetsTheBanResponse(t *testing.T) {
got := s.ask(client, "/")
wantDisposition(t, got, status, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
wantBody(t, got, http.StatusText(status)+"\n")
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), status, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
})
}
}
@@ -655,8 +655,8 @@ func TestBanResponseCloseIsAnAnswerOfItsOwn(t *testing.T) {
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionClose)
wantBody(t, got, "")
// The visitor is sent nothing.
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), 0, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantMetric(t, s.metrics(), `sww_requests_total{action="denied",instance="`+
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), 0, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantMetric(t, s.metrics(), `sww_requests_total{action="client_denied",instance="`+
alertInstance+`",status_class="none"}`, 1)
}
@@ -671,12 +671,12 @@ func TestBlockRuleIsDeniedWith403AndABanRuleWithTheBanResponse(t *testing.T) {
got := s.ask(client, "/blocked")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
got = s.ask(client, "/.env")
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusTooManyRequests, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLines(t, 2)[1], http.StatusTooManyRequests,
requestlog.ActionBanned)
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestQuestionUnderTheOwnPrefixIsDeniedWith404AfterTheChecks(t *testing.T) {
@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ func TestQuestionUnderTheOwnPrefixIsDeniedWith404AfterTheChecks(t *testing.T) {
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusNotFound, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
}
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint)
got := s.ask(otherClient, discriminator.MetricsPath)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ func TestObserveModeAllowsAndLogsWhatEnforceModeWouldHaveDone(t *testing.T) {
line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
}
func TestObserveModeRefusalAnsweredAllowCountsForTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
@@ -725,9 +725,9 @@ func TestObserveModeRefusalAnsweredAllowCountsForTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
}
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
if lines[0].LimitHit != "" || lines[1].LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst {
if lines[0].LimitHit != "" || lines[1].LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals {
t.Errorf("log lines have limit_hit %q and %q, want none and %q",
lines[0].LimitHit, lines[1].LimitHit, requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst)
lines[0].LimitHit, lines[1].LimitHit, requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals)
}
}
@@ -744,9 +744,9 @@ func TestDeniedQuestionCountsForTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
}
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
if lines[0].LimitHit != "" || lines[1].LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst {
if lines[0].LimitHit != "" || lines[1].LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals {
t.Errorf("log lines have limit_hit %q and %q, want none and %q",
lines[0].LimitHit, lines[1].LimitHit, requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst)
lines[0].LimitHit, lines[1].LimitHit, requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals)
}
}
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ func TestAllowCarriesTheLookupHeadersWhileTheSettingIsSet(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startDiscriminator(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
addLookupHeaders: tc.setting, lookupTimeout: "1h", deniedCountries: "kp",
addLookupHeaders: tc.setting, lookupTimeout: "1h", tagDeny: denyKP,
})
got := s.ask(fromDE, "/")
@@ -894,14 +894,14 @@ func TestDeniedRequestIsFinishedAtItsDecision(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("history is %+v, want the refused request alone", history)
}
const series = `sww_requests_total{action="rate_limited",instance="` +
const series = `sww_requests_total{action="client_is_rate_limited",instance="` +
alertInstance + `",status_class="4xx"}`
wantMetric(t, s.metrics(), series, 1)
got := s.report(discriminator.Report{
RequestID: denied.Header.Get(requestIDHeader), Status: http.StatusForbidden,
ResponseBytes: 1000, DurationTotal: 2,
ResponseBytes: 1000, DurationTotalMS: 2,
})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountAnAllowedRequestFromItsReport(t *testing.T) {
got := s.report(discriminator.Report{
RequestID: id, Status: http.StatusBadGateway,
RequestBytes: bodyBytes, ResponseBytes: answerBytes,
DurationTotal: 5, DurationUpstreamTotal: 4,
DurationTotalMS: 5, DurationUpstreamTotalMS: 4,
})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
@@ -951,7 +951,8 @@ func TestMetricsCountAnAllowedRequestFromItsReport(t *testing.T) {
unscraped := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
got = unscraped.report(discriminator.Report{
RequestID: unscraped.allowed(client), Status: http.StatusBadGateway, DurationTotal: 5,
RequestID: unscraped.allowed(client), Status: http.StatusBadGateway,
DurationTotalMS: 5,
})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
wantMetric(t, unscraped.metrics(),
@@ -1189,8 +1190,8 @@ func wantReportsFields(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
if line.DiscriminatorLine != requestlog.DiscriminatorLineReport ||
line.Status != http.StatusCreated ||
line.RequestBytes != bodyBytes || line.ResponseBytes != answerBytes ||
line.DurationTotal != 12.5 || line.DurationUpstreamTotal == nil ||
*line.DurationUpstreamTotal != 10.25 {
line.DurationTotalMS != 12.5 || line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS == nil ||
*line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS != 10.25 {
t.Errorf("the report's line lacks the report's fields: %+v", line.Line)
}
}
@@ -1205,8 +1206,8 @@ func wantSameDecision(t *testing.T, reported, decided logLine) {
same.Status = decided.Status
same.RequestBytes = decided.RequestBytes
same.ResponseBytes = decided.ResponseBytes
same.DurationTotal = decided.DurationTotal
same.DurationUpstreamTotal = decided.DurationUpstreamTotal
same.DurationTotalMS = decided.DurationTotalMS
same.DurationUpstreamTotalMS = decided.DurationUpstreamTotalMS
same.Counts.MinuteBytes = decided.Counts.MinuteBytes
same.Counts.HourBytes = decided.Counts.HourBytes
same.Counts.DayBytes = decided.Counts.DayBytes
@@ -1224,7 +1225,7 @@ func wantDecisionsFields(t *testing.T, line logLine, id, query, accept string) {
if line.DiscriminatorLine != requestlog.DiscriminatorLineDecision ||
line.Status != http.StatusOK || line.ResponseBytes != 0 ||
line.DurationUpstreamTotal != nil || line.DurationChecks == nil ||
line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS != nil || line.DurationChecksMS == nil ||
line.RequestID != id || line.Query != query ||
!line.HasAuthorization || !line.HasCookie ||
line.RequestHeaders["accept"] != accept || len(line.RuleIDs) != 1 ||
@@ -1260,7 +1261,7 @@ func TestReportWritesTheLastLineWithTheDecisionsAndTheReportsFields(t *testing.T
got := s.report(discriminator.Report{
RequestID: id, Status: http.StatusCreated,
RequestBytes: bodyBytes, ResponseBytes: answerBytes,
DurationTotal: 12.5, DurationUpstreamTotal: 10.25,
DurationTotalMS: 12.5, DurationUpstreamTotalMS: 10.25,
})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
@@ -1298,14 +1299,14 @@ func TestEveryDeniedRequestsReportGetsItsLastLine(t *testing.T) {
}{
{
"deny", map[string]string{denyNets: client}, "/", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionDenied,
requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
},
{
"close", map[string]string{denyNets: client, banResponse: banResponseClose}, "/",
0, requestlog.ActionDenied,
0, requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
},
{"own prefix", nil, discriminator.HealthPath, http.StatusNotFound,
requestlog.ActionAdmin},
requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -1317,7 +1318,7 @@ func TestEveryDeniedRequestsReportGetsItsLastLine(t *testing.T) {
do(t, req)
got := s.report(discriminator.Report{
RequestID: id, Status: tc.status, ResponseBytes: 8, DurationTotal: 3,
RequestID: id, Status: tc.status, ResponseBytes: 8, DurationTotalMS: 3,
})
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusNoContent)
@@ -1325,8 +1326,8 @@ func TestEveryDeniedRequestsReportGetsItsLastLine(t *testing.T) {
wantLine(t, line, tc.status, tc.action)
if line.DiscriminatorLine != requestlog.DiscriminatorLineReport ||
line.RequestID != id || line.ResponseBytes != 8 || line.DurationTotal != 3 ||
line.DurationUpstreamTotal != nil {
line.RequestID != id || line.ResponseBytes != 8 || line.DurationTotalMS != 3 ||
line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS != nil {
t.Errorf("the report's line is %+v", line.Line)
}
})
@@ -1485,7 +1486,7 @@ func TestALargeBodyAnnouncedAndLongHeadersAreNoReasonToRefuse(t *testing.T) {
func TestLogLevelHoldsBackNoRequestLine(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{"SWW_LOG_LEVEL": "error"})
s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{"SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL": "error"})
// A refused question would write a process warning, held back at error.
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
@@ -1583,9 +1584,10 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetAlertNamesTheSite(t *testing.T) {
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
waiting := s.queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventWAFBlock ||
if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventCoreRuleSetMatch ||
waiting[0].Host != siteA {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting are %+v, want a waf_block naming %s", waiting, siteA)
t.Errorf("alerts waiting are %+v, want a core_rule_set_match naming %s",
waiting, siteA)
}
}
internal/discriminator/dnsbl.go
+43
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic dnsbl. It reads SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION, and the DNSBL zones'
// verdicts through the DNSBL checker.
import (
"context"
"strings"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// dnsbl notes the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists the client, as noteListed
// does, adds the tag dnsbl=<zone> for each, the zone's key masked, and refuses
// the request when SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny. Being
// limit, it lowers the client's limits instead (see limitPercentages), and
// being log, it does nothing more. A zone without a verdict on the client is
// asked about it in the background, and the request does not wait for the
// answer. Its figure is the zones that list the client, their keys masked.
type dnsbl struct{}
func (dnsbl) name() string { return "dnsbl" }
func (dnsbl) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
listedBy := rq.h.dnsbl.ListedBy(ctx, rq.client)
rq.dnsblListed = len(listedBy) > 0
rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a DNSBL zone")
for _, zone := range listedBy {
rq.addTag(config.DNSBLTagPrefix + strings.ToLower(zone))
}
if !rq.dnsblListed || rq.h.config.ReputationAction != deny {
return nil
}
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
figures: map[string]any{"zones": listedBy},
}
}
internal/discriminator/headerlimits.go
+71
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic header_limits. It reads no setting: its limits are fixed.
import (
"context"
"strings"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The header limits: the most cookies and header fields a request may have
// when the checks reach the Core Rule Set. Real clients never reach them.
const (
maxCookies = 50
maxHeaderFields = 100
)
// headerLimits refuses a request over the header limits, with 431. Its figures
// are the request's header fields and cookies, and the limit of each.
type headerLimits struct{}
func (headerLimits) name() string { return "header_limits" }
func (headerLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
fields, cookies := rq.headerCounts()
if !overHeaderLimits(fields, cookies) {
return nil
}
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge,
figures: map[string]any{
"fields": fields, "fields_limit": maxHeaderFields,
"cookies": cookies, "cookies_limit": maxCookies,
},
}
}
// overHeaderLimits reports whether a request with these counts of header fields
// and cookies, as headerCounts counts them, is over the header limits: it has
// more than maxHeaderFields fields or more than maxCookies cookies.
func overHeaderLimits(fields, cookies int) bool {
return fields > maxHeaderFields || cookies > maxCookies
}
// headerCounts returns the request's header fields, each value of a header sent
// twice being one, and its cookies, each part of a Cookie header between
// semicolons being one unless it is empty or only spaces and tabs. The Core
// Rule Set runs each of its rules on each cookie, so that thousands of small
// cookies keep it busy for over a second. It trims only spaces and control
// characters, of which a header value can hold only tabs, so a part of Unicode
// spaces is a cookie to it.
func (rq *request) headerCounts() (int, int) {
fields, cookies := 0, 0
for _, values := range rq.in.Header {
fields += len(values)
}
for _, value := range rq.in.Header.Values("Cookie") {
for part := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
if strings.Trim(part, " \t") != "" {
cookies++
}
}
}
return fields, cookies
}
internal/discriminator/health_test.go
+2 -1
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ func TestHealthEndpointCountsTowardNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
)
for range healthChecks {
got := s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
got := s.ownEndpointRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.HealthPath, "",
http.StatusOK)
if string(got.body) != "ok\n" || got.header.Get("Content-Type") != contentType {
t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q with Content-Type %q, want ok "+
internal/discriminator/heuristics.go
+140
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
package discriminator
import (
"context"
"time"
)
// To add a heuristic, write one file with a type that implements heuristic,
// and add one line for it to one of the lists below. Its settings go in
// config.Config, and the comment at the top of its file names them.
// heuristic is one of the checks that decide what discriminator does with a
// request.
type heuristic interface {
// name is the heuristic's name, which the log line gives.
name() string
// check looks at the request at now, and returns nil to let it through.
// ctx is the request's own context.
check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict
}
// verdict is a heuristic refusing a request, or banning its client: the action
// the log line names, one of requestlog's Action constants, and the figures the
// heuristic acted on, by name, such as the count and the limit.
type verdict struct {
action string
figures map[string]any
}
// The names of the figures that more than one heuristic gives.
const (
figureWindow = "window"
figureCount = "count"
figureLimit = "limit"
figureScore = "score"
figureNetblock = "netblock"
)
// The lists of heuristics, each in the order its heuristics run. A client in
// SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS skips them all.
// beforeLookup are the heuristics that run before the client's AS number and
// country are looked up, so that a client they refuse is not looked up.
func beforeLookup() []heuristic {
return []heuristic{
tagLists{},
routeWatchTags{},
denyNets{},
activeBan{},
}
}
// afterLookup are the heuristics that run once the lookup has been made.
// tag_deny runs twice: before the rate limits, on the tags known by then, and
// last, on the tag rule_files and core_rule_set can add.
func afterLookup() []heuristic {
return []heuristic{
countries{},
blocklists{},
crowdSec{},
dnsbl{},
abuseIPDB{},
tagDeny{},
rateLimits{},
trapPaths{},
ruleFiles{},
headerLimits{},
coreRuleSet{},
tagDeny{},
}
}
// afterAnswer are the heuristics that run on a request once discriminator has
// answered it, before its decision line is written. They ban the client, and do
// not change what the request got: their verdict's action is not used.
func afterAnswer() []heuristic {
return []heuristic{
refusalLimit{},
}
}
// onReport are the heuristics that run on an allowed request when rproxy's
// report of it comes, before its report line is written. Like afterAnswer, they
// only ban.
func onReport() []heuristic {
return []heuristic{
byteLimits{},
}
}
// runAfterAnswer runs the heuristics of afterAnswer on the request, at the time
// it is called.
func (rq *request) runAfterAnswer(ctx context.Context) {
rq.runBanningHeuristics(ctx, afterAnswer())
}
// runHeuristics runs list, beforeLookup or afterLookup, on the request at now,
// and returns the first verdict, or nil when none gives one. The log line's
// heuristic and heuristic_figures name the heuristic that gave it, and give its
// figures. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) runHeuristics(
ctx context.Context, list []heuristic, now time.Time,
) *verdict {
name, v := rq.firstVerdict(ctx, list, now)
if v != nil {
rq.line.Heuristic = name
rq.line.HeuristicFigures = v.figures
}
return v
}
// runBanningHeuristics runs list, afterAnswer or onReport, on the request at
// the time it is called. The log line's after_answer_heuristic and
// after_answer_heuristic_figures name the heuristic that gave a verdict, and
// give its figures, so that heuristic and heuristic_figures still name the one
// that refused the request. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) runBanningHeuristics(ctx context.Context, list []heuristic) {
name, v := rq.firstVerdict(ctx, list, rq.h.now())
if v != nil {
rq.line.AfterAnswerHeuristic = name
rq.line.AfterAnswerHeuristicFigures = v.figures
}
}
// firstVerdict runs list on the request at now, in order, until a heuristic
// gives a verdict, and returns that heuristic's name and its verdict, or "" and
// nil when none gives one. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) firstVerdict(
ctx context.Context, list []heuristic, now time.Time,
) (string, *verdict) {
for _, each := range list {
v := each.check(ctx, rq, now)
if v != nil {
return each.name(), v
}
}
return "", nil
}
internal/discriminator/history_test.go
+5 -5
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
start := clk.Now()
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
clk.advance(time.Second)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
clk.advance(time.Second)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
want := ratelimit.History{
FirstSeen: start,
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ func TestOwnEndpointsAreNotInTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
s.ownEndpointRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
s.ownEndpointRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
http.StatusUnauthorized)
s.scrape()
internal/discriminator/lookup.go
+34 -3
View File
@@ -4,13 +4,15 @@ import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"strings"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
)
// The headers in which an answer of allow gives rproxy the client's AS number
// and country, for the app, while SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes
// and country, for the app, while SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes
// every header name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so
// X-Client-ASN arrives as X-Client-Asn; header names are not case-sensitive.
const (
@@ -19,8 +21,9 @@ const (
)
// lookUp looks up the client's AS number and country, in the lookup
// database or through GeoJS, and notes them for the log line, unless
// SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off or the client is on a private, loopback or
// database or through GeoJS, and notes them for the log line and as the
// request's asn= and country= tags, unless
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off or the client is on a private, loopback or
// link-local address, which no lookup can place. The lookup database
// answers at once. With GeoJS, while a setting needs the answer, such as a
// country list or a biased threshold, a new client's request waits for it,
@@ -47,6 +50,34 @@ func (rq *request) lookUp(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) {
rq.line.ASN = rq.lookupAnswer.ASN
rq.line.ASName = rq.lookupAnswer.ASName
rq.line.Country = rq.lookupAnswer.Country
if tag := asnTag(rq.line.ASN); tag != "" {
rq.addTag(tag)
}
if tag := countryTag(rq.line.Country); tag != "" {
rq.addTag(tag)
}
}
// asnTag returns the tag of asn, an AS number as the lookup gives it, such as
// asn=64496 for AS64496, or "" for no AS number.
func asnTag(asn string) string {
if asn == "" {
return ""
}
return config.ASNTagPrefix + strings.TrimPrefix(asn, "AS")
}
// countryTag returns the tag of country, a code as the lookup gives it, such
// as country=DE for DE, or "" for no country.
func countryTag(country string) string {
if country == "" {
return ""
}
return config.CountryTagPrefix + country
}
// addLookup adds answer, an answer about a client from the lookup
internal/discriminator/lookup_test.go
+14 -14
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import (
// and country.
type asnAndCountry struct{ asn, asName, country string }
// fileSource is the SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE that looks clients up in the
// fileSource is the SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE that looks clients up in the
// lookup database.
const fileSource = "file"
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func TestEveryClientIsLookedUpWithoutWaitingWhileNoSettingNeedsIt(t *testing.T)
// comes too. None waits for GeoJS.
for _, line := range []logLine{
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited),
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited),
s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
} {
got := asnAndCountry{line.ASN, line.ASName, line.Country}
@@ -94,9 +94,9 @@ func TestRequestThatWaitedForItsLookupIsCountedWhenItGoesOn(t *testing.T) {
clk := &clock{now: time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 58, 0, time.UTC)}
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, clk.Now,
map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
deniedCountries: "kp",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
requestFromDE := func() *http.Request {
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ func TestASNumberAndNameInTheLogLineTheHistoryTheBanNotesAndTheAlert(t *testing.
for _, line := range []logLine{
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited),
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited),
} {
if got := (asnAndCountry{line.ASN, line.ASName, line.Country}); got != want {
t.Errorf("log line has %+v, want %+v", got, want)
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ func TestClientsAreLookedUpInTheLookupDatabaseAndGeoJSIsNotAsked(t *testing.T) {
want asnAndCountry
}{
{s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward), de},
{s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited), de},
{s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited), de},
{
s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied),
asnAndCountry{asnKP, asNameKP, "KP"},
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays(t *testing.T) {
// is never reached.
const timeout = 3 * time.Second
server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: timeout.String(),
allowedCountries: "DE",
@@ -405,25 +405,25 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays(t *testing.T) {
})
}
// unansweredGeoJSURL is where a GeoJS that never answers is asked: a
// silentGeoJSURL is where a GeoJS that never answers is asked: a
// request to it waits, without the network, until it is abandoned.
// TestMain registers it with Go's default transport, through which GeoJS
// is asked.
const unansweredGeoJSURL = "unanswered://geojs/v1/ip/geo.json"
const silentGeoJSURL = "silent://geojs/v1/ip/geo.json"
func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
transport, _ := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport)
transport.RegisterProtocol("unanswered", unansweredGeoJS{})
transport.RegisterProtocol("silent", silentGeoJS{})
transport.RegisterProtocol("abuseipdb", abuseIPDBStandIn{})
m.Run()
}
// unansweredGeoJS is the GeoJS at unansweredGeoJSURL.
type unansweredGeoJS struct{}
// silentGeoJS is the GeoJS at silentGeoJSURL.
type silentGeoJS struct{}
// RoundTrip waits until req is abandoned.
func (unansweredGeoJS) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
func (silentGeoJS) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
<-req.Context().Done()
return nil, req.Context().Err()
internal/discriminator/metrics_test.go
+26 -26
View File
@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ import (
)
const (
metricsToken = "SWW_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsTopN = "SWW_METRICS_TOP_N"
// token is the SWW_METRICS_TOKEN the tests set, and bearer how a
metricsToken = "SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsTopN = "SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N"
// token is the SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN the tests set, and bearer how a
// request carries it.
token = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
bearer = "Bearer " + token
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ func TestMetricsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
for _, authorization := range []string{bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
s.adminRequest(authorization, http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
s.ownEndpointRequest(authorization, http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
http.StatusNotFound)
}
}
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ func TestMetricsNeedTheTokenAndOtherPathsAreNotFound(t *testing.T) {
{http.MethodGet, "/_sww/bans", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
{http.MethodPost, discriminator.HealthPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
} {
got := s.adminRequest(tc.authorization, tc.method, tc.path, "", tc.status)
got := s.ownEndpointRequest(tc.authorization, tc.method, tc.path, "", tc.status)
if tc.status == http.StatusUnauthorized &&
got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountTheTraffic(t *testing.T) {
out.endedLines(t, 2)
forward := `{action="forward",instance="app",status_class="2xx"}`
notFound := `{action="admin",instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`
notFound := `{action="own_endpoint",instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`
// The request for the metrics is itself under way.
metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountTheTraffic(t *testing.T) {
func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS
s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
metricsToken: token,
@@ -124,16 +124,16 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
maxBanDuration: "2h",
})
// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
s.get(denied, 0, requestlog.ActionDenied)
// SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
s.get(denied, 0, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
// A first broken limit bans for an hour.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
metrics := s.scrape()
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`sww_requests_total{action="denied",instance="app",status_class="none"}`, 1)
`sww_requests_total{action="client_denied",instance="app",status_class="none"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
`kind="requests",window="minute"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
@@ -145,9 +145,9 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `sww_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
// A limit broken again right after would ban for three hours, longer
// than SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
// than SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
metrics = s.scrape()
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
@@ -195,10 +195,10 @@ func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
})
env := map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
metricsTopN: "2",
deniedCountries: "kp",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
metricsTopN: "2",
allowedCountries: "de,fr",
}
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, time.Now, env)
@@ -322,18 +322,18 @@ func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, _, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, time.Now,
map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
deniedCountries: "kp",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
// GeoJS fails, so the client counts as coming from an unknown country,
// which SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES does not refuse.
// GeoJS fails, so the client has no country= tag, and SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY does
// not refuse it.
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
// The client stops waiting for GeoJS once SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT is up, so
// The client stops waiting for GeoJS once SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT is up, so
// GeoJS's failure can come after its request has ended.
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_geojs_requests_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_geojs_failures_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_geojs_unanswered_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_without_geojs_answer_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
}
// keptAnswer returns GeoJS's answer that the client at addr is in
@@ -381,8 +381,8 @@ func scrape(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
func (s *sender) scrape() string {
s.t.Helper()
return string(s.adminRequest(bearer, http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
http.StatusOK).body)
return string(s.ownEndpointRequest(bearer, http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath,
"", http.StatusOK).body)
}
// metric returns the value of series in metrics, which are in the
internal/discriminator/observe_test.go
+110 -10
View File
@@ -7,23 +7,123 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// observe is the value of SWW_MODE for observe mode.
// observe is the value of SWW_WAF_MODE for observe mode.
const observe = "observe"
func TestBanActionSaysWhetherTheBanRunsOut(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const trapPath = "/wp-login.php"
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
cause string
// endsIn is how long after the request the ban ends: negative for a
// ban that has ended, and zero for a permanent ban.
endsIn time.Duration
path string
want string
}{
{
"temporary ban", bans.CauseAdmin, time.Hour, "/",
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
},
{"permanent ban", bans.CauseAdmin, 0, "/", requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned},
{
"request that makes a ban permanent", bans.CauseAttack, time.Hour, "/",
requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned,
},
{
"trap path after an attack ban ended", bans.CauseAttack, -time.Hour,
trapPath, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned,
},
{
"first trap path after another ban ended", bans.CauseAdmin, -time.Hour,
trapPath, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
},
} {
for _, modeValue := range []string{"enforce", observe} {
t.Run(tc.name+" in "+modeValue, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList, mode: modeValue,
})
ban := bans.Ban{
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
Start: clk.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour),
Cause: tc.cause,
}
if tc.endsIn != 0 {
ban.Expires = clk.Now().Add(tc.endsIn)
}
server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{ban})
if modeValue == observe {
line := s.request(client, tc.path, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, tc.want)
return
}
s.request(client, tc.path, http.StatusForbidden, tc.want)
})
}
}
}
func TestObserveModeNamesAPermanentBanWhoseAlertWouldBeSent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList, mode: observe,
})
server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{{
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
Start: clk.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour),
Expires: clk.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
Cause: bans.CauseAttack,
}})
line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventPermanentBan {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting are %+v, want one %s", waiting, alerts.EventPermanentBan)
}
}
func TestObserveModeNamesTheHeuristicThatWouldHaveRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
mode: observe, denyNets: client,
})
line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+client+`/32"}`)
}
func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS
banned = otherClient // under a ban read from bans.json
)
for _, tc := range []struct {
setting string // "" leaves SWW_MODE at its default
setting string // "" leaves SWW_WAF_MODE at its default
observe bool
}{
{"", false},
@@ -38,7 +138,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
}
if tc.setting != "" {
@@ -57,10 +157,10 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
for _, sent := range []struct{ from, refusal string }{
{denied, requestlog.ActionDenied},
{banned, requestlog.ActionBanned},
{fromKP, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied},
{fromDE, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{denied, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
{banned, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned},
{fromKP, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
{fromDE, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
} {
if !tc.observe {
line := s.get(sent.from, http.StatusForbidden, sent.refusal)
@@ -98,7 +198,7 @@ func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {
for range 2 {
line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit ||
line.BanExpires != "" {
@@ -111,7 +211,7 @@ func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {
// The ban read from bans.json refuses nothing, and so counts no
// refusal in its notes, but is kept.
line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(kept.Expires) {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s", line.BanExpires,
internal/discriminator/proxy.go
+44 -32
View File
@@ -16,32 +16,33 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/routewatch"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
)
// adminPrefix starts the path of each of discriminator's own endpoints. The app never
// sees a path under it.
const adminPrefix = "/_sww/"
// ownEndpointPrefix starts the path of each of discriminator's own endpoints. The app
// never sees a path under it.
const ownEndpointPrefix = "/_sww/"
// HealthPath is the health endpoint of discriminator and of rproxy, which the
// container's health check asks.
const HealthPath = "/_sww/healthz"
// MetricsPath is where the metrics are, for a request that carries
// SWW_METRICS_TOKEN.
// SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN.
const MetricsPath = "/_sww/metrics"
// BansPath is where an admin lists and adds bans, and, followed by / and
// a client's address, lifts them, with SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN.
// a client's address, lifts them, with SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN.
const BansPath = "/_sww/bans"
// ClientsPath is where an admin asks what discriminator knows of a client, by
// the client's address after it, with SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN.
// the client's address after it, with SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN.
const ClientsPath = "/_sww/clients/"
// Params are what New needs.
@@ -54,17 +55,17 @@ type Params struct {
// ProcessLog receives the process's own messages.
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
// GeoJSURL is where clients' AS numbers and countries are looked up
// while SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is geojs, normally lookup.URL.
// while SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is geojs, normally lookup.URL.
GeoJSURL string
// AbuseIPDBURL is where clients are checked with AbuseIPDB while
// SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set, normally reputation.AbuseIPDBURL.
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set, normally reputation.AbuseIPDBURL.
AbuseIPDBURL string
// LookupFile is the lookup database they are looked up in while
// SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, and nil otherwise.
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, and nil otherwise.
LookupFile *lookup.File
// CoreRuleSet is what NewCoreRuleSet returns: what inspects requests
// while SWW_WAF_MODE is not off, and nil while it is.
CoreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
// while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is not off, and nil while it is.
CoreRuleSet *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet
// Now tells the time by which requests are counted for the rate
// limits, bans are made and run out, and GeoJS's answers are kept,
// normally time.Now in UTC, the time the state files give.
@@ -76,16 +77,17 @@ type Params struct {
// permanent, for each count over an anomaly threshold, for each request
// whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL zone or
// AbuseIPDB lists, for each request the Core Rule Set scores at or over
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, and for GeoJS failing, a fetch of a list
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, and for GeoJS failing, a fetch of a list
// failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB failing,
// or the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
Alerts *alerts.Queue
}
// Server is the server discriminator runs, with the parts whose state the state
// files keep, the lookup database, nil unless SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the
// files keep, the lookup database, nil unless SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the
// lists fetched from URLs, which its Run fetches, the DNSBL zones' verdicts,
// AbuseIPDB's scores and checks spent, and the metrics.
// AbuseIPDB's scores and checks spent, and the metrics. RouteWatch, nil while
// SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL is unset, keeps its answers in memory only.
type Server struct {
*http.Server
@@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ type Server struct {
Lists *reputation.Lists
DNSBL *reputation.DNSBL
AbuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB
RouteWatch *routewatch.Client
Metrics *metrics.Metrics
}
@@ -126,7 +129,7 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
BytesPerHour: params.Config.BytesLimitPerHour,
BytesPerDay: params.Config.BytesLimitPerDay,
}, params.Config.MaxTrackedClients),
ledger: bans.New(bans.Rules{
ledger: bans.New(bans.Params{
LimitBanDuration: params.Config.LimitBanDuration,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: params.Config.LimitBanRepeatWindow,
MaxBanDuration: params.Config.MaxBanDuration,
@@ -152,14 +155,21 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
coreRuleSet: params.CoreRuleSet,
alerts: params.Alerts,
}
if params.Config.RouteWatchURL != "" {
h.routeWatch = routewatch.New(routewatch.Params{
URL: params.Config.RouteWatchURL, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
})
}
h.geojs = lookup.New(lookup.Params{
URL: params.GeoJSURL,
Timeout: params.Config.LookupTimeout,
// The country lists, the headers and the biased thresholds act on
// the answer before the request goes on.
Wait: len(params.Config.DeniedCountries) > 0 ||
len(params.Config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries) > 0 ||
params.Config.AddLookupHeaders || biasedThresholdsSet(params.Config),
// The country list, the headers, the tag settings that name an asn=
// or country= tag and the biased thresholds act on the answer before
// the request goes on.
Wait: len(params.Config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries) > 0 ||
params.Config.AddLookupHeaders || params.Config.TagsNeedLookup() ||
biasedThresholdsSet(params.Config),
Answered: h.addLookup,
Now: params.Now,
ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
@@ -175,7 +185,7 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
// newReputation returns the lists fetched from URLs, the DNSBL zones'
// verdicts and AbuseIPDB's scores, as the settings in params name them,
// with none fetched, asked for or checked yet, and adds their metrics to
// m, AbuseIPDB's while SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
// m, AbuseIPDB's while SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
func newReputation(
params Params, m *metrics.Metrics,
) (*reputation.Lists, *reputation.DNSBL, *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
@@ -183,6 +193,7 @@ func newReputation(
lists := reputation.New(reputation.Params{
BlocklistURLs: cfg.BlocklistURLs, Refresh: cfg.BlocklistRefresh,
ASNLimitPercentURL: cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL,
TagLists: cfg.TagLists,
CrowdSecDecisionsURL: cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL, CrowdSecKey: cfg.CrowdSecKey,
Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog, Alerts: params.Alerts,
})
@@ -207,27 +218,27 @@ func newReputation(
return lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB
}
// NewCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
// without the rules SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
// up to SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT, with the exclusions in
// SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, or nil while SWW_WAF_MODE is off. It
// reads at most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
// NewCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
// without the rules SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
// up to SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT, with the exclusions in
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, or nil while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is
// off. It reads at most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
// QuestionBodyMaxBytes may be cut short, and the Core Rule Set does not read a
// JSON or XML body over its limit. An exclusions file that waf.New refuses is
// JSON or XML body over its limit. An exclusions file that coreruleset.New refuses is
// an error in every mode. While the mode is off, a set file is loaded with the
// Core Rule Set only to check it.
func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) (*waf.CoreRuleSet, error) {
func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff && cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile == "" {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // off is no Core Rule Set, and no error
}
coreRuleSet, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
coreRuleSet, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel, DisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules,
BodyLimit: min(cfg.WAFBodyLimit, QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1),
ExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: %w", err)
}
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff {
@@ -253,8 +264,9 @@ type handler struct {
lists *reputation.Lists
dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL
abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB
routeWatch *routewatch.Client
rules *rules.Files
coreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
coreRuleSet *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet
alerts *alerts.Queue
// awaitingReport holds the decision on each answered question by its id
// until its report comes, and nil for a question still being handled.
internal/discriminator/proxy_test.go
+44 -49
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config/configtest"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
@@ -55,33 +56,35 @@ const (
// The settings the tests set.
const (
mode = "SWW_MODE"
trustedProxies = "SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWW_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWW_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
lookupSource = "SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
deniedCountries = "SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
allowedCountries = "SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
banResponse = "SWW_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWW_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
instanceName = "SWW_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
attackBanDuration = "SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
rulesDir = "SWW_RULES_DIR"
wafMode = "SWW_WAF_MODE"
mode = "SWW_WAF_MODE"
trustedProxies = "SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
lookupSource = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
tagDeny = "SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY"
// denyKP is the value of SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY that refuses fromKP's country.
denyKP = "country=KP"
allowedCountries = "SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
banResponse = "SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
instanceName = "SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
attackBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
rulesDir = "SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR"
wafMode = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE"
)
// off is the value that switches a setting off.
@@ -294,8 +297,8 @@ func startProxyWithGeoJS(
// startProxyWithClock is startProxyWithGeoJS with requests counted and
// bans made by the time now tells, and returns discriminator's server as well, whose
// Addr is where discriminator listens. Unless env sets SWW_RULES_DIR, it is an empty
// directory, of no rules, and unless it sets SWW_INSTANCE_NAME, that is app,
// Addr is where discriminator listens. Unless env sets SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR, it is an
// empty directory, of no rules, and unless it sets SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME, that is app,
// the label instance of every metric.
func startProxyWithClock(
t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
@@ -345,25 +348,21 @@ func serve(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server) {
// startRProxy starts rproxy in front of the app at appURL, asking the discriminator
// at discriminatorAddr, with the settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns
// where it listens. What it writes is dropped. SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS is a minute unless
// env sets it, so that on a busy host SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION does not decide.
// where it listens. What it writes is dropped. SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS is a minute unless
// env sets it, so that on a busy host SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION does not decide.
func startRProxy(
t *testing.T, discriminatorAddr, appURL string, env map[string]string,
) string {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
"SWRP_WAF_BACKEND": "http://" + discriminatorAddr,
"SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
"SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS": "60000",
"SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND": "http://" + discriminatorAddr,
"SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
"SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS": "60000",
}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := settings[name]
return value, ok
})
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(configtest.Viper(settings))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", settings, err)
}
@@ -395,11 +394,11 @@ func startRProxy(
// settings in env make it. No alert is sent from the queue: they wait in it,
// for the test to look at.
// With no geojsURL, there is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and
// SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup
// database SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY. SWW_WAF_MODE is off unless
// env sets it, so that only the tests of the Core Rule Set have their requests
// inspected by it.
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup
// database SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY.
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is off unless env sets it, so that only the tests of the
// Core Rule Set have their requests inspected by it.
func newDiscriminator(
t *testing.T, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
) (*discriminator.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
@@ -424,11 +423,7 @@ func newDiscriminatorWith(
maps.Copy(settings, env)
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := settings[name]
return value, ok
})
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(configtest.Viper(settings))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", settings, err)
}
internal/discriminator/ratelimits.go
+69
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic rate_limits. It reads SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS,
// SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS and SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and the rate limits and
// biased thresholds through the limiter and limitPercentages.
import (
"context"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// rateLimits counts the request for the rate limits, unless
// countedByRateLimits exempts it, by the client's limit percentages, which it
// notes for the log line with the client's counts. A request that takes the
// client over a rate limit, as its limit percentage lowers it, breaks it: it is
// refused, and bans the client. A request exempt from the rate limits is exempt
// from the byte limits too. Its figures are the window, the count and the
// limit.
type rateLimits struct{}
func (rateLimits) name() string { return "rate_limits" }
func (rateLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
rq.counted = rq.countedByRateLimits()
if !rq.counted {
return nil
}
rq.rateLimitPercent, rq.bytesLimitPercent = rq.limitPercentages()
rq.line.RateLimitPercent, rq.line.RateLimitPercentSetting =
rq.rateLimitPercent.logged()
rq.line.BytesLimitPercent, rq.line.BytesLimitPercentSetting =
rq.bytesLimitPercent.logged()
counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
rq.rateLimitPercent.percent)
rq.line.Counts = counts
if !over {
return nil
}
rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.h.config.BanResponse)
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited, figures: limitFigures(hit),
}
}
// overAWholeRateLimit reports whether the heuristic rate_limits will refuse the
// request at now, whatever its client's limit percentages: the rate limits
// count it, and one more request from its client takes it over a whole rate
// limit. It counts nothing.
func (rq *request) overAWholeRateLimit(now time.Time) bool {
return rq.countedByRateLimits() &&
rq.h.limiter.OverARateLimit(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now)
}
// countedByRateLimits reports whether the rate limits count the request: its
// client is not in SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and its path is not exempt
// under SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS.
func (rq *request) countedByRateLimits() bool {
cfg := rq.h.config
return !isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) &&
!pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
}
internal/discriminator/ratelimits_test.go
+27 -13
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// minute is the window of SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE, as a log line's
// minute is the window of SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE, as a log line's
// limit_hit names it.
const minute = "minute"
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
if sent.want == http.StatusOK {
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
} else {
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
if line.LimitHit != minute {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want minute", line.LimitHit)
@@ -72,10 +72,21 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRateLimitRefusalNamesItsHeuristicWindowCountAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "rate_limits", `{"window": "minute", "count": 2, "limit": 1}`)
}
func TestIPv6GroupPrefixSetsTheClientTheLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// With SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX at 48, the first two addresses, in two
// With SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX at 48, the first two addresses, in two
// /64s of one /48, are one client, and the second's request breaks the
// limit; the third, in the next /48, is another client.
const (
@@ -91,7 +102,7 @@ func TestIPv6GroupPrefixSetsTheClientTheLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
status int
action string
}{
{rateLimitPerMinute, "1", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{rateLimitPerMinute, "1", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
{bytesLimitPerMinute, byteLimit, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
} {
t.Run(tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -118,14 +129,14 @@ func TestIPv6GroupPrefixSetsTheClientTheLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
rateLimitExemptPaths: "/assets/,/favicon.ico",
denyNets: denied,
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
// The answers are kept before the requests, so that none waits for
@@ -149,14 +160,17 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
// A path outside every prefix is counted: /assets is not under
// /assets/, and breaks the limit.
s.request(client, "/assets", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.request(client, "/assets", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
// A ban, SWW_DENY_NETS and the country lists still refuse a path
// under a prefix.
s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(denied, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
// A ban, SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS and SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY still refuse a path under a
// prefix.
s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
s.request(denied, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
s.request(fromKP, "/assets/app.js",
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
}
func TestRateLimitCountsPathsThatAreNotExempt(t *testing.T) {
@@ -200,7 +214,7 @@ func TestRateLimitCountsPathsThatAreNotExempt(t *testing.T) {
// Counted, the second request breaks the limit of one request
// a minute.
s.request(client, sent, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.request(client, sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.request(client, sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
})
}
}
internal/discriminator/refusallimit.go
+54
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic refusal_limit. It reads SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD and
// SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE.
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// refusalLimit counts the request once it has been answered, if discriminator
// refused it after a rule file match, a trap path or a Core Rule Set match, and
// in observe mode if enforce mode would have: more than
// SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD such refusals of the client within a minute break
// a limit, which bans the client. A client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS, which the
// heuristics skip, is not counted, and nothing is while the threshold is off.
// Its figures are the window, the count and the limit.
type refusalLimit struct{}
func (refusalLimit) name() string { return "refusal_limit" }
func (refusalLimit) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
cfg := rq.h.config
if cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold == 0 {
return nil
}
if !rq.attack && !rq.blockedByBlockRule && !rq.blockedByCoreRuleSet {
return nil
}
hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountRefusal(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold)
if !over {
return nil
}
// What the client was sent, or in observe mode would have been.
status := rq.out.status
switch rq.line.WouldAction {
case requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet:
status = http.StatusForbidden
case requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned:
status = cfg.BanResponse
}
rq.banForLimit(now, hit, status)
return &verdict{figures: limitFigures(hit)}
}
internal/discriminator/errorburst_test.go → internal/discriminator/refusallimit_test.go
+55 -23
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
const errorBurstThreshold = "SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
const errorBurstThreshold = "SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
// refused is a request the tests here send, which discriminator refuses after a rule
// file match.
@@ -37,9 +37,10 @@ func (r refused) send(s *sender, from string) logLine {
switch r {
case blockRule:
return s.request(from, blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
case banRule:
return s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
return s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
s.t.Fatalf("no request for the refusal %d", r)
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ func (r refused) send(s *sender, from string) logLine {
}
// startForErrorBurst is startWithClock with testRules, the metrics token and
// SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD at threshold, and the settings in env.
// SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD at threshold, and the settings in env.
func startForErrorBurst(
t *testing.T, threshold string, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *discriminator.Server) {
@@ -71,9 +72,20 @@ func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
name string
// refusals are four, one over the threshold of three.
refusals []refused
// nextAction is the action of the client's next request: the next
// request after a ban for a ban rule makes it permanent.
nextAction string
}{
{"block rule", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, blockRule}},
{"a ban rule last", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, banRule}},
{
"block rule",
[]refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, blockRule},
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
},
{
"a ban rule last",
[]refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, banRule},
requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -95,17 +107,36 @@ func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
// The fourth is answered as the others were, breaks the error
// burst, and bans the client.
line := tc.refusals[3].send(s, client)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst ||
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals ||
line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want error_burst "+
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want minute_refusals "+
"and limit", line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
}
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, tc.nextAction)
})
}
}
func TestRefusalLimitBanNamesItsHeuristicWindowCountAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "1", nil)
const ruleFigures = `{"rule_id": "blocked", "rule_action": "block"}`
line := blockRule.send(s, client)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", ruleFigures)
wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t, line, "", "null")
// The second refusal is the request refusal_limit bans for, and the line
// names both.
line = blockRule.send(s, client)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", ruleFigures)
wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t, line, "refusal_limit",
`{"window": "minute", "count": 2, "limit": 1}`)
}
func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -150,7 +181,7 @@ func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
}
wantOffences := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, RuleBlocked: 3}
wantOffences := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, BlockedByBlockRule: 3}
if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != wantOffences {
t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, wantOffences)
}
@@ -160,7 +191,7 @@ func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
`kind="refusals",window="minute"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 3)
`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_block_rule"}`, 3)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 1)
}
@@ -172,7 +203,7 @@ func TestErrorBurstIsNotLoweredForAClientWithLowerLimits(t *testing.T) {
lookupTimeout: "1h",
errorBurstThreshold: "2",
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
countryLimitPercent: countryDEHalf,
tagLimitPercent: countryTagDEHalf,
})
// Half of the threshold would be one, which the second refusal is over.
@@ -246,7 +277,8 @@ func TestErrorBurstOffOrAtItsDefault(t *testing.T) {
line = blockRule.send(s, client)
}
if broken := line.LimitHit == requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst; broken != tc.broken {
broken := line.LimitHit == requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals
if broken != tc.broken {
t.Errorf("the 31st refusal broke the error burst: %t, want %t",
broken, tc.broken)
}
@@ -258,15 +290,15 @@ func TestErrorBurstCountsEachClientTheChecksApplyTo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
)
s, _, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "1", map[string]string{
allowNets: allowed, rateLimitExemptNets: exempt,
})
// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS is not refused, and so not counted.
// A client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS is not refused, and so not counted.
for range 3 {
s.request(allowed, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
@@ -275,11 +307,11 @@ func TestErrorBurstCountsEachClientTheChecksApplyTo(t *testing.T) {
blockRule.send(s, exempt)
line := blockRule.send(s, exempt)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want error_burst", line.LimitHit)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want minute_refusals", line.LimitHit)
}
s.get(exempt, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(exempt, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestErrorBurstBanSetsTheRefusalsBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
@@ -322,7 +354,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
for range 2 {
line := s.request(otherClient, blockedPath, http.StatusOK,
requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
@@ -334,10 +366,10 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst || line.BanExpires != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, want error_burst "+
if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals || line.BanExpires != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, want minute_refusals "+
"and none", line.LimitHit, line.BanExpires)
}
internal/discriminator/reputation.go
+4 -78
View File
@@ -1,91 +1,17 @@
package discriminator
import (
"context"
"time"
// What the reputation heuristics share: blocklists, crowdsec, dnsbl and
// abuseipdb.
import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
)
// deny is the SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and the SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION that
// deny is the SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and the SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION that
// refuses the requests of a client a source lists.
const deny = "deny"
// blocklistDenied notes the blocklists that list the client, as
// noteListed does, and reports whether SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, being deny,
// refuses the request. Being limit, it lowers the client's limits instead
// (see limitPercentages), and being log, it does nothing more.
func (rq *request) blocklistDenied() bool {
listedBy := rq.h.lists.ListedBy(rq.client)
rq.blocklisted = len(listedBy) > 0
rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a blocklist")
return rq.blocklisted && rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny
}
// crowdSecBanned reports whether a decision of the CrowdSec decision list
// on the client is in force at now. If one is, it notes the list, as
// noteHit does, and bans the client until that decision ends.
func (rq *request) crowdSecBanned(now time.Time) bool {
decision, listed := rq.h.lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
if !listed {
return false
}
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: rq.h.config.CrowdSecDecisionsURL},
"listed by the CrowdSec decision list")
rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision)
return true
}
// dnsblDenied notes the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists the client, as
// noteListed does, and reports whether SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION, being
// deny, refuses the request. Being limit, it lowers the client's limits
// instead (see limitPercentages), and being log, it does nothing more. A
// zone without a verdict on the client is asked about it in the
// background, and the request does not wait for the answer. ctx is the
// request's own context.
func (rq *request) dnsblDenied(ctx context.Context) bool {
listedBy := rq.h.dnsbl.ListedBy(ctx, rq.client)
rq.dnsblListed = len(listedBy) > 0
rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a DNSBL zone")
return rq.dnsblListed && rq.h.config.ReputationAction == deny
}
// abuseIPDBDenied notes AbuseIPDB, as noteHit does, with the score, when
// its score of the client is a hit, and reports whether
// SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION, being deny, refuses the request, as dnsblDenied
// does for a zone. While SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is unset it does nothing. A
// client without a score is checked in the background, by the request's
// address, if its history counts an offence, and the request does not
// wait for the answer. The score is then used for each address of the
// client. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) abuseIPDBDenied(ctx context.Context) bool {
if rq.h.config.AbuseIPDBKey == "" {
return false
}
client := rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client)
held, _ := rq.h.limiter.Client(client)
offender := held.History.Offences != ratelimit.Offences{}
score, hit := rq.h.abuseIPDB.Hit(ctx, client, rq.client, offender)
if !hit {
return false
}
rq.abuseIPDBHit = true
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource, Score: &score},
"scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE")
return rq.h.config.ReputationAction == deny
}
// noteListed notes each of sources, the URLs of the blocklists or the
// DNSBL zones, their keys masked, that list the client, as noteHit does,
// with reason.
internal/discriminator/reputation_test.go
+172 -72
View File
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ import (
// The reputation settings.
const (
blocklistURLs = "SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS"
blocklistAction = "SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"
asnLimitPercentURL = "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"
blocklistURLs = "SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS"
blocklistAction = "SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"
asnLimitPercentURL = "SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"
)
// The actions of SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION:
// The actions of SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION:
// limitHalf gives a listed client half of every limit, and limitQuarter a
// quarter.
const (
@@ -49,12 +49,12 @@ const (
func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionDenied
forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionClientDenied
for _, tc := range []struct {
action string
// statuses and actions are those of a listed client's three
// requests, and percent their limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
// requests, and percent their rate_limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
statuses []int
actions []string
percent string
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
{
// Half of 4 requests a minute: the third breaks the limit.
limitHalf, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusForbidden},
[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
"50 from " + blocklistAction,
},
{
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
for i := range 3 {
line := s.get(from, tc.statuses[i], tc.actions[i])
wantReputation(t, line, dropURL)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent,
line.LimitPercentSetting, tc.percent)
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent", line.RateLimitPercent,
line.RateLimitPercentSetting, tc.percent)
// A request refused for the list is not counted.
counted := line.fields["counts"] != nil
@@ -106,7 +106,8 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
for range 3 {
line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusOK, forward)
wantReputation(t, line)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
none)
}
@@ -118,16 +119,66 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestBlocklistsComeAfterTheCountryListsAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
func TestReputationRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndWhatListedTheClient(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
heuristic string
env map[string]string
load func(*testing.T, *discriminator.Server)
figures string
}{
{
"blocklists",
map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL, blocklistAction: actionDeny},
func(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server) {
t.Helper()
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {client}})
},
`{"lists": ["` + dropURL + `"]}`,
},
{
"dnsbl",
map[string]string{
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver,
reputationAction: actionDeny,
},
func(_ *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server) {
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{client: {dnsblZone}})
},
`{"zones": ["` + dnsblZone + `"]}`,
},
{
"abuseipdb",
map[string]string{abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionDeny},
func(_ *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server) {
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{client: 80})
},
`{"score": 80, "min_score": 75}`,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.heuristic, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, tc.env)
tc.load(t, server)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, tc.heuristic, tc.figures)
})
}
}
func TestBlocklistsComeAfterAllowedCountriesAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, queue := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
blocklistURLs: dropURL, deniedCountries: "kp", allowNets: fromDE,
blocklistURLs: dropURL, allowedCountries: "de", allowNets: fromDE,
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {fromDE, fromKP}})
// fromKP's country refuses it before the list is looked at, and fromDE,
// in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted, nor
// in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted, nor
// alerted.
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied))
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
@@ -143,7 +194,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientABlocklistDeniesAndAlertsIt(t *testing.T) {
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {fromDE}})
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantReputation(t, line, dropURL)
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
@@ -157,31 +208,33 @@ func TestBlocklistLimitTakesPartInTheLowestPercentageOfEveryLimit(t *testing.T)
for _, tc := range []struct {
action, asnPercent string
// want is the upload's limit_percent and bytes_percent, as
// want is the upload's rate_limit_percent and bytes_limit_percent, as
// percentText gives them, and limitHit its limit_hit.
want, limitHit string
}{
{limitHalf, asnDEQuarter, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent, minuteBytes},
{limitQuarter, asnDEHalf, "25 from " + blocklistAction, minuteBytes},
{limitHalf, asnTagDEQuarter, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent, minuteBytes},
{limitQuarter, asnTagDEHalf, "25 from " + blocklistAction, minuteBytes},
// The AS number's, the first of two alike.
{limitQuarter, asnDEQuarter, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent, minuteBytes},
{actionLog, asnDE + ":100", none, ""},
{limitQuarter, asnTagDEQuarter, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent, minuteBytes},
{actionLog, "asn=64511:25", none, ""},
} {
t.Run(tc.action+" "+tc.asnPercent, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
bytesLimitPerMinute: twoUploads, blocklistURLs: dropURL,
blocklistAction: tc.action, asnLimitPercent: tc.asnPercent,
blocklistAction: tc.action, tagLimitPercent: tc.asnPercent,
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {fromDE}})
// The upload's 100 bytes are over 49, a quarter of 199, and 99,
// half of it, and within 199.
line := s.uploadFrom(fromDE)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
tc.want)
wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
tc.want)
if line.LimitHit != tc.limitHit {
@@ -196,35 +249,35 @@ func TestASNLimitPercentFileCountsAsTheSettingDoesTheLowerWinning(t *testing.T)
const (
fromURL = "25 from " + asnLimitPercentURL
fromSetting = "25 from " + asnLimitPercent
fromSetting = "25 from " + tagLimitPercent
)
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
file string
// limitPercent and bytesPercent are the upload's, as percentText
// gives them.
limitPercent, bytesPercent string
// rateLimitPercent and bytesLimitPercent are the upload's, as
// percentText gives them.
rateLimitPercent, bytesLimitPercent string
}{
{"the file's alone", nil, asnDEQuarter, fromURL, fromURL},
{
"the file's, lower than the setting's",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEHalf}, asnDEQuarter, fromURL, fromURL,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEHalf}, asnDEQuarter, fromURL, fromURL,
},
{
"the setting's, lower than the file's",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter}, asnDEHalf,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter}, asnDEHalf,
fromSetting, fromSetting,
},
{
"the setting's, the first of two alike",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter}, asnDEQuarter,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter}, asnDEQuarter,
fromSetting, fromSetting,
},
{"none, for an AS number the file does not list", nil, asnKP + ":25", none, none},
{
"SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT's in place of the file's for the byte limits",
"SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT's in place of the file's for the byte limits",
map[string]string{asnBytesPercent: asnDE + ":100"}, asnDEQuarter, fromURL, none,
},
} {
@@ -238,10 +291,12 @@ func TestASNLimitPercentFileCountsAsTheSettingDoesTheLowerWinning(t *testing.T)
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{asnURL: {"# by AS number", tc.file}})
line := s.uploadFrom(fromDE)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
tc.limitPercent)
wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
tc.bytesPercent)
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
tc.rateLimitPercent)
wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
tc.bytesLimitPercent)
})
}
}
@@ -312,9 +367,9 @@ func TestEachBlocklistThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
// The DNSBL settings.
const (
dnsblZones = "SWW_DNSBL_ZONES"
dnsblResolver = "SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER"
reputationAction = "SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION"
dnsblZones = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES"
dnsblResolver = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER"
reputationAction = "SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION"
)
// The DNSBL zones these tests name, which are never asked about the
@@ -330,12 +385,12 @@ const (
func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionDenied
forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionClientDenied
for _, tc := range []struct {
action string
// statuses and actions are those of a listed client's three
// requests, and percent their limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
// requests, and percent their rate_limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
statuses []int
actions []string
percent string
@@ -347,7 +402,7 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
{
// Half of 4 requests a minute: the third breaks the limit.
limitHalf, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusForbidden},
[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
"50 from " + reputationAction,
},
{
@@ -370,10 +425,10 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
for _, from := range []string{fromDE, fromKP} {
for i := range 3 {
line := s.get(from, tc.statuses[i], tc.actions[i])
// In the order SWW_DNSBL_ZONES names them.
// In the order SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES names them.
wantReputation(t, line, listedBy[from]...)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent,
line.LimitPercentSetting, tc.percent)
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent", line.RateLimitPercent,
line.RateLimitPercentSetting, tc.percent)
// A request refused for the verdict is not counted.
counted := line.fields["counts"] != nil
@@ -388,7 +443,8 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
for range 3 {
line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusOK, forward)
wantReputation(t, line)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
none)
}
@@ -416,9 +472,9 @@ func TestDNSBLZonesComeAfterTheBlocklistsAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromKP: {dnsblZone}, fromDE: {dnsblZone}})
// The blocklist refuses fromKP before its verdict is looked at, and
// fromDE, in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted
// fromDE, in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted
// for the zone, nor alerted, nor asked about.
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
dropURL)
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
@@ -432,6 +488,46 @@ func TestDNSBLZonesComeAfterTheBlocklistsAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestReputationSourcesTagTheRequestWhateverTheirAction(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
load func(*discriminator.Server)
want []string
}{
{
"dnsbl",
map[string]string{
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver, reputationAction: actionLog,
},
func(server *discriminator.Server) {
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {dnsblZone}})
},
[]string{"asn=64496", "country=DE", "dnsbl=" + dnsblZone},
},
{
abuseipdb,
map[string]string{abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog},
func(server *discriminator.Server) {
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{fromDE: 80})
},
[]string{abuseipdb, "asn=64496", "country=DE"},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, tc.env)
tc.load(server)
wantTags(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
tc.want...)
})
}
}
func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientADNSBLZoneDeniesAndAlertsIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -442,7 +538,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientADNSBLZoneDeniesAndAlertsIt(t *testing.T) {
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {dnsblZone}})
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantReputation(t, line, dnsblZone)
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
@@ -456,7 +552,7 @@ func TestReputationLimitTakesPartInTheLowestPercentageOfEveryLimit(t *testing.T)
for _, tc := range []struct {
blocklistAction, reputationAction string
// want is the request's limit_percent and bytes_percent, as
// want is the request's rate_limit_percent and bytes_limit_percent, as
// percentText gives them.
want string
}{
@@ -481,9 +577,11 @@ func TestReputationLimitTakesPartInTheLowestPercentageOfEveryLimit(t *testing.T)
// Named by the blocklist, then by the zone.
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantReputation(t, line, dropURL, dnsblZone)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
tc.want)
wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
tc.want)
})
}
@@ -609,7 +707,7 @@ func TestRequestFromAClientWithoutAVerdictHasTheZoneAskedAboutIt(t *testing.T) {
// The AbuseIPDB settings, and accountKey, the key the tests set.
const (
abuseIPDBKey = "SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
abuseIPDBKey = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
accountKey = "abuseipdb-key-0123456789abcdef"
)
@@ -651,8 +749,8 @@ func TestOnlyAClientThatHasCommittedAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDB(t *testing.T
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward)
s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, forward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 0)
// Once the ban has ended, fromDE's first request has it checked in the
@@ -691,7 +789,7 @@ func TestIPv6ClientCostsOneAbuseIPDBCheckWhicheverOfItsAddressesSends(t *testing
s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusOK, forward)
}
s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
clk.advance(time.Hour)
// Once the ban has ended, which set its counters back to zero, a
@@ -724,20 +822,20 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
want ratelimit.Offences
}{
{
"a block rule", blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked,
ratelimit.Offences{RuleBlocked: 1},
"a block rule", blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, ratelimit.Offences{BlockedByBlockRule: 1},
},
{
"the Core Rule Set", sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, ratelimit.Offences{WAFBlocked: 1},
requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet, ratelimit.Offences{BlockedByCoreRuleSet: 1},
},
{
"a ban rule", probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned,
"a ban rule", probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
},
{
"a trap path", "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned,
ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
"a trap path", "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned, ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -768,12 +866,12 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionDenied
forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionClientDenied
for _, tc := range []struct {
action string
// statuses and actions are those of fromDE's three requests, and
// percent their limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
// percent their rate_limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
statuses []int
actions []string
percent string
@@ -785,7 +883,7 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *test
{
// Half of 4 requests a minute: the third breaks the limit.
limitHalf, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusForbidden},
[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
"50 from " + reputationAction,
},
{
@@ -800,13 +898,14 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *test
rateLimitPerMinute: fourAMinute, abuseIPDBKey: accountKey,
reputationAction: tc.action,
})
// At SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default, and just under it.
// At SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default, and just under it.
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{fromDE: 75, fromKP: 74})
for i := range 3 {
line := s.get(fromDE, tc.statuses[i], tc.actions[i])
wantReputation(t, line, abuseipdb)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
tc.percent)
// A request refused for the score is not counted.
@@ -820,7 +919,8 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *test
for range 3 {
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, forward)
wantReputation(t, line)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
none)
}
@@ -851,7 +951,7 @@ func TestAbuseIPDBHitRaisesAnAlertWithTheScoreOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
// The alert is made as a DNSBL zone's is, with the score besides.
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventReputationHit ||
waiting[0].Reason != "scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE" ||
waiting[0].Reason != "scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE" ||
waiting[0].Detail["source"] != abuseipdb || waiting[0].Detail["score"] != int64(90) ||
queue.Suppressed() != 1 {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, %d held back, want AbuseIPDB's reputation_hit "+
@@ -882,7 +982,7 @@ func TestWithoutAnAbuseIPDBKeyNoClientIsCheckedNorAScoreUsed(t *testing.T) {
// fromDE's score is not used, and once it has committed an offence it
// is not checked either.
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward))
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
clk.advance(time.Hour)
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward))
wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 0)
@@ -906,10 +1006,10 @@ func TestBanNotesNameEachReputationSourceThatListedTheClient(t *testing.T) {
}{
{"for a broken rate limit", func(s *sender, from string) {
s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
}},
{"for a clear sign of attack", func(s *sender, from string) {
s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -922,7 +1022,7 @@ func TestBanNotesNameEachReputationSourceThatListedTheClient(t *testing.T) {
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog,
})
// Every source lists client, and none otherClient, whose score is
// under SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default.
// under SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default.
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {client}})
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{client: {dnsblZone}, otherClient: nil})
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{client: score, otherClient: 74})
@@ -971,7 +1071,7 @@ func verdictsFetched() time.Time {
}
// loadVerdicts puts into server's DNSBL, for each client listedBy names,
// a verdict of each zone SWW_DNSBL_ZONES names, fetched at
// a verdict of each zone SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES names, fetched at
// verdictsFetched, as reputation.json would at start: one that lists the
// client from each zone listedBy gives for it, and one that does not from
// each other zone.
internal/discriminator/request.go
+59 -111
View File
@@ -44,20 +44,20 @@ type decision struct {
lookedUp bool
lookupAnswer lookup.Answer
// skippedLookupWait is true for a request that did not wait for GeoJS and
// found no answer kept. SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT does not apply to it,
// found no answer kept. SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT does not apply to it,
// so that not waiting never lowers its client's limits.
skippedLookupWait bool
// counted is true for a request the rate limits counted, whose bytes
// the byte limits count once it has ended. limitPercent and
// bytesPercent are then its client's limit percentages for the rate
// the byte limits count once it has ended. rateLimitPercent and
// bytesLimitPercent are then its client's limit percentages for the rate
// limits and for the byte limits.
counted bool
limitPercent, bytesPercent percentage
counted bool
rateLimitPercent, bytesLimitPercent percentage
// attack is true for a request that matched a ban rule or asked for a
// trap path, ruleBlocked for one a block rule refused, and wafBlocked for
// one the Core Rule Set refused, each an offence its client's history
// counts.
attack, ruleBlocked, wafBlocked bool
// trap path, blockedByBlockRule for one a block rule refused, and
// blockedByCoreRuleSet for one the Core Rule Set refused, each an offence
// its client's history counts.
attack, blockedByBlockRule, blockedByCoreRuleSet bool
// reputation is the reputation sources that list the client, for the
// notes of a ban the request makes.
reputation []bans.ReputationHit
@@ -138,6 +138,15 @@ func (h *handler) startRequest(
return rq
}
// addTag adds tag to the request's tags, which stay sorted and hold each tag
// once.
func (rq *request) addTag(tag string) {
at, found := slices.BinarySearch(rq.line.Tags, tag)
if !found {
rq.line.Tags = slices.Insert(rq.line.Tags, at, tag)
}
}
// requestHeaders returns the headers of r that names lists, by name in
// lower case, each with its values joined by ", ". Authorization, Cookie
// and Set-Cookie are never among them, whatever names says.
@@ -160,58 +169,49 @@ func requestHeaders(r *http.Request, names []string) map[string]string {
}
// check is the one place where a request can be refused. It returns nil to let
// the request through. The checks of checkClient decide: a request they refuse
// is answered with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, 403 for a block rule or the Core Rule Set,
// or 431 for the header limits. In observe mode nothing is refused, and the log
// line names what enforce mode would have done. ctx is the request's own context.
// the request through. The heuristics of checkClient decide: a request they
// refuse is answered with SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE, 403 for a block rule or the Core
// Rule Set, or 431 for the header limits. In observe mode nothing is refused,
// and the log line names what enforce mode would have done. ctx is the
// request's own context.
func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
action := rq.checkClient(ctx)
v := rq.checkClient(ctx)
if v == nil {
return nil
}
action := v.action
switch {
case action == "":
return nil
case rq.h.config.Observe:
rq.line.WouldAction = action
return nil
case action == requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked || action == requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
case action == requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule ||
action == requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet:
return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
case action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge:
case action == requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge:
return &refusal{status: http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge, action: action}
default:
return rq.banResponse(action)
}
}
// checkClient runs the checks on the request's client, and returns the
// action of the first that refuses the request, or "" when none does. A
// client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS skips them, and is not looked up. For any
// other client, SWW_DENY_NETS comes first, then a ban on its netblock,
// so that a client either refuses is not looked up, then the lookup of
// its AS number and country, then the country lists, then the blocklists,
// then the CrowdSec decision list, which bans the client it lists, then
// the DNSBL zones' verdicts, and then AbuseIPDB's score; a request any of
// them refuses is not counted for the rate limits. Then come the
// rate limits, unless the client is in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS or the
// request's path is exempt under SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS, so that
// every other request is counted, each of them by the client's limit
// percentages, then SWW_TRAP_PATHS, then the rule files, then the header
// limits, and last the Core Rule Set. A request exempt from the rate limits
// is exempt from the byte limits too. ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
cfg := rq.h.config
if isInside(rq.client, cfg.AllowNets) {
return ""
// checkClient runs the heuristics of beforeLookup on the request, then looks
// up the client's AS number and country, then runs those of afterLookup. It
// returns the first verdict, or nil when none gives one. A client in
// SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS skips them all, and is not looked up. ctx is the request's
// own context.
func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) *verdict {
if isInside(rq.client, rq.h.config.AllowNets) {
return nil
}
now := rq.h.now()
if isInside(rq.client, cfg.DenyNets) {
return requestlog.ActionDenied
}
if rq.banned(now) {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
v := rq.runHeuristics(ctx, beforeLookup(), now)
if v != nil {
return v
}
rq.lookUp(ctx, now)
@@ -220,63 +220,11 @@ func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
// again: a request counted at the time it arrived could be counted
// after a later one of its client's, which the rate limits would take
// for the clock set back.
now = rq.h.now()
if rq.countryDenied() {
return requestlog.ActionCountryDenied
}
if rq.blocklistDenied() {
return requestlog.ActionDenied
}
if rq.crowdSecBanned(now) {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
}
if rq.dnsblDenied(ctx) || rq.abuseIPDBDenied(ctx) {
return requestlog.ActionDenied
}
rq.counted = rq.countedByRateLimits()
if rq.counted {
rq.limitPercent, rq.bytesPercent = rq.limitPercentages()
rq.line.LimitPercent, rq.line.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
rq.line.BytesPercent, rq.line.BytesPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
}
if rq.counted && rq.limitBroken(now) {
return requestlog.ActionRateLimited
}
if rq.trapPath(now) {
return requestlog.ActionBanned
}
action := rq.checkRules(now)
if action != "" {
return action
}
if rq.overHeaderLimits() {
return requestlog.ActionTooLarge
}
return rq.checkCoreRuleSet()
}
// countedByRateLimits reports whether the rate limits count the request: its
// client is not in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and its path is not exempt
// under SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS.
func (rq *request) countedByRateLimits() bool {
cfg := rq.h.config
return !isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) &&
!pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
return rq.runHeuristics(ctx, afterLookup(), rq.h.now())
}
// pathExempt reports whether r is exempt under prefixes,
// SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS or SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its
// SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS or SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its
// path as sent, the path the app receives, not percent-decoded, starts
// with one of prefixes, so that /%61ssets/x is not under /assets/ for an
// app whose router matches the path as received. A request whose decoded
@@ -314,8 +262,8 @@ func (rq *request) finish() {
}
duration := time.Since(rq.start)
line.DurationTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(duration)
line.DurationChecks = timing(rq.start, rq.checked)
line.DurationTotalMS = requestlog.Milliseconds(duration)
line.DurationChecksMS = timing(rq.start, rq.checked)
// Counted before the log line is written, so that the metrics count
// every request whose line is out. An allowed request is the exception:
@@ -356,15 +304,15 @@ func timing(start, end time.Time) *float64 {
// when it comes.
func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
request := ratelimit.Request{
Forwarded: rq.allowed,
Refused: rq.refused != nil,
Status: rq.out.status,
RequestBytes: rq.requestBytes,
ResponseBytes: rq.out.bytes,
BrokeLimit: rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
Attack: rq.attack,
RuleBlocked: rq.ruleBlocked,
WAFBlocked: rq.wafBlocked,
Forwarded: rq.allowed,
Refused: rq.refused != nil,
Status: rq.out.status,
RequestBytes: rq.requestBytes,
ResponseBytes: rq.out.bytes,
BrokeLimit: rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
Attack: rq.attack,
BlockedByBlockRule: rq.blockedByBlockRule,
BlockedByCoreRuleSet: rq.blockedByCoreRuleSet,
}
rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), rq.h.now(), request)
@@ -378,9 +326,9 @@ func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
// countAnomalies counts the request, which has ended, and its bytes, as
// countedBytes gives them, for the anomaly thresholds, whatever was done
// with it: a request refused, one from a client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS or
// SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and one for a path in
// SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS are counted too. It is counted for its
// with it: a request refused, one from a client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS or
// SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and one for a path in
// SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS are counted too. It is counted for its
// client's AS number when answerAtTheEnd gives one. With every anomaly
// threshold off, the default, it does nothing.
func (rq *request) countAnomalies() {
internal/discriminator/requestlog_test.go
+57 -14
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package discriminator_test
import (
"encoding/json"
"io"
"math"
"net/http"
@@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ import (
const (
// requestIDHeader carries the request's id.
requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
// instance is the SWW_INSTANCE_NAME a test sets.
// instance is the SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME a test sets.
instance = "fsn1app1/blog"
// ipv6Client is a client on IPv6, and ipv6Group the netblock the rate
// limits count it as.
@@ -155,9 +156,9 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
// withTimings returns want with the timings of line.
func withTimings(line logLine, want requestlog.Line) requestlog.Line {
want.DurationTotal = line.DurationTotal
want.DurationChecks = line.DurationChecks
want.DurationUpstreamTotal = line.DurationUpstreamTotal
want.DurationTotalMS = line.DurationTotalMS
want.DurationChecksMS = line.DurationChecksMS
want.DurationUpstreamTotalMS = line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS
return want
}
@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ func TestHasAuthorizationAndHasCookieEachComeFromTheirOwnHeader(t *testing.T) {
func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
// The pause sets the times apart; a hold-up of the test only lengthens
@@ -225,10 +226,10 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
// A request passed to the app has every timing; one refused, none of
// the app's; the health check, which runs no check, only the total.
wantTimings(t, forwarded, "duration_total", "duration_checks",
"duration_upstream_total")
wantTimings(t, refused, "duration_total", "duration_checks")
wantTimings(t, health, "duration_total")
wantTimings(t, forwarded, "duration_total_ms", "duration_checks_ms",
"duration_upstream_total_ms")
wantTimings(t, refused, "duration_total_ms", "duration_checks_ms")
wantTimings(t, health, "duration_total_ms")
if t.Failed() {
return
@@ -236,9 +237,9 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
// In whole microseconds, as they are logged, so that the sum below is
// exact.
total := microseconds(forwarded.DurationTotal)
checks := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationChecks)
upstream := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamTotal)
total := microseconds(forwarded.DurationTotalMS)
checks := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationChecksMS)
upstream := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamTotalMS)
// The checks end before the request is handed to the app.
if checks+upstream > total {
@@ -246,9 +247,9 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
total, checks, upstream)
}
if *refused.DurationChecks > refused.DurationTotal {
if *refused.DurationChecksMS > refused.DurationTotalMS {
t.Errorf("refused request's checks took %v of %v milliseconds",
*refused.DurationChecks, refused.DurationTotal)
*refused.DurationChecksMS, refused.DurationTotalMS)
}
}
@@ -272,6 +273,48 @@ func wantTimings(t *testing.T, line logLine, want ...string) {
}
}
// wantHeuristic checks that line names heuristic as the one that refused the
// request, with figures, a JSON object. A heuristic of "" with figures "null" is
// a line that names none.
func wantHeuristic(t *testing.T, line logLine, heuristic, figures string) {
t.Helper()
if line.Heuristic != heuristic ||
!reflect.DeepEqual(line.HeuristicFigures, decodeFigures(t, figures)) {
t.Errorf("log line has heuristic %q with heuristic_figures %v, want %q with %s",
line.Heuristic, line.HeuristicFigures, heuristic, figures)
}
}
// wantAfterAnswerHeuristic checks after_answer_heuristic and
// after_answer_heuristic_figures as wantHeuristic checks heuristic and
// heuristic_figures.
func wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t *testing.T, line logLine, heuristic, figures string) {
t.Helper()
if line.AfterAnswerHeuristic != heuristic ||
!reflect.DeepEqual(line.AfterAnswerHeuristicFigures, decodeFigures(t, figures)) {
t.Errorf("log line has after_answer_heuristic %q with "+
"after_answer_heuristic_figures %v, want %q with %s",
line.AfterAnswerHeuristic, line.AfterAnswerHeuristicFigures, heuristic, figures)
}
}
// decodeFigures decodes figures, a JSON object of a heuristic's figures, as
// the log line's figures are decoded.
func decodeFigures(t *testing.T, figures string) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
var decoded map[string]any
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(figures), &decoded)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode %s: %v", figures, err)
}
return decoded
}
// microseconds is a timing in whole microseconds.
func microseconds(milliseconds float64) int64 {
return int64(math.Round(milliseconds * 1000))
internal/discriminator/routewatchtags.go
+43
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic routewatch_tags. It reads SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL.
import (
"context"
"strconv"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
)
// routeWatchTags adds to the request the tags asn=<number> and prefix=<netblock>
// from what routewatch answered about the client. It refuses nothing, and the
// request does not wait for routewatch. A request that gets no tags from it has
// the reason in the log line's routewatch_tags_missing. While
// SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL is unset it does nothing. Answers are kept by client and
// asked for by the request's address, and a route without an origin AS gives only
// the prefix= tag.
type routeWatchTags struct{}
func (routeWatchTags) name() string { return "routewatch_tags" }
func (routeWatchTags) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
if rq.h.routeWatch == nil {
return nil
}
route, missing := rq.h.routeWatch.Route(ctx, rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), rq.client)
if missing != "" {
rq.line.RouteWatchTagsMissing = string(missing)
return nil
}
rq.addTag(config.PrefixTagPrefix + route.Netblock.String())
if route.ASN != 0 {
rq.addTag(config.ASNTagPrefix + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(route.ASN), 10))
}
return nil
}
internal/discriminator/routewatchtags_test.go
+245
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
package discriminator_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// routeWatchURL is SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL, and tagsMissing the log line's field
// that says why a request got no tags from routewatch.
const (
routeWatchURL = "SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL"
tagsMissing = "routewatch_tags_missing"
fromV6 = "2001:db8:1::5"
prefixV6 = "2001:db8::/32"
prefixDE = "203.0.113.0/24"
prefixKP = "198.51.100.0/24"
)
// standInRoute is what the stand-in for routewatch answers about an address.
type standInRoute struct {
Netblock string `json:"netblock"`
ASN int `json:"asn"`
}
// startRouteWatch starts a stand-in for routewatch's IP info API that knows the
// routes given by address, and returns its URL.
func startRouteWatch(t *testing.T, routes map[string]standInRoute) string {
t.Helper()
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
address := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/ip/")
result := map[string]any{"ip": address}
if route, known := routes[address]; known {
result["netblock"], result["asn"] = route.Netblock, route.ASN
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
"status": "ok",
"data": map[string]any{"results": []any{result}},
})
}))
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
return server.URL
}
// waitForRouteWatch waits until routewatch's answer about from, in the client
// group of the given length, is kept, so that the next request gets its tags.
func waitForRouteWatch(
t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, from string, bits int,
) {
t.Helper()
addr := netip.MustParseAddr(from)
client := netip.PrefixFrom(addr, bits).Masked()
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for {
_, missing := server.RouteWatch.Route(context.Background(), client, addr)
if missing == "" {
return
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatalf("routewatch's answer about %s not kept: %q", from, missing)
}
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
}
}
func wantTagsMissing(t *testing.T, line logLine, want string) {
t.Helper()
got, _ := line.fields[tagsMissing].(string)
if got != want {
t.Errorf("log line has %s %q, want %q", tagsMissing, got, want)
}
}
func TestRouteWatchTagsAreOnTheLogLineWithTheLookupsTags(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{fromDE: {prefixDE, 64496}})
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{routeWatchURL: url})
waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromDE, 32)
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantTags(t, line, "asn=64496", "country=DE", "prefix="+prefixDE)
wantTagsMissing(t, line, "")
}
func TestRouteWatchTagsAreOnALineDenyNetsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{fromKP: {prefixKP, 64511}})
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url, denyNets: fromKP,
})
waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromKP, 32)
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+fromKP+`/32"}`)
wantTags(t, line, "asn=64511", "prefix="+prefixKP)
}
func TestRouteWithoutAnOriginASGivesOnlyThePrefixTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{fromDE: {prefixDE, 0}})
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url,
})
waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromDE, 32)
wantTags(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
"prefix="+prefixDE)
}
func TestUnsetRouteWatchChangesNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{lookupSource: off})
if server.RouteWatch != nil {
t.Error("RouteWatch is set while SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL is unset")
}
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if _, present := line.fields[tagsMissing]; present {
t.Errorf("log line has %s", tagsMissing)
}
if _, present := line.fields["tags"]; present {
t.Errorf("log line has tags %v", line.fields["tags"])
}
}
func TestUnreachableRouteWatchLetsTheRequestThroughAndSaysWhy(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A stand-in that is closed at once, so that the port refuses connections.
dead := httptest.NewServer(http.NotFoundHandler())
url := dead.URL
dead.Close()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url,
})
wantTagsMissing(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
"no_answer_yet")
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for {
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
missing, _ := line.fields[tagsMissing].(string)
if missing == "request_failed" {
return
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatalf("still %q, want request_failed", missing)
}
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
}
}
func TestAddressWithoutARouteHasNoTagsAndTheLineSaysSo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: startRouteWatch(t, nil),
})
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for {
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
missing, _ := line.fields[tagsMissing].(string)
if missing == "no_route" {
return
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatalf("still %q, want no_route", missing)
}
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
}
}
func TestTagDenyRefusesOnARouteWatchPrefix(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{
fromDE: {prefixDE, 64496}, fromKP: {prefixKP, 64511},
})
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url, tagDeny: "prefix=" + prefixKP,
})
waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromKP, 32)
waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromDE, 32)
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
"tag_deny", `{"tag": "prefix=`+prefixKP+`"}`)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
func TestTagLimitPercentWorksWithAnIPv6Prefix(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{fromV6: {prefixV6, 64496}})
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url, rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
tagLimitPercent: "prefix=" + prefixV6 + ":50",
})
waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromV6, 64)
// Half of two is one: the second request breaks the limit.
line := s.get(fromV6, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantTags(t, line, "asn=64496", "prefix="+prefixV6)
s.get(fromV6, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
}
internal/discriminator/rulefiles.go
+62
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic rule_files. It reads the rules of the rule files, which
// SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR and SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED name.
import (
"context"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// ruleFiles checks the request against the rules of the rule files at now,
// notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, adds the tag
// exploitsignature when it matches any, and refuses the request
// when the last rule it matches refuses it: with ActionBlockedByBlockRule for a
// block rule, and for a ban rule with the action for the ban it makes. A ban
// rule bans the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack, or in observe
// mode raises the alert for the ban
// it would have made. Either rule's match is noted as an offence, for the
// client's history. Its figures are the rule's id and action.
type ruleFiles struct{}
func (ruleFiles) name() string { return "rule_files" }
func (ruleFiles) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
matched := rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in)
for _, rule := range matched {
rq.line.RuleIDs = append(rq.line.RuleIDs, rule.ID)
rq.h.metrics.RuleMatched(rule.ID, rule.Action)
}
if len(matched) == 0 {
return nil
}
rq.addTag(config.ExploitSignatureTag)
// Only the last rule matched can refuse the request.
last := matched[len(matched)-1]
figures := map[string]any{"rule_id": last.ID, "rule_action": last.Action}
switch last.Action {
case rules.ActionBlock:
rq.blockedByBlockRule = true
return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, figures: figures}
case rules.ActionBan:
rq.attack = true
return &verdict{
action: rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{RuleID: last.ID, Target: last.Target}),
figures: figures,
}
default:
return nil
}
}
internal/discriminator/rulefiles_test.go
+56 -21
View File
@@ -34,16 +34,17 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted")
// A block rule refuses with 403, whatever SWW_BAN_RESPONSE is, and
// A block rule refuses with 403, whatever SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE is, and
// bans no one.
line = s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "blocked")
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// A ban rule refuses with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, and bans the client for
// A ban rule refuses with SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and bans the client for
// seven days, the default.
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusTooManyRequests,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "probe")
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(7*24*time.Hour)) {
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
// against the rules, and makes the ban permanent.
clk.advance(time.Hour)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line)
if line.BanExpires != permanent {
@@ -90,7 +91,37 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
}
clk.advance(365 * 24 * time.Hour)
s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
}
func TestEachRuleActionAddsTheExploitSignatureTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/noted$\n"+testRules),
})
wantTags(t, s.request(client, "/noted", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
"exploitsignature")
wantTags(t, s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule), "exploitsignature")
wantTags(t, s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
}
func TestRuleRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndTheRule(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/\n"+testRules),
})
line := s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", `{"rule_id": "blocked", "rule_action": "block"}`)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", `{"rule_id": "probe", "rule_action": "ban"}`)
}
func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
@@ -101,8 +132,9 @@ func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
attackBanDuration: "1h",
})
// The first probe bans for SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION.
line := s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
// The first probe bans for SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION.
line := s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour)) {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want an hour on", line.BanExpires)
}
@@ -112,7 +144,8 @@ func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
clk.advance(time.Hour)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
if line.BanExpires != permanent {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
}
@@ -122,8 +155,8 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
)
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
@@ -133,14 +166,15 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
// A client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
line := s.request(allowed, "/.env", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantRuleIDs(t, line)
// A probe over the rate limit breaks the limit before any rule sees
// it.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
wantRuleIDs(t, line)
limitBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
@@ -150,7 +184,7 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
// A client the rate limits do not apply to is still checked.
s.get(exempt, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.request(exempt, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(exempt, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -162,11 +196,11 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
})
line := s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "blocked")
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "probe")
if line.BanExpires != "" {
@@ -190,9 +224,10 @@ func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
metricsToken: token,
})
s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
metrics := s.scrape()
wantMetric(t, metrics,
@@ -200,10 +235,10 @@ func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`sww_rule_matches_total{action="ban",instance="app",rule_id="probe"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rules_loaded{instance="app"}`, 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="rule_blocked",`+
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="blocked_by_block_rule",`+
`instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 1)
`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_block_rule"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="attack"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="attack",instance="app"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 0)
internal/discriminator/rules.go
-64
View File
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
package discriminator
import (
"slices"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// trapPath reports whether the request asks for a path in
// SWW_TRAP_PATHS: its path as a path rule sees it, without the query,
// as sent or once percent-decoded, is one of them. Such a request is a
// clear sign of attack, as a ban rule's match is: it bans the client's
// netblock, or in observe mode raises the alert for the ban it would have
// made. The ban's notes give the path as sent.
func (rq *request) trapPath(now time.Time) bool {
path := rules.Path(rq.in)
if !slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, path) &&
!slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, rules.DecodeOnce(path)) {
return false
}
rq.attack = true
rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{TrapPath: path})
return true
}
// checkRules checks the request against the rules of the rule files at
// now, notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, and returns the
// action of the rule that refuses it, ActionRuleBlocked for a block rule
// and ActionBanned for a ban rule, or "" when none does. A ban rule bans
// the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack, or in observe mode
// raises the alert for the ban it would have made. Either rule's match
// is noted as an offence, for the client's history.
func (rq *request) checkRules(now time.Time) string {
matched := rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in)
for _, rule := range matched {
rq.line.RuleIDs = append(rq.line.RuleIDs, rule.ID)
rq.h.metrics.RuleMatched(rule.ID, rule.Action)
}
if len(matched) == 0 {
return ""
}
// Only the last rule matched can refuse the request.
switch last := matched[len(matched)-1]; last.Action {
case rules.ActionBlock:
rq.ruleBlocked = true
return requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked
case rules.ActionBan:
rq.attack = true
rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{RuleID: last.ID, Target: last.Target})
return requestlog.ActionBanned
default:
return ""
}
}
internal/discriminator/staticlists_test.go
+26 -18
View File
@@ -26,19 +26,18 @@ func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheck(t *testing.T) {
calls.Add(1)
})
geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
// fromKP is in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, and in SWW_DENY_NETS too, which
// fromKP is in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS, and in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS too, which
// comes after it.
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
allowNets: "198.51.100.0/24",
denyNets: fromKP,
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
// Neither SWW_DENY_NETS, the country lists nor the limit of one
// request a minute refuses the client, and its country is not looked
// up.
// Neither SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS, SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY nor the limit of one request a
// minute refuses the client, and its country is not looked up.
wantAnswers(t, addr, out, []sentRequest{
{fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
@@ -69,7 +68,7 @@ func TestRequestFromAllowNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
})
}
@@ -83,9 +82,9 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
})
geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
denyNets: "203.0.113.0/24",
deniedCountries: "kp",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
denyNets: "203.0.113.0/24",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("a body"))
@@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
line := out.endedLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
if len(asked()) != 0 {
t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %v, want nothing", asked())
@@ -104,6 +103,15 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestDenyNetsRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndNetblock(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{denyNets: clientsNet})
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+clientsNet+`"}`)
}
func TestRequestRefusedByDenyNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -117,10 +125,10 @@ func TestRequestRefusedByDenyNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
// listedAddr's refused requests are not counted, so the first request
// from unlistedAddr is within the limit of one a minute.
wantAnswers(t, addr, out, []sentRequest{
{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
})
}
@@ -133,19 +141,19 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptNetsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitExemptNets: listedAddr + "," + fromKP,
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
// listedAddr's requests are neither refused nor counted, so the first
// request from unlistedAddr is within the limit of one a minute. The
// country lists still refuse an exempt client.
// request from unlistedAddr is within the limit of one a minute.
// SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY still refuses an exempt client.
wantAnswers(t, addr, out, []sentRequest{
{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
{fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
})
}
internal/discriminator/tagdeny.go
+30
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic tag_deny. It reads SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY.
import (
"context"
"slices"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// tagDeny refuses a request that carries a tag in SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY. Its figure is
// the first such tag, in sorted order.
type tagDeny struct{}
func (tagDeny) name() string { return "tag_deny" }
func (tagDeny) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
for _, tag := range rq.line.Tags {
if slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TagDeny, tag) {
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
figures: map[string]any{"tag": tag},
}
}
}
return nil
}
internal/discriminator/tagdeny_test.go
+124
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
package discriminator_test
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
func TestTagDenyRefusesALookupTagAndNamesTheTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The setting takes a country code in either case; the request's tag is
// in capitals.
s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{tagDeny: "Country=kp"})
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "country=KP"}`)
wantTags(t, line, "asn=64511", "country=KP")
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
func TestTagDenyRefusesAnASNTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{tagDeny: "asn=64511"})
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
"tag_deny", `{"tag": "asn=64511"}`)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
func TestTagDenyRefusesAListTagBeforeTheRateLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
tagLists: "torexit=" + torList, tagDeny: "torexit", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{torList: {fromDE}})
// Each is refused for its tag: none is counted to break the limit of one.
for range 3 {
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
"tag_deny", `{"tag": "torexit"}`)
}
}
func TestTagDenyRefusesAMixedCaseZoneByItsLowerCaseTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const mixedCaseZone = "DNSBL.example"
// The zone's tag is in lower case, however SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES writes it.
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
dnsblZones: mixedCaseZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver,
reputationAction: actionLog, tagDeny: "dnsbl=" + dnsblZone,
})
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {mixedCaseZone}})
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
"tag_deny", `{"tag": "dnsbl=`+dnsblZone+`"}`)
}
func TestTagDenyRefusesAnExploitSignatureOfARuleThatOnlyLogs(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/\n"), tagDeny: "exploitsignature",
})
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "exploitsignature"}`)
wantTags(t, line, "exploitsignature")
}
func TestTagLimitPercentLowersALimitTheLowestWinning(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: fourAMinute,
tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList + ",tor=" + torList,
tagLimitPercent: "vpn:50,tor:25",
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromDE}, torList: {fromDE}})
// A quarter of 4 requests a minute: the second breaks the limit.
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
"25 from "+tagLimitPercent)
}
func TestTagLimitPercentLowersAByteLimitByAListTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
bytesLimitPerMinute: twoUploads,
tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList,
tagLimitPercent: "vpn:50",
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromDE}})
// The upload's 100 bytes are over half of 199, 99.
line := s.uploadFrom(fromDE)
if line.LimitHit != minuteBytes {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want %s", line.LimitHit, minuteBytes)
}
wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
"50 from "+tagLimitPercent)
// fromKP, which the list does not hold, has the whole limit.
line = s.uploadFrom(fromKP)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line for %s has limit_hit %q, want none", fromKP, line.LimitHit)
}
wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting, none)
}
internal/discriminator/taglists.go
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic tag_lists. It reads the address lists of SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS through
// the reputation lists.
import (
"context"
"time"
)
// tagLists adds to the request one tag for each list of SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS that
// holds the client, the tag being the list's name. It refuses nothing, and runs
// first so that every refusal's log line carries these tags.
type tagLists struct{}
func (tagLists) name() string { return "tag_lists" }
func (tagLists) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
for _, name := range rq.h.lists.TagsOf(rq.client) {
rq.addTag(name)
}
return nil
}
internal/discriminator/taglists_test.go
+100
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
package discriminator_test
import (
"net/http"
"slices"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// tagLists is SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS, and vpnList and torList lists it names.
const (
tagLists = "SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS"
vpnList = "https://lists.example/vpn.txt"
torList = "https://lists.example/torexit.txt"
)
// wantTags checks the log line's tags.
func wantTags(t *testing.T, line logLine, want ...string) {
t.Helper()
got, _ := line.fields["tags"].([]any)
tags := make([]string, 0, len(got))
for _, tag := range got {
text, _ := tag.(string)
tags = append(tags, text)
}
if !slices.Equal(tags, want) {
t.Errorf("log line has tags %v, want %v", tags, want)
}
}
func TestLookupAndTagListsGiveTheRequestItsTagsSorted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
tagLists: "vpn=mullvad=" + vpnList + ",TorExit=" + torList,
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{
vpnList: {fromDE}, torList: {fromDE + "/32", fromKP},
})
wantTags(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
"asn=64496", "country=DE", "torexit", "vpn=mullvad")
wantTags(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
"asn=64511", "country=KP", "torexit")
}
func TestRequestWithoutATagLeavesTheFieldOut(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// With no lookup, a client is not placed and no setting gives it a tag.
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{lookupSource: "off"})
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if _, present := line.fields["tags"]; present {
t.Errorf("log line has tags %v, want none", line.fields["tags"])
}
}
func TestTagListsTagEvenARequestTheCountryListRefuses(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList, allowedCountries: "de",
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromKP}})
wantTags(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied),
"asn=64511", "country=KP", "vpn")
}
func TestTagListsTagARequestRefusedBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList, denyNets: fromKP, rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromDE, fromKP}})
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
if line.Heuristic != "deny_nets" {
t.Errorf("log line has heuristic %q, want deny_nets", line.Heuristic)
}
wantTags(t, line, "vpn")
// The second request breaks the limit of one a minute, which bans the client.
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
line = s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
if line.Heuristic != "active_ban" {
t.Errorf("log line has heuristic %q, want active_ban", line.Heuristic)
}
wantTags(t, line, "vpn")
}
internal/discriminator/trappaths.go
+37
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic trap_paths. It reads SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS.
import (
"context"
"slices"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// trapPaths refuses a request for a path in SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS: its path as a
// path rule sees it, without the query, as sent or once percent-decoded, is one
// of them. Such a request is a clear sign of attack, as a ban rule's match is:
// it bans the client's netblock, or in observe mode raises the alert for the
// ban it would have made. The ban's notes give the path as sent, and so does
// its figure.
type trapPaths struct{}
func (trapPaths) name() string { return "trap_paths" }
func (trapPaths) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
path := rules.Path(rq.in)
if !slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, path) &&
!slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, rules.DecodeOnce(path)) {
return nil
}
rq.attack = true
return &verdict{
action: rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{TrapPath: path}),
figures: map[string]any{"path": path},
}
}
internal/discriminator/trappaths_test.go
+22 -10
View File
@@ -14,14 +14,14 @@ import (
// trapPaths is the setting's name, and trapPathList what the tests set it
// to.
const (
trapPaths = "SWW_TRAP_PATHS"
trapPaths = "SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS"
trapPathList = "/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php"
)
func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
// A block rule for the same path: the trap path comes first.
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
@@ -38,12 +38,12 @@ func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
s.request(otherClient, path, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
// A client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
s.request(allowed, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// The query is not part of the path.
line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x", http.StatusTooManyRequests,
requestlog.ActionBanned)
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(7*24*time.Hour)) {
@@ -77,12 +77,22 @@ func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
}
// The next request is refused under the ban, and makes it permanent.
line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
if line.BanExpires != permanent {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
}
}
func TestTrapPathRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{trapPaths: trapPathList})
line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "trap_paths", `{"path": "/wp-login.php"}`)
}
func TestTrapPathMatchesThePathDecodedOnce(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -90,7 +100,8 @@ func TestTrapPathMatchesThePathDecodedOnce(t *testing.T) {
// %2577 decodes once to %77, not to w.
s.request(otherClient, "/%2577p-login.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.request(client, "/%77p-login.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(client, "/%77p-login.php", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
// The ban's notes give the path as the client sent it.
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
@@ -103,11 +114,12 @@ func TestTrapPathsNeedNoRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList,
"SWW_RULES_ENABLED": "false",
trapPaths: trapPathList,
"SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED": "false",
})
s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
}
func TestObserveModeLogsWhatATrapPathWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -119,7 +131,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatATrapPathWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
})
line := s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
// No ban was made.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
internal/lookup/file.go
+17 -7
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ const quietTime = 2 * time.Second
// FileParams are what OpenFile needs.
type FileParams struct {
// Path is the lookup database, the IPinfo Lite file in its .mmdb form
// (SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH).
// (SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH).
Path string
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now.
Now func() time.Time
@@ -133,8 +133,11 @@ func (f *File) Watch(ctx context.Context) {
}
if err != nil {
f.params.ProcessLog.Error("cannot watch the lookup database for replacements",
"error", err.Error())
f.params.ProcessLog.Error(
"cannot watch the lookup database for replacements",
"error",
err.Error(),
)
return
}
@@ -194,7 +197,10 @@ func (f *File) readAgain() {
f.params.Alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
Event: alerts.EventFileError,
Reason: kept,
Detail: map[string]any{"file": f.params.Path, "error": err.Error()},
Detail: map[string]any{
"file": f.params.Path,
"error": err.Error(),
},
})
f.params.ProcessLog.Error(kept, "error", err.Error())
@@ -212,7 +218,11 @@ func (f *File) use(reader *maxminddb.Reader) {
f.lastRead = f.params.Now()
f.mu.Unlock()
f.params.ProcessLog.Info("read the lookup database", "file", f.params.Path)
f.params.ProcessLog.Info(
"read the lookup database",
"file",
f.params.Path,
)
}
// read reads the lookup database at path. The whole file is read into
@@ -221,12 +231,12 @@ func (f *File) use(reader *maxminddb.Reader) {
func read(path string) (*maxminddb.Reader, error) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // the file the admin names
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: %w", err)
}
reader, err := maxminddb.OpenBytes(data)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH %s is not a .mmdb file: %w", path, err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH %s is not a .mmdb file: %w", path, err)
}
return reader, nil
internal/lookup/file_internal_test.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ func TestFileThatCannotBeReadIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
writeFile(t, notDatabase, "not a lookup database\n")
for path, want := range map[string]string{
missing: "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: open " + missing +
missing: "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: open " + missing +
": no such file or directory",
notDatabase: "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + notDatabase +
notDatabase: "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + notDatabase +
" is not a .mmdb file: error opening database: invalid MaxMind DB file",
} {
_, err := OpenFile(FileParams{
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ func TestReplacementThatCannotBeReadLeavesTheFileInUseWithOneAlert(t *testing.T)
Reason: "the lookup database cannot be read, and the one read before stays in use",
Detail: map[string]any{
"file": path,
"error": "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + path + " is not a .mmdb file: " +
"error": "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + path + " is not a .mmdb file: " +
"error opening database: invalid MaxMind DB file",
},
})
internal/lookup/lookup.go
+5 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// Package lookup looks up each client's AS number and country, through
// the GeoJS web service or in the lookup database, the IPinfo Lite file
// SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names. GeoJS's answers are kept in memory, for at
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names. GeoJS's answers are kept in memory, for at
// most 100,000 clients and for 7 days each, and are written to
// lookups.json and read from it by the state package.
package lookup
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ type Params struct {
URL string
// Timeout is how long a request waits for its client's first answer,
// and how long a request to GeoJS may take before it is abandoned
// (SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT).
// (SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT).
Timeout time.Duration
// Wait is true when a setting needs each request's answer before the
// request goes on. Otherwise no request waits for one.
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
answer, found := g.kept(client)
if !found {
g.metrics.GeoJSUnanswered.Inc()
g.metrics.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc()
}
w, waiting := g.waiting[client]
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
}
if w == nil {
g.metrics.GeoJSUnanswered.Inc()
g.metrics.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc()
return Answer{}, nil // too many clients wait already
}
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
}
if w.late {
g.metrics.GeoJSUnanswered.Inc()
g.metrics.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc()
return Answer{}, nil
}
internal/lookup/lookup_test.go
+8 -8
View File
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ func TestWithoutWaitTheRequestGoesOnAtOnceAndTheAnswerIsGivenWhenItComes(
mu.Unlock()
wantCountry(t, g, client, germany)
wantUnanswered(t, m, 0)
wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t, m, 0)
})
}
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ func TestClientsWithoutAnAnswerAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
// GeoJS fails, so the first client goes without an answer, and GeoJS
// is left alone for a second, which does not pass in this test.
wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
wantUnanswered(t, m, 1)
wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t, m, 1)
// Meanwhile each new client goes without one at once, while there is
// room for it among the 10,000 that may wait.
@@ -604,11 +604,11 @@ func TestClientsWithoutAnAnswerAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
}
wantUnanswered(t, m, 10000)
wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t, m, 10000)
// One more, for which there is no room, goes without one too.
wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
wantUnanswered(t, m, 10001)
wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t, m, 10001)
})
}
@@ -841,12 +841,12 @@ func wantAsked(t *testing.T, geojs *standIn, i int, want ...string) {
}
}
// wantUnanswered checks how many requests m counts as having gone without
// an answer from GeoJS.
func wantUnanswered(t *testing.T, m *metrics.Metrics, want float64) {
// wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer checks how many requests m counts as having
// gone without an answer from GeoJS.
func wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t *testing.T, m *metrics.Metrics, want float64) {
t.Helper()
got := testutil.ToFloat64(m.GeoJSUnanswered)
got := testutil.ToFloat64(m.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer)
if got != want {
t.Errorf("%v requests went without an answer, want %v", got, want)
}
internal/metrics/busiest.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ type busiest struct {
requests *prometheus.CounterVec
requestBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
responseBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
// refused are, by country, the requests the country lists refused; nil
// refused are, by country, the requests the country list refused; nil
// by AS number.
refused *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ type busiest struct {
func newCountries(topN int) *busiest {
countries := newBusiest(topN, "country", "the client's country")
countries.refused = counterVec("sww_country_list_refusals_total",
"Requests the country lists refused, by the client's country.",
"Requests SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES refused, by the client's country.",
[]string{"country"})
return countries
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ func (b *busiest) Collect(ch chan<- prometheus.Metric) {
}
// vecs returns the metrics: by AS number, those of requests and bytes; by
// country, the refusals by the country lists as well.
// country, the refusals by the country list as well.
func (b *busiest) vecs() []*prometheus.CounterVec {
vecs := []*prometheus.CounterVec{b.requests, b.requestBytes, b.responseBytes}
if b.refused != nil {
internal/metrics/metrics.go
+40 -40
View File
@@ -28,15 +28,15 @@ type Metrics struct {
registry prometheus.Registerer
handler http.Handler
inFlight prometheus.Gauge
requests *prometheus.CounterVec
requestBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
responseBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
requestDuration prometheus.Histogram
upstreamDuration prometheus.Histogram
rateLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
offences *prometheus.CounterVec
wafMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
inFlight prometheus.Gauge
requests *prometheus.CounterVec
requestBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
responseBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
requestDuration prometheus.Histogram
upstreamDuration prometheus.Histogram
rateLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
offences *prometheus.CounterVec
coreRuleSetMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
// ruleMatches are made by AddRules, and reputationHits by
// AddReputation.
ruleMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ type Metrics struct {
asns *busiest
// GeoJSRequests are the requests to GeoJS, and GeoJSFailures those
// that failed. GeoJSUnanswered are the requests that needed their
// client's answer, for a setting that acts on it, and went on without
// it because GeoJS had not given it in time.
GeoJSRequests prometheus.Counter
GeoJSFailures prometheus.Counter
GeoJSUnanswered prometheus.Counter
// that failed. RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer are the requests that needed
// their client's answer, for a setting that acts on it, and went on
// without it because GeoJS had not given it in time.
GeoJSRequests prometheus.Counter
GeoJSFailures prometheus.Counter
RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer prometheus.Counter
stateFileWrites *prometheus.CounterVec
stateFileWriteFailures *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ type Metrics struct {
// New returns the metrics, with the Go runtime's and the process's own.
// topN is how many countries and how many AS numbers get series of their
// own (SWW_METRICS_TOP_N). Every metric carries instanceName
// (SWW_INSTANCE_NAME) as its label instance.
// own (SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N). Every metric carries instanceName
// (SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME) as its label instance.
//
//nolint:funlen // a few lines for each metric, a list that grows with them
func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
[]string{"window", "kind"}),
offences: counterVec("sww_offences_total",
"Offences, by kind.", []string{"kind"}),
wafMatches: counterVec("sww_waf_matches_total",
"Requests that matched a rule of the Core Rule Set, by SWW_WAF_MODE "+
coreRuleSetMatches: counterVec("sww_core_rule_set_matches_total",
"Requests that matched a rule of the Core Rule Set, by SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE "+
"and the rule's id.", []string{"mode", "rule_id"}),
countries: newCountries(topN),
asns: newASNs(topN),
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
Name: "sww_geojs_failures_total",
Help: "Requests to GeoJS that failed.",
}),
GeoJSUnanswered: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "sww_geojs_unanswered_total",
RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "sww_requests_without_geojs_answer_total",
Help: "Requests that needed their client's answer from GeoJS and " +
"went on without it, because GeoJS had not given it in time.",
}),
@@ -139,9 +139,9 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
collectors.NewProcessCollector(collectors.ProcessCollectorOpts{}),
m.inFlight, m.requests, m.requestBytes, m.responseBytes,
m.requestDuration, m.upstreamDuration,
m.rateLimitHits, m.offences, m.wafMatches,
m.rateLimitHits, m.offences, m.coreRuleSetMatches,
m.countries, m.asns,
m.GeoJSRequests, m.GeoJSFailures, m.GeoJSUnanswered,
m.GeoJSRequests, m.GeoJSFailures, m.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer,
m.stateFileWrites, m.stateFileWriteFailures,
m.stateFileLastWrite, m.stateFileSize,
m.stateFileEditsTakenIn, m.stateFileEditsSetAside,
@@ -214,13 +214,13 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddRules(ruleFiles *rules.Files) {
}
// AddRemoteLog adds the metrics of sending the log lines to
// SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL, read from remote as the metrics are asked for: the
// SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, read from remote as the metrics are asked for: the
// lines sent, those dropped, and those waiting in the buffer.
func (m *Metrics) AddRemoteLog(remote *remotelog.Sender) {
m.registry.MustRegister(
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "sww_remote_log_lines_sent_total",
Help: "Log lines sent to SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL.",
Help: "Log lines sent to SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL.",
}, func() float64 {
return float64(remote.Sent())
}),
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddRemoteLog(remote *remotelog.Sender) {
return float64(remote.Dropped())
}),
prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
Name: "sww_remote_log_buffer_depth",
Name: "sww_remote_log_lines_waiting",
Help: "Log lines in the buffer, waiting to be sent.",
}, func() float64 {
return float64(remote.Depth())
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddReputation(lists *reputation.Lists, dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL
// AddAbuseIPDB adds the metrics of AbuseIPDB, with the source abuseipdb,
// read from abuseIPDB as the metrics are asked for: the checks made, those
// that failed, and how many checks the day's budget has left. It is
// called once, after AddReputation, while SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
// called once, after AddReputation, while SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
func (m *Metrics) AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
source := prometheus.Labels{sourceLabel: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource}
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
m.registry.MustRegister(
prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
Name: "sww_reputation_daily_budget_remaining",
Help: "Checks of the day's SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET not yet spent.",
Help: "Checks of the day's SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET not yet spent.",
ConstLabels: source,
}, func() float64 {
return float64(abuseIPDB.BudgetLeft())
@@ -355,16 +355,16 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddAlerts(queue *alerts.Queue) {
return float64(queue.Counts(name).Sent)
}),
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "sww_alerts_failed_total",
Name: "sww_alert_send_failures_total",
Help: "Requests to the destination that failed.",
ConstLabels: destination,
}, func() float64 {
return float64(queue.Counts(name).Failed)
return float64(queue.Counts(name).SendFailures)
}),
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "sww_alerts_suppressed_total",
Help: "Alerts held back: repeats within SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN, and " +
"alerts past SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary.",
Help: "Alerts held back: repeats within SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN, and " +
"alerts past SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary.",
ConstLabels: destination,
}, func() float64 {
return float64(queue.Suppressed())
@@ -424,10 +424,10 @@ func (m *Metrics) LimitHit(hit ratelimit.Hit) {
// them.
func (m *Metrics) Offences(r ratelimit.Request) {
for kind, committed := range map[string]bool{
"limit": r.BrokeLimit,
"attack": r.Attack,
"rule_blocked": r.RuleBlocked,
"waf_blocked": r.WAFBlocked,
"limit": r.BrokeLimit,
"attack": r.Attack,
"blocked_by_block_rule": r.BlockedByBlockRule,
"blocked_by_core_rule_set": r.BlockedByCoreRuleSet,
} {
if committed {
m.offences.WithLabelValues(kind).Inc()
@@ -441,10 +441,10 @@ func (m *Metrics) RuleMatched(id, action string) {
m.ruleMatches.WithLabelValues(id, action).Inc()
}
// WAFMatched counts a request that matched the Core Rule Set's rule id,
// with SWW_WAF_MODE at mode.
func (m *Metrics) WAFMatched(mode string, id int) {
m.wafMatches.WithLabelValues(mode, strconv.Itoa(id)).Inc()
// CoreRuleSetMatched counts a request that matched the Core Rule Set's rule id,
// with SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE at mode.
func (m *Metrics) CoreRuleSetMatched(mode string, id int) {
m.coreRuleSetMatches.WithLabelValues(mode, strconv.Itoa(id)).Inc()
}
// StateFileWritten counts a write of the state file name, of size bytes,
internal/ratelimit/ratelimit.go
+19 -18
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// and bytes counted over a minute, an hour and a day, as the "Counting
// method" section of SPEC.md describes, which tell when a request takes
// the client over a rate limit or a byte limit, and each client's history
// since it was first seen. At most SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS clients are
// since it was first seen. At most SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS clients are
// kept, in memory, and written to clients.json and read from it by the
// state package.
package ratelimit
@@ -122,12 +122,13 @@ type Responses struct {
type Offences struct {
// Limit is its requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
// error burst, Attack those that were a clear sign of attack, a match
// of a ban rule or a request for a trap path, RuleBlocked those a block
// rule refused, and WAFBlocked those the Core Rule Set refused.
Limit int64 `json:"limit"`
Attack int64 `json:"attack"`
RuleBlocked int64 `json:"rule_blocked"`
WAFBlocked int64 `json:"waf_blocked"`
// of a ban rule or a request for a trap path, BlockedByBlockRule those a
// block rule refused, and BlockedByCoreRuleSet those the Core Rule Set
// refused.
Limit int64 `json:"limit"`
Attack int64 `json:"attack"`
BlockedByBlockRule int64 `json:"blocked_by_block_rule"`
BlockedByCoreRuleSet int64 `json:"blocked_by_core_rule_set"`
// TokenRefused is what a clients.json written by an earlier version gives,
// which must still load. Nothing adds to it.
TokenRefused int64 `json:"token_refused,omitempty"`
@@ -147,16 +148,16 @@ type Request struct {
ResponseBytes int64
// BrokeLimit is true for a request that broke a rate limit, a byte
// limit or the error burst, Attack for one that matched a ban rule or
// asked for a trap path, RuleBlocked for one a block rule refused, and
// WAFBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused.
BrokeLimit bool
Attack bool
RuleBlocked bool
WAFBlocked bool
// asked for a trap path, BlockedByBlockRule for one a block rule refused,
// and BlockedByCoreRuleSet for one the Core Rule Set refused.
BrokeLimit bool
Attack bool
BlockedByBlockRule bool
BlockedByCoreRuleSet bool
}
// New returns a Limiter for limits, with no client counted yet, whose
// table holds at most maxClients clients (SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS). Past
// table holds at most maxClients clients (SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS). Past
// it, the least recently seen client is dropped, with its history, and
// starts afresh if it comes back.
func New(limits Limits, maxClients int) *Limiter {
@@ -323,12 +324,12 @@ func (l *Limiter) AddToHistory(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, r Request) {
h.Offences.Attack++
}
if r.RuleBlocked {
h.Offences.RuleBlocked++
if r.BlockedByBlockRule {
h.Offences.BlockedByBlockRule++
}
if r.WAFBlocked {
h.Offences.WAFBlocked++
if r.BlockedByCoreRuleSet {
h.Offences.BlockedByCoreRuleSet++
}
}
internal/ratelimit/ratelimit_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import (
const limit = 3
// tableSize is the most clients the tests' tables hold, the default of
// SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS.
// SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS.
const tableSize = 20000
// whole is the percentage of each limit a client gets when nothing lowers
internal/remotelog/remotelog.go
+8 -8
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
// Package remotelog sends the lines sww writes on stdout to the
// remote log endpoint, SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL, as the "Request log" section
// remote log endpoint, SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, as the "Request log" section
// of SPEC.md describes: each line as the message of an RFC 5424 syslog
// record, over UDP, TCP or TLS. Lines wait in a bounded buffer, so a slow
// or unreachable endpoint never holds up a request or stdout.
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The forms of SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL, by its scheme.
// The forms of SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, by its scheme.
const (
SchemeUDP = "syslog+udp"
SchemeTCP = "syslog+tcp"
@@ -56,18 +56,18 @@ const (
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
// URL is the endpoint (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL): SchemeUDP, SchemeTCP or
// URL is the endpoint (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL): SchemeUDP, SchemeTCP or
// SchemeTLS, a host and a port.
URL *url.URL
// RootCAs are the certificates a SchemeTLS endpoint's certificate
// must chain to (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE), nil for the host's.
// must chain to (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE), nil for the host's.
RootCAs *x509.CertPool
// Buffer is the most lines held while they wait to be sent
// (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER).
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER).
Buffer int
// Facility is the number of the records' syslog facility
// (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY), and AppName their APP-NAME
// (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME).
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY), and AppName their APP-NAME
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME).
Facility int
AppName string
}
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ func (s *Sender) send(ctx context.Context, processLog *slog.Logger) net.Conn {
}
}
processLog.Warn("sending to SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed",
processLog.Warn("sending to SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed",
"error", err.Error(), "connecting_again_in", delay.String())
select {
internal/remotelog/remotelog_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ func wantRetries(t *testing.T, logged *output, delays ...string) {
var fields map[string]any
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &fields)
if err != nil || fields["msg"] != "sending to SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed" {
if err != nil || fields["msg"] != "sending to SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed" {
t.Fatalf("logged %q", line)
}
internal/reputation/abuseipdb.go
+5 -5
View File
@@ -58,17 +58,17 @@ type Checks struct {
// AbuseIPDBParams are what NewAbuseIPDB needs.
type AbuseIPDBParams struct {
// URL is where clients are checked, normally AbuseIPDBURL, with Key,
// the account's key (SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY).
// the account's key (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY).
URL string
Key string
// MinScore is the least score that is a hit (SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE),
// MinScore is the least score that is a hit (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE),
// and DailyBudget the most checks made in a day, in UTC
// (SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET).
// (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET).
MinScore int64
DailyBudget int
// CacheTTL is how long a score is used after it was fetched
// (SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a check may take
// (SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT).
// (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a check may take
// (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT).
CacheTTL time.Duration
Timeout time.Duration
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
internal/reputation/dnsbl.go
+7 -7
View File
@@ -53,15 +53,15 @@ type Verdict struct {
// DNSBLParams are what NewDNSBL needs.
type DNSBLParams struct {
// Zones are the DNSBL zones clients are asked about in
// (SWW_DNSBL_ZONES).
// (SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES).
Zones []string
// Resolver is the resolver they are asked through
// (SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER), or, while it is the zero AddrPort, the
// (SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER), or, while it is the zero AddrPort, the
// host's, as /etc/resolv.conf names it.
Resolver netip.AddrPort
// CacheTTL is how long a verdict is used after it was fetched
// (SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a query may take
// (SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT).
// (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a query may take
// (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT).
CacheTTL time.Duration
Timeout time.Duration
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
@@ -127,13 +127,13 @@ func NewDNSBL(params DNSBLParams) *DNSBL {
}
}
// Zones returns the zones, in the order SWW_DNSBL_ZONES names them.
// Zones returns the zones, in the order SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES names them.
func (d *DNSBL) Zones() []string {
return slices.Clone(d.params.Zones)
}
// ListedBy returns the zones whose verdict on addr, a client's address,
// lists it, in the order SWW_DNSBL_ZONES names them, each with its key
// lists it, in the order SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES names them, each with its key
// masked, as config.MaskZoneKey masks it, since they go to the request
// log, the alerts and the metrics. A verdict is used until CacheTTL has
// passed since it was fetched. Each zone without one is asked about addr
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ func (d *DNSBL) Snapshot() []Verdict {
}
// Load keeps verdicts, read from reputation.json, in place of those it
// keeps, but for those of a zone SWW_DNSBL_ZONES does not name, and,
// keeps, but for those of a zone SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES does not name, and,
// past maxVerdicts, those fetched longest ago. One fetched CacheTTL ago or
// more is neither used nor written, as for any verdict.
func (d *DNSBL) Load(verdicts []Verdict) {
internal/reputation/dnsbl_test.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ const (
// zone and otherZone are the DNSBL zones the tests name.
zone = "dnsbl.example"
otherZone = "other.example"
// cacheTTL is the tests' SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL, and timeout their
// SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT: a second, the least time /etc/resolv.conf
// cacheTTL is the tests' SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL, and timeout their
// SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT: a second, the least time /etc/resolv.conf
// can have Go's resolver wait for one server, so that it is the
// DNSBL's own timeout that ends a query, whatever that file says.
cacheTTL = 24 * time.Hour
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ func TestNeitherAVerdictOfAZoneNotNamedNorOnePastItsTTLIsKept(t *testing.T) {
dnsbl := reputation.NewDNSBL(p)
// The last verdict still in use, one fetched a TTL ago, and one of a
// zone SWW_DNSBL_ZONES does not name.
// zone SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES does not name.
inUse := reputation.Verdict{
Zone: zone, Client: netip.MustParseAddr(listed), Listed: true,
Fetched: now.Add(-cacheTTL + time.Nanosecond),
internal/reputation/reputation.go
+47 -24
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
// Package reputation fetches the lists the settings name by URL: the
// blocklists of SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS, the file of AS:percent lines
// SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names, and the decision list of the CrowdSec
// engine SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL names. It keeps the last good copy of
// blocklists of SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS, the file of AS:percent lines
// SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names, the address lists of SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS, and
// the decision list of the CrowdSec engine SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL names. It
// keeps the last good copy of
// each, whole, comment lines included, which is used while a fetch fails,
// and when each was last tried. It also asks the DNSBL zones of
// SWW_DNSBL_ZONES about clients, and keeps their verdicts, and checks
// SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES about clients, and keeps their verdicts, and checks
// clients with AbuseIPDB, and keeps their scores and the checks spent
// today. The state package writes all of these to reputation.json and
// reads them from it, so that a restart keeps them too.
@@ -66,18 +67,20 @@ type List struct {
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
// BlocklistURLs are the blocklists (SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS), and
// BlocklistURLs are the blocklists (SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS), and
// ASNLimitPercentURL the file of AS:percent lines
// (SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL), "" while it is unset.
// (SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL), "" while it is unset.
BlocklistURLs []string
ASNLimitPercentURL string
// TagLists are the address lists that add a tag (SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS).
TagLists []config.TagList
// CrowdSecDecisionsURL is the CrowdSec decision list, "" while
// SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL is unset, fetched with CrowdSecKey
// (SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY).
// SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL is unset, fetched with CrowdSecKey
// (SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY).
CrowdSecDecisionsURL string
CrowdSecKey string
// Refresh is how long after a list was last fetched or tried it is
// fetched again (SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH), but for the CrowdSec decision
// fetched again (SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH), but for the CrowdSec decision
// list, which is fetched again crowdSecRefresh after.
Refresh time.Duration
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
@@ -112,11 +115,11 @@ type list struct {
failures int
}
// entries are what the lines of a copy say: for a blocklist, the netblocks
// it names, with the lengths among them, for the file of AS:percent lines,
// the percentage it gives each AS number, and for the CrowdSec decision
// list, the decision on each netblock that ends last, with the lengths
// among them.
// entries are what the lines of a copy say: for a blocklist or a tag list, the
// netblocks it names, with the lengths among them, for the file of AS:percent
// lines, the percentage it gives each AS number, and for the CrowdSec decision
// list, the decision on each netblock that ends last, with the lengths among
// them.
type entries struct {
netblocks map[netip.Prefix]bool
lengths []int
@@ -152,14 +155,18 @@ func New(params Params) *Lists {
}
// URLs returns the URL of every list: the blocklists' in the order
// SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them, then SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL, then
// the CrowdSec decision list's.
// SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them, then SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL, then the
// tag lists', then the CrowdSec decision list's.
func (l *Lists) URLs() []string {
urls := slices.Clone(l.params.BlocklistURLs)
if l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL != "" {
urls = append(urls, l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL)
}
for _, list := range l.params.TagLists {
urls = append(urls, list.URL)
}
if l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL != "" {
urls = append(urls, l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL)
}
@@ -168,7 +175,7 @@ func (l *Lists) URLs() []string {
}
// ListedBy returns the URLs of the blocklists whose copy lists addr, in
// the order SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them.
// the order SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them.
func (l *Lists) ListedBy(addr netip.Addr) []string {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
@@ -184,6 +191,22 @@ func (l *Lists) ListedBy(addr netip.Addr) []string {
return listedBy
}
// TagsOf returns the names of the tag lists whose copy holds addr.
func (l *Lists) TagsOf(addr netip.Addr) []string {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
var names []string
for _, list := range l.params.TagLists {
if l.lists[list.URL].entries.contain(addr) {
names = append(names, list.Name)
}
}
return names
}
// ASNLimitPercent returns the percentage the copy of the file of
// AS:percent lines gives asn, and whether it lists asn.
func (l *Lists) ASNLimitPercent(asn string) (int64, bool) {
@@ -481,10 +504,10 @@ func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
}
// parse reads the lines of the list at listURL, fetched at fetched: those
// of a blocklist, of the file of AS:percent lines, or of the CrowdSec
// decision list. In the first two, anything after a ; or a # on a line is
// left out, and so is a line left blank. Any other line that does not read
// is an error naming it by its number.
// of a blocklist or a tag list, of the file of AS:percent lines, or of the
// CrowdSec decision list. In all but the decision list, anything after a ; or
// a # on a line is left out, and so is a line left blank. Any other line that
// does not read is an error naming it by its number.
func (l *Lists) parse(
listURL string, lines []string, fetched time.Time,
) (entries, error) {
@@ -498,8 +521,8 @@ func (l *Lists) parse(
}
}
// parseNetblocks reads a blocklist's lines, each an address or a netblock
// as the settings take them.
// parseNetblocks reads the lines of a blocklist or a tag list, each an address
// or a netblock as the settings take them.
func parseNetblocks(lines []string) (entries, error) {
found := entries{netblocks: map[netip.Prefix]bool{}}
@@ -551,7 +574,7 @@ func parseNetblock(text string) (netip.Prefix, bool) {
}
// parsePercents reads the lines of the file of AS:percent lines, each an
// AS number, : and a percentage, as SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT takes them. An
// AS number, : and a percentage, such as AS64496:50. An
// AS number listed more than once gets the lowest of its percentages.
func parsePercents(lines []string) (entries, error) {
found := entries{percents: map[string]int64{}}
Loaded 100 of 125 files, more files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff. Show more