Say which bytes the byte limits count, and what passing one does (closes #203)
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sneak asked for every document to be audited for sentences that do not say what they mean. The byte limits now say which bytes count (response bodies, request bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says, WebSocket traffic included) and what passing one does. Other unclear or false sentences in `README.md`, `SPEC.md`, `EVALUATION.md` and `docs/` are rewritten. Documents only. `REPO_POLICIES.md` is shared policy text and stayed out. Model: fable-5-1 (first audit); opus-5-5 (rework)
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@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
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- R1: rate limits per minute, per hour and per day
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- R2: netblocks that bypass rate limiting
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- R3: alerts on attacks through webhook, Slack or ntfy
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- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests or bytes per minute or hour, for given IPs
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or netblocks, crossing a threshold
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- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests made or bytes transferred per minute or
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hour, for given IPs or netblocks, crossing a threshold
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- R5: temporary blocks for abusers, permanent bans for repeat offenders
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- R6: one or more RBLs or IP reputation APIs
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- R7: AS number lookup
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@@ -24,14 +24,19 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
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## Verdict
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Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8 (scaling limits by AS
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number or country) or the bytes half of R4 at all, and the tools that come
|
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closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML or a web UI.
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The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar; `SPEC.md` in this
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directory begins that spec. It reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field as
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libraries and data sources (Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set for attack
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detection, DNSBLs, AbuseIPDB, optionally a CrowdSec decision feed) instead of
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reimplementing them.
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Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8, which asks for limits
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scaled by AS number or country. None meets R4's alerts on bytes transferred. The
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tools that come closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML
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or a web UI. The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar;
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`SPEC.md` in this directory begins that spec.
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The sidecar reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field instead of
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reimplementing them. It takes these as libraries and data sources:
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|
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- Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set, for attack detection
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- DNSBLs
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- AbuseIPDB
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- optionally, a CrowdSec decision feed
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Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,13 +50,16 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
|
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external blacklist URLs, optional CrowdSec), R7 partly (AS number used for
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blacklist and whitelist decisions), R9 (ModSecurity with the Core Rule
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Set, or Coraza plugin), env-var settings.
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- Fails: R8 (AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a
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limit), R4 (no volume or byte threshold alerts in the free edition;
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reporting is a paid feature), R5 escalation, and R10 in spirit: since 1.6
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it needs a `bunkerweb` container plus a `bw-scheduler` container and a
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database, or the all-in-one image that bundles nginx, scheduler, UI and
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Redis in one container. It is designed to be the front door for many
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sites, not a per-app sidecar. AGPL-3.0.
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- Fails:
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- R8: AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a limit.
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- R4: no alerts on request-count or byte thresholds in the free edition;
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reporting is a paid feature.
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- R5: no escalation for repeat offenders.
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- R10: since 1.6 it is not one plain sidecar. It needs a `bunkerweb`
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container, a `bw-scheduler` container and a database, or the
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||||
all-in-one image that bundles nginx, the scheduler, the UI and Redis.
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- It is designed as the proxy in front of many sites, not as a sidecar for
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one app. AGPL-3.0.
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- Unverified: whether several rates (minute, hour, day) can be stacked on
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the same URL pattern; the documented design is one rate per URL pattern.
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- CrowdSec is the strongest detection and ban engine, but it is not a proxy.
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@@ -66,16 +74,20 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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listed AS numbers is possible, but each is a hand-written YAML scenario,
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it reacts after the fact by banning, and it is not an inline limiter that
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answers 429.
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- Fails: R10 (needs the security engine container with persistent state, log
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acquisition from traefik, a bouncer such as the traefik plugin, and YAML
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for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications), bytes half of R4.
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- Fails:
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- R10, because it needs:
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- the security engine container with persistent state
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- log acquisition from traefik
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- a bouncer such as the traefik plugin
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- YAML for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications
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- R4's alerts on bytes.
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- CrowdSec plus traefik's own `rateLimit` middleware is the best combination
|
||||
with no new code. It gives inline limiting (one window per middleware, keyed
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by IP, with `sourceCriterion` exclusions), bans with escalation, alerts and
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reputation. It still fails R8, the bytes half of R4, R1's three stacked
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windows only by chaining three middlewares per router, and R10 entirely: the
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||||
configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not in
|
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one sidecar's environment.
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||||
reputation lookups. It still fails R8, R4's alerts on bytes, and R10 entirely:
|
||||
the configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not
|
||||
in one sidecar's environment. It meets R1's three windows only by chaining
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||||
three middlewares per router.
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||||
|
||||
## Candidate by candidate
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@@ -87,10 +99,10 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
|
||||
cached, streamed decision list (recommended), standalone against the
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central API, or AppSec only. Supports captcha remediation.
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- Covers: R5, R6, R9, R3 and R7 through the engine (see Verdict).
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- Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4 bytes.
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- Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4's alerts on bytes.
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- Configuration: traefik static config to load the plugin, dynamic config or
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labels for the middleware, CrowdSec YAML for everything else.
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- Sidecar fit: no. It lives inside traefik, plus a separate engine
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- Sidecar fit: no. It runs inside traefik and needs a separate engine
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container.
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- Maturity: widely used (about 900 stars, listed in the traefik plugin
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catalog, documented by CrowdSec itself), actively maintained. Traefik
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@@ -115,7 +127,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
|
||||
- What it is: nginx-derived (Tengine) reverse proxy with a proprietary
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semantic detection engine and a web console. About 22,000 stars.
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||||
- Covers: R9 well, basic per-IP rate limiting with block duration, bot
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challenge, authentication gate.
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challenge, authentication in front of the app.
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||||
- Misses: R8, R7, R4; R1 has one window per rule. Country blocking, alert
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messages, syslog forwarding and the better reputation database are paid
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||||
(Lite about 10 USD per month, Pro about 100 USD per month); the free
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@@ -128,7 +140,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
|
||||
- Coraza (`corazawaf/coraza`) and Coraza-based proxies
|
||||
- What it is: a Go library that implements the ModSecurity rule language and
|
||||
runs the OWASP Core Rule Set. OWASP project, actively maintained, the
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||||
successor path now that ModSecurity is in maintenance only.
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||||
successor to ModSecurity, which is now in maintenance only.
|
||||
- Packagings: `coraza-caddy` (Caddy module), `coraza-spoa` (HAProxy),
|
||||
`coraza-proxy-wasm` (Envoy), a traefik WASM plugin, and
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||||
`coreruleset/coraza-crs-docker` (Caddy plus Coraza plus the Core Rule Set,
|
||||
@@ -142,7 +154,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
|
||||
- ModSecurity Core Rule Set containers (`owasp/modsecurity-crs`)
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- What it is: official images of Apache or nginx with ModSecurity and the
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Core Rule Set, as a reverse proxy configured by env vars (`BACKEND`,
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||||
paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images carry
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||||
paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images contain
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ModSecurity 2.9.x on Apache and Core Rule Set 4.x.
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- Covers: R9, and R10 (single container, env vars, one backend).
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- Misses: R1 to R8.
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@@ -152,8 +164,8 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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||||
- Anubis (`TecharoHQ/anubis`), 1.27 current
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- What it is: a single-binary reverse proxy that makes browsers solve a
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proof-of-work challenge before passing them to `TARGET`. Aimed at
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scrapers, which is likely a large share of unwanted traffic on a public
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code forge.
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scrapers, which are likely a large share of the unwanted traffic on a
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public code forge.
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||||
- Covers: R10 well (one container, env vars for listener, target,
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difficulty, cookies). Policy rules can match on path, user agent, headers,
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IP ranges, and with the vendor's hosted data service also AS number and
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@@ -180,13 +192,13 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
|
||||
temporary ban, no escalation, state lost on traefik restart) and R2
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||||
(allowlist). Nothing else.
|
||||
- `juitde/traefik-plugin-fail2ban`, fail2ban connector plugins, GeoBlock
|
||||
plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): same
|
||||
shape, each one small feature, configured in traefik, state in memory.
|
||||
plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): each adds
|
||||
one small feature, is configured in traefik and keeps its state in memory.
|
||||
- Sidecar fit: no; they live inside traefik.
|
||||
- Traefik built-in middlewares
|
||||
- `rateLimit` (one average-and-burst window per middleware, optional Redis
|
||||
in traefik 3.x), `inFlightReq`, `ipAllowList`. No bans, alerts, reputation
|
||||
or AS number awareness.
|
||||
lookups or AS number lookups.
|
||||
- caddy-waf (`fabriziosalmi/caddy-waf`), 0.4.x
|
||||
- What it is: a Caddy module with regex rules and anomaly scoring, per-IP
|
||||
and per-path rate limiting with one configurable window, IP and DNS
|
||||
@@ -198,12 +210,12 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
|
||||
- open-appsec (Check Point)
|
||||
- Machine-learning WAF agent attached to nginx, Kong, Envoy or similar, with
|
||||
a declarative policy file or the vendor's cloud console. Covers R9 only;
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||||
rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. Not a sidecar in the
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||||
required sense.
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||||
rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. It attaches to an
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||||
existing proxy, so it is not the sidecar R10 asks for.
|
||||
- iocaine
|
||||
- Serves generated garbage pages to clients the fronting proxy classifies as
|
||||
scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope except as a
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||||
curiosity for scraper traffic.
|
||||
scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope, and only of
|
||||
passing interest for scraper traffic.
|
||||
- Pangolin
|
||||
- A tunnelled access platform that bundles traefik and optionally CrowdSec.
|
||||
Replaces the ingress rather than adding a sidecar; out of scope.
|
||||
@@ -214,17 +226,17 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
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||||
Everyone else offers one window per rule or none.
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||||
- R2 bypass netblocks: BunkerWeb, CrowdSec, traefik, fail2ban plugins.
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||||
- R3 alerts: CrowdSec (best), BunkerWeb (denied requests only), SafeLine (paid).
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- R4 volume and byte anomalies: none. CrowdSec can approximate request-count
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||||
anomalies with a custom scenario; nothing handles bytes.
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||||
- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb has fixed or permanent,
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||||
not both by history.
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- R4 alerts on request counts and bytes: none. CrowdSec can approximate alerts
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on request counts with a custom scenario; no surveyed tool alerts on bytes.
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- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb's ban is either one
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fixed length or permanent, and does not change with a client's history.
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- R6 reputation: CrowdSec, BunkerWeb, go-away, caddy-waf (static lists).
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- R7 AS number lookup: CrowdSec (enrichment), BunkerWeb and caddy-waf (allow or
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deny), Anubis (hosted service).
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- R8 biased thresholds: none.
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- R9 attack detection: Coraza or ModSecurity with the Core Rule Set (open,
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standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps the
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first).
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standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps Coraza
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or ModSecurity).
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- R10 env-var sidecar: `owasp/modsecurity-crs`, `coraza-crs-docker`, Anubis.
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None of these covers anything beyond its one job.
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@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ without an answer in time, `rproxy` passes the request to the app.
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It protects against:
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- Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Each client gets a limit on
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requests and on bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults leave
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room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that keeps up
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one request every 2 seconds. A client over a limit is refused and banned: for
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a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently when
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it keeps at it.
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requests and on body bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults
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leave room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that
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keeps up one request every 2 seconds. A client that breaks a limit is banned:
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for a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently
|
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when it keeps at it.
|
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- Scanners that probe for secrets, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`. The
|
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default rule file bans such a client at its first probe, and its next request
|
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during the ban makes the ban permanent. Your own rules, or a list of trap
|
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@@ -210,128 +210,132 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
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percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100. A path prefix starts with `/`.
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- `off` switches a limit, a threshold or a timeout off where the table says a
|
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setting takes it.
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- The byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count only body bytes: the
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app's response bodies, the visitors' request bodies, or both, as
|
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`SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted. What the visitor sent over
|
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a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
|
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- An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the
|
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variable and what is wrong with the value. The settings in effect are logged
|
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on one line at start, with tokens, keys and webhook paths shown as `********`.
|
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|
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Every setting the code reads, with its default:
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| Variable | Default | What it does |
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| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
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| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
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| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
|
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| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
|
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| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `502`, or cut off once it has started. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | How long the visitor may take to send its request line and headers, and then the whole request to reach the app, in milliseconds or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
|
||||
| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
|
||||
| `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes a client past any byte limit bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in an hour, a size or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a day, a size or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | Which body bytes the byte limits count: `response`, `request` or `both`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals by a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set a client may get in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A limit broken again within this time after the last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs`, a web service, `file`, or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
|
||||
| `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| Variable | Default | What it does |
|
||||
| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
|
||||
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
|
||||
| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
|
||||
| `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
|
||||
| `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
|
||||
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
|
||||
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
|
||||
@@ -527,8 +531,9 @@ of the request reaches the app.
|
||||
|
||||
17. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
|
||||
18. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `discriminator` a report with the status
|
||||
and the bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts the
|
||||
bytes toward the byte limits and adds the request to the client's history.
|
||||
and the body bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts
|
||||
the bytes `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names toward the byte limits, bans the client if
|
||||
they take it past one, and adds the request to the client's history.
|
||||
|
||||
A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a Core
|
||||
Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has false
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ to them.
|
||||
key or a token stays off until the operator supplies it.
|
||||
- It keeps a site answering while the part that decides is down, slow or
|
||||
restarting (see "Without an answer from `discriminator`").
|
||||
- It limits each client's requests and bytes per minute, hour and day. It bounds
|
||||
the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
|
||||
- It limits each client's requests and body bytes per minute, hour and day. It
|
||||
bounds the size and duration of every request and answer. It detects attacks.
|
||||
- It bans abusers: briefly at first, for seven days on a clear sign of attack,
|
||||
and permanently when they keep at it.
|
||||
- It looks up each client's AS number and country. It can refuse whole countries
|
||||
@@ -192,11 +192,12 @@ request log's `heuristic` field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and
|
||||
sent is removed.
|
||||
18. After the visitor's answer has ended, `rproxy` sends the report (see "The
|
||||
report"). `discriminator` then counts:
|
||||
- For a request it allowed, the response bytes, the request bytes or both
|
||||
are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. For a
|
||||
WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client whose
|
||||
total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit and
|
||||
is banned (`byte_limits`). The response in progress is not cut off.
|
||||
- For a request it allowed, the body bytes of the response, of the request
|
||||
or of both are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. For
|
||||
a WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client
|
||||
whose total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit
|
||||
and is banned (`byte_limits`). The request that broke it has already been
|
||||
passed on whole; nothing is cut off.
|
||||
- For a request it allowed, the client's history and the anomaly counters
|
||||
are updated, and the alert thresholds are evaluated.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -259,7 +260,8 @@ to a ban, each by its own rule:
|
||||
clear sign of attack bans it permanently at once.
|
||||
- A broken limit, one of:
|
||||
- a request over a rate limit;
|
||||
- a response that takes the client's byte total past a byte limit;
|
||||
- the bytes counted for a request and its response taking the client's total
|
||||
past a byte limit;
|
||||
- more than `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` refusals within a minute.
|
||||
|
||||
The bans for a broken limit:
|
||||
@@ -448,10 +450,15 @@ the same way.
|
||||
|
||||
### Byte limits, per client
|
||||
|
||||
By default there is no minute limit, so a client can download in a burst at full
|
||||
speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB and the day limit to 100 GiB. They
|
||||
allow several downloads of a few GiB each. A response's bytes are counted when
|
||||
it ends (see step 18).
|
||||
The byte limits count body bytes: the app's response bodies, the visitors'
|
||||
request bodies, or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted.
|
||||
What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app
|
||||
sent as response bytes. The bytes counted for a request and its response are
|
||||
added to the client's total once the response has ended (see step 18). So the
|
||||
request that takes a client past a limit is passed on whole, and the ban refuses
|
||||
the client's requests from then on. By default there is no minute limit, so a
|
||||
client can download in a burst at full speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB
|
||||
and the day limit to 100 GiB. They allow several downloads of a few GiB each.
|
||||
|
||||
### Lookup of AS number and country
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -953,7 +960,8 @@ which the metrics show. They reveal a widely distributed scraper, thousands of
|
||||
addresses at low rates each, which the per-client limits do not see. A low
|
||||
percentage for its `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` is the response.
|
||||
|
||||
- Requests and bytes are counted per minute and per hour, for each of:
|
||||
- Requests and body bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted per
|
||||
minute and per hour, for each of:
|
||||
- a client;
|
||||
- the surrounding netblock;
|
||||
- an AS number;
|
||||
@@ -1263,9 +1271,9 @@ short.
|
||||
### Answering in time
|
||||
|
||||
`rproxy` stops waiting for `discriminator` after `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, by default 2
|
||||
seconds, and `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` then decides. So at the defaults,
|
||||
`discriminator` answers a request well within that time, whatever the request
|
||||
and whatever its outside sources do.
|
||||
seconds, and `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` then decides. The longest a question
|
||||
waits on an outside source is `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800 milliseconds,
|
||||
well within that time.
|
||||
|
||||
GeoJS is the only outside source a question can wait on. A question waits only
|
||||
when step 6 says so, and for at most `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800
|
||||
@@ -1361,9 +1369,9 @@ answer.
|
||||
For a request it holds, `discriminator` writes the request's last log line (see
|
||||
"The log"). For a request it allowed, it first:
|
||||
|
||||
- counts the bytes as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says, toward the client's byte limits at
|
||||
the percentages it gave that request;
|
||||
- bans a client that passes a byte limit;
|
||||
- counts the body bytes `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, toward the client's byte limits
|
||||
at the percentages it gave that request;
|
||||
- bans a client whose total passes a byte limit;
|
||||
- adds the request with its status to the client's history, the anomaly counters
|
||||
and the metrics.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ What `GET /_sww/metrics` answers with, at `discriminator`'s own address.
|
||||
keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
|
||||
`honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
|
||||
|
||||
Every `sww_*request_bytes_total` and `sww_*response_bytes_total` series counts
|
||||
body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says.
|
||||
|
||||
## Traffic
|
||||
|
||||
- `sww_requests_total`, `sww_request_bytes_total` and
|
||||
|
||||
+8
-6
@@ -145,20 +145,22 @@ Every one of these lines has:
|
||||
included. It is left out when rate limiting did not count the request. It
|
||||
holds:
|
||||
- `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests;
|
||||
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: bytes.
|
||||
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: the body bytes
|
||||
`SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, in that window.
|
||||
|
||||
A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
|
||||
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes of an allowed request are counted when
|
||||
its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the bytes are without this
|
||||
request's.
|
||||
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes counted for an allowed request and its
|
||||
response are added when its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the
|
||||
three byte totals leave them out.
|
||||
|
||||
- `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
|
||||
- `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
|
||||
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit;
|
||||
- `error_burst`.
|
||||
|
||||
A request whose bytes broke a limit was passed on whole, so its `action`
|
||||
stays `forward`. Only its `report` line gives that limit.
|
||||
When the bytes counted for a request and its response break a limit, the
|
||||
request has been passed on whole, so its `action` stays `forward`. Only its
|
||||
`report` line gives that limit.
|
||||
|
||||
- `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that
|
||||
refused.
|
||||
|
||||
+23
-8
@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ between the two (see "The image's command" below).
|
||||
|
||||
## Request rate limits, per client
|
||||
|
||||
The request past one of these limits is refused, and the client is banned.
|
||||
|
||||
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a
|
||||
client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
|
||||
person opening two pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files each.
|
||||
@@ -120,11 +122,22 @@ between the two (see "The image's command" below).
|
||||
|
||||
## Byte limits, per client
|
||||
|
||||
These count body bytes, never headers. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
|
||||
counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. The bytes
|
||||
counted for a request and its response are added to the client's total once the
|
||||
response has ended. The request that takes a client's total past a limit is not
|
||||
cut off; the client is banned.
|
||||
|
||||
- `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
|
||||
(default `50G`) and `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes
|
||||
counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
|
||||
- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
|
||||
`response`, `request` or `both`.
|
||||
counted for a client in each window, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says
|
||||
which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that
|
||||
passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response
|
||||
ends.
|
||||
- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): what the byte limits and the byte anomaly
|
||||
thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the
|
||||
visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
|
||||
counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Lookup of AS number and country
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -233,8 +246,9 @@ the request first.
|
||||
a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
|
||||
such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
|
||||
yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
|
||||
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client in
|
||||
a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
|
||||
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may get
|
||||
in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or
|
||||
`off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
|
||||
|
||||
## Ban lengths, response and scope
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -311,9 +325,10 @@ the request first.
|
||||
|
||||
## Anomaly thresholds
|
||||
|
||||
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most bytes counted in
|
||||
a minute and in an hour. Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by
|
||||
default. The four thresholds per client are:
|
||||
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most body bytes
|
||||
counted in a minute and in an hour. The bytes are those `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names.
|
||||
Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by default. The four
|
||||
thresholds per client are:
|
||||
|
||||
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`;
|
||||
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`;
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ since it was first seen:
|
||||
- the first and last time seen;
|
||||
- the AS number, AS name and country last looked up, and when;
|
||||
- total requests, and how many were forwarded and how many refused;
|
||||
- bytes in each direction;
|
||||
- body bytes of its requests, and of the responses it was sent;
|
||||
- responses by status class;
|
||||
- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`. A file
|
||||
may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which nothing adds to.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user