81413c56e963b252f4ab0269dc49c1be0f31d8d6
21
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  clawbotandsneak
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81413c56e9 |
Refactor delivery targets to a Target interface (closes #77) (#81)
check / check (push) Successful in 2m42s
Refactors the delivery engine so each target TYPE is an implementation of a `Target` interface, dispatched from a registry, with each target owning its full delivery including durable retries. Implements the authoritative design from issue #77 (the corrected "hand the DB + Scheduler to the target" design). ## The new interface ```go type Scheduler interface { ScheduleRetry(task Task, delay time.Duration) } type Target interface { Deliver(ctx context.Context, webhookDB *gorm.DB, d *database.Delivery, task *Task, sched Scheduler) } ``` `Deliver` receives everything a target needs to be autonomous and durable: the request context, the per-webhook `*gorm.DB`, the `*database.Delivery`, the attempt `*Task`, and a `Scheduler` (the engine) for durable re-enqueue. The target makes one attempt, writes the `DeliveryResult`, updates `DeliveryStatus`, and — for retry targets — decides whether to retry, computes its own backoff, gates with its own circuit breaker, and reschedules via the injected `Scheduler`. `processDelivery` collapses to a registry lookup (`map[database.TargetType]Target`) and a `Deliver` call; an unknown target type still fails the delivery as before. ## Per-target ownership - `httpTarget` and `slackTarget` share a retry core (`httpCore`) that owns retry, exponential backoff, and the per-target circuit breaker. The core is fire-and-forget when `MaxRetries == 0` and adds breaker-gated backed-off retries when `MaxRetries > 0`. The per-attempt request differs (HTTP forwards the body + filtered headers; Slack posts a formatted message) and is supplied as a closure, so each keeps its exact recording semantics (e.g. HTTP records no error string for a non-2xx, Slack records `HTTP <code>`). - `databaseTarget` and `logTarget` are fire-and-forget: they record a single successful attempt. Moved wholesale into the http/slack targets: `deliverHTTP*`, `handleHTTPRetry`, `circuitBreakerBlock`, `calcBackoff` / `calcRemainingBackoff` / `backoffElapsed`, the circuit-breaker `sync.Map` + `getCircuitBreaker`, `clientForConfig`, `doHTTPRequest`, `applyRequestHeaders`, and the config parsers. The engine keeps `recordResult`, `updateDeliveryStatus`, and `ScheduleRetry`. ## Slack MaxRetries gating Slack is now on the same shared core as HTTP, with retry + breaker gated on `MaxRetries`. A `MaxRetries` of 0 stays single-attempt fire-and-forget, so **every existing Slack target is unchanged**; a Slack target configured with retries gets backoff + circuit breaker. ## Log-target full content `logTarget` now logs the ENTIRE inbound webhook — full request body and full request headers, plus method, content type, and the webhook id and entrypoint id — rather than a summary line. This supersedes the smaller log-summary work (#70). ## `Task.EntrypointID` To carry the entrypoint id to the log target, `Task` gains an `EntrypointID` field, populated in the webhook handler's `buildDeliveryTasks`, the engine's recovery-task builder, and `buildEventFromTask`. ## Durability / recovery The crash-durable async retry model is preserved unchanged: one attempt per worker turn; on failure the status is set `retrying`, backoff is computed, and the task is re-enqueued via `ScheduleRetry` (a `time.AfterFunc` onto the retry channel). On restart, `recoverRetryingDeliveries` and the 60s sweep hand each orphaned `retrying` delivery back to its target to recompute the remaining backoff and reschedule (targets that own retries implement an internal `rescheduler`; fire-and-forget targets, which never produce `retrying` deliveries, are skipped). ## How behaviour is preserved No external behaviour changes except the two called out above (log target full content; Slack gaining `MaxRetries`-gated retries). All existing delivery tests pass with only their `export_test.go` wrappers re-pointed at the new structure — `ExportDeliverHTTP/Slack/Database/Log` now call the targets, `ExportGetCircuitBreaker` / `ExportClient` / `ExportClientForConfig` / `ExportDoHTTPRequest` resolve against the HTTP target's shared client and breaker map, and `ExportParseHTTPConfig` / `ExportParseSlackConfig` call the relocated free functions. Added: a `logTarget` test asserting the log line contains the full body, headers, and ids, and a Slack `MaxRetries`-gated retry test. `docker build .` is green (fmt-check, lint, test, static build all pass). Closes #77 Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin> Reviewed-on: #81 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotandsneak
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f6b929f2d7 |
Add per-webhook event retention reaper (closes #63) (#78)
check / check (push) Successful in 2m42s
Enforces each webhook's `RetentionDays` so per-webhook SQLite files no longer grow without bound. ## Reaper New `RetentionReaper` in `internal/database/retention.go`. A background ticker runs each sweep: it lists all webhooks from the main DB and, for each webhook with a positive `RetentionDays`, opens its per-webhook DB via `WebhookDBManager.GetDB` and deletes every `Event` (and its dependent `Delivery` and `DeliveryResult` rows) whose `CreatedAt` is older than `RetentionDays` days. - Deletions run in foreign-key-safe order: delivery results, then deliveries, then events. - Deletes are unscoped (hard deletes) so rows are physically removed and disk is reclaimed, rather than GORM soft-deleting them. - `RetentionDays <= 0` means retain forever; those webhooks are skipped. - Webhooks whose per-webhook DB does not yet exist are skipped. ## Config `internal/config/config.go` gains `RetentionSweepInterval` (env `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL`, parsed as a Go duration, default `1h`) via a new `envDuration` helper, following the existing env-helper conventions. ## Wiring `cmd/webhooker/main.go` registers `database.NewRetentionReaper` as an fx provider and forces its construction in `fx.Invoke`. The reaper starts its sweep loop on an fx `OnStart` hook and stops cleanly on `OnStop` via context cancellation, matching the existing lifecycle components. ## Test `internal/database/retention_test.go` seeds an old event chain (event + delivery + result, 40 days old) and a recent one (1 day old) in a real per-webhook DB and asserts a single sweep removes only the expired chain while keeping the recent one. A second test forces a non-positive `RetentionDays` and asserts an ancient event is retained. Note: the `Webhook.RetentionDays` column carries `gorm:"default:30"`, so a `0` passed to a GORM `Create` is replaced by the default; the test forces the value with an explicit column update to exercise the retain-forever path. No model changes were made. Validated with `docker build .` (fmt-check, lint, test, build) exit 0. Closes #63 Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin> Reviewed-on: #78 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotandsneak
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8ea7f76540 |
Add NoCache middleware for authenticated pages (closes #61) (#75)
check / check (push) Successful in 6s
Adds a `NoCache()` middleware that sets `Cache-Control: no-store` and `Pragma: no-cache`, and wires it onto the dynamic app route groups (`/pages`, `/user/{username}`, `/sources`, `/source/{sourceID}`) adjacent to their existing `CSRF()` call. The static `/s` mount, `/metrics`, `/webhook/{uuid}`, and `/.well-known/healthcheck` are intentionally left untouched (static assets are safe to cache; the others are not authenticated pages).
A middleware unit test asserts both headers are set.
Closes #61
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #75
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
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clawbotandsneak
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752d6beead |
Validate Slack target URLs at creation time (closes #68) (#73)
check / check (push) Successful in 4s
Slack delivery targets were only checked by the request-time dialer guard, not at creation, giving them a weaker SSRF gate than HTTP targets. This validates the Slack incoming-webhook URL with `delivery.ValidateTargetURL` in the Slack target creation path (`buildSlackTargetConfig`), before persisting, mirroring the existing HTTP-target path. On failure the create is rejected with the same clear, non-leaking user-facing error the HTTP path uses. Adds handlers-package tests covering both an accepted public URL and a rejected private/reserved URL. Confined to `internal/handlers/`; `internal/delivery/` is unchanged. Closes #68 Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin> Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org> Reviewed-on: #73 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotandsneak
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b1f43c9520 |
Keep the SSRF-safe transport in clientForConfig (closes #69) (#74)
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
`clientForConfig()` in `internal/delivery/engine.go` built a fresh `http.Client` without a Transport when a per-target timeout was configured, dropping the request-time private-IP guard for that path. It now reuses the shared client's SSRF-safe transport (`e.client.Transport`, the same `NewSSRFSafeTransport` instance), overriding only the `Timeout`. Behaviour is unchanged when no per-target timeout is set (the shared client is returned as before), so no engine code path makes an outbound target request with a client lacking the SSRF-safe transport. Adds a delivery-package test proving a client from `clientForConfig()` with a per-target timeout still refuses private/reserved/link-local destinations, that the timeout is applied, that the SSRF-safe transport is reused (not duplicated), and that the no-timeout path returns the shared client unchanged. Confined to `internal/delivery/` only; handlers and server code untouched. Closes #69 Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin> Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org> Reviewed-on: #74 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotandsneak
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07fc63d9fa |
Wrap /user/{username} in RequireAuth middleware (closes #60) (#71)
check / check (push) Successful in 4s
Enforces authentication for the `/user/{username}` route group at the middleware layer, matching every other authenticated route group.
## Changes
- **`internal/server/routes.go`** (`setupUserRoutes`): added `r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())` immediately after the existing `r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())` on the `/user/{username}` group, so auth is enforced by design (CSRF first, then RequireAuth) — consistent with `/sources` and `/source/{sourceID}`.
- **`internal/handlers/profile.go`** (`HandleProfile`): removed the now-dead unauthenticated-redirect branch (RequireAuth guarantees an authenticated session before the handler runs). The handler still reads the username and user id from the session for the own-profile-only check; a request for another user's profile still returns 403. The session-retrieval error is now handled as a 500.
## Tests (`internal/handlers/profile_test.go`)
- own profile returns 200
- another user's profile returns 403
- an unauthenticated request to `/user/{username}` is redirected to `/pages/login` at the middleware layer and never reaches the endpoint handler (routing-level test replicating the CSRF + RequireAuth chain)
## Validation
`docker build .` (fmt-check, lint, test, build) passes.
Closes #60
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org>
Reviewed-on: #71
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
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clawbotandsneak
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0c9c885d51 |
Raise HTTP WriteTimeout above the request middleware timeout (closes #62) (#72)
check / check (push) Successful in 4s
Raise `httpWriteTimeout` in `internal/server/http.go` from 10s to `65 * time.Second` so it comfortably exceeds the router's 60s `requestTimeout`. This makes the `middleware.Timeout(60s)` the effective request limit — a slow response now returns a clean 503 from the middleware instead of being cut at the socket write deadline by the transport. `httpReadTimeout` stays at 10s. A comment on `httpWriteTimeout` documents that it must remain above the 60s request timeout. Change is confined to `internal/server/http.go`; `routes.go` is untouched. Closes #62 Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin> Reviewed-on: #72 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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 clawbotandclawbot
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afe88c601a |
refactor: use pinned golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
check / check (push) Successful in 5s
Closes [issue #50](#50) ## Summary Refactors the Dockerfile to use a separate lint stage with a pinned golangci-lint Docker image, following the pattern used by [sneak/pixa](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/pixa). This replaces the previous approach of installing golangci-lint via curl in the builder stage. ## Changes ### Dockerfile - **New `lint` stage** using `golangci/golangci-lint:v2.11.3` (Debian-based, pinned by sha256 digest) as a separate build stage - **Builder stage** depends on lint via `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null` — build won't proceed unless linting passes - **Go bumped** from 1.24 to 1.26.1 (`golang:1.26.1-bookworm`, pinned by sha256) - **golangci-lint bumped** from v1.64.8 to v2.11.3 - All three Docker images (golangci-lint, golang, alpine) pinned by sha256 digest - Debian-based golangci-lint image used (not Alpine) because mattn/go-sqlite3 CGO does not compile on musl (off64_t) ### Linter Config (.golangci.yml) - Migrated from v1 to v2 format (`version: "2"` added) - Removed linters no longer available in v2: `gofmt` (handled by `make fmt-check`), `gosimple` (merged into `staticcheck`), `typecheck` (always-on in v2) - Same set of linters enabled — no rules weakened ### Code Fixes (all lint issues from v2 upgrade) - Added package comments to all packages - Added doc comments to all exported types, functions, and methods - Fixed unchecked errors flagged by `errcheck` (sqlDB.Close, os.Setenv in tests, resp.Body.Close, fmt.Fprint) - Fixed unused parameters flagged by `revive` (renamed to `_`) - Fixed `gosec` G120 warnings: added `http.MaxBytesReader` before `r.ParseForm()` calls - Fixed `staticcheck` QF1012: replaced `WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(...))` with `fmt.Fprintf` - Fixed `staticcheck` QF1003: converted if/else chain to tagged switch - Renamed `DeliveryTask` → `Task` to avoid package stutter (`delivery.Task` instead of `delivery.DeliveryTask`) - Renamed shadowed builtin `max` parameter to `upperBound` in `cryptoRandInt` - Used `t.Setenv` instead of `os.Setenv` in tests (auto-restores) ### README.md - Updated version requirements: Go 1.26+, golangci-lint v2.11+ - Updated Dockerfile description in project structure ## Verification `docker build .` passes cleanly — formatting check, linting, all tests, and build all succeed. Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #55 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotanduser
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d771fe14df |
fix: detect TLS per-request in CSRF middleware to fix login (#54)
check / check (push) Successful in 1m55s
## Problem After the security hardening in PR #42, login fails with `Forbidden - invalid CSRF token` in production deployments. The CSRF middleware tied its `PlaintextHTTPRequest` wrapping and cookie `Secure` flag to the `IsDev()` environment check. This meant production mode always assumed HTTPS via gorilla/csrf's strict mode, which broke login in common deployment scenarios: 1. **Production behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy**: gorilla/csrf assumed HTTPS but `r.TLS` was nil (the Go server receives HTTP from the proxy). Origin/Referer scheme mismatches caused `referer not supplied` or `origin invalid` errors. 2. **Production over direct HTTP** (testing/staging with prod config): the `Secure` cookie flag prevented the browser from sending the CSRF cookie back over HTTP, causing `CSRF token invalid` errors. ## Root Cause gorilla/csrf v1.7.3 defaults to HTTPS-strict mode unless `PlaintextHTTPRequest()` is called. In strict mode it: - Forces `requestURL.Scheme = "https"` for Origin/Referer comparisons - Requires a `Referer` header on POST and rejects `http://` Referer schemes - The `csrf.Secure(true)` option makes the browser refuse to send the CSRF cookie over HTTP The old code only called `PlaintextHTTPRequest()` in dev mode, leaving prod mode permanently stuck in HTTPS-strict mode regardless of the actual transport. ## Fix Detect the actual transport protocol **per-request** using: - `r.TLS != nil` — direct TLS connection to the Go server - `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` header — TLS-terminating reverse proxy Two gorilla/csrf middleware instances are maintained (one with `Secure: true`, one with `Secure: false`) since `csrf.Secure()` is a creation-time option. Both use the same signing key, so cookies are interchangeable. | Scenario | Cookie Secure | Origin/Referer Mode | |---|---|---| | Direct TLS (`r.TLS != nil`) | ✅ Secure | Strict (HTTPS scheme) | | Behind TLS proxy (`X-Forwarded-Proto: https`) | ✅ Secure | Strict (HTTPS scheme) | | Plaintext HTTP | ❌ Non-Secure | Relaxed (PlaintextHTTPRequest) | CSRF token validation (cookie + form double-submit) is always enforced regardless of mode. ## Testing - Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode over plaintext HTTP - Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_BehindProxy_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode behind TLS proxy - Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_DirectTLS_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode with direct TLS - Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithoutToken` — token still required - Added `TestIsClientTLS_*` — TLS detection unit tests - All existing CSRF tests pass unchanged - `docker build .` passes (includes `make check`) - Manual verification: built and ran the container in both `dev` and `prod` modes, confirmed login succeeds in both Closes #53 Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Reviewed-on: #54 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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33e2140a5a |
feat: redirect root path based on auth state (#52)
check / check (push) Successful in 1m54s
Closes #51 The root path `/` now checks for an authenticated session and redirects accordingly: - **Authenticated users** → `303 See Other` redirect to `/sources` (the webhook dashboard) - **Unauthenticated users** → `303 See Other` redirect to `/pages/login` ### Changes - **`internal/handlers/index.go`** — Replaced the template-rendering `HandleIndex()` with a session-checking redirect handler. Removed `formatUptime` helper (dead code after this change). - **`internal/handlers/handlers.go`** — Removed `index.html` from the template map (no longer rendered). - **`internal/handlers/handlers_test.go`** — Replaced the old "handler is not nil" test with two proper redirect tests: - `unauthenticated redirects to login` — verifies 303 to `/pages/login` - `authenticated redirects to sources` — sets up an authenticated session cookie, verifies 303 to `/sources` - Removed `TestFormatUptime` (tested dead code). - **`README.md`** — Updated the API endpoints table to describe the new redirect behavior. ### How it works The handler calls `session.Get(r)` and `session.IsAuthenticated(sess)` — the same pattern used by the `RequireAuth` middleware and `HandleLoginPage`. No new dependencies or session logic introduced. The login flow is unaffected: `HandleLoginSubmit` redirects to `/` after successful login, which now forwards to `/sources` (one extra redirect hop, but correct and clean). Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #52 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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f003ec7141 |
fix: use absolute path for dev DATA_DIR default, clarify env docs (#46)
check / check (push) Successful in 1m9s
Closes #45. ## Problem 1. The README didn't clearly explain what `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=dev` vs `prod` actually changes. 2. The dev-mode default for `DATA_DIR` was `./data` — a relative path whose meaning depends on the working directory. There's no reason to use a relative path even in development. ## Changes ### Code (`internal/config/config.go`) - Replace the dev default `DATA_DIR` from `./data` to `$XDG_DATA_HOME/webhooker` (falling back to `$HOME/.local/share/webhooker`). This follows the XDG Base Directory Specification and ensures the data directory is always an absolute path regardless of the working directory. - Add `devDataDir()` helper that resolves the XDG path, with a `/tmp/webhooker` last-resort fallback if `$HOME` can't be determined. ### Tests (`internal/config/config_test.go`) - `TestDevDataDir`: verifies XDG_DATA_HOME is respected, HOME fallback works, and the result is always absolute. - `TestDevDefaultDataDirIsAbsolute`: integration test that creates a full Config via fx and asserts the dev default DataDir is absolute. ### README - Add a table documenting exactly what `dev` vs `prod` changes: DATA_DIR default, CORS policy, and session cookie Secure flag. - Clarify that log format and security headers are independent of the environment setting. - Update the DATA_DIR default in the configuration variable table. Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Reviewed-on: #46 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotandclawbot
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17e740a45f |
fix: use absolute paths and static linking in Dockerfile (#49)
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
Closes #48 ## Problem The Docker container failed to start with: ``` exec ./webhooker: no such file or directory ``` Two root causes: 1. **Relative paths**: `COPY` destination and `CMD` used relative paths (`./webhooker`), depending on `WORKDIR` context. 2. **Dynamic linking** (the actual root cause): The binary was built with CGO enabled on Debian (glibc) via `make build`, but deployed to an Alpine runtime (musl). The kernel couldn't find the glibc dynamic linker (`/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2`), producing the misleading "no such file or directory" error — even though the file existed on disk. ## Fix - **Absolute paths throughout**: `COPY --from=builder /build/bin/webhooker /app/webhooker` and `CMD ["/app/webhooker"]` — no reliance on WORKDIR. - **Static rebuild for Alpine**: Added a `RUN CGO_ENABLED=1 go build -ldflags '-extldflags "-static"' -o bin/webhooker ./cmd/webhooker` step after `make check`. This rebuilds the binary with static linking so it runs on Alpine without glibc. The `make check` step still runs normally (formatting, linting, tests, dynamic build) — the static rebuild is only for the deployment binary. ## Verification - `docker build .` passes (all checks green) - Container starts successfully and initializes the Fx dependency graph - The README already stated "The runtime binary is statically linked and runs on Alpine" — this fix makes that claim actually true. Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@users.noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #49 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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60786c5019 |
feat: add CSRF protection, SSRF prevention, and login rate limiting (#42)
check / check (push) Successful in 4s
## Security Hardening This PR implements three security hardening issues: ### CSRF Protection (closes #35) - Session-based CSRF tokens with cryptographically random 256-bit generation - Constant-time token comparison to prevent timing attacks - CSRF middleware applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and `/user` routes - Hidden `csrf_token` field added to all 12+ POST forms in templates - Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and `/api` (stateless API) ### SSRF Prevention (closes #36) - `ValidateTargetURL()` blocks private/reserved IP ranges at target creation time - Blocked ranges: `127.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `::1`, `fc00::/7`, `fe80::/10`, plus multicast, reserved, test-net, and CGN ranges - SSRF-safe HTTP transport with custom `DialContext` in the delivery engine for defense-in-depth (prevents DNS rebinding attacks) - Only `http` and `https` schemes allowed ### Login Rate Limiting (closes #37) - Per-IP rate limiter using `golang.org/x/time/rate` - 5 attempts per minute per IP on `POST /pages/login` - GET requests (form rendering) pass through unaffected - Automatic cleanup of stale per-IP limiter entries every 5 minutes - `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` header support for reverse proxies ### Files Changed **New files:** - `internal/middleware/csrf.go` + tests — CSRF middleware - `internal/middleware/ratelimit.go` + tests — Login rate limiter - `internal/delivery/ssrf.go` + tests — SSRF validation + safe transport **Modified files:** - `internal/server/routes.go` — Wire CSRF and rate limit middleware - `internal/handlers/handlers.go` — Inject CSRF token into template data - `internal/handlers/source_management.go` — SSRF validation on target creation - `internal/delivery/engine.go` — SSRF-safe HTTP transport for production - All form templates — Added hidden `csrf_token` fields - `README.md` — Updated Security section and TODO checklist `docker build .` passes (lint + tests + build). Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org> Reviewed-on: #42 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotanduser
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8d702a16c6 |
feat: add Slack target type for incoming webhook notifications (#47)
check / check (push) Successful in 4s
## Summary Adds a new `slack` target type that sends webhook events as formatted messages to any Slack-compatible incoming webhook URL (Slack, Mattermost, and other compatible services). closes #44 ## What it does When a webhook event is received, the Slack target: 1. Formats a human-readable message with event metadata (HTTP method, content type, timestamp, body size) 2. Pretty-prints the payload in a code block — JSON payloads get indented formatting, non-JSON payloads are shown as raw text 3. Truncates large payloads at 3500 characters to keep Slack messages reasonable 4. POSTs the message as a `{"text": "..."}` JSON payload to the configured webhook URL ## Changes - **`internal/database/model_target.go`** — Add `TargetTypeSlack` constant - **`internal/delivery/engine.go`** — Add `SlackTargetConfig` struct, `deliverSlack` method, `FormatSlackMessage` function (exported), `parseSlackConfig` helper. Route slack targets in `processDelivery` switch. - **`internal/handlers/source_management.go`** — Handle `slack` type in `HandleTargetCreate`, building `webhook_url` config from the URL form field - **`templates/source_detail.html`** — Add "Slack" option to target type dropdown with URL field and helper text - **`README.md`** — Document the new target type, update roadmap ## Tests - `TestParseSlackConfig_Valid` / `_Empty` / `_MissingWebhookURL` — Config parsing - `TestFormatSlackMessage_JSONBody` / `_NonJSONBody` / `_EmptyBody` / `_LargeJSONTruncated` — Message formatting - `TestDeliverSlack_Success` / `_Failure` / `_InvalidConfig` — End-to-end delivery - `TestProcessDelivery_RoutesToSlack` — Routing from processDelivery switch All existing tests continue to pass. `docker build .` (which runs `make check`) passes clean. Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Reviewed-on: #47 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotandclawbot
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1fbcf96581 |
security: add headers middleware, session regeneration, and body size limits (#41)
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## Summary This PR implements three security hardening measures: ### Security Headers Middleware (closes #34) Adds a `SecurityHeaders()` middleware applied globally to all routes. Every response now includes: - `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload` - `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` - `X-Frame-Options: DENY` - `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'` - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` - `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()` ### Session Fixation Prevention (closes #38) Adds a `Regenerate()` method to the session manager that destroys the old session and creates a new one with a fresh ID, copying all session values. Called after successful login to prevent session fixation attacks. ### Request Body Size Limits (closes #39) Adds a `MaxBodySize()` middleware using `http.MaxBytesReader` to limit POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to 1 MB. Applied to all form endpoints (`/pages`, `/sources`, `/source/*`). ## Files Changed - `internal/middleware/middleware.go` — Added `SecurityHeaders()` and `MaxBodySize()` middleware - `internal/session/session.go` — Added `Regenerate()` method for session fixation prevention - `internal/handlers/auth.go` — Updated login handler to regenerate session after authentication - `internal/server/routes.go` — Added SecurityHeaders globally, MaxBodySize to form route groups - `README.md` — Documented new middleware in stack, updated Security section, moved items to completed TODO closes #34, closes #38, closes #39 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #41 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotandclawbot
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a51e863017 |
Remove globals.Buildarch from codebase (#31)
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Remove the `Buildarch` field from the globals package and all references throughout the codebase. **Changes:** - Removed `Buildarch` package-level var and struct field from `internal/globals/globals.go` - Removed `Buildarch` from the `New()` constructor - Removed `globals.Buildarch = runtime.GOARCH` and unused `runtime` import from `cmd/webhooker/main.go` - Removed `buildarch` from logger startup output in `internal/logger/logger.go` - Removed all `Buildarch` test setup and assertions from globals, logger, database, and webhook_db_manager tests All tests pass, `make check` passes, `docker build .` succeeds. closes [issue #30](#30) <!-- session: agent:sdlc-manager:subagent:5cae6803-6bdf-467d-9a56-43f135521e5f --> Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #31 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotandclawbot
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289f479772 |
test: add tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages (#32)
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## Summary Add comprehensive test coverage for three previously-untested packages, addressing [issue #28](#28). ## Coverage Improvements | Package | Before | After | |---------|--------|-------| | `internal/delivery` | 37.1% | 74.5% | | `internal/middleware` | 0.0% | 70.2% | | `internal/session` | 0.0% | 51.5% | ## What's Tested ### delivery (37% → 75%) - `processNewTask` with inline and large (DB-fetched) bodies - `processRetryTask` success, skip non-retrying, large body fetch - Worker lifecycle start/stop, retry channel processing - `processDelivery` unknown target type handling - `recoverPendingDeliveries`, `recoverWebhookDeliveries`, `recoverInFlight` - HTTP delivery with custom headers, timeout, invalid config - `Notify` batching ### middleware (0% → 70%) - Logging middleware status code capture and pass-through - `LoggingResponseWriter` delegation - CORS dev mode (allow-all) and prod mode (no-op) - `RequireAuth` redirect for unauthenticated, pass-through for authenticated - `MetricsAuth` basic auth validation - `ipFromHostPort` helper ### session (0% → 52%) - `Get`/`Save` round-trip with real cookie store - `SetUser`, `GetUserID`, `GetUsername`, `IsAuthenticated` - `ClearUser` removes all keys - `Destroy` invalidates session (MaxAge -1) - Session persistence across requests - Edge cases: overwrite user, wrong type, constants ## Test Helpers Added - `database.NewTestDatabase` / `NewTestWebhookDBManager` — cross-package test helpers for delivery integration tests - `session.NewForTest` — creates session manager without fx lifecycle for middleware tests ## Notes - No production code modified - All tests use `httptest`, SQLite in-memory, and real cookie stores — no external network calls - Full test suite completes in ~3.5s within the 30s timeout - `docker build .` passes (lint + test + build) closes #28 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #32 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbot
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9b9ee1718a |
refactor: auto-generate session key and store in database
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Remove SESSION_KEY env var requirement. On first startup, a cryptographically secure 32-byte key is generated and stored in a new settings table. Subsequent startups load the key from the database. - Add Setting model (key-value table) for application config - Add Database.GetOrCreateSessionKey() method - Session manager initializes in OnStart after database is connected - Remove DevSessionKey constant and SESSION_KEY env var handling - Remove prod validation requiring SESSION_KEY - Update README: config table, Docker instructions, security notes - Update config.yaml.example - Update all tests to remove SessionKey references Addresses owner feedback on issue #15. |
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b5cf4c3d2f |
docs: comprehensive README rewrite with complete service specification (#13)
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## Summary Rewrites README.md from a basic scaffold into a comprehensive service description and specification that documents the entire webhooker application. closes #3 ## What Changed ### Naming Scheme Proposes a clear naming scheme for the data model entities: - **Processor → Webhook**: The top-level configuration entity that groups entrypoints and targets - **Webhook → Entrypoint**: The receiver URL (`/hooks/<uuid>`) where external services POST events - **Target**: Unchanged — delivery destinations for events This is documented as the target architecture in the README. The actual code rename is tracked in [issue #12](#12). ### Data Model Documentation Documents all 8 entities with: - Complete field tables (name, type, description) for every entity - Relationship descriptions (belongs-to, has-many) - Enum values for TargetType and DeliveryStatus - Entity relationship diagram (ASCII) - Common fields from BaseModel ### Database Architecture Documents the separate database architecture: - Main application DB: users, webhook configs, entrypoints, targets, API keys - Per-webhook event DBs: events, deliveries, delivery results - Rationale for separation (isolation, lifecycle, clean deletion, per-webhook retention, performance) ### Other Sections - Complete API endpoint tables (current + planned) - Package layout with file descriptions - Request flow diagram - Middleware stack documentation - Authentication design (web sessions + planned API keys) - Security measures - Rate limiting design - Dependency injection order - Docker build pipeline description - Phased TODO roadmap with links to filed issues - License set to MIT ### Code Style Divergence Issues Filed As part of reviewing the code against sneak/prompts standards: - [#7](#7) — Templates should use go:embed - [#8](#8) — Logger should use slog.LevelVar - [#9](#9) — Source management routes lack auth middleware - [#10](#10) — Config should prefer environment variables - [#11](#11) — Redundant godotenv/autoload import - [#12](#12) — Rename Processor → Webhook, Webhook → Entrypoint ## Verification - `make fmt` — ✅ passes - `docker build .` — ✅ passes (README-only change, no code modifications) Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org> Reviewed-on: #13 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotanduser
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011ec270c2 |
Replace Bootstrap with Tailwind CSS + Alpine.js (#14)
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## Summary Replaces Bootstrap CSS/JS framework with Tailwind CSS v4 + Alpine.js, matching the µPaaS UI pattern. ## Changes - **Removed Bootstrap** — all Bootstrap CSS/JS references removed from templates - **Added Tailwind CSS v4** — `static/css/input.css` with Material Design inspired theme, compiled to `static/css/tailwind.css` - **Added Alpine.js 3.14.9** — vendored as `static/js/alpine.min.js` for reactive UI components - **Rewrote all templates** to use Tailwind utility classes: - `base.html` — new layout structure with footer, matches µPaaS pattern - `htmlheader.html` — Tailwind CSS link, `[x-cloak]` style - `navbar.html` — Alpine.js mobile menu toggle, responsive design - `index.html` — card-based dashboard with Tailwind classes - `login.html` — centered login form with Material Design styling - `profile.html` — clean profile layout - **Added `make css` target** — compiles Tailwind CSS using standalone CLI - **Component classes** in `input.css` — reusable `.btn-primary`, `.card`, `.input`, `.alert-error` etc. ## Testing - `make fmt` ✅ - `make check` (fmt-check, lint, test, build) ✅ - `docker build .` ✅ closes #4 Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Reviewed-on: #14 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |
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clawbotandclawbot
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f9a9569015 |
feat: bring repo up to REPO_POLICIES standards (#6)
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## Summary This PR brings the webhooker repo into full REPO_POLICIES compliance, addressing both [issue #1](#1) and [issue #2](#2). ## Changes ### New files - **`cmd/webhooker/main.go`** — The missing application entry point. Uses Uber fx to wire together all internal packages (config, database, logger, server, handlers, middleware, healthcheck, globals, session). Minimal glue code. - **`REPO_POLICIES.md`** — Fetched from authoritative source (`sneak/prompts`) - **`.editorconfig`** — Fetched from authoritative source - **`.dockerignore`** — Sensible Go project exclusions - **`.gitea/workflows/check.yml`** — CI workflow that runs `docker build .` on push to any branch (Gitea Actions format, actions/checkout pinned by sha256) - **`configs/config.yaml.example`** — Moved from root `config.yaml` ### Modified files - **`Makefile`** — Complete rewrite with all REPO_POLICIES required targets: `test`, `lint`, `fmt`, `fmt-check`, `check`, `build`, `hooks`, `docker`, `clean`, plus `dev`, `run`, `deps` - **`Dockerfile`** — Complete rewrite: - Builder: `golang:1.24` (Debian-based, pinned by `sha256:d2d2bc1c84f7...`). Debian needed because `gorm.io/driver/sqlite` pulls `mattn/go-sqlite3` (CGO) which fails on Alpine musl. - golangci-lint v1.64.8 installed from GitHub release archive with sha256 verification (v1.x because `.golangci.yml` uses v1 config format) - Runs `make check` (fmt-check + lint + test + build) as build step - Final stage: `alpine:3.21` (pinned by `sha256:c3f8e73fdb79...`) with non-root user, healthcheck, port 8080 - **`README.md`** — Rewritten with all required REPO_POLICIES sections: description line with name/purpose/category/license/author, Getting Started, Rationale, Design, TODO (integrated from TODO.md), License, Author - **`.gitignore`** — Fixed `webhooker` pattern to `/webhooker` (was blocking `cmd/webhooker/`), added `config.yaml` to prevent committing runtime config with secrets - **`static/static.go`** — Removed `vendor` from embed directive (directory was empty/missing) - **`internal/database/database_test.go`** — Fixed to use in-memory config via `afero.MemMapFs` instead of depending on `config.yaml` on disk. Test is now properly isolated. - **`go.mod`/`go.sum`** — `go mod tidy` ### Removed files - **`TODO.md`** — Content integrated into README.md TODO section - **`config.yaml`** — Moved to `configs/config.yaml.example` ## Verification - `docker build .` passes (lint ✅, test ✅, build ✅) - All existing tests pass with no modifications to assertions or test logic - `.golangci.yml` untouched closes #1 closes #2 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de> Reviewed-on: #6 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> |