The pinned CI linter's gosec G120 flagged r.FormValue in
buildDatabaseTargetConfig because the MaxBytesReader guard lives
one function up in processTargetCreate, out of static-analysis
sight. Read the expiry alongside the other form values in
processTargetCreate and pass it down as a string, matching how
the http and slack config builders receive their URL.
Two review findings on the database archiving target:
- An archive error now records the attempt as failed with the
error string and marks the delivery failed, instead of logging
the error and reporting success. A target that could not do its
one job must not claim it did.
- The archive expiry is now actually configurable: the add-target
form gains an expiry field for database targets, and the value
is validated at creation time via the new
delivery.ValidateArchiveExpiry (empty, "never", or a positive
Go duration), rejecting bad values with a 400 at the only place
a human can fix them, mirroring how Slack target URLs are
validated at creation.
Test updates: a forced archive failure asserts a failed delivery
with a recorded error and no archive file; config builder tests
cover empty/never/duration and rejection paths; the two engine
tests that exercise the database target now build engines with a
real webhook DB manager since archiving is no longer a no-op; the
reopen-debounce test uses a wider window so parallel test load
cannot make two rapid writes straddle it.
Refactors the delivery engine so each target TYPE is an implementation of a `Target` interface, dispatched from a registry, with each target owning its full delivery including durable retries. Implements the authoritative design from issue #77 (the corrected "hand the DB + Scheduler to the target" design).
## The new interface
```go
type Scheduler interface {
ScheduleRetry(task Task, delay time.Duration)
}
type Target interface {
Deliver(ctx context.Context, webhookDB *gorm.DB,
d *database.Delivery, task *Task, sched Scheduler)
}
```
`Deliver` receives everything a target needs to be autonomous and durable: the request context, the per-webhook `*gorm.DB`, the `*database.Delivery`, the attempt `*Task`, and a `Scheduler` (the engine) for durable re-enqueue. The target makes one attempt, writes the `DeliveryResult`, updates `DeliveryStatus`, and — for retry targets — decides whether to retry, computes its own backoff, gates with its own circuit breaker, and reschedules via the injected `Scheduler`.
`processDelivery` collapses to a registry lookup (`map[database.TargetType]Target`) and a `Deliver` call; an unknown target type still fails the delivery as before.
## Per-target ownership
- `httpTarget` and `slackTarget` share a retry core (`httpCore`) that owns retry, exponential backoff, and the per-target circuit breaker. The core is fire-and-forget when `MaxRetries == 0` and adds breaker-gated backed-off retries when `MaxRetries > 0`. The per-attempt request differs (HTTP forwards the body + filtered headers; Slack posts a formatted message) and is supplied as a closure, so each keeps its exact recording semantics (e.g. HTTP records no error string for a non-2xx, Slack records `HTTP <code>`).
- `databaseTarget` and `logTarget` are fire-and-forget: they record a single successful attempt.
Moved wholesale into the http/slack targets: `deliverHTTP*`, `handleHTTPRetry`, `circuitBreakerBlock`, `calcBackoff` / `calcRemainingBackoff` / `backoffElapsed`, the circuit-breaker `sync.Map` + `getCircuitBreaker`, `clientForConfig`, `doHTTPRequest`, `applyRequestHeaders`, and the config parsers. The engine keeps `recordResult`, `updateDeliveryStatus`, and `ScheduleRetry`.
## Slack MaxRetries gating
Slack is now on the same shared core as HTTP, with retry + breaker gated on `MaxRetries`. A `MaxRetries` of 0 stays single-attempt fire-and-forget, so **every existing Slack target is unchanged**; a Slack target configured with retries gets backoff + circuit breaker.
## Log-target full content
`logTarget` now logs the ENTIRE inbound webhook — full request body and full request headers, plus method, content type, and the webhook id and entrypoint id — rather than a summary line. This supersedes the smaller log-summary work (#70).
## `Task.EntrypointID`
To carry the entrypoint id to the log target, `Task` gains an `EntrypointID` field, populated in the webhook handler's `buildDeliveryTasks`, the engine's recovery-task builder, and `buildEventFromTask`.
## Durability / recovery
The crash-durable async retry model is preserved unchanged: one attempt per worker turn; on failure the status is set `retrying`, backoff is computed, and the task is re-enqueued via `ScheduleRetry` (a `time.AfterFunc` onto the retry channel). On restart, `recoverRetryingDeliveries` and the 60s sweep hand each orphaned `retrying` delivery back to its target to recompute the remaining backoff and reschedule (targets that own retries implement an internal `rescheduler`; fire-and-forget targets, which never produce `retrying` deliveries, are skipped).
## How behaviour is preserved
No external behaviour changes except the two called out above (log target full content; Slack gaining `MaxRetries`-gated retries). All existing delivery tests pass with only their `export_test.go` wrappers re-pointed at the new structure — `ExportDeliverHTTP/Slack/Database/Log` now call the targets, `ExportGetCircuitBreaker` / `ExportClient` / `ExportClientForConfig` / `ExportDoHTTPRequest` resolve against the HTTP target's shared client and breaker map, and `ExportParseHTTPConfig` / `ExportParseSlackConfig` call the relocated free functions. Added: a `logTarget` test asserting the log line contains the full body, headers, and ids, and a Slack `MaxRetries`-gated retry test.
`docker build .` is green (fmt-check, lint, test, static build all pass).
Closes#77
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #81
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Enforces each webhook's `RetentionDays` so per-webhook SQLite files no longer grow without bound.
## Reaper
New `RetentionReaper` in `internal/database/retention.go`. A background ticker runs each sweep: it lists all webhooks from the main DB and, for each webhook with a positive `RetentionDays`, opens its per-webhook DB via `WebhookDBManager.GetDB` and deletes every `Event` (and its dependent `Delivery` and `DeliveryResult` rows) whose `CreatedAt` is older than `RetentionDays` days.
- Deletions run in foreign-key-safe order: delivery results, then deliveries, then events.
- Deletes are unscoped (hard deletes) so rows are physically removed and disk is reclaimed, rather than GORM soft-deleting them.
- `RetentionDays <= 0` means retain forever; those webhooks are skipped.
- Webhooks whose per-webhook DB does not yet exist are skipped.
## Config
`internal/config/config.go` gains `RetentionSweepInterval` (env `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL`, parsed as a Go duration, default `1h`) via a new `envDuration` helper, following the existing env-helper conventions.
## Wiring
`cmd/webhooker/main.go` registers `database.NewRetentionReaper` as an fx provider and forces its construction in `fx.Invoke`. The reaper starts its sweep loop on an fx `OnStart` hook and stops cleanly on `OnStop` via context cancellation, matching the existing lifecycle components.
## Test
`internal/database/retention_test.go` seeds an old event chain (event + delivery + result, 40 days old) and a recent one (1 day old) in a real per-webhook DB and asserts a single sweep removes only the expired chain while keeping the recent one. A second test forces a non-positive `RetentionDays` and asserts an ancient event is retained.
Note: the `Webhook.RetentionDays` column carries `gorm:"default:30"`, so a `0` passed to a GORM `Create` is replaced by the default; the test forces the value with an explicit column update to exercise the retain-forever path. No model changes were made.
Validated with `docker build .` (fmt-check, lint, test, build) exit 0.
Closes#63
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #78
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Adds a `NoCache()` middleware that sets `Cache-Control: no-store` and `Pragma: no-cache`, and wires it onto the dynamic app route groups (`/pages`, `/user/{username}`, `/sources`, `/source/{sourceID}`) adjacent to their existing `CSRF()` call. The static `/s` mount, `/metrics`, `/webhook/{uuid}`, and `/.well-known/healthcheck` are intentionally left untouched (static assets are safe to cache; the others are not authenticated pages).
A middleware unit test asserts both headers are set.
Closes#61
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #75
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Slack delivery targets were only checked by the request-time dialer guard, not at creation, giving them a weaker SSRF gate than HTTP targets.
This validates the Slack incoming-webhook URL with `delivery.ValidateTargetURL` in the Slack target creation path (`buildSlackTargetConfig`), before persisting, mirroring the existing HTTP-target path. On failure the create is rejected with the same clear, non-leaking user-facing error the HTTP path uses.
Adds handlers-package tests covering both an accepted public URL and a rejected private/reserved URL. Confined to `internal/handlers/`; `internal/delivery/` is unchanged.
Closes#68
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org>
Reviewed-on: #73
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
`clientForConfig()` in `internal/delivery/engine.go` built a fresh `http.Client` without a Transport when a per-target timeout was configured, dropping the request-time private-IP guard for that path.
It now reuses the shared client's SSRF-safe transport (`e.client.Transport`, the same `NewSSRFSafeTransport` instance), overriding only the `Timeout`. Behaviour is unchanged when no per-target timeout is set (the shared client is returned as before), so no engine code path makes an outbound target request with a client lacking the SSRF-safe transport.
Adds a delivery-package test proving a client from `clientForConfig()` with a per-target timeout still refuses private/reserved/link-local destinations, that the timeout is applied, that the SSRF-safe transport is reused (not duplicated), and that the no-timeout path returns the shared client unchanged.
Confined to `internal/delivery/` only; handlers and server code untouched.
Closes#69
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org>
Reviewed-on: #74
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Enforces authentication for the `/user/{username}` route group at the middleware layer, matching every other authenticated route group.
## Changes
- **`internal/server/routes.go`** (`setupUserRoutes`): added `r.Use(s.mw.RequireAuth())` immediately after the existing `r.Use(s.mw.CSRF())` on the `/user/{username}` group, so auth is enforced by design (CSRF first, then RequireAuth) — consistent with `/sources` and `/source/{sourceID}`.
- **`internal/handlers/profile.go`** (`HandleProfile`): removed the now-dead unauthenticated-redirect branch (RequireAuth guarantees an authenticated session before the handler runs). The handler still reads the username and user id from the session for the own-profile-only check; a request for another user's profile still returns 403. The session-retrieval error is now handled as a 500.
## Tests (`internal/handlers/profile_test.go`)
- own profile returns 200
- another user's profile returns 403
- an unauthenticated request to `/user/{username}` is redirected to `/pages/login` at the middleware layer and never reaches the endpoint handler (routing-level test replicating the CSRF + RequireAuth chain)
## Validation
`docker build .` (fmt-check, lint, test, build) passes.
Closes#60
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org>
Reviewed-on: #71
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Raise `httpWriteTimeout` in `internal/server/http.go` from 10s to `65 * time.Second` so it comfortably exceeds the router's 60s `requestTimeout`. This makes the `middleware.Timeout(60s)` the effective request limit — a slow response now returns a clean 503 from the middleware instead of being cut at the socket write deadline by the transport.
`httpReadTimeout` stays at 10s. A comment on `httpWriteTimeout` documents that it must remain above the 60s request timeout. Change is confined to `internal/server/http.go`; `routes.go` is untouched.
Closes#62
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #72
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Closes [issue #50](#50)
## Summary
Refactors the Dockerfile to use a separate lint stage with a pinned golangci-lint Docker image, following the pattern used by [sneak/pixa](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/pixa). This replaces the previous approach of installing golangci-lint via curl in the builder stage.
## Changes
### Dockerfile
- **New `lint` stage** using `golangci/golangci-lint:v2.11.3` (Debian-based, pinned by sha256 digest) as a separate build stage
- **Builder stage** depends on lint via `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null` — build won't proceed unless linting passes
- **Go bumped** from 1.24 to 1.26.1 (`golang:1.26.1-bookworm`, pinned by sha256)
- **golangci-lint bumped** from v1.64.8 to v2.11.3
- All three Docker images (golangci-lint, golang, alpine) pinned by sha256 digest
- Debian-based golangci-lint image used (not Alpine) because mattn/go-sqlite3 CGO does not compile on musl (off64_t)
### Linter Config (.golangci.yml)
- Migrated from v1 to v2 format (`version: "2"` added)
- Removed linters no longer available in v2: `gofmt` (handled by `make fmt-check`), `gosimple` (merged into `staticcheck`), `typecheck` (always-on in v2)
- Same set of linters enabled — no rules weakened
### Code Fixes (all lint issues from v2 upgrade)
- Added package comments to all packages
- Added doc comments to all exported types, functions, and methods
- Fixed unchecked errors flagged by `errcheck` (sqlDB.Close, os.Setenv in tests, resp.Body.Close, fmt.Fprint)
- Fixed unused parameters flagged by `revive` (renamed to `_`)
- Fixed `gosec` G120 warnings: added `http.MaxBytesReader` before `r.ParseForm()` calls
- Fixed `staticcheck` QF1012: replaced `WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(...))` with `fmt.Fprintf`
- Fixed `staticcheck` QF1003: converted if/else chain to tagged switch
- Renamed `DeliveryTask` → `Task` to avoid package stutter (`delivery.Task` instead of `delivery.DeliveryTask`)
- Renamed shadowed builtin `max` parameter to `upperBound` in `cryptoRandInt`
- Used `t.Setenv` instead of `os.Setenv` in tests (auto-restores)
### README.md
- Updated version requirements: Go 1.26+, golangci-lint v2.11+
- Updated Dockerfile description in project structure
## Verification
`docker build .` passes cleanly — formatting check, linting, all tests, and build all succeed.
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #55
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
## Problem
After the security hardening in PR #42, login fails with `Forbidden - invalid CSRF token` in production deployments.
The CSRF middleware tied its `PlaintextHTTPRequest` wrapping and cookie `Secure` flag to the `IsDev()` environment check. This meant production mode always assumed HTTPS via gorilla/csrf's strict mode, which broke login in common deployment scenarios:
1. **Production behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy**: gorilla/csrf assumed HTTPS but `r.TLS` was nil (the Go server receives HTTP from the proxy). Origin/Referer scheme mismatches caused `referer not supplied` or `origin invalid` errors.
2. **Production over direct HTTP** (testing/staging with prod config): the `Secure` cookie flag prevented the browser from sending the CSRF cookie back over HTTP, causing `CSRF token invalid` errors.
## Root Cause
gorilla/csrf v1.7.3 defaults to HTTPS-strict mode unless `PlaintextHTTPRequest()` is called. In strict mode it:
- Forces `requestURL.Scheme = "https"` for Origin/Referer comparisons
- Requires a `Referer` header on POST and rejects `http://` Referer schemes
- The `csrf.Secure(true)` option makes the browser refuse to send the CSRF cookie over HTTP
The old code only called `PlaintextHTTPRequest()` in dev mode, leaving prod mode permanently stuck in HTTPS-strict mode regardless of the actual transport.
## Fix
Detect the actual transport protocol **per-request** using:
- `r.TLS != nil` — direct TLS connection to the Go server
- `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` header — TLS-terminating reverse proxy
Two gorilla/csrf middleware instances are maintained (one with `Secure: true`, one with `Secure: false`) since `csrf.Secure()` is a creation-time option. Both use the same signing key, so cookies are interchangeable.
| Scenario | Cookie Secure | Origin/Referer Mode |
|---|---|---|
| Direct TLS (`r.TLS != nil`) | ✅ Secure | Strict (HTTPS scheme) |
| Behind TLS proxy (`X-Forwarded-Proto: https`) | ✅ Secure | Strict (HTTPS scheme) |
| Plaintext HTTP | ❌ Non-Secure | Relaxed (PlaintextHTTPRequest) |
CSRF token validation (cookie + form double-submit) is always enforced regardless of mode.
## Testing
- Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode over plaintext HTTP
- Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_BehindProxy_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode behind TLS proxy
- Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_DirectTLS_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode with direct TLS
- Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithoutToken` — token still required
- Added `TestIsClientTLS_*` — TLS detection unit tests
- All existing CSRF tests pass unchanged
- `docker build .` passes (includes `make check`)
- Manual verification: built and ran the container in both `dev` and `prod` modes, confirmed login succeeds in both
Closes #53
Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan>
Reviewed-on: #54
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Closes#51
The root path `/` now checks for an authenticated session and redirects accordingly:
- **Authenticated users** → `303 See Other` redirect to `/sources` (the webhook dashboard)
- **Unauthenticated users** → `303 See Other` redirect to `/pages/login`
### Changes
- **`internal/handlers/index.go`** — Replaced the template-rendering `HandleIndex()` with a session-checking redirect handler. Removed `formatUptime` helper (dead code after this change).
- **`internal/handlers/handlers.go`** — Removed `index.html` from the template map (no longer rendered).
- **`internal/handlers/handlers_test.go`** — Replaced the old "handler is not nil" test with two proper redirect tests:
- `unauthenticated redirects to login` — verifies 303 to `/pages/login`
- `authenticated redirects to sources` — sets up an authenticated session cookie, verifies 303 to `/sources`
- Removed `TestFormatUptime` (tested dead code).
- **`README.md`** — Updated the API endpoints table to describe the new redirect behavior.
### How it works
The handler calls `session.Get(r)` and `session.IsAuthenticated(sess)` — the same pattern used by the `RequireAuth` middleware and `HandleLoginPage`. No new dependencies or session logic introduced.
The login flow is unaffected: `HandleLoginSubmit` redirects to `/` after successful login, which now forwards to `/sources` (one extra redirect hop, but correct and clean).
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #52
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Closes#45.
## Problem
1. The README didn't clearly explain what `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=dev` vs `prod` actually changes.
2. The dev-mode default for `DATA_DIR` was `./data` — a relative path whose meaning depends on the working directory. There's no reason to use a relative path even in development.
## Changes
### Code (`internal/config/config.go`)
- Replace the dev default `DATA_DIR` from `./data` to `$XDG_DATA_HOME/webhooker` (falling back to `$HOME/.local/share/webhooker`). This follows the XDG Base Directory Specification and ensures the data directory is always an absolute path regardless of the working directory.
- Add `devDataDir()` helper that resolves the XDG path, with a `/tmp/webhooker` last-resort fallback if `$HOME` can't be determined.
### Tests (`internal/config/config_test.go`)
- `TestDevDataDir`: verifies XDG_DATA_HOME is respected, HOME fallback works, and the result is always absolute.
- `TestDevDefaultDataDirIsAbsolute`: integration test that creates a full Config via fx and asserts the dev default DataDir is absolute.
### README
- Add a table documenting exactly what `dev` vs `prod` changes: DATA_DIR default, CORS policy, and session cookie Secure flag.
- Clarify that log format and security headers are independent of the environment setting.
- Update the DATA_DIR default in the configuration variable table.
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de>
Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan>
Reviewed-on: #46
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Closes#48
## Problem
The Docker container failed to start with:
```
exec ./webhooker: no such file or directory
```
Two root causes:
1. **Relative paths**: `COPY` destination and `CMD` used relative paths (`./webhooker`), depending on `WORKDIR` context.
2. **Dynamic linking** (the actual root cause): The binary was built with CGO enabled on Debian (glibc) via `make build`, but deployed to an Alpine runtime (musl). The kernel couldn't find the glibc dynamic linker (`/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2`), producing the misleading "no such file or directory" error — even though the file existed on disk.
## Fix
- **Absolute paths throughout**: `COPY --from=builder /build/bin/webhooker /app/webhooker` and `CMD ["/app/webhooker"]` — no reliance on WORKDIR.
- **Static rebuild for Alpine**: Added a `RUN CGO_ENABLED=1 go build -ldflags '-extldflags "-static"' -o bin/webhooker ./cmd/webhooker` step after `make check`. This rebuilds the binary with static linking so it runs on Alpine without glibc. The `make check` step still runs normally (formatting, linting, tests, dynamic build) — the static rebuild is only for the deployment binary.
## Verification
- `docker build .` passes (all checks green)
- Container starts successfully and initializes the Fx dependency graph
- The README already stated "The runtime binary is statically linked and runs on Alpine" — this fix makes that claim actually true.
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@users.noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #49
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
## Summary
Adds a new `slack` target type that sends webhook events as formatted messages to any Slack-compatible incoming webhook URL (Slack, Mattermost, and other compatible services).
closes#44
## What it does
When a webhook event is received, the Slack target:
1. Formats a human-readable message with event metadata (HTTP method, content type, timestamp, body size)
2. Pretty-prints the payload in a code block — JSON payloads get indented formatting, non-JSON payloads are shown as raw text
3. Truncates large payloads at 3500 characters to keep Slack messages reasonable
4. POSTs the message as a `{"text": "..."}` JSON payload to the configured webhook URL
## Changes
- **`internal/database/model_target.go`** — Add `TargetTypeSlack` constant
- **`internal/delivery/engine.go`** — Add `SlackTargetConfig` struct, `deliverSlack` method, `FormatSlackMessage` function (exported), `parseSlackConfig` helper. Route slack targets in `processDelivery` switch.
- **`internal/handlers/source_management.go`** — Handle `slack` type in `HandleTargetCreate`, building `webhook_url` config from the URL form field
- **`templates/source_detail.html`** — Add "Slack" option to target type dropdown with URL field and helper text
- **`README.md`** — Document the new target type, update roadmap
## Tests
- `TestParseSlackConfig_Valid` / `_Empty` / `_MissingWebhookURL` — Config parsing
- `TestFormatSlackMessage_JSONBody` / `_NonJSONBody` / `_EmptyBody` / `_LargeJSONTruncated` — Message formatting
- `TestDeliverSlack_Success` / `_Failure` / `_InvalidConfig` — End-to-end delivery
- `TestProcessDelivery_RoutesToSlack` — Routing from processDelivery switch
All existing tests continue to pass. `docker build .` (which runs `make check`) passes clean.
Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan>
Reviewed-on: #47
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
## Summary
This PR implements three security hardening measures:
### Security Headers Middleware (closes #34)
Adds a `SecurityHeaders()` middleware applied globally to all routes. Every response now includes:
- `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload`
- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
- `X-Frame-Options: DENY`
- `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`
- `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`
- `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()`
### Session Fixation Prevention (closes #38)
Adds a `Regenerate()` method to the session manager that destroys the old session and creates a new one with a fresh ID, copying all session values. Called after successful login to prevent session fixation attacks.
### Request Body Size Limits (closes #39)
Adds a `MaxBodySize()` middleware using `http.MaxBytesReader` to limit POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to 1 MB. Applied to all form endpoints (`/pages`, `/sources`, `/source/*`).
## Files Changed
- `internal/middleware/middleware.go` — Added `SecurityHeaders()` and `MaxBodySize()` middleware
- `internal/session/session.go` — Added `Regenerate()` method for session fixation prevention
- `internal/handlers/auth.go` — Updated login handler to regenerate session after authentication
- `internal/server/routes.go` — Added SecurityHeaders globally, MaxBodySize to form route groups
- `README.md` — Documented new middleware in stack, updated Security section, moved items to completed TODO
closes #34, closes #38, closes #39
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #41
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Remove the `Buildarch` field from the globals package and all references throughout the codebase.
**Changes:**
- Removed `Buildarch` package-level var and struct field from `internal/globals/globals.go`
- Removed `Buildarch` from the `New()` constructor
- Removed `globals.Buildarch = runtime.GOARCH` and unused `runtime` import from `cmd/webhooker/main.go`
- Removed `buildarch` from logger startup output in `internal/logger/logger.go`
- Removed all `Buildarch` test setup and assertions from globals, logger, database, and webhook_db_manager tests
All tests pass, `make check` passes, `docker build .` succeeds.
closes [issue #30](#30)
<!-- session: agent:sdlc-manager:subagent:5cae6803-6bdf-467d-9a56-43f135521e5f -->
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #31
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
- README.md: remove 'in development mode' from admin user creation
description (admin user creation is unconditional)
- internal/delivery/engine.go: remove 'and retry' from HTTPTargetConfig
comment (retry was merged into http target type)
- internal/delivery/engine_test.go: remove '/retry' from
newHTTPTargetConfig comment for consistency
- Remove retry→http data migration from migrate() — no databases exist pre-1.0
- Remove unused DevelopmentMode field and DEVELOPMENT_MODE env var from config
- Remove DevelopmentMode from config log output (dead code cleanup)
DBURL → DATA_DIR consolidation:
- Remove DBURL env var entirely; main DB now lives at {DATA_DIR}/webhooker.db
- database.go constructs DB path from config.DataDir, ensures dir exists
- Update DATA_DIR prod default from /data/events to /data
- Update all tests to use DataDir instead of DBURL
- Update Dockerfile: /data (not /data/events) for all SQLite databases
- Update README configuration table, Docker examples, architecture docs
Dead code removal:
- Remove unused IndexResponse struct (handlers/index.go)
- Remove unused TemplateData struct (handlers/handlers.go)
Stale comment cleanup:
- Remove TODO in server.go (DB cleanup handled by fx lifecycle)
- Fix nolint:golint → nolint:revive on ServerParams for consistency
- Clean up verbose middleware/routing comments in routes.go
- Fix TODO fan-out description (worker pool, not goroutine-per-target)
.gitignore fixes:
- Add data/ directory to gitignore
- Remove stale config.yaml entry (env-only config since rework)
Remove the entire pkg/config package (Viper-based YAML config file
loader) and simplify internal/config to read all settings directly from
environment variables via os.Getenv(). This eliminates the spurious
"Failed to load config" log messages that appeared when no config.yaml
file was present.
- Delete pkg/config/ (YAML loader, resolver, manager, tests)
- Delete configs/config.yaml.example
- Simplify internal/config helper functions to use os.Getenv() with
defaults instead of falling back to pkgconfig
- Update tests to set env vars directly instead of creating in-memory
YAML config files via afero
- Remove afero, cloud.google.com/*, aws-sdk-go dependencies from go.mod
- Update README: document env-var-only configuration, remove YAML/Viper
references
- Keep godotenv/autoload for .env file convenience in local development
closes #27
Replace unbounded goroutine-per-delivery fan-out with a fixed-size
worker pool (10 workers). Channels serve as bounded queues (10,000
buffer). Workers are the only goroutines doing HTTP delivery.
When retry channel overflows, timers are dropped instead of re-armed.
The delivery stays in 'retrying' status in the DB and a periodic sweep
(every 60s) recovers orphaned retries. The database is the durable
fallback — same path used on startup recovery.
Addresses owner feedback on circuit breaker recovery goroutine flood.
- Fan out all targets for an event in parallel goroutines (fire-and-forget)
- Add per-target circuit breaker for retry targets (closed/open/half-open)
- Circuit breaker trips after 5 consecutive failures, 30s cooldown
- Open circuit skips delivery and reschedules after cooldown
- Half-open allows one probe delivery to test recovery
- HTTP/database/log targets unaffected (no circuit breaker)
- Recovery path also fans out in parallel
- Update README with parallel delivery and circuit breaker docs
The webhook handler now builds DeliveryTask structs carrying all target
config and event data inline (for bodies ≤16KB) and sends them through
the delivery channel. In the happy path, the engine delivers without
reading from any database — it only writes to record delivery results.
For large bodies (≥16KB), Body is nil and the engine fetches it from the
per-webhook database on demand. Retry timers also carry the full
DeliveryTask, so retries avoid unnecessary DB reads.
The database is used for crash recovery only: on startup the engine scans
for interrupted pending/retrying deliveries and re-queues them.
Implements owner feedback from issue #15:
> the message in the <=16KB case should have everything it needs to do
> its delivery. it shouldn't touch the db until it has a success or
> failure to record.
Remove SESSION_KEY env var requirement. On first startup, a
cryptographically secure 32-byte key is generated and stored in a new
settings table. Subsequent startups load the key from the database.
- Add Setting model (key-value table) for application config
- Add Database.GetOrCreateSessionKey() method
- Session manager initializes in OnStart after database is connected
- Remove DevSessionKey constant and SESSION_KEY env var handling
- Remove prod validation requiring SESSION_KEY
- Update README: config table, Docker instructions, security notes
- Update config.yaml.example
- Update all tests to remove SessionKey references
Addresses owner feedback on issue #15.
Replace the polling-based delivery engine with a fully event-driven
architecture using Go channels and goroutines:
- Webhook handler notifies engine via buffered channel after creating
delivery records, with inline event data for payloads < 16KB
- Large payloads (>= 16KB) use pointer semantics (Body *string = nil)
and are fetched from DB on demand, keeping channel memory bounded
- Failed retry-target deliveries schedule Go timers with exponential
backoff; timers fire into a separate retry channel when ready
- On startup, engine scans DB once to recover interrupted deliveries
(pending processed immediately, retrying get timers for remaining
backoff)
- DB stores delivery status for crash recovery only, not for
inter-component communication during normal operation
- delivery.Notifier interface decouples handlers from engine; fx wires
*Engine as Notifier
No more periodic polling. No more wasted cycles when idle.
Split data storage into main application DB (config only) and
per-webhook event databases (one SQLite file per webhook).
Architecture changes:
- New WebhookDBManager component manages per-webhook DB lifecycle
(create, open, cache, delete) with lazy connection pooling via sync.Map
- Main DB (DBURL) stores only config: Users, Webhooks, Entrypoints,
Targets, APIKeys
- Per-webhook DBs (DATA_DIR) store Events, Deliveries, DeliveryResults
in files named events-{webhook_uuid}.db
- New DATA_DIR env var (default: ./data dev, /data/events prod)
Behavioral changes:
- Webhook creation creates per-webhook DB file
- Webhook deletion hard-deletes per-webhook DB file (config soft-deleted)
- Event ingestion writes to per-webhook DB, not main DB
- Delivery engine polls all per-webhook DBs for pending deliveries
- Database target type marks delivery as immediately successful (events
are already in the dedicated per-webhook DB)
- Event log UI reads from per-webhook DBs with targets from main DB
- Existing webhooks without DB files get them created lazily
Removed:
- ArchivedEvent model (was a half-measure, replaced by per-webhook DBs)
- Event/Delivery/DeliveryResult removed from main DB migrations
Added:
- Comprehensive tests for WebhookDBManager (create, delete, lazy
creation, delivery workflow, multiple webhooks, close all)
- Dockerfile creates /data/events directory
README updates:
- Per-webhook event databases documented as implemented (was Phase 2)
- DATA_DIR added to configuration table
- Docker instructions updated with data volume mount
- Data model diagram updated
- TODO updated (database separation moved to completed)
Closes#15
The "database" target type now writes events to a separate
archived_events table instead of just marking the delivery as done.
This table persists independently of internal event retention/pruning,
allowing the data to be consumed by external systems or preserved
indefinitely.
New ArchivedEvent model copies the full event payload (method, headers,
body, content_type) along with webhook/entrypoint/event/target IDs.
When no config.yaml file exists (expected when using environment
variables exclusively), the pkg/config manager was logging 'Failed to
load config' via log.Printf, which is confusing during normal operation.
Suppress these messages since missing config file is a valid state.
Replace slog.Info (which outputs structured JSON in prod and ends up in
log aggregation) with a plain fmt.Fprintf to stderr. The password is
printed once on first startup in a clearly-delimited banner that won't
be parsed as a structured log field.
Add toggle (activate/deactivate) and delete buttons for individual
entrypoints and targets on the webhook detail page. Each action is a
POST form submission with ownership verification.
New routes:
POST /source/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete
POST /source/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle
POST /source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/delete
POST /source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/toggle
When deleting a webhook, also soft-delete all related deliveries and
delivery results (not just entrypoints, targets, and events). Query
event IDs, then delivery IDs, then cascade delete delivery results,
deliveries, events, entrypoints, targets, and finally the webhook
itself — all within a single transaction.
In dev mode, keep the wildcard origin for local testing convenience.
In production, skip CORS headers entirely since the web UI is
server-rendered and cross-origin requests are not expected.
Remove DevAdminUsername and DevAdminPassword fields from the Config
struct and their loading code. These fields were never referenced
anywhere else in the codebase.
The serve() method called cleanShutdown() after ctx.Done(), and the fx
OnStop hook also called cleanShutdown(). Remove the call in serve() so
shutdown happens exactly once via the fx lifecycle.
Add method check at the top of HandleWebhook, returning 405 Method Not
Allowed with an Allow: POST header for any non-POST request. This
prevents GET, PUT, DELETE, etc. from being accepted at entrypoint URLs.
Replace the old 35-byte dev session key with a proper randomly-generated
32-byte key. Also ensure dev mode actually falls back to DevSessionKey
when SESSION_KEY is not set in the environment, rather than leaving
SessionKey empty and failing at session creation.
Update tests to remove the old key references.
Reorder template.ParseFS arguments so the page template file is listed
first. Go's template package names the template set after the first file
parsed. When htmlheader.html was first, its content (entirely a
{{define}} block) became the root template, which is empty. By putting
the page file first, its {{template "base" .}} invocation becomes the
root action and the page renders correctly.
Store the *database.Database wrapper instead of calling .DB() eagerly
at construction time. The GORM *gorm.DB is only available after the
database's OnStart hook runs, but the engine constructor runs during
fx resolution (before OnStart). Accessing .DB() lazily via the wrapper
avoids the nil pointer panic.
