Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot ec86b964d5 Read a cached source only once a processing slot is taken (closes #64)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m27s
A request whose source was in the disk cache read the whole file into
memory, then waited for a processing slot, so a burst of new sizes for
one large cached image held one copy per waiting request, with no
ceiling. The service now opens the cached file and hands it to the image
processor, which reads it only after taking its slot. The file's size,
now returned by GetSourceContent, still sends an empty or oversized
cached source to upstream instead. A cached file that fails while being
read now fails the request instead of being fetched again.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 04:10:55 +00:00
clawbot d57379414b Test that a cached source is read only with a processing slot (closes #64)
Failing test: with the only processing slot held, a request for a new
width of a cached image waits for the slot while the cached file is
rewritten; the answer must come from the rewritten file, so the request
read none of the source before it had a slot. Also a test that a fetch
whose request context ends while it waits for a connection shared by all
hosts gives its host's slot back; that one passes already.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 04:08:58 +00:00
clawbot 5a20a5f48d Bound concurrent image processing and upstream fetches (closes #64)
max_concurrent_processing (default: the number of CPUs Go uses) bounds
the images processed at once, and upstream_connections (default 64) the
fetches from all upstream hosts together, beside the per-host limit. A
request that finds either full waits up to 10 seconds, then gets 503
"server busy, try again later". The processor holds its slot from before
it reads the input until it returns, and takes a free slot even after the
request context has ended; a fetch holds its connection until the
response body is closed, after its image is processed. libvips now starts
with one worker thread per image and no operation cache. Both settings
have PIXA_ variables and are in README.md and config.example.yml.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 04:08:58 +00:00
clawbot 7472249394 Test the processing and upstream connection limits (closes #64)
Failing tests for two limits that do not exist yet. Config:
max_concurrent_processing and upstream_connections, their defaults, and
valid and invalid values from the file and the environment. Image
processor: never more images at once than its limit, waiting and then
failing with ErrTooManyImages when no slot frees, and freeing its slot on
every error. Fetcher: connections to all hosts counted together, apart
from the per-host limit, and freed on errors. Both image routes answer
503 when either wait gives up. TestEnvironmentSetsEveryKey sets the two
new variables, as it compares the whole config. The tests do not compile
until the limits exist.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 04:08:38 +00:00
clawbot 1b920fe000 Correct trusted_proxies advice and state signature padding (closes #150)
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The README told operators to set trusted_proxies to the proxy's own
address. A proxy on the Docker host that connects over 127.0.0.1 reaches
pixa from the Docker network's gateway, so that advice made pixa count
every user as one client for the login limit. The login-limit paragraph,
the trusted_proxies entry and config.example.yml now say to use the
address pixa sees for requests through the proxy, that a proxy connecting
through another host address is seen with that address, and how to read
it from the request log.

The signature section now says sig is base64url with the = padding
kept, since pixa compares it exactly, and shows the example's sig for a
stated key, computed with pixa's signer.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 06:05:44 +02:00
clawbot e98b998cb6 Make the cache stats count what is cached, fetched and transcoded (closes #56)
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Cache.Stats read request_cache and output_content, which nothing
writes, so TotalItems and TotalSizeBytes were always 0. They now count
source_content plus variant_content and use UsageBytes; a disabled disk
cache reports 0 for both. The upstream fetch count and bytes and the
transform count never moved: Get now passes the bytes it fetched
(including those read before a failed body read) and counts each
successful transcode. Hits, misses and these counters are written with
context.WithoutCancel, so a client disconnect or the request timeout no
longer loses them. The unused tables stay; metaCache is #70.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 05:25:10 +02:00
clawbot ed3f8770e6 Give pixad a fixed uid and gid 65532 (closes #151)
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adduser took the first free uid, 1000, and the entrypoint gives a
bind-mounted /var/lib/pixa to pixad, so on the host a person's login
account ended up owning pixa's database and cache. The image now creates
the pixad group with gid 65532 and the pixad user with uid 65532, which
host login and system accounts do not use. The first-run step of
"Running under upaas" in README.md names the uid and gid.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 04:44:49 +02:00
clawbot 2afe61e301 Keep max-age within an expiring image URL's lifetime (closes #63)
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Both image routes sent Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000,
immutable unconditionally, so a browser or proxy could keep serving an
image for a year after its signed or encrypted URL had expired. max-age
is now the whole seconds left until the URL expires, never negative and
at most one year; a URL with no expiry keeps one year. The 304 answer
uses the same value. An encrypted URL's expiry now reaches
ImageRequest.Expires through ToImageRequest. immutable stays: freshness
now ends no later than the URL's expiry. README.md documents the header.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 03:51:58 +02:00
sneak 05678eaae5 next -> main (1.0.0 milestone) (#118)
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Reviewed-on: #118
2026-09-29 03:01:06 +02:00
clawbot be060a8305 Strip metadata from processed images (closes #82)
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Every output is exported with govips' StripMetadata, so it carries no
EXIF (GPS, serial numbers, embedded thumbnails), XMP, IPTC or ICC
profile, the orig format included: it is always re-encoded, and pixa
never serves the source bytes. The image is turned upright with
AutoRotate right after decoding, so dropping the orientation tag does
not leave it rotated, and a requested size applies to the upright
image. An image with an ICC profile is converted to sRGB before export.
No setting turns this off. README.md documents it.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 02:18:25 +02:00
clawbot e410146fb6 Rate limit login attempts per client address (closes #66)
check / check (push) Successful in 12s
POST / had no limit, so the signing key could be guessed at no cost. It
is now limited to 5 attempts per minute per client by a new RateLimit
middleware on github.com/go-chi/httprate; an attempt over the limit gets
429 with Retry-After. It counts by the address the ClientIP middleware
resolved through trusted_proxies (an IPv4-mapped address as its IPv4
address, IPv6 by its /64) and runs after the body-size and CSRF checks,
so every attempt that reaches the key comparison is counted. README says
that with the default trusted_proxies a client with a private address
can choose its counted address, and how to close that.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-29 01:03:37 +02:00
clawbot 6010f5beb0 Refuse an unparseable exp with 400; log swallowed cache errors (closes #72)
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An exp that was not a whole number, or empty, was ignored, so a URL for
a host that needs a signature got 401 as if it had no exp. It is now a
400 naming exp and the value, on every host; only an exp missing from
the URL is unchanged.

A failed variant .meta write, source metadata JSON write, Stats count
query, stats counter update, negative cache write or expired negative
cache delete was discarded without a trace. Each is now logged at warn
with the path or key and the error, and stays non-fatal, with tests for
those that can be made to fail. VariantStorage takes the cache's logger.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-28 19:59:39 +02:00
clawbot f149813c7e Refuse an empty fit on /v1/image/ with 400 (closes #139)
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A fit in the URL with an empty value (fit=) was treated as missing, so
it was served as cover and verified against a signature made for cover.
It is now a 400 naming fit, the same rule the route applies to an empty
q. It is checked before the existing fit-mode check, which takes an
empty fit as missing; any other value still goes through that check
unchanged. Only a fit missing from the URL is cover.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-28 18:07:11 +02:00
clawbot 45869572ff Refuse a q outside 1-100 on /v1/image/ with 400 (closes #134)
check / check (push) Successful in 13s
A q that was not a number or was outside 1-100 was dropped and 85 used,
so q=500 was served and verified against a signature made for 85. It is
now a 400 naming q and the value, read with the generator's quality
check; only a q missing from the URL is 85.

The route also refuses with 400 a query string that cannot be decoded
(r.URL.Query() drops such a pair, so q=80% arrived as no q) and any
parameter given more than once, which was read from its first value only
(q=80&q=500 was served at 80).

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-28 17:46:49 +02:00
clawbot 0f3700f7f5 Abort startup on an unknown PIXA_ environment variable (closes #133)
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A variable whose name starts with PIXA_ but is neither a setting's
variable, from the list pairing each config key with its variable, nor
PIXA_CONFIG_PATH now aborts startup naming it, as an unknown config key
does. PIXA_PORT is named with a pointer to PORT. The check runs after
the config file loads, so the variables the file's env section sets are
checked too. README.md says so under Configuration.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-28 16:12:57 +02:00
clawbot 582ff66ba6 Describe what --health-interval does in docker-smoke on current Docker (closes #132)
check / check (push) Successful in 14s
The old comment said the flag stops the image's 30-second interval from
delaying the first probe past the wait. From Docker 25 on, the first
probe runs 5 seconds after start either way; the flag makes probes
after the 10-second start period come every second instead of every
30. Only the comment changes; TODO.md is left alone because the issue
limits the change to this script.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-28 15:48:53 +02:00
clawbot f8d40b89a7 Validate dimensions and fit mode on encrypted URLs (closes #62)
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The encrypted /v1/e/ route used the decrypted payload unchecked, so a
token could request an over-limit size or an unknown fit mode; the
generator turned unparseable numbers into 0.

imgcache.ValidateDimension alone holds the MaxDimension bound and is
used by the path parser, by the new ValidateImageRequest (which adds
ValidateFitMode) and by the generator. Both image routes call
ValidateImageRequest, so each answers 400. The generator answers 400
naming the field for a width or height that is not a number or fails
that check, a quality that is not a number from 1 to 100, a ttl that is
not a number from 0 to the largest the expiry calculation can hold, or
an unknown fit. Empty quality is 85; empty ttl never expires. The
form's size inputs stop at 8192.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation); opus-5-5 (rework)
2026-09-28 15:24:32 +02:00
clawbot 50123b2a6d Start on a fresh upaas volume and document running under upaas (closes #129)
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upaas bind-mounts an existing host directory and sets no container
user, so a directory made with mkdir as root left pixad unable to
write /var/lib/pixa, and the container exited at startup.

The image now starts as root: deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh gives
/var/lib/pixa to pixad when pixad does not own it, then runs the
server as pixad through su-exec (alpine's package), so the server
never runs as root. README.md gains a "Running under upaas" section:
port, volume, environment variables, health check, first-run step.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-28 15:12:48 +02:00
clawbot 2f7365cc9b Run all linting in Docker through script/lint (closes #104)
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make lint calls script/lint, the only way golangci-lint is run. Inside a
container it runs the linter; anywhere else it builds Dockerfile.lint,
whose last step runs script/lint again. Both Dockerfiles set
container=docker to mark the container, since /.dockerenv is missing in
build steps and present on hosts that are themselves containers. The
Dockerfile lint stage runs make lint.

A new CACHEBUST build-arg on every run keeps the lint step from being
served from cache; a tmpfs mount keeps Go's and golangci-lint's caches
out of that step's layer, so runs do not pile up build cache.
script/bootstrap and the nix-shell package lists no longer carry
golangci-lint. golangci-lint config verify is not run: it fetches its
schema over an unpinned live HTTPS call.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation); opus-5-5 (rework)
2026-09-28 14:27:35 +02:00
clawbot 0f5bd51b09 Every setting can be given as an environment variable (closes #128)
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Each config key can now be set by PIXA_ plus the key in upper case
("." written as "_"), and the port by PORT. A present variable, even
an empty one, is read before the config file through the existing
typed getters, so every existing check covers it; errors name the key
and the variable, never the signing key or metrics password. A
variable named in the file's env: section overrides both. An empty
string for blocked_networks or trusted_proxies is now an empty list.
The image no longer bakes in config.docker.yml or passes --config; its
HEALTHCHECK probes ${PORT:-8080}. The config file is looked for under
/etc/pixa rather than /etc/pixad. Also covers #99.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-28 13:46:56 +02:00
clawbot db784bf561 Include quality and fit in the URL signature (closes #60)
check / check (push) Successful in 12s
The signed data is now
host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration:quality:fit. The route
turns a missing q into 85 and a missing fit into cover before checking
the signature, so those are the values signed for a URL without them;
imgcache fills both from the parsed request.

imgcache.Service.GenerateSignedURL now writes q and fit into the URL
next to sig and exp, first setting an unset quality or fit to 85 or
cover, so a generated URL verifies for the values it signed.

The known-answer vectors in golden_test.go, including one for quality
40 and fit contain, and the README signature section describe the new
format.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation); opus-5-5 (rework)
2026-09-28 13:02:21 +02:00
clawbot b7c1226c38 Add a Docker HEALTHCHECK and make docker-smoke (closes #111)
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The runtime stage declares a HEALTHCHECK that probes
/.well-known/healthcheck.json with busybox wget. script/docker-smoke
(make docker-smoke) builds the image with script/docker, starts it with
a random PIXA_SIGNING_KEY, and passes only once Docker reports the
container healthy within 30 seconds; the container is removed on exit
and its log printed on failure. The Gitea workflow runs it after
script/cibuild; it is not part of make check.

It waits on Docker's health status instead of polling a published host
port because the Gitea job runs in its own container on its own
network, where such a port is not reachable at localhost.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-09-28 12:06:29 +02:00
clawbot 10eab440e7 Resolve real client IP behind trusted proxies (closes #94)
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RFC1918 ranges are the default trusted proxy set on an omitted key; an explicit list replaces the default; an explicit empty list trusts no one; unparseable values abort startup; forwarded headers honored only from trusted peers. Independent review passed: #127 (comment)

model: claude-opus-4-8 (implementation and review); merged by claude-fable-5
2026-09-22 10:25:41 +02:00
clawbot 3cfcda0730 feat: blocked_networks config and extended SSRF ranges (closes #67)
check / check (push) Failing after 1s
Adds the blocked_networks config key: a list of CIDRs, parsed with net/netip, that is added to the built-in list of address ranges the fetcher refuses to contact and can never remove an entry from it. An invalid CIDR aborts startup naming the key and the value.

The built-in list gains CGNAT 100.64.0.0/10, IETF protocol assignments 192.0.0.0/24, benchmark 198.18.0.0/15 and NAT64 64:ff9b::/96. Resolved addresses are unmapped before matching, so IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms are caught too. Enforcement stays in the dial-time re-resolution, which is what closes the DNS rebinding window.

What a reader would trip over: 192.0.0.0/24 is now blocked but TEST-NET-1 (192.0.2.0/24), which the Fetch tests use as a public upstream, is a different range and stays dialable. The package-level dialer enforces the built-in ranges only; operator entries are applied by the fetcher.

Disclosure: one nolint:gochecknoglobals on the immutable built-in prefix list.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation, review); fable-5-1 (landing message)
2026-09-22 00:43:27 +02:00
clawbot 1798cba96c Take the image signing key from PIXA_SIGNING_KEY and refuse the example placeholder (closes #110)
check / check (push) Failing after 1s
The Docker image now ships config.docker.yml, which sets only signing_key (read from the PIXA_SIGNING_KEY environment variable), state_dir and port. The placeholder key and the five-host allowlist from config.example.yml are no longer in the image; anything else is configured by mounting a file over /etc/pixa/config.yml. A container started without PIXA_SIGNING_KEY exits naming it.

Startup now refuses the exact placeholder signing_key from config.example.yml. It is 45 characters long and used to pass the length check, so a deployment could sign URLs with a key that is public in this repository. README Getting Started is corrected to match.

What a reader would trip over: the unset-variable error comes from config interpolation, not from validate(); the signing key checks moved into validateSigningKey to stay under the complexity limit.

Disclosure: TODO.md is not updated by this change.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation, review); fable-5-1 (landing message)
2026-09-21 21:59:24 +02:00
clawbot 37d49ade11 Harden http.Server: slowloris timeouts and form body limit (closes #92)
check / check (push) Failing after 1s
The http.Server now sets ReadHeaderTimeout (10s), which bounds the slow header dribble that ReadTimeout alone does not, and IdleTimeout (120s), which bounds keep-alive reuse. Server construction moved into a small helper so a test can assert the timeouts without binding a listener.

POST / and POST /generate bodies are capped at 1 MiB and an oversized body returns 413.

What a reader would trip over: the CSRF library reads its token from the form and swallows a parse error, so a cap applied only inside it would surface as 403. The body limit therefore parses the form under the cap before the CSRF check; the parsed form is reused afterwards. A test covers an oversized body that carries a valid token.

Judgement call: WriteTimeout stays at 60s; it also bounds how long a large image may take to send over a slow link.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation, review); fable-5-1 (landing message)
2026-09-21 20:59:24 +02:00
clawbot b4e5300feb feat: add HSTS, CSP, and Permissions-Policy security headers (closes #91)
check / check (push) Failing after 0s
SecurityHeaders() now also sets Strict-Transport-Security (one year, includeSubDomains), a Content-Security-Policy (default-src self, frame-ancestors none) and a Permissions-Policy denying the browser features pixa does not use. X-Frame-Options stays as the legacy fallback.

What a reader would trip over: HSTS is sent on every response even though pixa listens on plain HTTP behind a TLS-terminating proxy; browsers ignore the header over plaintext, and this avoids trusting a forwarded-proto header. The clipboard feature is left unlisted so the copy button on the generator page keeps working.

Disclosure: script-src and style-src carry unsafe-inline because the generator template has inline onclick handlers and the bundled Tailwind script injects a style element at runtime; removing it needs template changes and is tracked separately.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation, review); fable-5-1 (landing message)
2026-09-21 20:43:13 +02:00
clawbot 4f95cb6a37 docs: update TODO.md Workflow and Status for the next branching model (closes #106)
check / check (push) Failing after 0s
The Workflow section of TODO.md still told contributors to branch from main and merge there. It now describes the current model: one branch per issue cut from next, a PR based on next, an independent reviewer, a squash-merge into next by the manager, and only the owner merging next into main through the milestone PR. The Status paragraph no longer claims work is green on main.

Disclosure: only the wrong lines are touched; reflowing the whole file is left to #100.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation, review); fable-5-1 (landing message)
2026-09-21 19:59:51 +02:00
clawbot 6f416eac31 test: cover redirect SSRF and semaphore release in httpfetcher (closes #78)
check / check (push) Failing after 0s
internal/httpfetcher had only helper-level tests. This adds tests of the full Fetch path, with no non-test code changed: a redirect to a private address is refused and never dialed while public redirects and a two-hop chain still work; the per-host semaphore is released on error, after a full read and after a partial read; an oversized body yields ErrResponseTooLarge; non-2xx and disallowed content types are rejected; the dialer blocks private, link-local and loopback targets.

What a reader would trip over: the upstream host in the tests is the TEST-NET-1 literal 192.0.2.10, which the private-IP check treats as public; a recording dialer routes it to the local test server and records every dial.

Disclosure: DNS rebinding is not simulated end to end (it would mean changing the global resolver under parallel race tests); the dial-time re-resolution is tested directly instead.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation, review); fable-5-1 (landing message)
2026-09-21 19:59:26 +02:00
clawbot b95ef1eb69 fix: script/test conditional-verbose-rerun with -cover (closes #59)
check / check (push) Failing after 2s
script/test now runs the suite quietly first (with -race and -cover, 30s timeout) and re-runs it with -v only when that run fails, then exits non-zero. This is the pattern REPO_POLICIES.md mandates; before, every green run printed full per-test output.

What a reader would trip over: the whole compound command is passed as one string to run_with_cgo_deps, so it behaves the same on the host path and under the nix-shell fallback. -cover is on the first run only; the verbose rerun exists for diagnostics.

Disclosure: no test was written for the wrapper script itself; the failure path was exercised by hand by author and reviewer.
Disclosure: the nix-shell fallback is kept; moving tests into Docker belongs to #101 and #104.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation, review); fable-5-1 (landing message)
2026-09-21 19:43:21 +02:00
clawbot a96eba8083 CSRF protection on the login and URL-generator forms (closes #93)
check / check (push) Failing after 1s
Adds CSRF protection to the two cookie-authenticated form posts, POST / (login) and POST /generate, using github.com/gorilla/csrf, the recorded default for this job.

The token key is derived from signing_key with its own HKDF salt, so it needs no new config and survives restarts. The token cookie is separate from the session cookie, which also covers login CSRF, where no session exists yet. Both templates carry the hidden token field.

What a reader would trip over: outside debug mode the library enforces its https Referer origin check, so the TLS-terminating proxy must preserve the Host and Referer headers from the browser or form posts are rejected.

Disclosure: one nolint:gosec on a test constant holding the library field name (G101 false positive).

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation, review); fable-5-1 (landing message)
2026-09-21 19:26:18 +02:00
clawbot 04b5db6fbf next -> main (1.0.0 milestone) (#105)
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Accumulating milestone branch. One squashed commit per closed issue; `next` is kept green and mergeable to `main` at any time without notice.

Landed so far:

- `chore: update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 with canonical config` (#54) — canonical v2-schema `.golangci.yml`, pins bumped in `Dockerfile` and `script/bootstrap`, tree at `0 issues.`. Three behaviour deltas are recorded in that PR's body: `Cache.StoreVariant` takes a context, `MetadataStorage.Store` no longer leaks temp files on failure, and the `signing_key` too-short error text gained a `value too short:` prefix.

Sequencing for the milestone is tracked in #103.

Reviewed-on: #105
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-09-21 09:31:54 +02:00
clawbotandsneak 63fbc98e63 feat: cache size management and LRU eviction (closes #51) (#55)
check / check (push) Has been cancelled
Implements #51 per the issue DoD and the owner direction comment (issuecomment-44068).

## Behavior

**Config: `cache_max_bytes`** (integrates with the #52/#53 validation framework)

- Strict int64 parsing via a new `getInt64`/`int64Val` getter in the existing strict-loader pattern; the key is registered in the known-keys list. A SET but invalid value — negative, float, null, non-numeric string, boolean, list — aborts startup with exit 1 naming the key and the offending value.
- Explicit values are used exactly as given, any non-negative amount, no floor. `cache_max_bytes: 0` is a valid value that disables the disk cache entirely.
- Omitted: after `state_dir` validation, the default resolves to `max(75% of free bytes on the filesystem containing &lt;state_dir&gt;/cache/, 500 MiB)`. The cache directory is created first and statfs runs on that actual path, so the measurement hits the right filesystem. The probe is injectable (`FreeSpaceProbeFunc`) so tests do not depend on the host disk. The effective limit (and disabled state) is logged at startup.

**Size accounting** (no directory scans on the hot path)

- Migration `002` adds a `variant_content` table — processed variants were previously untracked anywhere — and a `last_accessed_at` column on `source_content`, both indexed. Total usage is two SUM queries.
- Stores record accounting rows; cache hits touch the LRU timestamps (same cost class as the existing per-request stats UPDATEs). The variant accounting insert is best-effort with a warning: the reconciliation pass (below) adopts any file that missed its row, and this keeps the pre-migration inline test schema working.

**Eviction policy: global LRU across both content classes**

- Candidates are the least-recently-used entries from `variant_content` and `source_content` (batched, 100 per class per pass, merged oldest-first by `COALESCE(last_accessed_at, fetched_at)`), evicted until usage is at or below the limit.
- Why global LRU: recency of actual use is the best cheap predictor of future use for a CDN-style cache, and treating both classes in one ordering avoids pathologies of class-priority schemes (e.g. evicting every variant before any cold source blob, which would tank hit rate, or the reverse, which would hoard stale sources). Byte-for-byte, the coldest data goes first regardless of what kind it is. LFU-style schemes need more bookkeeping for marginal gain at this scale.
- Reference safety (the multi-reference DoD case): evicting a source blob deletes ALL `source_metadata` rows referencing it plus its `source_content` row in a single transaction BEFORE the file is unlinked. A blob referenced by multiple source paths is only ever removed together with all of its references, and DB rows never point at deleted files (the crash window leaves at worst an orphaned file, which reconciliation sweeps). The JSON metadata sidecars for removed rows are deleted as well.

**Triggers, off the request path**

- A background goroutine (started in the handlers OnStart hook, stopped in OnStop) runs an eviction pass on a periodic ticker (5 min) and on write pressure: every store sends a non-blocking notification on a capacity-1 channel. Requests never wait on eviction.
- On startup the goroutine first reconciles accounting with the disk (off the hot path): adopts untracked variant files (size/mtime from disk, content type from the `.meta` sidecar), drops accounting rows whose files are missing, removes source blob files the DB does not know (unreachable, since lookups go through `source_metadata`), removes rows whose files are gone, and sweeps `.tmp-*` files older than an hour.

**`cache_max_bytes: 0` disables the disk cache**

- No cache directories are created, lookups always miss, `StoreSource`/`StoreVariant` are no-ops, no evictor runs; every request fetches and processes uncached. Verified end-to-end (below).

## Notes for review

- At the `imgcache.CacheConfig` layer, disabling is an explicit `DisableDiskCache` flag rather than `MaxBytes == 0`, because existing test fixtures construct `CacheConfig` without `MaxBytes` and rely on the legacy "no limit" behavior; per repo rules those tests were not touched. The config layer maps `cache_max_bytes: 0` to the flag in `handlers`. `MaxBytes == 0` at that layer means "no limit enforced" and is unreachable from production config (the computed default is always at least 500 MiB).
- The negative cache stays active in disabled mode: it is DB-backed (TTL-expired rows in SQLite), not part of the disk cache this issue bounds, and it protects against hammering failing upstreams. Flagging explicitly since the direction said "no cache reads, no cache writes" — I read that as the disk cache; happy to disable it too if intended.
- One deviation from pure red/green: after the red commit I extended the new-test fixture helper (`newEvictionTestCache`) to pass `DisableDiskCache: maxBytes == 0`, mirroring the production mapping, when the flag design emerged. Assertions were not touched; no pre-existing tests were modified.
- Sidecar files (`.meta`, metadata JSON) are not counted in usage; they are bounded by entry counts and small (tens of bytes to ~1 KiB per entry) while content bytes dominate. Documented here for transparency.
- Discovered while working: `Cache.Stats` reads the never-populated `output_content`/`request_cache` tables, so `TotalItems`/`TotalSizeBytes` are always 0. Out of scope here; filing as a separate issue.

## Verification

- TDD: commit `3963ec3` adds the failing tests first (18 new tests covering strict parsing, default computation with injected probe including floor and 75% branches, explicit-no-floor, zero-disables, size accounting, dedup accounting, LRU order, multi-reference blob eviction with the no-dangling-references invariant, under-limit no-op, write-pressure trigger, periodic trigger, reconciliation); implementation follows in `8cb09b6`/`bdd86a4` until green.
- `make check` green (all tests, lint 0 issues, fmt-check) at HEAD.
- Pinned CI lint gate: `docker build --target lint .` green (golangci-lint v2.10.1).
- End-to-end with the built binary:
  - omitted key: startup logs `computed default cache size limit from free space` and `effective cache size limit` (75% of the test host's free space);
  - `cache_max_bytes: banana`: exit 1 with `config key "cache_max_bytes": value "banana" is not an integer`;
  - `cache_max_bytes: 0`: `cache_disabled=true` logged, two identical requests both fetch upstream (2 upstream fetches logged), 200 `image/jpeg` responses, no `cache/` directory created, only `state.sqlite3` in the state dir;
  - enabled: second request served from cache (1 upstream fetch), `variant_content` and `source_content` rows match the on-disk file sizes.

Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #55
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2026-08-09 13:22:51 +02:00
clawbotandsneak 61f42e6602 feat: validate configuration on startup, fail fast on bad config (closes #52) (#53)
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closes #52

Implements startup configuration validation per the plan on #52. Two commits, TDD: the first commit adds the enforcement tests (red — six test functions fail against the lenient behavior) plus a mechanical extraction of `newFromSmartConfig` from `config.New` so construction is testable without fx; the second commit makes them green and carries the `TODO.md` bookkeeping.

## Behavior

- **No silent fallbacks**: a config value that is SET but unparseable or invalid aborts startup with an error naming the key and value. Defaults apply only to OMITTED keys. The old `getString`/`getInt`/`getBool` helpers swallowed every conversion error and returned the default; they are now strict. Fractional ports are rejected, not truncated (smartconfig's `GetInt` would have turned `8080.5` into `8080`).
- **Unknown keys abort**: unknown top-level keys and unknown `metrics` subkeys are fatal, each named in the error (`unknown config keys: whitelist_hosts`). The `env` section stays permitted because smartconfig consumes it for environment injection.
- **Malformed config file aborts**: a config file that exists at a standard location but fails to parse was previously logged as a warning and skipped (the server would start on defaults); it is now fatal.
- **Range/sanity checks**: `port` in 1-65535; `upstream_connections_per_host` at least 1; `signing_key` required, at least 32 characters (keyless mode was never implemented; the stale "leave empty" comment in `config.example.yml` is corrected); `allowlist_hosts` entries must be bare hostnames (leading-dot suffix patterns still allowed; schemes, paths, whitespace, non-string and empty entries rejected); `state_dir` non-empty and verified creatable+writable with a probe file before the listener binds; `sentry_dsn` must be a URL with scheme and host when set; `metrics.username`/`metrics.password` must be set together.

## Verification

- `make check` green on the branch head (all tests, golangci-lint 0 issues, fmt-check clean).
- End-to-end: `./bin/pixad` with `port: banana` exits 1 printing `config key "port": value "banana" is not an integer`; with `whitelist_hosts:` it exits 1 printing `unknown config keys: whitelist_hosts`.

## Notes for review

- `getStringSlice` keeps its lenient signature because the existing tests in `config_test.go` exercise it and modifying existing tests requires explicit approval. Strictness for `allowlist_hosts` is instead enforced up front on the raw value by `validateAllowlistHostsValue`, so nothing is silently skipped; extraction then reuses the existing parser. If you prefer the helper folded into a single strict function, that requires retargeting those three tests — happy to do that as a follow-up with approval.
- `TODO.md` here is edited against current `main`; PR #50 (merge-ready) edits adjacent lines, so whichever merges second will need a trivial rebase of `TODO.md` only.
- The README Configuration section lists keys that have never existed in the code (`access_control_allow_origin`, `upstream_fetch_timeout`, `upstream_max_response_size`, `downstream_timeout`). Under this change a config using them now fails fast instead of silently doing nothing — that is the intended behavior. Implementing them is already tracked as the P2 "add all configuration options from README" item in `TODO.md`.

Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #53
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2026-08-07 22:39:40 +02:00
clawbotandsneak 5d0b5f864e docs: record manual test pass of auth and encrypted URL flows (closes #49) (#50)
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closes #49

Records the P0 manual test pass in `TODO.md` per its Workflow section
(checked-off results into Completed Steps; cache size management and
eviction promoted to Next Step). `TODO.md` is the only changed file —
no production code changes, as the issue requires.

## Test setup

`pixad` built from `main` at `6573b9d` via `make build`, run on port
18099 with a throwaway local config (temp state dir, known
`signing_key`, `allowlist_hosts` including `s3.sneak.cloud`), driven
with curl using explicit cookie replay (session cookies are
`Secure`/`HttpOnly`/`SameSite=Strict`).

## Results — all six checks PASS

1. **Login form**: GET `/` → HTTP 200, `Pixa - Login` page with
   `name="key"` password form.
2. **Wrong key error**: POST `/` with `key=wrong-key` → HTTP 200 login
   page containing "Invalid signing key".
3. **Generator form**: POST `/` with the correct signing key → HTTP 303
   to `/` with `Set-Cookie: pixa_session=...; HttpOnly; Secure;
   SameSite=Strict`; GET `/` with that cookie → `Pixa - URL Generator`
   with the `/generate` form and logout link.
4. **Encrypted URL serves image**: POST `/generate` (ttl=3600) produced
   a `/v1/e/<token>/img.jpeg` URL → HTTP 200, `Content-Type:
   image/jpeg`, 800x600 baseline JPEG, 61706 bytes.
5. **Expired URL → 410**: a ttl=1 URL fetched after 3 s → HTTP 410 Gone
   with `{"error":"URL has expired","status":410,...}`.
6. **Logout**: GET `/logout` → HTTP 303 to `/` with `Set-Cookie:
   pixa_session=; Max-Age=0`; subsequent GET `/` → login form again.

Additionally, all nine checks in `scripts/manual-test.sh` passed
against the same server instance.

## Verification

`make check` green on the branch head (all tests, golangci-lint 0
issues, fmt-check clean) — the first fully green `make check` on a
`main`-derived branch under the current linter, confirming the #47/#48
fix on merged `main`.

Note for review: the test execution was performed this session; the
adversarial re-review (independently re-running the six flows) is still
pending and should happen before merge.

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Reviewed-on: #50
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2026-08-07 18:44:01 +02:00
clawbotandsneak 6573b9d1ef refactor: extract signature package from imgcache (#46)
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Extracts HMAC-SHA256 request signing out of `internal/imgcache/` into its own `internal/signature/` package, per the plan in [issue #39](#39).

This is one of the remaining "easily separable" extractions (`imageprocessor`, `allowlist`, `magic`, and `httpfetcher` already landed). Only the signer is moved here so the diff stays reviewable.

## What moved

From `internal/imgcache/signature.go` and its tests into `internal/signature/`:

- `Signer` type, its `New` constructor, `Sign`, `Verify`, `GenerateSignedURL`
- `ParseParams` (query-string signature/expiration parsing)
- Signature error sentinels

## One-way import edge

To keep the import edge one-way (`imgcache` depends on `signature`, never the reverse), the package defines a standalone `Request` type carrying just the fields the signature covers, instead of importing `imgcache.ImageRequest`. `imgcache` projects its `ImageRequest` onto `signature.Request` via a small unexported `signatureRequest` helper. This mirrors how the `magic` extraction defined its own `ImageFormat` type.

## Renames (no stuttering)

- `NewSigner` -> `signature.New`
- `ParseSignatureParams` -> `signature.ParseParams`
- `ErrSignatureRequired`/`Invalid`/`Expired` -> `signature.ErrRequired`/`Invalid`/`Expired`

The `ErrRequired` message is updated from "non-whitelisted host" to "non-allowlisted host" for inclusive terminology, consistent with the `allowlist` rename.

## Rework (post-review)

Three commits added after review feedback:

- `d69019b` — golden known-answer test pinning the exact HMAC signatures and signed URL paths for three fixed vectors (resized, resized+query, orig size), cross-validated against an independent HMAC implementation. Any change to the signed byte format now fails loudly.
- `43b9f1c` — whitelist→allowlist rename completed across `internal/imgcache` and `internal/handlers` (`ServiceConfig.Allowlist`, `Allowlist` interface, `IsAllowlisted`, test helpers and test names).
- `3dc1999` — one-pass config surface rename, no back-compat alias: YAML key `whitelist_hosts` → `allowlist_hosts`, `Config.WhitelistHosts` → `Config.AllowlistHosts`, `config.example.yml`, `scripts/manual-test.sh`, and `README.md` (which also documented a nonexistent `source_host_whitelist` key — now fixed to the real one).

## Behavior

Pure refactor apart from the config key rename above. The bytes fed to the HMAC are unchanged (`host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration`), so previously issued signatures remain valid — now enforced by the golden test. All existing tests move with the package. `script/cibuild` passes at head `3dc1999` (fmt-check, lint, test, build).

refs #39

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Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org>
Reviewed-on: #46
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2026-08-07 17:44:00 +02:00
clawbotandsneak 275e145a6d fix: set Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite on session cookies (closes #47) (#48)
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closes #47

Fixes the two remaining `gosec` findings on `main`, both `G124`
(http.Cookie missing or has insecure `Secure`, `HttpOnly`, or
`SameSite` attribute):

- `internal/session/session.go:84` (`CreateSession`, the login
  set-cookie path)
- `internal/session/session.go:128` (`ClearSession`, the logout
  delete-cookie path)

## What changed

- Both cookie-writing paths now unconditionally set `Secure: true`,
  `HttpOnly: true`, and `SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode`.
- The `secure` field (previously wired to `!config.Debug`) and the
  `sameSite` field are removed from `session.Manager`, and the dead
  secure-toggle parameter is removed from `session.NewManager`, which
  now takes only the signing key (reviewer-directed; the mechanical
  call-shape updates in `session_test.go` leave every assertion
  untouched).
- TDD per repo rules: the first commit adds
  `TestSessionCookieAttributesAlwaysSecure` (failing), asserting that
  every cookie emitted by the session manager carries `HttpOnly`,
  `Secure`, and `SameSite` of Lax or stricter, for both write paths.
  The second commit makes it pass.
- `TODO.md` updated per its Workflow section (Next Step completed,
  next Future Step promoted, stale "10 open findings" Status text
  corrected).

## Attribute choices and reasoning

- `Secure: true` always: the `G124` analyzer only accepts a constant
  `true` store, and there is no legitimate configuration in which the
  authentication cookie should be sent over plaintext HTTP. The old
  behavior disabled `Secure` whenever `debug` was on. Local development
  over `http://localhost` keeps working: browsers treat `localhost` as
  a trustworthy origin and accept `Secure` cookies there. Any
  plain-HTTP flow on a non-localhost host will no longer keep a
  session, which is the point of the fix.
- `SameSite: Strict` (unchanged from current production behavior, and
  stricter than the Lax minimum): the login form is a same-origin POST
  to `/` followed by a same-site redirect, so `Strict` breaks nothing.
- `HttpOnly: true` (unchanged).

## Verification

`make check` (tests, golangci-lint, fmt-check) is fully green on the
branch head `cb9e14e`: all tests pass and the linter reports 0 issues,
independently confirmed by the reviewer in a fresh worktree. Commit
history: `ca15f52` (failing test) → `02ca16a` (fix + TODO.md, closes
#47) → `cb9e14e` (drop the dead `NewManager` parameter).

Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #48
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2026-08-07 17:41:03 +02:00
b6e9ac2a93 refactor: extract httpfetcher package from imgcache (#43)
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Extracts the HTTP fetcher concern out of `internal/imgcache/` into its own `internal/httpfetcher/` package, per the plan in [issue #39](#39).

This is one of four planned extractions; only the fetcher is moved here so the diff stays reviewable. The remaining three (signature, magic, urlparser) will land in separate PRs.

## What moved

From `internal/imgcache/fetcher.go` and `internal/imgcache/mock_fetcher.go` into `internal/httpfetcher/`:

- `HTTPFetcher` type, its `New` constructor, and `Config` (formerly `FetcherConfig`) with `DefaultConfig`
- SSRF-safe dialer, `validateURL`, `isPrivateIP`, `isLocalhost`, `extractHost`
- Per-host connection semaphore (rate limiting) and `limitedReader`
- Content-type validation (`isAllowedContentType`, `detectContentTypeFromPath`)
- All related error values (`ErrSSRFBlocked`, `ErrUpstreamError`, `ErrUpstreamTimeout`, `ErrPayloadTooLarge`, `ErrDisallowedContentType`)
- All related constants (`DefaultFetchTimeout`, `DefaultMaxPayloadBytes`, `DefaultMaxConnectionsPerHost`, etc.)
- The `Fetcher` interface and `FetchResult` type (moved here to keep the import edge one-way: `imgcache` depends on `httpfetcher`, never the reverse)
- `MockFetcher` test helper

## Renames (no stuttering)

- `NewHTTPFetcher` → `httpfetcher.New`
- `FetcherConfig` → `httpfetcher.Config`
- `DefaultFetcherConfig` → `httpfetcher.DefaultConfig`
- `NewMockFetcher` → `httpfetcher.NewMock`

The `ServiceConfig.FetcherConfig` field name is retained — it describes what kind of config the field holds (not a stutter).

## Behavior

Pure refactor. No behavior changes. All existing tests pass; unit tests for the new package are included.

`docker build .` passes (fmt-check, lint, test, build).

refs #39

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2026-07-25 12:26:18 +02:00
sneak 504afea4f8 scripts-to-rule-them-all (#45)
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Reviewed-on: #45
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
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2026-07-07 02:14:03 +02:00
sneak 2fb909283d Update TODO.md: standard structure and Workflow section (#44)
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Reviewed-on: #44
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Co-committed-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
2026-07-06 21:20:56 +02:00
clawbotanduser 6b4a1d7607 refactor: extract magic byte detection into internal/magic package (#42)
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## Summary

Extract magic byte detection and MIME type handling from `internal/imgcache/` into a new focused `internal/magic/` package.

Part of [issue #39](#39)

## Changes

### New package: `internal/magic/`

Moved the following from `internal/imgcache/magic.go`:
- `MIMEType` type and constants (`MIMETypeJPEG`, `MIMETypePNG`, etc.)
- `DetectFormat()` — detects image format from magic bytes
- `ValidateMagicBytes()` — validates content matches declared MIME type
- `PeekAndValidate()` — reads minimum bytes, validates, returns combined reader
- `IsSupportedMIMEType()` — checks if a MIME type is supported
- `MIMEToImageFormat()` — converts MIME type to ImageFormat
- `ImageFormatToMIME()` — converts ImageFormat to MIME string
- All error sentinels (`ErrUnknownFormat`, `ErrMagicByteMismatch`, `ErrNotEnoughData`)
- All helper functions (`detectSVG`, `skipBOM`, `normalizeMIMEType`)

The magic package defines its own `ImageFormat` type and constants to avoid circular imports (`imgcache` → `magic` for validation; `magic` cannot import `imgcache`).

### Updated imports
- `internal/imgcache/service.go`: uses `magic.ValidateMagicBytes()`
- `internal/imgcache/service_test.go`: uses `magic.DetectFormat()` and `magic.MIMEToImageFormat()`

### Naming
- Clean package-qualified names: `magic.DetectFormat()`, `magic.ValidateMagicBytes()`, etc.
- No stuttering names

### Tests
- Full test suite moved to `internal/magic/magic_test.go` (all 15 test functions preserved)
- All existing tests pass unchanged
- `docker build .` passes (includes `make check`: fmt, lint, tests)

Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan>
Reviewed-on: #42
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2026-04-07 00:41:48 +02:00
e34743f070 refactor: extract whitelist package from internal/imgcache (#41)
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Extract `HostWhitelist`, `NewHostWhitelist`, `IsWhitelisted`, `IsEmpty`, and `Count` from `internal/imgcache/` into the new `internal/whitelist/` package.

The whitelist package is completely self-contained, depending only on `net/url` and `strings` from the standard library. No circular imports introduced.

**Changes:**
- Moved `whitelist.go` → `internal/whitelist/whitelist.go` (added package comment)
- Moved `whitelist_test.go` → `internal/whitelist/whitelist_test.go` (adapted to external test style)
- Updated `internal/imgcache/service.go` to import from `sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/whitelist`

`docker build .` passes (lint, tests, build).

Part of [issue #39](#39)

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2026-03-25 20:44:56 +01:00
7010d55d72 Move schema_migrations table creation into 000.sql (#36)
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## Summary

Moves the `schema_migrations` table definition from inline Go code into `internal/database/schema/000.sql`, so the migration tracking table schema lives alongside all other schema files.

closes #29

## Changes

### New file: `internal/database/schema/000.sql`
- Contains the `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_migrations` DDL
- This is applied as a bootstrap step before the normal migration loop

### Refactored: `internal/database/database.go`
- Removed the inline `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_migrations` SQL from both `runMigrations` and `ApplyMigrations`
- Added `bootstrapMigrationsTable()` which:
  - Checks `sqlite_master` to see if the table already exists
  - If missing: reads and executes `000.sql` to create it, then records version `000`
  - If present (backwards compat with existing DBs created by old inline code): back-fills version `000` so the normal loop skips the bootstrap file
- Deduplicated: both `Database.runMigrations()` and the exported `ApplyMigrations()` now delegate to a single `applyMigrations()` helper
- Added `logInfo`/`logDebug` helpers to handle the optional logger (nil when called from `ApplyMigrations` in tests)

### New file: `internal/database/database_test.go`
- `TestApplyMigrations_CreatesSchemaAndTables` — verifies all migrations apply and all expected tables exist
- `TestApplyMigrations_Idempotent` — verifies running migrations twice produces no errors or duplicates
- `TestBootstrapMigrationsTable_FreshDatabase` — verifies bootstrap creates the table and records version 000
- `TestBootstrapMigrationsTable_ExistingTableBackwardsCompat` — verifies existing DBs (from old inline-SQL code) get version 000 back-filled without data loss

## Conflict note

[PR #33](#33) (for [issue #28](#28)) is also modifying migration code. This PR is based on current `main` and the conflict will be resolved at merge time.

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Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@sneak.berlin>
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2026-03-25 02:20:52 +01:00
clawbotanduser a50364bfca Enforce and document exact-match-only for signature verification (#40)
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Closes #27

Signatures are per-URL only — this PR adds explicit tests and documentation enforcing that HMAC-SHA256 signatures verify against exact URLs only. No suffix matching, wildcard matching, or partial matching is supported.

## What this does NOT touch

**The host whitelist code (`whitelist.go`) is not modified.** This PR is exclusively about signature verification, per sneak's instructions on [issue #27](#27), [PR #32](#32), and [PR #35](#35).

## Changes

### `internal/imgcache/signature.go`
- Added documentation comments on `Verify()` and `buildSignatureData()` explicitly specifying that signatures are exact-match only — no suffix, wildcard, or partial matching

### `internal/imgcache/signature_test.go`
- **`TestSigner_Verify_ExactMatchOnly`**: 14 tamper cases verifying that modifying any signed component (host, path, query, dimensions, format) causes verification to fail. Host-specific cases include:
  - Parent domain (`example.com`) does not match subdomain signature (`cdn.example.com`)
  - Sibling subdomain (`images.example.com`) does not match
  - Deeper subdomain (`images.cdn.example.com`) does not match
  - Evil suffix domain (`cdn.example.com.evil.com`) does not match
  - Prefixed host (`evilcdn.example.com`) does not match
- **`TestSigner_Sign_ExactHostInData`**: Verifies that suffix-related hosts (`cdn.example.com`, `example.com`, `images.example.com`, etc.) all produce distinct signatures

### `internal/imgcache/service_test.go`
- **`TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch`**: Integration test through `ValidateRequest` verifying that a valid signature for `cdn.example.com` is rejected when presented with a different host (parent domain, sibling subdomain, deeper subdomain, evil suffix, prefixed host)

### `README.md`
- Updated Signature Specification section to explicitly document exact-match-only semantics

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2026-03-20 23:56:45 +01:00
e85b5ff033 Consolidate appname to internal/globals as a constant (#34)
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Closes [issue #30](#30).

The appname `"pixad"` was redundantly defined in both `cmd/pixad/main.go` (as a package-level var) and `internal/globals/globals.go` (as a package-level var that got copied from main). Since the appname is always `"pixad"` and is not actually set via ldflags (only `Version` is), this PR:

- Defines `appname` once as an unexported constant in `internal/globals/globals.go`
- Removes the `Appname` var from `cmd/pixad/main.go`
- Removes the `globals.Appname = Appname` assignment from `main.run()`
- Keeps `Version` flow unchanged (still set via ldflags in main, passed to globals)

The `Globals.Appname` struct field remains available to all consumers — they just get it from the constant now instead of a package var that was always `"pixad"`.

All existing tests pass, `docker build .` succeeds.

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Reviewed-on: #34
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-03-20 07:04:54 +01:00
55a609dd77 Bound imageprocessor.Process input read to prevent unbounded memory use (#37)
check / check (push) Successful in 4s
closes #31

## Problem

`ImageProcessor.Process` used `io.ReadAll(input)` without any size limit, allowing arbitrarily large inputs to exhaust all available memory. This is a DoS vector — even though the upstream fetcher has a `MaxResponseSize` limit (50 MiB), the processor interface accepts any `io.Reader` and should defend itself independently.

Additionally, the service layer's `processFromSourceOrFetch` read cached source content with `io.ReadAll` without a bound, so an unexpectedly large cached file could also cause unbounded memory consumption.

## Changes

### Processor (`processor.go`)
- Added `maxInputBytes` field to `ImageProcessor` (configurable, defaults to 50 MiB via `DefaultMaxInputBytes`)
- `NewImageProcessor` now accepts a `maxInputBytes` parameter (0 or negative uses the default)
- `Process` now wraps the input reader with `io.LimitReader` and rejects inputs exceeding the limit with `ErrInputDataTooLarge`
- Added `DefaultMaxInputBytes` and `ErrInputDataTooLarge` exported constants/errors

### Service (`service.go`)
- `NewService` now wires the fetcher's `MaxResponseSize` through to the processor
- Extracted `loadCachedSource` helper method to flatten nesting in `processFromSourceOrFetch`
- Cached source reads are now bounded by `maxResponseSize` — oversized cached files are discarded and re-fetched

### Tests (`processor_test.go`)
- `TestImageProcessor_RejectsOversizedInputData` — verifies that inputs exceeding `maxInputBytes` are rejected with `ErrInputDataTooLarge`
- `TestImageProcessor_AcceptsInputWithinLimit` — verifies that inputs within the limit are processed normally
- `TestImageProcessor_DefaultMaxInputBytes` — verifies that 0 and negative values use the default
- All existing tests updated to use `NewImageProcessor(0)` (default limit)

Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan>
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #37
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-03-20 07:01:15 +01:00
clawbotanduser 9c29cb57df feat: parse version prefix from migration filenames (#33)
check / check (push) Successful in 1m49s
Closes #28

Migration filenames now follow the pattern `<version>_<description>.sql` (e.g. `001_initial_schema.sql`). The version stored in `schema_migrations` is the numeric prefix only, not the full filename stem.

## Changes

- **`ParseMigrationVersion()`** — new exported function that extracts the numeric prefix from migration filenames. Validates that the prefix is purely numeric and rejects malformed filenames (empty prefix, non-numeric characters, leading underscore).
- **Renamed `001.sql` → `001_initial_schema.sql`** — migration files can now have descriptive names while the tracked version remains `001`. This is safe pre-1.0.0 (no installed base).
- **Deduplicated migration logic** — `runMigrations()` and `ApplyMigrations()` now share a single `applyMigrations()` implementation, plus extracted `collectMigrations()` and `ensureMigrationsTable()` helpers.
- **Unit tests** — `TestParseMigrationVersion` covers valid patterns (version-only, with description, multi-digit, multiple underscores) and error cases (empty, leading underscore, non-numeric, mixed alphanumeric). `TestApplyMigrations` and `TestApplyMigrationsIdempotent` verify end-to-end migration application against an in-memory SQLite database.

Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan>
Reviewed-on: #33
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-03-18 03:18:38 +01:00
127 changed files with 16535 additions and 3758 deletions
+2 -1
View File
@@ -6,4 +6,5 @@ jobs:
steps:
# actions/checkout v4.2.2, 2026-02-22
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
- run: docker build .
- run: script/cibuild
- run: script/docker-smoke
+25 -108
View File
@@ -1,117 +1,34 @@
version: "2"
# Config schema uses the golangci-lint v2 layout (settings live under
# linters.settings, not top-level linters-settings) so that the
# thresholds below are actually applied by golangci-lint >= v2.
run:
go: "1.24"
tests: false
timeout: 5m
modules-download-mode: readonly
linters:
enable:
# Additional linters requested
- testifylint # Checks usage of github.com/stretchr/testify
- usetesting # usetesting is an analyzer that detects using os.Setenv instead of t.Setenv since Go 1.17
# - tagliatelle # Disabled: we need snake_case for external API compatibility
- nlreturn # nlreturn checks for a new line before return and branch statements
- nilnil # Checks that there is no simultaneous return of nil error and an invalid value
- nestif # Reports deeply nested if statements
- mnd # An analyzer to detect magic numbers
- lll # Reports long lines
- intrange # intrange is a linter to find places where for loops could make use of an integer range
- gochecknoglobals # Check that no global variables exist
# Default/existing linters that are commonly useful
- govet
- errcheck
- staticcheck
- unused
- ineffassign
- misspell
- revive
- gosec
- unconvert
- unparam
linters-settings:
lll:
line-length: 120
nestif:
min-complexity: 4
nlreturn:
block-size: 2
revive:
rules:
- name: var-naming
arguments:
- []
- []
- "upperCaseConst=true"
tagliatelle:
case:
rules:
json: snake
yaml: snake
xml: snake
bson: snake
testifylint:
enable-all: true
usetesting: {}
default: all
disable:
# Genuinely incompatible with project patterns
- exhaustruct # Requires all struct fields
- depguard # Dependency allow/block lists
- godot # Requires comments to end with periods
- wsl # Deprecated, replaced by wsl_v5
- wrapcheck # Too verbose for internal packages
- varnamelen # Short names like db, id are idiomatic Go
settings:
lll:
line-length: 88
funlen:
lines: 80
statements: 50
cyclop:
max-complexity: 15
dupl:
threshold: 100
issues:
max-issues-per-linter: 0
max-same-issues: 0
exclude-rules:
# Exclude unused parameter warnings for cobra command signatures
- text: "parameter '(args|cmd)' seems to be unused"
linters:
- revive
# Allow ALL_CAPS constant names
- text: "don't use ALL_CAPS in Go names"
linters:
- revive
# Allow snake_case JSON tags for external API compatibility
- path: "internal/types/ris.go"
linters:
- tagliatelle
# Allow snake_case JSON tags for database models
- path: "internal/database/models.go"
linters:
- tagliatelle
# Allow generic package name for types that define data structures
- path: "internal/types/"
text: "avoid meaningless package names"
linters:
- revive
# Allow globals in the globals package (by design)
- path: "internal/globals/"
linters:
- gochecknoglobals
# Allow globals in main (Version/Buildarch set by ldflags)
- path: "cmd/"
linters:
- gochecknoglobals
# Allow blank imports for driver registration
- text: "blank-imports"
linters:
- revive
# Allow unused fx.Lifecycle parameters (required by fx signature)
- text: "parameter 'lc' seems to be unused"
linters:
- revive
# Allow unused context parameters in fx hooks
- text: "parameter 'ctx' seems to be unused"
linters:
- revive
+26 -10
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
# Lint stage
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.10.1-alpine, 2026-02-17
FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.10.1-alpine@sha256:33bc6b6156d4c7da87175f187090019769903d04dd408833b83083ed214b0ddf AS lint
# Same image as Dockerfile.lint: change both pins together.
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2-alpine, 2026-08-07
FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2-alpine@sha256:91b27804074a0bacea298707f016911e60cf0cdbc6c7bf5ccacb5f0606d18d60 AS lint
RUN apk add --no-cache make build-base vips-dev libheif-dev pkgconfig
@@ -13,6 +14,9 @@ RUN go mod download
# Copy source code
COPY . .
# Tells script/lint it is inside a container, so it runs the linter.
ENV container=docker
# Run formatting check and linter
RUN make fmt-check
RUN make lint
@@ -57,22 +61,34 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache \
vips \
libheif \
ca-certificates \
tzdata
tzdata \
su-exec
# Copy binary from builder
COPY --from=builder /pixad /usr/local/bin/pixad
COPY deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
# Create non-root user, config directory, and data directory
RUN adduser -D -H -s /sbin/nologin pixad && \
# Create non-root user, config directory, and data directory. pixad
# gets uid and gid 65532, which host login and system accounts do not
# use: a bind-mounted /var/lib/pixa is given to pixad, and on the host
# it must not belong to a person's account.
RUN addgroup -g 65532 pixad && \
adduser -D -H -s /sbin/nologin -u 65532 -G pixad pixad && \
mkdir -p /var/lib/pixa /etc/pixa && \
chown pixad:pixad /var/lib/pixa
# Copy default config (edit signing_key before use)
COPY config.example.yml /etc/pixa/config.yml
USER pixad
# No USER: the entrypoint must start as root to give a bind-mounted
# /var/lib/pixa to pixad; it then runs the server as pixad.
WORKDIR /var/lib/pixa
EXPOSE 8080
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/pixad", "--config", "/etc/pixa/config.yml"]
# Shell form so the probe follows PORT; a port set only in a mounted
# config file is not seen here.
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
CMD wget --spider -q "http://localhost:${PORT:-8080}/.well-known/healthcheck.json" || exit 1
# Settings come from PORT and the PIXA_ environment variables; only
# PIXA_SIGNING_KEY is required. A config file mounted at
# /etc/pixa/config.yml is optional and is read when present.
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh"]
+34
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
# Dockerfile.lint: the container script/lint builds to run golangci-lint,
# which is never installed on the host. Pinned to the same image as the
# Dockerfile lint stage: change both pins together, or the two run
# different linter versions.
#
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2-alpine, 2026-08-07
FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2-alpine@sha256:91b27804074a0bacea298707f016911e60cf0cdbc6c7bf5ccacb5f0606d18d60
# pixa is CGO/libvips: the type-aware linters compile every package, so
# this image needs the same C libraries the build does.
RUN apk add --no-cache build-base vips-dev libheif-dev pkgconfig
WORKDIR /src
# Modules first for layer caching; go.mod/go.sum settle this layer's
# result, so it may safely be reused between runs.
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
# Tells script/lint it is inside a container, so it runs the linter.
ENV container=docker
# script/lint passes a different CACHEBUST on every run, and BuildKit
# keys every RUN after this ARG on its value, so the lint step always
# runs instead of returning a cached success that linted nothing.
#
# Go's and golangci-lint's caches (/root/.cache, hundreds of MB) go on a
# tmpfs that is discarded after the step. Written into the layer, they
# would pile up as build cache on every run, since no later run, with
# its new CACHEBUST, can reuse that layer.
ARG CACHEBUST
RUN --mount=type=tmpfs,target=/root/.cache script/lint
+26 -16
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.PHONY: check lint test fmt fmt-check build clean docker docker-test devserver devserver-stop hooks
.PHONY: bootstrap setup check lint test fmt fmt-check build clean docker docker-smoke docker-versioned docker-test devserver devserver-stop hooks
VERSION := $(shell git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || echo "dev")
LDFLAGS := -X main.Version=$(VERSION)
@@ -10,32 +10,35 @@ ifdef HAS_PKGCONFIG
NIX_RUN_PREFIX =
NIX_RUN_SUFFIX =
else
NIX_RUN_PREFIX = nix-shell -p pkg-config vips libheif golangci-lint git --run '
NIX_RUN_PREFIX = nix-shell -p pkg-config vips libheif git --run '
NIX_RUN_SUFFIX = '
endif
# Default target: run all checks
check: fmt-check lint test
check:
@script/check
bootstrap:
@script/bootstrap
setup:
@script/setup
# Check formatting without modifying files
fmt-check:
@echo "Checking formatting..."
@test -z "$$(gofmt -l . | grep -v '^vendor/')" || (echo "Files need formatting:"; gofmt -l . | grep -v '^vendor/'; exit 1)
@script/fmt-check
# Format code
fmt:
@echo "Formatting code..."
gofmt -w $$(find . -name '*.go' -not -path './vendor/*')
@script/fmt
# Run linter
lint:
@echo "Running linter..."
$(NIX_RUN_PREFIX)golangci-lint run$(NIX_RUN_SUFFIX)
@script/lint
# Run tests (30-second timeout)
test:
@echo "Running tests..."
$(NIX_RUN_PREFIX)CGO_ENABLED=1 go test -timeout 30s -v ./...$(NIX_RUN_SUFFIX)
@script/test
# Build the binary
build:
@@ -47,8 +50,17 @@ clean:
rm -rf bin/
rm -rf ./data
# Build Docker image
# Build Docker image (tagged via script/projectname)
docker:
@script/docker
# Build the image, start it, and wait for its healthcheck (needs Docker;
# not part of check)
docker-smoke:
@script/docker-smoke
# Build Docker image tagged pixad:$(VERSION) and pixad:latest
docker-versioned:
docker build --build-arg VERSION=$(VERSION) -t pixad:$(VERSION) -t pixad:latest .
# Run tests in Docker (needed for CGO/libvips)
@@ -57,7 +69,7 @@ docker-test:
docker run --rm pixad-builder sh -c "CGO_ENABLED=1 GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go test -v ./..."
# Run local dev server in Docker
devserver: docker devserver-stop
devserver: docker-versioned devserver-stop
docker run -d --name pixad-dev -p 8080:8080 \
-v $(CURDIR)/config.dev.yml:/etc/pixa/config.yml:ro \
pixad:latest
@@ -70,6 +82,4 @@ devserver-stop:
# Install pre-commit hook
hooks:
@printf '#!/bin/sh\nset -e\n' > .git/hooks/pre-commit
@printf 'make check\n' >> .git/hooks/pre-commit
@chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit
@script/install-precommit
+224 -19
View File
@@ -15,21 +15,61 @@ git clone https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/pixa.git
cd pixa
make build
# run with a config file
./bin/pixad --config config.example.yml
# run with a config file: copy the example and set a real signing key
# (the example placeholder is refused at startup), e.g. with
# openssl rand -base64 32
cp config.example.yml config.yml
$EDITOR config.yml # replace the signing_key placeholder
./bin/pixad --config config.yml
# or build and run via Docker
make docker
docker run -p 8080:8080 pixad:latest
docker run -p 8080:8080 -e PIXA_SIGNING_KEY="$(openssl rand -base64 32)" pixa:latest
```
A container takes its settings from environment variables (see
Configuration below for the list). Only `PIXA_SIGNING_KEY` is required; if
it is unset the container exits at startup naming the variable. Everything
else has a built-in default. A config file mounted at `/etc/pixa/config.yml`
is optional: it is read when present, and an environment variable wins over
the same setting in it.
## Running under upaas
What the [upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas) app for pixa needs:
- **Port:** pixa listens on container port `8080`.
- **Volume:** container path `/var/lib/pixa`, where pixa keeps its
database and cache. upaas bind-mounts the host path it is given and
does not create it, so the host directory must exist before the first
deploy.
- **Environment variables:**
- `PIXA_SIGNING_KEY` (required): secret for signed and encrypted URLs
and login, 32+ characters, for example from
`openssl rand -base64 32`
- `PIXA_ALLOWLIST_HOSTS`: upstream hosts served without a signature,
comma-separated
- `PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES`: disk cache limit in bytes; `0` disables it;
default 75% of free space
- the rest are in the table under Configuration below
- **Health check:** the image's `HEALTHCHECK` requests
`/.well-known/healthcheck.json`. upaas reads the container's health 60
seconds after a deploy and marks the deploy failed unless it is
`healthy`. The probe uses the port from `PORT` (default `8080`), so a
port changed only in a mounted config file is not seen by it: change
the port with `PORT`.
- **First run:** create the host directory, owned by root or by uid
`65532` and gid `65532`. The server runs as the container's `pixad`
user, which has that uid and gid, and the container gives the
directory to `pixad` when it starts.
## Rationale
Image-heavy web applications need a fast, caching reverse proxy that
can resize and transcode images on the fly. pixa fills that role as a
single, self-contained binary with no external runtime dependencies
beyond libvips. It supports HMAC-SHA256 signed URLs with expiration to
prevent abuse, and whitelisted source hosts for open access.
prevent abuse, and allowlisted source hosts for open access.
## Design
@@ -56,23 +96,68 @@ In-process caching of request-to-output mappings targets 1-5k r/s.
Images are only fetched from origins using TLS with valid certificates.
A request whose query string cannot be decoded, or gives any parameter more
than once, is refused with 400.
- `<format>`: one of `orig`, `png`, `jpeg`, `webp`
- `<size>`: `orig` or `<width>x<height>` (e.g. `800x600`)
An image is served with `Cache-Control: public, max-age=<seconds>, immutable`.
When the URL has an expiry (an `exp`, or the TTL of an encrypted URL),
`max-age` is the whole seconds left until then, at most one year, so no browser
or proxy cache keeps the image after pixa would refuse the URL. A URL with no
expiry gets one year. `immutable` only stops a client revalidating while its
copy is fresh.
The login form (`POST /`) is limited to 5 attempts per minute per client
address, counting an IPv6 client by its /64; an attempt over the limit is
refused with 429 and a `Retry-After` header. Behind a reverse proxy the client
address comes from `X-Forwarded-For` only when the address pixa sees for
requests that come through the proxy is in `trusted_proxies`; otherwise all
users behind the proxy are counted as one client. That address is not always
the proxy's own: a proxy on the Docker host that connects to pixa over
`127.0.0.1` is seen as the gateway of the container's Docker network, such as
`172.17.0.1` on the default bridge, and one that connects through another of the
host's addresses is seen with that address. To be sure, read it as `remoteIP` in
pixa's request log while it is not in `trusted_proxies` (see `trusted_proxies`
under Configuration). With the default `trusted_proxies` (the RFC 1918 ranges),
a client with a private address can choose the address it is counted by through
its own `X-Forwarded-For`, whether it connects directly or through the proxy,
because its own address is trusted too. Setting `trusted_proxies` to only the
address pixa sees for requests that come through the proxy closes this.
### Image Metadata
pixa decodes and re-encodes every image it serves, and removes all metadata from
the output: EXIF (GPS position, camera make, model and serial number, capture
time, embedded thumbnail), XMP, IPTC and the ICC colour profile. This cannot be
turned off.
- The `orig` format means the source's own format, not the source's bytes: an
`orig` image is re-encoded and stripped like any other.
- An image with an EXIF orientation is turned upright first, so it displays the
same without the tag; a requested size applies to the upright image.
- An image with an ICC profile is converted to sRGB first, since clients show an
image with no profile as sRGB. Colours outside sRGB, such as the most
saturated ones in a Display P3 photo, are clipped.
### Source Hosts
Source hosts may be whitelisted in the configuration. Non-whitelisted
Source hosts may be allowlisted in the configuration. Non-allowlisted
hosts require an HMAC-SHA256 signature.
#### Signature Specification
Signatures use HMAC-SHA256 and include an expiration timestamp to
prevent replay attacks.
prevent replay attacks. Signatures are **exact match only**: every
component (host, path, query, dimensions, format, expiration, quality,
fit) must match exactly what was signed. No suffix matching, wildcard
matching, or partial matching is supported.
**Signed data format** (colon-separated):
```
HMAC-SHA256(secret, "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration")
HMAC-SHA256(secret, "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration:quality:fit")
```
Where:
@@ -83,33 +168,126 @@ Where:
- `width` — requested width in pixels, `0` for original
- `height` — requested height in pixels, `0` for original
- `format` — output format (jpeg, png, webp, avif, gif, orig)
- `expiration` — Unix timestamp when signature expires
- `expiration` — the URL's `exp` query parameter, the Unix timestamp when
the signature expires; a request whose `exp` is not a whole number, an
empty `exp=` included, is refused with 400
- `quality` — the URL's `q` query parameter, a whole number from 1 to 100,
or `85` when the URL has no `q`; a request whose `q` is anything else is
refused with 400
- `fit` — the URL's `fit` query parameter (cover, contain, fill, inside,
outside), or `cover` when the URL has no `fit`; a request whose `fit` is
anything else, an empty `fit=` included, is refused with 400
**Example:** resize
`https://cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg` to 800x600 WebP with
expiration 1704067200:
The URL's `sig` is the HMAC-SHA256 result in base64url (the URL-safe alphabet
of RFC 4648) with the trailing `=` padding kept, 44 characters in all. pixa
compares it exactly, so a signature encoded without padding, as Node's
`base64url` and Go's `base64.RawURLEncoding` do, is refused with 401.
**Example:** with the signing key `example-signing-key-for-documentation`,
resize `https://cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg` to 800x600 WebP with
expiration 1704067200, default quality and fit:
1. Build input:
`cdn.example.com:/photos/cat.jpg::800:600:webp:1704067200`
2. Compute HMAC-SHA256 with your secret key
3. Base64URL-encode the result
`cdn.example.com:/photos/cat.jpg::800:600:webp:1704067200:85:cover`
2. Compute HMAC-SHA256 of it with the signing key
3. Base64URL-encode the result, keeping the `=` padding:
`-ay7KHpfqmtIGbibDGbUuBDkymi-Ymdn0NkC6j5EJag=`
4. URL:
`/v1/image/cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp?sig=<base64url>&exp=1704067200`
`/v1/image/cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp?sig=-ay7KHpfqmtIGbibDGbUuBDkymi-Ymdn0NkC6j5EJag=&exp=1704067200`
**Whitelist patterns:**
For the same image at quality 40 with fit `contain`, the input ends in
`:40:contain`, the signature is `5IwXUx6vf7yefhaUvFzgXZvG2o0Df4RJxPTK3pKq5VU=`,
and the URL is
`/v1/image/cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp?sig=5IwXUx6vf7yefhaUvFzgXZvG2o0Df4RJxPTK3pKq5VU=&exp=1704067200&q=40&fit=contain`.
- **Exact match only**: `cdn.example.com` — matches only that host
**Allowlist patterns:**
- **Exact match**: `cdn.example.com` — matches only that host
- **Suffix match**: `.example.com` — matches `cdn.example.com`,
`images.example.com`, and `example.com`
### Configuration
Configured via YAML file (`--config`). Key settings:
Every setting can be given as an environment variable, in a YAML config
file (`--config`), or both. A variable present in the environment wins over
the file, even when it is empty, and the file wins over the built-in
default. The one exception is a variable named in the file's `env:` section:
it is set while the file loads, so it overrides both the environment the
process was started with and the file's own key. A variable's value is
parsed as the same text in the file would be. The three lists take
comma-separated entries, with the spaces around each trimmed; an empty
variable is an empty list. A value that does not parse or is invalid aborts
startup, naming the variable. A variable whose name starts with `PIXA_` but
is not in the table below, such as a misspelled one or `PIXA_PORT`, aborts
startup naming it, as an unknown config key does. The one other accepted
name is `PIXA_CONFIG_PATH`, the config file's path (like `--config`). The
variables set by the file's `env:` section are checked the same way.
| Variable | Config key | Meaning |
| ------------------------------------ | ------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `PIXA_SIGNING_KEY` | `signing_key` | Required: secret for signed and encrypted URLs and login, 32+ characters |
| `PORT` | `port` | Port to listen on; default `8080` |
| `PIXA_STATE_DIR` | `state_dir` | Directory for the database and the disk cache; default `/var/lib/pixa` |
| `PIXA_DB_URL` | `db_url` | SQLite database URL; default `state.sqlite3` in the state directory |
| `PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES` | `cache_max_bytes` | Disk cache limit in bytes; `0` disables it; default 75% of free space |
| `PIXA_ALLOWLIST_HOSTS` | `allowlist_hosts` | Upstream hosts served without a signature |
| `PIXA_BLOCKED_NETWORKS` | `blocked_networks` | CIDR ranges never fetched from, on top of the built-in ones |
| `PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `trusted_proxies` | CIDR ranges of proxies whose `X-Forwarded-For` is believed; default RFC 1918 |
| `PIXA_ALLOW_HTTP` | `allow_http` | Allow plain-HTTP upstreams, for testing only; default `false` |
| `PIXA_UPSTREAM_CONNECTIONS_PER_HOST` | `upstream_connections_per_host` | Concurrent connections per upstream host; default `20` |
| `PIXA_UPSTREAM_CONNECTIONS` | `upstream_connections` | Concurrent connections to all upstream hosts together; default `64` |
| `PIXA_MAX_CONCURRENT_PROCESSING` | `max_concurrent_processing` | Images processed at once; default the number of CPUs |
| `PIXA_METRICS_USERNAME` | `metrics.username` | Username for `/metrics`, which is served only when both are set |
| `PIXA_METRICS_PASSWORD` | `metrics.password` | Password for `/metrics`; set together with the username |
| `PIXA_SENTRY_DSN` | `sentry_dsn` | Sentry DSN for error reporting; empty disables it |
| `PIXA_DEBUG` | `debug` | Debug logging and plain-HTTP local development; default `false` |
| `PIXA_MAINTENANCE_MODE` | `maintenance_mode` | Maintenance flag reported by the health check; default `false` |
Key settings in more detail:
- `access_control_allow_origin` — CORS origin
- `source_host_whitelist` — list of allowed upstream hosts
- `allowlist_hosts` — list of allowed upstream hosts
- `blocked_networks` — list of CIDR ranges to refuse for SSRF protection,
added to the always-enforced built-in ranges (loopback, private,
link-local, CGNAT, benchmark, NAT64, and the like); an invalid CIDR
aborts startup
- `trusted_proxies` — list of CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies in front
of pixa. `X-Forwarded-For` is believed only when the direct peer falls
inside one of these ranges; the logged and login-recorded client
address is then the rightmost forwarded entry that is not itself a
trusted proxy. Otherwise the direct peer address is used and the header
is ignored, so a client connecting directly from an address outside
these ranges cannot spoof its address.
An omitted key defaults to the RFC 1918 private ranges (`10.0.0.0/8`,
`172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`), since pixa is deployed behind a
proxy on a private network; an explicitly empty list (`[]`) trusts no
one, and an explicit list replaces the default. An invalid CIDR aborts
startup. Set this to the address pixa sees for requests that come through
your proxy, such as `172.17.0.1/32`, when the defaults do not cover it, or
to trust nothing else (see the login limit under Routes). For a proxy on
the Docker host that connects to pixa over `127.0.0.1`, that address is the
gateway of the container's Docker network (`172.17.0.1` on the default
bridge), not the proxy's own address; a proxy that connects through another of
the host's addresses is seen with that address. To be sure which address it
is, set this to `[]` (or `PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXIES` to empty), send a request
through the proxy, and read `remoteIP` in pixa's request log line for it
- `upstream_fetch_timeout` — timeout for origin requests
- `upstream_max_response_size` — max origin response size
- `downstream_timeout` — client response timeout
- `signing_key` — HMAC secret for URL signatures
- `cache_max_bytes` — disk cache size limit in bytes; `0` disables the
disk cache entirely; omitted defaults to 75% of the free space on
the filesystem containing `<state_dir>/cache/` (minimum 500 MiB)
- `upstream_connections` — the most connections to upstream hosts at once, all
hosts together, on top of `upstream_connections_per_host`; default `64`. A
fetch holds its connection until its image has been processed. A fetch that
finds all of them in use waits up to 10 seconds for one to free up; if none
does, the request is answered 503 with the error
`server busy, try again later`
- `max_concurrent_processing` — the most images decoded and encoded at once;
default the number of CPUs pixa can use (`GOMAXPROCS`), which follows a
container's CPU limit. A request that finds all of them in use waits up to 10
seconds for one to free up; if none does, it is answered 503 the same way
See `config.example.yml` for all options with defaults.
@@ -123,6 +301,33 @@ See `config.example.yml` for all options with defaults.
- **Metrics**: Prometheus
- **Logging**: stdlib slog
## Entrypoints
This repository adheres to the
[Scripts to Rule Them All](https://github.com/github/scripts-to-rule-them-all)
standard: normalized scripts in `script/` are the entrypoints for the
development workflow, and the Makefile targets are thin shims that call
them. We provide:
- `script/bootstrap` — install all dependencies (idempotent)
- `script/setup` — make a fresh clone ready for development
(bootstrap, then install-precommit)
- `script/projectname` — output the project name ("pixa")
- `script/test` — run the test suite
- `script/lint` — run golangci-lint, always in a container (builds
`Dockerfile.lint` when run outside one)
- `script/fmt` — format all code (writes)
- `script/fmt-check` — check formatting (read-only)
- `script/check` — run test, lint, and fmt-check
- `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged via `script/projectname`
- `script/docker-smoke` — build the image, start it, wait for it to be healthy
- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: `docker build .` (the Dockerfile
runs the checks, so a green build implies a green repo)
- `script/precommit` — pre-commit checks (`go mod tidy` guard, then
`script/check`)
- `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook that
runs `script/precommit`
## TODO
See [TODO.md](TODO.md) for the full prioritized task list.
+239 -13
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Repository Policies
last_modified: 2026-02-22
last_modified: 2026-07-06
---
This document covers repository structure, tooling, and workflow standards. Code
@@ -34,10 +34,46 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
every file before committing. There are zero exceptions to this rule.
- Every repo with software must have a root `Makefile` with these targets:
`make test`, `make lint`, `make fmt` (writes), `make fmt-check` (read-only),
`make check` (prereqs: `test`, `lint`, `fmt-check`), `make docker`, and
`make hooks` (installs pre-commit hook). A model Makefile is at
`https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/Makefile`.
`make bootstrap`, `make setup`, `make test`, `make lint`, `make fmt` (writes),
`make fmt-check` (read-only), `make check` (runs `test`, `lint`, `fmt-check`),
`make docker`, and `make hooks` (installs pre-commit hook). A model Makefile
is at `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/Makefile`.
- Repos follow the
[Scripts to Rule Them All](https://github.com/github/scripts-to-rule-them-all)
pattern: the implementation of each Makefile target lives in an executable
script in `script/` (`script/bootstrap`, `script/setup`, `script/test`,
`script/lint`, `script/fmt`, `script/fmt-check`, `script/check`,
`script/docker`), and the Makefile targets are thin shims that call them. The
scripts must be POSIX sh (`#!/bin/sh`, `set -eu`, no bashisms) so they run in
minimal containers (e.g. alpine images have no bash); locate the repo root
with `$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)` and `cd` there before acting. From
the standard's canonical set we use `bootstrap`, `setup` (make the repo ready
for development after a fresh clone: runs `bootstrap`, then
`install-precommit`, plus any repo-specific initialization), `test`, and
`cibuild`. `script/bootstrap` installs all dependencies idempotently and
assumes nothing is present: base tools come from nix, apt, brew, or apk
(detected in that order; apt runs noninteractive). For node it uses the
installed node if present; otherwise it installs a PINNED node version via
nvm, first installing nvm itself if missing — from a hash-verified GitHub
release archive (never `curl | sh`), with bash installed as an explicit
prerequisite since nvm requires bash. yarn is then pinned via
`corepack prepare yarn@<version> --activate`. Never install "latest" or "lts";
always exact versions. `script/cibuild` runs the CI build: it changes to the
repo root and runs `docker build .`; the Gitea workflow calls it. Four further
scripts are our own extensions to the standard: `script/check` runs
`script/test`, `script/lint`, and `script/fmt-check`; `script/precommit` is
what the git pre-commit hook runs, and it calls `script/check`;
`script/install-precommit` installs the git pre-commit hook (the `make hooks`
target shims to it); and `script/projectname` (literally that filename) simply
outputs the project's name. Scripts that need the name call
`script/projectname` — e.g. `script/docker` assembles its image tag from it —
so those scripts stay byte-identical across all repos. Repo-type-specific
pre-commit extras (e.g. `go mod tidy` verification in Go repos) belong in
`script/precommit`, not in the hook itself. Model scripts are at
`https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/script/<name>`. The README
must document the provided scripts in an **Entrypoints** section (see the
README requirements below).
- Always use Makefile targets (`make fmt`, `make test`, `make lint`, etc.)
instead of invoking the underlying tools directly. The Makefile is the single
@@ -57,11 +93,83 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
as a build step so the build fails if the branch is not green. For non-server
repos, the Dockerfile should bring up a development environment and run
`make check`. For server repos, `make check` should run as an early build
stage before the final image is assembled.
stage before the final image is assembled. Dockerfiles install development
prerequisites by running `script/bootstrap` rather than duplicating installs
inline; COPY `script/` and the dependency manifests (`package.json` +
`yarn.lock`, `go.mod` + `go.sum`, etc.) before running it so the bootstrap
layer stays cached until dependencies change.
- **Dockerfiles must use a separate lint stage for fail-fast feedback.** Go
repos use a multistage build where linting runs in an independent stage based
on the `golangci/golangci-lint` image (pinned by hash). This stage runs
`make fmt-check` and `make lint` before the full build begins. The build stage
then declares an explicit dependency on the lint stage via
`COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null`, which forces BuildKit to complete
linting before proceeding to compilation and tests. This ensures lint failures
surface in seconds rather than minutes, without blocking on dependency
download or compilation in the build stage.
The standard pattern for a Go repo Dockerfile is:
```dockerfile
# Lint stage — fast feedback on formatting and lint issues
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.x.x, YYYY-MM-DD
FROM golangci/golangci-lint@sha256:... AS lint
WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
RUN make fmt-check
RUN make lint
# Build stage
# golang:1.x-alpine, YYYY-MM-DD
FROM golang@sha256:... AS builder
WORKDIR /src
# Force BuildKit to run the lint stage before proceeding
COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
RUN make test
ARG VERSION=dev
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
-ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-o /app ./cmd/app/
# Runtime stage
FROM alpine@sha256:...
COPY --from=builder /app /usr/local/bin/app
ENTRYPOINT ["app"]
```
Key points:
- The lint stage uses the `golangci/golangci-lint` image directly (it
includes both Go and the linter), so there is no need to install the
linter separately.
- `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null` is a no-op file copy that creates
a stage dependency. BuildKit runs stages in parallel by default; without
this line, the build stage would not wait for lint to finish and a lint
failure might not fail the overall build.
- If the project uses `//go:embed` directives that reference build artifacts
(e.g. a web frontend compiled in a separate stage), the lint stage must
create placeholder files so the embed directives resolve. Example:
`RUN mkdir -p web/dist && touch web/dist/index.html web/dist/style.css`.
The lint stage should not depend on the actual build output — it exists to
fail fast.
- If the project requires CGO or system libraries for linting (e.g.
`vips-dev`), install them in the lint stage with `apk add`.
- The build stage runs `make test` after compilation setup. Tests run in the
build stage, not the lint stage, because they may require compiled
artifacts or heavier dependencies.
- Every repo should have a Gitea Actions workflow (`.gitea/workflows/`) that
runs `docker build .` on push. Since the Dockerfile already runs `make check`,
a successful build implies all checks pass.
runs `script/cibuild` (which runs `docker build .`) on push. Since the
Dockerfile already runs `make check`, a successful build implies all checks
pass.
- Use platform-standard formatters: `black` for Python, `prettier` for
JS/CSS/Markdown/HTML, `go fmt` for Go. Always use default configuration with
@@ -69,9 +177,11 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
Markdown (hard-wrap at 80 columns). Documentation and writing repos (Markdown,
HTML, CSS) should also have `.prettierrc` and `.prettierignore`.
- Pre-commit hook: `make check` if local testing is possible, otherwise
`make lint && make fmt-check`. The Makefile should provide a `make hooks`
target to install the pre-commit hook.
- Pre-commit hook: runs `script/precommit`, which calls `script/check`. If local
testing is not possible in the repo, `script/precommit` may skip `script/test`
and run only `script/lint` and `script/fmt-check`. The hook is installed by
`script/install-precommit`; the Makefile must provide a `make hooks` target
that shims to it.
- All repos with software must have tests that run via the platform-standard
test framework (`go test`, `pytest`, `jest`/`vitest`, etc.). If no meaningful
@@ -82,6 +192,42 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
- `make test` must complete in under 20 seconds. Add a 30-second timeout in the
Makefile.
- **`make test` should use the conditional verbose rerun pattern.** Run tests
without `-v` (verbose) first. If tests fail, automatically rerun with `-v` to
show full output. This keeps CI logs and `docker build` output clean on
success (just package/suite summaries) while providing full diagnostic detail
on failure (every test case, every assertion). The general shell pattern:
```makefile
test:
@<test-command> || \
{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
<test-command-with-v>; exit 1; }
```
Go example:
```makefile
test:
@go test -timeout 30s -race -cover ./... || \
{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
go test -timeout 30s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
```
Python example:
```makefile
test:
@python -m pytest || \
{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
python -m pytest -v; exit 1; }
```
The `exit 1` ensures the target always fails after a rerun — the first run
already proved the tests are broken, so the build must not pass even if a
flaky test happens to succeed on the second attempt. The rerun exists solely
for diagnostic output.
- Docker builds must complete in under 5 minutes.
- `make check` must not modify any files in the repo. Tests may use temporary
@@ -98,6 +244,13 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
`https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.gitignore` when setting up
a new repo.
- **No build artifacts in version control.** Code-derived data (compiled
bundles, minified output, generated assets) must never be committed to the
repository if it can be avoided. The build process (e.g. Dockerfile, Makefile)
should generate these at build time. Notable exception: Go protobuf generated
files (`.pb.go`) ARE committed because repos need to work with `go get`, which
downloads code but does not execute code generation.
- Never use `git add -A` or `git add .`. Always stage files explicitly by name.
- Never force-push to `main`.
@@ -121,12 +274,76 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
- Dockerized web services listen on port 8080 by default, overridable with
`PORT`.
- **HTTP/web services must be hardened for production internet exposure before
tagging 1.0.** This means full compliance with security best practices
including, without limitation, all of the following:
- **Security headers** on every response:
- `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) with `max-age` of at least one year
and `includeSubDomains`.
- `Content-Security-Policy` (CSP) with a restrictive default policy
(`default-src 'self'` as a baseline, tightened per-resource as
needed). Never use `unsafe-inline` or `unsafe-eval` unless
unavoidable, and document the reason.
- `X-Frame-Options: DENY` (or `SAMEORIGIN` if framing is required).
Prefer the `frame-ancestors` CSP directive as the primary control.
- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
- `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (or stricter).
- `Permissions-Policy` restricting access to browser features the
application does not use (camera, microphone, geolocation, etc.).
- **Request and response limits:**
- Maximum request body size enforced on all endpoints (e.g. Go
`http.MaxBytesReader`). Choose a sane default per-route; never accept
unbounded input.
- Maximum response body size where applicable (e.g. paginated APIs).
- `ReadTimeout` and `ReadHeaderTimeout` on the `http.Server` to defend
against slowloris attacks.
- `WriteTimeout` on the `http.Server`.
- `IdleTimeout` on the `http.Server`.
- Per-handler execution time limits via `context.WithTimeout` or
chi/stdlib `middleware.Timeout`.
- **Authentication and session security:**
- Rate limiting on password-based authentication endpoints. API keys are
high-entropy and not susceptible to brute force, so they are exempt.
- CSRF tokens on all state-mutating HTML forms. API endpoints
authenticated via `Authorization` header (Bearer token, API key) are
exempt because the browser does not attach these automatically.
- Passwords stored using bcrypt, scrypt, or argon2 — never plain-text,
MD5, or SHA.
- Session cookies set with `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, and `SameSite=Lax` (or
`Strict`) attributes.
- **Reverse proxy awareness:**
- True client IP detection when behind a reverse proxy
(`X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`). The application must accept
forwarded headers only from a configured set of trusted proxy
addresses — never trust `X-Forwarded-For` unconditionally.
- **CORS:**
- Authenticated endpoints must restrict `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` to
an explicit allowlist of known origins. Wildcard (`*`) is acceptable
only for public, unauthenticated read-only APIs.
- **Error handling:**
- Internal errors must never leak stack traces, SQL queries, file paths,
or other implementation details to the client. Return generic error
messages in production; detailed errors only when `DEBUG` is enabled.
- **TLS:**
- Services never terminate TLS directly. They are always deployed behind
a TLS-terminating reverse proxy. The service itself listens on plain
HTTP. However, HSTS headers and `Secure` cookie flags must still be
set by the application so that the browser enforces HTTPS end-to-end.
This list is non-exhaustive. Apply defense-in-depth: if a standard security
hardening measure exists for HTTP services and is not listed here, it is
still expected. When in doubt, harden.
- `README.md` is the primary documentation. Required sections:
- **Description**: First line must include the project name, purpose,
category (web server, SPA, CLI tool, etc.), license, and author. Example:
"µPaaS is an MIT-licensed Go web application by @sneak that receives
git-frontend webhooks and deploys applications via Docker in realtime."
- **Getting Started**: Copy-pasteable install/usage code block.
- **Entrypoints**: Opens by stating that the repo adheres to the
[Scripts to Rule Them All](https://github.com/github/scripts-to-rule-them-all)
standard (with that link), then documents each provided `script/`
entrypoint and its purpose.
- **Rationale**: Why does this exist?
- **Design**: How is the program structured?
- **TODO**: Update meticulously, even between commits. When planning, put
@@ -144,8 +361,14 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
- Use SemVer.
- Database migrations live in `internal/db/migrations/` and must be embedded in
the binary. Pre-1.0.0: modify existing migrations (no installed base assumed).
Post-1.0.0: add new migration files.
the binary.
- `000_migration.sql` — contains ONLY the creation of the migrations
tracking table itself. Nothing else.
- `001_schema.sql` — the full application schema.
- **Pre-1.0.0:** never add additional migration files (002, 003, etc.).
There is no installed base to migrate. Edit `001_schema.sql` directly.
- **Post-1.0.0:** add new numbered migration files for each schema change.
Never edit existing migrations after release.
- All repos should have an `.editorconfig` enforcing the project's indentation
settings.
@@ -175,6 +398,9 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
- `README.md`, `.git`, `.gitignore`, `.editorconfig`
- `LICENSE`, `REPO_POLICIES.md` (copy from the `prompts` repo)
- `Makefile`
- `script/` entrypoints (`bootstrap`, `setup`, `projectname`, `test`,
`lint`, `fmt`, `fmt-check`, `check`, `docker`, `cibuild`, `precommit`,
`install-precommit`)
- `Dockerfile`, `.dockerignore`
- `.gitea/workflows/check.yml`
- Go: `go.mod`, `go.sum`, `.golangci.yml`
+313 -56
View File
@@ -1,65 +1,322 @@
# Pixa 1.0 TODO
# Workflow
Remaining tasks sorted by priority for a working 1.0 release.
* branch per issue from `next`
* do the work in Next Step
* move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps
* move the top item of Future Steps into Next Step
* commit (`TODO.md` changes in the same commit as the work)
* open a PR based on `next`
* an independent reviewer who did not write the change gates it
* the manager squash-merges the PR into `next` once review passes
* `next` stays green and mergeable to `main` at any time; only the owner
merges `next` into `main`, via the single milestone PR
* push
## P0: Critical for 1.0
# Status
### Image Processing
- [x] Add WebP encoding support (currently returns error)
- [x] Add AVIF encoding support (implemented via govips)
pre-1.0. No git tags exist. The `1.0.0` milestone is in progress; work
lands on `next`, and `main` receives only the milestone PR that the
owner merges. `next` is at the canonical `golangci-lint` v2.12.2 config
and is green. Recent work extracted the internal/magic,
internal/allowlist, internal/httpfetcher, and internal/signature
packages. The gosec findings from the 2026-07-06 survey are resolved.
The disk cache is now size-bounded with LRU eviction
(`cache_max_bytes`), closing the unbounded disk growth DoS vector.
### Manual Testing (verify auth/encrypted URLs work)
- [ ] Manual test: visit `/`, see login form
- [ ] Manual test: enter wrong key, see error
- [ ] Manual test: enter correct signing key, see generator form
- [ ] Manual test: generate encrypted URL, verify it works
- [ ] Manual test: wait for expiration or use short TTL, verify expired URL returns 410
- [ ] Manual test: logout, verify redirected to login
# Next Step
### Cache Management
- [ ] Implement cache size management/eviction (prevent disk from filling up)
P2: security: referer blacklist
### Configuration
- [ ] Validate configuration on startup (fail fast on bad config)
# Completed Steps
## P1: Important for Production
- 2026-09-29 bound concurrent image processing and upstream fetches (closes
#64): `max_concurrent_processing` (default the number of CPUs pixa can use)
limits the images decoded and encoded at once, and `upstream_connections`
(default 64) the connections to all upstream hosts together, on top of
`upstream_connections_per_host`; a fetch holds its connection until its image
has been processed, and a request whose source is cached reads it only once it
has a processing slot; a request that finds either limit reached waits up to
10 seconds for a free one, then gets 503 `server busy, try again later`;
libvips runs one worker thread per image with its operation cache off;
documented in `README.md` and `config.example.yml`.
- 2026-09-29 `trusted_proxies` advice and signature padding in `README.md`
(closes #150): the login-limit paragraph, the `trusted_proxies` entry and
`config.example.yml` say to set `trusted_proxies` to the address pixa sees for
requests that come through the proxy, which the request log shows as
`remoteIP` while it is not trusted; for a proxy on the Docker host that
connects over `127.0.0.1` that is the Docker network's gateway, not the
proxy's own address; the signature section says `sig` is base64url with the
`=` padding kept, and gives the example's `sig` for a stated signing key.
- 2026-09-29 fixed uid and gid for `pixad` (closes #151): the image creates the
`pixad` group with gid 65532 and the `pixad` user with uid 65532, instead of
the first free uid 1000, so a bind-mounted `/var/lib/pixa` given to `pixad`
is not owned on the host by a person's login account; the first-run step of
"Running under upaas" in `README.md` names the uid and gid.
- 2026-09-29 `max-age` never outlives an expiring URL (closes #63): both image
routes build `Cache-Control` from the request's `Expires`, which an encrypted
URL's expiry now fills too; `max-age` is one year, or the whole seconds left
until the `exp` of a `/v1/image/` URL or the expiry of an encrypted URL when
that is sooner, never negative; an allowlisted host's URL that has an `exp`
follows it too; `immutable` stays, as freshness now ends at the expiry;
documented in `README.md`.
- 2026-09-28 cache stats report real numbers (closes #56): `Cache.Stats`
counts the cached source images and processed variants (`source_content`
plus `variant_content`) and takes their size from `Cache.UsageBytes`,
instead of reading `request_cache` and `output_content`, which nothing
writes; those two tables are left in the schema; a disabled disk cache
reports no items and no size. A hit is counted even when the request
context has ended. A miss is counted after it is served or fails, also
when the request context has ended by then, with the bytes it read from
upstream, so `upstream_fetch_count` and `upstream_fetch_bytes` move,
including for an upstream body that fails partway or a fetched source
that then fails the magic byte check; `transform_count` counts each image
the image processor transcodes.
- 2026-09-28 strip metadata from processed images (closes #82): every output is
exported with govips' `StripMetadata`, so it carries no EXIF, XMP, IPTC or ICC
profile; the image is first turned upright with `AutoRotate` (before sizes are
worked out) and, when it has an ICC profile, converted to sRGB; the `orig`
format is re-encoded and stripped like any other, as pixa never serves the
source bytes; there is no setting to keep metadata; documented in `README.md`.
- 2026-09-28 rate limit the login form (closes #66): `POST /` is limited to 5
attempts per minute per client address, and an attempt over the limit is
refused with 429 and a `Retry-After` header; the address is the one
`internal/clientip` resolves through `trusted_proxies`, an IPv6 client is
counted by its /64, and an IPv4-mapped address as the IPv4 address it
carries; the limit is a `RateLimit` middleware in `internal/middleware` on
`github.com/go-chi/httprate`, which the image routes can reuse; the library
keeps counts for the current and the previous minute only; documented in
`README.md`.
- 2026-09-28 refuse an unparseable `exp` on `/v1/image/` and log swallowed
cache errors (closes #72): an `exp` in the URL that is not a whole
number, an empty `exp=` included, is a 400 naming `exp` and the value,
instead of being ignored and answered with 401 as if the URL had no
`exp`; only an `exp` missing from the URL is unchanged; `README.md` says
so where it documents `exp`. A failed variant `.meta` write, source
metadata JSON write, `Stats` count query, stats counter update, negative
cache write or expired negative cache delete is now logged at `warn`
with the path or key and the error, and stays non-fatal.
- 2026-09-28 refuse an empty `fit` on `/v1/image/` (closes #139): a
`fit` in the URL with an empty value (`fit=`) is a 400 naming `fit`,
instead of being served as `cover` and verified against a signature
made for `cover`; only a `fit` missing from the URL is still `cover`;
any other value still goes through the existing fit-mode check;
`README.md` says so where it documents `fit`.
- 2026-09-28 refuse an invalid `q` on `/v1/image/` (closes #134): a `q`
that is not a whole number from 1 to 100, an empty `q` included, is a
400 naming `q` and the value, instead of being served at the default
85; the route reads `q` with the generator's quality check
(`parseFormInt` with `minQuality` and `maxQuality`); only a `q` missing
from the URL is still 85; a query string that cannot be decoded, such
as `q=80%`, is a 400 showing it; any query parameter given more than
once (`q`, `fit`, `sig`, `exp` alike) is a 400 naming it, so none is
read from its first value only; `README.md` states the range and both
query-string rules.
- 2026-09-28 unknown `PIXA_` environment variables abort startup (closes
#133): a variable whose name starts with `PIXA_` but is neither a
setting's variable nor `PIXA_CONFIG_PATH` aborts startup naming it, as
an unknown config key does, and `PIXA_PORT` is named with a pointer to
`PORT`; the check runs after the config file loads, so the variables
the file's `env:` section sets are checked too; documented in
`README.md`.
- 2026-09-28 start on a fresh upaas volume (closes #129): the image
starts as root only to give `/var/lib/pixa` to `pixad` when `pixad`
does not own it (`deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh`), then runs the server
as `pixad` through `su-exec`, so a root-owned host directory
bind-mounted there no longer stops the container at startup;
`README.md` gains a "Running under upaas" section.
- 2026-09-28 run all linting in Docker via `Dockerfile.lint` +
`script/lint` (closes #104): `make lint` calls `script/lint`, the only
way the linter is run; inside a container (both Dockerfiles set
`container=docker`) it runs `golangci-lint`, anywhere else it builds the
hash-pinned `Dockerfile.lint`, whose last step runs `script/lint` again;
the `Dockerfile` lint stage runs `make lint`; no host or nix-shell
`golangci-lint` path remains (`script/bootstrap` installs no linter);
a per-run `CACHEBUST` build-arg keeps the lint step from being served
from cache, and a tmpfs mount on that step keeps Go's and
golangci-lint's caches out of its layer, so a run leaves no large build
cache behind; `golangci-lint config verify` stays out, as it fetches its
schema over an unpinned live HTTPS call
- 2026-09-28 every setting as an environment variable (closes #128, also
covers #99): each config key can be set by `PIXA_` plus the key in upper
case (`.` written as `_`), and the port by `PORT`; a variable present in
the environment, even empty, wins over the config file, which wins over
the default; the typed getters read the variable first, so every existing
check applies to it and a bad value aborts startup naming the variable;
lists are comma-separated, and an empty variable (or `""` in the file) is
an empty list; the Docker image no longer bakes in `config.docker.yml` or
passes `--config`, and its `HEALTHCHECK` probes `PORT` (default `8080`);
the config file is looked for under `/etc/pixa` and `~/.config/pixa`
instead of the daemon name `pixad`; documented in `README.md` and
`config.example.yml`.
- 2026-09-28 quality and fit in the URL signature (closes #60): the signed
data is now `host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration:quality:fit`,
using `85` and `cover` when the URL has no `q` or `fit`, so one signed
URL can no longer be replayed across other quality and fit values to
create unauthorized cache entries and transcodes; the known-answer
vectors in `internal/signature/golden_test.go` and the README signature
specification describe the new format.
- 2026-09-28 Docker image healthcheck (closes #111): a `HEALTHCHECK` in
the runtime stage probing `/.well-known/healthcheck.json` with busybox
`wget`; `script/docker-smoke` (`make docker-smoke`) builds the image,
starts it with a throwaway `PIXA_SIGNING_KEY`, and passes only once
Docker reports it healthy within 30 seconds, removing the container on
exit; the Gitea workflow runs it after `script/cibuild`.
- 2026-09-21 trusted-proxy client IP resolution (closes #94): a
`trusted_proxies` config key taking a list of CIDRs, parsed by the same
`net/netip` list parser as `blocked_networks` (an invalid entry aborts
startup naming the key and value; an omitted key defaults to the RFC 1918
private ranges, an explicitly empty list trusts no one, and an explicit
list replaces the default); a new
`internal/clientip` package resolves the client address by honoring
`X-Forwarded-For` only when the direct peer is a trusted proxy, walking
the chain right-to-left to the rightmost non-proxy entry, so a client
connecting directly cannot spoof its address; the resolved address is
stored in the request context by a new middleware and used by the
request-logging middleware and the login-attempt logs in place of the
raw peer address; documented in `README.md` and `config.example.yml`.
- 2026-09-21 blocked networks configuration extending SSRF protection: a
`blocked_networks` config key taking a list of CIDRs (parsed with
`net/netip`, an invalid entry aborts startup naming the key and value),
added to the built-in blocklist rather than replacing it; the built-in
ranges extended to CGNAT `100.64.0.0/10`, IETF protocol assignments
`192.0.0.0/24`, benchmark `198.18.0.0/15`, and NAT64 `64:ff9b::/96`
(IPv4-mapped forms covered); enforcement stays in the dial-time
re-resolution so the DNS-rebinding window remains closed; documented in
`README.md` and `config.example.yml`.
- 2026-09-21 validate dimensions and fit mode on the encrypted-URL
route and the token generator (closes #62): `imgcache.ValidateDimension`
alone holds the `MaxDimension` bound and is used by the path parser, by
the new `ValidateImageRequest` (which also applies `ValidateFitMode`)
and by the generator; both the `/v1/image/` and `/v1/e/` routes call
`ValidateImageRequest`, so an over-limit size or an unknown fit mode is a
400 rather than an out-of-memory or a 500 from the processor; the URL
generator answers 400 naming the field for a `width` or `height` that is
not a number or fails the shared check, a `quality` that is not a number
from 1 to 100, a `ttl` that is not a number from 0 to the largest number
of seconds the expiry calculation can hold, or an unknown `fit`; an empty
`quality` is 85 and
an empty `ttl` never expires; the form's width and height inputs stop at
8192
- 2026-09-21 http.Server hardening (closes #92): added
`HTTPReadHeaderTimeout` (10s, bounds the slowloris header dribble) and
`HTTPIdleTimeout` (120s, bounds keep-alive reuse) alongside the
existing timeouts and wired them onto the server; added a `LimitBody`
middleware capping the two form POST bodies (`POST /`, `POST /generate`)
at `MaxFormBytes` (1 MiB) and returning 413, applied ahead of the CSRF
middleware so an oversized body is refused as 413 rather than being read
as a missing CSRF token (403); left `WriteTimeout` at 60s unchanged
- 2026-08-07 update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 with the canonical
`.golangci.yml` (v2 schema, `default: all` minus six disabled
linters, `lll` 88, tests included): bumped the pinned
`golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2-alpine` image in `Dockerfile` and the
release-archive sha256 pins in `script/bootstrap`; fixed the findings
the stricter config surfaced (notably `paralleltest`, `wsl_v5`,
`goconst`, `lll`, `noinlineerr`, `err113`, `errcheck`, `testpackage` —
white-box test files renamed to `*_internal_test.go`), including #55's
code absorbed after it merged, iterating the pinned linter to
`0 issues.`; no single finding total is substantiable, since
golangci-lint's `uniq-by-line` reveals new findings on a line as
others there are fixed — the documented re-measurements were 81 after
the #53 merge and 149 after the #55 merge; three behavior changes, so
not a pure no-op: `Cache.StoreVariant` now takes a `context.Context`
(`noctx`), so a cancelled request skips its best-effort accounting
row; `MetadataStorage.Store`'s cleanup defer was dead on `main` and
leaked `.tmp-*.json` on failure, now fixed with explicit removals; and
the `signing_key` validation error text gained `value too short: `;
the eviction loop's uncancellable context is deferred to #102 under a
`//nolint:contextcheck`; three `//nolint:tagliatelle` directives keep
the snake_case JSON wire/disk formats unchanged; `make check` green
- 2026-08-07 implement cache size management and eviction (closes
#51): new `cache_max_bytes` config key validated by the startup
framework (explicit values used exactly with no floor, `0` disables
the disk cache entirely, omitted defaults to max(75% of free space
on the filesystem containing `<state_dir>/cache/`, 500 MiB), logged
at startup); processed variants are now tracked in the database (a
new `variant_content` table and an LRU timestamp on `source_content`)
so total usage is two SUMs, never a directory scan on the hot path; a
background goroutine evicts globally least-recently-used entries
(variants and source blobs merged) to the limit, woken by a periodic
ticker and by write-pressure notifications from stores; a source
blob and ALL of its `source_metadata` references are deleted in one
transaction before the file is unlinked, so multi-referenced blobs
are never removed while referenced and rows never point at deleted
files; a startup and periodic reconciliation pass adopts untracked
variant files, drops rows for missing files, removes unreachable
source blobs, and sweeps stale temp files
- 2026-08-07 validate configuration on startup, fail fast on bad
config (closes #52): a config value that is set but unparseable or
invalid aborts startup naming the key and value (defaults apply only
to omitted keys), unknown config keys abort startup, a malformed
config file aborts instead of being skipped, and `state_dir` is
verified creatable and writable before the listener binds
- 2026-08-07 manual test pass of the auth and encrypted URL flows
against a locally built and running `pixad` (built from `main` at
`6573b9d`, port 18099, local throwaway config); all six checks
passed, plus all nine tests in `scripts/manual-test.sh` (closes #49):
- [x] visit `/` and see the login form: HTTP 200, `Pixa - Login`
page with `name="key"` password form
- [x] wrong key shows an error: POST `/` with `key=wrong-key`
returned HTTP 200 login page containing "Invalid signing key"
- [x] correct signing key shows the generator form: POST `/`
returned HTTP 303 to `/` with
`Set-Cookie: pixa_session=...; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict`;
GET `/` with that cookie rendered `Pixa - URL Generator` with the
`/generate` form and logout link
- [x] a generated encrypted URL serves the image: POST `/generate`
(ttl=3600) produced a `/v1/e/<token>/img.jpeg` URL that returned
HTTP 200, `Content-Type: image/jpeg`, an 800x600 baseline JPEG of
61706 bytes
- [x] an expired URL (short TTL) returns 410: a ttl=1 URL fetched
after 3 s returned HTTP 410 Gone with
`{"error":"URL has expired","status":410,...}`
- [x] logout redirects back to login: GET `/logout` returned HTTP
303 to `/` with `Set-Cookie: pixa_session=; Max-Age=0`;
subsequent GET `/` rendered the login form again
- 2026-08-07 fix the two remaining gosec findings (G124 in
internal/session): session cookies now always carry
Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite=Strict on both the set and clear paths;
`make check` green (closes #47)
- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints,
Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
- 2026-04-07 extract magic byte detection into internal/magic (#42)
- 2026-03-25 extract allowlist package from internal/imgcache (#41)
- 2026-03-25 move schema_migrations table creation into 000.sql (#36)
- 2026-03-20 enforce and document exact-match-only signature
verification (#40)
- 2026-03-20 bound imageprocessor.Process input read to prevent
unbounded memory use (#37); consolidate appname into an
internal/globals constant (#34)
- 2026-03-18 parse version prefix from migration filenames (#33)
- 2026-03-15 QA audit fixes for 1.0/MVP readiness (#25)
- 2026-03-02 split Dockerfile with pre-built golangci-lint stage for
faster CI (#23)
- 2026-02-25 repo policy compliance: CI workflow, hash-pinned images,
golangci-lint and gosec fixes of that date (#14); arm64 Docker build
fix (#16)
- 2026-01-08 WebP and AVIF encoding support via govips (both former P0
image processing items, now done)
### Security
- [ ] Implement blocked networks configuration (extend SSRF protection)
- [ ] Add rate limiting global concurrent fetches (prevent resource exhaustion)
# Future Steps
### Image Processing
- [ ] Implement EXIF/metadata stripping (privacy)
## P2: Nice to Have
### Security
- [ ] Implement referer blacklist
- [ ] Add rate limiting per-IP
- [ ] Add rate limiting per-origin
### HTTP Response Handling
- [ ] Implement Last-Modified headers
- [ ] Implement Vary header for content negotiation
- [ ] Implement X-Request-ID propagation
### Additional Endpoints
- [ ] Implement auto-format selection (format=auto based on Accept header)
### Configuration
- [ ] Add all configuration options from README
- [ ] Implement environment variable overrides
- [ ] Implement YAML config file support
### Operational
- [ ] Implement Sentry error reporting (optional)
- [ ] Add comprehensive request logging
- [ ] Add performance metrics (Prometheus)
- [ ] Write integration tests for image proxy flow
- [ ] Write load tests to verify 1-5k req/s target
### Documentation
- [ ] Document configuration options
- [ ] Document API endpoints
- [ ] Document deployment guide
- [ ] Add example nginx/caddy reverse proxy config
- P2: security
- per-IP rate limiting on the image routes
- per-origin rate limiting
- P2: HTTP response handling
- Last-Modified headers
- Vary header for content negotiation
- X-Request-ID propagation
- P2: auto format selection (format=auto based on Accept header)
- P2: configuration
- add all configuration options from README
- YAML config file support
- P2: operational
- optional Sentry error reporting
- comprehensive request logging
- Prometheus performance metrics
- integration tests for the image proxy flow
- load tests to verify the 1k to 5k req/s target
- P2: documentation
- configuration options
- API endpoints
- deployment guide
- example nginx or caddy reverse proxy config
+3 -6
View File
@@ -17,10 +17,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/server"
)
var (
Appname = "pixad" //nolint:gochecknoglobals // set by ldflags
Version string //nolint:gochecknoglobals // set by ldflags
)
var Version string //nolint:gochecknoglobals // set by ldflags
var configPath string //nolint:gochecknoglobals // cobra flag
@@ -33,14 +30,14 @@ func main() {
rootCmd.Flags().StringVarP(&configPath, "config", "c", "", "path to config file")
if err := rootCmd.Execute(); err != nil {
err := rootCmd.Execute()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
func run(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) {
globals.Appname = Appname
globals.Version = Version
// Set config path in environment if specified via flag
+62 -3
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,13 @@
# Pixa Example Configuration
#
# Every key can also be set by an environment variable, which wins over
# this file: PIXA_ plus the key in upper case, with "." written as "_"
# (state_dir is PIXA_STATE_DIR, metrics.username is
# PIXA_METRICS_USERNAME). The one exception is port, which is set by
# PORT. In a variable, a list is comma-separated. A variable named in
# this file's env: section is set while the file loads, so it overrides
# both the environment the process was started with and this file's own
# key.
# Server settings
port: 8080
@@ -9,24 +18,74 @@ maintenance_mode: false
state_dir: ./data
# Image proxy settings
# HMAC signing key for URL signatures (leave empty to require whitelist for all requests)
# HMAC signing key for URL signatures (required, at least 32 characters)
# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
signing_key: "CHANGE_ME_generate_with_openssl_rand_base64_32"
# Hosts that don't require signatures (exact match only)
whitelist_hosts:
# Hosts that don't require signatures
# Use "." prefix for wildcard subdomain matching (e.g., ".example.com" matches "cdn.example.com")
allowlist_hosts:
- s3.sneak.cloud
- static.sneak.cloud
- sneak.berlin
- github.com
- user-images.githubusercontent.com
# Additional CIDR ranges to refuse when fetching upstream, extending the
# SSRF protection. These are added to the always-enforced built-in ranges
# (loopback, RFC 1918 private, link-local, CGNAT, benchmark, NAT64, and
# similar), never replacing them. Each entry must be a valid CIDR in IPv4
# or IPv6 form; an invalid entry aborts startup.
# blocked_networks:
# - 100.64.0.0/10
# - 2001:db8::/32
# CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies in front of pixa. X-Forwarded-For
# is believed only when the direct peer is inside one of these ranges;
# the client address in the access log and login records is then the
# rightmost forwarded entry that is not itself a trusted proxy. A client
# connecting directly (peer outside these ranges) cannot spoof its
# address: the header is ignored and the peer address is used. When
# omitted, this defaults to the RFC 1918 private ranges (10.0.0.0/8,
# 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16), since pixa is deployed behind a proxy on
# a private network. An explicitly empty list ([]) trusts no one; an
# explicit list replaces the default. An invalid CIDR aborts startup.
# Uncomment to override the defaults with the address pixa sees for
# requests that come through your proxy. That is not always the proxy's own
# address: a proxy on the Docker host that connects over 127.0.0.1 is seen
# as the gateway of the container's Docker network (172.17.0.1 on the
# default bridge), and one that connects through another host address is
# seen with that address. To be sure, look it up in the request log as the
# trusted_proxies entry in README.md describes.
# trusted_proxies:
# - 10.0.0.0/8
# - 2001:db8::/32
# Allow HTTP upstream (only for testing, always use HTTPS in production)
allow_http: false
# Maximum concurrent connections per upstream host (default: 20)
upstream_connections_per_host: 20
# Maximum concurrent connections to all upstream hosts together, on top of
# the per-host limit (default: 64). A fetch holds its connection until its
# image has been processed. A fetch that finds none free waits up to 10
# seconds for one, and if none frees up the request is answered 503.
upstream_connections: 64
# Maximum number of images decoded and encoded at once (default: the
# number of CPUs pixa can use, which follows a container's CPU limit). A
# request that finds none free waits up to 10 seconds for one, and if none
# frees up it is answered 503.
# max_concurrent_processing: 4
# Maximum disk cache size in bytes. Explicit values are used exactly as
# given; 0 disables the disk cache entirely (every request fetches and
# processes uncached). When omitted, the default is 75% of the free
# space on the filesystem containing <state_dir>/cache/ at startup,
# with a minimum of 500 MiB.
# cache_max_bytes: 10737418240
# Sentry error reporting (optional)
sentry_dsn: ""
+15
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
#!/bin/sh
# deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh: the Docker image's ENTRYPOINT. It runs as
# root only to give /var/lib/pixa to pixad: a host directory
# bind-mounted there keeps its host owner, often root, and pixad could
# not write to it. The server itself always runs as pixad.
set -eu
main() {
if [ "$(stat -c %U /var/lib/pixa)" != pixad ]; then
chown pixad:pixad /var/lib/pixa
fi
exec su-exec pixad /usr/local/bin/pixad "$@"
}
main "$@"
+4
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ require (
github.com/getsentry/sentry-go v0.40.0
github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.3
github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.2
github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.16.0
github.com/gorilla/csrf v1.7.3
github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.23.2
github.com/slok/go-http-metrics v0.13.0
@@ -90,6 +92,7 @@ require (
github.com/inconshreveable/mousetrap v1.1.0 // indirect
github.com/josharian/intern v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/json-iterator/go v1.1.12 // indirect
github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10 // indirect
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 // indirect
github.com/mailru/easyjson v0.7.7 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-colorable v0.1.13 // indirect
@@ -112,6 +115,7 @@ require (
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.0 // indirect
github.com/x448/float16 v0.8.4 // indirect
github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2 // indirect
go.etcd.io/etcd/api/v3 v3.6.2 // indirect
go.etcd.io/etcd/client/pkg/v3 v3.6.2 // indirect
go.etcd.io/etcd/client/v3 v3.6.2 // indirect
+10
View File
@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.3 h1:WQIt9uxdsAbgIYgid+BpYc+liqQZGMHRaUwp0JUcvdE=
github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.3/go.mod h1:L2yAIGWB3H+phAw1NxKwWM+7eUH/lU8pOMm5hHcoops=
github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.2 h1:Jmey33TE+b+rB7fT8MUy1u0I4L+NARQlK6LhzKPSyQE=
github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.2/go.mod h1:sSbTewc+6wYHBBCW7ytsFSn836hqM7JxpglAy2Vzc58=
github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.16.0 h1:8V5DH9j6pSK6UQoBsTpvMyFxycqaKEIToyPKzHJjUa8=
github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.16.0/go.mod h1:A8lo+qRhk+s9LiuP5saS7XCGDXRXMcrueq0NfIuCa/I=
github.com/go-errors/errors v1.4.2 h1:J6MZopCL4uSllY1OfXM374weqZFFItUbrImctkmUxIA=
github.com/go-errors/errors v1.4.2/go.mod h1:sIVyrIiJhuEF+Pj9Ebtd6P/rEYROXFi3BopGUQ5a5Og=
github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.0.5 h1:M6T8+mKZl/+fNNuFHvGIzDz7BTLQPIounk/b9dw3AaE=
@@ -175,6 +177,8 @@ github.com/googleapis/enterprise-certificate-proxy v0.3.6 h1:GW/XbdyBFQ8Qe+YAmFU
github.com/googleapis/enterprise-certificate-proxy v0.3.6/go.mod h1:MkHOF77EYAE7qfSuSS9PU6g4Nt4e11cnsDUowfwewLA=
github.com/googleapis/gax-go/v2 v2.14.2 h1:eBLnkZ9635krYIPD+ag1USrOAI0Nr0QYF3+/3GqO0k0=
github.com/googleapis/gax-go/v2 v2.14.2/go.mod h1:ON64QhlJkhVtSqp4v1uaK92VyZ2gmvDQsweuyLV+8+w=
github.com/gorilla/csrf v1.7.3 h1:BHWt6FTLZAb2HtWT5KDBf6qgpZzvtbp9QWDRKZMXJC0=
github.com/gorilla/csrf v1.7.3/go.mod h1:F1Fj3KG23WYHE6gozCmBAezKookxbIvUJT+121wTuLk=
github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2 h1:YCIWL56dvtr73r6715mJs5ZvhtnY73hBvEF8kXD8ePA=
github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2/go.mod h1:NfCASbcHqRSY+3a8tlWJwsQap2VX5pwzwo4h3eOamfo=
github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway/v2 v2.26.3 h1:5ZPtiqj0JL5oKWmcsq4VMaAW5ukBEgSGXEN89zeH1Jo=
@@ -249,6 +253,8 @@ github.com/kisielk/errcheck v1.5.0/go.mod h1:pFxgyoBC7bSaBwPgfKdkLd5X25qrDl4LWUI
github.com/kisielk/gotool v1.0.0/go.mod h1:XhKaO+MFFWcvkIS/tQcRk01m1F5IRFswLeQ+oQHNcck=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.0 h1:c/Cqfb0r+Yi+JtIEq73FWXVkRonBlf0CRNYc8Zttxdo=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.0/go.mod h1:2Pp+KzxcywXVXMr50+X0Q/Lsb43OQHYWRCY2AiWywWQ=
github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10 h1:tBs3QSyvjDyFTq3uoc/9xFpCuOsJQFNPiAhYdw2skhE=
github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10/go.mod h1:hqwkgyIinND0mEev00jJYCxPNVRVXFQeu1XKlok6oO0=
github.com/konsorten/go-windows-terminal-sequences v1.0.1/go.mod h1:T0+1ngSBFLxvqU3pZ+m/2kptfBszLMUkC4ZK/EgS/cQ=
github.com/kr/logfmt v0.0.0-20140226030751-b84e30acd515/go.mod h1:+0opPa2QZZtGFBFZlji/RkVcI2GknAs/DXo4wKdlNEc=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.1.0/go.mod h1:dAy3ld7l9f0ibDNOQOHHMYYIIbhfbHSm3C4ZsoJORNo=
@@ -394,6 +400,10 @@ github.com/x448/float16 v0.8.4/go.mod h1:14CWIYCyZA/cWjXOioeEpHeN/83MdbZDRQHoFcY
github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.1.27/go.mod h1:3hX8gzYuyVAZsxl0MRgGTJEmQBFcNTphYh9decYSb74=
github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.2.1/go.mod h1:3hX8gzYuyVAZsxl0MRgGTJEmQBFcNTphYh9decYSb74=
github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.4.13/go.mod h1:6yULJ656Px+3vBD8DxQVa3kxgyrAnzto9xy5taEt/CY=
github.com/zeebo/assert v1.3.0 h1:g7C04CbJuIDKNPFHmsk4hwZDO5O+kntRxzaUoNXj+IQ=
github.com/zeebo/assert v1.3.0/go.mod h1:Pq9JiuJQpG8JLJdtkwrJESF0Foym2/D9XMU5ciN/wJ0=
github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2 h1:xZmwmqxHZA8AI603jOQ0tMqmBr9lPeFwGg6d+xy9DC0=
github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2/go.mod h1:5NWz9Sef7zIDm2JHfFlcQvNekmcEl9ekUZQQKCYaDcA=
go.etcd.io/etcd/api/v3 v3.6.2 h1:25aCkIMjUmiiOtnBIp6PhNj4KdcURuBak0hU2P1fgRc=
go.etcd.io/etcd/api/v3 v3.6.2/go.mod h1:eFhhvfR8Px1P6SEuLT600v+vrhdDTdcfMzmnxVXXSbk=
go.etcd.io/etcd/client/pkg/v3 v3.6.2 h1:zw+HRghi/G8fKpgKdOcEKpnBTE4OO39T6MegA0RopVU=
+84
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
// Package allowlist provides host-based URL allow-listing for the image proxy.
package allowlist
import (
"net/url"
"strings"
)
// HostAllowList checks whether source hosts are permitted.
type HostAllowList struct {
// exactHosts contains hosts that must match exactly (e.g., "cdn.example.com")
exactHosts map[string]struct{}
// suffixHosts contains domain suffixes to match
// (e.g., ".example.com" matches "cdn.example.com")
suffixHosts []string
}
// New creates a HostAllowList from a list of host patterns.
// Patterns starting with "." are treated as suffix matches.
// Examples:
// - "cdn.example.com" - exact match only
// - ".example.com" - matches cdn.example.com, images.example.com, etc.
func New(patterns []string) *HostAllowList {
w := &HostAllowList{
exactHosts: make(map[string]struct{}),
suffixHosts: make([]string, 0),
}
for _, pattern := range patterns {
pattern = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(pattern))
if pattern == "" {
continue
}
if strings.HasPrefix(pattern, ".") {
w.suffixHosts = append(w.suffixHosts, pattern)
} else {
w.exactHosts[pattern] = struct{}{}
}
}
return w
}
// IsAllowed checks if a URL's host is in the allow list.
func (w *HostAllowList) IsAllowed(u *url.URL) bool {
if u == nil {
return false
}
host := strings.ToLower(u.Hostname())
if host == "" {
return false
}
// Check exact match
if _, ok := w.exactHosts[host]; ok {
return true
}
// Check suffix match
for _, suffix := range w.suffixHosts {
if strings.HasSuffix(host, suffix) {
return true
}
// Also match if host equals the suffix without the leading dot
// e.g., pattern ".example.com" should match "example.com"
if host == strings.TrimPrefix(suffix, ".") {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// IsEmpty returns true if the allow list has no entries.
func (w *HostAllowList) IsEmpty() bool {
return len(w.exactHosts) == 0 && len(w.suffixHosts) == 0
}
// Count returns the total number of allow list entries.
func (w *HostAllowList) Count() int {
return len(w.exactHosts) + len(w.suffixHosts)
}
@@ -1,131 +1,148 @@
package imgcache
package allowlist_test
import (
"net/url"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/allowlist"
)
func TestHostWhitelist_IsWhitelisted(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
patterns []string
testURL string
want bool
}{
const (
testExactHost = "cdn.example.com"
testImageURL = "https://cdn.example.com/image.jpg"
testSuffix = ".example.com"
)
type isAllowedCase struct {
name string
patterns []string
testURL string
want bool
}
func runIsAllowedCases(t *testing.T, tests []isAllowedCase) {
t.Helper()
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
w := allowlist.New(tt.patterns)
var u *url.URL
if tt.testURL != "" {
parsed, err := url.Parse(tt.testURL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to parse test URL: %v", err)
}
u = parsed
}
got := w.IsAllowed(u)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("IsAllowed() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestHostAllowList_IsAllowed_ExactMatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runIsAllowedCases(t, []isAllowedCase{
{
name: "exact match",
patterns: []string{"cdn.example.com"},
testURL: "https://cdn.example.com/image.jpg",
patterns: []string{testExactHost},
testURL: testImageURL,
want: true,
},
{
name: "exact match case insensitive",
patterns: []string{"CDN.Example.COM"},
testURL: "https://cdn.example.com/image.jpg",
testURL: testImageURL,
want: true,
},
{
name: "exact match not found",
patterns: []string{"cdn.example.com"},
patterns: []string{testExactHost},
testURL: "https://other.example.com/image.jpg",
want: false,
},
{
name: "dot prefix does not enable suffix matching",
patterns: []string{".example.com"},
testURL: "https://cdn.example.com/image.jpg",
want: false,
},
{
name: "dot prefix does not match deep subdomain",
patterns: []string{".example.com"},
testURL: "https://cdn.images.example.com/image.jpg",
want: false,
},
{
name: "dot prefix stripped matches apex domain exactly",
patterns: []string{".example.com"},
testURL: "https://example.com/image.jpg",
want: true,
},
{
name: "dot prefix does not match unrelated domain",
patterns: []string{".example.com"},
testURL: "https://notexample.com/image.jpg",
want: false,
},
{
name: "dot prefix does not match partial domain",
patterns: []string{".example.com"},
testURL: "https://fakeexample.com/image.jpg",
want: false,
},
{
name: "multiple patterns exact only",
patterns: []string{"cdn.example.com", "photos.images.org", "static.test.net"},
name: "multiple patterns",
patterns: []string{testExactHost, ".images.org", "static.test.net"},
testURL: "https://photos.images.org/image.jpg",
want: true,
},
{
name: "multiple patterns no suffix match",
patterns: []string{"cdn.example.com", ".images.org", "static.test.net"},
testURL: "https://photos.images.org/image.jpg",
want: false,
},
{
name: "empty whitelist",
name: "empty allow list",
patterns: []string{},
testURL: "https://cdn.example.com/image.jpg",
testURL: testImageURL,
want: false,
},
{
name: "nil url",
patterns: []string{"cdn.example.com"},
patterns: []string{testExactHost},
testURL: "",
want: false,
},
{
name: "url with port",
patterns: []string{"cdn.example.com"},
patterns: []string{testExactHost},
testURL: "https://cdn.example.com:443/image.jpg",
want: true,
},
{
name: "whitespace in patterns",
patterns: []string{" cdn.example.com ", " .other.com "},
testURL: "https://cdn.example.com/image.jpg",
testURL: testImageURL,
want: true,
},
})
}
func TestHostAllowList_IsAllowed_SuffixMatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runIsAllowedCases(t, []isAllowedCase{
{
name: "suffix match",
patterns: []string{testSuffix},
testURL: testImageURL,
want: true,
},
{
name: "whitespace dot prefix stripped matches exactly",
patterns: []string{" .other.com "},
testURL: "https://other.com/image.jpg",
name: "suffix match deep subdomain",
patterns: []string{testSuffix},
testURL: "https://cdn.images.example.com/image.jpg",
want: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
w := NewHostWhitelist(tt.patterns)
var u *url.URL
if tt.testURL != "" {
var err error
u, err = url.Parse(tt.testURL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to parse test URL: %v", err)
}
}
got := w.IsWhitelisted(u)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("IsWhitelisted() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
}
})
}
{
name: "suffix match apex domain",
patterns: []string{testSuffix},
testURL: "https://example.com/image.jpg",
want: true,
},
{
name: "suffix match not found",
patterns: []string{testSuffix},
testURL: "https://notexample.com/image.jpg",
want: false,
},
{
name: "suffix match partial not allowed",
patterns: []string{testSuffix},
testURL: "https://fakeexample.com/image.jpg",
want: false,
},
})
}
func TestHostWhitelist_IsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
func TestHostAllowList_IsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
patterns []string
@@ -151,16 +168,13 @@ func TestHostWhitelist_IsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
patterns: []string{"example.com"},
want: false,
},
{
name: "dot prefix entry still counts",
patterns: []string{".example.com"},
want: false,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
w := NewHostWhitelist(tt.patterns)
t.Parallel()
w := allowlist.New(tt.patterns)
if got := w.IsEmpty(); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("IsEmpty() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
}
@@ -168,7 +182,9 @@ func TestHostWhitelist_IsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestHostWhitelist_Count(t *testing.T) {
func TestHostAllowList_Count(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
patterns []string
@@ -185,7 +201,7 @@ func TestHostWhitelist_Count(t *testing.T) {
want: 3,
},
{
name: "dot prefix hosts treated as exact",
name: "suffix hosts only",
patterns: []string{".a.com", ".b.com"},
want: 2,
},
@@ -194,16 +210,13 @@ func TestHostWhitelist_Count(t *testing.T) {
patterns: []string{"exact.com", ".suffix.com"},
want: 2,
},
{
name: "dot prefix deduplicates with exact",
patterns: []string{"example.com", ".example.com"},
want: 1,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
w := NewHostWhitelist(tt.patterns)
t.Parallel()
w := allowlist.New(tt.patterns)
if got := w.Count(); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("Count() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
}
+119
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
// Package clientip resolves the real client IP address of an HTTP request
// when pixa runs behind a reverse proxy. Forwarding headers are believed
// only when the immediate peer is a configured trusted proxy, so an
// untrusted client cannot spoof its address by sending the header.
package clientip
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strings"
)
// ForwardedForHeader is the request header carrying the proxy chain. It is
// honored only when the immediate peer is a trusted proxy.
const ForwardedForHeader = "X-Forwarded-For"
// Resolver determines the client IP of a request against a fixed set of
// trusted proxy networks.
type Resolver struct {
trusted []netip.Prefix
}
// NewResolver returns a Resolver that trusts forwarding headers only from
// peers inside the given CIDR ranges. A nil or empty list trusts no one,
// so the peer address is always used.
func NewResolver(trusted []netip.Prefix) *Resolver {
return &Resolver{trusted: trusted}
}
// Resolve returns the client IP for a request whose direct peer is
// remoteAddr (a "host:port" string as in http.Request.RemoteAddr) and
// whose X-Forwarded-For header lines are forwardedFor (as returned by
// http.Header.Values). When the peer is not a trusted proxy, the peer
// address is returned and the header is ignored entirely. When the peer is
// trusted, the header is walked right to left and the first address that is
// not itself a trusted proxy is returned; this is the client the outermost
// trusted proxy observed, and entries an untrusted client may have prepended
// sit to its left and are never reached.
func (r *Resolver) Resolve(remoteAddr string, forwardedFor []string) string {
peer := hostOnly(remoteAddr)
peerAddr, err := netip.ParseAddr(peer)
if err != nil || !r.isTrusted(peerAddr) {
return peer
}
for _, hop := range slices.Backward(forwardedForChain(forwardedFor)) {
hopAddr, err := netip.ParseAddr(hop)
if err != nil || r.isTrusted(hopAddr) {
continue
}
return hopAddr.String()
}
return peerAddr.String()
}
// isTrusted reports whether addr falls inside one of the trusted proxy
// ranges. Addresses are unmapped first so an IPv4-mapped IPv6 form matches
// an IPv4 range, matching the fetcher's blocklist comparison.
func (r *Resolver) isTrusted(addr netip.Addr) bool {
if !addr.IsValid() {
return false
}
unmapped := addr.Unmap()
return slices.ContainsFunc(r.trusted, func(prefix netip.Prefix) bool {
return prefix.Contains(unmapped)
})
}
// hostOnly strips the port from a "host:port" address. A value without a
// port (already a bare host) is returned unchanged.
func hostOnly(remoteAddr string) string {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(remoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return remoteAddr
}
return host
}
// forwardedForChain flattens the comma-separated entries of every
// X-Forwarded-For header line into a single ordered, trimmed list.
func forwardedForChain(values []string) []string {
var chain []string
for _, value := range values {
for part := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ",") {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(part)
if trimmed != "" {
chain = append(chain, trimmed)
}
}
}
return chain
}
// contextKey is the private key type under which the resolved client IP is
// stored in a request context.
type contextKey struct{}
// WithClientIP returns a copy of ctx carrying the resolved client IP.
func WithClientIP(ctx context.Context, ip string) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, contextKey{}, ip)
}
// FromContext returns the resolved client IP stored in ctx, or an empty
// string if none was set.
func FromContext(ctx context.Context) string {
ip, _ := ctx.Value(contextKey{}).(string)
return ip
}
+189
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
package clientip_test
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/clientip"
)
// Addresses reused across the resolver cases.
const (
trustedRangeV4 = "10.0.0.0/8"
forwardedV4 = "203.0.113.7"
untrustedV4 = "198.51.100.9"
trustedPeer = "10.0.0.1:5000"
)
// mustPrefixes parses CIDR strings into prefixes for building a resolver.
func mustPrefixes(t *testing.T, cidrs ...string) []netip.Prefix {
t.Helper()
prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(cidrs))
for _, c := range cidrs {
p, err := netip.ParsePrefix(c)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("netip.ParsePrefix(%q) error = %v", c, err)
}
prefixes = append(prefixes, p)
}
return prefixes
}
type resolveCase struct {
name string
trusted []string
remoteAddr string
forwardedFor []string
want string
}
// runResolveCases runs each case against a resolver built from its trusted
// list and checks the resolved address.
func runResolveCases(t *testing.T, cases []resolveCase) {
t.Helper()
for _, tt := range cases {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := clientip.NewResolver(mustPrefixes(t, tt.trusted...))
got := r.Resolve(tt.remoteAddr, tt.forwardedFor)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("Resolve(%q, %v) = %q, want %q",
tt.remoteAddr, tt.forwardedFor, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestResolvePeerTrust covers the trust decision on the direct peer: a
// forwarded header is believed only from a trusted peer, and a client
// connecting directly cannot spoof its address.
func TestResolvePeerTrust(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runResolveCases(t, []resolveCase{
{
name: "trusted peer honors forwarded client",
trusted: []string{trustedRangeV4},
remoteAddr: trustedPeer,
forwardedFor: []string{forwardedV4},
want: forwardedV4,
},
{
name: "untrusted peer ignores forwarded header",
trusted: []string{trustedRangeV4},
remoteAddr: untrustedV4 + ":33333",
forwardedFor: []string{forwardedV4},
want: untrustedV4,
},
{
name: "spoofed chain from untrusted peer cannot influence result",
trusted: []string{trustedRangeV4},
remoteAddr: untrustedV4 + ":33333",
forwardedFor: []string{"1.2.3.4, 10.9.9.9, 127.0.0.1"},
want: untrustedV4,
},
{
name: "empty trusted list always uses peer",
trusted: nil,
remoteAddr: forwardedV4 + ":80",
forwardedFor: []string{"10.0.0.5"},
want: forwardedV4,
},
{
name: "trusted peer with no forwarded header uses peer",
trusted: []string{trustedRangeV4},
remoteAddr: trustedPeer,
forwardedFor: nil,
want: "10.0.0.1",
},
{
name: "unparseable peer is returned unchanged",
trusted: []string{trustedRangeV4},
remoteAddr: "garbage",
forwardedFor: []string{forwardedV4},
want: "garbage",
},
})
}
// TestResolveChainWalk covers walking the X-Forwarded-For chain from a
// trusted peer to the rightmost entry that is not itself a trusted proxy.
func TestResolveChainWalk(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runResolveCases(t, []resolveCase{
{
name: "rightmost untrusted entry across a mixed chain",
trusted: []string{trustedRangeV4, "192.168.0.0/16"},
remoteAddr: trustedPeer,
forwardedFor: []string{forwardedV4 + ", 192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.2"},
want: forwardedV4,
},
{
name: "spoofed client behind a trusted proxy is not believed",
trusted: []string{trustedRangeV4},
remoteAddr: trustedPeer,
forwardedFor: []string{"1.2.3.4, " + untrustedV4},
want: untrustedV4,
},
{
name: "chain split across multiple header lines",
trusted: []string{trustedRangeV4},
remoteAddr: trustedPeer,
forwardedFor: []string{forwardedV4, "10.0.0.2"},
want: forwardedV4,
},
{
name: "garbage entries are skipped",
trusted: []string{trustedRangeV4},
remoteAddr: trustedPeer,
forwardedFor: []string{forwardedV4 + ", not-an-ip"},
want: forwardedV4,
},
{
name: "all-trusted chain falls back to peer",
trusted: []string{trustedRangeV4},
remoteAddr: trustedPeer,
forwardedFor: []string{"10.0.0.9, 10.0.0.2"},
want: "10.0.0.1",
},
{
name: "trusted IPv6 peer honors forwarded client",
trusted: []string{"2001:db8::/32"},
remoteAddr: "[2001:db8::1]:9000",
forwardedFor: []string{forwardedV4},
want: forwardedV4,
},
{
name: "IPv4-mapped peer matches IPv4 trusted range",
trusted: []string{trustedRangeV4},
remoteAddr: "[::ffff:10.0.0.1]:5000",
forwardedFor: []string{forwardedV4},
want: forwardedV4,
},
})
}
func TestContextRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ctx := clientip.WithClientIP(t.Context(), forwardedV4)
if got := clientip.FromContext(ctx); got != forwardedV4 {
t.Errorf("FromContext = %q, want %q", got, forwardedV4)
}
}
func TestFromContextAbsent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
if got := clientip.FromContext(t.Context()); got != "" {
t.Errorf("FromContext with no value = %q, want empty", got)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
package config
import (
"testing"
)
// TestBlockedNetworksParsed loads a valid blocked_networks list and checks
// each CIDR is parsed into the resolved prefixes in order.
func TestBlockedNetworksParsed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := signingKeyLine + `blocked_networks:
- 203.0.113.0/24
- 2001:db8::/32
`
c, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("valid blocked_networks should load, got error: %v", err)
}
want := []string{"203.0.113.0/24", "2001:db8::/32"}
if len(c.BlockedNetworks) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("BlockedNetworks = %v, want %d entries", c.BlockedNetworks, len(want))
}
for i, w := range want {
if got := c.BlockedNetworks[i].String(); got != w {
t.Errorf("BlockedNetworks[%d] = %q, want %q", i, got, w)
}
}
}
// TestBlockedNetworksOmittedIsEmpty confirms an omitted key leaves the
// operator list empty; the built-in defaults still apply in the fetcher.
func TestBlockedNetworksOmittedIsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("minimal config should be valid, got error: %v", err)
}
if len(c.BlockedNetworks) != 0 {
t.Errorf("BlockedNetworks = %v, want empty", c.BlockedNetworks)
}
}
// TestBlockedNetworksInvalidAbortsStartup checks that malformed values abort
// startup with an error naming the key and the offending value.
func TestBlockedNetworksInvalidAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runAbortCases(t, []abortCase{
{
name: "not-a-cidr",
yaml: signingKeyLine + `blocked_networks:
- not-a-cidr
`,
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyBlockedNetworks, "not-a-cidr"},
},
{
name: "bare-address-without-prefix",
yaml: signingKeyLine + `blocked_networks:
- 10.0.0.1
`,
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyBlockedNetworks, "10.0.0.1"},
},
{
name: "empty-entry",
yaml: signingKeyLine + `blocked_networks:
- ""
`,
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyBlockedNetworks},
},
{
name: "non-string-entry",
yaml: signingKeyLine + `blocked_networks:
- 42
`,
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyBlockedNetworks},
},
{
name: "null-value",
yaml: signingKeyLine + `blocked_networks:
`,
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyBlockedNetworks, nullValueText},
},
})
}
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
package config
import (
"errors"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// Static errors returned by the stub free-space probes below.
var (
errTestStatfsFailed = errors.New("statfs failed")
errTestProbeNotExpected = errors.New("probe must not be called")
)
// discardLogger returns a logger that swallows all output, for tests
// that exercise code paths which log.
func discardLogger() *slog.Logger {
return slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
}
// TestCacheMaxBytesExplicitValueUsedWithoutFloor verifies that an
// explicitly configured cache_max_bytes value is used exactly as
// given: the 500 MiB floor applies only to the computed default, never
// to explicit values.
func TestCacheMaxBytesExplicitValueUsedWithoutFloor(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := "signing_key: " + validTestSigningKey + "\ncache_max_bytes: 1024\n"
c, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("explicit cache_max_bytes must be accepted, got error: %v", err)
}
if c.CacheMaxBytes != 1024 {
t.Errorf("CacheMaxBytes = %d, want 1024 (no floor for explicit values)",
c.CacheMaxBytes)
}
}
// TestCacheMaxBytesZeroIsValidAndDisablesCache verifies that an
// explicit zero is a valid value (it disables the disk cache), not an
// error.
func TestCacheMaxBytesZeroIsValidAndDisablesCache(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := "signing_key: " + validTestSigningKey + "\ncache_max_bytes: 0\n"
c, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cache_max_bytes: 0 must be accepted, got error: %v", err)
}
if c.CacheMaxBytes != 0 {
t.Errorf("CacheMaxBytes = %d, want 0", c.CacheMaxBytes)
}
}
// TestCacheMaxBytesLargeExplicitValueParses verifies that values above
// 32-bit range parse correctly (the field is an int64 byte count).
func TestCacheMaxBytesLargeExplicitValueParses(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := "signing_key: " + validTestSigningKey +
"\ncache_max_bytes: 10737418240\n"
c, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("large cache_max_bytes must be accepted, got error: %v", err)
}
if c.CacheMaxBytes != 10737418240 {
t.Errorf("CacheMaxBytes = %d, want 10737418240", c.CacheMaxBytes)
}
}
// TestCacheMaxBytesInvalidValuesAbortStartup verifies that a SET but
// invalid cache_max_bytes value aborts startup naming the key and the
// offending value, per the no-silent-fallback rule: defaults apply
// only to omitted keys.
func TestCacheMaxBytesInvalidValuesAbortStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
signingKeyLine := "signing_key: " + validTestSigningKey + "\n"
cases := []struct {
name string
yaml string
// wantErrSubstrings must all appear in the error message.
wantErrSubstrings []string
}{
{
name: "negative",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "cache_max_bytes: -1024\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyCacheMaxBytes, "-1024"},
},
{
name: "float",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "cache_max_bytes: 3.5\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyCacheMaxBytes, "3.5"},
},
{
name: "non-numeric string",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "cache_max_bytes: banana\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyCacheMaxBytes, "banana"},
},
{
name: "explicit null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "cache_max_bytes: null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyCacheMaxBytes, "null"},
},
{
name: "bare key no value",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "cache_max_bytes:\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyCacheMaxBytes, "null"},
},
{
name: "boolean",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "cache_max_bytes: true\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyCacheMaxBytes, "true"},
},
{
name: "list",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "cache_max_bytes:\n - 1\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyCacheMaxBytes},
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, tc.yaml)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf(
"config with %s cache_max_bytes must abort startup, got config: %+v",
tc.name, c)
}
t.Logf("got expected error: %v", err)
for _, want := range tc.wantErrSubstrings {
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), want) {
t.Errorf("error %q does not mention %q", err.Error(), want)
}
}
})
}
}
// TestComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytesUses75PercentOfFreeSpace verifies the
// computed default is 75% of the probed free space when that exceeds
// the floor.
func TestComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytesUses75PercentOfFreeSpace(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// 4 GiB free -> 3 GiB default.
probe := func(string) (uint64, error) { return 4294967296, nil }
got, err := ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes(t.TempDir(), probe)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes returned error: %v", err)
}
if got != 3221225472 {
t.Errorf("ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes = %d, want 3221225472 (75%% of 4 GiB)",
got)
}
}
// TestComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytesAppliesFloorToComputedDefault
// verifies that when 75% of free space is below 500 MiB, the computed
// default is floored at DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor.
func TestComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytesAppliesFloorToComputedDefault(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []struct {
name string
freeBytes uint64
}{
{name: "100 MiB free", freeBytes: 104857600},
{name: "zero free", freeBytes: 0},
{name: "just below floor threshold", freeBytes: 699050665},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
probe := func(string) (uint64, error) { return tc.freeBytes, nil }
got, err := ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes(t.TempDir(), probe)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes returned error: %v", err)
}
if got != DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor {
t.Errorf("ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes = %d, want floor %d",
got, DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor)
}
})
}
}
// TestComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytesPropagatesProbeError verifies that a
// failing free-space probe produces an error naming the config key,
// instead of a silently wrong default.
func TestComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytesPropagatesProbeError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
probe := func(string) (uint64, error) { return 0, errTestStatfsFailed }
_, err := ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes(t.TempDir(), probe)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("probe failure must produce an error, got nil")
}
t.Logf("got expected error: %v", err)
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), keyCacheMaxBytes) {
t.Errorf("error %q does not name the config key cache_max_bytes", err.Error())
}
}
// TestResolveCacheMaxBytesComputesDefaultWhenOmitted verifies that an
// omitted cache_max_bytes key resolves to the computed default, that
// the probe is pointed at <state_dir>/cache/ (which must be created
// first so statfs measures the right filesystem), and that the result
// lands on the Config.
func TestResolveCacheMaxBytesComputesDefaultWhenOmitted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, "signing_key: "+validTestSigningKey+"\n")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("minimal config should be valid, got error: %v", err)
}
c.StateDir = t.TempDir()
wantCacheDir := filepath.Join(c.StateDir, "cache")
var probedPath string
// 4 GiB free -> 3 GiB default.
probe := func(path string) (uint64, error) {
probedPath = path
return 4294967296, nil
}
err = c.resolveCacheMaxBytes(discardLogger(), probe)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("resolveCacheMaxBytes returned error: %v", err)
}
if c.CacheMaxBytes != 3221225472 {
t.Errorf("CacheMaxBytes = %d, want computed default 3221225472",
c.CacheMaxBytes)
}
if probedPath != wantCacheDir {
t.Errorf("free space probed at %q, want cache directory %q",
probedPath, wantCacheDir)
}
info, err := os.Stat(wantCacheDir)
if err != nil || !info.IsDir() {
t.Errorf("cache directory %q was not created before probing: info=%v err=%v",
wantCacheDir, info, err)
}
}
// TestResolveCacheMaxBytesDoesNotOverrideExplicitValue verifies that
// an explicitly configured value survives resolution untouched and
// that the free-space probe is never consulted for it.
func TestResolveCacheMaxBytesDoesNotOverrideExplicitValue(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := "signing_key: " + validTestSigningKey + "\ncache_max_bytes: 1024\n"
c, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("explicit cache_max_bytes must be accepted, got error: %v", err)
}
c.StateDir = t.TempDir()
probe := func(string) (uint64, error) {
t.Error("free-space probe must not be consulted for explicit values")
return 0, errTestProbeNotExpected
}
err = c.resolveCacheMaxBytes(discardLogger(), probe)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("resolveCacheMaxBytes returned error: %v", err)
}
if c.CacheMaxBytes != 1024 {
t.Errorf("CacheMaxBytes = %d, want explicit 1024 (no floor, no recompute)",
c.CacheMaxBytes)
}
}
+116
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@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
package config
import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"math"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"syscall"
)
// DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor is the minimum computed default for the
// cache_max_bytes setting: 500 MiB. The floor applies only to the
// computed default (when the key is omitted from the configuration),
// never to explicitly configured values.
const DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor int64 = 524288000
// cacheDirPerms is the permission mode for the cache directory created
// before probing free space, matching the state directory permissions.
const cacheDirPerms = 0o750
// freeSpaceFractionNumerator and freeSpaceFractionDenominator express
// the 75% share of free space used for the computed default limit as
// integer arithmetic (dividing before multiplying avoids overflow).
const (
freeSpaceFractionNumerator uint64 = 3
freeSpaceFractionDenominator uint64 = 4
)
// FreeSpaceProbeFunc reports the number of free bytes available on the
// filesystem containing path. It is a function type so tests can
// inject a fake probe instead of depending on the host disk.
type FreeSpaceProbeFunc func(path string) (uint64, error)
// defaultFreeSpaceProbe reports free filesystem bytes via statfs on
// the given path, as available to unprivileged processes.
func defaultFreeSpaceProbe(path string) (uint64, error) {
var stat syscall.Statfs_t
err := syscall.Statfs(path, &stat)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if stat.Bsize < 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w %d for %q", errNegativeBlockSize, stat.Bsize, path)
}
blockSize := uint64(stat.Bsize)
return stat.Bavail * blockSize, nil
}
// ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes returns the default cache size limit for
// the filesystem containing cacheDir: 75% of the free bytes reported
// by probe, with a floor of DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor.
func ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes(
cacheDir string, probe FreeSpaceProbeFunc,
) (int64, error) {
freeBytes, err := probe(cacheDir)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("config key %q: cannot determine free space for %q: %w",
"cache_max_bytes", cacheDir, err)
}
computed := freeBytes / freeSpaceFractionDenominator * freeSpaceFractionNumerator
computed = min(computed, math.MaxInt64)
// gosec cannot see that min() above bounds computed, so it reads
// this conversion as potentially overflowing. It cannot: computed is
// at most math.MaxInt64 on every path here.
//nolint:gosec // G115: clamped to MaxInt64 by min above
limit := int64(computed)
limit = max(limit, DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor)
return limit, nil
}
// resolveCacheMaxBytes finalizes CacheMaxBytes after state_dir
// validation: an explicitly configured value is kept as-is (no floor
// applies), while an omitted key receives the computed default based
// on free space in <state_dir>/cache/. The cache directory is created
// first so statfs measures the filesystem that will actually hold the
// cache. The effective limit is logged either way.
func (c *Config) resolveCacheMaxBytes(
log *slog.Logger, probe FreeSpaceProbeFunc,
) error {
if !c.cacheMaxBytesExplicit {
cacheDir := filepath.Join(c.StateDir, "cache")
err := os.MkdirAll(cacheDir, cacheDirPerms)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("config key %q: cannot create cache directory %q: %w",
keyCacheMaxBytes, cacheDir, err)
}
limit, err := ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes(cacheDir, probe)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.CacheMaxBytes = limit
log.Info("computed default cache size limit from free space",
"cache_max_bytes", limit,
"cache_dir", cacheDir,
)
}
log.Info("effective cache size limit",
"cache_max_bytes", c.CacheMaxBytes,
"cache_disabled", c.CacheMaxBytes == 0,
)
return nil
}
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
package config
import (
"runtime"
"testing"
)
// The variables that set the two concurrency limits.
const (
testMaxConcurrentProcessingVar = "PIXA_MAX_CONCURRENT_PROCESSING"
testUpstreamConnectionsVar = "PIXA_UPSTREAM_CONNECTIONS"
)
// TestOmittedConcurrencyLimitsUseDefaults checks that an omitted
// max_concurrent_processing is the number of CPUs Go uses and an omitted
// upstream_connections is 64.
func TestOmittedConcurrencyLimitsUseDefaults(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("minimal config should be valid, got error: %v", err)
}
if c.MaxConcurrentProcessing != runtime.GOMAXPROCS(0) {
t.Errorf("MaxConcurrentProcessing = %d, want %d, one per CPU",
c.MaxConcurrentProcessing, runtime.GOMAXPROCS(0))
}
if c.UpstreamConnections != 64 {
t.Errorf("UpstreamConnections = %d, want 64", c.UpstreamConnections)
}
}
// TestExplicitConcurrencyLimitsAreUsed checks that valid values for the
// two limits are used as given.
func TestExplicitConcurrencyLimitsAreUsed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+
"max_concurrent_processing: 3\nupstream_connections: 10\n")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("valid config should load, got error: %v", err)
}
if c.MaxConcurrentProcessing != 3 {
t.Errorf("MaxConcurrentProcessing = %d, want 3", c.MaxConcurrentProcessing)
}
if c.UpstreamConnections != 10 {
t.Errorf("UpstreamConnections = %d, want 10", c.UpstreamConnections)
}
}
// TestInvalidConcurrencyLimitAbortsStartup checks that a limit that is
// not a whole number of at least 1, or is null, aborts startup naming the
// key and the value, and the variable too where the value could have come
// from it.
func TestInvalidConcurrencyLimitAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
processing := keyMaxConcurrentProcessing
connections := keyUpstreamConnections
runAbortCases(t, []abortCase{
{
name: "max_concurrent_processing zero",
yaml: signingKeyLine + processing + ": 0\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{
processing, testMaxConcurrentProcessingVar, "value 0",
},
},
{
name: "max_concurrent_processing negative",
yaml: signingKeyLine + processing + ": -2\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{
processing, testMaxConcurrentProcessingVar, "value -2",
},
},
{
name: "max_concurrent_processing not a number",
yaml: signingKeyLine + processing + ": lots\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{
processing, testMaxConcurrentProcessingVar, "lots",
},
},
{
name: "max_concurrent_processing fractional",
yaml: signingKeyLine + processing + ": 1.5\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{processing, "1.5"},
},
{
name: "max_concurrent_processing null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + processing + ": null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{processing, nullValueText},
},
{
name: "upstream_connections zero",
yaml: signingKeyLine + connections + ": 0\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{
connections, testUpstreamConnectionsVar, "value 0",
},
},
{
name: "upstream_connections negative",
yaml: signingKeyLine + connections + ": -5\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{
connections, testUpstreamConnectionsVar, "value -5",
},
},
{
name: "upstream_connections not a number",
yaml: signingKeyLine + connections + ": many\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{
connections, testUpstreamConnectionsVar, "many",
},
},
{
name: "upstream_connections null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + connections + ": null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{connections, nullValueText},
},
})
}
// TestConcurrencyLimitsFromEnvironment checks that the two variables set
// the limits over the config file, and that an invalid value in either
// aborts startup naming the variable and the value.
func TestConcurrencyLimitsFromEnvironment(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(testMaxConcurrentProcessingVar, "3")
t.Setenv(testUpstreamConnectionsVar, "10")
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+
"max_concurrent_processing: 5\nupstream_connections: 50\n")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("limits from the environment should load: %v", err)
}
if c.MaxConcurrentProcessing != 3 || c.UpstreamConnections != 10 {
t.Errorf("limits = %d and %d, want 3 and 10 from the environment",
c.MaxConcurrentProcessing, c.UpstreamConnections)
}
cases := []struct {
variable string
value string
}{
{testMaxConcurrentProcessingVar, "lots"},
{testMaxConcurrentProcessingVar, "0"},
{testUpstreamConnectionsVar, "-1"},
{testUpstreamConnectionsVar, "ten"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.variable+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(tc.variable, tc.value)
_, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine)
wantStartupError(t, err, tc.variable, tc.value)
})
}
}
+884 -59
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+98
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@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
package config
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/smartconfig"
)
// writeTestConfig writes yamlContent to a temp config file and returns
// the file path.
func writeTestConfig(t *testing.T, yamlContent string) string {
t.Helper()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
configPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "config.yml")
err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(yamlContent), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test config: %v", err)
}
return configPath
}
// checkAllowlistHosts loads the config at configPath and asserts that
// getStringSlice returns the three expected hosts.
func checkAllowlistHosts(t *testing.T, configPath string) {
t.Helper()
sc, err := loadTestConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to load config: %v", err)
}
hosts := getStringSlice(sc)
if len(hosts) != 3 {
t.Errorf("expected 3 hosts, got %d: %v", len(hosts), hosts)
}
expected := []string{"static.sneak.cloud", "sneak.berlin", testHostS3}
for i, want := range expected {
if i >= len(hosts) {
t.Errorf("missing host at index %d: want %q", i, want)
continue
}
if hosts[i] != want {
t.Errorf("host[%d] = %q, want %q", i, hosts[i], want)
}
}
}
func TestGetStringSlice_YAMLList(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := `
allowlist_hosts:
- static.sneak.cloud
- sneak.berlin
- s3.sneak.cloud
`
checkAllowlistHosts(t, writeTestConfig(t, yamlContent))
}
func TestGetStringSlice_CommaSeparated(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Backwards compatibility with comma-separated string values.
yamlContent := `allowlist_hosts: "static.sneak.cloud, sneak.berlin, s3.sneak.cloud"`
checkAllowlistHosts(t, writeTestConfig(t, yamlContent))
}
func TestGetStringSlice_Empty(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
configPath := writeTestConfig(t, `port: 8080`)
sc, err := loadTestConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to load config: %v", err)
}
hosts := getStringSlice(sc)
if len(hosts) != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected nil or empty slice, got %v", hosts)
}
}
// loadTestConfig is a helper to load a config file for testing.
func loadTestConfig(path string) (*smartconfig.Config, error) {
return smartconfig.NewFromConfigPath(path)
}
-113
View File
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
package config
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/smartconfig"
)
func TestGetStringSlice_YAMLList(t *testing.T) {
// Create a temp config file with YAML list format
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
configPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "config.yml")
yamlContent := `
whitelist_hosts:
- static.sneak.cloud
- sneak.berlin
- s3.sneak.cloud
`
err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(yamlContent), 0644)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test config: %v", err)
}
// Load config using smartconfig
sc, err := loadTestConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to load config: %v", err)
}
// Test that getStringSlice correctly parses YAML list
hosts := getStringSlice(sc, "whitelist_hosts")
if len(hosts) != 3 {
t.Errorf("expected 3 hosts, got %d: %v", len(hosts), hosts)
}
expected := []string{"static.sneak.cloud", "sneak.berlin", "s3.sneak.cloud"}
for i, want := range expected {
if i >= len(hosts) {
t.Errorf("missing host at index %d: want %q", i, want)
continue
}
if hosts[i] != want {
t.Errorf("host[%d] = %q, want %q", i, hosts[i], want)
}
}
}
func TestGetStringSlice_CommaSeparated(t *testing.T) {
// Test backwards compatibility with comma-separated string
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
configPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "config.yml")
yamlContent := `whitelist_hosts: "static.sneak.cloud, sneak.berlin, s3.sneak.cloud"`
err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(yamlContent), 0644)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test config: %v", err)
}
sc, err := loadTestConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to load config: %v", err)
}
hosts := getStringSlice(sc, "whitelist_hosts")
if len(hosts) != 3 {
t.Errorf("expected 3 hosts, got %d: %v", len(hosts), hosts)
}
expected := []string{"static.sneak.cloud", "sneak.berlin", "s3.sneak.cloud"}
for i, want := range expected {
if i >= len(hosts) {
t.Errorf("missing host at index %d: want %q", i, want)
continue
}
if hosts[i] != want {
t.Errorf("host[%d] = %q, want %q", i, hosts[i], want)
}
}
}
func TestGetStringSlice_Empty(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
configPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "config.yml")
yamlContent := `port: 8080`
err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(yamlContent), 0644)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test config: %v", err)
}
sc, err := loadTestConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to load config: %v", err)
}
hosts := getStringSlice(sc, "whitelist_hosts")
if hosts != nil && len(hosts) != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected nil or empty slice, got %v", hosts)
}
}
// loadTestConfig is a helper to load a config file for testing
func loadTestConfig(path string) (*smartconfig.Config, error) {
return smartconfig.NewFromConfigPath(path)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,601 @@
package config
import (
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/smartconfig"
)
// validTestSigningKey is a 32-character signing key that satisfies the
// minimum length requirement in validate().
const validTestSigningKey = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
// signingKeyLine is a valid signing_key config line used as the base of
// test config files.
const signingKeyLine = "signing_key: " + validTestSigningKey + "\n"
// testHostS3 is an allowlist host entry used across the config tests.
const testHostS3 = "s3.sneak.cloud"
// nullValueText is the substring that error messages about explicitly
// null config values must contain.
const nullValueText = "null"
// abortCase describes a config file that must abort startup with an
// error mentioning every string in wantErrSubstrings.
type abortCase struct {
name string
yaml string
// wantErrSubstrings must all appear in the error message.
wantErrSubstrings []string
}
// configFromYAML writes yamlContent to a temporary config file, loads it
// via smartconfig, and constructs a Config from it using the same code
// path the server uses at startup.
func configFromYAML(t *testing.T, yamlContent string) (*Config, error) {
t.Helper()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
configPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "config.yml")
err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(yamlContent), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test config: %v", err)
}
sc, err := smartconfig.NewFromConfigPath(configPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to load test config: %v", err)
}
return newFromSmartConfig(sc)
}
func TestOmittedValuesUseDefaults(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("minimal config should be valid, got error: %v", err)
}
if c.Port != DefaultPort {
t.Errorf("Port = %d, want default %d", c.Port, DefaultPort)
}
if c.StateDir != DefaultStateDir {
t.Errorf("StateDir = %q, want default %q", c.StateDir, DefaultStateDir)
}
if c.UpstreamConnectionsPerHost != DefaultUpstreamConnectionsPerHost {
t.Errorf("UpstreamConnectionsPerHost = %d, want default %d",
c.UpstreamConnectionsPerHost, DefaultUpstreamConnectionsPerHost)
}
if c.Debug {
t.Error("Debug = true, want default false")
}
if c.MaintenanceMode {
t.Error("MaintenanceMode = true, want default false")
}
if c.AllowHTTP {
t.Error("AllowHTTP = true, want default false")
}
if len(c.AllowlistHosts) != 0 {
t.Errorf("AllowlistHosts = %v, want empty", c.AllowlistHosts)
}
wantDBURL := "file:" + DefaultStateDir + "/state.sqlite3?_journal_mode=WAL"
if c.DBURL != wantDBURL {
t.Errorf("DBURL = %q, want derived default %q", c.DBURL, wantDBURL)
}
}
func TestExplicitValidValuesAreUsed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := `
port: 9090
debug: true
maintenance_mode: true
state_dir: /tmp/pixa-test-state
db_url: "file:/tmp/pixa-test-state/other.sqlite3"
signing_key: ` + validTestSigningKey + `
allowlist_hosts:
- s3.sneak.cloud
- .example.com
allow_http: true
upstream_connections_per_host: 5
sentry_dsn: "https://abc123@sentry.example.com/42"
metrics:
username: metricsuser
password: metricspass
`
c, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("valid config should load, got error: %v", err)
}
if c.Port != 9090 {
t.Errorf("Port = %d, want 9090", c.Port)
}
if !c.Debug || !c.MaintenanceMode || !c.AllowHTTP {
t.Errorf("bool fields = debug %v maintenance %v allow_http %v, want all true",
c.Debug, c.MaintenanceMode, c.AllowHTTP)
}
if c.StateDir != "/tmp/pixa-test-state" {
t.Errorf("StateDir = %q, want /tmp/pixa-test-state", c.StateDir)
}
if c.DBURL != "file:/tmp/pixa-test-state/other.sqlite3" {
t.Errorf("DBURL = %q, want explicit value", c.DBURL)
}
if len(c.AllowlistHosts) != 2 || c.AllowlistHosts[0] != testHostS3 ||
c.AllowlistHosts[1] != ".example.com" {
t.Errorf("AllowlistHosts = %v, want [s3.sneak.cloud .example.com]",
c.AllowlistHosts)
}
if c.UpstreamConnectionsPerHost != 5 {
t.Errorf("UpstreamConnectionsPerHost = %d, want 5", c.UpstreamConnectionsPerHost)
}
if c.SentryDSN != "https://abc123@sentry.example.com/42" {
t.Errorf("SentryDSN = %q, want explicit value", c.SentryDSN)
}
if c.MetricsUsername != "metricsuser" || c.MetricsPassword != "metricspass" {
t.Errorf("metrics = %q/%q, want metricsuser/metricspass",
c.MetricsUsername, c.MetricsPassword)
}
}
func TestCommaSeparatedAllowlistStillSupported(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := signingKeyLine +
`allowlist_hosts: "s3.sneak.cloud, sneak.berlin"
`
c, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("comma-separated allowlist should load, got error: %v", err)
}
if len(c.AllowlistHosts) != 2 || c.AllowlistHosts[0] != testHostS3 ||
c.AllowlistHosts[1] != "sneak.berlin" {
t.Errorf("AllowlistHosts = %v, want [s3.sneak.cloud sneak.berlin]",
c.AllowlistHosts)
}
}
// runAbortCases asserts that each case's config aborts startup with an
// error message mentioning every expected substring.
func runAbortCases(t *testing.T, cases []abortCase) {
t.Helper()
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, tc.yaml)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("config with %s must abort startup, got config: %+v", tc.name, c)
}
t.Logf("got expected error: %v", err)
for _, want := range tc.wantErrSubstrings {
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), want) {
t.Errorf("error %q does not mention %q", err.Error(), want)
}
}
})
}
}
// invalidScalarValueCases are configs where a scalar key is explicitly
// set to an unparseable or out-of-range value; each must abort startup
// naming the offending key, never silently fall back to the default.
func invalidScalarValueCases() []abortCase {
return []abortCase{
{
name: "port not a number",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "port: banana\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyPort, "banana"},
},
{
name: "port zero",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "port: 0\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyPort, "0"},
},
{
name: "port above 65535",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "port: 99999\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyPort, "99999"},
},
{
name: "port fractional",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "port: 8080.5\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyPort, "8080.5"},
},
{
name: "debug not a bool",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "debug: notabool\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyDebug, "notabool"},
},
{
name: "maintenance_mode not a bool",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "maintenance_mode: sometimes\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyMaintenanceMode, "sometimes"},
},
{
name: "allow_http numeric",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "allow_http: 2\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyAllowHTTP, "2"},
},
{
name: "upstream_connections_per_host zero",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "upstream_connections_per_host: 0\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyUpstreamConnectionsPerHost, "0"},
},
{
name: "upstream_connections_per_host negative",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "upstream_connections_per_host: -3\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyUpstreamConnectionsPerHost, "-3"},
},
{
name: "upstream_connections_per_host not a number",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "upstream_connections_per_host: many\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyUpstreamConnectionsPerHost, "many"},
},
}
}
// invalidHostAndCredentialCases are configs where allowlist_hosts,
// signing_key, state_dir, sentry_dsn, or metrics is explicitly set to
// an invalid value; each must abort startup naming the offending key.
func invalidHostAndCredentialCases() []abortCase {
return []abortCase{
{
name: "allowlist host with scheme",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "allowlist_hosts:\n - https://example.com\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{
keyAllowlistHosts, "https://example.com",
},
},
{
name: "allowlist host with path",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "allowlist_hosts:\n - example.com/images\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{
keyAllowlistHosts, "example.com/images",
},
},
{
name: "allowlist host with whitespace",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "allowlist_hosts:\n - \"exa mple.com\"\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyAllowlistHosts, "exa mple.com"},
},
{
name: "allowlist entry not a string",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "allowlist_hosts:\n - 123\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyAllowlistHosts, "123"},
},
{
name: "allowlist not a list",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "allowlist_hosts:\n key: value\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyAllowlistHosts},
},
{
name: "signing_key too short",
yaml: "signing_key: short\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keySigningKey},
},
{
name: "signing_key is the documented placeholder",
yaml: "signing_key: " + placeholderSigningKey + "\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keySigningKey},
},
{
name: "signing_key missing",
yaml: "port: 8080\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keySigningKey},
},
{
name: "state_dir explicitly empty",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "state_dir: \"\"\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyStateDir},
},
{
name: "sentry_dsn not a URL",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "sentry_dsn: \"not a url\"\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keySentryDSN, "not a url"},
},
{
name: "metrics username without password",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "metrics:\n username: bob\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyMetrics},
},
{
name: "metrics password without username",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "metrics:\n password: hunter2\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyMetrics},
},
}
}
// TestSetButInvalidValueAbortsStartup verifies the no-silent-fallback
// rule: a key that is explicitly set to an unparseable or out-of-range
// value must produce a startup error naming the offending key, never
// silently fall back to the default.
func TestSetButInvalidValueAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runAbortCases(t, append(
invalidScalarValueCases(), invalidHostAndCredentialCases()...))
}
// explicitNullValueCases are configs where a key is explicitly set to
// null (including the bare "key:" form and the "~" alias); each must
// abort startup naming the key.
func explicitNullValueCases() []abortCase {
return []abortCase{
{
name: "port explicit null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "port: null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyPort, nullValueText},
},
{
name: "port bare key no value",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "port:\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyPort, nullValueText},
},
{
name: "debug tilde null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "debug: ~\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyDebug, nullValueText},
},
{
name: "maintenance_mode null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "maintenance_mode: null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyMaintenanceMode, nullValueText},
},
{
name: "allow_http null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "allow_http: null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyAllowHTTP, nullValueText},
},
{
name: "state_dir null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "state_dir: null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyStateDir, nullValueText},
},
{
name: "db_url null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "db_url: null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyDBURL, nullValueText},
},
{
name: "sentry_dsn null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "sentry_dsn: null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keySentryDSN, nullValueText},
},
{
name: "upstream_connections_per_host null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "upstream_connections_per_host: null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyUpstreamConnectionsPerHost, nullValueText},
},
{
name: "allowlist_hosts null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "allowlist_hosts: null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyAllowlistHosts, nullValueText},
},
{
name: "signing_key null",
yaml: "signing_key: null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keySigningKey, nullValueText},
},
{
name: "metrics null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "metrics: null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyMetrics, nullValueText},
},
{
name: "metrics subkeys null",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "metrics:\n username: null\n password: null\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{
keyMetricsUsername, keyMetricsPassword, nullValueText,
},
},
}
}
// TestExplicitNullValueAbortsStartup verifies that a key explicitly
// set to null (including the bare "key:" form and the "~" alias) aborts
// startup naming the key. An explicit null is a SET value: it must
// never silently fall back to the default the way an omitted key does.
func TestExplicitNullValueAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runAbortCases(t, explicitNullValueCases())
}
// TestExplicitlyEmptyDBURLAbortsStartup verifies that db_url set to an
// empty string aborts startup: the derived file:...state.sqlite3 URL is
// a default, and defaults apply only to omitted keys. This matches
// state_dir, where an explicitly empty value already aborts.
func TestExplicitlyEmptyDBURLAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := signingKeyLine + "db_url: \"\"\n"
c, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("explicitly empty db_url must abort startup, got config: %+v", c)
}
t.Logf("got expected error: %v", err)
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), keyDBURL) {
t.Errorf("error %q does not name the offending key db_url", err.Error())
}
}
// TestAllowlistHostsRejectsDotOnlyEntries verifies that entries with no
// hostname labels are rejected. The allowlist matcher treats a leading
// dot as a suffix pattern, so a bare "." entry would match any upstream
// host written in FQDN trailing-dot form (e.g. evil.com.) and
// effectively disable URL signing with a single character.
func TestAllowlistHostsRejectsDotOnlyEntries(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, entry := range []string{".", ".."} {
t.Run(entry, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := signingKeyLine +
"allowlist_hosts:\n - \"" + entry + "\"\n"
c, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("allowlist entry %q must abort startup, got config: %+v",
entry, c)
}
t.Logf("got expected error: %v", err)
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), keyAllowlistHosts) {
t.Errorf("error %q does not name the offending key allowlist_hosts",
err.Error())
}
})
}
}
func TestUnknownTopLevelKeyAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := signingKeyLine + `whitelist_hosts:
- example.com
`
c, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("config with unknown key must abort startup, got config: %+v", c)
}
t.Logf("got expected error: %v", err)
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "whitelist_hosts") {
t.Errorf("error %q does not name the unknown key whitelist_hosts", err.Error())
}
}
func TestUnknownMetricsSubkeyAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := signingKeyLine + `metrics:
username: bob
password: hunter2
port: 9100
`
c, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("config with unknown metrics subkey must abort startup, got config: %+v", c)
}
t.Logf("got expected error: %v", err)
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "metrics.port") {
t.Errorf("error %q does not name the unknown key metrics.port", err.Error())
}
}
func TestEnvSectionIsPermitted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := signingKeyLine + `env:
PIXA_TEST_ENV_INJECTION: injected
`
_, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf(
"env section must be permitted (smartconfig consumes it), got error: %v",
err)
}
}
func TestMalformedConfigFileAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
configPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "config.yml")
err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte("port: [unclosed\n"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write malformed config: %v", err)
}
// loadConfigFile falls through to the relative config.yml candidate;
// the appname is chosen so no /etc or $HOME candidate can exist.
t.Setenv("PIXA_CONFIG_PATH", "")
t.Chdir(tmpDir)
log := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
sc, err := loadConfigFile(log, "pixa-test-nonexistent-app")
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("malformed config file must abort startup, got config: %v", sc)
}
t.Logf("got expected error: %v", err)
}
func TestEnsureStateDirCreatesDirectory(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
stateDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nested", "state")
c := &Config{StateDir: stateDir}
err := c.ensureStateDirWritable()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("creatable state_dir must validate, got error: %v", err)
}
info, err := os.Stat(stateDir)
if err != nil || !info.IsDir() {
t.Fatalf("state_dir was not created: info=%v err=%v", info, err)
}
}
func TestEnsureStateDirFailsOnUncreatablePath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A path below /dev/null can never be created, even when running
// as root (as in the Docker build).
c := &Config{StateDir: "/dev/null/pixa-state"}
err := c.ensureStateDirWritable()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("uncreatable state_dir must abort startup, got nil error")
}
t.Logf("got expected error: %v", err)
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), keyStateDir) {
t.Errorf("error %q does not name the offending key state_dir", err.Error())
}
}
+371
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,371 @@
package config
import (
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/logger"
)
// TestMain unsets PORT and every PIXA_ environment variable before the
// tests run, so each test sees only the variables it sets itself, not
// whatever the shell running the tests exports.
func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
for _, entry := range os.Environ() {
name, _, _ := strings.Cut(entry, "=")
if name != "PORT" && !strings.HasPrefix(name, "PIXA_") {
continue
}
err := os.Unsetenv(name)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
}
m.Run()
}
// wantStartupError fails the test unless err is a startup error that
// mentions every one of wants.
func wantStartupError(t *testing.T, err error, wants ...string) {
t.Helper()
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("want a startup error mentioning %q, got none", wants)
}
t.Logf("got expected error: %v", err)
for _, want := range wants {
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), want) {
t.Errorf("error %q does not mention %q", err.Error(), want)
}
}
}
// TestEnvironmentSetsEveryKey sets every key from its environment
// variable, with no config file at all: PORT for the port, and PIXA_
// plus the key in upper case, "." written as "_", for every other key.
func TestEnvironmentSetsEveryKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PIXA_DEBUG", "true")
t.Setenv("PIXA_MAINTENANCE_MODE", "1")
t.Setenv("PORT", "9090")
t.Setenv("PIXA_STATE_DIR", "/srv/pixa-env")
t.Setenv("PIXA_SENTRY_DSN", "https://abc123@sentry.example.com/42")
t.Setenv("PIXA_DB_URL", "file:/srv/pixa-env/other.sqlite3")
t.Setenv("PIXA_METRICS_USERNAME", "metricsuser")
t.Setenv("PIXA_METRICS_PASSWORD", "metricspass")
t.Setenv("PIXA_SIGNING_KEY", validTestSigningKey)
t.Setenv("PIXA_ALLOWLIST_HOSTS", "s3.sneak.cloud,.example.com")
t.Setenv("PIXA_ALLOW_HTTP", "true")
t.Setenv("PIXA_UPSTREAM_CONNECTIONS_PER_HOST", "5")
t.Setenv("PIXA_UPSTREAM_CONNECTIONS", "10")
t.Setenv("PIXA_MAX_CONCURRENT_PROCESSING", "3")
t.Setenv("PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES", "1024")
t.Setenv("PIXA_BLOCKED_NETWORKS", "203.0.113.0/24")
t.Setenv("PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "192.0.2.0/24")
c, err := newFromSmartConfig(nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("configuration from the environment alone should load: %v", err)
}
want := Config{
Debug: true,
MaintenanceMode: true,
Port: 9090,
StateDir: "/srv/pixa-env",
SentryDSN: "https://abc123@sentry.example.com/42",
DBURL: "file:/srv/pixa-env/other.sqlite3",
MetricsUsername: "metricsuser",
MetricsPassword: "metricspass",
SigningKey: validTestSigningKey,
AllowlistHosts: []string{testHostS3, ".example.com"},
AllowHTTP: true,
UpstreamConnectionsPerHost: 5,
UpstreamConnections: 10,
MaxConcurrentProcessing: 3,
CacheMaxBytes: 1024,
cacheMaxBytesExplicit: true,
BlockedNetworks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")},
TrustedProxies: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.0/24")},
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(*c, want) {
t.Errorf("config from the environment =\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", *c, want)
}
}
// TestUnknownPixaVariableAbortsStartup checks that a PIXA_ variable that
// is not a setting's variable, such as a misspelled one, aborts startup
// naming it, as an unknown config key does, instead of being ignored.
func TestUnknownPixaVariableAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXY", "192.0.2.0/24")
t.Setenv("PIXA_SIGNINGKEY", validTestSigningKey)
err := validateKnownEnvVars()
wantStartupError(t, err, "PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXY", "PIXA_SIGNINGKEY")
}
// TestPixaPortAbortsStartupPointingToPort checks that PIXA_PORT aborts
// startup with a message saying to use PORT, which sets the port.
func TestPixaPortAbortsStartupPointingToPort(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PIXA_PORT", "9090")
err := validateKnownEnvVars()
wantStartupError(t, err, "PIXA_PORT", "use PORT")
}
// TestSettingVariablesAndConfigPathAreAccepted checks that every
// setting's variable and PIXA_CONFIG_PATH pass the check for unknown
// PIXA_ variables. TestEnvironmentSetsEveryKey pins the names in the list.
func TestSettingVariablesAndConfigPathAreAccepted(t *testing.T) {
// A config file's env section loaded by another test can leave a
// PIXA_ variable set for the whole process, so every one is unset
// here first; t.Setenv restores each when the test ends.
for _, entry := range os.Environ() {
name, _, _ := strings.Cut(entry, "=")
if !strings.HasPrefix(name, "PIXA_") {
continue
}
t.Setenv(name, "")
err := os.Unsetenv(name)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to unset %s: %v", name, err)
}
}
t.Setenv("PIXA_CONFIG_PATH", "/etc/pixa/config.yml")
for _, name := range envVarNames() {
t.Setenv(name, "")
}
err := validateKnownEnvVars()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("PIXA_CONFIG_PATH and every setting's variable "+
"must be accepted: %v", err)
}
}
// configFromNew writes yamlContent to a temporary config file, points
// PIXA_CONFIG_PATH at it, and runs New, as the server does at startup.
// The state directory is a temporary one and the disk cache is off, so
// New succeeds unless something in the test is wrong.
func configFromNew(t *testing.T, yamlContent string) (*Config, error) {
t.Helper()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
configPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "config.yml")
err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(yamlContent), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test config: %v", err)
}
t.Setenv("PIXA_CONFIG_PATH", configPath)
t.Setenv("PIXA_STATE_DIR", filepath.Join(tmpDir, "state"))
t.Setenv("PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES", "0")
testLogger, err := logger.New(nil, logger.Params{Globals: &globals.Globals{}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create logger: %v", err)
}
return New(nil, Params{Logger: testLogger})
}
// TestUnknownPixaVariableAbortsNew checks that New, which the server
// calls at startup, aborts on a misspelled PIXA_ variable.
func TestUnknownPixaVariableAbortsNew(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXY", "192.0.2.0/24")
_, err := configFromNew(t, signingKeyLine)
wantStartupError(t, err, "PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXY")
}
// TestUnknownPixaVariableInEnvSectionAbortsNew checks that New aborts
// on a misspelled PIXA_ name in the config file's env section, which
// loading the file sets as an environment variable.
func TestUnknownPixaVariableInEnvSectionAbortsNew(t *testing.T) {
// The variable must be absent until the file loads. t.Setenv makes
// sure the one the file sets is removed when the test ends.
t.Setenv("PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXY", "")
err := os.Unsetenv("PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXY")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to unset PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXY: %v", err)
}
_, err = configFromNew(t, signingKeyLine+
"env:\n PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXY: 192.0.2.0/24\n")
wantStartupError(t, err, "PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXY")
}
// TestPortFromEnvironmentOverridesConfigFile checks that PORT wins over
// the port in the config file.
func TestPortFromEnvironmentOverridesConfigFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PORT", "9090")
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+"port: 8080\n")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("PORT=9090 with port 8080 in the file should load: %v", err)
}
if c.Port != 9090 {
t.Errorf("Port = %d, want 9090 from PORT, not 8080 from the file", c.Port)
}
}
// TestInvalidPortFromEnvironmentAbortsStartup checks that a PORT that is
// not a number, or is outside the port range, aborts startup naming PORT
// and the value, even though the file's port is valid.
func TestInvalidPortFromEnvironmentAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PORT", "banana")
_, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+"port: 8080\n")
wantStartupError(t, err, "PORT", "banana")
t.Setenv("PORT", "70000")
_, err = configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+"port: 8080\n")
wantStartupError(t, err, "PORT", "70000")
}
// TestListFromEnvironmentReplacesConfigFileList checks that a list
// variable replaces the file's list, split on commas with the spaces
// around each entry trimmed.
func TestListFromEnvironmentReplacesConfigFileList(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PIXA_ALLOWLIST_HOSTS", " cdn.example.com , .example.org ")
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+
"allowlist_hosts:\n - s3.sneak.cloud\n - sneak.berlin\n")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("PIXA_ALLOWLIST_HOSTS should load: %v", err)
}
want := []string{"cdn.example.com", ".example.org"}
if !slices.Equal(c.AllowlistHosts, want) {
t.Errorf("AllowlistHosts = %v, want %v from PIXA_ALLOWLIST_HOSTS",
c.AllowlistHosts, want)
}
}
// TestInvalidBlockedNetworksFromEnvironmentAbortsStartup checks that an
// invalid CIDR, or an empty entry, in PIXA_BLOCKED_NETWORKS aborts
// startup naming the variable, as the same list in the file does.
func TestInvalidBlockedNetworksFromEnvironmentAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PIXA_BLOCKED_NETWORKS", "203.0.113.0/24,not-a-cidr")
_, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine)
wantStartupError(t, err, "PIXA_BLOCKED_NETWORKS", "not-a-cidr")
t.Setenv("PIXA_BLOCKED_NETWORKS", "203.0.113.0/24,,198.51.100.0/24")
_, err = configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine)
wantStartupError(t, err, "PIXA_BLOCKED_NETWORKS")
}
// TestInvalidDebugFromEnvironmentAbortsStartup checks that a PIXA_DEBUG
// that strconv.ParseBool rejects aborts startup instead of defaulting.
func TestInvalidDebugFromEnvironmentAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PIXA_DEBUG", "maybe")
_, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine)
wantStartupError(t, err, "PIXA_DEBUG", "maybe")
}
// TestConfigFileAloneBehavesAsBefore checks that with no variables set
// (TestMain unsets them) the config file's values are used and omitted
// keys take their defaults.
func TestConfigFileAloneBehavesAsBefore(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+"port: 9191\n")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("config file should load: %v", err)
}
if c.Port != 9191 {
t.Errorf("Port = %d, want 9191 from the file", c.Port)
}
if c.StateDir != DefaultStateDir {
t.Errorf("StateDir = %q, want default %q", c.StateDir, DefaultStateDir)
}
if !slices.Equal(c.TrustedProxies, defaultTrustedProxies()) {
t.Errorf("TrustedProxies = %v, want default %v",
c.TrustedProxies, defaultTrustedProxies())
}
}
// TestEmptyTrustedProxiesFromEnvironmentTrustsNoOne checks that an empty
// PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXIES is an empty list, like [] in the file: it trusts
// no proxy instead of taking the default ranges.
func TestEmptyTrustedProxiesFromEnvironmentTrustsNoOne(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "")
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("empty PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXIES should load: %v", err)
}
if len(c.TrustedProxies) != 0 {
t.Errorf("TrustedProxies = %v, want none", c.TrustedProxies)
}
}
// TestEmptyVariableDoesNotFallBackToConfigFile checks that a variable
// that is present but empty is a set value: an empty PIXA_STATE_DIR
// aborts startup like state_dir: "" in the file, instead of falling
// through to the file's state_dir.
func TestEmptyVariableDoesNotFallBackToConfigFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PIXA_STATE_DIR", "")
_, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+"state_dir: /srv/pixa-file\n")
wantStartupError(t, err, "PIXA_STATE_DIR")
}
// TestMissingSigningKeyNamesItsVariable checks that with no config file
// and no PIXA_SIGNING_KEY, startup aborts naming the variable, which is
// how a container started without it reports the problem.
func TestMissingSigningKeyNamesItsVariable(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := newFromSmartConfig(nil)
wantStartupError(t, err, "PIXA_SIGNING_KEY")
}
// TestSecretsFromEnvironmentAreNotPrinted checks that errors about the
// signing key and the metrics password name their variables but never
// print their values.
func TestSecretsFromEnvironmentAreNotPrinted(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PIXA_SIGNING_KEY", "short-signing-secret")
_, err := newFromSmartConfig(nil)
wantStartupError(t, err, "PIXA_SIGNING_KEY")
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "short-signing-secret") {
t.Errorf("error %q prints the signing key", err.Error())
}
t.Setenv("PIXA_SIGNING_KEY", validTestSigningKey)
t.Setenv("PIXA_METRICS_PASSWORD", "metrics-password-secret")
_, err = newFromSmartConfig(nil)
wantStartupError(t, err, "PIXA_METRICS_PASSWORD")
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "metrics-password-secret") {
t.Errorf("error %q prints the metrics password", err.Error())
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
package config
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
// TestTrustedProxiesConfig checks the trusted_proxies key wiring: an
// explicit CIDR list lands in TrustedProxies in order and replaces the
// default, an omitted key falls back to the RFC 1918 private ranges, and an
// explicitly empty list trusts no one. The list parser itself is shared with
// blocked_networks and is exercised in depth by that key's tests.
func TestTrustedProxiesConfig(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
t.Run("explicit list replaces the default in order", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t,
signingKeyLine+`trusted_proxies: ["10.0.0.0/8", "2001:db8::/32"]`+"\n")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("valid trusted_proxies should load: %v", err)
}
got := make([]string, len(c.TrustedProxies))
for i, p := range c.TrustedProxies {
got[i] = p.String()
}
if joined := strings.Join(got, ","); joined != "10.0.0.0/8,2001:db8::/32" {
t.Errorf("TrustedProxies = %v, want the two ranges in order", got)
}
})
t.Run("omitted key defaults to the RFC 1918 ranges", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("minimal config should load: %v", err)
}
got := make([]string, len(c.TrustedProxies))
for i, p := range c.TrustedProxies {
got[i] = p.String()
}
want := "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
if joined := strings.Join(got, ","); joined != want {
t.Errorf("TrustedProxies = %v, want the RFC 1918 ranges %q", got, want)
}
})
t.Run("explicitly empty list trusts no one", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+"trusted_proxies: []\n")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("empty trusted_proxies should load: %v", err)
}
if len(c.TrustedProxies) != 0 {
t.Errorf("TrustedProxies = %v, want empty", c.TrustedProxies)
}
})
}
// TestTrustedProxiesInvalidAbortsStartup checks that an invalid or null
// value aborts startup with an error naming the key and the offending value.
func TestTrustedProxiesInvalidAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runAbortCases(t, []abortCase{
{
name: "invalid cidr",
yaml: signingKeyLine + `trusted_proxies: ["999.0.0.0/8"]` + "\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyTrustedProxies, "999.0.0.0/8"},
},
{
name: "null value",
yaml: signingKeyLine + "trusted_proxies:\n",
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyTrustedProxies, nullValueText},
},
})
}
+184 -156
View File
@@ -5,10 +5,12 @@ import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"embed"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"path/filepath"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
"go.uber.org/fx"
@@ -21,13 +23,22 @@ import (
//go:embed schema/*.sql
var schemaFS embed.FS
// bootstrapVersion is the migration that creates the schema_migrations
// table itself. It is applied before the normal migration loop.
const bootstrapVersion = 0
// Params defines dependencies for Database.
type Params struct {
fx.In
Logger *logger.Logger
Config *config.Config
}
// errInvalidMigrationFilename is returned when a migration filename does
// not match the "<version>[_<description>].sql" pattern.
var errInvalidMigrationFilename = errors.New("invalid migration filename")
// Database wraps the SQL database connection.
type Database struct {
db *sql.DB
@@ -35,6 +46,44 @@ type Database struct {
config *config.Config
}
// ParseMigrationVersion extracts the numeric version prefix from a migration
// filename. Filenames must follow the pattern "<version>.sql" or
// "<version>_<description>.sql", where version is a zero-padded numeric
// string (e.g. "001", "002"). Returns the version as an integer and an
// error if the filename does not match the expected pattern.
func ParseMigrationVersion(filename string) (int, error) {
name := strings.TrimSuffix(filename, filepath.Ext(filename))
if name == "" {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w %q: empty name", errInvalidMigrationFilename, filename)
}
// Split on underscore to separate version from description.
// If there's no underscore, the entire stem is the version.
versionStr, _, _ := strings.Cut(name, "_")
if versionStr == "" {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"%w %q: empty version prefix", errInvalidMigrationFilename, filename,
)
}
// Validate the version is purely numeric.
for _, ch := range versionStr {
if ch < '0' || ch > '9' {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"%w %q: version %q contains non-numeric character %q",
errInvalidMigrationFilename, filename, versionStr, string(ch),
)
}
}
version, err := strconv.Atoi(versionStr)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w %q: %w", errInvalidMigrationFilename, filename, err)
}
return version, nil
}
// New creates a new Database instance.
func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params Params) (*Database, error) {
s := &Database{
@@ -52,6 +101,7 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params Params) (*Database, error) {
},
OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
s.log.Info("Database OnStop Hook")
if s.db != nil {
return s.db.Close()
}
@@ -63,6 +113,137 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params Params) (*Database, error) {
return s, nil
}
// collectMigrations reads the embedded schema directory and returns
// migration filenames sorted lexicographically.
func collectMigrations() ([]string, error) {
entries, err := schemaFS.ReadDir("schema")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read schema directory: %w", err)
}
var migrations []string
for _, entry := range entries {
if !entry.IsDir() && strings.HasSuffix(entry.Name(), ".sql") {
migrations = append(migrations, entry.Name())
}
}
sort.Strings(migrations)
return migrations, nil
}
// bootstrapMigrationsTable ensures the schema_migrations table exists
// by applying 000.sql if the table is missing.
func bootstrapMigrationsTable(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, log *slog.Logger) error {
var tableExists int
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='schema_migrations'",
).Scan(&tableExists)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check for migrations table: %w", err)
}
if tableExists > 0 {
return nil
}
content, err := schemaFS.ReadFile("schema/000.sql")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read bootstrap migration 000.sql: %w", err)
}
if log != nil {
log.Info("applying bootstrap migration", "version", bootstrapVersion)
}
_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, string(content))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to apply bootstrap migration: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// ApplyMigrations applies all pending migrations to db. An optional logger
// may be provided for informational output; pass nil for silent operation.
// This is exported so tests can apply the real schema without the full fx
// lifecycle.
func ApplyMigrations(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, log *slog.Logger) error {
err := bootstrapMigrationsTable(ctx, db, log)
if err != nil {
return err
}
migrations, err := collectMigrations()
if err != nil {
return err
}
for _, migration := range migrations {
version, parseErr := ParseMigrationVersion(migration)
if parseErr != nil {
return parseErr
}
// Check if already applied.
var count int
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM schema_migrations WHERE version = ?",
version,
).Scan(&count)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check migration status: %w", err)
}
if count > 0 {
if log != nil {
log.Debug("migration already applied", "version", version)
}
continue
}
// Read and apply migration.
content, readErr := schemaFS.ReadFile(filepath.Join("schema", migration))
if readErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read migration %s: %w", migration, readErr)
}
if log != nil {
log.Info("applying migration", "version", version)
}
_, execErr := db.ExecContext(ctx, string(content))
if execErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to apply migration %s: %w", migration, execErr)
}
// Record migration as applied.
_, recErr := db.ExecContext(ctx,
"INSERT INTO schema_migrations (version) VALUES (?)",
version,
)
if recErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to record migration %s: %w", migration, recErr)
}
if log != nil {
log.Info("migration applied successfully", "version", version)
}
}
return nil
}
// DB returns the underlying sql.DB.
func (s *Database) DB() *sql.DB {
return s.db
}
func (s *Database) connect(ctx context.Context) error {
dbURL := s.config.DBURL
@@ -75,7 +256,8 @@ func (s *Database) connect(ctx context.Context) error {
return err
}
if err := db.PingContext(ctx); err != nil {
err = db.PingContext(ctx)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to ping database", "error", err)
return err
@@ -84,159 +266,5 @@ func (s *Database) connect(ctx context.Context) error {
s.db = db
s.log.Info("database connected")
return s.runMigrations(ctx)
}
func (s *Database) runMigrations(ctx context.Context) error {
// Create migrations tracking table
_, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_migrations (
version TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
applied_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
)
`)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create migrations table: %w", err)
}
// Get list of migration files
entries, err := schemaFS.ReadDir("schema")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read schema directory: %w", err)
}
// Sort migration files by name (001.sql, 002.sql, etc.)
var migrations []string
for _, entry := range entries {
if !entry.IsDir() && strings.HasSuffix(entry.Name(), ".sql") {
migrations = append(migrations, entry.Name())
}
}
sort.Strings(migrations)
// Apply each migration that hasn't been applied yet
for _, migration := range migrations {
version := strings.TrimSuffix(migration, filepath.Ext(migration))
// Check if already applied
var count int
err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM schema_migrations WHERE version = ?",
version,
).Scan(&count)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check migration status: %w", err)
}
if count > 0 {
s.log.Debug("migration already applied", "version", version)
continue
}
// Read and apply migration
content, err := schemaFS.ReadFile(filepath.Join("schema", migration))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read migration %s: %w", migration, err)
}
s.log.Info("applying migration", "version", version)
_, err = s.db.ExecContext(ctx, string(content))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to apply migration %s: %w", migration, err)
}
// Record migration as applied
_, err = s.db.ExecContext(ctx,
"INSERT INTO schema_migrations (version) VALUES (?)",
version,
)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to record migration %s: %w", migration, err)
}
s.log.Info("migration applied successfully", "version", version)
}
return nil
}
// DB returns the underlying sql.DB.
func (s *Database) DB() *sql.DB {
return s.db
}
// ApplyMigrations applies all migrations to the given database.
// This is useful for testing where you want to use the real schema
// without the full fx lifecycle.
func ApplyMigrations(db *sql.DB) error {
ctx := context.Background()
// Create migrations tracking table
_, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_migrations (
version TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
applied_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
)
`)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create migrations table: %w", err)
}
// Get list of migration files
entries, err := schemaFS.ReadDir("schema")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read schema directory: %w", err)
}
// Sort migration files by name (001.sql, 002.sql, etc.)
var migrations []string
for _, entry := range entries {
if !entry.IsDir() && strings.HasSuffix(entry.Name(), ".sql") {
migrations = append(migrations, entry.Name())
}
}
sort.Strings(migrations)
// Apply each migration that hasn't been applied yet
for _, migration := range migrations {
version := strings.TrimSuffix(migration, filepath.Ext(migration))
// Check if already applied
var count int
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM schema_migrations WHERE version = ?",
version,
).Scan(&count)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check migration status: %w", err)
}
if count > 0 {
continue
}
// Read and apply migration
content, err := schemaFS.ReadFile(filepath.Join("schema", migration))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read migration %s: %w", migration, err)
}
_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, string(content))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to apply migration %s: %w", migration, err)
}
// Record migration as applied
_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx,
"INSERT INTO schema_migrations (version) VALUES (?)",
version,
)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to record migration %s: %w", migration, err)
}
}
return nil
return ApplyMigrations(ctx, s.db, s.log)
}
+255
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
package database
import (
"database/sql"
"testing"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite" // SQLite driver registration
)
// openTestDB returns a fresh in-memory SQLite database.
func openTestDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
t.Helper()
db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", ":memory:")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to open test db: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
return db
}
func TestParseMigrationVersion(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
filename string
want int
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "version only",
filename: "001.sql",
want: 1,
},
{
name: "version with description",
filename: "001_initial_schema.sql",
want: 1,
},
{
name: "multi-digit version",
filename: "042_add_indexes.sql",
want: 42,
},
{
name: "long version number",
filename: "00001_long_prefix.sql",
want: 1,
},
{
name: "description with multiple underscores",
filename: "003_add_user_auth_tables.sql",
want: 3,
},
{
name: "empty filename",
filename: ".sql",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "leading underscore",
filename: "_description.sql",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "non-numeric version",
filename: "abc_migration.sql",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "mixed alphanumeric version",
filename: "001a_migration.sql",
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := ParseMigrationVersion(tt.filename)
if tt.wantErr {
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("ParseMigrationVersion(%q) expected error, got %d", tt.filename, got)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("ParseMigrationVersion(%q) unexpected error: %v", tt.filename, err)
return
}
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("ParseMigrationVersion(%q) = %d, want %d", tt.filename, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestApplyMigrations_CreatesSchemaAndTables(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := openTestDB(t)
ctx := t.Context()
err := ApplyMigrations(ctx, db, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ApplyMigrations failed: %v", err)
}
// The schema_migrations table must exist and contain at least
// version 0 (the bootstrap) and 1 (the initial schema).
rows, err := db.QueryContext(
ctx, "SELECT version FROM schema_migrations ORDER BY version",
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to query schema_migrations: %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
var versions []int
for rows.Next() {
var v int
scanErr := rows.Scan(&v)
if scanErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to scan version: %v", scanErr)
}
versions = append(versions, v)
}
err = rows.Err()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("row iteration error: %v", err)
}
if len(versions) < 2 {
t.Fatalf(
"expected at least 2 migrations recorded, got %d: %v",
len(versions), versions,
)
}
if versions[0] != 0 {
t.Errorf("first recorded migration = %d, want %d", versions[0], 0)
}
if versions[1] != 1 {
t.Errorf("second recorded migration = %d, want %d", versions[1], 1)
}
// Verify that the application tables created by 001.sql exist.
tables := []string{
"source_content", "source_metadata", "output_content",
"request_cache", "negative_cache", "cache_stats",
}
for _, table := range tables {
var count int
err := db.QueryRowContext(
ctx,
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name=?",
table,
).Scan(&count)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to check for table %s: %v", table, err)
}
if count != 1 {
t.Errorf("table %s does not exist after migrations", table)
}
}
}
func TestApplyMigrations_Idempotent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := openTestDB(t)
ctx := t.Context()
err := ApplyMigrations(ctx, db, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first ApplyMigrations failed: %v", err)
}
// Running a second time must succeed without errors.
err = ApplyMigrations(ctx, db, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second ApplyMigrations failed: %v", err)
}
// Verify no duplicate rows in schema_migrations.
var count int
err = db.QueryRowContext(
ctx, "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM schema_migrations WHERE version = 0",
).Scan(&count)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to count version 0 rows: %v", err)
}
if count != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected exactly 1 row for version 0, got %d", count)
}
}
func TestBootstrapMigrationsTable_FreshDatabase(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := openTestDB(t)
ctx := t.Context()
err := bootstrapMigrationsTable(ctx, db, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("bootstrapMigrationsTable failed: %v", err)
}
// schema_migrations table must exist.
var tableCount int
err = db.QueryRowContext(
ctx,
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='schema_migrations'",
).Scan(&tableCount)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to check for table: %v", err)
}
if tableCount != 1 {
t.Fatalf("schema_migrations table not created")
}
// Version 0 must be recorded.
var recorded int
err = db.QueryRowContext(
ctx, "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM schema_migrations WHERE version = 0",
).Scan(&recorded)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to check version: %v", err)
}
if recorded != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected version 0 to be recorded, got count %d", recorded)
}
}
+9
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
-- Migration 000: Schema migrations tracking table
-- Applied as a bootstrap step before the normal migration loop.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_migrations (
version INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
applied_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);
INSERT OR IGNORE INTO schema_migrations (version) VALUES (0);
@@ -3,12 +3,17 @@
-- Source content blobs
-- Files stored at: cache/src-content/<ab>/<cd>/<sha256>
-- last_accessed_at is NULL until the first LRU touch; eviction falls
-- back to fetched_at for rows that have never been touched.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS source_content (
content_hash TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
content_type TEXT NOT NULL,
size_bytes INTEGER NOT NULL,
fetched_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
fetched_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
last_accessed_at DATETIME
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_source_content_last_accessed
ON source_content(last_accessed_at);
-- Source URL metadata - maps URLs to content hashes
-- JSON stored at: cache/src-metadata/<hostname>/<path_hash>.json
@@ -34,6 +39,22 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_source_meta_path_hash ON source_metadata(path_has
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_source_meta_expires ON source_metadata(expires_at);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_source_meta_content_hash ON source_metadata(content_hash);
-- Processed variant blobs
-- Files stored at: cache/variants/<ab>/<cd>/<cache_key> (plus a .meta
-- sidecar with the content type). Tracked here (like source content
-- blobs above) so total cache usage can be computed with a SUM query,
-- never a directory scan, and so LRU eviction has a timestamp to order
-- on.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS variant_content (
cache_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
size_bytes INTEGER NOT NULL,
content_type TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
last_accessed_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_variant_content_last_accessed
ON variant_content(last_accessed_at);
-- Output/transformed content blobs
-- Files stored at: cache/dst-content/<ab>/<cd>/<sha256>
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS output_content (
+15 -4
View File
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ type Generator struct {
key [seal.KeySize]byte
}
// NewGenerator creates an encrypted URL generator with a key derived from the signing key.
// NewGenerator creates an encrypted URL generator with a key derived
// from the signing key.
func NewGenerator(signingKey string) (*Generator, error) {
key, err := seal.DeriveKey([]byte(signingKey), urlKeySalt)
if err != nil {
@@ -77,7 +78,8 @@ func (g *Generator) Parse(token string) (*Payload, error) {
// Decrypt
data, err := seal.Decrypt(g.key, token)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, seal.ErrDecryptionFailed) || errors.Is(err, seal.ErrInvalidPayload) {
if errors.Is(err, seal.ErrDecryptionFailed) ||
errors.Is(err, seal.ErrInvalidPayload) {
return nil, ErrDecryptFailed
}
@@ -86,7 +88,9 @@ func (g *Generator) Parse(token string) (*Payload, error) {
// CBOR decode
var p Payload
if err := cbor.Unmarshal(data, &p); err != nil {
err = cbor.Unmarshal(data, &p)
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrInvalidFormat
}
@@ -99,7 +103,8 @@ func (g *Generator) Parse(token string) (*Payload, error) {
}
// ToImageRequest converts the payload to an ImageRequest.
// Applies default values for omitted optional fields.
// Applies default values for omitted optional fields. An ExpiresAt of 0, a URL
// that never expires, gives the zero Expires.
func (p *Payload) ToImageRequest() *imgcache.ImageRequest {
format := p.Format
if format == "" {
@@ -116,6 +121,11 @@ func (p *Payload) ToImageRequest() *imgcache.ImageRequest {
fitMode = DefaultFitMode
}
var expires time.Time
if p.ExpiresAt != 0 {
expires = time.Unix(p.ExpiresAt, 0)
}
return &imgcache.ImageRequest{
SourceHost: p.SourceHost,
SourcePath: p.SourcePath,
@@ -127,6 +137,7 @@ func (p *Payload) ToImageRequest() *imgcache.ImageRequest {
Format: format,
Quality: quality,
FitMode: fitMode,
Expires: expires,
}
}
+102 -50
View File
@@ -1,22 +1,33 @@
package encurl
package encurl_test
import (
"errors"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
)
// Shared test fixture strings.
const (
testSourceHost = "cdn.example.com"
testSourcePath = "/images/photo.jpg"
testSourceQuery = "v=2"
)
func TestGenerator_GenerateAndParse(t *testing.T) {
gen, err := NewGenerator("test-signing-key-12345")
t.Parallel()
gen, err := encurl.NewGenerator("test-signing-key-12345")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewGenerator() error = %v", err)
}
payload := &Payload{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
SourceQuery: "v=2",
payload := &encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: testSourceHost,
SourcePath: testSourcePath,
SourceQuery: testSourceQuery,
Width: 800,
Height: 600,
Format: imgcache.FormatWebP,
@@ -43,38 +54,48 @@ func TestGenerator_GenerateAndParse(t *testing.T) {
if parsed.SourceHost != payload.SourceHost {
t.Errorf("SourceHost = %q, want %q", parsed.SourceHost, payload.SourceHost)
}
if parsed.SourcePath != payload.SourcePath {
t.Errorf("SourcePath = %q, want %q", parsed.SourcePath, payload.SourcePath)
}
if parsed.SourceQuery != payload.SourceQuery {
t.Errorf("SourceQuery = %q, want %q", parsed.SourceQuery, payload.SourceQuery)
}
if parsed.Width != payload.Width {
t.Errorf("Width = %d, want %d", parsed.Width, payload.Width)
}
if parsed.Height != payload.Height {
t.Errorf("Height = %d, want %d", parsed.Height, payload.Height)
}
if parsed.Format != payload.Format {
t.Errorf("Format = %q, want %q", parsed.Format, payload.Format)
}
if parsed.Quality != payload.Quality {
t.Errorf("Quality = %d, want %d", parsed.Quality, payload.Quality)
}
if parsed.FitMode != payload.FitMode {
t.Errorf("FitMode = %q, want %q", parsed.FitMode, payload.FitMode)
}
if parsed.ExpiresAt != payload.ExpiresAt {
t.Errorf("ExpiresAt = %d, want %d", parsed.ExpiresAt, payload.ExpiresAt)
}
}
func TestGenerator_Parse_Expired(t *testing.T) {
gen, _ := NewGenerator("test-signing-key-12345")
t.Parallel()
payload := &Payload{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
gen, _ := encurl.NewGenerator("test-signing-key-12345")
payload := &encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: testSourceHost,
SourcePath: testSourcePath,
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour).Unix(), // Already expired
}
@@ -88,13 +109,15 @@ func TestGenerator_Parse_Expired(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("Parse() should fail for expired token")
}
if err != ErrExpired {
t.Errorf("Parse() error = %v, want %v", err, ErrExpired)
if !errors.Is(err, encurl.ErrExpired) {
t.Errorf("Parse() error = %v, want %v", err, encurl.ErrExpired)
}
}
func TestGenerator_Parse_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
gen, _ := NewGenerator("test-signing-key-12345")
t.Parallel()
gen, _ := encurl.NewGenerator("test-signing-key-12345")
_, err := gen.Parse("not-a-valid-token")
if err == nil {
@@ -103,11 +126,13 @@ func TestGenerator_Parse_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestGenerator_Parse_TamperedToken(t *testing.T) {
gen, _ := NewGenerator("test-signing-key-12345")
t.Parallel()
payload := &Payload{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
gen, _ := encurl.NewGenerator("test-signing-key-12345")
payload := &encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: testSourceHost,
SourcePath: testSourcePath,
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
}
@@ -126,12 +151,14 @@ func TestGenerator_Parse_TamperedToken(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestGenerator_Parse_WrongKey(t *testing.T) {
gen1, _ := NewGenerator("signing-key-1")
gen2, _ := NewGenerator("signing-key-2")
t.Parallel()
payload := &Payload{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
gen1, _ := encurl.NewGenerator("signing-key-1")
gen2, _ := encurl.NewGenerator("signing-key-2")
payload := &encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: testSourceHost,
SourcePath: testSourcePath,
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
}
@@ -144,10 +171,12 @@ func TestGenerator_Parse_WrongKey(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestPayload_ToImageRequest(t *testing.T) {
payload := &Payload{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
SourceQuery: "v=2",
t.Parallel()
payload := &encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: testSourceHost,
SourcePath: testSourcePath,
SourceQuery: testSourceQuery,
Width: 800,
Height: 600,
Format: imgcache.FormatWebP,
@@ -161,55 +190,68 @@ func TestPayload_ToImageRequest(t *testing.T) {
if req.SourceHost != payload.SourceHost {
t.Errorf("SourceHost = %q, want %q", req.SourceHost, payload.SourceHost)
}
if req.SourcePath != payload.SourcePath {
t.Errorf("SourcePath = %q, want %q", req.SourcePath, payload.SourcePath)
}
if req.SourceQuery != payload.SourceQuery {
t.Errorf("SourceQuery = %q, want %q", req.SourceQuery, payload.SourceQuery)
}
if req.Size.Width != payload.Width {
t.Errorf("Width = %d, want %d", req.Size.Width, payload.Width)
}
if req.Size.Height != payload.Height {
t.Errorf("Height = %d, want %d", req.Size.Height, payload.Height)
}
if req.Format != payload.Format {
t.Errorf("Format = %q, want %q", req.Format, payload.Format)
}
if req.Quality != payload.Quality {
t.Errorf("Quality = %d, want %d", req.Quality, payload.Quality)
}
if req.FitMode != payload.FitMode {
t.Errorf("FitMode = %q, want %q", req.FitMode, payload.FitMode)
}
}
func TestPayload_ToImageRequest_Defaults(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Payload with only required fields - should get defaults
payload := &Payload{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
payload := &encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: testSourceHost,
SourcePath: testSourcePath,
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
}
req := payload.ToImageRequest()
if req.Format != DefaultFormat {
t.Errorf("Format = %q, want default %q", req.Format, DefaultFormat)
if req.Format != encurl.DefaultFormat {
t.Errorf("Format = %q, want default %q", req.Format, encurl.DefaultFormat)
}
if req.Quality != DefaultQuality {
t.Errorf("Quality = %d, want default %d", req.Quality, DefaultQuality)
if req.Quality != encurl.DefaultQuality {
t.Errorf("Quality = %d, want default %d", req.Quality, encurl.DefaultQuality)
}
if req.FitMode != DefaultFitMode {
t.Errorf("FitMode = %q, want default %q", req.FitMode, DefaultFitMode)
if req.FitMode != encurl.DefaultFitMode {
t.Errorf("FitMode = %q, want default %q", req.FitMode, encurl.DefaultFitMode)
}
}
func TestFromImageRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &imgcache.ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
SourceQuery: "v=2",
SourceHost: testSourceHost,
SourcePath: testSourcePath,
SourceQuery: testSourceQuery,
Size: imgcache.Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: imgcache.FormatWebP,
Quality: 90,
@@ -217,52 +259,62 @@ func TestFromImageRequest(t *testing.T) {
}
expiresAt := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
payload := FromImageRequest(req, expiresAt)
payload := encurl.FromImageRequest(req, expiresAt)
if payload.SourceHost != req.SourceHost {
t.Errorf("SourceHost = %q, want %q", payload.SourceHost, req.SourceHost)
}
if payload.SourcePath != req.SourcePath {
t.Errorf("SourcePath = %q, want %q", payload.SourcePath, req.SourcePath)
}
if payload.Width != req.Size.Width {
t.Errorf("Width = %d, want %d", payload.Width, req.Size.Width)
}
if payload.ExpiresAt != expiresAt.Unix() {
t.Errorf("ExpiresAt = %d, want %d", payload.ExpiresAt, expiresAt.Unix())
}
}
func TestFromImageRequest_OmitsDefaults(t *testing.T) {
// Request with default values - payload should omit them for smaller encoding
t.Parallel()
// Request with default values - payload should omit them for
// smaller encoding
req := &imgcache.ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
Format: DefaultFormat,
Quality: DefaultQuality,
FitMode: DefaultFitMode,
SourceHost: testSourceHost,
SourcePath: testSourcePath,
Format: encurl.DefaultFormat,
Quality: encurl.DefaultQuality,
FitMode: encurl.DefaultFitMode,
}
payload := FromImageRequest(req, time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
payload := encurl.FromImageRequest(req, time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
// These should be zero/empty because they match defaults
if payload.Format != "" {
t.Errorf("Format should be empty for default, got %q", payload.Format)
}
if payload.Quality != 0 {
t.Errorf("Quality should be 0 for default, got %d", payload.Quality)
}
if payload.FitMode != "" {
t.Errorf("FitMode should be empty for default, got %q", payload.FitMode)
}
}
func TestGenerator_TokenIsURLSafe(t *testing.T) {
gen, _ := NewGenerator("test-signing-key-12345")
t.Parallel()
payload := &Payload{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
gen, _ := encurl.NewGenerator("test-signing-key-12345")
payload := &encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: testSourceHost,
SourcePath: testSourcePath,
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
}
+5 -6
View File
@@ -5,11 +5,10 @@ import (
"go.uber.org/fx"
)
// Build-time variables populated from main() via ldflags.
var (
Appname string //nolint:gochecknoglobals // set from main
Version string //nolint:gochecknoglobals // set from main
)
const appname = "pixad"
// Version is populated from main() via ldflags.
var Version string //nolint:gochecknoglobals // set from main
// Globals holds application-wide constants.
type Globals struct {
@@ -20,7 +19,7 @@ type Globals struct {
// New creates a new Globals instance from build-time variables.
func New(_ fx.Lifecycle) (*Globals, error) {
return &Globals{
Appname: Appname,
Appname: appname,
Version: Version,
}, nil
}
+220 -80
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,37 @@
package handlers
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/subtle"
"errors"
"fmt"
"html/template"
"math"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/clientip"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/templates"
)
// errInvalidFormField reports a generator form field, or the q or exp
// parameter of /v1/image/, whose value is non-numeric or out of range. The
// offending field name is wrapped in so the response can name it.
var errInvalidFormField = errors.New("invalid")
// Bounds for the generator's quality and ttl fields; the quality bounds also
// apply to the q parameter of /v1/image/. maxTTL is in seconds: the expiry
// calculation time.Duration(ttl) * time.Second overflows above it.
const (
minQuality = 1
maxQuality = 100
maxTTL = int(math.MaxInt64 / time.Second)
)
// HandleRoot serves the login page or generator page based on authentication state.
func (s *Handlers) HandleRoot() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -23,20 +43,21 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleRoot() http.HandlerFunc {
// Check if authenticated
if s.sessMgr.IsAuthenticated(r) {
s.renderGenerator(w, nil)
s.renderGenerator(w, r, nil)
return
}
// Show login page
s.renderLogin(w, "")
s.renderLogin(w, r, "")
}
}
// handleLoginPost handles login form submission.
func (s *Handlers) handleLoginPost(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
s.renderLogin(w, "Invalid form data")
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
s.renderLogin(w, r, "Invalid form data")
return
}
@@ -45,21 +66,24 @@ func (s *Handlers) handleLoginPost(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(submittedKey), []byte(s.config.SigningKey)) != 1 {
s.log.Warn("failed login attempt", "remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr)
s.renderLogin(w, "Invalid signing key")
s.log.Warn("failed login attempt",
"remote_addr", clientip.FromContext(r.Context()))
s.renderLogin(w, r, "Invalid signing key")
return
}
// Create session
if err := s.sessMgr.CreateSession(w); err != nil {
err = s.sessMgr.CreateSession(w)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to create session", "error", err)
s.renderLogin(w, "Failed to create session")
s.renderLogin(w, r, "Failed to create session")
return
}
s.log.Info("successful login", "remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr)
s.log.Info("successful login",
"remote_addr", clientip.FromContext(r.Context()))
// Redirect to generator page
http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
@@ -83,85 +107,43 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleGenerateURL() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
s.renderGenerator(w, &generatorData{Error: "Invalid form data"})
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
s.renderGenerator(w, r, &generatorData{Error: "Invalid form data"})
return
}
// Parse form values
sourceURL := r.FormValue("url")
widthStr := r.FormValue("width")
heightStr := r.FormValue("height")
format := r.FormValue("format")
qualityStr := r.FormValue("quality")
fit := r.FormValue("fit")
ttlStr := r.FormValue("ttl")
// Validate source URL
parsed, err := url.Parse(sourceURL)
if err != nil || parsed.Host == "" {
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, "Invalid source URL", r.Form)
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, r, "Invalid source URL", r.Form,
http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Parse dimensions
width, _ := strconv.Atoi(widthStr)
height, _ := strconv.Atoi(heightStr)
quality, _ := strconv.Atoi(qualityStr)
ttl, _ := strconv.Atoi(ttlStr)
payload, expiresAt, ttl, err := buildGeneratePayload(parsed, r.Form)
if err != nil {
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, r, err.Error(), r.Form,
http.StatusBadRequest)
if quality <= 0 {
quality = 85
}
// Create payload
// ttl=0 means never expires
var expiresAt time.Time
var expiresAtUnix int64
if ttl > 0 {
expiresAt = time.Now().Add(time.Duration(ttl) * time.Second)
expiresAtUnix = expiresAt.Unix()
}
// else expiresAtUnix stays 0 (never expires)
payload := &encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: parsed.Host,
SourcePath: parsed.Path,
SourceQuery: parsed.RawQuery,
Width: width,
Height: height,
Format: imgcache.ImageFormat(format),
Quality: quality,
FitMode: imgcache.FitMode(fit),
ExpiresAt: expiresAtUnix,
return
}
// Generate encrypted token
token, err := s.encGen.Generate(payload)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to generate encrypted URL", "error", err)
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, "Failed to generate URL", r.Form)
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, r, "Failed to generate URL", r.Form,
http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Build full URL (URL-encode the token for safety)
scheme := "https"
if s.config.Debug {
scheme = "http"
}
// Determine file extension for the trailing filename
ext := format
if ext == "" || ext == "orig" {
ext = "jpg" // Default extension
}
host := r.Host
generatedURL := scheme + "://" + host + "/v1/e/" + url.PathEscape(token) + "/img." + ext
generatedURL := s.buildGeneratedURL(r, token, r.FormValue("format"))
// Format expiry for display
expiresAtStr := "Never"
@@ -169,20 +151,128 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleGenerateURL() http.HandlerFunc {
expiresAtStr = expiresAt.Format(time.RFC3339)
}
s.renderGenerator(w, &generatorData{
s.renderGenerator(w, r, &generatorData{
GeneratedURL: generatedURL,
ExpiresAt: expiresAtStr,
FormURL: sourceURL,
FormWidth: widthStr,
FormHeight: heightStr,
FormFormat: format,
FormQuality: qualityStr,
FormFit: fit,
FormTTL: ttlStr,
FormWidth: r.FormValue("width"),
FormHeight: r.FormValue("height"),
FormFormat: r.FormValue("format"),
FormQuality: r.FormValue("quality"),
FormFit: r.FormValue("fit"),
FormTTL: r.FormValue("ttl"),
})
}
}
// buildGeneratePayload parses the numeric form fields and assembles the
// encrypted URL payload. ttl=0 means never expires (ExpiresAt stays 0). A
// non-numeric or out-of-range width, height, quality or ttl, or an
// unrecognized fit mode, is a client error naming the offending field. The
// format field is passed through unchecked.
func buildGeneratePayload(
parsed *url.URL, form url.Values,
) (*encurl.Payload, time.Time, int, error) {
width, err := parseFormDimension(form, "width")
if err != nil {
return nil, time.Time{}, 0, err
}
height, err := parseFormDimension(form, "height")
if err != nil {
return nil, time.Time{}, 0, err
}
quality, err := parseFormInt(form, "quality",
encurl.DefaultQuality, minQuality, maxQuality)
if err != nil {
return nil, time.Time{}, 0, err
}
ttl, err := parseFormInt(form, "ttl", 0, 0, maxTTL)
if err != nil {
return nil, time.Time{}, 0, err
}
fitMode := imgcache.FitMode(form.Get("fit"))
err = imgcache.ValidateFitMode(fitMode)
if err != nil {
return nil, time.Time{}, 0,
fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", imgcache.ErrInvalidFitMode, form.Get("fit"))
}
var (
expiresAt time.Time
expiresAtUnix int64
)
if ttl > 0 {
expiresAt = time.Now().Add(time.Duration(ttl) * time.Second)
expiresAtUnix = expiresAt.Unix()
}
payload := &encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: parsed.Host,
SourcePath: parsed.Path,
SourceQuery: parsed.RawQuery,
Width: width,
Height: height,
Format: imgcache.ImageFormat(form.Get("format")),
Quality: quality,
FitMode: fitMode,
ExpiresAt: expiresAtUnix,
}
return payload, expiresAt, ttl, nil
}
// parseFormDimension reads an optional width or height form field. An empty
// value means "original size" (0). A non-numeric value, or one
// imgcache.ValidateDimension rejects, is an error naming the field.
func parseFormDimension(form url.Values, field string) (int, error) {
raw := form.Get(field)
if raw == "" {
return 0, nil
}
value, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w %s: not a number", errInvalidFormField, field)
}
err = imgcache.ValidateDimension(field, value)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return value, nil
}
// parseFormInt reads an optional integer form field or URL query parameter,
// returning def when the field is empty and an error naming the field when the
// value is non-numeric or outside minValue to maxValue.
func parseFormInt(
form url.Values, field string, def, minValue, maxValue int,
) (int, error) {
raw := form.Get(field)
if raw == "" {
return def, nil
}
value, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w %s: not a number", errInvalidFormField, field)
}
if value < minValue || value > maxValue {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w %s: must be from %d to %d",
errInvalidFormField, field, minValue, maxValue)
}
return value, nil
}
// generatorData holds template data for the generator page.
type generatorData struct {
GeneratedURL string
@@ -195,38 +285,72 @@ type generatorData struct {
FormQuality string
FormFit string
FormTTL string
CSRFField template.HTML
}
func (s *Handlers) renderLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, errorMsg string) {
func (s *Handlers) renderLogin(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, errorMsg string,
) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
data := struct {
Error string
Error string
CSRFField template.HTML
}{
Error: errorMsg,
Error: errorMsg,
CSRFField: csrfField(r),
}
if err := templates.Render(w, "login.html", data); err != nil {
err := templates.Render(w, "login.html", data)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to render login template", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
}
func (s *Handlers) renderGenerator(w http.ResponseWriter, data *generatorData) {
func (s *Handlers) renderGenerator(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data *generatorData,
) {
s.renderGeneratorStatus(w, r, data, http.StatusOK)
}
// renderGeneratorStatus renders the generator page with an explicit HTTP
// status; a rejected form uses 400. The page is rendered into a buffer before
// the status is written, so a template failure can still answer 500.
func (s *Handlers) renderGeneratorStatus(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data *generatorData, status int,
) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
if data == nil {
data = &generatorData{}
}
if err := templates.Render(w, "generator.html", data); err != nil {
data.CSRFField = csrfField(r)
var page bytes.Buffer
err := templates.Render(&page, "generator.html", data)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to render generator template", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(status)
_, err = page.WriteTo(w)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to write generator page", "error", err)
}
}
func (s *Handlers) renderGeneratorWithForm(w http.ResponseWriter, errorMsg string, form url.Values) {
s.renderGenerator(w, &generatorData{
func (s *Handlers) renderGeneratorWithForm(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, errorMsg string,
form url.Values, status int,
) {
s.renderGeneratorStatus(w, r, &generatorData{
Error: errorMsg,
FormURL: form.Get("url"),
FormWidth: form.Get("width"),
@@ -235,5 +359,21 @@ func (s *Handlers) renderGeneratorWithForm(w http.ResponseWriter, errorMsg strin
FormQuality: form.Get("quality"),
FormFit: form.Get("fit"),
FormTTL: form.Get("ttl"),
})
}, status)
}
func (s *Handlers) buildGeneratedURL(r *http.Request, token, format string) string {
// Build full URL (URL-encode the token for safety)
scheme := "https"
if s.config.Debug {
scheme = "http"
}
// Determine file extension for the trailing filename
ext := format
if ext == "" || ext == "orig" {
ext = "jpg" // Default extension
}
return scheme + "://" + r.Host + "/v1/e/" + url.PathEscape(token) + "/img." + ext
}
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
package handlers
import (
"bytes"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/clientip"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/config"
)
// TestFailedLoginLogsResolvedClientIP verifies the failed-login record
// carries the resolved client IP from the request context, not the raw
// proxy peer address.
func TestFailedLoginLogsResolvedClientIP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var buf bytes.Buffer
h := &Handlers{
log: slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, nil)),
config: &config.Config{SigningKey: testSigningKey},
}
form := url.Values{loginKeyField: {"wrong-key"}}
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodPost, "/",
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
req = req.WithContext(clientip.WithClientIP(req.Context(), "203.0.113.7"))
h.handleLoginPost(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
if !strings.Contains(buf.String(), `"remote_addr":"203.0.113.7"`) {
t.Errorf("failed-login log missing resolved client IP; got %q", buf.String())
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
package handlers
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/session"
)
// testSigningKey is a throwaway signing key for the CSRF flow tests. It
// seeds the session manager, the encrypted-URL generator, and the CSRF
// token key, exactly as the real signing key does in production.
const testSigningKey = "test-signing-key-0123456789abcdef"
// Form field names used in the CSRF flow tests.
const (
loginKeyField = "key"
// gorilla/csrf's default form field name, not a credential.
csrfTokenField = "gorilla.csrf.Token" //nolint:gosec // G101 false positive
)
// csrfFieldPattern extracts the token rendered by csrf.TemplateField into
// the form. The field name is gorilla/csrf's default.
var csrfFieldPattern = regexp.MustCompile(
`name="gorilla\.csrf\.Token" value="([^"]+)"`)
// newCSRFTestRouter builds a router that mirrors the production wiring for
// the CSRF-protected UI routes (see server.SetupRoutes): the login and
// generator forms and their POST targets sit behind the real CSRF
// middleware. Requests are marked plaintext (Debug: true) so the flow runs
// over httptest's http transport without an https Referer.
func newCSRFTestRouter(t *testing.T) (*Handlers, http.Handler) {
t.Helper()
cfg := &config.Config{SigningKey: testSigningKey, Debug: true}
sessMgr, err := session.NewManager(testSigningKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session.NewManager() error = %v", err)
}
encGen, err := encurl.NewGenerator(testSigningKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encurl.NewGenerator() error = %v", err)
}
protect, err := newCSRFProtect(testSigningKey, cfg.Debug)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newCSRFProtect() error = %v", err)
}
h := &Handlers{
log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
config: cfg,
sessMgr: sessMgr,
encGen: encGen,
csrfProtect: protect,
}
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(h.CSRF())
r.Get("/", h.HandleRoot())
r.Post("/", h.HandleRoot())
r.Post("/generate", h.HandleGenerateURL())
})
return h, r
}
// csrfCredentials performs a GET that renders a form and returns the CSRF
// cookies the middleware set and the token embedded in the form. Passing
// the authenticated session cookie renders the generator form instead of
// the login form.
func csrfCredentials(
t *testing.T, srv http.Handler, reqCookies []*http.Cookie,
) ([]*http.Cookie, string) {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
for _, c := range reqCookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("GET / status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
match := csrfFieldPattern.FindStringSubmatch(rec.Body.String())
if match == nil {
t.Fatalf("no CSRF token field found in rendered form")
}
return rec.Result().Cookies(), match[1]
}
// postForm submits form values with the given cookies and returns the
// recorder.
func postForm(
srv http.Handler, path string,
cookies []*http.Cookie, form url.Values,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, path,
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
for _, c := range cookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
return rec
}
// TestLoginPostRejectedWithoutToken verifies that POST / with no CSRF token
// is rejected. This is login CSRF: no session cookie exists yet, so the
// protection must rest on a token bound to a pre-session cookie.
func TestLoginPostRejectedWithoutToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, srv := newCSRFTestRouter(t)
rec := postForm(srv, "/", nil, url.Values{loginKeyField: {testSigningKey}})
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("POST / without token status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
}
}
// TestLoginPostRejectedWithForeignToken verifies that a token that does not
// match the request's CSRF cookie is rejected: a token minted for one
// cookie cannot authorize a request carrying a different cookie.
func TestLoginPostRejectedWithForeignToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, srv := newCSRFTestRouter(t)
cookiesA, _ := csrfCredentials(t, srv, nil)
_, tokenB := csrfCredentials(t, srv, nil)
rec := postForm(srv, "/", cookiesA, url.Values{
loginKeyField: {testSigningKey},
csrfTokenField: {tokenB},
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("POST / with foreign token status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
}
}
// TestLoginPostAcceptedWithValidToken verifies that POST / with a matching
// cookie and token succeeds: the login is processed and a session is
// established (303 redirect).
func TestLoginPostAcceptedWithValidToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, srv := newCSRFTestRouter(t)
cookies, token := csrfCredentials(t, srv, nil)
rec := postForm(srv, "/", cookies, url.Values{
loginKeyField: {testSigningKey},
csrfTokenField: {token},
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther {
t.Fatalf("POST / with valid token status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusSeeOther)
}
var authed bool
for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
if c.Name == session.CookieName && c.Value != "" {
authed = true
}
}
if !authed {
t.Error("valid login did not set a session cookie")
}
}
// TestGeneratePostRejectedWithoutToken verifies that POST /generate is
// rejected without a CSRF token even when the request carries a valid
// authenticated session. The session cookie is not sufficient; the policy
// requires a CSRF token on this cookie-authenticated form.
func TestGeneratePostRejectedWithoutToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, srv := newCSRFTestRouter(t)
sessionCookie := newSessionCookie(t, h)
rec := postForm(srv, "/generate",
[]*http.Cookie{sessionCookie},
url.Values{"url": {"https://example.com/a.jpg"}})
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("POST /generate without token status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
}
}
// TestGeneratePostAcceptedWithValidToken verifies that POST /generate
// succeeds with a valid session and a matching CSRF cookie and token.
func TestGeneratePostAcceptedWithValidToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, srv := newCSRFTestRouter(t)
sessionCookie := newSessionCookie(t, h)
cookies, token := csrfCredentials(t, srv, []*http.Cookie{sessionCookie})
cookies = append(cookies, sessionCookie)
rec := postForm(srv, "/generate", cookies, url.Values{
"url": {"https://example.com/a.jpg"},
"format": {"jpeg"},
csrfTokenField: {token},
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("POST /generate with valid token status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "/v1/e/") {
t.Error("generator response did not contain a generated URL")
}
}
// newSessionCookie creates an authenticated session cookie via the
// handler's session manager.
func newSessionCookie(t *testing.T, h *Handlers) *http.Cookie {
t.Helper()
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
err := h.sessMgr.CreateSession(rec)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateSession() error = %v", err)
}
for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
if c.Name == session.CookieName {
return c
}
}
t.Fatalf("session manager did not set a %q cookie", session.CookieName)
return nil
}
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
package handlers
import (
"maps"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
)
// Generator form field names, and a value that is not a number.
const (
widthField = "width"
heightField = "height"
qualityField = "quality"
ttlField = "ttl"
fitField = "fit"
notANumber = "abc"
)
// generatePost submits the /generate form with a valid session and CSRF token
// plus the caller's extra fields, returning the recorder.
func generatePost(
t *testing.T, extra url.Values,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
h, srv := newCSRFTestRouter(t)
sessionCookie := newSessionCookie(t, h)
cookies, token := csrfCredentials(t, srv, []*http.Cookie{sessionCookie})
cookies = append(cookies, sessionCookie)
form := url.Values{
sourceURLField: {testSourceURL},
csrfTokenField: {token},
}
maps.Copy(form, extra)
return postForm(srv, "/generate", cookies, form)
}
// TestGeneratePostRejectsNonNumericWidth verifies that a non-numeric width is
// rejected with 400 naming the field rather than being coerced to 0 and
// minting a 0-width token.
func TestGeneratePostRejectsNonNumericWidth(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rec := generatePost(t, url.Values{"width": {"abc"}})
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "/v1/e/") {
t.Error("a token was generated for non-numeric width")
}
}
// TestGeneratePostRejectsOverLimitWidth verifies that a width beyond
// MaxDimension is rejected at generation time so an unusable token cannot be
// minted.
func TestGeneratePostRejectsOverLimitWidth(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rec := generatePost(t, url.Values{"width": {"100000"}})
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "/v1/e/") {
t.Error("a token was generated for an over-limit width")
}
}
// TestGeneratePostRejectsBadField verifies that each generator field whose
// value is not a number, out of range, or unrecognized is rejected with 400,
// mints no token, and is named in the error shown on the page.
func TestGeneratePostRejectsBadField(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
field, value, wantError string
}{
{widthField, notANumber, "invalid width: not a number"},
{widthField, "-1", "width is negative"},
{widthField, "8193", "width is above 8192"},
{heightField, notANumber, "invalid height: not a number"},
{heightField, "8193", "height is above 8192"},
{qualityField, notANumber, "invalid quality: not a number"},
{qualityField, "0", "invalid quality: must be from 1 to 100"},
{qualityField, "101", "invalid quality: must be from 1 to 100"},
{ttlField, notANumber, "invalid ttl: not a number"},
{ttlField, "-1", "invalid ttl: must be from 0 to"},
{ttlField, "10000000000", "invalid ttl: must be from 0 to"},
{fitField, "bogus", "invalid fit mode: bogus"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.field+"="+tt.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rec := generatePost(t, url.Values{tt.field: {tt.value}})
body := rec.Body.String()
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if strings.Contains(body, "/v1/e/") {
t.Error("a token was generated")
}
if !strings.Contains(body, tt.wantError) {
t.Errorf("page does not show %q", tt.wantError)
}
})
}
}
// TestBuildGeneratePayloadDefaultAndLimits verifies that an empty quality
// takes the default, and that the largest accepted width, height, quality and
// ttl are accepted with an expiry still in the future.
func TestBuildGeneratePayloadDefaultAndLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
parsed, err := url.Parse(testSourceURL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("url.Parse() error = %v", err)
}
payload, _, _, err := buildGeneratePayload(parsed, url.Values{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("empty form: error = %v", err)
}
if payload.Quality != encurl.DefaultQuality {
t.Errorf("empty quality gave %d, want %d",
payload.Quality, encurl.DefaultQuality)
}
_, expiresAt, _, err := buildGeneratePayload(parsed, url.Values{
widthField: {strconv.Itoa(imgcache.MaxDimension)},
heightField: {strconv.Itoa(imgcache.MaxDimension)},
qualityField: {strconv.Itoa(maxQuality)},
ttlField: {strconv.Itoa(maxTTL)},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("largest accepted values: error = %v", err)
}
if !expiresAt.After(time.Now()) {
t.Errorf("ttl %d gave expiry %v, want a time in the future",
maxTTL, expiresAt)
}
}
+45
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
package handlers
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
)
// MaxFormBytes bounds the request body accepted on the HTML form POST
// routes (POST / and POST /generate). The forms carry a handful of short
// fields, so 1 MiB is generous while making the bound explicit rather than
// resting on ParseForm's incidental 10 MB cap.
const MaxFormBytes = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
// LimitBody returns middleware that caps the request body on POST requests
// at maxBytes and rejects an oversized body with 413 Request Entity Too
// Large.
//
// It parses the form here, before the CSRF middleware reads the token from
// it. The CSRF middleware reads the token with PostFormValue, which
// swallows a parse error, so if the body were only capped there an
// oversized body would read as a missing token and be refused as 403. By
// parsing under the cap first, an oversized body is refused as 413. A
// successful parse is cached on the request, so the CSRF check and the
// handler reuse it rather than reading the body again.
func (s *Handlers) LimitBody(maxBytes int64) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxBytes)
err := r.ParseForm()
var tooLarge *http.MaxBytesError
if errors.As(err, &tooLarge) {
http.Error(w, "Request body too large",
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
return
}
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
package handlers
import (
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/session"
)
// Form field names and a throwaway source image URL for the body-limit
// tests.
const (
sourceURLField = "url"
testSourceURL = "https://example.com/a.jpg"
)
// newBodyLimitTestRouter mirrors the production wiring for the form POST
// routes (see server.SetupRoutes): LimitBody sits in front of the CSRF
// middleware, which sits in front of the handlers. maxBytes is the body
// cap under test, so a test can trip the limit with a small body.
func newBodyLimitTestRouter(
t *testing.T, maxBytes int64,
) (*Handlers, http.Handler) {
t.Helper()
cfg := &config.Config{SigningKey: testSigningKey, Debug: true}
sessMgr, err := session.NewManager(testSigningKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session.NewManager() error = %v", err)
}
encGen, err := encurl.NewGenerator(testSigningKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encurl.NewGenerator() error = %v", err)
}
protect, err := newCSRFProtect(testSigningKey, cfg.Debug)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newCSRFProtect() error = %v", err)
}
h := &Handlers{
log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
config: cfg,
sessMgr: sessMgr,
encGen: encGen,
csrfProtect: protect,
}
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(h.LimitBody(maxBytes))
r.Use(h.CSRF())
r.Get("/", h.HandleRoot())
r.Post("/", h.HandleRoot())
r.Post("/generate", h.HandleGenerateURL())
})
return h, r
}
// TestOversizedLoginPostRejectedBeforeCSRF is the core regression: an
// oversized POST / carrying an otherwise valid CSRF cookie and token must
// be rejected with 413. If the body limit ran after CSRF, the truncated
// body would read as a missing token and return 403; if it ran after the
// handler, a valid token would return 303. Getting 413 proves the limit
// fires before CSRF parses the form.
func TestOversizedLoginPostRejectedBeforeCSRF(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, srv := newBodyLimitTestRouter(t, 16)
cookies, token := csrfCredentials(t, srv, nil)
rec := postForm(srv, "/", cookies, url.Values{
loginKeyField: {testSigningKey},
csrfTokenField: {token},
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("oversized POST / status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
}
}
// TestOversizedGeneratePostRejectedBeforeCSRF is the same regression for
// POST /generate, which also parses a form behind CSRF.
func TestOversizedGeneratePostRejectedBeforeCSRF(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, srv := newBodyLimitTestRouter(t, 16)
sessionCookie := newSessionCookie(t, h)
cookies, token := csrfCredentials(t, srv, []*http.Cookie{sessionCookie})
cookies = append(cookies, sessionCookie)
rec := postForm(srv, "/generate", cookies, url.Values{
sourceURLField: {testSourceURL},
csrfTokenField: {token},
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("oversized POST /generate status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
}
}
// TestWithinLimitLoginPostSucceeds verifies the limit does not disturb a
// normal request: under the production cap, a valid login still parses and
// establishes a session (303). This guards against the body limit
// consuming or corrupting the form the CSRF check and handler depend on.
func TestWithinLimitLoginPostSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, srv := newBodyLimitTestRouter(t, MaxFormBytes)
cookies, token := csrfCredentials(t, srv, nil)
rec := postForm(srv, "/", cookies, url.Values{
loginKeyField: {testSigningKey},
csrfTokenField: {token},
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther {
t.Fatalf("within-limit POST / status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusSeeOther)
}
var authed bool
for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
if c.Name == session.CookieName && c.Value != "" {
authed = true
}
}
if !authed {
t.Error("within-limit valid login did not set a session cookie")
}
}
// TestWithinLimitGeneratePostSucceeds is the same non-regression check for
// POST /generate.
func TestWithinLimitGeneratePostSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, srv := newBodyLimitTestRouter(t, MaxFormBytes)
sessionCookie := newSessionCookie(t, h)
cookies, token := csrfCredentials(t, srv, []*http.Cookie{sessionCookie})
cookies = append(cookies, sessionCookie)
rec := postForm(srv, "/generate", cookies, url.Values{
sourceURLField: {testSourceURL},
"format": {"jpeg"},
csrfTokenField: {token},
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("within-limit POST /generate status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "/v1/e/") {
t.Error("within-limit generate response did not contain a generated URL")
}
}
+65
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
package handlers
import (
"html/template"
"net/http"
"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/seal"
)
// csrfKeySalt provides domain separation for the CSRF authentication key,
// derived from the signing key so tokens survive restarts without extra
// configuration and never reuse the session or encrypted-URL key material.
const csrfKeySalt = "pixa-csrf-v1"
// newCSRFProtect builds the CSRF-protection middleware for the
// state-mutating HTML form routes. The token lives in its own cookie,
// independent of the session cookie, so it also protects the login POST
// where no session exists yet (login CSRF).
//
// When plaintext is true (local HTTP development), requests are marked
// plaintext so the library neither demands an https Referer nor sets a
// Secure cookie the browser would withhold over http. In production the
// service runs behind a TLS-terminating proxy, so plaintext is false and
// the library enforces its https Referer origin check.
func newCSRFProtect(
signingKey string, plaintext bool,
) (func(http.Handler) http.Handler, error) {
key, err := seal.DeriveKey([]byte(signingKey), csrfKeySalt)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
protect := csrf.Protect(
key[:],
csrf.Path("/"),
csrf.Secure(!plaintext),
csrf.SameSite(csrf.SameSiteStrictMode),
)
if !plaintext {
return protect, nil
}
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
protected := protect(next)
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
protected.ServeHTTP(w, csrf.PlaintextHTTPRequest(r))
})
}, nil
}
// CSRF returns the CSRF-protection middleware for the login and generator
// form routes.
func (s *Handlers) CSRF() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return s.csrfProtect
}
// csrfField returns the hidden form input carrying the CSRF token for the
// given request, to be embedded verbatim in a rendered form.
func csrfField(r *http.Request) template.HTML {
return csrf.TemplateField(r)
}
+67 -26
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/session"
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ import (
// Params defines dependencies for Handlers.
type Params struct {
fx.In
Logger *logger.Logger
Healthcheck *healthcheck.Healthcheck
Database *database.Database
@@ -29,29 +31,51 @@ type Params struct {
// Handlers provides HTTP request handlers.
type Handlers struct {
log *slog.Logger
hc *healthcheck.Healthcheck
db *database.Database
config *config.Config
imgSvc *imgcache.Service
imgCache *imgcache.Cache
sessMgr *session.Manager
encGen *encurl.Generator
log *slog.Logger
hc *healthcheck.Healthcheck
db *database.Database
config *config.Config
imgSvc *imgcache.Service
imgCache *imgcache.Cache
sessMgr *session.Manager
encGen *encurl.Generator
csrfProtect func(http.Handler) http.Handler
}
// New creates a new Handlers instance.
func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params Params) (*Handlers, error) {
csrfProtect, err := newCSRFProtect(params.Config.SigningKey, params.Config.Debug)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s := &Handlers{
log: params.Logger.Get(),
hc: params.Healthcheck,
db: params.Database,
config: params.Config,
log: params.Logger.Get(),
hc: params.Healthcheck,
db: params.Database,
config: params.Config,
csrfProtect: csrfProtect,
}
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
// The eviction goroutine must outlive OnStart, so it cannot
// inherit this hook's context. It makes its own instead, which
// leaves it uncancellable: an in-flight pass runs to completion
// during OnStop regardless of the shutdown deadline. Making the
// loop cancellable changes shutdown semantics and is tracked
// separately in issue #102, rather than being folded into the
// lint-conformance change that surfaced it.
//nolint:contextcheck // see issue #102
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
return s.initImageService()
},
OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
if s.imgCache != nil {
s.imgCache.StopEviction()
}
return nil
},
})
return s, nil
@@ -59,11 +83,15 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params Params) (*Handlers, error) {
// initImageService initializes the image cache and service.
func (s *Handlers) initImageService() error {
// Create the cache
// Create the cache. cache_max_bytes: 0 disables the disk cache
// entirely; any other value is the eviction limit in bytes.
cache, err := imgcache.NewCache(s.db.DB(), imgcache.CacheConfig{
StateDir: s.config.StateDir,
CacheTTL: imgcache.DefaultCacheTTL,
NegativeTTL: imgcache.DefaultNegativeTTL,
StateDir: s.config.StateDir,
CacheTTL: imgcache.DefaultCacheTTL,
NegativeTTL: imgcache.DefaultNegativeTTL,
MaxBytes: s.config.CacheMaxBytes,
DisableDiskCache: s.config.CacheMaxBytes == 0,
Logger: s.log,
})
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -71,20 +99,29 @@ func (s *Handlers) initImageService() error {
s.imgCache = cache
// Background eviction: startup reconciliation, then periodic and
// write-pressure passes. No-op when the disk cache is disabled.
cache.StartEviction(imgcache.DefaultEvictionInterval)
// Create the fetcher config
fetcherCfg := imgcache.DefaultFetcherConfig()
fetcherCfg := httpfetcher.DefaultConfig()
fetcherCfg.AllowHTTP = s.config.AllowHTTP
if s.config.UpstreamConnectionsPerHost > 0 {
fetcherCfg.MaxConnectionsPerHost = s.config.UpstreamConnectionsPerHost
}
fetcherCfg.MaxConnections = s.config.UpstreamConnections
fetcherCfg.BlockedNetworks = s.config.BlockedNetworks
// Create the service
svc, err := imgcache.NewService(&imgcache.ServiceConfig{
Cache: cache,
FetcherConfig: fetcherCfg,
SigningKey: s.config.SigningKey,
Whitelist: s.config.WhitelistHosts,
Logger: s.log,
Cache: cache,
FetcherConfig: fetcherCfg,
SigningKey: s.config.SigningKey,
Allowlist: s.config.AllowlistHosts,
MaxConcurrentProcessing: s.config.MaxConcurrentProcessing,
Logger: s.log,
})
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -93,11 +130,13 @@ func (s *Handlers) initImageService() error {
s.imgSvc = svc
s.log.Info("image service initialized")
// Initialize session manager (signing key is validated at config load time)
sessMgr, err := session.NewManager(s.config.SigningKey, !s.config.Debug)
// Initialize session manager (signing key is validated at config load
// time). Session cookies are always Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite=Strict.
sessMgr, err := session.NewManager(s.config.SigningKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.sessMgr = sessMgr
// Initialize encrypted URL generator
@@ -105,6 +144,7 @@ func (s *Handlers) initImageService() error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.encGen = encGen
s.log.Info("session manager and URL generator initialized")
@@ -112,9 +152,10 @@ func (s *Handlers) initImageService() error {
return nil
}
func (s *Handlers) respondJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, data interface{}, status int) {
func (s *Handlers) respondJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, data any, status int) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
if data != nil {
err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(data)
if err != nil {
@@ -124,7 +165,7 @@ func (s *Handlers) respondJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, data interface{}, status i
}
func (s *Handlers) respondError(w http.ResponseWriter, message string, status int) {
s.respondJSON(w, map[string]interface{}{
s.respondJSON(w, map[string]any{
"error": message,
"status": status,
"timestamp": time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"image"
"image/color"
"image/jpeg"
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@ import (
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
)
@@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ func setupTestHandler(t *testing.T) *testFixtures {
Cache: cache,
Fetcher: newMockFetcher(mockFS),
SigningKey: "test-signing-key-must-be-32-chars",
Whitelist: []string{goodHost},
Allowlist: []string{goodHost},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create service: %v", err)
@@ -82,7 +84,8 @@ func setupTestDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
t.Fatalf("failed to open test db: %v", err)
}
if err := database.ApplyMigrations(db); err != nil {
err = database.ApplyMigrations(context.Background(), db, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to apply migrations: %v", err)
}
@@ -93,14 +96,16 @@ func generateTestJPEG(t *testing.T, width, height int, c color.Color) []byte {
t.Helper()
img := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, width, height))
for y := 0; y < height; y++ {
for x := 0; x < width; x++ {
for y := range height {
for x := range width {
img.Set(x, y, c)
}
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := jpeg.Encode(&buf, img, &jpeg.Options{Quality: 85}); err != nil {
err := jpeg.Encode(&buf, img, &jpeg.Options{Quality: 85})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encode test JPEG: %v", err)
}
@@ -116,16 +121,18 @@ func newMockFetcher(fs fs.FS) *mockFetcher {
return &mockFetcher{fs: fs}
}
func (f *mockFetcher) Fetch(ctx context.Context, url string) (*imgcache.FetchResult, error) {
func (f *mockFetcher) Fetch(
_ context.Context, url string,
) (*httpfetcher.FetchResult, error) {
// Remove https:// prefix
path := url[8:] // Remove "https://"
data, err := fs.ReadFile(f.fs, path)
if err != nil {
return nil, imgcache.ErrUpstreamError
return nil, httpfetcher.ErrUpstreamError
}
return &imgcache.FetchResult{
return &httpfetcher.FetchResult{
Content: io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(data)),
ContentLength: int64(len(data)),
ContentType: "image/jpeg",
@@ -133,13 +140,16 @@ func (f *mockFetcher) Fetch(ctx context.Context, url string) (*imgcache.FetchRes
}
func TestHandleImage_HEAD_ReturnsHeadersOnly(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fix := setupTestHandler(t)
// Create a chi router to properly handle wildcards
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Head("/v1/image/*", fix.handler.HandleImage())
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodHead, "/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodHead,
"/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
@@ -166,13 +176,16 @@ func TestHandleImage_HEAD_ReturnsHeadersOnly(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandleImage_ConditionalRequest_IfNoneMatch_Returns304(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fix := setupTestHandler(t)
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/v1/image/*", fix.handler.HandleImage())
// First request to get the ETag
req1 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg", nil)
req1 := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg", nil)
rec1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rec1, req1)
@@ -187,15 +200,18 @@ func TestHandleImage_ConditionalRequest_IfNoneMatch_Returns304(t *testing.T) {
}
// Second request with If-None-Match header
req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg", nil)
req2 := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg", nil)
req2.Header.Set("If-None-Match", etag)
rec2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rec2, req2)
// Should return 304 Not Modified
if rec2.Code != http.StatusNotModified {
t.Errorf("Conditional request status = %d, want %d", rec2.Code, http.StatusNotModified)
t.Errorf("Conditional request status = %d, want %d",
rec2.Code, http.StatusNotModified)
}
// Body should be empty for 304 response
@@ -205,21 +221,26 @@ func TestHandleImage_ConditionalRequest_IfNoneMatch_Returns304(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandleImage_ConditionalRequest_IfNoneMatch_DifferentETag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fix := setupTestHandler(t)
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/v1/image/*", fix.handler.HandleImage())
// Request with non-matching ETag
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg", nil)
req.Header.Set("If-None-Match", `"different-etag"`)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
// Should return 200 OK with full response
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("Request with non-matching ETag status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
t.Errorf("Request with non-matching ETag status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
// Body should not be empty
@@ -229,12 +250,15 @@ func TestHandleImage_ConditionalRequest_IfNoneMatch_DifferentETag(t *testing.T)
}
func TestHandleImage_ETagHeader(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fix := setupTestHandler(t)
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/v1/image/*", fix.handler.HandleImage())
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
@@ -253,3 +277,120 @@ func TestHandleImage_ETagHeader(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("ETag should be quoted, got %q", etag)
}
}
// TestHandleImage_InvalidFitMode_Returns400 verifies that the plain image
// route rejects an unrecognized fit mode with 400.
func TestHandleImage_InvalidFitMode_Returns400(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fix := setupTestHandler(t)
status := getImage(t, fix,
"/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg?fit=bogus")
if status != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", status, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
}
// TestHandleImage_InvalidQuery_Returns400 verifies that the plain image route
// answers a q that is not a whole number from 1 to 100, an empty one
// included, with 400 naming q and the value, a parameter given more than once
// with 400 naming it, and a query string that cannot be decoded with 400
// showing it, instead of serving the image at the default quality 85 or at
// the first value given.
func TestHandleImage_InvalidQuery_Returns400(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
query, wantError string
}{
{"q=banana", `invalid q: not a number, got "banana"`},
{"q=0", `invalid q: must be from 1 to 100, got "0"`},
{"q=101", `invalid q: must be from 1 to 100, got "101"`},
{"q=", `invalid q: not a number, got ""`},
{"q=80&q=500", `invalid q: given more than once`},
{"q=80&q=", `invalid q: given more than once`},
{"fit=cover&fit=contain", `invalid fit: given more than once`},
{"q=80%", `invalid query string "q=80%": invalid URL escape "%"`},
{
"q=50;fit=contain",
`invalid query string "q=50;fit=contain": ` +
`invalid semicolon separator in query`,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.query, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fix := setupTestHandler(t)
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/v1/image/*", fix.handler.HandleImage())
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg?"+tt.query, nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
t.Logf("GET %s: %d %s", req.URL, rec.Code, rec.Body)
var body struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
}
err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response body: %v", err)
}
if body.Error != tt.wantError {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want %q", body.Error, tt.wantError)
}
})
}
}
// TestHandleImage_EmptyFit_Returns400 verifies that the plain image route
// answers a fit that is in the URL but empty with 400 naming fit, instead of
// serving the image as cover. Only a fit missing from the URL means cover.
func TestHandleImage_EmptyFit_Returns400(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fix := setupTestHandler(t)
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/v1/image/*", fix.handler.HandleImage())
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg?fit=", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
t.Logf("GET %s: %d %s", req.URL, rec.Code, rec.Body)
var body struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
}
err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response body: %v", err)
}
wantError := `invalid fit: not a fit mode, got ""`
if body.Error != wantError {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want %q", body.Error, wantError)
}
}
+252 -125
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,17 @@ package handlers
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imageprocessor"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
)
@@ -15,64 +20,14 @@ import (
// /v1/image/<host>/<path>/<width>x<height>.<format>
func (s *Handlers) HandleImage() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
// Get the wildcard path from chi
pathParam := chi.URLParam(r, "*")
// Parse the URL path
parsed, err := imgcache.ParseImagePath(pathParam)
if err != nil {
s.log.Warn("failed to parse image URL",
"path", pathParam,
"error", err,
)
s.respondError(w, "invalid image URL: "+err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
req, ok := s.parseImageRequest(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
// Convert to ImageRequest
req := parsed.ToImageRequest()
// Parse signature params from query string
query := r.URL.Query()
req.Signature = query.Get("sig")
if expStr := query.Get("exp"); expStr != "" {
if exp, err := strconv.ParseInt(expStr, 10, 64); err == nil {
req.Expires = time.Unix(exp, 0)
}
}
// Parse optional quality and fit params
if qStr := query.Get("q"); qStr != "" {
if q, err := strconv.Atoi(qStr); err == nil && q > 0 && q <= 100 {
req.Quality = q
}
}
if fit := query.Get("fit"); fit != "" {
req.FitMode = imgcache.FitMode(fit)
if err := imgcache.ValidateFitMode(req.FitMode); err != nil {
s.respondError(w, "invalid fit mode: "+fit, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
}
// Default quality if not set
if req.Quality == 0 {
req.Quality = 85
}
// Default fit mode if not set
if req.FitMode == "" {
req.FitMode = imgcache.FitCover
}
// Validate signature if required
if err := s.imgSvc.ValidateRequest(req); err != nil {
err := s.imgSvc.ValidateRequest(req)
if err != nil {
s.log.Warn("signature validation failed",
"host", req.SourceHost,
"path", req.SourcePath,
@@ -88,83 +43,17 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleImage() http.HandlerFunc {
// Get the image (from cache or fetch/process)
startTime := time.Now()
resp, err := s.imgSvc.Get(ctx, req)
resp, err := s.imgSvc.Get(r.Context(), req)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to get image",
"host", req.SourceHost,
"path", req.SourcePath,
"error", err,
)
// Check for specific error types
if errors.Is(err, imgcache.ErrSSRFBlocked) {
s.respondError(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
if errors.Is(err, imgcache.ErrUpstreamError) {
s.respondError(w, "upstream error", http.StatusBadGateway)
return
}
s.respondError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
s.respondImageError(w, req, err)
return
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Content.Close() }()
// Set response headers
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", resp.ContentType)
if resp.ContentLength > 0 {
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.FormatInt(resp.ContentLength, 10))
}
// Cache control headers
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=31536000, immutable")
w.Header().Set("X-Pixa-Cache", string(resp.CacheStatus))
if resp.ETag != "" {
w.Header().Set("ETag", resp.ETag)
// Check for conditional request (If-None-Match)
if ifNoneMatch := r.Header.Get("If-None-Match"); ifNoneMatch != "" {
if ifNoneMatch == resp.ETag {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotModified)
return
}
}
}
// Handle HEAD request - return headers only
if r.Method == http.MethodHead {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
// Stream the response
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
servedBytes, err := io.Copy(w, resp.Content)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to write response",
"error", err,
)
}
// Log cache status and timing after serving
duration := time.Since(startTime)
s.log.Info("image served",
"cache_key", cacheKey,
"cache_status", resp.CacheStatus,
"duration_ms", duration.Milliseconds(),
"format", req.Format,
"served_bytes", servedBytes,
"fetched_bytes", resp.FetchedBytes,
)
s.writeImageResponse(w, r, req, resp, cacheKey, startTime)
}
}
@@ -179,3 +68,241 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleRobotsTxt() http.HandlerFunc {
_, _ = w.Write(robotsTxt)
}
}
// parseImageRequest parses the wildcard path and query parameters into
// an ImageRequest. On invalid input it writes an error response and
// returns false.
func (s *Handlers) parseImageRequest(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
) (*imgcache.ImageRequest, bool) {
// Get the wildcard path from chi
pathParam := chi.URLParam(r, "*")
// Parse the URL path
parsed, err := imgcache.ParseImagePath(pathParam)
if err != nil {
s.log.Warn("failed to parse image URL",
"path", pathParam,
"error", err,
)
s.respondError(w, "invalid image URL: "+err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return nil, false
}
// Convert to ImageRequest
req := parsed.ToImageRequest()
// Parse signature params from query string. r.URL.Query() would silently
// drop a pair it cannot decode, such as q=80%, so that q would be served
// at 85; a query string that cannot be decoded is refused instead. A
// parameter given more than once is refused too, as only its first value
// would be read.
query, err := url.ParseQuery(r.URL.RawQuery)
if err != nil {
s.respondError(w, fmt.Sprintf("invalid query string %q: %v",
r.URL.RawQuery, err), http.StatusBadRequest)
return nil, false
}
for name, values := range query {
if len(values) > 1 {
s.respondError(w, fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s: given more than once",
name), http.StatusBadRequest)
return nil, false
}
}
req.Signature = query.Get("sig")
req.Expires, err = parseExpires(query)
if err != nil {
s.respondError(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return nil, false
}
// Parse optional quality and fit params. Only a q missing from the URL is
// 85. A q in the URL that is not a whole number from 1 to 100, an empty
// one included, is refused, checked as the generator checks its quality
// field; that check alone would take an empty q as missing.
qStr := query.Get("q")
if query.Has("q") && qStr == "" {
s.respondError(w, `invalid q: not a number, got ""`,
http.StatusBadRequest)
return nil, false
}
req.Quality, err = parseFormInt(query, "q",
encurl.DefaultQuality, minQuality, maxQuality)
if err != nil {
s.respondError(w, fmt.Sprintf("%v, got %q", err, qStr),
http.StatusBadRequest)
return nil, false
}
// Only a fit missing from the URL is cover. A fit in the URL that is not a
// fit mode is refused by the fit-mode check below; that check would take an
// empty fit as missing, so an empty one is refused here.
req.FitMode = imgcache.FitMode(query.Get("fit"))
if query.Has("fit") && req.FitMode == "" {
s.respondError(w, `invalid fit: not a fit mode, got ""`, http.StatusBadRequest)
return nil, false
}
// Default fit mode if not set
if req.FitMode == "" {
req.FitMode = imgcache.FitCover
}
// Enforce dimension and fit-mode bounds, shared with the encrypted-URL
// route. Dimensions are already bounded by the path parser above; this
// also rejects an unrecognized fit mode with 400 instead of letting it
// reach the processor as a 500.
err = imgcache.ValidateImageRequest(req)
if err != nil {
s.respondError(w, "invalid image request: "+err.Error(),
http.StatusBadRequest)
return nil, false
}
return req, true
}
// parseExpires reads the exp query parameter, a Unix time in seconds. An exp
// missing from the URL gives the zero time, which the signature check takes
// as no expiration. An exp in the URL that is not a whole number, an empty
// one included, is an error naming exp and the value.
func parseExpires(query url.Values) (time.Time, error) {
if !query.Has("exp") {
return time.Time{}, nil
}
expStr := query.Get("exp")
exp, err := strconv.ParseInt(expStr, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("%w exp: not a number, got %q",
errInvalidFormField, expStr)
}
return time.Unix(exp, 0), nil
}
// respondImageError maps image retrieval errors to HTTP responses.
func (s *Handlers) respondImageError(
w http.ResponseWriter, req *imgcache.ImageRequest, err error,
) {
s.log.Error("failed to get image",
"host", req.SourceHost,
"path", req.SourcePath,
"error", err,
)
// Check for specific error types
if errors.Is(err, httpfetcher.ErrSSRFBlocked) {
s.respondError(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
if errors.Is(err, httpfetcher.ErrUpstreamError) {
s.respondError(w, "upstream error", http.StatusBadGateway)
return
}
if errors.Is(err, httpfetcher.ErrTooManyConnections) ||
errors.Is(err, imageprocessor.ErrTooManyImages) {
s.respondError(w, "server busy, try again later",
http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
s.respondError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
// cacheControl returns the Cache-Control header for an image served through a
// URL that expires at expires, or never when expires is the zero time. A cache
// may keep the image for a year, but not past the URL's expiry, after which
// pixa refuses the URL. The seconds left are rounded down and never negative.
// immutable only stops revalidation while the image is fresh, so it also ends
// at the expiry.
func cacheControl(expires time.Time) string {
const oneYear = 365 * 24 * time.Hour
maxAge := oneYear
if !expires.IsZero() {
maxAge = min(maxAge, max(time.Until(expires), 0))
}
return fmt.Sprintf("public, max-age=%d, immutable", int64(maxAge/time.Second))
}
// writeImageResponse writes headers and streams the image content,
// handling conditional and HEAD requests.
func (s *Handlers) writeImageResponse(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
req *imgcache.ImageRequest, resp *imgcache.ImageResponse,
cacheKey imgcache.VariantKey, startTime time.Time,
) {
// Set response headers
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", resp.ContentType)
if resp.ContentLength > 0 {
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.FormatInt(resp.ContentLength, 10))
}
// Cache control headers
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", cacheControl(req.Expires))
w.Header().Set("X-Pixa-Cache", string(resp.CacheStatus))
if resp.ETag != "" {
w.Header().Set("ETag", resp.ETag)
// Check for conditional request (If-None-Match)
if ifNoneMatch := r.Header.Get("If-None-Match"); ifNoneMatch != "" {
if ifNoneMatch == resp.ETag {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotModified)
return
}
}
}
// Handle HEAD request - return headers only
if r.Method == http.MethodHead {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
// Stream the response
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
servedBytes, err := io.Copy(w, resp.Content)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to write response",
"error", err,
)
}
// Log cache status and timing after serving
duration := time.Since(startTime)
s.log.Info("image served",
"cache_key", cacheKey,
"cache_status", resp.CacheStatus,
"duration_ms", duration.Milliseconds(),
"format", req.Format,
"served_bytes", servedBytes,
"fetched_bytes", resp.FetchedBytes,
)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
package handlers
import (
"image/color"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"testing/fstest"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
)
// photoPath is the path of the JPEG that newSignedHostServer serves.
const photoPath = "/images/photo.jpg"
// newSignedHostServer returns a router for both image routes, and the Handlers
// behind it, whose fetcher serves a JPEG at photoPath on signedHost. signedHost
// is not on the allowlist, so a /v1/image/ URL for it is served only with a
// valid signature.
func newSignedHostServer(t *testing.T) (*Handlers, http.Handler) {
t.Helper()
cache, err := imgcache.NewCache(setupTestDB(t), imgcache.CacheConfig{
StateDir: t.TempDir(),
CacheTTL: time.Hour,
NegativeTTL: 5 * time.Minute,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("imgcache.NewCache() error = %v", err)
}
jpegData := generateTestJPEG(t, 100, 100, color.RGBA{255, 0, 0, 255})
svc, err := imgcache.NewService(&imgcache.ServiceConfig{
Cache: cache,
Fetcher: newMockFetcher(fstest.MapFS{
signedHost + photoPath: &fstest.MapFile{Data: jpegData},
}),
SigningKey: testSigningKey,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("imgcache.NewService() error = %v", err)
}
encGen, err := encurl.NewGenerator(testSigningKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encurl.NewGenerator() error = %v", err)
}
h := &Handlers{
log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
imgSvc: svc,
encGen: encGen,
}
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/v1/image/*", h.HandleImage())
r.Get("/v1/e/{token}/*", h.HandleImageEnc())
return h, r
}
// getMaxAge sends a GET for target to srv, requires a 200, and returns the
// max-age of the response's Cache-Control header, which must read
// "public, max-age=<seconds>, immutable".
func getMaxAge(t *testing.T, srv http.Handler, target string) int {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, target, nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
header := rec.Header().Get("Cache-Control")
t.Logf("GET %s: %d, Cache-Control: %s", target, rec.Code, header)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
value, hasPrefix := strings.CutPrefix(header, "public, max-age=")
value, hasSuffix := strings.CutSuffix(value, ", immutable")
maxAge, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
if !hasPrefix || !hasSuffix || err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Cache-Control = %q, want public, max-age=<seconds>, immutable",
header)
}
return maxAge
}
// TestHandleImage_SignedURL_MaxAgeEndsAtExp verifies that an image served
// through a signed URL expiring in 60 seconds may be cached for at most those
// 60 seconds. The lower bound of 50 shows the max-age is the time left, not 0.
func TestHandleImage_SignedURL_MaxAgeEndsAtExp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, srv := newSignedHostServer(t)
signedURL, err := h.imgSvc.GenerateSignedURL("", &imgcache.ImageRequest{
SourceHost: signedHost,
SourcePath: photoPath,
Size: imgcache.Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: imgcache.FormatJPEG,
}, time.Minute)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateSignedURL() error = %v", err)
}
maxAge := getMaxAge(t, srv, signedURL)
if maxAge < 50 || maxAge > 60 {
t.Errorf("max-age = %d, want 50 to 60", maxAge)
}
}
// TestHandleImage_AllowlistedHost_MaxAge verifies the max-age of an image from
// an allowlisted host, which is served without checking sig or exp. A URL with
// no exp may be cached for a year. A URL whose exp has passed is the one request
// that reaches the header after its expiry, and must get 0, never less.
func TestHandleImage_AllowlistedHost_MaxAge(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
pastExp := strconv.FormatInt(time.Now().Add(-time.Hour).Unix(), 10)
tests := []struct {
name string
query string
wantMaxAge int
}{
{"no exp", "", 31536000},
{"exp already past", "?exp=" + pastExp, 0},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fix := setupTestHandler(t)
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/v1/image/*", fix.handler.HandleImage())
maxAge := getMaxAge(t, r,
"/v1/image/"+fix.goodHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg"+tt.query)
if maxAge != tt.wantMaxAge {
t.Errorf("max-age = %d, want %d", maxAge, tt.wantMaxAge)
}
})
}
}
// TestHandleImageEnc_MaxAge verifies that an image served through an encrypted
// URL with a 60 second TTL may be cached for at most those 60 seconds, that one
// with a two-year TTL may be cached for a year, and that one made without a
// TTL, which never expires, may be cached for a year.
func TestHandleImageEnc_MaxAge(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
expiresAt int64
wantAtLeast int
wantAtMost int
}{
{"60 second TTL", time.Now().Add(time.Minute).Unix(), 50, 60},
{"two-year TTL", time.Now().Add(2 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour).Unix(), 31536000, 31536000},
{"no TTL", 0, 31536000, 31536000},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, srv := newSignedHostServer(t)
token, err := h.encGen.Generate(&encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: signedHost,
SourcePath: photoPath,
Width: 50,
Height: 50,
Format: imgcache.FormatJPEG,
ExpiresAt: tt.expiresAt,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Generate() error = %v", err)
}
maxAge := getMaxAge(t, srv, "/v1/e/"+token+"/img.jpg")
if maxAge < tt.wantAtLeast || maxAge > tt.wantAtMost {
t.Errorf("max-age = %d, want %d to %d",
maxAge, tt.wantAtLeast, tt.wantAtMost)
}
})
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
package handlers
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/signature"
)
// signedHost is not on the allowlist setupTestHandler builds, so a request
// for it needs a valid signature. setupTestHandler serves no image for it: a
// request that passes the signature check gets 502 from the failed fetch, and
// one that fails the check gets 401.
const signedHost = "signed.example.com"
// getImage sends a GET for target to the image route of fix and returns the
// response status.
func getImage(t *testing.T, fix *testFixtures, target string) int {
t.Helper()
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/v1/image/*", fix.handler.HandleImage())
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, target, nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
t.Logf("GET %s: %d", target, rec.Code)
return rec.Code
}
// TestHandleImage_SignatureCoversQualityAndFit signs a URL for quality 85
// and fit cover, the values the route uses when a URL has no q or fit, and
// sends that signature with each q and fit below.
func TestHandleImage_SignatureCoversQualityAndFit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
expires := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
signer := signature.New("test-signing-key-must-be-32-chars")
sig := signer.Sign(&signature.Request{
SourceHost: signedHost,
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
Width: 50,
Height: 50,
Format: string(imgcache.FormatJPEG),
Quality: 85,
FitMode: string(imgcache.FitCover),
Expires: expires,
})
signedURL := fmt.Sprintf("/v1/image/%s/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg?sig=%s&exp=%d",
signedHost, sig, expires.Unix())
tests := []struct {
name string
query string
wantStatus int
}{
{"no q or fit", "", http.StatusBadGateway},
{"q=85 and fit=cover", "&q=85&fit=cover", http.StatusBadGateway},
{"replayed with q=40", "&q=40", http.StatusUnauthorized},
{"replayed with fit=contain", "&fit=contain", http.StatusUnauthorized},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
status := getImage(t, setupTestHandler(t), signedURL+tt.query)
if status != tt.wantStatus {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d", status, tt.wantStatus)
}
})
}
}
// TestHandleImage_GeneratedSignedURLVerifies sends URLs built by the
// service's signed-URL generator to the route.
func TestHandleImage_GeneratedSignedURLVerifies(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
quality int
fitMode imgcache.FitMode
}{
{"quality 40 and fit contain", 40, imgcache.FitContain},
{"quality and fit unset", 0, ""},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fix := setupTestHandler(t)
signedURL, err := fix.service.GenerateSignedURL("", &imgcache.ImageRequest{
SourceHost: signedHost,
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
Size: imgcache.Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: imgcache.FormatJPEG,
Quality: tt.quality,
FitMode: tt.fitMode,
}, time.Hour)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateSignedURL() error = %v", err)
}
status := getImage(t, fix, signedURL)
if status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d", status, http.StatusBadGateway)
}
})
}
}
// TestHandleImage_InvalidExp_Returns400 sends a signed-host URL whose exp is
// not a whole number, and one whose exp is empty. Each is refused with 400
// naming exp and the value, not with the 401 a URL without exp still gets.
func TestHandleImage_InvalidExp_Returns400(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
query string
wantStatus int
wantError string
}{
{"sig=x&exp=banana", http.StatusBadRequest,
`invalid exp: not a number, got "banana"`},
{"sig=x&exp=", http.StatusBadRequest, `invalid exp: not a number, got ""`},
{"sig=x", http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.query, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fix := setupTestHandler(t)
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/v1/image/*", fix.handler.HandleImage())
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"/v1/image/"+signedHost+"/images/photo.jpg/50x50.jpeg?"+tt.query, nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
t.Logf("GET %s: %d %s", req.URL, rec.Code, rec.Body)
var body struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
}
err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response body: %v", err)
}
if rec.Code != tt.wantStatus || body.Error != tt.wantError {
t.Errorf("got %d %q, want %d %q",
rec.Code, body.Error, tt.wantStatus, tt.wantError)
}
})
}
}
+31 -8
View File
@@ -11,11 +11,14 @@ import (
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imageprocessor"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
)
// HandleImageEnc handles requests to /v1/e/{token}/* for encrypted image URLs.
// The trailing path (e.g., /img.jpg) is ignored but helps browsers identify the content type.
// HandleImageEnc handles requests to /v1/e/{token}/* for encrypted
// image URLs. The trailing path (e.g., /img.jpg) is ignored but helps
// browsers identify the content type.
func (s *Handlers) HandleImageEnc() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
@@ -48,6 +51,19 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleImageEnc() http.HandlerFunc {
// Convert payload to ImageRequest
req := payload.ToImageRequest()
// Apply the same dimension and fit-mode bounds as the plain image
// route: a sealed payload is trusted for its origin, not for staying
// within limits, so an over-limit size or unknown fit mode is a 400
// here rather than an out-of-memory or a 500 from the processor.
err = imgcache.ValidateImageRequest(req)
if err != nil {
s.log.Debug("encrypted URL failed validation", "error", err)
s.respondError(w, "invalid encrypted URL: "+err.Error(),
http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Log the request
s.log.Debug("encrypted image request",
"host", req.SourceHost,
@@ -56,23 +72,26 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleImageEnc() http.HandlerFunc {
"format", req.Format,
)
// Fetch and process the image (no signature validation needed - encrypted URL is trusted)
// Fetch and process the image (no signature validation
// needed - encrypted URL is trusted)
resp, err := s.imgSvc.Get(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
s.handleImageError(w, err)
return
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Content.Close() }()
// Set response headers
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", resp.ContentType)
if resp.ContentLength > 0 {
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.FormatInt(resp.ContentLength, 10))
}
// Cache headers - encrypted URLs can be cached since they're immutable
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=31536000, immutable")
// Cache headers: max-age ends at the URL's expiry
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", cacheControl(req.Expires))
w.Header().Set("X-Pixa-Cache", string(resp.CacheStatus))
// Stream the response
@@ -100,12 +119,16 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleImageEnc() http.HandlerFunc {
// handleImageError converts image service errors to HTTP responses.
func (s *Handlers) handleImageError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, imgcache.ErrSSRFBlocked):
case errors.Is(err, httpfetcher.ErrSSRFBlocked):
s.respondError(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
case errors.Is(err, imgcache.ErrUpstreamError):
case errors.Is(err, httpfetcher.ErrUpstreamError):
s.respondError(w, "upstream error", http.StatusBadGateway)
case errors.Is(err, imgcache.ErrUpstreamTimeout):
case errors.Is(err, httpfetcher.ErrUpstreamTimeout):
s.respondError(w, "upstream timeout", http.StatusGatewayTimeout)
case errors.Is(err, httpfetcher.ErrTooManyConnections),
errors.Is(err, imageprocessor.ErrTooManyImages):
s.respondError(w, "server busy, try again later",
http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
default:
s.log.Error("image request failed", "error", err)
s.respondError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
package handlers
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
)
// newEncTestServer builds a router serving the encrypted-URL route with a
// generator seeded by the shared test signing key. The image service is left
// nil: these tests exercise validation that rejects a token before any image
// is fetched, so the handler must never reach the service.
func newEncTestServer(t *testing.T) (*encurl.Generator, http.Handler) {
t.Helper()
encGen, err := encurl.NewGenerator(testSigningKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encurl.NewGenerator() error = %v", err)
}
h := &Handlers{
log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
encGen: encGen,
}
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/v1/e/{token}/*", h.HandleImageEnc())
return encGen, r
}
// getEncToken issues a GET for the given token and returns the recorder.
func getEncToken(srv http.Handler, token string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/v1/e/"+token+"/img.jpg", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
return rec
}
// TestHandleImageEnc_OverLimitDimension_Returns400 verifies that a decrypted
// token requesting a dimension beyond MaxDimension is rejected with 400
// instead of reaching the image processor and libvips.
func TestHandleImageEnc_OverLimitDimension_Returns400(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
encGen, srv := newEncTestServer(t)
token, err := encGen.Generate(&encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photo.jpg",
Width: 100000,
Height: 100000,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Generate() error = %v", err)
}
rec := getEncToken(srv, token)
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
}
// TestHandleImageEnc_InvalidFitMode_Returns400 verifies that a decrypted token
// carrying an unrecognized fit mode is rejected with 400 rather than surfacing
// as a 500 from the image processor's default branch.
func TestHandleImageEnc_InvalidFitMode_Returns400(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
encGen, srv := newEncTestServer(t)
token, err := encGen.Generate(&encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photo.jpg",
Width: 800,
Height: 600,
FitMode: imgcache.FitMode("bogus"),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Generate() error = %v", err)
}
rec := getEncToken(srv, token)
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
package handlers
import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imageprocessor"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
)
// TestServerBusyAnswers503 checks that both image routes answer 503 with
// a clear error when the image service gives up waiting for a free upstream
// connection or processing slot, wrapped as the service wraps them.
func TestServerBusyAnswers503(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := &Handlers{log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)}
req := &imgcache.ImageRequest{SourceHost: "img.example.com", SourcePath: "/a.jpg"}
for _, err := range []error{
fmt.Errorf("upstream fetch failed: %w", httpfetcher.ErrTooManyConnections),
fmt.Errorf("image processing failed: %w", imageprocessor.ErrTooManyImages),
} {
plain := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.respondImageError(plain, req, err)
encrypted := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.handleImageError(encrypted, err)
for route, rec := range map[string]*httptest.ResponseRecorder{
"/v1/image/": plain, "/v1/e/": encrypted,
} {
if rec.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
t.Errorf("%s for %v: status = %d, want %d",
route, err, rec.Code, http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
}
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "server busy, try again later") {
t.Errorf("%s for %v: body = %q, want the server busy error",
route, err, rec.Body.String())
}
}
}
}
+7 -4
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
// Params defines dependencies for Healthcheck.
type Params struct {
fx.In
Globals *globals.Globals
Config *config.Config
Logger *logger.Logger
@@ -53,6 +54,8 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params Params) (*Healthcheck, error) {
}
// Response is the JSON response for health checks.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // health endpoint response format uses snake_case
type Response struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
Now string `json:"now"`
@@ -63,10 +66,6 @@ type Response struct {
Maintenance bool `json:"maintenance_mode"`
}
func (s *Healthcheck) uptime() time.Duration {
return time.Since(s.StartupTime)
}
// Healthcheck returns the current health status.
func (s *Healthcheck) Healthcheck() *Response {
resp := &Response{
@@ -81,3 +80,7 @@ func (s *Healthcheck) Healthcheck() *Response {
return resp
}
func (s *Healthcheck) uptime() time.Duration {
return time.Since(s.StartupTime)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
package httpfetcher
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"testing"
)
// TestIsPrivateIPBlocksSpecialRanges covers the internal and special-use
// ranges added to the built-in blocklist, in IPv4, IPv6, and IPv4-mapped
// forms, alongside public controls that must stay reachable.
func TestIsPrivateIPBlocksSpecialRanges(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
ip string
want bool
}{
{"cgnat-low", "100.64.0.1", true},
{"cgnat-high", "100.127.255.254", true},
{"ietf-protocol", "192.0.0.1", true},
{"benchmark-low", "198.18.0.1", true},
{"benchmark-high", "198.19.255.254", true},
{"nat64", "64:ff9b::1", true},
{"nat64-embeds-private", "64:ff9b::a00:1", true}, // maps 10.0.0.1
{"ipv4-mapped-private", "::ffff:10.0.0.1", true},
{"cloud-metadata", "169.254.169.254", true},
{"public-v4", "8.8.8.8", false},
{"test-net-1-public", testPublicHost, false}, // TEST-NET-1, stays public
{"public-v6", "2001:4860:4860::8888", false},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ip := net.ParseIP(tc.ip)
if ip == nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to parse IP %q", tc.ip)
}
got := isPrivateIP(ip)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("isPrivateIP(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.ip, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
// transportOf returns the *http.Transport backing a fetcher, so a test can
// exercise the SSRF-safe dialer New installed with the operator blocklist.
func transportOf(t *testing.T, f *HTTPFetcher) *http.Transport {
t.Helper()
transport, ok := f.client.Transport.(*http.Transport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("transport is %T, want *http.Transport", f.client.Transport)
}
return transport
}
// TestDialerEnforcesBlockedNetworks proves an operator-supplied
// blocked_networks entry is enforced by the dialer, in addition to the
// built-in ranges, while an address outside both stays dialable.
func TestDialerEnforcesBlockedNetworks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := DefaultConfig()
// TEST-NET-2 (198.51.100.0/24) is public to the built-in check, so
// blocking it can only come from the operator-supplied list.
cfg.BlockedNetworks = []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")}
transport := transportOf(t, New(cfg))
blocked := []string{
"198.51.100.5:80", // operator-supplied range
"10.0.0.5:80", // built-in RFC 1918, still enforced
"100.64.0.1:80", // built-in CGNAT range
}
for _, addr := range blocked {
t.Run("blocked/"+addr, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := transport.DialContext(context.Background(), "tcp", addr)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrSSRFBlocked) {
t.Errorf("DialContext(%q) = %v, want ErrSSRFBlocked", addr, err)
}
})
}
t.Run("public-not-blocked", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A cancelled context makes the dial fail without touching the
// network; the point is only that a public literal outside every
// blocked range is not SSRF-blocked.
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
_, err := transport.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", testPublicHost+":80")
if errors.Is(err, ErrSSRFBlocked) {
t.Errorf("public target SSRF-blocked with operator list set: %v", err)
}
})
}
+421
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@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
package httpfetcher
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
)
// testPublicHost is a TEST-NET-1 (RFC 5737) literal. isPrivateIP treats it as
// public, so validateURL and the redirect check accept it with no DNS lookup,
// while the recording dialer routes it to the local httptest server. The
// address is reserved for documentation and is never routed on the network.
const testPublicHost = "192.0.2.10"
// imagePayload is the body served by the fake upstream's image route.
const imagePayload = "fake-jpeg-bytes"
// errUnexpectedDial reports a dial to any host other than testPublicHost, which
// would mean SSRF protection let a forbidden target reach the transport.
var errUnexpectedDial = errors.New("unexpected dial target")
// upstreamURL builds a fetch URL on the fake public host for the given path.
func upstreamURL(path string) string {
return "http://" + testPublicHost + path
}
// recordingDialer records every address the transport asks it to dial and
// routes connections for testPublicHost to a real local server, so the SSRF
// checks run against a public-looking host while bytes go to httptest.
type recordingDialer struct {
target string
mu sync.Mutex
dialed []string
}
func (d *recordingDialer) dialContext(
ctx context.Context,
network, addr string,
) (net.Conn, error) {
d.mu.Lock()
d.dialed = append(d.dialed, addr)
d.mu.Unlock()
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if host != testPublicHost {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errUnexpectedDial, addr)
}
var dialer net.Dialer
return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, d.target)
}
// dialedAddrs returns a copy of the addresses the dialer was asked to reach.
func (d *recordingDialer) dialedAddrs() []string {
d.mu.Lock()
defer d.mu.Unlock()
return slices.Clone(d.dialed)
}
// startUpstream launches a fake upstream with the routes the fetch tests
// exercise and stops it when the test finishes.
func startUpstream(t *testing.T) *httptest.Server {
t.Helper()
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/image", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentTypeJPEG)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, imagePayload)
})
mux.HandleFunc("/status/500", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
})
mux.HandleFunc("/html", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "<html></html>")
})
mux.HandleFunc("/redirect/private", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", http.StatusFound)
})
mux.HandleFunc("/redirect/public", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/image", http.StatusFound)
})
mux.HandleFunc("/redirect/chain", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/redirect/hop", http.StatusFound)
})
mux.HandleFunc("/redirect/hop", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/image", http.StatusFound)
})
srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
return srv
}
// newServerFetcher builds a fetcher whose transport routes testPublicHost to
// srv, leaving the real SSRF validation and redirect checks in place.
func newServerFetcher(
t *testing.T,
srv *httptest.Server,
cfg *Config,
) (*HTTPFetcher, *recordingDialer) {
t.Helper()
if cfg == nil {
cfg = DefaultConfig()
}
cfg.AllowHTTP = true
f := New(cfg)
transport, ok := f.client.Transport.(*http.Transport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("transport is %T, want *http.Transport", f.client.Transport)
}
dialer := &recordingDialer{target: srv.Listener.Addr().String()}
transport.DialContext = dialer.dialContext
return f, dialer
}
// testContext returns a context cancelled when the test ends, bounding any
// fetch that would otherwise block on a leaked semaphore slot.
func testContext(t *testing.T) context.Context {
t.Helper()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
t.Cleanup(cancel)
return ctx
}
// fetchImage fetches path from the fake upstream and fails on error.
func fetchImage(t *testing.T, f *HTTPFetcher, path string) *FetchResult {
t.Helper()
res, err := f.Fetch(testContext(t), upstreamURL(path))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Fetch(%s) error = %v", path, err)
}
return res
}
// fetchExpectError fetches path and fails unless Fetch returns an error.
func fetchExpectError(t *testing.T, f *HTTPFetcher, path string) error {
t.Helper()
res, err := f.Fetch(testContext(t), upstreamURL(path))
if err == nil {
_ = res.Content.Close()
t.Fatalf("Fetch(%s) = nil error, want an error", path)
}
return err
}
// fetchBody fetches path and returns the fully read, closed response body.
func fetchBody(t *testing.T, f *HTTPFetcher, path string) string {
t.Helper()
res := fetchImage(t, f, path)
defer func() { _ = res.Content.Close() }()
data, err := io.ReadAll(res.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read body: %v", err)
}
return string(data)
}
// semLen reports how many per-host semaphore slots are currently held.
func semLen(f *HTTPFetcher, host string) int {
return len(f.getHostSemaphore(host))
}
func TestFetchRedirectToPrivateIPBlocked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := startUpstream(t)
f, dialer := newServerFetcher(t, srv, nil)
_, err := f.Fetch(testContext(t), upstreamURL("/redirect/private"))
if !errors.Is(err, ErrSSRFBlocked) {
t.Fatalf("Fetch() error = %v, want ErrSSRFBlocked", err)
}
for _, addr := range dialer.dialedAddrs() {
if strings.Contains(addr, "169.254.169.254") {
t.Errorf("dialer connected to the private redirect target: %s", addr)
}
}
}
func TestFetchRedirectToPublicSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := startUpstream(t)
f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, nil)
if body := fetchBody(t, f, "/redirect/public"); body != imagePayload {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, imagePayload)
}
}
func TestFetchRedirectChainSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := startUpstream(t)
f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, nil)
if body := fetchBody(t, f, "/redirect/chain"); body != imagePayload {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, imagePayload)
}
}
func TestFetchRejectsNon2xx(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := startUpstream(t)
f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, nil)
err := fetchExpectError(t, f, "/status/500")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUpstreamError) {
t.Fatalf("Fetch() error = %v, want ErrUpstreamError", err)
}
}
func TestFetchRejectsDisallowedContentType(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := startUpstream(t)
f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, nil)
err := fetchExpectError(t, f, "/html")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidContentType) {
t.Fatalf("Fetch() error = %v, want ErrInvalidContentType", err)
}
}
func TestFetchMaxResponseSizeEnforced(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := startUpstream(t)
cfg := DefaultConfig()
cfg.MaxResponseSize = 8
f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, cfg)
res := fetchImage(t, f, "/image")
defer func() { _ = res.Content.Close() }()
data, err := io.ReadAll(res.Content)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrResponseTooLarge) {
t.Fatalf("read error = %v, want ErrResponseTooLarge", err)
}
if int64(len(data)) > cfg.MaxResponseSize {
t.Errorf("read %d bytes, exceeds limit %d", len(data), cfg.MaxResponseSize)
}
}
func TestFetchSemaphoreReleasedOnError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := startUpstream(t)
cfg := DefaultConfig()
cfg.MaxConnectionsPerHost = 1
f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, cfg)
err := fetchExpectError(t, f, "/status/500")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUpstreamError) {
t.Fatalf("Fetch() error = %v, want ErrUpstreamError", err)
}
if held := semLen(f, testPublicHost); held != 0 {
t.Fatalf("semaphore slot leaked after error: %d held", held)
}
// One slot per host: this fetch proceeds only if the slot was released.
res := fetchImage(t, f, "/image")
_ = res.Content.Close()
}
// assertSlotReleasedByClose fetches an image over a one-slot host, hands the
// open result to consume, and asserts the slot is held before and freed after,
// then that a follow-up fetch can still acquire it.
func assertSlotReleasedByClose(
t *testing.T,
consume func(*testing.T, *FetchResult),
) {
t.Helper()
srv := startUpstream(t)
cfg := DefaultConfig()
cfg.MaxConnectionsPerHost = 1
f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, cfg)
res := fetchImage(t, f, "/image")
if held := semLen(f, testPublicHost); held != 1 {
t.Fatalf("slot not held while body is open: %d held", held)
}
consume(t, res)
if held := semLen(f, testPublicHost); held != 0 {
t.Fatalf("slot not released after close: %d held", held)
}
next := fetchImage(t, f, "/image")
_ = next.Content.Close()
}
func TestFetchSemaphoreReleasedOnBodyClose(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertSlotReleasedByClose(t, func(t *testing.T, res *FetchResult) {
t.Helper()
_, err := io.ReadAll(res.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read body: %v", err)
}
err = res.Content.Close()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("close body: %v", err)
}
})
}
func TestFetchSemaphoreReleasedOnPartialReadClose(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertSlotReleasedByClose(t, func(t *testing.T, res *FetchResult) {
t.Helper()
buf := make([]byte, 1)
_, err := res.Content.Read(buf)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("partial read: %v", err)
}
err = res.Content.Close()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("close body: %v", err)
}
})
}
// The dial-time re-resolution in ssrfSafeDialer is what closes the DNS
// rebinding window: even if validateURL saw a public answer earlier, the
// dialer independently re-checks the address it is about to connect to. A full
// rebinding simulation (a resolver returning public, then private) would mean
// replacing the global net.DefaultResolver with a fake DNS server, which is
// heavyweight and unsafe to mutate under parallel -race tests. The property is
// proven directly here instead: the dialer rejects a private target outright,
// which is exactly the check that fires when a validated host later resolves
// to a private address.
func TestSSRFSafeDialerBlocksPrivateTarget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, addr := range []string{
"169.254.169.254:80", // link-local (cloud metadata)
"127.0.0.1:80", // loopback
"10.0.0.5:80", // RFC 1918 private
} {
t.Run(addr, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := ssrfSafeDialer(context.Background(), "tcp", addr)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrSSRFBlocked) {
t.Errorf("ssrfSafeDialer(%q) = %v, want ErrSSRFBlocked", addr, err)
}
})
}
}
func TestSSRFSafeDialerAllowsPublicTarget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A cancelled context makes the dial fail immediately without touching the
// network; the point is only that a public literal is not SSRF-blocked.
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
_, err := ssrfSafeDialer(ctx, "tcp", testPublicHost+":80")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected a dial error for an unreachable public target")
}
if errors.Is(err, ErrSSRFBlocked) {
t.Errorf("public target was SSRF-blocked: %v", err)
}
}
+641
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,641 @@
// Package httpfetcher fetches content from upstream HTTP origins with SSRF
// protection, connection limits per host and for all hosts together, and
// content-type validation.
package httpfetcher
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptrace"
"net/netip"
neturl "net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// Fetcher configuration constants.
const (
DefaultFetchTimeout = 30 * time.Second
DefaultMaxResponseSize = 50 << 20 // 50MB
DefaultTLSTimeout = 10 * time.Second
DefaultMaxIdleConns = 100
DefaultIdleConnTimeout = 90 * time.Second
DefaultMaxRedirects = 10
DefaultMaxConnectionsPerHost = 20
DefaultMaxConnections = 64
)
// ConnectionWaitTimeout is how long Fetch waits for a free connection when
// MaxConnections fetches are already in progress.
const ConnectionWaitTimeout = 10 * time.Second
// MIME content types.
const (
contentTypeJPEG = "image/jpeg"
contentTypePNG = "image/png"
contentTypeGIF = "image/gif"
contentTypeWebP = "image/webp"
contentTypeAVIF = "image/avif"
contentTypeSVG = "image/svg+xml"
contentTypeOctetStream = "application/octet-stream"
)
// Loopback addresses blocked by SSRF protection.
const (
localhostIPv4 = "127.0.0.1"
localhostIPv6 = "::1"
)
// builtinBlockedPrefixes are internal or special-use ranges that Go's
// net.IP predicates (IsPrivate, IsLinkLocalUnicast, and the like) do not
// already cover. They are always blocked, in addition to any
// operator-supplied networks. IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses are unmapped
// before matching, so these IPv4 ranges are caught in both forms.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // immutable built-in blocklist
var builtinBlockedPrefixes = []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10"), // RFC 6598 CGNAT / carrier-grade NAT
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.0.0/24"), // RFC 6890 IETF protocol assignments
netip.MustParsePrefix("198.18.0.0/15"), // RFC 2544 benchmarking range
netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b::/96"), // RFC 6052 NAT64 (maps onto IPv4)
}
// Fetcher errors.
var (
ErrSSRFBlocked = errors.New("request blocked: private or internal IP")
ErrInvalidHost = errors.New("invalid or unresolvable host")
ErrUnsupportedScheme = errors.New("only HTTPS is supported")
ErrResponseTooLarge = errors.New("response exceeds maximum size")
ErrInvalidContentType = errors.New("invalid or unsupported content type")
ErrUpstreamError = errors.New("upstream server error")
ErrUpstreamTimeout = errors.New("upstream request timeout")
ErrTooManyConnections = errors.New("too many concurrent upstream connections")
)
// Internal fetcher errors.
var (
errTooManyRedirects = errors.New("too many redirects")
errConnectFailed = errors.New("failed to connect")
)
// Fetcher retrieves content from upstream origins.
type Fetcher interface {
// Fetch retrieves content from the given URL.
Fetch(ctx context.Context, url string) (*FetchResult, error)
}
// FetchResult contains the result of fetching from upstream.
type FetchResult struct {
// Content is the raw image data.
Content io.ReadCloser
// ContentLength is the size in bytes (-1 if unknown).
ContentLength int64
// ContentType is the MIME type from upstream.
ContentType string
// Headers contains all response headers from upstream.
Headers map[string][]string
// StatusCode is the HTTP status code from upstream.
StatusCode int
// FetchDurationMs is how long the fetch took in milliseconds.
FetchDurationMs int64
// RemoteAddr is the IP:port of the upstream server.
RemoteAddr string
// HTTPVersion is the protocol version (e.g., "1.1", "2.0").
HTTPVersion string
// TLSVersion is the TLS protocol version (e.g., "TLS 1.3").
TLSVersion string
// TLSCipherSuite is the negotiated cipher suite name.
TLSCipherSuite string
}
// Config holds configuration for the upstream fetcher.
type Config struct {
// Timeout for upstream requests.
Timeout time.Duration
// MaxResponseSize is the maximum allowed response body size.
MaxResponseSize int64
// UserAgent to send to upstream servers.
UserAgent string
// AllowedContentTypes is an allow list of MIME types to accept.
AllowedContentTypes []string
// AllowHTTP allows non-TLS connections (for testing only).
AllowHTTP bool
// MaxConnectionsPerHost limits concurrent connections to each upstream host.
MaxConnectionsPerHost int
// MaxConnections limits concurrent connections to all upstream hosts
// together.
MaxConnections int
// BlockedNetworks are operator-supplied CIDR ranges refused by the
// dialer, in addition to the always-enforced built-in ranges.
BlockedNetworks []netip.Prefix
}
// DefaultConfig returns a Config with sensible defaults.
func DefaultConfig() *Config {
return &Config{
Timeout: DefaultFetchTimeout,
MaxResponseSize: DefaultMaxResponseSize,
UserAgent: "pixa/1.0",
AllowedContentTypes: []string{
contentTypeJPEG,
contentTypePNG,
contentTypeGIF,
contentTypeWebP,
contentTypeAVIF,
contentTypeSVG,
},
AllowHTTP: false,
MaxConnectionsPerHost: DefaultMaxConnectionsPerHost,
MaxConnections: DefaultMaxConnections,
}
}
// HTTPFetcher implements Fetcher with SSRF protection and connection limits
// per host and for all hosts together.
type HTTPFetcher struct {
client *http.Client
config *Config
hostSems map[string]chan struct{} // per-host semaphores
hostSemMu sync.Mutex // protects hostSems map
// allHostsSemaphore has one slot per connection allowed to all hosts
// together (config.MaxConnections).
allHostsSemaphore chan struct{}
// connectionWaitTimeout is ConnectionWaitTimeout; tests shorten it.
connectionWaitTimeout time.Duration
}
// New creates a new HTTPFetcher with SSRF protection.
func New(config *Config) *HTTPFetcher {
if config == nil {
config = DefaultConfig()
}
// Create transport with SSRF-safe dialer. The dialer re-resolves and
// re-checks at connect time (closing the DNS-rebinding window) against
// both the built-in ranges and the operator-supplied blocklist.
transport := &http.Transport{
DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
return dialSSRFSafe(ctx, network, addr, config.BlockedNetworks)
},
TLSHandshakeTimeout: DefaultTLSTimeout,
MaxIdleConns: DefaultMaxIdleConns,
IdleConnTimeout: DefaultIdleConnTimeout,
}
client := &http.Client{
Transport: transport,
Timeout: config.Timeout,
// Don't follow redirects automatically - we need to validate each hop
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= DefaultMaxRedirects {
return errTooManyRedirects
}
// Validate the redirect target
err := validateURL(req.Context(), req.URL.String(), config.AllowHTTP)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("redirect blocked: %w", err)
}
return nil
},
}
return &HTTPFetcher{
client: client,
config: config,
hostSems: make(map[string]chan struct{}),
allHostsSemaphore: make(chan struct{}, config.MaxConnections),
connectionWaitTimeout: ConnectionWaitTimeout,
}
}
// Fetch retrieves content from the given URL with SSRF protection. When
// MaxConnections fetches are already in progress, it waits up to
// ConnectionWaitTimeout for one to finish, then fails with
// ErrTooManyConnections.
func (f *HTTPFetcher) Fetch(ctx context.Context, url string) (*FetchResult, error) {
// Validate URL before making request
err := validateURL(ctx, url, f.config.AllowHTTP)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
release, err := f.acquireConnection(ctx, extractHost(url))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// If we fail before returning a result, release the connection
success := false
defer func() {
if !success {
release()
}
}()
parsedURL, err := neturl.Parse(url)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse URL: %w", err)
}
req := &http.Request{
Method: http.MethodGet,
URL: parsedURL,
Header: make(http.Header),
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", f.config.UserAgent)
req.Header.Set("Accept", strings.Join(f.config.AllowedContentTypes, ", "))
// Use httptrace to capture connection details
var remoteAddr string
trace := &httptrace.ClientTrace{
GotConn: func(info httptrace.GotConnInfo) {
if info.Conn != nil {
remoteAddr = info.Conn.RemoteAddr().String()
}
},
}
req = req.WithContext(httptrace.WithClientTrace(ctx, trace))
startTime := time.Now()
resp, err := f.client.Do(req)
fetchDuration := time.Since(startTime)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
return nil, ErrUpstreamTimeout
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("upstream request failed: %w", err)
}
result, err := f.buildResult(resp, remoteAddr, fetchDuration, release)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Mark success so defer doesn't release the connection; closing the
// result's Content does
success = true
return result, nil
}
// acquireConnection takes a slot for host, then one of the slots shared by
// all hosts, and returns the func that gives both back. The host's slot
// comes first, so fetches queued for one busy host hold no shared slot.
// Only the wait for a shared slot is bounded: after connectionWaitTimeout
// it fails with ErrTooManyConnections.
func (f *HTTPFetcher) acquireConnection(
ctx context.Context, host string,
) (func(), error) {
hostSem := f.getHostSemaphore(host)
select {
case hostSem <- struct{}{}:
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
select {
case f.allHostsSemaphore <- struct{}{}:
case <-time.After(f.connectionWaitTimeout):
<-hostSem
return nil, ErrTooManyConnections
case <-ctx.Done():
<-hostSem
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
return func() {
<-hostSem
<-f.allHostsSemaphore
}, nil
}
// getHostSemaphore returns the semaphore for a host, creating it if necessary.
func (f *HTTPFetcher) getHostSemaphore(host string) chan struct{} {
f.hostSemMu.Lock()
defer f.hostSemMu.Unlock()
sem, ok := f.hostSems[host]
if !ok {
sem = make(chan struct{}, f.config.MaxConnectionsPerHost)
f.hostSems[host] = sem
}
return sem
}
// buildResult validates the upstream response and assembles a FetchResult
// whose Content calls release when closed.
func (f *HTTPFetcher) buildResult(
resp *http.Response,
remoteAddr string,
fetchDuration time.Duration,
release func(),
) (*FetchResult, error) {
// Extract HTTP version (strip "HTTP/" prefix)
httpVersion := strings.TrimPrefix(resp.Proto, "HTTP/")
// Extract TLS info if available
var tlsVersion, tlsCipherSuite string
if resp.TLS != nil {
tlsVersion = tls.VersionName(resp.TLS.Version)
tlsCipherSuite = tls.CipherSuiteName(resp.TLS.CipherSuite)
}
// Check status code
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: status %d", ErrUpstreamError, resp.StatusCode)
}
// Validate content type
contentType := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type")
if !f.isAllowedContentType(contentType) {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrInvalidContentType, contentType)
}
// Wrap body with size limiter and semaphore releaser
limitedBody := &limitedReader{
reader: resp.Body,
remaining: f.config.MaxResponseSize,
}
return &FetchResult{
Content: &semaphoreReleasingReadCloser{limitedBody, resp.Body, release},
ContentLength: resp.ContentLength,
ContentType: contentType,
Headers: resp.Header,
StatusCode: resp.StatusCode,
FetchDurationMs: fetchDuration.Milliseconds(),
RemoteAddr: remoteAddr,
HTTPVersion: httpVersion,
TLSVersion: tlsVersion,
TLSCipherSuite: tlsCipherSuite,
}, nil
}
// isAllowedContentType checks if the content type is in the allow list.
func (f *HTTPFetcher) isAllowedContentType(contentType string) bool {
// Extract the MIME type without parameters
mediaType := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(contentType, ";")[0])
for _, allowed := range f.config.AllowedContentTypes {
if strings.EqualFold(mediaType, allowed) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// validateURL checks if a URL is safe to fetch (not internal/private).
func validateURL(ctx context.Context, rawURL string, allowHTTP bool) error {
if !allowHTTP && !strings.HasPrefix(rawURL, "https://") {
return ErrUnsupportedScheme
}
// Parse to extract host
host := extractHost(rawURL)
if host == "" {
return ErrInvalidHost
}
// Remove port if present
h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host)
if err == nil {
host = h
}
// Block obvious localhost patterns
if isLocalhost(host) {
return ErrSSRFBlocked
}
// Resolve the host to check IP addresses
addrs, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrInvalidHost, host)
}
private := slices.ContainsFunc(addrs, func(addr net.IPAddr) bool {
return isPrivateIP(addr.IP)
})
if private {
return ErrSSRFBlocked
}
return nil
}
// extractHost extracts the host from a URL string.
func extractHost(rawURL string) string {
// Simple extraction without full URL parsing
url := rawURL
if idx := strings.Index(url, "://"); idx != -1 {
url = url[idx+3:]
}
if idx := strings.Index(url, "/"); idx != -1 {
url = url[:idx]
}
if idx := strings.Index(url, "?"); idx != -1 {
url = url[:idx]
}
return url
}
// isLocalhost checks if the host is localhost.
func isLocalhost(host string) bool {
host = strings.ToLower(host)
return host == "localhost" ||
host == localhostIPv4 ||
host == localhostIPv6 ||
host == "[::1]" ||
strings.HasSuffix(host, ".localhost") ||
strings.HasSuffix(host, ".local")
}
// isPrivateIP checks if an IP is private, loopback, or otherwise internal.
func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
if ip == nil {
return true
}
// Check for loopback
if ip.IsLoopback() {
return true
}
// Check for private ranges
if ip.IsPrivate() {
return true
}
// Check for link-local
if ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
return true
}
// Check for unspecified (0.0.0.0 or ::)
if ip.IsUnspecified() {
return true
}
// Check for multicast
if ip.IsMulticast() {
return true
}
// Additional checks for IPv4
if ip4 := ip.To4(); ip4 != nil {
// 169.254.0.0/16 - Link local
if ip4[0] == 169 && ip4[1] == 254 {
return true
}
// 0.0.0.0/8 - Current network
if ip4[0] == 0 {
return true
}
}
// Special-use ranges the net.IP predicates above do not cover.
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
if !ok {
return true
}
addr = addr.Unmap()
return slices.ContainsFunc(builtinBlockedPrefixes, func(prefix netip.Prefix) bool {
return prefix.Contains(addr)
})
}
// isBlockedIP reports whether ip is refused, either by the built-in
// internal-range check or by one of the operator-supplied prefixes.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP, blocked []netip.Prefix) bool {
if isPrivateIP(ip) {
return true
}
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
if !ok {
return true
}
addr = addr.Unmap()
return slices.ContainsFunc(blocked, func(prefix netip.Prefix) bool {
return prefix.Contains(addr)
})
}
// ssrfSafeDialer validates IP addresses against the built-in blocked ranges
// before connecting. New wraps dialSSRFSafe with the operator-supplied
// blocklist; this entry point enforces the built-in ranges alone.
func ssrfSafeDialer(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
return dialSSRFSafe(ctx, network, addr, nil)
}
// dialSSRFSafe re-resolves addr and refuses to connect to any built-in
// internal range or operator-supplied blocked prefix, closing the
// DNS-rebinding window at connect time.
func dialSSRFSafe(
ctx context.Context,
network, addr string,
blocked []netip.Prefix,
) (net.Conn, error) {
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Resolve the address
ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIP(ctx, "ip", host)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrInvalidHost, host)
}
// Check all resolved IPs
for _, ip := range ips {
if isBlockedIP(ip, blocked) {
return nil, ErrSSRFBlocked
}
}
// Connect using the first valid IP
var dialer net.Dialer
for _, ip := range ips {
addr := net.JoinHostPort(ip.String(), port)
conn, err := dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
if err == nil {
return conn, nil
}
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w to %s", errConnectFailed, host)
}
// limitedReader wraps a reader and limits the number of bytes read.
type limitedReader struct {
reader io.Reader
remaining int64
}
func (r *limitedReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
if r.remaining <= 0 {
return 0, ErrResponseTooLarge
}
if int64(len(p)) > r.remaining {
p = p[:r.remaining]
}
n, err := r.reader.Read(p)
r.remaining -= int64(n)
return n, err
}
// semaphoreReleasingReadCloser releases the fetch's connection slots when
// closed.
type semaphoreReleasingReadCloser struct {
*limitedReader
closer io.Closer
release func()
}
func (r *semaphoreReleasingReadCloser) Close() error {
err := r.closer.Close()
r.release()
return err
}
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
package httpfetcher
import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"net"
"testing"
"testing/fstest"
)
// testHost is the hostname used by mock fetch tests.
const testHost = "example.com"
func TestDefaultConfig(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if cfg.Timeout != DefaultFetchTimeout {
t.Errorf("Timeout = %v, want %v", cfg.Timeout, DefaultFetchTimeout)
}
if cfg.MaxResponseSize != DefaultMaxResponseSize {
t.Errorf("MaxResponseSize = %d, want %d", cfg.MaxResponseSize, DefaultMaxResponseSize)
}
if cfg.MaxConnectionsPerHost != DefaultMaxConnectionsPerHost {
t.Errorf("MaxConnectionsPerHost = %d, want %d",
cfg.MaxConnectionsPerHost, DefaultMaxConnectionsPerHost)
}
if cfg.AllowHTTP {
t.Error("AllowHTTP should default to false")
}
if len(cfg.AllowedContentTypes) == 0 {
t.Error("AllowedContentTypes should not be empty")
}
}
func TestNewWithNilConfigUsesDefaults(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := New(nil)
if f == nil {
t.Fatal("New(nil) returned nil")
}
if f.config == nil {
t.Fatal("config should be populated from DefaultConfig")
}
if f.config.Timeout != DefaultFetchTimeout {
t.Errorf("Timeout = %v, want %v", f.config.Timeout, DefaultFetchTimeout)
}
}
func TestIsAllowedContentType(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
f := New(DefaultConfig())
tests := []struct {
contentType string
want bool
}{
{contentTypeJPEG, true},
{contentTypePNG, true},
{contentTypeWebP, true},
{"image/jpeg; charset=utf-8", true},
{"IMAGE/JPEG", true},
{"text/html", false},
{contentTypeOctetStream, false},
{"", false},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.contentType, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := f.isAllowedContentType(tc.contentType)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("isAllowedContentType(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.contentType, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestExtractHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
url string
want string
}{
{"https://example.com/path", testHost},
{"http://example.com:8080/path", "example.com:8080"},
{"https://example.com", testHost},
{"https://example.com?q=1", testHost},
{"example.com/path", testHost},
{"", ""},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.url, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := extractHost(tc.url)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("extractHost(%q) = %q, want %q", tc.url, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestIsLocalhost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
host string
want bool
}{
{"localhost", true},
{"LOCALHOST", true},
{localhostIPv4, true},
{localhostIPv6, true},
{"[::1]", true},
{"foo.localhost", true},
{"foo.local", true},
{testHost, false},
{"127.0.0.2", false}, // Handled by isPrivateIP, not isLocalhost string match
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.host, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := isLocalhost(tc.host)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("isLocalhost(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.host, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestIsPrivateIP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
ip string
want bool
}{
{localhostIPv4, true}, // loopback
{"10.0.0.1", true}, // private
{"192.168.1.1", true}, // private
{"172.16.0.1", true}, // private
{"169.254.1.1", true}, // link-local
{"0.0.0.0", true}, // unspecified
{"224.0.0.1", true}, // multicast
{localhostIPv6, true}, // IPv6 loopback
{"fe80::1", true}, // IPv6 link-local
{"8.8.8.8", false}, // public
{"2001:4860:4860::8888", false}, // public IPv6
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.ip, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ip := net.ParseIP(tc.ip)
if ip == nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to parse IP %q", tc.ip)
}
got := isPrivateIP(ip)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("isPrivateIP(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.ip, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
if !isPrivateIP(nil) {
t.Error("isPrivateIP(nil) should return true")
}
}
func TestValidateURL_RejectsNonHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := validateURL(t.Context(), "http://example.com/path", false)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnsupportedScheme) {
t.Errorf("validateURL http = %v, want ErrUnsupportedScheme", err)
}
}
func TestValidateURL_AllowsHTTPWhenConfigured(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Use a host that won't resolve (explicit .invalid TLD) so we don't hit DNS.
err := validateURL(t.Context(), "http://nonexistent.invalid/path", true)
// We expect a host resolution error, not ErrUnsupportedScheme.
if errors.Is(err, ErrUnsupportedScheme) {
t.Error("validateURL with AllowHTTP should not return ErrUnsupportedScheme")
}
}
func TestValidateURL_RejectsLocalhost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := validateURL(t.Context(), "https://localhost/path", false)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrSSRFBlocked) {
t.Errorf("validateURL localhost = %v, want ErrSSRFBlocked", err)
}
}
func TestValidateURL_EmptyHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := validateURL(t.Context(), "https:///path", false)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidHost) {
t.Errorf("validateURL empty host = %v, want ErrInvalidHost", err)
}
}
func TestMockFetcher_FetchesFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mockFS := fstest.MapFS{
"example.com/images/photo.jpg": &fstest.MapFile{Data: []byte("fake-jpeg-data")},
}
m := NewMock(mockFS)
result, err := m.Fetch(context.Background(), "https://example.com/images/photo.jpg")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Fetch() error = %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = result.Content.Close() }()
if result.ContentType != contentTypeJPEG {
t.Errorf("ContentType = %q, want image/jpeg", result.ContentType)
}
data, err := io.ReadAll(result.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read content: %v", err)
}
if string(data) != "fake-jpeg-data" {
t.Errorf("Content = %q, want %q", string(data), "fake-jpeg-data")
}
if result.ContentLength != int64(len("fake-jpeg-data")) {
t.Errorf("ContentLength = %d, want %d", result.ContentLength, len("fake-jpeg-data"))
}
}
func TestMockFetcher_MissingFileReturnsUpstreamError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mockFS := fstest.MapFS{}
m := NewMock(mockFS)
_, err := m.Fetch(context.Background(), "https://example.com/missing.jpg")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUpstreamError) {
t.Errorf("Fetch() error = %v, want ErrUpstreamError", err)
}
}
func TestMockFetcher_RespectsContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mockFS := fstest.MapFS{
"example.com/photo.jpg": &fstest.MapFile{Data: []byte("data")},
}
m := NewMock(mockFS)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
_, err := m.Fetch(ctx, "https://example.com/photo.jpg")
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Errorf("Fetch() error = %v, want context.Canceled", err)
}
}
func TestDetectContentTypeFromPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
path string
want string
}{
{"foo/bar.jpg", contentTypeJPEG},
{"foo/bar.JPG", contentTypeJPEG},
{"foo/bar.jpeg", contentTypeJPEG},
{"foo/bar.png", contentTypePNG},
{"foo/bar.gif", contentTypeGIF},
{"foo/bar.webp", contentTypeWebP},
{"foo/bar.avif", contentTypeAVIF},
{"foo/bar.svg", contentTypeSVG},
{"foo/bar.bin", contentTypeOctetStream},
{"foo/bar", contentTypeOctetStream},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.path, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := detectContentTypeFromPath(tc.path)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("detectContentTypeFromPath(%q) = %q, want %q", tc.path, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestLimitedReader_EnforcesLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
src := make([]byte, 100)
r := &limitedReader{
reader: &byteReader{data: src},
remaining: 50,
}
buf := make([]byte, 100)
n, err := r.Read(buf)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Read error = %v", err)
}
if n > 50 {
t.Errorf("read %d bytes, should be capped at 50", n)
}
// Drain until limit is exhausted.
total := n
for total < 50 {
nn, err := r.Read(buf)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("during drain: %v", err)
}
total += nn
}
// Now the limit is exhausted — next read should error.
_, err = r.Read(buf)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrResponseTooLarge) {
t.Errorf("exhausted Read error = %v, want ErrResponseTooLarge", err)
}
}
// byteReader is a minimal io.Reader over a byte slice for testing.
type byteReader struct {
data []byte
pos int
}
func (r *byteReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
if r.pos >= len(r.data) {
return 0, io.EOF
}
n := copy(p, r.data[r.pos:])
r.pos += n
return n, nil
}
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
package httpfetcher
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net"
"strconv"
"testing"
"time"
)
// imageURLOnPort is the fake upstream's image route on testPublicHost at
// port. Each port is a different host to the per-host limit, while the test
// dialer sends every port to the one test server.
func imageURLOnPort(port int) string {
return "http://" + net.JoinHostPort(testPublicHost, strconv.Itoa(port)) +
"/image"
}
func TestDefaultConfigMaxConnections(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
if got := DefaultConfig().MaxConnections; got != DefaultMaxConnections {
t.Errorf("MaxConnections = %d, want %d", got, DefaultMaxConnections)
}
}
// TestFetchLimitsConnectionsToAllHostsTogether checks that MaxConnections
// counts the fetches to every host together, apart from the per-host
// limit: with MaxConnections at 2 and two responses open from two hosts, a
// fetch from a third host, which has nothing open, waits the whole wait
// timeout and fails with ErrTooManyConnections. Closing one response lets
// it through.
func TestFetchLimitsConnectionsToAllHostsTogether(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := startUpstream(t)
cfg := DefaultConfig()
cfg.MaxConnections = 2
f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, cfg)
f.connectionWaitTimeout = 100 * time.Millisecond
first, err := f.Fetch(testContext(t), imageURLOnPort(81))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Fetch() error = %v", err)
}
second, err := f.Fetch(testContext(t), imageURLOnPort(82))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second Fetch() error = %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = second.Content.Close() }()
start := time.Now()
_, err = f.Fetch(testContext(t), imageURLOnPort(83))
if !errors.Is(err, ErrTooManyConnections) {
t.Fatalf("third Fetch() error = %v, want ErrTooManyConnections", err)
}
if waited := time.Since(start); waited < f.connectionWaitTimeout {
t.Errorf("third Fetch() failed after %v, before waiting %v",
waited, f.connectionWaitTimeout)
}
if held := semLen(f, testPublicHost+":83"); held != 0 {
t.Errorf("the refused fetch kept its host's slot: %d held", held)
}
err = first.Content.Close()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("close first body: %v", err)
}
third, err := f.Fetch(testContext(t), imageURLOnPort(83))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Fetch() after a response was closed: error = %v", err)
}
_ = third.Content.Close()
}
// TestFetchFreesHostSlotWhenContextEndsWaitingForConnection checks that a
// fetch whose request context ends while it waits for a connection shared
// by all hosts gives its host's slot back. With MaxConnections at 1 and one
// response open, a fetch from another host takes that host's slot and waits;
// its context ends long before the 10 second wait timeout.
func TestFetchFreesHostSlotWhenContextEndsWaitingForConnection(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := startUpstream(t)
cfg := DefaultConfig()
cfg.MaxConnections = 1
f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, cfg)
first, err := f.Fetch(testContext(t), imageURLOnPort(81))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Fetch() error = %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = first.Content.Close() }()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 100*time.Millisecond)
defer cancel()
_, err = f.Fetch(ctx, imageURLOnPort(82))
if !errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
t.Fatalf("second Fetch() error = %v, want context.DeadlineExceeded", err)
}
if held := semLen(f, testPublicHost+":82"); held != 0 {
t.Errorf("the fetch kept its host's slot after its context ended: "+
"%d held", held)
}
}
// TestFetchReleasesConnectionOnError checks that a fetch that fails after
// taking its connection gives it back: with MaxConnections at 1, the slot
// must be free after the failure and the next fetch must succeed.
func TestFetchReleasesConnectionOnError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []struct {
name string
url string
want error
}{
{"upstream answers 500", upstreamURL("/status/500"), ErrUpstreamError},
{"upstream sends HTML", upstreamURL("/html"), ErrInvalidContentType},
// 198.51.100.7 (TEST-NET-2) passes the SSRF checks, and the test
// dialer refuses every host but testPublicHost.
{"connecting fails", "http://198.51.100.7/image", errUnexpectedDial},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := startUpstream(t)
cfg := DefaultConfig()
cfg.MaxConnections = 1
f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, cfg)
f.connectionWaitTimeout = 100 * time.Millisecond
_, err := f.Fetch(testContext(t), tc.url)
if !errors.Is(err, tc.want) {
t.Fatalf("Fetch() error = %v, want %v", err, tc.want)
}
if held := len(f.allHostsSemaphore); held != 0 {
t.Fatalf("connection still held after the error: %d held", held)
}
res := fetchImage(t, f, "/image")
_ = res.Content.Close()
})
}
}
@@ -1,24 +1,26 @@
package imgcache
package httpfetcher
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/fs"
"net/http"
"strings"
)
// MockFetcher implements the Fetcher interface using an embedded filesystem.
// errEmptyURLPath is returned when a mock URL has no usable path.
var errEmptyURLPath = errors.New("empty URL path")
// MockFetcher implements Fetcher using an embedded filesystem.
// Files are organized as: hostname/path/to/file.ext
// URLs like https://example.com/images/photo.jpg map to example.com/images/photo.jpg
// URLs like https://example.com/images/photo.jpg map to example.com/images/photo.jpg.
type MockFetcher struct {
fs fs.FS
}
// NewMockFetcher creates a new mock fetcher backed by the given filesystem.
func NewMockFetcher(fsys fs.FS) *MockFetcher {
// NewMock creates a new mock fetcher backed by the given filesystem.
func NewMock(fsys fs.FS) *MockFetcher {
return &MockFetcher{fs: fsys}
}
@@ -59,7 +61,7 @@ func (m *MockFetcher) Fetch(ctx context.Context, url string) (*FetchResult, erro
contentType := detectContentTypeFromPath(path)
return &FetchResult{
Content: f.(io.ReadCloser),
Content: f,
ContentLength: stat.Size(),
ContentType: contentType,
Headers: make(http.Header),
@@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ func urlToFSPath(rawURL string) (string, error) {
}
if url == "" {
return "", errors.New("empty URL path")
return "", errEmptyURLPath
}
return url, nil
@@ -98,18 +100,18 @@ func detectContentTypeFromPath(path string) string {
switch {
case strings.HasSuffix(path, ".jpg"), strings.HasSuffix(path, ".jpeg"):
return "image/jpeg"
return contentTypeJPEG
case strings.HasSuffix(path, ".png"):
return "image/png"
return contentTypePNG
case strings.HasSuffix(path, ".gif"):
return "image/gif"
return contentTypeGIF
case strings.HasSuffix(path, ".webp"):
return "image/webp"
return contentTypeWebP
case strings.HasSuffix(path, ".avif"):
return "image/avif"
return contentTypeAVIF
case strings.HasSuffix(path, ".svg"):
return "image/svg+xml"
return contentTypeSVG
default:
return "application/octet-stream"
return contentTypeOctetStream
}
}
+522
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,522 @@
// Package imageprocessor provides image format conversion and resizing using libvips.
package imageprocessor
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"runtime"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/davidbyttow/govips/v2/vips"
)
// vipsOnce ensures vips is initialized exactly once.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level sync.Once for one-time vips init
var vipsOnce sync.Once
// initVips initializes libvips with quiet logging, one worker thread per
// image and no operation cache. Process already works on one image per CPU
// by default, so more threads per image would only compete for the CPUs.
// Each request decodes different source bytes, so the operation cache
// would rarely be hit and would hold memory outside MaxConcurrentProcessing;
// repeated requests are served from pixa's disk cache instead.
func initVips() {
vipsOnce.Do(func() {
vips.LoggingSettings(nil, vips.LogLevelError)
vips.Startup(&vips.Config{
ConcurrencyLevel: 1,
MaxCacheSize: 0,
MaxCacheMem: 0,
MaxCacheFiles: 0,
})
})
}
// Format represents supported output image formats.
type Format string
// Supported image output formats.
const (
FormatOriginal Format = "orig"
FormatJPEG Format = "jpeg"
FormatPNG Format = "png"
FormatWebP Format = "webp"
FormatAVIF Format = "avif"
FormatGIF Format = "gif"
)
// FitMode represents how to fit an image into requested dimensions.
type FitMode string
// Supported image fit modes.
const (
FitCover FitMode = "cover"
FitContain FitMode = "contain"
FitFill FitMode = "fill"
FitInside FitMode = "inside"
FitOutside FitMode = "outside"
)
// ErrInvalidFitMode is returned when an invalid fit mode is provided.
var ErrInvalidFitMode = errors.New("invalid fit mode")
// Size represents requested image dimensions.
type Size struct {
Width int
Height int
}
// Request holds the parameters for image processing.
type Request struct {
Size Size
Format Format
Quality int
FitMode FitMode
}
// Result contains the output of image processing.
type Result struct {
// Content is the processed image data.
Content io.ReadCloser
// ContentLength is the size in bytes.
ContentLength int64
// ContentType is the MIME type of the output.
ContentType string
// Width is the output image width.
Width int
// Height is the output image height.
Height int
// InputWidth is the original image width before processing.
InputWidth int
// InputHeight is the original image height before processing.
InputHeight int
// InputFormat is the detected input format (e.g., "jpeg", "png").
InputFormat string
}
// MaxInputDimension is the maximum allowed width or height for input images.
// Images larger than this are rejected to prevent DoS via decompression bombs.
const MaxInputDimension = 8192
// DefaultMaxInputBytes is the default maximum input size in bytes (50 MiB).
// This matches the default upstream fetcher limit.
const DefaultMaxInputBytes = 50 << 20
// ErrInputTooLarge is returned when input image dimensions exceed MaxInputDimension.
var ErrInputTooLarge = errors.New("input image dimensions exceed maximum")
// ErrInputDataTooLarge is returned when the raw input data exceeds the
// configured byte limit.
var ErrInputDataTooLarge = errors.New("input data exceeds maximum allowed size")
// ErrUnsupportedOutputFormat is returned when the requested output format is
// not supported.
var ErrUnsupportedOutputFormat = errors.New("unsupported output format")
// ErrTooManyImages is returned when MaxConcurrentProcessing images are being
// processed and none finishes within ProcessingWaitTimeout.
var ErrTooManyImages = errors.New("too many images being processed at once")
// ProcessingWaitTimeout is how long Process waits for a free slot when
// MaxConcurrentProcessing images are already being processed.
const ProcessingWaitTimeout = 10 * time.Second
// ImageProcessor implements image transformation using libvips via govips.
type ImageProcessor struct {
maxInputBytes int64
// processingSemaphore has one slot per image that may be processed at
// once. Process holds a slot from before it reads its input until it
// returns, so the input, the decoded image and the output all count.
processingSemaphore chan struct{}
// processingWaitTimeout is ProcessingWaitTimeout; tests shorten it.
processingWaitTimeout time.Duration
}
// Params holds configuration for creating an ImageProcessor.
// Zero values use sensible defaults (MaxInputBytes defaults to DefaultMaxInputBytes).
type Params struct {
// MaxInputBytes is the maximum allowed input size in bytes.
// If <= 0, DefaultMaxInputBytes is used.
MaxInputBytes int64
// MaxConcurrentProcessing is the most images processed at once.
// If <= 0, the number of CPUs Go uses (runtime.GOMAXPROCS(0)) is used.
MaxConcurrentProcessing int
}
// New creates a new image processor with the given parameters.
// A zero-value Params{} uses sensible defaults.
func New(params Params) *ImageProcessor {
initVips()
maxInputBytes := params.MaxInputBytes
if maxInputBytes <= 0 {
maxInputBytes = DefaultMaxInputBytes
}
maxConcurrentProcessing := params.MaxConcurrentProcessing
if maxConcurrentProcessing <= 0 {
maxConcurrentProcessing = runtime.GOMAXPROCS(0)
}
return &ImageProcessor{
maxInputBytes: maxInputBytes,
processingSemaphore: make(chan struct{}, maxConcurrentProcessing),
processingWaitTimeout: ProcessingWaitTimeout,
}
}
// Process transforms an image according to the request. When
// MaxConcurrentProcessing images are already being processed, it waits up
// to ProcessingWaitTimeout for one to finish, then fails with
// ErrTooManyImages.
func (p *ImageProcessor) Process(
ctx context.Context,
input io.Reader,
req *Request,
) (*Result, error) {
release, err := p.acquireSlot(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer release()
// Read input with a size limit to prevent unbounded memory consumption.
// We read at most maxInputBytes+1 so we can detect if the input exceeds
// the limit without consuming additional memory.
limited := io.LimitReader(input, p.maxInputBytes+1)
data, err := io.ReadAll(limited)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read input: %w", err)
}
if int64(len(data)) > p.maxInputBytes {
return nil, ErrInputDataTooLarge
}
// Decode image
img, err := vips.NewImageFromBuffer(data)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode image: %w", err)
}
defer img.Close()
// Turn the image upright now: encode strips the EXIF orientation tag,
// and sizes below must be worked out on the upright image.
err = img.AutoRotate()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to auto-rotate: %w", err)
}
// Get original dimensions
origWidth := img.Width()
origHeight := img.Height()
// Detect input format
inputFormat := p.detectFormat(img)
// Validate input dimensions to prevent DoS via decompression bombs
if origWidth > MaxInputDimension || origHeight > MaxInputDimension {
return nil, ErrInputTooLarge
}
// Determine target dimensions
targetWidth, targetHeight := targetDimensions(req.Size, origWidth, origHeight)
// Resize if needed
if targetWidth != origWidth || targetHeight != origHeight {
err := p.resize(img, targetWidth, targetHeight, req.FitMode)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resize: %w", err)
}
}
// Determine output format
outputFormat := req.Format
if outputFormat == FormatOriginal || outputFormat == "" {
outputFormat = p.formatFromString(inputFormat)
}
// Encode to target format
output, err := p.encode(img, outputFormat, req.Quality)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encode: %w", err)
}
return &Result{
Content: io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(output)),
ContentLength: int64(len(output)),
ContentType: FormatToMIME(outputFormat),
Width: img.Width(),
Height: img.Height(),
InputWidth: origWidth,
InputHeight: origHeight,
InputFormat: inputFormat,
}, nil
}
// targetDimensions calculates the output dimensions for a requested size,
// scaling proportionally when only one dimension is given and keeping the
// original dimensions when both are zero.
func targetDimensions(size Size, origWidth, origHeight int) (int, int) {
switch {
case size.Width == 0 && size.Height == 0:
// Both are 0: keep original size
return origWidth, origHeight
case size.Width == 0:
// Only height specified: calculate width proportionally
return origWidth * size.Height / origHeight, size.Height
case size.Height == 0:
// Only width specified: calculate height proportionally
return size.Width, origHeight * size.Width / origWidth
default:
return size.Width, size.Height
}
}
// MIME types for the supported image formats.
const (
mimeJPEG = "image/jpeg"
mimePNG = "image/png"
mimeGIF = "image/gif"
mimeWebP = "image/webp"
mimeAVIF = "image/avif"
)
// SupportedInputFormats returns MIME types this processor can read.
func (p *ImageProcessor) SupportedInputFormats() []string {
return []string{
mimeJPEG,
mimePNG,
mimeGIF,
mimeWebP,
mimeAVIF,
}
}
// SupportedOutputFormats returns formats this processor can write.
func (p *ImageProcessor) SupportedOutputFormats() []Format {
return []Format{
FormatJPEG,
FormatPNG,
FormatGIF,
FormatWebP,
FormatAVIF,
}
}
// FormatToMIME converts a Format to its MIME type string.
func FormatToMIME(format Format) string {
switch format {
case FormatJPEG:
return mimeJPEG
case FormatPNG:
return mimePNG
case FormatWebP:
return mimeWebP
case FormatGIF:
return mimeGIF
case FormatAVIF:
return mimeAVIF
case FormatOriginal:
return "application/octet-stream"
default:
return "application/octet-stream"
}
}
// acquireSlot takes a slot in processingSemaphore, waiting at most
// processingWaitTimeout for one to free up, and returns the func that gives
// it back. A free slot is taken even when ctx has ended; only the wait for
// one stops when ctx ends, as the rest of Process does not check ctx.
func (p *ImageProcessor) acquireSlot(ctx context.Context) (func(), error) {
release := func() { <-p.processingSemaphore }
select {
case p.processingSemaphore <- struct{}{}:
return release, nil
default:
}
select {
case p.processingSemaphore <- struct{}{}:
return release, nil
case <-time.After(p.processingWaitTimeout):
return nil, ErrTooManyImages
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
}
// detectFormat returns the format string from a vips image.
func (p *ImageProcessor) detectFormat(img *vips.ImageRef) string {
format := img.Format()
switch format {
case vips.ImageTypeJPEG:
return "jpeg"
case vips.ImageTypePNG:
return "png"
case vips.ImageTypeGIF:
return "gif"
case vips.ImageTypeWEBP:
return "webp"
case vips.ImageTypeAVIF, vips.ImageTypeHEIF:
return string(FormatAVIF)
case vips.ImageTypeUnknown, vips.ImageTypeMagick, vips.ImageTypePDF,
vips.ImageTypeSVG, vips.ImageTypeTIFF, vips.ImageTypeBMP,
vips.ImageTypeJP2K, vips.ImageTypeJXL:
return "unknown"
default:
return "unknown"
}
}
// resize resizes the image according to the fit mode.
func (p *ImageProcessor) resize(
img *vips.ImageRef, width, height int, fit FitMode,
) error {
switch fit {
case FitCover, "":
// Resize and crop to fill exact dimensions (default)
return img.Thumbnail(width, height, vips.InterestingCentre)
case FitContain:
// Resize to fit within dimensions, maintaining aspect ratio
imgW, imgH := img.Width(), img.Height()
scaleW := float64(width) / float64(imgW)
scaleH := float64(height) / float64(imgH)
scale := min(scaleW, scaleH)
newW := int(float64(imgW) * scale)
newH := int(float64(imgH) * scale)
return img.Thumbnail(newW, newH, vips.InterestingNone)
case FitFill:
// Resize to exact dimensions (may distort)
return img.ThumbnailWithSize(width, height, vips.InterestingNone, vips.SizeForce)
case FitInside:
// Same as contain, but only shrink
if img.Width() <= width && img.Height() <= height {
return nil // Already fits
}
imgW, imgH := img.Width(), img.Height()
scaleW := float64(width) / float64(imgW)
scaleH := float64(height) / float64(imgH)
scale := min(scaleW, scaleH)
newW := int(float64(imgW) * scale)
newH := int(float64(imgH) * scale)
return img.Thumbnail(newW, newH, vips.InterestingNone)
case FitOutside:
// Resize so smallest dimension fits, may exceed target on other dimension
imgW, imgH := img.Width(), img.Height()
scaleW := float64(width) / float64(imgW)
scaleH := float64(height) / float64(imgH)
scale := max(scaleW, scaleH)
newW := int(float64(imgW) * scale)
newH := int(float64(imgH) * scale)
return img.Thumbnail(newW, newH, vips.InterestingNone)
default:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrInvalidFitMode, fit)
}
}
const defaultQuality = 85
// encode encodes an image to the specified format.
func (p *ImageProcessor) encode(
img *vips.ImageRef, format Format, quality int,
) ([]byte, error) {
if quality <= 0 {
quality = defaultQuality
}
var params vips.ExportParams
switch format {
case FormatJPEG:
params = vips.ExportParams{
Format: vips.ImageTypeJPEG,
Quality: quality,
}
case FormatPNG:
params = vips.ExportParams{
Format: vips.ImageTypePNG,
}
case FormatGIF:
params = vips.ExportParams{
Format: vips.ImageTypeGIF,
}
case FormatWebP:
params = vips.ExportParams{
Format: vips.ImageTypeWEBP,
Quality: quality,
}
case FormatAVIF:
params = vips.ExportParams{
Format: vips.ImageTypeAVIF,
Quality: quality,
}
case FormatOriginal:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrUnsupportedOutputFormat, format)
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrUnsupportedOutputFormat, format)
}
// Stripping drops the ICC profile as well, and clients show an image
// with no profile as sRGB, so convert to sRGB first. "srgb" names
// libvips' built-in profile; govips' own sRGB path variable is set on
// first use but read without a lock, so concurrent requests race on it.
if img.HasICCProfile() {
err := img.TransformICCProfileWithFallback("srgb", "srgb")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to convert to sRGB: %w", err)
}
}
// Drop EXIF, XMP, IPTC and the ICC profile. govips ignores this for
// GIF, which carries none of them.
params.StripMetadata = true
output, _, err := img.Export(&params)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return output, nil
}
// formatFromString converts a format string to Format.
func (p *ImageProcessor) formatFromString(format string) Format {
switch format {
case "jpeg":
return FormatJPEG
case "png":
return FormatPNG
case "gif":
return FormatGIF
case "webp":
return FormatWebP
case string(FormatAVIF):
return FormatAVIF
default:
return FormatJPEG
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,714 @@
package imageprocessor
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"image"
"image/color"
"image/jpeg"
"image/png"
"io"
"math"
"os"
"slices"
"testing"
"github.com/davidbyttow/govips/v2/vips"
)
func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
initVips()
code := m.Run()
vips.Shutdown()
os.Exit(code)
}
// createTestJPEG creates a simple test JPEG image.
func createTestJPEG(t *testing.T, width, height int) []byte {
t.Helper()
img := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, width, height))
// Fill with a gradient
for y := range height {
for x := range width {
img.Set(x, y, color.RGBA{
R: uint8((x * 255 / width) & 0xff),
G: uint8((y * 255 / height) & 0xff),
B: 128,
A: 255,
})
}
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
err := jpeg.Encode(&buf, img, &jpeg.Options{Quality: 90})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encode test JPEG: %v", err)
}
return buf.Bytes()
}
// createTestPNG creates a simple test PNG image.
func createTestPNG(t *testing.T, width, height int) []byte {
t.Helper()
img := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, width, height))
for y := range height {
for x := range width {
img.Set(x, y, color.RGBA{
R: uint8((x * 255 / width) & 0xff),
G: uint8((y * 255 / height) & 0xff),
B: 128,
A: 255,
})
}
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
err := png.Encode(&buf, img)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encode test PNG: %v", err)
}
return buf.Bytes()
}
// isAVIF reports whether data starts with an AVIF ftyp box.
func isAVIF(data []byte) bool {
if len(data) < 12 || string(data[4:8]) != "ftyp" {
return false
}
brand := string(data[8:12])
return brand == string(FormatAVIF) || brand == "avis"
}
// detectMIME is a minimal magic-byte detector for test assertions.
func detectMIME(data []byte) string {
if len(data) >= 3 && data[0] == 0xFF && data[1] == 0xD8 && data[2] == 0xFF {
return mimeJPEG
}
if len(data) >= 8 && string(data[:8]) == "\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" {
return mimePNG
}
if len(data) >= 4 && string(data[:4]) == "GIF8" {
return mimeGIF
}
if len(data) >= 12 && string(data[:4]) == "RIFF" && string(data[8:12]) == "WEBP" {
return mimeWebP
}
if isAVIF(data) {
return mimeAVIF
}
return ""
}
func TestImageProcessor_ResizeJPEG(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
proc := New(Params{})
ctx := context.Background()
input := createTestJPEG(t, 800, 600)
req := &Request{
Size: Size{Width: 400, Height: 300},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = result.Content.Close() }()
if result.Width != 400 {
t.Errorf("Process() width = %d, want 400", result.Width)
}
if result.Height != 300 {
t.Errorf("Process() height = %d, want 300", result.Height)
}
if result.ContentLength == 0 {
t.Error("Process() returned zero content length")
}
// Verify it's valid JPEG by reading the content
data, err := io.ReadAll(result.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read result: %v", err)
}
mime := detectMIME(data)
if mime != mimeJPEG {
t.Errorf("Output format = %v, want image/jpeg", mime)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_ConvertToPNG(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
proc := New(Params{})
ctx := context.Background()
input := createTestJPEG(t, 200, 150)
req := &Request{
Size: Size{Width: 200, Height: 150},
Format: FormatPNG,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = result.Content.Close() }()
data, err := io.ReadAll(result.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read result: %v", err)
}
mime := detectMIME(data)
if mime != mimePNG {
t.Errorf("Output format = %v, want image/png", mime)
}
}
// processAndCheckSize processes a test JPEG of the given input dimensions
// with the requested size and asserts the resulting dimensions.
func processAndCheckSize(
t *testing.T, inputW, inputH int, size Size, wantW, wantH int,
) {
t.Helper()
proc := New(Params{})
ctx := context.Background()
input := createTestJPEG(t, inputW, inputH)
req := &Request{
Size: size,
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = result.Content.Close() }()
if result.Width != wantW {
t.Errorf("Process() width = %d, want %d", result.Width, wantW)
}
if result.Height != wantH {
t.Errorf("Process() height = %d, want %d", result.Height, wantH)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_OriginalSize(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Width and height 0: keep original size
processAndCheckSize(t, 640, 480, Size{Width: 0, Height: 0}, 640, 480)
}
func TestImageProcessor_FitContain(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
proc := New(Params{})
ctx := context.Background()
// 800x400 image (2:1 aspect) into 400x400 box with contain
// Should result in 400x200 (maintaining aspect ratio)
input := createTestJPEG(t, 800, 400)
req := &Request{
Size: Size{Width: 400, Height: 400},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitContain,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = result.Content.Close() }()
// With contain, the image should fit within the box
if result.Width > 400 || result.Height > 400 {
t.Errorf("Process() size %dx%d exceeds 400x400 box", result.Width, result.Height)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_ProportionalScale_WidthOnly(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// 800x600 image, request width=400 height=0
// Should scale proportionally to 400x300
processAndCheckSize(t, 800, 600, Size{Width: 400, Height: 0}, 400, 300)
}
func TestImageProcessor_ProportionalScale_HeightOnly(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// 800x600 image, request width=0 height=300
// Should scale proportionally to 400x300
processAndCheckSize(t, 800, 600, Size{Width: 0, Height: 300}, 400, 300)
}
func TestImageProcessor_ProcessPNG(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
proc := New(Params{})
ctx := context.Background()
input := createTestPNG(t, 400, 300)
req := &Request{
Size: Size{Width: 200, Height: 150},
Format: FormatPNG,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = result.Content.Close() }()
if result.Width != 200 {
t.Errorf("Process() width = %d, want 200", result.Width)
}
if result.Height != 150 {
t.Errorf("Process() height = %d, want 150", result.Height)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_SupportedFormats(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
proc := New(Params{})
inputFormats := proc.SupportedInputFormats()
if len(inputFormats) == 0 {
t.Error("SupportedInputFormats() returned empty slice")
}
outputFormats := proc.SupportedOutputFormats()
if len(outputFormats) == 0 {
t.Error("SupportedOutputFormats() returned empty slice")
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_RejectsOversizedInput(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Images exceeding MaxInputDimension in either dimension must be
// rejected before processing to prevent DoS.
tests := []struct {
name string
width int
height int
}{
{name: "oversized width", width: 10000, height: 100},
{name: "oversized height", width: 100, height: 10000},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
proc := New(Params{})
ctx := context.Background()
input := createTestJPEG(t, tt.width, tt.height)
req := &Request{
Size: Size{Width: 100, Height: 100},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
_, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err == nil {
t.Error("Process() should reject oversized input images")
}
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInputTooLarge) {
t.Errorf("Process() error = %v, want ErrInputTooLarge", err)
}
})
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_AcceptsMaxDimensionInput(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
proc := New(Params{})
ctx := context.Background()
// Create an image at exactly MaxInputDimension - should be accepted
input := createTestJPEG(t, MaxInputDimension, 100)
req := &Request{
Size: Size{Width: 100, Height: 100},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf(
"Process() should accept images at MaxInputDimension, got error: %v",
err,
)
}
defer func() { _ = result.Content.Close() }()
}
// encodeAndCheck processes a 200x150 test JPEG into a 100x75 output of the
// given format and asserts the output MIME type and dimensions.
func encodeAndCheck(t *testing.T, format Format, quality int, wantMIME string) {
t.Helper()
proc := New(Params{})
ctx := context.Background()
input := createTestJPEG(t, 200, 150)
req := &Request{
Size: Size{Width: 100, Height: 75},
Format: format,
Quality: quality,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v, want nil", err)
}
defer func() { _ = result.Content.Close() }()
// Verify output format
data, err := io.ReadAll(result.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read result: %v", err)
}
mime := detectMIME(data)
if mime != wantMIME {
t.Errorf("Output format = %v, want %v", mime, wantMIME)
}
// Verify dimensions
if result.Width != 100 {
t.Errorf("Width = %d, want 100", result.Width)
}
if result.Height != 75 {
t.Errorf("Height = %d, want 75", result.Height)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_EncodeWebP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
encodeAndCheck(t, FormatWebP, 80, mimeWebP)
}
func TestImageProcessor_DecodeAVIF(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
proc := New(Params{})
ctx := context.Background()
// Load test AVIF file
input, err := os.ReadFile("testdata/red.avif")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read test AVIF: %v", err)
}
// Request resize and convert to JPEG
req := &Request{
Size: Size{Width: 2, Height: 2},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v, want nil (AVIF decoding should work)", err)
}
defer func() { _ = result.Content.Close() }()
// Verify output is valid JPEG
data, err := io.ReadAll(result.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read result: %v", err)
}
mime := detectMIME(data)
if mime != mimeJPEG {
t.Errorf("Output format = %v, want image/jpeg", mime)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_RejectsOversizedInputData(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Create a processor with a very small byte limit
const limit = 1024
proc := New(Params{MaxInputBytes: limit})
ctx := context.Background()
// Create a valid JPEG that exceeds the byte limit
input := createTestJPEG(t, 800, 600) // will be well over 1 KiB
if int64(len(input)) <= limit {
t.Fatalf("test JPEG must exceed %d bytes, got %d", limit, len(input))
}
req := &Request{
Size: Size{Width: 100, Height: 75},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
_, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Process() should reject input exceeding maxInputBytes")
}
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInputDataTooLarge) {
t.Errorf("Process() error = %v, want ErrInputDataTooLarge", err)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_AcceptsInputWithinLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Create a small image and set limit well above its size
input := createTestJPEG(t, 10, 10)
limit := int64(len(input)) * 10 // 10× headroom
proc := New(Params{MaxInputBytes: limit})
ctx := context.Background()
req := &Request{
Size: Size{Width: 10, Height: 10},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v, want nil", err)
}
defer func() { _ = result.Content.Close() }()
}
func TestImageProcessor_DefaultMaxInputBytes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Passing 0 should use the default
proc := New(Params{})
if proc.maxInputBytes != DefaultMaxInputBytes {
t.Errorf("maxInputBytes = %d, want %d", proc.maxInputBytes, DefaultMaxInputBytes)
}
// Passing negative should also use the default
proc = New(Params{MaxInputBytes: -1})
if proc.maxInputBytes != DefaultMaxInputBytes {
t.Errorf("maxInputBytes = %d, want %d", proc.maxInputBytes, DefaultMaxInputBytes)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_EncodeAVIF(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
encodeAndCheck(t, FormatAVIF, 85, mimeAVIF)
}
// processAndDecode runs input through Process and decodes the output with
// vips, so a test can inspect the image a client would receive.
func processAndDecode(t *testing.T, input []byte, req *Request) *vips.ImageRef {
t.Helper()
result, err := New(Params{}).Process(
context.Background(), bytes.NewReader(input), req,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = result.Content.Close() }()
data, err := io.ReadAll(result.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read result: %v", err)
}
output, err := vips.NewImageFromBuffer(data)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode output: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(output.Close)
return output
}
func TestImageProcessor_StripsEXIF(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// gps-exif.jpg carries GPS coordinates, a camera make, model and serial
// number, and a capture time.
input, err := os.ReadFile("testdata/gps-exif.jpg")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read test JPEG: %v", err)
}
fixture, err := vips.NewImageFromBuffer(input)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode test JPEG: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(fixture.Close)
if !slices.Contains(fixture.GetFields(), "exif-ifd3-GPSLatitude") {
t.Fatal("testdata/gps-exif.jpg has no GPS latitude")
}
formats := []Format{
FormatJPEG, FormatPNG, FormatWebP, FormatAVIF, FormatGIF, FormatOriginal,
}
for _, format := range formats {
t.Run(string(format), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
output := processAndDecode(t, input, &Request{Format: format})
if output.HasExif() {
t.Errorf("output has EXIF: %v", output.GetExif())
}
})
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_AppliesEXIFOrientation(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// orientation-6.jpg is stored 16x8, red on the left and blue on the
// right, with EXIF orientation 6 (turn 90 degrees clockwise to view).
// Upright it is 8x16, red on top and blue below.
input, err := os.ReadFile("testdata/orientation-6.jpg")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read test JPEG: %v", err)
}
tests := []struct {
name string
size Size
wantW int
wantH int
}{
{name: "original size", size: Size{}, wantW: 8, wantH: 16},
{name: "width only", size: Size{Width: 4}, wantW: 4, wantH: 8},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
output := processAndDecode(t, input, &Request{
Size: tt.size,
Format: FormatPNG,
})
if output.Width() != tt.wantW || output.Height() != tt.wantH {
t.Fatalf("output is %dx%d, want %dx%d",
output.Width(), output.Height(), tt.wantW, tt.wantH)
}
top, err := output.GetPoint(tt.wantW/2, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetPoint() error = %v", err)
}
bottom, err := output.GetPoint(tt.wantW/2, tt.wantH-1)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetPoint() error = %v", err)
}
if top[0] <= top[2] || bottom[2] <= bottom[0] {
t.Errorf("top pixel = %v, bottom pixel = %v, want red above blue",
top, bottom)
}
})
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_ConvertsWideGamutToSRGB(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// display-p3.jpg is a flat 8x8 image with the Display P3 profile
// embedded, filled with Display P3 (234, 51, 35), which is sRGB red.
input, err := os.ReadFile("testdata/display-p3.jpg")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read test JPEG: %v", err)
}
output := processAndDecode(t, input, &Request{Format: FormatPNG})
if output.HasICCProfile() {
t.Error("output has an ICC profile")
}
pixel, err := output.GetPoint(4, 4)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetPoint() error = %v", err)
}
want := []float64{255, 0, 0}
for i := range want {
if math.Abs(pixel[i]-want[i]) > 5 {
t.Fatalf("pixel = %v, want within 5 of %v", pixel, want)
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
package imageprocessor
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"runtime"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"testing/iotest"
"time"
)
// errTestReadFailed is the error the unreadable test input returns.
var errTestReadFailed = errors.New("test input cannot be read")
// readingCounter counts the Process calls reading their input at the same
// time and remembers the most there ever were.
type readingCounter struct {
mu sync.Mutex
reading int
most int
}
func (c *readingCounter) start() {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
c.reading++
c.most = max(c.most, c.reading)
}
func (c *readingCounter) stop() {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
c.reading--
}
func (c *readingCounter) mostReading() int {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
return c.most
}
// gatedReader is a Process input. Its first Read counts the call in,
// reports it on entered and blocks until gate is closed; it counts the call
// out when it returns io.EOF. Process reads its input only while it holds a
// processing slot, so the count never goes above MaxConcurrentProcessing.
type gatedReader struct {
data *bytes.Reader
gate <-chan struct{}
entered chan<- struct{}
counter *readingCounter
started bool
}
func (r *gatedReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
if !r.started {
r.started = true
r.counter.start()
r.entered <- struct{}{}
<-r.gate
}
n, err := r.data.Read(p)
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
r.counter.stop()
}
return n, err
}
// smallJPEGRequest asks for a 5x5 JPEG.
func smallJPEGRequest() *Request {
return &Request{
Size: Size{Width: 5, Height: 5},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
}
// processInBackground runs Process on reader in a new goroutine and sends
// its error on results.
func processInBackground(
proc *ImageProcessor, reader *gatedReader, results chan<- error,
) {
go func() {
result, err := proc.Process(context.Background(), reader, smallJPEGRequest())
if err == nil {
_ = result.Content.Close()
}
results <- err
}()
}
// waitForEntries fails the test unless count Process calls report on
// entered within a few seconds.
func waitForEntries(t *testing.T, entered <-chan struct{}, count int) {
t.Helper()
for range count {
select {
case <-entered:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Process calls did not start reading their input")
}
}
}
func TestNewDefaultsMaxConcurrentProcessingToCPUs(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, limit := range []int{0, -1} {
proc := New(Params{MaxConcurrentProcessing: limit})
if got := cap(proc.processingSemaphore); got != runtime.GOMAXPROCS(0) {
t.Errorf("MaxConcurrentProcessing %d: %d slots, want %d, one per CPU",
limit, got, runtime.GOMAXPROCS(0))
}
}
proc := New(Params{MaxConcurrentProcessing: 3})
if got := cap(proc.processingSemaphore); got != 3 {
t.Errorf("MaxConcurrentProcessing 3: %d slots, want 3", got)
}
}
// TestProcessNeverExceedsMaxConcurrentProcessing starts more Process calls
// than MaxConcurrentProcessing allows and holds the first ones inside
// Process until the test lets them go. No more than the limit may be
// working at once, and the calls held back must wait for a slot and then
// succeed.
func TestProcessNeverExceedsMaxConcurrentProcessing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
limit = 2
calls = 6
)
proc := New(Params{MaxConcurrentProcessing: limit})
input := createTestJPEG(t, 50, 50)
counter := &readingCounter{}
gate := make(chan struct{})
entered := make(chan struct{}, calls)
results := make(chan error, calls)
openGate := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(gate) })
t.Cleanup(openGate)
for range calls {
processInBackground(proc, &gatedReader{
data: bytes.NewReader(input), gate: gate, entered: entered,
counter: counter,
}, results)
}
waitForEntries(t, entered, limit)
// A call beyond the limit would start reading its input now.
select {
case <-entered:
t.Fatalf("a Process call started while %d were already working", limit)
case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond):
}
openGate()
for range calls {
err := <-results
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Process() error = %v, want nil once a slot is free", err)
}
}
if most := counter.mostReading(); most > limit {
t.Errorf("%d Process calls worked at once, want at most %d", most, limit)
}
}
// TestProcessWaitsThenFailsWhenNoSlotFrees holds the only slot and checks
// that another call waits the whole wait timeout, then fails with
// ErrTooManyImages instead of processing anyway.
func TestProcessWaitsThenFailsWhenNoSlotFrees(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
proc := New(Params{MaxConcurrentProcessing: 1})
proc.processingWaitTimeout = 100 * time.Millisecond
input := createTestJPEG(t, 10, 10)
gate := make(chan struct{})
entered := make(chan struct{}, 1)
held := make(chan error, 1)
openGate := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(gate) })
t.Cleanup(openGate)
processInBackground(proc, &gatedReader{
data: bytes.NewReader(input), gate: gate, entered: entered,
counter: &readingCounter{},
}, held)
waitForEntries(t, entered, 1)
start := time.Now()
_, err := proc.Process(context.Background(), bytes.NewReader(input),
smallJPEGRequest())
if !errors.Is(err, ErrTooManyImages) {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v, want ErrTooManyImages", err)
}
if waited := time.Since(start); waited < proc.processingWaitTimeout {
t.Errorf("Process() failed after %v, before waiting %v",
waited, proc.processingWaitTimeout)
}
openGate()
err = <-held
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Process() holding the slot: error = %v, want nil", err)
}
}
// TestProcessReleasesSlotOnError checks that Process gives its slot back
// when it fails, whether it fails early or late: with one slot, the slot
// must be free after the failure and the next call must succeed.
func TestProcessReleasesSlotOnError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
valid := createTestJPEG(t, 10, 10)
unsupported := smallJPEGRequest()
unsupported.Format = "bmp"
cases := []struct {
name string
input io.Reader
req *Request
// want is the error Process must return; nil means any error.
want error
}{
{
name: "input cannot be read",
input: iotest.ErrReader(errTestReadFailed),
req: smallJPEGRequest(),
want: errTestReadFailed,
},
{
name: "input over the byte limit",
input: bytes.NewReader(createTestJPEG(t, 800, 600)),
req: smallJPEGRequest(),
want: ErrInputDataTooLarge,
},
{
name: "input not an image",
input: strings.NewReader("not an image"),
req: smallJPEGRequest(),
},
{
name: "output format not supported",
input: bytes.NewReader(valid),
req: unsupported,
want: ErrUnsupportedOutputFormat,
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
proc := New(Params{MaxInputBytes: 4096, MaxConcurrentProcessing: 1})
proc.processingWaitTimeout = 100 * time.Millisecond
_, err := proc.Process(context.Background(), tc.input, tc.req)
if err == nil || (tc.want != nil && !errors.Is(err, tc.want)) {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v, want %v", err, tc.want)
}
if held := len(proc.processingSemaphore); held != 0 {
t.Fatalf("slot still held after the error: %d held", held)
}
result, err := proc.Process(context.Background(), bytes.NewReader(valid),
smallJPEGRequest())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() after the error = %v, want nil", err)
}
_ = result.Content.Close()
})
}
}
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@@ -2,13 +2,19 @@ package imgcache
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"database/sql"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"path/filepath"
"sync"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
)
// Cache errors.
@@ -25,6 +31,22 @@ type CacheConfig struct {
StateDir string
CacheTTL time.Duration
NegativeTTL time.Duration
// MaxBytes is the disk cache size limit in bytes that eviction
// enforces. Zero means no limit is enforced (no eviction). The
// config layer supplies the computed default when the operator
// omits cache_max_bytes.
MaxBytes int64
// DisableDiskCache turns the disk cache off entirely: no cache
// directories are created, lookups always miss, stores are
// no-ops, and no eviction machinery runs. The config layer sets
// this when the operator configures cache_max_bytes: 0.
DisableDiskCache bool
// Logger receives accounting and eviction log output. A nil
// Logger means slog.Default().
Logger *slog.Logger
}
// variantMeta stores content type for fast cache hits without reading .meta file.
@@ -40,36 +62,87 @@ type Cache struct {
variants *VariantStorage // processed variants by cache key
srcMetadata *MetadataStorage // source metadata by host/path
config CacheConfig
log *slog.Logger
// In-memory cache of variant metadata (content type, size) to avoid reading .meta files
// disabled means the disk cache is turned off entirely: lookups
// always miss, stores are no-ops, and no eviction runs.
disabled bool
// Eviction machinery. The channels are created in NewCache so
// stores can signal write pressure without racing StartEviction.
evictionPressure chan struct{}
evictionStop chan struct{}
evictionDone chan struct{}
evictionStarted bool
evictionStopOnce sync.Once
// In-memory cache of variant metadata (content type, size) to avoid
// reading .meta files
metaCache map[VariantKey]variantMeta
// contentLocks serializes StoreSource and evictSourceBlob per
// content hash, closing the race window between an eviction's row
// deletion and its file unlink against a concurrent store of
// identical content.
contentLocks *contentLock
// evictSourceBlobTestHook, when set, is invoked by evictSourceBlob
// after its row-deletion transaction commits and before the
// content file is unlinked. It exists solely so tests can
// deterministically pause inside that window to exercise
// concurrent stores against it; production code leaves it nil.
evictSourceBlobTestHook func(ContentHash)
}
// NewCache creates a new cache instance.
func NewCache(db *sql.DB, config CacheConfig) (*Cache, error) {
srcContent, err := NewContentStorage(filepath.Join(config.StateDir, "cache", "sources"))
log := config.Logger
if log == nil {
log = slog.Default()
}
c := &Cache{
db: db,
config: config,
log: log,
disabled: config.DisableDiskCache,
evictionPressure: make(chan struct{}, 1),
evictionStop: make(chan struct{}),
evictionDone: make(chan struct{}),
metaCache: make(map[VariantKey]variantMeta),
contentLocks: newContentLock(),
}
if c.disabled {
return c, nil
}
srcContent, err := NewContentStorage(
filepath.Join(config.StateDir, "cache", "sources"),
)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create source content storage: %w", err)
}
variants, err := NewVariantStorage(filepath.Join(config.StateDir, "cache", "variants"))
variants, err := NewVariantStorage(
filepath.Join(config.StateDir, "cache", "variants"), log,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create variant storage: %w", err)
}
srcMetadata, err := NewMetadataStorage(filepath.Join(config.StateDir, "cache", "metadata"))
srcMetadata, err := NewMetadataStorage(
filepath.Join(config.StateDir, "cache", "metadata"),
)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create source metadata storage: %w", err)
}
return &Cache{
db: db,
srcContent: srcContent,
variants: variants,
srcMetadata: srcMetadata,
config: config,
metaCache: make(map[VariantKey]variantMeta),
}, nil
c.srcContent = srcContent
c.variants = variants
c.srcMetadata = srcMetadata
return c, nil
}
// LookupResult contains the result of a cache lookup.
@@ -81,12 +154,15 @@ type LookupResult struct {
CacheStatus CacheStatus
}
// Lookup checks if a processed variant exists on disk (no DB access for hits).
func (c *Cache) Lookup(_ context.Context, req *ImageRequest) (*LookupResult, error) {
// Lookup checks if a processed variant exists on disk. Hits touch the
// variant's LRU timestamp; a disabled cache always misses.
func (c *Cache) Lookup(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) (*LookupResult, error) {
cacheKey := CacheKey(req)
// Check variant storage directly - no DB needed for cache hits
if c.variants.Exists(cacheKey) {
if !c.disabled && c.variants.Exists(cacheKey) {
c.touchVariant(ctx, cacheKey)
return &LookupResult{
Hit: true,
CacheKey: cacheKey,
@@ -103,25 +179,63 @@ func (c *Cache) Lookup(_ context.Context, req *ImageRequest) (*LookupResult, err
// GetVariant returns a reader, size, and content type for a cached variant.
func (c *Cache) GetVariant(cacheKey VariantKey) (io.ReadCloser, int64, string, error) {
if c.disabled {
return nil, 0, "", ErrNotFound
}
return c.variants.LoadWithMeta(cacheKey)
}
// StoreSource stores fetched source content and metadata.
// StoreSource stores fetched source content and metadata. On a
// disabled cache it is a no-op returning an empty hash.
func (c *Cache) StoreSource(
ctx context.Context,
req *ImageRequest,
content io.Reader,
result *FetchResult,
result *httpfetcher.FetchResult,
) (ContentHash, error) {
// Store content
contentHash, size, err := c.srcContent.Store(content)
if c.disabled {
return "", nil
}
// Hash the content ourselves (rather than via srcContent.Store,
// which would hash internally) so the content hash is known before
// any file or database work happens: that lets the entire store be
// serialized, per hash, against a concurrent eviction of the same
// content below.
data, err := io.ReadAll(content)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to read source content: %w", err)
}
sum := sha256.Sum256(data)
contentHash := ContentHash(hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]))
// Hold the content hash's lock for the whole store operation. A
// concurrent eviction of this exact hash (the real SHA-256 dedup
// case: a different source path whose bytes hash identically)
// deletes the accounting rows and unlinks the file inside the same
// lock, so the two can never interleave: either this store
// completes first (and a subsequent eviction removes it together
// with its rows and file, correctly), or eviction completes first
// (and this store finds the file already gone and recreates it
// fresh) — never a fresh row left pointing at a file eviction is
// mid-unlink on.
unlock := c.contentLocks.Lock(string(contentHash))
defer unlock()
size, err := c.srcContent.StoreHashed(contentHash, data)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to store source content: %w", err)
}
// Store in database
pathHash := HashPath(req.SourcePath + "?" + req.SourceQuery)
headersJSON, _ := json.Marshal(result.Headers)
headersJSON, err := json.Marshal(result.Headers)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal response headers: %w", err)
}
_, err = c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO source_content (content_hash, content_type, size_bytes)
@@ -149,39 +263,58 @@ func (c *Cache) StoreSource(
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to insert source metadata: %w", err)
}
// Store metadata JSON file
meta := &SourceMetadata{
Host: req.SourceHost,
Path: req.SourcePath,
Query: req.SourceQuery,
ContentHash: string(contentHash),
StatusCode: result.StatusCode,
ContentType: result.ContentType,
ContentLength: result.ContentLength,
ResponseHeaders: result.Headers,
FetchedAt: time.Now().UTC().Unix(),
FetchDurationMs: result.FetchDurationMs,
RemoteAddr: result.RemoteAddr,
}
c.writeMetadataSidecar(req, pathHash, contentHash, result)
if err := c.srcMetadata.Store(req.SourceHost, pathHash, meta); err != nil {
// Non-fatal, we have it in the database
_ = err
}
c.notifyWritePressure()
return contentHash, nil
}
// StoreVariant stores a processed variant by its cache key.
func (c *Cache) StoreVariant(cacheKey VariantKey, content io.Reader, contentType string) error {
_, err := c.variants.Store(cacheKey, content, contentType)
// StoreVariant stores a processed variant by its cache key and records
// it in the size accounting. On a disabled cache it is a no-op. The
// accounting insert is best-effort (the startup reconciliation pass
// adopts any variant file that misses its accounting row).
func (c *Cache) StoreVariant(
ctx context.Context, cacheKey VariantKey, content io.Reader, contentType string,
) error {
if c.disabled {
return nil
}
return err
size, err := c.variants.Store(cacheKey, content, contentType)
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO variant_content (cache_key, size_bytes, content_type)
VALUES (?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(cache_key) DO UPDATE SET
size_bytes = excluded.size_bytes,
content_type = excluded.content_type,
last_accessed_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
`, string(cacheKey), size, contentType)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("failed to record variant in size accounting",
"cache_key", cacheKey, "error", err)
}
c.notifyWritePressure()
return nil
}
// LookupSource checks if we have cached source content for a request.
// Returns the content hash and content type if found, or empty values if not.
func (c *Cache) LookupSource(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) (ContentHash, string, error) {
// Returns the content hash and content type if found, or empty values
// if not. Hits touch the blob's LRU timestamp; a disabled cache always
// reports no cached source.
func (c *Cache) LookupSource(
ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest,
) (ContentHash, string, error) {
if c.disabled {
return "", "", nil
}
var hashStr, contentType string
err := c.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
@@ -204,15 +337,21 @@ func (c *Cache) LookupSource(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) (ContentHas
return "", "", nil
}
c.touchSourceContent(ctx, contentHash)
return contentHash, contentType, nil
}
// StoreNegative stores a negative cache entry for a failed fetch.
func (c *Cache) StoreNegative(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest, statusCode int, errMsg string) error {
func (c *Cache) StoreNegative(
ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest, statusCode int, errMsg string,
) error {
expiresAt := time.Now().UTC().Add(c.config.NegativeTTL)
_, err := c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO negative_cache (source_host, source_path, source_query, status_code, error_message, expires_at)
INSERT INTO negative_cache
(source_host, source_path, source_query, status_code,
error_message, expires_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(source_host, source_path, source_query) DO UPDATE SET
status_code = excluded.status_code,
@@ -227,46 +366,16 @@ func (c *Cache) StoreNegative(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest, statusCode
return nil
}
// checkNegativeCache checks if a request is in the negative cache.
func (c *Cache) checkNegativeCache(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) (bool, error) {
var expiresAt time.Time
err := c.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
SELECT expires_at FROM negative_cache
WHERE source_host = ? AND source_path = ? AND source_query = ?
`, req.SourceHost, req.SourcePath, req.SourceQuery).Scan(&expiresAt)
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return false, nil
}
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to check negative cache: %w", err)
}
// Check if expired
if time.Now().After(expiresAt) {
// Clean up expired entry
_, _ = c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
DELETE FROM negative_cache
WHERE source_host = ? AND source_path = ? AND source_query = ?
`, req.SourceHost, req.SourcePath, req.SourceQuery)
return false, nil
}
return true, nil
}
// GetSourceMetadataID returns the source metadata ID for a request.
func (c *Cache) GetSourceMetadataID(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) (int64, error) {
func (c *Cache) GetSourceMetadataID(
ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest,
) (int64, error) {
var id int64
err := c.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
SELECT id FROM source_metadata
WHERE source_host = ? AND source_path = ? AND source_query = ?
`, req.SourceHost, req.SourcePath, req.SourceQuery).Scan(&id)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to get source metadata ID: %w", err)
}
@@ -274,9 +383,16 @@ func (c *Cache) GetSourceMetadataID(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) (int
return id, nil
}
// GetSourceContent returns a reader for cached source content by its hash.
func (c *Cache) GetSourceContent(contentHash ContentHash) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
return c.srcContent.Load(contentHash)
// GetSourceContent returns a reader for cached source content by its hash,
// and the content's size in bytes.
func (c *Cache) GetSourceContent(
contentHash ContentHash,
) (io.ReadCloser, int64, error) {
if c.disabled {
return nil, 0, ErrNotFound
}
return c.srcContent.LoadWithSize(contentHash)
}
// CleanExpired removes expired entries from the cache.
@@ -306,9 +422,22 @@ func (c *Cache) Stats(ctx context.Context) (*CacheStats, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get cache stats: %w", err)
}
// Get actual item count and total size from content tables
_ = c.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM request_cache`).Scan(&stats.TotalItems)
_ = c.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COALESCE(SUM(size_bytes), 0) FROM output_content`).Scan(&stats.TotalSizeBytes)
// Count and size the cached source images and processed variants. A
// disabled cache holds none, whatever rows an earlier run left.
if !c.disabled {
err = c.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
SELECT (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM source_content)
+ (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM variant_content)
`).Scan(&stats.TotalItems)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("failed to count cache items for stats", "error", err)
}
stats.TotalSizeBytes, err = c.UsageBytes(ctx)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("failed to sum cache size for stats", "error", err)
}
}
// Compute hit rate as a ratio
if stats.HitCount+stats.MissCount > 0 {
@@ -320,23 +449,145 @@ func (c *Cache) Stats(ctx context.Context) (*CacheStats, error) {
// IncrementStats increments cache statistics.
func (c *Cache) IncrementStats(ctx context.Context, hit bool, fetchBytes int64) {
var err error
if hit {
_, _ = c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE cache_stats SET hit_count = hit_count + 1, last_updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id = 1
_, err = c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE cache_stats
SET hit_count = hit_count + 1,
last_updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE id = 1
`)
} else {
_, _ = c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE cache_stats SET miss_count = miss_count + 1, last_updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id = 1
_, err = c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE cache_stats
SET miss_count = miss_count + 1,
last_updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE id = 1
`)
}
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("failed to count cache hit or miss", "hit", hit, "error", err)
}
if fetchBytes > 0 {
_, _ = c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
_, err = c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE cache_stats
SET upstream_fetch_count = upstream_fetch_count + 1,
upstream_fetch_bytes = upstream_fetch_bytes + ?,
last_updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE id = 1
`, fetchBytes)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("failed to count upstream fetch",
"fetch_bytes", fetchBytes, "error", err)
}
}
}
// IncrementTransformCount counts one image transcoded by the image processor.
func (c *Cache) IncrementTransformCount(ctx context.Context) {
_, err := c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE cache_stats
SET transform_count = transform_count + 1,
last_updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE id = 1
`)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("failed to count transform", "error", err)
}
}
// writeMetadataSidecar writes the JSON metadata sidecar of a stored source.
// A failure is logged and is otherwise non-fatal; the metadata is in the
// database.
func (c *Cache) writeMetadataSidecar(
req *ImageRequest,
pathHash PathHash,
contentHash ContentHash,
result *httpfetcher.FetchResult,
) {
meta := &SourceMetadata{
Host: req.SourceHost,
Path: req.SourcePath,
Query: req.SourceQuery,
ContentHash: string(contentHash),
StatusCode: result.StatusCode,
ContentType: result.ContentType,
ContentLength: result.ContentLength,
ResponseHeaders: result.Headers,
FetchedAt: time.Now().UTC().Unix(),
FetchDurationMs: result.FetchDurationMs,
RemoteAddr: result.RemoteAddr,
}
err := c.srcMetadata.Store(req.SourceHost, pathHash, meta)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("failed to write metadata sidecar",
"host", req.SourceHost, "path_hash", pathHash, "error", err)
}
}
// touchVariant updates the LRU timestamp of a variant, best-effort:
// a failed touch only makes the entry look colder to eviction.
func (c *Cache) touchVariant(ctx context.Context, cacheKey VariantKey) {
_, err := c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE variant_content SET last_accessed_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE cache_key = ?
`, string(cacheKey))
if err != nil {
c.log.Debug("failed to touch variant LRU timestamp",
"cache_key", cacheKey, "error", err)
}
}
// touchSourceContent updates the LRU timestamp of a source content
// blob, best-effort: a failed touch only makes the blob look colder.
func (c *Cache) touchSourceContent(ctx context.Context, contentHash ContentHash) {
_, err := c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE source_content SET last_accessed_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE content_hash = ?
`, string(contentHash))
if err != nil {
c.log.Debug("failed to touch source content LRU timestamp",
"content_hash", contentHash, "error", err)
}
}
// checkNegativeCache checks if a request is in the negative cache.
func (c *Cache) checkNegativeCache(
ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest,
) (bool, error) {
var expiresAt time.Time
err := c.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
SELECT expires_at FROM negative_cache
WHERE source_host = ? AND source_path = ? AND source_query = ?
`, req.SourceHost, req.SourcePath, req.SourceQuery).Scan(&expiresAt)
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return false, nil
}
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to check negative cache: %w", err)
}
// Check if expired
if time.Now().After(expiresAt) {
// Clean up expired entry
_, err = c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
DELETE FROM negative_cache
WHERE source_host = ? AND source_path = ? AND source_query = ?
`, req.SourceHost, req.SourcePath, req.SourceQuery)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("failed to delete expired negative cache entry",
"host", req.SourceHost, "path", req.SourcePath, "error", err)
}
return false, nil
}
return true, nil
}
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"time"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
)
func setupTestDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
@@ -85,14 +86,15 @@ func setupTestDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
INSERT INTO cache_stats (id) VALUES (1);
`
if _, err := db.Exec(schema); err != nil {
_, err = db.ExecContext(t.Context(), schema)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create schema: %v", err)
}
return db
}
func setupTestCache(t *testing.T) (*Cache, string) {
func setupTestCache(t *testing.T) *Cache {
t.Helper()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
@@ -107,16 +109,18 @@ func setupTestCache(t *testing.T) (*Cache, string) {
t.Fatalf("failed to create cache: %v", err)
}
return cache, tmpDir
return cache
}
func TestCache_LookupMiss(t *testing.T) {
cache, _ := setupTestCache(t)
t.Parallel()
cache := setupTestCache(t)
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Quality: 85,
@@ -138,12 +142,14 @@ func TestCache_LookupMiss(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCache_StoreAndLookup(t *testing.T) {
cache, _ := setupTestCache(t)
t.Parallel()
cache := setupTestCache(t)
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Quality: 85,
@@ -152,12 +158,13 @@ func TestCache_StoreAndLookup(t *testing.T) {
// Store source content
sourceContent := []byte("fake jpeg data")
fetchResult := &FetchResult{
ContentType: "image/jpeg",
Headers: map[string][]string{"Content-Type": {"image/jpeg"}},
fetchResult := &httpfetcher.FetchResult{
ContentType: testContentTypeJPEG,
Headers: map[string][]string{testHeaderContentType: {testContentTypeJPEG}},
}
contentHash, err := cache.StoreSource(ctx, req, bytes.NewReader(sourceContent), fetchResult)
contentHash, err := cache.StoreSource(
ctx, req, bytes.NewReader(sourceContent), fetchResult)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StoreSource() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -169,7 +176,9 @@ func TestCache_StoreAndLookup(t *testing.T) {
// Store variant
cacheKey := CacheKey(req)
outputContent := []byte("fake webp data")
err = cache.StoreVariant(cacheKey, bytes.NewReader(outputContent), "image/webp")
err = cache.StoreVariant(
t.Context(), cacheKey, bytes.NewReader(outputContent), "image/webp")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StoreVariant() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -194,11 +203,13 @@ func TestCache_StoreAndLookup(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCache_NegativeCache(t *testing.T) {
cache, _ := setupTestCache(t)
t.Parallel()
cache := setupTestCache(t)
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: "/photos/notfound.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
@@ -222,6 +233,8 @@ func TestCache_NegativeCache(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCache_NegativeCacheExpiry(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
db := setupTestDB(t)
@@ -238,7 +251,7 @@ func TestCache_NegativeCacheExpiry(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: "/photos/expired.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
@@ -265,11 +278,13 @@ func TestCache_NegativeCacheExpiry(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCache_VariantLookup(t *testing.T) {
cache, _ := setupTestCache(t)
t.Parallel()
cache := setupTestCache(t)
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: "/photos/variant.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
@@ -280,7 +295,9 @@ func TestCache_VariantLookup(t *testing.T) {
// Store variant
cacheKey := CacheKey(req)
outputContent := []byte("output data")
err := cache.StoreVariant(cacheKey, bytes.NewReader(outputContent), "image/webp")
err := cache.StoreVariant(
t.Context(), cacheKey, bytes.NewReader(outputContent), "image/webp")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StoreVariant() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -311,11 +328,13 @@ func TestCache_VariantLookup(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCache_GetVariant_ReturnsContentType(t *testing.T) {
cache, _ := setupTestCache(t)
t.Parallel()
cache := setupTestCache(t)
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: "/photos/variantct.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
@@ -326,7 +345,9 @@ func TestCache_GetVariant_ReturnsContentType(t *testing.T) {
// Store variant
cacheKey := CacheKey(req)
outputContent := []byte("output webp data")
err := cache.StoreVariant(cacheKey, bytes.NewReader(outputContent), "image/webp")
err := cache.StoreVariant(
t.Context(), cacheKey, bytes.NewReader(outputContent), "image/webp")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StoreVariant() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -346,7 +367,8 @@ func TestCache_GetVariant_ReturnsContentType(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetVariant() error = %v", err)
}
defer reader.Close()
defer func() { _ = reader.Close() }()
if contentType != "image/webp" {
t.Errorf("GetVariant() ContentType = %q, want %q", contentType, "image/webp")
@@ -358,11 +380,13 @@ func TestCache_GetVariant_ReturnsContentType(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCache_GetVariant(t *testing.T) {
cache, _ := setupTestCache(t)
t.Parallel()
cache := setupTestCache(t)
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: "/photos/output.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
@@ -373,7 +397,9 @@ func TestCache_GetVariant(t *testing.T) {
// Store variant
cacheKey := CacheKey(req)
outputContent := []byte("the actual output content")
err := cache.StoreVariant(cacheKey, bytes.NewReader(outputContent), "image/webp")
err := cache.StoreVariant(
t.Context(), cacheKey, bytes.NewReader(outputContent), "image/webp")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StoreVariant() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -389,7 +415,8 @@ func TestCache_GetVariant(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetVariant() error = %v", err)
}
defer reader.Close()
defer func() { _ = reader.Close() }()
buf := make([]byte, 100)
n, _ := reader.Read(buf)
@@ -400,7 +427,9 @@ func TestCache_GetVariant(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCache_Stats(t *testing.T) {
cache, _ := setupTestCache(t)
t.Parallel()
cache := setupTestCache(t)
ctx := context.Background()
// Increment some stats
@@ -423,6 +452,8 @@ func TestCache_Stats(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCache_CleanExpired(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
db := setupTestDB(t)
@@ -435,7 +466,8 @@ func TestCache_CleanExpired(t *testing.T) {
// Insert expired negative cache entry directly
_, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO negative_cache (source_host, source_path, source_query, status_code, expires_at)
INSERT INTO negative_cache
(source_host, source_path, source_query, status_code, expires_at)
VALUES ('example.com', '/old.jpg', '', 404, datetime('now', '-1 hour'))
`)
if err != nil {
@@ -444,7 +476,12 @@ func TestCache_CleanExpired(t *testing.T) {
// Verify it exists
var count int
db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM negative_cache`).Scan(&count)
err = db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM negative_cache`).Scan(&count)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to count negative cache entries: %v", err)
}
if count != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 negative cache entry, got %d", count)
}
@@ -456,13 +493,19 @@ func TestCache_CleanExpired(t *testing.T) {
}
// Verify it's gone
db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM negative_cache`).Scan(&count)
err = db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM negative_cache`).Scan(&count)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to count negative cache entries: %v", err)
}
if count != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected 0 negative cache entries after clean, got %d", count)
}
}
func TestCache_StorageDirectoriesCreated(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
db := setupTestDB(t)
@@ -482,7 +525,9 @@ func TestCache_StorageDirectoriesCreated(t *testing.T) {
for _, dir := range dirs {
path := tmpDir + "/" + dir
if _, err := os.Stat(path); os.IsNotExist(err) {
_, err := os.Stat(path)
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Errorf("directory %s was not created", dir)
}
}
+64
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
package imgcache
import "sync"
// contentLock provides per-key mutual exclusion for content-hash keyed
// operations. StoreSource and evictSourceBlob each hold a content
// hash's lock for the full duration of their file-plus-accounting-row
// work, so a store and an eviction racing on identical content bytes
// (the real SHA-256 content-addressed dedup case, not a contrived one)
// can never interleave: the unlink of an evicted blob's file can never
// race the creation of a fresh database row for a concurrently
// re-stored copy of the same content. Entries are removed once no
// goroutine holds or is waiting for them, so a long-running process
// does not accumulate memory proportional to the number of distinct
// content hashes it has ever seen.
type contentLock struct {
mu sync.Mutex
entries map[string]*contentLockEntry
}
// contentLockEntry is one key's exclusion lock plus a count of
// goroutines currently holding or waiting to acquire it, used to know
// when it is safe to remove the entry from the map.
type contentLockEntry struct {
mu sync.Mutex
count int
}
// newContentLock creates an empty contentLock.
func newContentLock() *contentLock {
return &contentLock{entries: make(map[string]*contentLockEntry)}
}
// Lock acquires exclusive access for key, blocking until it is
// available, and returns a function that releases it. The caller must
// invoke the returned function exactly once to release the lock.
func (c *contentLock) Lock(key string) func() {
c.mu.Lock()
entry, ok := c.entries[key]
if !ok {
entry = &contentLockEntry{}
c.entries[key] = entry
}
entry.count++
c.mu.Unlock()
entry.mu.Lock()
return func() {
entry.mu.Unlock()
c.mu.Lock()
entry.count--
if entry.count == 0 {
delete(c.entries, key)
}
c.mu.Unlock()
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
package imgcache
import (
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
)
// TestContentLockExcludesSameKey verifies that two goroutines locking
// the same key never run their critical sections concurrently.
func TestContentLockExcludesSameKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
lock := newContentLock()
var (
active atomic.Int32
maxSeen int32
wg sync.WaitGroup
)
const goroutines = 20
wg.Add(goroutines)
for range goroutines {
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
unlock := lock.Lock("same-key")
defer unlock()
n := active.Add(1)
for {
seen := atomic.LoadInt32(&maxSeen)
if n <= seen || atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&maxSeen, seen, n) {
break
}
}
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
active.Add(-1)
}()
}
wg.Wait()
if maxSeen != 1 {
t.Errorf("max concurrent holders of the same key = %d, want 1", maxSeen)
}
}
// TestContentLockAllowsDifferentKeys verifies that locking distinct
// keys does not serialize unrelated work: all goroutines must be able
// to enter their critical sections at once, proven by every one of
// them reaching the rendezvous point before any is allowed to
// proceed.
func TestContentLockAllowsDifferentKeys(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
lock := newContentLock()
const goroutines = 20
var (
wg sync.WaitGroup
inside atomic.Int32
reached = make(chan struct{}, goroutines)
)
wg.Add(goroutines)
release := make(chan struct{})
for i := range goroutines {
key := string(rune('a' + i))
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
unlock := lock.Lock(key)
defer unlock()
inside.Add(1)
reached <- struct{}{}
<-release
}()
}
// Every goroutine must reach the rendezvous point (i.e. acquire its
// own key's lock) without needing any other to release first. If
// keys were incorrectly serialized onto one underlying lock, only
// one would get here and this would time out.
for i := range goroutines {
select {
case <-reached:
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatalf("only %d/%d goroutines locking distinct keys made progress; "+
"keys may be incorrectly serialized", i, goroutines)
}
}
if n := inside.Load(); n != goroutines {
t.Errorf("goroutines inside their critical section = %d, want %d",
n, goroutines)
}
close(release)
wg.Wait()
}
// TestContentLockRemovesEntryAfterUnlock verifies that the internal
// entries map does not grow without bound: once no goroutine holds or
// awaits a key, its entry is removed.
func TestContentLockRemovesEntryAfterUnlock(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
lock := newContentLock()
unlock := lock.Lock("k")
lock.mu.Lock()
if _, ok := lock.entries["k"]; !ok {
lock.mu.Unlock()
t.Fatal("entry missing while lock is held")
}
lock.mu.Unlock()
unlock()
lock.mu.Lock()
defer lock.mu.Unlock()
if _, ok := lock.entries["k"]; ok {
t.Error("entry for key still present after the last holder unlocked")
}
}
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import (
)
func TestSizePercentSafeWithZeroFetchBytes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Simulate the calculation from processAndStore
fetchBytes := int64(0)
outputSize := int64(100)
@@ -29,6 +31,8 @@ func TestSizePercentSafeWithZeroFetchBytes(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestSizePercentNormalCase(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fetchBytes := int64(1000)
outputSize := int64(500)
+803
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,803 @@
package imgcache
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
)
// DefaultEvictionInterval is how often the background evictor checks
// cache usage against the configured limit, in addition to the
// write-pressure wakeups triggered by stores.
const DefaultEvictionInterval = 5 * time.Minute
// evictionBatchSize is how many LRU candidates of each class (variants
// and source blobs) one eviction pass fetches from the database.
const evictionBatchSize = 100
// staleTempFileAge is how old an orphaned temp file (left behind by a
// crashed write) must be before reconciliation removes it. Fresh temp
// files may still belong to an in-flight store.
const staleTempFileAge = time.Hour
// sqliteTimestampLayout matches SQLite's CURRENT_TIMESTAMP format, so
// timestamps written by reconciliation order correctly against ones
// written by the hot path.
const sqliteTimestampLayout = "2006-01-02 15:04:05"
// tempFilePrefix is the prefix os.CreateTemp uses for in-flight cache
// writes (".tmp-*" patterns in the storage layer).
const tempFilePrefix = ".tmp-"
// variantMetaSuffix is the sidecar suffix VariantStorage writes next
// to each variant file.
const variantMetaSuffix = ".meta"
// fallbackContentType is recorded when a reconciled variant file has
// no readable .meta sidecar.
const fallbackContentType = "application/octet-stream"
// UsageBytes returns the total number of bytes of cache content
// tracked in the database (source content blobs plus processed
// variants). It never scans the cache directories.
func (c *Cache) UsageBytes(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
if c.disabled {
return 0, nil
}
var total int64
err := c.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
SELECT (SELECT COALESCE(SUM(size_bytes), 0) FROM source_content)
+ (SELECT COALESCE(SUM(size_bytes), 0) FROM variant_content)
`).Scan(&total)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to compute cache usage: %w", err)
}
return total, nil
}
// evictionCandidate is one LRU eviction victim candidate: either a
// processed variant (isVariant true, identified by cacheKey) or a
// source content blob (identified by contentHash).
type evictionCandidate struct {
isVariant bool
cacheKey VariantKey
contentHash ContentHash
sizeBytes int64
lastAccessedAt string
}
// EvictToLimit evicts least-recently-used cache entries until total
// tracked usage is at or below the configured MaxBytes limit. It is a
// no-op when the cache is disabled or no limit is configured.
func (c *Cache) EvictToLimit(ctx context.Context) error {
if c.disabled || c.config.MaxBytes <= 0 {
return nil
}
for {
usage, err := c.UsageBytes(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if usage <= c.config.MaxBytes {
return nil
}
freed, err := c.evictBatch(ctx, usage-c.config.MaxBytes)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if freed == 0 {
c.log.Warn("cache eviction made no progress",
"usage_bytes", usage,
"cache_max_bytes", c.config.MaxBytes,
)
return nil
}
c.log.Info("evicted cache content",
"freed_bytes", freed,
"usage_bytes", usage-freed,
"cache_max_bytes", c.config.MaxBytes,
)
}
}
// evictBatch fetches one batch of LRU candidates across variants and
// source blobs and evicts them oldest-first until excessBytes are
// freed or the batch is exhausted. It returns the bytes freed.
func (c *Cache) evictBatch(ctx context.Context, excessBytes int64) (int64, error) {
candidates, err := c.evictionCandidates(ctx)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
var freed int64
for _, candidate := range candidates {
if freed >= excessBytes {
break
}
err := c.evictCandidate(ctx, candidate)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("failed to evict cache entry",
"cache_key", candidate.cacheKey,
"content_hash", candidate.contentHash,
"error", err,
)
continue
}
freed += candidate.sizeBytes
}
return freed, nil
}
// evictCandidate removes a single eviction victim.
func (c *Cache) evictCandidate(ctx context.Context, candidate evictionCandidate) error {
if candidate.isVariant {
return c.evictVariant(ctx, candidate.cacheKey)
}
return c.evictSourceBlob(ctx, candidate.contentHash)
}
// evictionCandidates returns up to evictionBatchSize variants and
// evictionBatchSize source blobs, merged into a single list ordered by
// last access time (oldest first).
func (c *Cache) evictionCandidates(ctx context.Context) ([]evictionCandidate, error) {
variants, err := c.variantCandidates(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sources, err := c.sourceCandidates(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Merge the two lists, each already sorted oldest-first. SQLite
// CURRENT_TIMESTAMP strings compare correctly lexicographically.
merged := make([]evictionCandidate, 0, len(variants)+len(sources))
for len(variants) > 0 && len(sources) > 0 {
if variants[0].lastAccessedAt <= sources[0].lastAccessedAt {
merged = append(merged, variants[0])
variants = variants[1:]
} else {
merged = append(merged, sources[0])
sources = sources[1:]
}
}
merged = append(merged, variants...)
merged = append(merged, sources...)
return merged, nil
}
// variantCandidates returns the least recently used variants.
func (c *Cache) variantCandidates(ctx context.Context) ([]evictionCandidate, error) {
rows, err := c.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT cache_key, size_bytes, last_accessed_at
FROM variant_content
ORDER BY last_accessed_at ASC, cache_key ASC
LIMIT ?
`, evictionBatchSize)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query variant eviction candidates: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
var candidates []evictionCandidate
for rows.Next() {
candidate := evictionCandidate{isVariant: true}
var key string
err := rows.Scan(&key, &candidate.sizeBytes, &candidate.lastAccessedAt)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to scan variant candidate: %w", err)
}
candidate.cacheKey = VariantKey(key)
candidates = append(candidates, candidate)
}
err = rows.Err()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("variant candidate iteration failed: %w", err)
}
return candidates, nil
}
// sourceCandidates returns the least recently used source blobs. Rows
// written before the LRU column existed fall back to fetched_at.
func (c *Cache) sourceCandidates(ctx context.Context) ([]evictionCandidate, error) {
rows, err := c.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT content_hash, size_bytes,
COALESCE(last_accessed_at, fetched_at, '1970-01-01 00:00:00') AS lru
FROM source_content
ORDER BY lru ASC, content_hash ASC
LIMIT ?
`, evictionBatchSize)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query source eviction candidates: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
var candidates []evictionCandidate
for rows.Next() {
var candidate evictionCandidate
var hash string
err := rows.Scan(&hash, &candidate.sizeBytes, &candidate.lastAccessedAt)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to scan source candidate: %w", err)
}
candidate.contentHash = ContentHash(hash)
candidates = append(candidates, candidate)
}
err = rows.Err()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("source candidate iteration failed: %w", err)
}
return candidates, nil
}
// evictVariant removes one variant: accounting row first, then the
// content and .meta files, so the database never references a deleted
// file.
func (c *Cache) evictVariant(ctx context.Context, cacheKey VariantKey) error {
_, err := c.db.ExecContext(ctx,
`DELETE FROM variant_content WHERE cache_key = ?`, string(cacheKey))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete variant accounting row: %w", err)
}
err = c.variants.DeleteWithMeta(cacheKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
// sourceReference identifies one source_metadata row's JSON sidecar.
type sourceReference struct {
host string
pathHash PathHash
}
// evictSourceBlob removes one source content blob. All source_metadata
// rows referencing the blob are deleted together with its
// source_content row in a single transaction BEFORE the file is
// unlinked: a blob referenced by multiple source paths is only ever
// removed together with all of its references, and database rows never
// point at deleted files. The JSON metadata sidecars for the removed
// rows are deleted afterwards.
//
// The whole operation holds the content hash's lock (the same one
// StoreSource holds for its full store), so a concurrent store of
// identical content bytes can never observe the file gone but a row
// still present, or insert a fresh row between this transaction's
// commit and the file unlink below: it either runs entirely before
// this eviction starts, or is blocked until this eviction (row
// deletion and unlink together) has fully completed.
func (c *Cache) evictSourceBlob(ctx context.Context, contentHash ContentHash) error {
unlock := c.contentLocks.Lock(string(contentHash))
defer unlock()
references, err := c.sourceReferences(ctx, contentHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
tx, err := c.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to begin eviction transaction: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
_, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx,
`DELETE FROM source_metadata WHERE content_hash = ?`, string(contentHash))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete source metadata rows: %w", err)
}
_, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx,
`DELETE FROM source_content WHERE content_hash = ?`, string(contentHash))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete source content row: %w", err)
}
err = tx.Commit()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to commit eviction transaction: %w", err)
}
if c.evictSourceBlobTestHook != nil {
c.evictSourceBlobTestHook(contentHash)
}
// Only after the rows are gone may the files be removed.
for _, reference := range references {
err := c.srcMetadata.Delete(reference.host, reference.pathHash)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("failed to delete metadata sidecar",
"host", reference.host, "path_hash", reference.pathHash, "error", err)
}
}
err = c.srcContent.Delete(contentHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
// sourceReferences lists the metadata sidecar locations of every
// source_metadata row referencing the given blob.
func (c *Cache) sourceReferences(
ctx context.Context, contentHash ContentHash,
) ([]sourceReference, error) {
rows, err := c.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT source_host, path_hash FROM source_metadata WHERE content_hash = ?
`, string(contentHash))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query source references: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
var references []sourceReference
for rows.Next() {
var reference sourceReference
var pathHash string
err := rows.Scan(&reference.host, &pathHash)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to scan source reference: %w", err)
}
reference.pathHash = PathHash(pathHash)
references = append(references, reference)
}
err = rows.Err()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("source reference iteration failed: %w", err)
}
return references, nil
}
// notifyWritePressure wakes the background evictor after a store, so
// eviction under write pressure happens promptly without blocking the
// storing request. The notification channel has capacity one and drops
// when a wakeup is already pending.
func (c *Cache) notifyWritePressure() {
if c.disabled || c.config.MaxBytes <= 0 {
return
}
select {
case c.evictionPressure <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
}
// StartEviction launches the background eviction goroutine, which
// reconciles the database accounting with the cache directories at
// startup and again on every periodic tick thereafter, and evicts to
// the configured limit on the given periodic interval and on
// write-pressure notifications. It is a no-op on a disabled cache or
// when already started.
func (c *Cache) StartEviction(interval time.Duration) {
if c.disabled || c.evictionStarted {
return
}
c.evictionStarted = true
go c.evictionLoop(interval)
}
// StopEviction stops the background eviction goroutine and waits for
// it to exit. It is safe to call when eviction was never started, and
// safe to call more than once.
func (c *Cache) StopEviction() {
if !c.evictionStarted {
return
}
c.evictionStopOnce.Do(func() {
close(c.evictionStop)
<-c.evictionDone
})
}
// evictionLoop is the body of the background eviction goroutine.
func (c *Cache) evictionLoop(interval time.Duration) {
defer close(c.evictionDone)
ctx := context.Background()
c.runReconciliationPass(ctx)
c.runEvictionPass(ctx)
ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-c.evictionStop:
return
case <-ticker.C:
// Reconciliation walks the cache directories, so it only
// runs on the periodic ticker rather than on every
// write-pressure wakeup, keeping it off the per-store hot
// path. Reusing the eviction interval itself (rather than a
// separate, longer one) is a deliberate choice: it is the
// simplest option that still bounds how long a store's
// best-effort accounting insert can stay silently
// unaccounted for to one interval, on a process that is
// already running this loop regardless.
c.runReconciliationPass(ctx)
case <-c.evictionPressure:
}
c.runEvictionPass(ctx)
}
}
// runEvictionPass runs one eviction pass, logging failures instead of
// propagating them (the loop must keep running).
func (c *Cache) runEvictionPass(ctx context.Context) {
err := c.EvictToLimit(ctx)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("cache eviction pass failed", "error", err)
}
}
// runReconciliationPass runs one reconciliation pass, logging failures
// instead of propagating them (the loop must keep running).
func (c *Cache) runReconciliationPass(ctx context.Context) {
err := c.reconcileAccounting(ctx)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("cache accounting reconciliation failed", "error", err)
}
}
// reconcileAccounting synchronizes the database size accounting with
// the actual contents of the cache directories. It runs at startup and
// again on every periodic eviction tick thereafter, off the request
// hot path: it adopts variant files that predate the accounting table
// (or whose accounting insert failed, e.g. StoreVariant's best-effort
// insert under transient DB contention), drops accounting rows whose
// files are missing, removes source blob files the database does not
// know (and rows whose files are gone), and sweeps stale temp files
// left behind by crashed writes. Running it periodically, not just
// once, bounds how long such drift can accumulate unaccounted for on a
// long-running process to one eviction interval.
func (c *Cache) reconcileAccounting(ctx context.Context) error {
if c.disabled {
return nil
}
err := c.reconcileVariantFiles(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = c.reconcileVariantRows(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = c.reconcileSourceFiles(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = c.reconcileSourceRows(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
// reconcileVariantFiles walks the variant storage directory, adopting
// files without accounting rows and sweeping stale temp files.
func (c *Cache) reconcileVariantFiles(ctx context.Context) error {
return filepath.WalkDir(
c.variants.baseDir,
func(path string, entry fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
if err != nil || entry.IsDir() {
return err
}
name := entry.Name()
if strings.HasPrefix(name, tempFilePrefix) {
c.sweepStaleTempFile(path, entry)
return nil
}
if strings.HasSuffix(name, variantMetaSuffix) {
return nil
}
return c.adoptVariantFile(ctx, path, entry, VariantKey(name))
},
)
}
// adoptVariantFile inserts an accounting row for a variant file that
// has none, using the file's size and modification time.
func (c *Cache) adoptVariantFile(
ctx context.Context, path string, entry fs.DirEntry, cacheKey VariantKey,
) error {
var rowExists int
err := c.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM variant_content WHERE cache_key = ?`, string(cacheKey),
).Scan(&rowExists)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check variant accounting row: %w", err)
}
if rowExists > 0 {
return nil
}
info, err := entry.Info()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to stat variant file: %w", err)
}
modTime := info.ModTime().UTC().Format(sqliteTimestampLayout)
contentType := c.variantContentTypeFromSidecar(path)
_, err = c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO variant_content
(cache_key, size_bytes, content_type, created_at, last_accessed_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
`, string(cacheKey), info.Size(), contentType, modTime, modTime)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to adopt variant file into accounting: %w", err)
}
c.log.Info("adopted untracked variant file into size accounting",
"cache_key", cacheKey, "size_bytes", info.Size())
return nil
}
// variantContentTypeFromSidecar reads the content type from a variant
// .meta sidecar, falling back to application/octet-stream.
func (c *Cache) variantContentTypeFromSidecar(variantPath string) string {
//nolint:gosec // path from cache walk
metaData, err := os.ReadFile(variantPath + variantMetaSuffix)
if err != nil {
return fallbackContentType
}
var meta VariantMeta
if json.Unmarshal(metaData, &meta) != nil || meta.ContentType == "" {
return fallbackContentType
}
return meta.ContentType
}
// reconcileVariantRows drops accounting rows whose variant files are
// missing, so the database never references deleted content.
func (c *Cache) reconcileVariantRows(ctx context.Context) error {
keys, err := c.allVariantKeys(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
for _, key := range keys {
if c.variants.Exists(key) {
continue
}
_, err := c.db.ExecContext(ctx,
`DELETE FROM variant_content WHERE cache_key = ?`, string(key))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to drop stale variant accounting row: %w", err)
}
c.log.Info("dropped accounting row for missing variant file", "cache_key", key)
}
return nil
}
// allVariantKeys returns every tracked variant cache key.
func (c *Cache) allVariantKeys(ctx context.Context) ([]VariantKey, error) {
return queryStringColumn[VariantKey](ctx, c.db,
`SELECT cache_key FROM variant_content`, "variant keys", "variant key")
}
// queryStringColumn runs a single-column query and returns the column
// values as T. plural names the set for the query and scan failure
// messages; singular names one row for the scan and iteration failure
// messages.
func queryStringColumn[T ~string](
ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, query, plural, singular string,
) ([]T, error) {
rows, err := db.QueryContext(ctx, query)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query %s: %w", plural, err)
}
defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
var values []T
for rows.Next() {
var value string
err := rows.Scan(&value)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to scan %s: %w", singular, err)
}
values = append(values, T(value))
}
err = rows.Err()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s iteration failed: %w", singular, err)
}
return values, nil
}
// reconcileSourceFiles walks the source content directory, removing
// blob files the database does not track (they are unreachable: source
// lookups always go through source_metadata) and sweeping stale temp
// files.
func (c *Cache) reconcileSourceFiles(ctx context.Context) error {
return filepath.WalkDir(
c.srcContent.baseDir,
func(path string, entry fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
if err != nil || entry.IsDir() {
return err
}
name := entry.Name()
if strings.HasPrefix(name, tempFilePrefix) {
c.sweepStaleTempFile(path, entry)
return nil
}
return c.removeUntrackedSourceFile(ctx, path, ContentHash(name))
},
)
}
// removeUntrackedSourceFile deletes a source blob file that has no
// source_content row. Any source_metadata rows referencing the hash
// are removed first so no row ever points at a deleted file.
func (c *Cache) removeUntrackedSourceFile(
ctx context.Context, path string, contentHash ContentHash,
) error {
var rowExists int
err := c.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM source_content WHERE content_hash = ?`, string(contentHash),
).Scan(&rowExists)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check source content row: %w", err)
}
if rowExists > 0 {
return nil
}
_, err = c.db.ExecContext(ctx,
`DELETE FROM source_metadata WHERE content_hash = ?`, string(contentHash))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete metadata rows for untracked blob: %w", err)
}
err = os.Remove(path)
if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to remove untracked source file: %w", err)
}
c.log.Info("removed untracked source content file", "content_hash", contentHash)
return nil
}
// reconcileSourceRows removes source_content rows (and their metadata
// references and sidecars) whose blob files are missing on disk.
func (c *Cache) reconcileSourceRows(ctx context.Context) error {
hashes, err := c.allSourceContentHashes(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
for _, hash := range hashes {
if c.srcContent.Exists(hash) {
continue
}
// The blob file is already gone; evictSourceBlob removes the
// rows and sidecars and tolerates the missing file.
err := c.evictSourceBlob(ctx, hash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.log.Info("dropped rows for missing source content file", "content_hash", hash)
}
return nil
}
// allSourceContentHashes returns every tracked source content hash.
func (c *Cache) allSourceContentHashes(ctx context.Context) ([]ContentHash, error) {
return queryStringColumn[ContentHash](ctx, c.db,
`SELECT content_hash FROM source_content`,
"source content hashes", "content hash")
}
// sweepStaleTempFile removes a temp file left behind by a crashed
// write once it is old enough that no in-flight store can own it.
func (c *Cache) sweepStaleTempFile(path string, entry fs.DirEntry) {
info, err := entry.Info()
if err != nil {
return
}
if time.Since(info.ModTime()) < staleTempFileAge {
return
}
err = os.Remove(path)
if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
c.log.Warn("failed to remove stale temp file", "path", path, "error", err)
return
}
c.log.Info("removed stale temp file", "path", path)
}
+985
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,985 @@
package imgcache
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"io/fs"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
)
// sqliteTimestampFormat matches the format SQLite's CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
// produces, so injected timestamps compare correctly against ones the
// implementation writes.
const sqliteTimestampFormat = "2006-01-02 15:04:05"
// testVariantKeyOne through testVariantKeyFour are the variant cache
// keys reused across the eviction tests, in the order the tests store
// them.
const (
testVariantKeyOne VariantKey = "aabbccdd0001"
testVariantKeyTwo VariantKey = "aabbccdd0002"
testVariantKeyThree VariantKey = "aabbccdd0003"
testVariantKeyFour VariantKey = "aabbccdd0004"
)
// evictionTestDB creates an in-memory SQLite database with the real
// production schema, limited to a single connection so the background
// eviction goroutine shares the same in-memory database as the test.
func evictionTestDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
t.Helper()
db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", ":memory:")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to open test db: %v", err)
}
db.SetMaxOpenConns(1)
err = database.ApplyMigrations(context.Background(), db, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to apply migrations: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
return db
}
// newEvictionTestCache creates a Cache backed by a temp directory and
// an in-memory database, with the given size limit.
func newEvictionTestCache(t *testing.T, maxBytes int64) (*Cache, string) {
t.Helper()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
db := evictionTestDB(t)
// maxBytes zero mirrors the production mapping of
// cache_max_bytes: 0 (handlers sets DisableDiskCache); at the
// CacheConfig layer itself a zero MaxBytes means "no limit" for
// backwards compatibility with existing fixtures.
cache, err := NewCache(db, CacheConfig{
StateDir: tmpDir,
CacheTTL: time.Hour,
NegativeTTL: 5 * time.Minute,
MaxBytes: maxBytes,
DisableDiskCache: maxBytes == 0,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create cache: %v", err)
}
return cache, tmpDir
}
// storeEvictionTestSource stores content as a fetched source for
// host/path and returns the resulting content hash.
func storeEvictionTestSource(
t *testing.T, cache *Cache, host, path string, content []byte,
) ContentHash {
t.Helper()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: host,
SourcePath: path,
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result := &httpfetcher.FetchResult{
StatusCode: 200,
ContentType: testContentTypeJPEG,
ContentLength: int64(len(content)),
Headers: map[string][]string{
testHeaderContentType: {testContentTypeJPEG},
},
}
hash, err := cache.StoreSource(
context.Background(), req, bytes.NewReader(content), result,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StoreSource(%s%s) failed: %v", host, path, err)
}
return hash
}
// storeEvictionTestVariant stores content as a processed variant under
// the given cache key.
func storeEvictionTestVariant(
t *testing.T, cache *Cache, key VariantKey, content []byte,
) {
t.Helper()
err := cache.StoreVariant(t.Context(), key, bytes.NewReader(content), "image/webp")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StoreVariant(%s) failed: %v", key, err)
}
}
// setVariantLastAccessed backdates the last access time of a tracked
// variant, to make LRU ordering deterministic in tests.
func setVariantLastAccessed(
t *testing.T, cache *Cache, key VariantKey, when time.Time,
) {
t.Helper()
res, err := cache.db.ExecContext(t.Context(),
`UPDATE variant_content SET last_accessed_at = ? WHERE cache_key = ?`,
when.UTC().Format(sqliteTimestampFormat), string(key),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to set variant last_accessed_at: %v", err)
}
affected, err := res.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read affected rows: %v", err)
}
if affected != 1 {
t.Fatalf("variant %s has no accounting row (affected=%d); "+
"stores must track variants in the database", key, affected)
}
}
// setSourceLastAccessed backdates the last access time of a tracked
// source content blob.
func setSourceLastAccessed(
t *testing.T, cache *Cache, hash ContentHash, when time.Time,
) {
t.Helper()
res, err := cache.db.ExecContext(t.Context(),
`UPDATE source_content SET last_accessed_at = ? WHERE content_hash = ?`,
when.UTC().Format(sqliteTimestampFormat), string(hash),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to set source last_accessed_at: %v", err)
}
affected, err := res.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read affected rows: %v", err)
}
if affected != 1 {
t.Fatalf("source %s has no accounting row (affected=%d)", hash, affected)
}
}
// countRows returns the number of rows the given query yields.
func countRows(t *testing.T, cache *Cache, query string, args ...any) int {
t.Helper()
var n int
err := cache.db.QueryRowContext(t.Context(), query, args...).Scan(&n)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("count query %q failed: %v", query, err)
}
return n
}
// assertNoDanglingReferences verifies the core eviction invariant:
// every database row that references cache content on disk points at a
// file that actually exists.
func assertNoDanglingReferences(t *testing.T, cache *Cache) {
t.Helper()
rows, err := cache.db.QueryContext(t.Context(),
`SELECT content_hash FROM source_metadata
WHERE content_hash IS NOT NULL AND content_hash != ''`,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to query source_metadata: %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
for rows.Next() {
var hash string
err := rows.Scan(&hash)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to scan content_hash: %v", err)
}
if !cache.srcContent.Exists(ContentHash(hash)) {
t.Errorf("source_metadata references content %s but the file is missing",
hash)
}
}
err = rows.Err()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("source_metadata iteration failed: %v", err)
}
variantRows, err := cache.db.QueryContext(t.Context(),
`SELECT cache_key FROM variant_content`)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to query variant_content: %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = variantRows.Close() }()
for variantRows.Next() {
var key string
err := variantRows.Scan(&key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to scan cache_key: %v", err)
}
if !cache.variants.Exists(VariantKey(key)) {
t.Errorf("variant_content references key %s but the file is missing", key)
}
}
err = variantRows.Err()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("variant_content iteration failed: %v", err)
}
}
// waitForUsageAtOrBelow polls UsageBytes until it reaches limit or the
// timeout expires, returning the last observed usage.
func waitForUsageAtOrBelow(
t *testing.T, cache *Cache, limit int64, timeout time.Duration,
) int64 {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
var usage int64
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
var err error
usage, err = cache.UsageBytes(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UsageBytes failed: %v", err)
}
if usage <= limit {
return usage
}
time.Sleep(25 * time.Millisecond)
}
return usage
}
func TestUsageBytesAccountsSourceAndVariantBytes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache, "src.example.com", "/a.jpg",
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAA}, 1000))
storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache, "src.example.com", "/b.jpg",
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAB}, 2000))
storeEvictionTestVariant(t, cache, testVariantKeyOne,
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAC}, 500))
storeEvictionTestVariant(t, cache, testVariantKeyTwo,
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAD}, 250))
usage, err := cache.UsageBytes(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UsageBytes failed: %v", err)
}
if usage != 3750 {
t.Errorf("UsageBytes = %d, want 3750 (1000+2000+500+250)", usage)
}
}
func TestUsageBytesCountsMultiReferencedBlobOnce(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
content := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xCC}, 1200)
hashOne := storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache,
"src.example.com", "/one.jpg", content)
hashTwo := storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache,
"src.example.com", "/two.jpg", content)
if hashOne != hashTwo {
t.Fatalf("identical content produced different hashes: %s vs %s",
hashOne, hashTwo)
}
usage, err := cache.UsageBytes(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UsageBytes failed: %v", err)
}
if usage != 1200 {
t.Errorf("UsageBytes = %d, want 1200 (deduplicated blob counted once)", usage)
}
}
func TestEvictToLimitEvictsLeastRecentlyUsedFirst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const limit = 3000
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, limit)
now := time.Now()
keys := []VariantKey{
testVariantKeyOne, testVariantKeyTwo,
testVariantKeyThree, testVariantKeyFour,
}
fills := []byte{0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04}
ages := []time.Duration{4 * time.Hour, 3 * time.Hour, 2 * time.Hour, 1 * time.Hour}
for i, key := range keys {
storeEvictionTestVariant(t, cache, key, bytes.Repeat([]byte{fills[i]}, 1000))
setVariantLastAccessed(t, cache, key, now.Add(-ages[i]))
}
err := cache.EvictToLimit(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EvictToLimit failed: %v", err)
}
usage, err := cache.UsageBytes(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UsageBytes failed: %v", err)
}
if usage > limit {
t.Errorf("usage after eviction = %d, want <= %d", usage, limit)
}
if cache.variants.Exists(keys[0]) {
t.Errorf("least recently used variant %s must be evicted", keys[0])
}
if n := countRows(t, cache,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM variant_content WHERE cache_key = ?`, string(keys[0]),
); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("evicted variant %s still has %d accounting rows", keys[0], n)
}
for _, key := range keys[1:] {
if !cache.variants.Exists(key) {
t.Errorf("more recently used variant %s must survive eviction", key)
}
}
assertNoDanglingReferences(t, cache)
}
func TestEvictionRemovesMultiReferencedBlobTogetherWithAllReferences(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const limit = 1000
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, limit)
now := time.Now()
// One 800-byte blob referenced by two source paths.
sharedContent := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xDD}, 800)
sharedHash := storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache,
"src.example.com", "/a.jpg", sharedContent)
h := storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache,
"src.example.com", "/b.jpg", sharedContent)
if h != sharedHash {
t.Fatalf("identical content produced different hashes: %s vs %s",
h, sharedHash)
}
// A newer 600-byte blob referenced by one source path.
recentHash := storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache, "src.example.com", "/c.jpg",
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xEE}, 600))
setSourceLastAccessed(t, cache, sharedHash, now.Add(-2*time.Hour))
setSourceLastAccessed(t, cache, recentHash, now.Add(-time.Minute))
err := cache.EvictToLimit(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EvictToLimit failed: %v", err)
}
usage, err := cache.UsageBytes(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UsageBytes failed: %v", err)
}
if usage > limit {
t.Errorf("usage after eviction = %d, want <= %d", usage, limit)
}
// The multi-referenced blob must be gone from disk, from
// source_content, and from BOTH source_metadata rows: references
// are removed together with the blob, never left dangling.
if cache.srcContent.Exists(sharedHash) {
t.Errorf("evicted blob %s still exists on disk", sharedHash)
}
if n := countRows(t, cache,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM source_content WHERE content_hash = ?`, string(sharedHash),
); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("evicted blob %s still has %d source_content rows", sharedHash, n)
}
if n := countRows(t, cache,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM source_metadata WHERE content_hash = ?`, string(sharedHash),
); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("evicted blob %s still has %d source_metadata references", sharedHash, n)
}
// The JSON metadata sidecars for both referencing paths must be
// removed along with the rows.
for _, path := range []string{"/a.jpg", "/b.jpg"} {
pathHash := HashPath(path + "?")
if cache.srcMetadata.Exists("src.example.com", pathHash) {
t.Errorf("metadata sidecar for %s must be removed with its row", path)
}
}
// The more recently used blob survives fully intact.
if !cache.srcContent.Exists(recentHash) {
t.Errorf("recently used blob %s must survive eviction", recentHash)
}
if n := countRows(t, cache,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM source_metadata WHERE content_hash = ?`, string(recentHash),
); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("recently used blob %s has %d source_metadata rows, want 1",
recentHash, n)
}
assertNoDanglingReferences(t, cache)
}
func TestEvictionKeepsEverythingWhenUnderLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
content := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xDF}, 800)
hash := storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache, "src.example.com", "/a.jpg", content)
h := storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache, "src.example.com", "/b.jpg", content)
if h != hash {
t.Fatalf("identical content produced different hashes: %s vs %s", h, hash)
}
storeEvictionTestVariant(t, cache, testVariantKeyOne,
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xE0}, 500))
err := cache.EvictToLimit(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EvictToLimit failed: %v", err)
}
if !cache.srcContent.Exists(hash) {
t.Errorf("blob %s must not be evicted while usage is under the limit", hash)
}
if n := countRows(t, cache,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM source_metadata WHERE content_hash = ?`, string(hash),
); n != 2 {
t.Errorf("blob %s has %d source_metadata rows, want 2", hash, n)
}
if !cache.variants.Exists(testVariantKeyOne) {
t.Error("variant must not be evicted while usage is under the limit")
}
assertNoDanglingReferences(t, cache)
}
func TestZeroMaxBytesDisablesDiskCache(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, tmpDir := newEvictionTestCache(t, 0)
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "src.example.com",
SourcePath: "/a.jpg",
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
assertDisabledCacheWritesAreNoOps(t, cache, req)
assertDisabledCacheReadsAlwaysMiss(t, cache, req)
assertDisabledCacheTracksNothing(t, cache)
assertDisabledCacheWroteNothingToDisk(t, tmpDir)
}
// assertDisabledCacheWritesAreNoOps verifies that stores against a
// disabled cache report success without recording anything.
func assertDisabledCacheWritesAreNoOps(
t *testing.T, cache *Cache, req *ImageRequest,
) {
t.Helper()
ctx := t.Context()
err := cache.StoreVariant(
ctx, CacheKey(req), bytes.NewReader([]byte("data")), "image/webp",
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StoreVariant on disabled cache must be a no-op, got error: %v", err)
}
result := &httpfetcher.FetchResult{
StatusCode: 200,
ContentType: testContentTypeJPEG,
ContentLength: 4,
Headers: map[string][]string{},
}
hash, err := cache.StoreSource(ctx, req, bytes.NewReader([]byte("data")), result)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StoreSource on disabled cache must be a no-op, got error: %v", err)
}
if hash != "" {
t.Errorf("StoreSource on disabled cache returned hash %q, want empty", hash)
}
}
// assertDisabledCacheReadsAlwaysMiss verifies that lookups against a
// disabled cache never report a hit.
func assertDisabledCacheReadsAlwaysMiss(
t *testing.T, cache *Cache, req *ImageRequest,
) {
t.Helper()
ctx := t.Context()
lookup, err := cache.Lookup(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Lookup on disabled cache failed: %v", err)
}
if lookup.Hit {
t.Error("Lookup on disabled cache must always miss")
}
srcHash, srcType, err := cache.LookupSource(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LookupSource on disabled cache failed: %v", err)
}
if srcHash != "" || srcType != "" {
t.Errorf("LookupSource on disabled cache = (%q, %q), want empty",
srcHash, srcType)
}
}
// assertDisabledCacheTracksNothing verifies that a disabled cache
// records no usage and writes no accounting rows.
func assertDisabledCacheTracksNothing(t *testing.T, cache *Cache) {
t.Helper()
usage, err := cache.UsageBytes(t.Context())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UsageBytes failed: %v", err)
}
if usage != 0 {
t.Errorf("UsageBytes on disabled cache = %d, want 0", usage)
}
if n := countRows(t, cache, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM source_content`); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("disabled cache wrote %d source_content rows, want 0", n)
}
if n := countRows(t, cache, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM source_metadata`); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("disabled cache wrote %d source_metadata rows, want 0", n)
}
}
// assertDisabledCacheWroteNothingToDisk verifies that a disabled cache
// creates neither the cache directory tree nor any file under stateDir.
func assertDisabledCacheWroteNothingToDisk(t *testing.T, stateDir string) {
t.Helper()
_, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(stateDir, "cache"))
if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Errorf("disabled cache must not create the cache directory tree "+
"(stat err=%v)", err)
}
var foundFiles []string
walkErr := filepath.WalkDir(stateDir,
func(path string, d fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !d.IsDir() {
foundFiles = append(foundFiles, path)
}
return nil
})
if walkErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to walk state dir: %v", walkErr)
}
if len(foundFiles) != 0 {
t.Errorf("disabled cache wrote files to disk: %v", foundFiles)
}
}
func TestEvictionRunsUnderWritePressure(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const limit = 1500
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, limit)
// An interval far longer than the test ensures only write
// pressure can trigger eviction here.
cache.StartEviction(time.Hour)
defer cache.StopEviction()
keys := []VariantKey{
testVariantKeyOne, testVariantKeyTwo, testVariantKeyThree,
}
fills := []byte{0x11, 0x12, 0x13}
for i, key := range keys {
storeEvictionTestVariant(t, cache, key,
bytes.Repeat([]byte{fills[i]}, 1000))
}
usage := waitForUsageAtOrBelow(t, cache, limit, 5*time.Second)
if usage > limit {
t.Errorf("write pressure did not trigger eviction: usage = %d, want <= %d",
usage, limit)
}
assertNoDanglingReferences(t, cache)
}
func TestEvictionRunsOnPeriodicSchedule(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const limit = 1500
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, limit)
// Start the evictor while the cache is empty, then create tracked
// over-limit state WITHOUT going through the store methods, so no
// write-pressure notification fires and only the periodic ticker
// can trigger eviction.
cache.StartEviction(100 * time.Millisecond)
defer cache.StopEviction()
keys := []VariantKey{
testVariantKeyOne, testVariantKeyTwo, testVariantKeyThree,
}
fills := []byte{0x21, 0x22, 0x23}
for i, key := range keys {
content := bytes.Repeat([]byte{fills[i]}, 1000)
_, err := cache.variants.Store(key, bytes.NewReader(content), "image/webp")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to store variant file: %v", err)
}
_, err = cache.db.ExecContext(t.Context(),
`INSERT INTO variant_content (cache_key, size_bytes, content_type)
VALUES (?, ?, ?)`,
string(key), len(content), "image/webp",
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to insert variant accounting row: %v", err)
}
}
usage := waitForUsageAtOrBelow(t, cache, limit, 5*time.Second)
if usage > limit {
t.Errorf("periodic schedule did not trigger eviction: usage = %d, want <= %d",
usage, limit)
}
assertNoDanglingReferences(t, cache)
}
func TestStartEvictionReconcilesAccountingWithDisk(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
// An untracked variant file on disk (e.g. written before this
// feature existed) must be adopted into the accounting.
untracked := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x31}, 1000)
_, err := cache.variants.Store(
testVariantKeyOne, bytes.NewReader(untracked), "image/webp",
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to store untracked variant file: %v", err)
}
// An accounting row whose file is missing must be dropped.
_, err = cache.db.ExecContext(t.Context(),
`INSERT INTO variant_content (cache_key, size_bytes, content_type)
VALUES (?, ?, ?)`,
"deadbeef0001", 700, "image/webp",
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to insert stale variant accounting row: %v", err)
}
cache.StartEviction(time.Hour)
defer cache.StopEviction()
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
var usage int64
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
var err error
usage, err = cache.UsageBytes(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UsageBytes failed: %v", err)
}
if usage == 1000 {
break
}
time.Sleep(25 * time.Millisecond)
}
if usage != 1000 {
t.Errorf("usage after reconciliation = %d, want 1000 "+
"(untracked file adopted, stale row dropped)", usage)
}
if n := countRows(t, cache,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM variant_content WHERE cache_key = ?`,
string(testVariantKeyOne),
); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("untracked variant file was not adopted into accounting (rows=%d)", n)
}
if n := countRows(t, cache,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM variant_content WHERE cache_key = ?`, "deadbeef0001",
); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("stale accounting row without a file was not dropped (rows=%d)", n)
}
}
// TestPeriodicReconciliationAdoptsFileThatAppearsAfterStartup proves
// reconciliation is not a one-shot startup-only pass: it must also run
// on the periodic ticker, so a variant file that lands on disk with no
// accounting row well after startup (e.g. because StoreVariant's
// best-effort accounting insert failed under transient contention, or
// any other cause of an untracked file appearing during steady-state
// operation) is still adopted into accounting eventually, rather than
// staying invisible to UsageBytes/EvictToLimit until the next process
// restart.
func TestPeriodicReconciliationAdoptsFileThatAppearsAfterStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
const interval = 100 * time.Millisecond
cache.StartEviction(interval)
defer cache.StopEviction()
// Let startup reconciliation run and settle on an empty cache
// before introducing the untracked file, so the adoption we assert
// below can only be the work of a later, periodic pass.
time.Sleep(3 * interval)
// Simulate a variant whose accounting insert failed after the
// process was already running and serving requests: the content
// file is written directly, bypassing StoreVariant's (and thus its
// accounting insert) entirely, exactly as would happen if that
// insert had failed and only the file write had succeeded.
untracked := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x41}, 900)
_, err := cache.variants.Store(
"aabbccdd0099", bytes.NewReader(untracked), "image/webp",
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to store untracked variant file: %v", err)
}
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
var usage int64
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
var err error
usage, err = cache.UsageBytes(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UsageBytes failed: %v", err)
}
if usage == 900 {
break
}
time.Sleep(25 * time.Millisecond)
}
if usage != 900 {
t.Errorf("usage after periodic reconciliation = %d, want 900 "+
"(a file that appeared after startup reconciliation already ran must still "+
"be adopted by a later periodic pass)", usage)
}
if n := countRows(t, cache,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM variant_content WHERE cache_key = ?`, "aabbccdd0099",
); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("file that appeared after startup was not adopted by periodic "+
"reconciliation (rows=%d)", n)
}
}
// TestEvictSourceBlobExcludesConcurrentStoreOfIdenticalContent exercises
// the exact TOCTOU window between evictSourceBlob's row-deletion
// transaction commit and its content file unlink: a concurrent
// StoreSource for a different source path whose content hashes to the
// same value (real SHA-256 dedup, not a contrived case) must not be
// able to insert a fresh row referencing the file while eviction is
// mid-unlink, and must not lose its own store once eviction has fully
// released the content hash.
func TestEvictSourceBlobExcludesConcurrentStoreOfIdenticalContent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
ctx := context.Background()
content := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x55}, 400)
hash := storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache,
"race.example.com", "/first.jpg", content)
proceed := make(chan struct{})
storeAttempted := make(chan struct{})
cache.evictSourceBlobTestHook = func(gotHash ContentHash) {
if gotHash != hash {
t.Errorf("test hook invoked for hash %s, want %s", gotHash, hash)
}
close(storeAttempted)
<-proceed
}
evictDone := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
evictDone <- cache.evictSourceBlob(ctx, hash)
}()
// Wait until eviction has committed its delete transaction and is
// paused (inside the test hook) immediately before unlinking the
// content file: exactly the window the review flagged.
<-storeAttempted
storeDone := storeIdenticalContentConcurrently(ctx, cache, content)
// The concurrent store must not be able to complete while eviction
// still holds the content hash (i.e. before the file is unlinked):
// if it could, it would insert a row referencing a file about to be
// removed out from under it.
select {
case err := <-storeDone:
t.Fatalf("StoreSource for identical content completed (err=%v) while eviction "+
"still held the content hash open between commit and unlink; the store and "+
"the evict of identical content are not mutually exclusive", err)
case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
// Expected: the store is blocked behind eviction's exclusion.
}
close(proceed)
err := <-evictDone
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("evictSourceBlob failed: %v", err)
}
err = <-storeDone
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StoreSource failed: %v", err)
}
assertNoDanglingReferences(t, cache)
dupHash, _, err := cache.LookupSource(ctx, &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "race.example.com",
SourcePath: "/dup.jpg",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LookupSource failed: %v", err)
}
if dupHash == "" {
t.Fatal("re-stored blob was lost: the store legitimately ran after eviction " +
"released the content hash and must have recreated the file and row")
}
if !cache.srcContent.Exists(dupHash) {
t.Errorf("source_content/source_metadata references %s but its file is missing",
dupHash)
}
}
// storeIdenticalContentConcurrently starts a StoreSource for a second
// source path whose body hashes to the same content hash, returning the
// channel its error is delivered on.
func storeIdenticalContentConcurrently(
ctx context.Context, cache *Cache, content []byte,
) chan error {
storeDone := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "race.example.com",
SourcePath: "/dup.jpg",
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result := &httpfetcher.FetchResult{
StatusCode: 200,
ContentType: testContentTypeJPEG,
ContentLength: int64(len(content)),
Headers: map[string][]string{
testHeaderContentType: {testContentTypeJPEG},
},
}
_, err := cache.StoreSource(ctx, req, bytes.NewReader(content), result)
storeDone <- err
}()
return storeDone
}
-445
View File
@@ -1,445 +0,0 @@
package imgcache
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptrace"
neturl "net/url"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// Fetcher configuration constants.
const (
DefaultFetchTimeout = 30 * time.Second
DefaultMaxResponseSize = 50 << 20 // 50MB
DefaultTLSTimeout = 10 * time.Second
DefaultMaxIdleConns = 100
DefaultIdleConnTimeout = 90 * time.Second
DefaultMaxRedirects = 10
DefaultMaxConnectionsPerHost = 20
)
// Fetcher errors.
var (
ErrSSRFBlocked = errors.New("request blocked: private or internal IP")
ErrInvalidHost = errors.New("invalid or unresolvable host")
ErrUnsupportedScheme = errors.New("only HTTPS is supported")
ErrResponseTooLarge = errors.New("response exceeds maximum size")
ErrInvalidContentType = errors.New("invalid or unsupported content type")
ErrUpstreamError = errors.New("upstream server error")
ErrUpstreamTimeout = errors.New("upstream request timeout")
)
// FetcherConfig holds configuration for the upstream fetcher.
type FetcherConfig struct {
// Timeout for upstream requests
Timeout time.Duration
// MaxResponseSize is the maximum allowed response body size
MaxResponseSize int64
// UserAgent to send to upstream servers
UserAgent string
// AllowedContentTypes is a whitelist of MIME types to accept
AllowedContentTypes []string
// AllowHTTP allows non-TLS connections (for testing only)
AllowHTTP bool
// MaxConnectionsPerHost limits concurrent connections to each upstream host
MaxConnectionsPerHost int
}
// DefaultFetcherConfig returns sensible defaults.
func DefaultFetcherConfig() *FetcherConfig {
return &FetcherConfig{
Timeout: DefaultFetchTimeout,
MaxResponseSize: DefaultMaxResponseSize,
UserAgent: "pixa/1.0",
AllowedContentTypes: []string{
"image/jpeg",
"image/png",
"image/gif",
"image/webp",
"image/avif",
"image/svg+xml",
},
AllowHTTP: false,
MaxConnectionsPerHost: DefaultMaxConnectionsPerHost,
}
}
// HTTPFetcher implements the Fetcher interface with SSRF protection.
type HTTPFetcher struct {
client *http.Client
config *FetcherConfig
hostSems map[string]chan struct{} // per-host semaphores
hostSemMu sync.Mutex // protects hostSems map
}
// NewHTTPFetcher creates a new fetcher with SSRF protection.
func NewHTTPFetcher(config *FetcherConfig) *HTTPFetcher {
if config == nil {
config = DefaultFetcherConfig()
}
// Create transport with SSRF-safe dialer
transport := &http.Transport{
DialContext: ssrfSafeDialer,
TLSHandshakeTimeout: DefaultTLSTimeout,
MaxIdleConns: DefaultMaxIdleConns,
IdleConnTimeout: DefaultIdleConnTimeout,
}
client := &http.Client{
Transport: transport,
Timeout: config.Timeout,
// Don't follow redirects automatically - we need to validate each hop
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= DefaultMaxRedirects {
return errors.New("too many redirects")
}
// Validate the redirect target
if err := validateURL(req.URL.String(), config.AllowHTTP); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("redirect blocked: %w", err)
}
return nil
},
}
return &HTTPFetcher{
client: client,
config: config,
hostSems: make(map[string]chan struct{}),
}
}
// getHostSemaphore returns the semaphore for a host, creating it if necessary.
func (f *HTTPFetcher) getHostSemaphore(host string) chan struct{} {
f.hostSemMu.Lock()
defer f.hostSemMu.Unlock()
sem, ok := f.hostSems[host]
if !ok {
sem = make(chan struct{}, f.config.MaxConnectionsPerHost)
f.hostSems[host] = sem
}
return sem
}
// Fetch retrieves content from the given URL with SSRF protection.
func (f *HTTPFetcher) Fetch(ctx context.Context, url string) (*FetchResult, error) {
// Validate URL before making request
if err := validateURL(url, f.config.AllowHTTP); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Extract host for rate limiting
host := extractHost(url)
// Acquire semaphore slot for this host
sem := f.getHostSemaphore(host)
select {
case sem <- struct{}{}:
// Acquired slot
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
// If we fail before returning a result, release the slot
success := false
defer func() {
if !success {
<-sem
}
}()
parsedURL, err := neturl.Parse(url)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse URL: %w", err)
}
req := &http.Request{
Method: http.MethodGet,
URL: parsedURL,
Header: make(http.Header),
}
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", f.config.UserAgent)
req.Header.Set("Accept", strings.Join(f.config.AllowedContentTypes, ", "))
// Use httptrace to capture connection details
var remoteAddr string
trace := &httptrace.ClientTrace{
GotConn: func(info httptrace.GotConnInfo) {
if info.Conn != nil {
remoteAddr = info.Conn.RemoteAddr().String()
}
},
}
req = req.WithContext(httptrace.WithClientTrace(req.Context(), trace))
startTime := time.Now()
//nolint:gosec // G704: URL validated by validateURL() above
resp, err := f.client.Do(req)
fetchDuration := time.Since(startTime)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
return nil, ErrUpstreamTimeout
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("upstream request failed: %w", err)
}
// Extract HTTP version (strip "HTTP/" prefix)
httpVersion := strings.TrimPrefix(resp.Proto, "HTTP/")
// Extract TLS info if available
var tlsVersion, tlsCipherSuite string
if resp.TLS != nil {
tlsVersion = tls.VersionName(resp.TLS.Version)
tlsCipherSuite = tls.CipherSuiteName(resp.TLS.CipherSuite)
}
// Check status code
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: status %d", ErrUpstreamError, resp.StatusCode)
}
// Validate content type
contentType := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type")
if !f.isAllowedContentType(contentType) {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrInvalidContentType, contentType)
}
// Wrap body with size limiter and semaphore releaser
limitedBody := &limitedReader{
reader: resp.Body,
remaining: f.config.MaxResponseSize,
}
// Mark success so defer doesn't release the semaphore
success = true
return &FetchResult{
Content: &semaphoreReleasingReadCloser{limitedBody, resp.Body, sem},
ContentLength: resp.ContentLength,
ContentType: contentType,
Headers: resp.Header,
StatusCode: resp.StatusCode,
FetchDurationMs: fetchDuration.Milliseconds(),
RemoteAddr: remoteAddr,
HTTPVersion: httpVersion,
TLSVersion: tlsVersion,
TLSCipherSuite: tlsCipherSuite,
}, nil
}
// isAllowedContentType checks if the content type is in the whitelist.
func (f *HTTPFetcher) isAllowedContentType(contentType string) bool {
// Extract the MIME type without parameters
mediaType := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(contentType, ";")[0])
for _, allowed := range f.config.AllowedContentTypes {
if strings.EqualFold(mediaType, allowed) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// validateURL checks if a URL is safe to fetch (not internal/private).
func validateURL(rawURL string, allowHTTP bool) error {
if !allowHTTP && !strings.HasPrefix(rawURL, "https://") {
return ErrUnsupportedScheme
}
// Parse to extract host
host := extractHost(rawURL)
if host == "" {
return ErrInvalidHost
}
// Remove port if present
if h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host); err == nil {
host = h
}
// Block obvious localhost patterns
if isLocalhost(host) {
return ErrSSRFBlocked
}
// Resolve the host to check IP addresses
ips, err := net.LookupIP(host)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrInvalidHost, host)
}
for _, ip := range ips {
if isPrivateIP(ip) {
return ErrSSRFBlocked
}
}
return nil
}
// extractHost extracts the host from a URL string.
func extractHost(rawURL string) string {
// Simple extraction without full URL parsing
url := rawURL
if idx := strings.Index(url, "://"); idx != -1 {
url = url[idx+3:]
}
if idx := strings.Index(url, "/"); idx != -1 {
url = url[:idx]
}
if idx := strings.Index(url, "?"); idx != -1 {
url = url[:idx]
}
return url
}
// isLocalhost checks if the host is localhost.
func isLocalhost(host string) bool {
host = strings.ToLower(host)
return host == "localhost" ||
host == "127.0.0.1" ||
host == "::1" ||
host == "[::1]" ||
strings.HasSuffix(host, ".localhost") ||
strings.HasSuffix(host, ".local")
}
// isPrivateIP checks if an IP is private, loopback, or otherwise internal.
func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
if ip == nil {
return true
}
// Check for loopback
if ip.IsLoopback() {
return true
}
// Check for private ranges
if ip.IsPrivate() {
return true
}
// Check for link-local
if ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
return true
}
// Check for unspecified (0.0.0.0 or ::)
if ip.IsUnspecified() {
return true
}
// Check for multicast
if ip.IsMulticast() {
return true
}
// Additional checks for IPv4
if ip4 := ip.To4(); ip4 != nil {
// 169.254.0.0/16 - Link local
if ip4[0] == 169 && ip4[1] == 254 {
return true
}
// 0.0.0.0/8 - Current network
if ip4[0] == 0 {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// ssrfSafeDialer is a custom dialer that validates IP addresses before connecting.
func ssrfSafeDialer(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Resolve the address
ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIP(ctx, "ip", host)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrInvalidHost, host)
}
// Check all resolved IPs
for _, ip := range ips {
if isPrivateIP(ip) {
return nil, ErrSSRFBlocked
}
}
// Connect using the first valid IP
var dialer net.Dialer
for _, ip := range ips {
addr := net.JoinHostPort(ip.String(), port)
conn, err := dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
if err == nil {
return conn, nil
}
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to connect to %s", host)
}
// limitedReader wraps a reader and limits the number of bytes read.
type limitedReader struct {
reader io.Reader
remaining int64
}
func (r *limitedReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
if r.remaining <= 0 {
return 0, ErrResponseTooLarge
}
if int64(len(p)) > r.remaining {
p = p[:r.remaining]
}
n, err := r.reader.Read(p)
r.remaining -= int64(n)
return n, err
}
// semaphoreReleasingReadCloser releases a semaphore slot when closed.
type semaphoreReleasingReadCloser struct {
*limitedReader
closer io.Closer
sem chan struct{}
}
func (r *semaphoreReleasingReadCloser) Close() error {
err := r.closer.Close()
<-r.sem // Release semaphore slot
return err
}
+30 -68
View File
@@ -59,6 +59,24 @@ func ValidateFitMode(fit FitMode) error {
}
}
// ValidateImageRequest checks a request's width and height with
// ValidateDimension and its fit mode with ValidateFitMode. Both the plain
// /v1/image/ route and the encrypted /v1/e/ route validate through this
// function so a request from either source enforces identical bounds.
func ValidateImageRequest(req *ImageRequest) error {
err := ValidateDimension("width", req.Size.Width)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = ValidateDimension("height", req.Size.Height)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return ValidateFitMode(req.FitMode)
}
// ImageRequest represents a request for a processed image
type ImageRequest struct {
// SourceHost is the origin host (e.g., "cdn.example.com")
@@ -75,9 +93,10 @@ type ImageRequest struct {
Quality int
// FitMode is how to fit the image into requested dimensions
FitMode FitMode
// Signature is the HMAC signature for non-whitelisted hosts
// Signature is the HMAC signature for non-allowlisted hosts
Signature string
// Expires is the signature expiration timestamp
// Expires is when the URL expires: the exp of a signed URL, or the expiry
// of an encrypted URL; the zero time if it has none
Expires time.Time
// AllowHTTP indicates whether HTTP (non-TLS) is allowed for this request
AllowHTTP bool
@@ -90,6 +109,7 @@ func (r *ImageRequest) SourceURL() string {
if r.AllowHTTP {
scheme = "http"
}
url := scheme + "://" + r.SourceHost + r.SourcePath
if r.SourceQuery != "" {
url += "?" + r.SourceQuery
@@ -143,9 +163,11 @@ type ImageCache interface {
// CacheStats contains cache statistics
type CacheStats struct {
// TotalItems is the number of cached items
// TotalItems is the number of cached source images plus processed
// variants
TotalItems int64
// TotalSizeBytes is the total size of cached content
// TotalSizeBytes is the total size of cached source images and
// processed variants
TotalSizeBytes int64
// HitCount is the number of cache hits
HitCount int64
@@ -163,70 +185,10 @@ type SignatureValidator interface {
Generate(req *ImageRequest) string
}
// Whitelist checks if a URL is whitelisted (no signature required)
type Whitelist interface {
// IsWhitelisted returns true if the URL doesn't require a signature
IsWhitelisted(u *url.URL) bool
}
// Fetcher fetches images from upstream origins
type Fetcher interface {
// Fetch retrieves an image from the origin
Fetch(ctx context.Context, url string) (*FetchResult, error)
}
// FetchResult contains the result of fetching from upstream
type FetchResult struct {
// Content is the raw image data
Content io.ReadCloser
// ContentLength is the size in bytes (-1 if unknown)
ContentLength int64
// ContentType is the MIME type from upstream
ContentType string
// Headers contains all response headers from upstream
Headers map[string][]string
// StatusCode is the HTTP status code from upstream
StatusCode int
// FetchDurationMs is how long the fetch took in milliseconds
FetchDurationMs int64
// RemoteAddr is the IP:port of the upstream server
RemoteAddr string
// HTTPVersion is the protocol version (e.g., "1.1", "2.0")
HTTPVersion string
// TLSVersion is the TLS protocol version (e.g., "TLS 1.3")
TLSVersion string
// TLSCipherSuite is the negotiated cipher suite name
TLSCipherSuite string
}
// Processor handles image transformation (resize, format conversion)
type Processor interface {
// Process transforms an image according to the request
Process(ctx context.Context, input io.Reader, req *ImageRequest) (*ProcessResult, error)
// SupportedInputFormats returns MIME types this processor can read
SupportedInputFormats() []string
// SupportedOutputFormats returns formats this processor can write
SupportedOutputFormats() []ImageFormat
}
// ProcessResult contains the result of image processing
type ProcessResult struct {
// Content is the processed image data
Content io.ReadCloser
// ContentLength is the size in bytes
ContentLength int64
// ContentType is the MIME type of the output
ContentType string
// Width is the output image width
Width int
// Height is the output image height
Height int
// InputWidth is the original image width before processing
InputWidth int
// InputHeight is the original image height before processing
InputHeight int
// InputFormat is the detected input format (e.g., "jpeg", "png")
InputFormat string
// Allowlist checks if a URL is allowlisted (no signature required)
type Allowlist interface {
// IsAllowlisted returns true if the URL doesn't require a signature
IsAllowlisted(u *url.URL) bool
}
// Storage handles persistent storage of cached content
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
package imgcache
import (
"image/color"
"image/jpeg"
"io"
"os"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imageprocessor"
)
// widthOnlyRequest asks for the test photo at width, its height scaled to
// keep the photo's aspect ratio.
func widthOnlyRequest(fixtures *TestFixtures, width int) *ImageRequest {
return &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.GoodHost,
SourcePath: testPathPhoto,
Size: Size{Width: width},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
}
// holdProcessingSlot takes one of proc's processing slots and returns the
// func that gives it back. Process takes its slot before it reads its input,
// so once it has read a byte from the pipe it holds the slot, until the pipe
// is closed.
func holdProcessingSlot(
t *testing.T, proc *imageprocessor.ImageProcessor,
) func() {
t.Helper()
input, feed := io.Pipe()
go func() {
_, _ = proc.Process(t.Context(), input, &imageprocessor.Request{})
}()
_, err := feed.Write([]byte{0})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process call to hold the slot did not start: %v", err)
}
release := func() { _ = feed.Close() }
t.Cleanup(release)
return release
}
// TestService_Get_WaitsForSlotBeforeReadingCachedSource checks that a
// request whose source is cached holds none of it while it waits for a
// processing slot: it reads the cached file only once it has a slot. With
// the only slot held, a request for a new width of the cached 100x100 photo
// waits; the cached file is then rewritten as a 100x50 image before the slot
// is freed, so the request must answer with that image scaled to 40x20.
func TestService_Get_WaitsForSlotBeforeReadingCachedSource(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
svc.processor = imageprocessor.New(
imageprocessor.Params{MaxConcurrentProcessing: 1},
)
// A first request caches the photo as a source.
resp, err := svc.Get(t.Context(), widthOnlyRequest(fixtures, 50))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Get() error = %v", err)
}
_ = resp.Content.Close()
contentHash, _, err := svc.cache.LookupSource(t.Context(),
widthOnlyRequest(fixtures, 50))
if err != nil || contentHash == "" {
t.Fatalf("LookupSource() = %q, %v; want the cached source",
contentHash, err)
}
release := holdProcessingSlot(t, svc.processor)
var (
waited *ImageResponse
waitedErr error
)
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(done)
waited, waitedErr = svc.Get(t.Context(), widthOnlyRequest(fixtures, 40))
}()
// Give the request time to reach the slot: had it read the cached source
// before waiting, it would have read it by now.
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
err = os.WriteFile(svc.cache.srcContent.hashToPath(contentHash),
generateTestJPEG(t, 100, 50, color.RGBA{0, 0, 255, 255}), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to rewrite the cached source: %v", err)
}
release()
<-done
if waitedErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get() error = %v", waitedErr)
}
defer func() { _ = waited.Content.Close() }()
output, err := jpeg.DecodeConfig(waited.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode the response: %v", err)
}
if output.Width != 40 || output.Height != 20 {
t.Errorf("response is %dx%d, want 40x20: the request read the cached "+
"source before it had a processing slot", output.Width, output.Height)
}
}
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ import (
)
func TestNegativeCache_StoreAndCheck(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := setupTestDB(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
@@ -22,7 +24,7 @@ func TestNegativeCache_StoreAndCheck(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "example.com",
SourceHost: testHostExample,
SourcePath: "/missing.jpg",
}
@@ -31,6 +33,7 @@ func TestNegativeCache_StoreAndCheck(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if hit {
t.Error("expected no negative cache hit initially")
}
@@ -46,12 +49,15 @@ func TestNegativeCache_StoreAndCheck(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !hit {
t.Error("expected negative cache hit after storing")
}
}
func TestNegativeCache_Expired(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := setupTestDB(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
@@ -66,7 +72,7 @@ func TestNegativeCache_Expired(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "example.com",
SourceHost: testHostExample,
SourcePath: "/expired.jpg",
}
@@ -84,12 +90,15 @@ func TestNegativeCache_Expired(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if hit {
t.Error("expected expired negative cache entry to be a miss")
}
}
func TestService_Get_ReturnsErrorForNegativeCachedURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// This test verifies that Service.Get() checks the negative cache
// We can't easily test the full pipeline without vips, but we can
// verify the error type
-285
View File
@@ -1,285 +0,0 @@
package imgcache
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"sync"
"github.com/davidbyttow/govips/v2/vips"
)
// vipsOnce ensures vips is initialized exactly once.
var vipsOnce sync.Once //nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level sync.Once for one-time vips init
// initVips initializes libvips with quiet logging.
func initVips() {
vipsOnce.Do(func() {
vips.LoggingSettings(nil, vips.LogLevelError)
vips.Startup(nil)
})
}
// MaxInputDimension is the maximum allowed width or height for input images.
// Images larger than this are rejected to prevent DoS via decompression bombs.
const MaxInputDimension = 8192
// ErrInputTooLarge is returned when input image dimensions exceed MaxInputDimension.
var ErrInputTooLarge = errors.New("input image dimensions exceed maximum")
// ErrUnsupportedOutputFormat is returned when the requested output format is not supported.
var ErrUnsupportedOutputFormat = errors.New("unsupported output format")
// ImageProcessor implements the Processor interface using libvips via govips.
type ImageProcessor struct{}
// NewImageProcessor creates a new image processor.
func NewImageProcessor() *ImageProcessor {
initVips()
return &ImageProcessor{}
}
// Process transforms an image according to the request.
func (p *ImageProcessor) Process(
_ context.Context,
input io.Reader,
req *ImageRequest,
) (*ProcessResult, error) {
// Read input
data, err := io.ReadAll(input)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read input: %w", err)
}
// Decode image
img, err := vips.NewImageFromBuffer(data)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode image: %w", err)
}
defer img.Close()
// Get original dimensions
origWidth := img.Width()
origHeight := img.Height()
// Detect input format
inputFormat := p.detectFormat(img)
// Validate input dimensions to prevent DoS via decompression bombs
if origWidth > MaxInputDimension || origHeight > MaxInputDimension {
return nil, ErrInputTooLarge
}
// Determine target dimensions
targetWidth := req.Size.Width
targetHeight := req.Size.Height
// Handle dimension calculation
if targetWidth == 0 && targetHeight == 0 {
// Both are 0: keep original size
targetWidth = origWidth
targetHeight = origHeight
} else if targetWidth == 0 {
// Only height specified: calculate width proportionally
targetWidth = origWidth * targetHeight / origHeight
} else if targetHeight == 0 {
// Only width specified: calculate height proportionally
targetHeight = origHeight * targetWidth / origWidth
}
// Resize if needed
if targetWidth != origWidth || targetHeight != origHeight {
if err := p.resize(img, targetWidth, targetHeight, req.FitMode); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resize: %w", err)
}
}
// Determine output format
outputFormat := req.Format
if outputFormat == FormatOriginal || outputFormat == "" {
outputFormat = p.formatFromString(inputFormat)
}
// Encode to target format
output, err := p.encode(img, outputFormat, req.Quality)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encode: %w", err)
}
return &ProcessResult{
Content: io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(output)),
ContentLength: int64(len(output)),
ContentType: ImageFormatToMIME(outputFormat),
Width: img.Width(),
Height: img.Height(),
InputWidth: origWidth,
InputHeight: origHeight,
InputFormat: inputFormat,
}, nil
}
// SupportedInputFormats returns MIME types this processor can read.
func (p *ImageProcessor) SupportedInputFormats() []string {
return []string{
string(MIMETypeJPEG),
string(MIMETypePNG),
string(MIMETypeGIF),
string(MIMETypeWebP),
string(MIMETypeAVIF),
}
}
// SupportedOutputFormats returns formats this processor can write.
func (p *ImageProcessor) SupportedOutputFormats() []ImageFormat {
return []ImageFormat{
FormatJPEG,
FormatPNG,
FormatGIF,
FormatWebP,
FormatAVIF,
}
}
// detectFormat returns the format string from a vips image.
func (p *ImageProcessor) detectFormat(img *vips.ImageRef) string {
format := img.Format()
switch format {
case vips.ImageTypeJPEG:
return "jpeg"
case vips.ImageTypePNG:
return "png"
case vips.ImageTypeGIF:
return "gif"
case vips.ImageTypeWEBP:
return "webp"
case vips.ImageTypeAVIF, vips.ImageTypeHEIF:
return "avif"
default:
return "unknown"
}
}
// resize resizes the image according to the fit mode.
func (p *ImageProcessor) resize(img *vips.ImageRef, width, height int, fit FitMode) error {
switch fit {
case FitCover, "":
// Resize and crop to fill exact dimensions (default)
return img.Thumbnail(width, height, vips.InterestingCentre)
case FitContain:
// Resize to fit within dimensions, maintaining aspect ratio
// Calculate target dimensions maintaining aspect ratio
imgW, imgH := img.Width(), img.Height()
scaleW := float64(width) / float64(imgW)
scaleH := float64(height) / float64(imgH)
scale := min(scaleW, scaleH)
newW := int(float64(imgW) * scale)
newH := int(float64(imgH) * scale)
return img.Thumbnail(newW, newH, vips.InterestingNone)
case FitFill:
// Resize to exact dimensions (may distort) - use ThumbnailWithSize with Force
return img.ThumbnailWithSize(width, height, vips.InterestingNone, vips.SizeForce)
case FitInside:
// Same as contain, but only shrink
if img.Width() <= width && img.Height() <= height {
return nil // Already fits
}
imgW, imgH := img.Width(), img.Height()
scaleW := float64(width) / float64(imgW)
scaleH := float64(height) / float64(imgH)
scale := min(scaleW, scaleH)
newW := int(float64(imgW) * scale)
newH := int(float64(imgH) * scale)
return img.Thumbnail(newW, newH, vips.InterestingNone)
case FitOutside:
// Resize so smallest dimension fits, may exceed target on other dimension
imgW, imgH := img.Width(), img.Height()
scaleW := float64(width) / float64(imgW)
scaleH := float64(height) / float64(imgH)
scale := max(scaleW, scaleH)
newW := int(float64(imgW) * scale)
newH := int(float64(imgH) * scale)
return img.Thumbnail(newW, newH, vips.InterestingNone)
default:
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrInvalidFitMode, fit)
}
}
const defaultQuality = 85
// encode encodes an image to the specified format.
func (p *ImageProcessor) encode(img *vips.ImageRef, format ImageFormat, quality int) ([]byte, error) {
if quality <= 0 {
quality = defaultQuality
}
var params vips.ExportParams
switch format {
case FormatJPEG:
params = vips.ExportParams{
Format: vips.ImageTypeJPEG,
Quality: quality,
}
case FormatPNG:
params = vips.ExportParams{
Format: vips.ImageTypePNG,
}
case FormatGIF:
params = vips.ExportParams{
Format: vips.ImageTypeGIF,
}
case FormatWebP:
params = vips.ExportParams{
Format: vips.ImageTypeWEBP,
Quality: quality,
}
case FormatAVIF:
params = vips.ExportParams{
Format: vips.ImageTypeAVIF,
Quality: quality,
}
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported output format: %s", format)
}
output, _, err := img.Export(&params)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return output, nil
}
// formatFromString converts a format string to ImageFormat.
func (p *ImageProcessor) formatFromString(format string) ImageFormat {
switch format {
case "jpeg":
return FormatJPEG
case "png":
return FormatPNG
case "gif":
return FormatGIF
case "webp":
return FormatWebP
case "avif":
return FormatAVIF
default:
return FormatJPEG
}
}
-509
View File
@@ -1,509 +0,0 @@
package imgcache
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"image"
"image/color"
"image/jpeg"
"image/png"
"io"
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/davidbyttow/govips/v2/vips"
)
func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
initVips()
code := m.Run()
vips.Shutdown()
os.Exit(code)
}
// createTestJPEG creates a simple test JPEG image.
func createTestJPEG(t *testing.T, width, height int) []byte {
t.Helper()
img := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, width, height))
// Fill with a gradient
for y := 0; y < height; y++ {
for x := 0; x < width; x++ {
img.Set(x, y, color.RGBA{
R: uint8(x * 255 / width),
G: uint8(y * 255 / height),
B: 128,
A: 255,
})
}
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := jpeg.Encode(&buf, img, &jpeg.Options{Quality: 90}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encode test JPEG: %v", err)
}
return buf.Bytes()
}
// createTestPNG creates a simple test PNG image.
func createTestPNG(t *testing.T, width, height int) []byte {
t.Helper()
img := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, width, height))
for y := 0; y < height; y++ {
for x := 0; x < width; x++ {
img.Set(x, y, color.RGBA{
R: uint8(x * 255 / width),
G: uint8(y * 255 / height),
B: 128,
A: 255,
})
}
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := png.Encode(&buf, img); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encode test PNG: %v", err)
}
return buf.Bytes()
}
func TestImageProcessor_ResizeJPEG(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
ctx := context.Background()
input := createTestJPEG(t, 800, 600)
req := &ImageRequest{
Size: Size{Width: 400, Height: 300},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer result.Content.Close()
if result.Width != 400 {
t.Errorf("Process() width = %d, want 400", result.Width)
}
if result.Height != 300 {
t.Errorf("Process() height = %d, want 300", result.Height)
}
if result.ContentLength == 0 {
t.Error("Process() returned zero content length")
}
// Verify it's valid JPEG by reading the content
data, err := io.ReadAll(result.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read result: %v", err)
}
mime, err := DetectFormat(data)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DetectFormat() error = %v", err)
}
if mime != MIMETypeJPEG {
t.Errorf("Output format = %v, want %v", mime, MIMETypeJPEG)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_ConvertToPNG(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
ctx := context.Background()
input := createTestJPEG(t, 200, 150)
req := &ImageRequest{
Size: Size{Width: 200, Height: 150},
Format: FormatPNG,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer result.Content.Close()
data, err := io.ReadAll(result.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read result: %v", err)
}
mime, err := DetectFormat(data)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DetectFormat() error = %v", err)
}
if mime != MIMETypePNG {
t.Errorf("Output format = %v, want %v", mime, MIMETypePNG)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_OriginalSize(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
ctx := context.Background()
input := createTestJPEG(t, 640, 480)
req := &ImageRequest{
Size: Size{Width: 0, Height: 0}, // Original size
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer result.Content.Close()
if result.Width != 640 {
t.Errorf("Process() width = %d, want 640", result.Width)
}
if result.Height != 480 {
t.Errorf("Process() height = %d, want 480", result.Height)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_FitContain(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
ctx := context.Background()
// 800x400 image (2:1 aspect) into 400x400 box with contain
// Should result in 400x200 (maintaining aspect ratio)
input := createTestJPEG(t, 800, 400)
req := &ImageRequest{
Size: Size{Width: 400, Height: 400},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitContain,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer result.Content.Close()
// With contain, the image should fit within the box
if result.Width > 400 || result.Height > 400 {
t.Errorf("Process() size %dx%d exceeds 400x400 box", result.Width, result.Height)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_ProportionalScale_WidthOnly(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
ctx := context.Background()
// 800x600 image, request width=400 height=0
// Should scale proportionally to 400x300
input := createTestJPEG(t, 800, 600)
req := &ImageRequest{
Size: Size{Width: 400, Height: 0},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer result.Content.Close()
if result.Width != 400 {
t.Errorf("Process() width = %d, want 400", result.Width)
}
if result.Height != 300 {
t.Errorf("Process() height = %d, want 300", result.Height)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_ProportionalScale_HeightOnly(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
ctx := context.Background()
// 800x600 image, request width=0 height=300
// Should scale proportionally to 400x300
input := createTestJPEG(t, 800, 600)
req := &ImageRequest{
Size: Size{Width: 0, Height: 300},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer result.Content.Close()
if result.Width != 400 {
t.Errorf("Process() width = %d, want 400", result.Width)
}
if result.Height != 300 {
t.Errorf("Process() height = %d, want 300", result.Height)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_ProcessPNG(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
ctx := context.Background()
input := createTestPNG(t, 400, 300)
req := &ImageRequest{
Size: Size{Width: 200, Height: 150},
Format: FormatPNG,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer result.Content.Close()
if result.Width != 200 {
t.Errorf("Process() width = %d, want 200", result.Width)
}
if result.Height != 150 {
t.Errorf("Process() height = %d, want 150", result.Height)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_ImplementsInterface(t *testing.T) {
// Verify ImageProcessor implements Processor interface
var _ Processor = (*ImageProcessor)(nil)
}
func TestImageProcessor_SupportedFormats(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
inputFormats := proc.SupportedInputFormats()
if len(inputFormats) == 0 {
t.Error("SupportedInputFormats() returned empty slice")
}
outputFormats := proc.SupportedOutputFormats()
if len(outputFormats) == 0 {
t.Error("SupportedOutputFormats() returned empty slice")
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_RejectsOversizedInput(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
ctx := context.Background()
// Create an image that exceeds MaxInputDimension (e.g., 10000x100)
// This should be rejected before processing to prevent DoS
input := createTestJPEG(t, 10000, 100)
req := &ImageRequest{
Size: Size{Width: 100, Height: 100},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
_, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err == nil {
t.Error("Process() should reject oversized input images")
}
if err != ErrInputTooLarge {
t.Errorf("Process() error = %v, want ErrInputTooLarge", err)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_RejectsOversizedInputHeight(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
ctx := context.Background()
// Create an image with oversized height
input := createTestJPEG(t, 100, 10000)
req := &ImageRequest{
Size: Size{Width: 100, Height: 100},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
_, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err == nil {
t.Error("Process() should reject oversized input images")
}
if err != ErrInputTooLarge {
t.Errorf("Process() error = %v, want ErrInputTooLarge", err)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_AcceptsMaxDimensionInput(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
ctx := context.Background()
// Create an image at exactly MaxInputDimension - should be accepted
// Using smaller dimensions to keep test fast
input := createTestJPEG(t, MaxInputDimension, 100)
req := &ImageRequest{
Size: Size{Width: 100, Height: 100},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() should accept images at MaxInputDimension, got error: %v", err)
}
defer result.Content.Close()
}
func TestImageProcessor_EncodeWebP(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
ctx := context.Background()
input := createTestJPEG(t, 200, 150)
req := &ImageRequest{
Size: Size{Width: 100, Height: 75},
Format: FormatWebP,
Quality: 80,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v, want nil", err)
}
defer result.Content.Close()
// Verify output is valid WebP
data, err := io.ReadAll(result.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read result: %v", err)
}
mime, err := DetectFormat(data)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DetectFormat() error = %v", err)
}
if mime != MIMETypeWebP {
t.Errorf("Output format = %v, want %v", mime, MIMETypeWebP)
}
// Verify dimensions
if result.Width != 100 {
t.Errorf("Width = %d, want 100", result.Width)
}
if result.Height != 75 {
t.Errorf("Height = %d, want 75", result.Height)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_DecodeAVIF(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
ctx := context.Background()
// Load test AVIF file
input, err := os.ReadFile("testdata/red.avif")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read test AVIF: %v", err)
}
// Request resize and convert to JPEG
req := &ImageRequest{
Size: Size{Width: 2, Height: 2},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v, want nil (AVIF decoding should work)", err)
}
defer result.Content.Close()
// Verify output is valid JPEG
data, err := io.ReadAll(result.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read result: %v", err)
}
mime, err := DetectFormat(data)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DetectFormat() error = %v", err)
}
if mime != MIMETypeJPEG {
t.Errorf("Output format = %v, want %v", mime, MIMETypeJPEG)
}
}
func TestImageProcessor_EncodeAVIF(t *testing.T) {
proc := NewImageProcessor()
ctx := context.Background()
input := createTestJPEG(t, 200, 150)
req := &ImageRequest{
Size: Size{Width: 100, Height: 75},
Format: FormatAVIF,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
result, err := proc.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(input), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v, want nil (AVIF encoding should work)", err)
}
defer result.Content.Close()
// Verify output is valid AVIF
data, err := io.ReadAll(result.Content)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read result: %v", err)
}
mime, err := DetectFormat(data)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DetectFormat() error = %v", err)
}
if mime != MIMETypeAVIF {
t.Errorf("Output format = %v, want %v", mime, MIMETypeAVIF)
}
// Verify dimensions
if result.Width != 100 {
t.Errorf("Width = %d, want 100", result.Width)
}
if result.Height != 75 {
t.Errorf("Height = %d, want 75", result.Height)
}
}
+246 -123
View File
@@ -11,17 +11,24 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/allowlist"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imageprocessor"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/magic"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/signature"
)
// Service implements the ImageCache interface, orchestrating cache, fetcher, and processor.
// Service implements the ImageCache interface, orchestrating cache,
// fetcher, and processor.
type Service struct {
cache *Cache
fetcher Fetcher
processor Processor
signer *Signer
whitelist *HostWhitelist
log *slog.Logger
allowHTTP bool
cache *Cache
fetcher httpfetcher.Fetcher
processor *imageprocessor.ImageProcessor
signer *signature.Signer
allowlist *allowlist.HostAllowList
log *slog.Logger
allowHTTP bool
maxResponseSize int64
}
// ServiceConfig holds configuration for the image service.
@@ -29,40 +36,52 @@ type ServiceConfig struct {
// Cache is the cache instance
Cache *Cache
// FetcherConfig configures the upstream fetcher (ignored if Fetcher is set)
FetcherConfig *FetcherConfig
FetcherConfig *httpfetcher.Config
// Fetcher is an optional custom fetcher (for testing)
Fetcher Fetcher
Fetcher httpfetcher.Fetcher
// SigningKey is the HMAC signing key (empty disables signing)
SigningKey string
// Whitelist is the list of hosts that don't require signatures
Whitelist []string
// Allowlist is the list of hosts that don't require signatures
Allowlist []string
// MaxConcurrentProcessing is the most images processed at once; zero
// uses the image processor's default, one per CPU
MaxConcurrentProcessing int
// Logger for logging
Logger *slog.Logger
}
// Static errors for service construction and unimplemented operations.
var (
errCacheRequired = errors.New("cache is required")
errSigningKeyRequired = errors.New("signing key is required")
errPurgeNotImplemented = errors.New("purge not implemented")
)
// NewService creates a new image service.
func NewService(cfg *ServiceConfig) (*Service, error) {
if cfg.Cache == nil {
return nil, errors.New("cache is required")
return nil, errCacheRequired
}
if cfg.SigningKey == "" {
return nil, errors.New("signing key is required")
return nil, errSigningKeyRequired
}
// Resolve fetcher config for defaults
fetcherCfg := cfg.FetcherConfig
if fetcherCfg == nil {
fetcherCfg = httpfetcher.DefaultConfig()
}
// Use custom fetcher if provided, otherwise create HTTP fetcher
var fetcher Fetcher
var fetcher httpfetcher.Fetcher
if cfg.Fetcher != nil {
fetcher = cfg.Fetcher
} else {
fetcherCfg := cfg.FetcherConfig
if fetcherCfg == nil {
fetcherCfg = DefaultFetcherConfig()
}
fetcher = NewHTTPFetcher(fetcherCfg)
fetcher = httpfetcher.New(fetcherCfg)
}
signer := NewSigner(cfg.SigningKey)
signer := signature.New(cfg.SigningKey)
log := cfg.Logger
if log == nil {
@@ -74,14 +93,21 @@ func NewService(cfg *ServiceConfig) (*Service, error) {
allowHTTP = cfg.FetcherConfig.AllowHTTP
}
maxResponseSize := fetcherCfg.MaxResponseSize
processor := imageprocessor.New(imageprocessor.Params{
MaxInputBytes: maxResponseSize,
MaxConcurrentProcessing: cfg.MaxConcurrentProcessing,
})
return &Service{
cache: cfg.Cache,
fetcher: fetcher,
processor: NewImageProcessor(),
signer: signer,
whitelist: NewHostWhitelist(cfg.Whitelist),
log: log,
allowHTTP: allowHTTP,
cache: cfg.Cache,
fetcher: fetcher,
processor: processor,
signer: signer,
allowlist: allowlist.New(cfg.Allowlist),
log: log,
allowHTTP: allowHTTP,
maxResponseSize: maxResponseSize,
}, nil
}
@@ -98,13 +124,14 @@ func (s *Service) Get(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) (*ImageResponse, e
if err != nil {
s.log.Warn("negative cache check failed", "error", err)
}
if negHit {
s.log.Debug("negative cache hit",
"host", req.SourceHost,
"path", req.SourcePath,
)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrUpstreamError, ErrNegativeCached)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", httpfetcher.ErrUpstreamError, ErrNegativeCached)
}
// Check variant cache first (disk only, no DB)
@@ -120,7 +147,8 @@ func (s *Service) Get(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) (*ImageResponse, e
s.log.Error("failed to get cached variant", "key", result.CacheKey, "error", err)
// Fall through to re-process
} else {
s.cache.IncrementStats(ctx, true, 0)
// Counted also when the request context has ended meanwhile
s.cache.IncrementStats(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), true, 0)
return &ImageResponse{
Content: reader,
@@ -132,11 +160,15 @@ func (s *Service) Get(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) (*ImageResponse, e
}
}
// Cache miss - check if we have source content cached
// Cache miss - process the cached source or fetch it, then count the
// miss with the bytes it fetched from upstream, also when it failed or
// the request context has ended meanwhile
cacheKey := CacheKey(req)
s.cache.IncrementStats(ctx, false, 0)
response, err := s.processFromSourceOrFetch(ctx, req, cacheKey)
response, fetchedBytes, err := s.processFromSourceOrFetch(ctx, req, cacheKey)
s.cache.IncrementStats(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), false, fetchedBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -146,62 +178,149 @@ func (s *Service) Get(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) (*ImageResponse, e
return response, nil
}
// processFromSourceOrFetch processes an image, using cached source content if available.
// Warm pre-fetches and caches an image without returning it.
func (s *Service) Warm(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) error {
_, err := s.Get(ctx, req)
return err
}
// Purge removes a cached image. Purging is not implemented yet.
func (s *Service) Purge(_ context.Context, _ *ImageRequest) error {
return errPurgeNotImplemented
}
// Stats returns cache statistics.
func (s *Service) Stats(ctx context.Context) (*CacheStats, error) {
return s.cache.Stats(ctx)
}
// ValidateRequest validates the request signature if required.
func (s *Service) ValidateRequest(req *ImageRequest) error {
// Check if host is allowed (no signature required)
sourceURL := req.SourceURL()
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(sourceURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid source URL: %w", err)
}
if s.allowlist.IsAllowed(parsedURL) {
return nil
}
// Signature required for non-allowed hosts
return s.signer.Verify(signatureRequest(req))
}
// GenerateSignedURL generates a signed URL for the given request. The URL
// carries q and fit next to sig and exp, so the image route verifies it for
// the quality and fit it was signed with. An unset quality or fit is first
// set to 85 or cover, the values the route uses when a URL has no q or fit.
func (s *Service) GenerateSignedURL(
baseURL string,
req *ImageRequest,
ttl time.Duration,
) (string, error) {
if req.Quality == 0 {
req.Quality = 85
}
if req.FitMode == "" {
req.FitMode = FitCover
}
sigReq := signatureRequest(req)
path, sig, exp := s.signer.GenerateSignedURL(sigReq, ttl)
// Propagate the generated signature and expiration back onto the request.
req.Expires = sigReq.Expires
req.Signature = sigReq.Signature
return fmt.Sprintf("%s%s?sig=%s&exp=%d&q=%d&fit=%s",
baseURL, path, sig, exp, req.Quality, req.FitMode), nil
}
// loadCachedSource opens source content from cache, without reading it, and
// returns it with its size; nil if the cached data is unavailable, empty or
// exceeds maxResponseSize.
func (s *Service) loadCachedSource(
contentHash ContentHash,
) (io.ReadCloser, int64) {
reader, size, err := s.cache.GetSourceContent(contentHash)
if err != nil {
s.log.Warn("failed to load cached source, fetching", "error", err)
return nil, 0
}
if size > s.maxResponseSize {
_ = reader.Close()
s.log.Warn("cached source exceeds max response size, discarding",
"hash", contentHash,
"max_bytes", s.maxResponseSize,
)
return nil, 0
}
if size == 0 {
_ = reader.Close()
return nil, 0
}
return reader, size
}
// processFromSourceOrFetch processes an image, using cached source content
// if available. It also returns the number of bytes fetched from upstream,
// as fetchAndProcess does, or 0 when the cached source was used.
func (s *Service) processFromSourceOrFetch(
ctx context.Context,
req *ImageRequest,
cacheKey VariantKey,
) (*ImageResponse, error) {
) (*ImageResponse, int64, error) {
// Check if we have cached source content
contentHash, _, err := s.cache.LookupSource(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
s.log.Warn("source lookup failed", "error", err)
}
var sourceData []byte
var fetchBytes int64
var (
source io.ReadCloser
sourceSize int64
)
if contentHash != "" {
// We have cached source - load it
s.log.Debug("using cached source", "hash", contentHash)
reader, err := s.cache.GetSourceContent(contentHash)
if err != nil {
s.log.Warn("failed to load cached source, fetching", "error", err)
// Fall through to fetch
} else {
sourceData, err = io.ReadAll(reader)
_ = reader.Close()
if err != nil {
s.log.Warn("failed to read cached source, fetching", "error", err)
// Fall through to fetch
}
}
source, sourceSize = s.loadCachedSource(contentHash)
}
// Fetch from upstream if we don't have source data or it's empty
if len(sourceData) == 0 {
resp, err := s.fetchAndProcess(ctx, req, cacheKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return resp, nil
if source == nil {
return s.fetchAndProcess(ctx, req, cacheKey)
}
// Process using cached source
fetchBytes = int64(len(sourceData))
defer func() { _ = source.Close() }()
return s.processAndStore(ctx, req, cacheKey, sourceData, fetchBytes)
// Process using cached source; nothing was fetched from upstream. The
// image processor reads the source only once it has a processing slot,
// so a request waiting for one holds none of it in memory.
resp, err := s.processAndStore(ctx, req, cacheKey, source, sourceSize)
return resp, 0, err
}
// fetchAndProcess fetches from upstream, processes, and caches the result.
// It also returns the number of bytes read from upstream, including when
// reading the response or a later step fails.
func (s *Service) fetchAndProcess(
ctx context.Context,
req *ImageRequest,
cacheKey VariantKey,
) (*ImageResponse, error) {
) (*ImageResponse, int64, error) {
// Fetch from upstream
sourceURL := req.SourceURL()
@@ -212,21 +331,32 @@ func (s *Service) fetchAndProcess(
// Store negative cache for certain errors
if isNegativeCacheable(err) {
statusCode := extractStatusCode(err)
_ = s.cache.StoreNegative(ctx, req, statusCode, err.Error())
storeErr := s.cache.StoreNegative(ctx, req, statusCode, err.Error())
if storeErr != nil {
s.log.Warn("failed to store negative cache entry",
"host", req.SourceHost, "path", req.SourcePath, "error", storeErr)
}
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("upstream fetch failed: %w", err)
return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("upstream fetch failed: %w", err)
}
// Closing the body frees the upstream connection. It is closed only
// after processing, so the fetcher's connection limit also bounds the
// fetched sources held in memory while their requests wait for a
// processing slot.
defer func() { _ = fetchResult.Content.Close() }()
// Read and validate the source content
sourceData, err := io.ReadAll(fetchResult.Content)
fetchBytes := int64(len(sourceData))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read upstream response: %w", err)
return nil, fetchBytes, fmt.Errorf("failed to read upstream response: %w", err)
}
// Calculate download bitrate
fetchBytes := int64(len(sourceData))
var downloadRate string
if fetchResult.FetchDurationMs > 0 {
@@ -249,8 +379,9 @@ func (s *Service) fetchAndProcess(
)
// Validate magic bytes match content type
if err := ValidateMagicBytes(sourceData, fetchResult.ContentType); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("content validation failed: %w", err)
err = magic.ValidateMagicBytes(sourceData, fetchResult.ContentType)
if err != nil {
return nil, fetchBytes, fmt.Errorf("content validation failed: %w", err)
}
// Store source content
@@ -260,27 +391,42 @@ func (s *Service) fetchAndProcess(
// Continue even if caching fails
}
return s.processAndStore(ctx, req, cacheKey, sourceData, fetchBytes)
resp, err := s.processAndStore(
ctx, req, cacheKey, bytes.NewReader(sourceData), fetchBytes,
)
return resp, fetchBytes, err
}
// processAndStore processes an image and stores the result.
// processAndStore processes the image read from source and stores the
// result.
func (s *Service) processAndStore(
ctx context.Context,
req *ImageRequest,
cacheKey VariantKey,
sourceData []byte,
source io.Reader,
fetchBytes int64,
) (*ImageResponse, error) {
// Process the image
processStart := time.Now()
processResult, err := s.processor.Process(ctx, bytes.NewReader(sourceData), req)
processReq := &imageprocessor.Request{
Size: imageprocessor.Size{Width: req.Size.Width, Height: req.Size.Height},
Format: imageprocessor.Format(req.Format),
Quality: req.Quality,
FitMode: imageprocessor.FitMode(req.FitMode),
}
processResult, err := s.processor.Process(ctx, source, processReq)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("image processing failed: %w", err)
}
processDuration := time.Since(processStart)
// Counted also when the request context has ended meanwhile
s.cache.IncrementTransformCount(context.WithoutCancel(ctx))
// Read processed content
processedData, err := io.ReadAll(processResult.Content)
_ = processResult.Content.Close()
@@ -294,7 +440,8 @@ func (s *Service) processAndStore(
var sizePercent float64
if fetchBytes > 0 {
sizePercent = float64(outputSize) / float64(fetchBytes) * 100.0 //nolint:mnd // percentage calculation
//nolint:mnd // percentage calculation
sizePercent = float64(outputSize) / float64(fetchBytes) * 100.0
}
s.log.Info("image converted",
@@ -304,8 +451,10 @@ func (s *Service) processAndStore(
"dst_format", req.Format,
"src_bytes", fetchBytes,
"dst_bytes", outputSize,
"src_dimensions", fmt.Sprintf("%dx%d", processResult.InputWidth, processResult.InputHeight),
"dst_dimensions", fmt.Sprintf("%dx%d", processResult.Width, processResult.Height),
"src_dimensions", fmt.Sprintf("%dx%d",
processResult.InputWidth, processResult.InputHeight),
"dst_dimensions", fmt.Sprintf("%dx%d",
processResult.Width, processResult.Height),
"size_ratio", fmt.Sprintf("%.1f%%", sizePercent),
"convert_ms", processDuration.Milliseconds(),
"quality", req.Quality,
@@ -313,7 +462,10 @@ func (s *Service) processAndStore(
)
// Store variant to cache
if err := s.cache.StoreVariant(cacheKey, bytes.NewReader(processedData), processResult.ContentType); err != nil {
err = s.cache.StoreVariant(
ctx, cacheKey, bytes.NewReader(processedData), processResult.ContentType,
)
if err != nil {
s.log.Warn("failed to store variant", "error", err)
// Continue even if caching fails
}
@@ -327,51 +479,22 @@ func (s *Service) processAndStore(
}, nil
}
// Warm pre-fetches and caches an image without returning it.
func (s *Service) Warm(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) error {
_, err := s.Get(ctx, req)
return err
}
// Purge removes a cached image.
func (s *Service) Purge(_ context.Context, _ *ImageRequest) error {
// TODO: Implement purge
return errors.New("purge not implemented")
}
// Stats returns cache statistics.
func (s *Service) Stats(ctx context.Context) (*CacheStats, error) {
return s.cache.Stats(ctx)
}
// ValidateRequest validates the request signature if required.
func (s *Service) ValidateRequest(req *ImageRequest) error {
// Check if host is whitelisted (no signature required)
sourceURL := req.SourceURL()
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(sourceURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid source URL: %w", err)
// signatureRequest projects an ImageRequest onto the standalone
// signature.Request type used by the signature package. This keeps the
// import edge one-way: imgcache depends on signature, never the reverse.
func signatureRequest(req *ImageRequest) *signature.Request {
return &signature.Request{
SourceHost: req.SourceHost,
SourcePath: req.SourcePath,
SourceQuery: req.SourceQuery,
Width: req.Size.Width,
Height: req.Size.Height,
Format: string(req.Format),
Quality: req.Quality,
FitMode: string(req.FitMode),
Signature: req.Signature,
Expires: req.Expires,
}
if s.whitelist.IsWhitelisted(parsedURL) {
return nil
}
// Signature required for non-whitelisted hosts
return s.signer.Verify(req)
}
// GenerateSignedURL generates a signed URL for the given request.
func (s *Service) GenerateSignedURL(
baseURL string,
req *ImageRequest,
ttl time.Duration,
) (string, error) {
path, sig, exp := s.signer.GenerateSignedURL(req, ttl)
return fmt.Sprintf("%s%s?sig=%s&exp=%d", baseURL, path, sig, exp), nil
}
// HTTP status codes for error responses.
@@ -382,13 +505,13 @@ const (
// isNegativeCacheable returns true if the error should be cached.
func isNegativeCacheable(err error) bool {
return errors.Is(err, ErrUpstreamError)
return errors.Is(err, httpfetcher.ErrUpstreamError)
}
// extractStatusCode extracts HTTP status code from error message.
func extractStatusCode(err error) int {
// Default to 502 Bad Gateway for upstream errors
if errors.Is(err, ErrUpstreamError) {
if errors.Is(err, httpfetcher.ErrUpstreamError) {
return httpStatusBadGateway
}
@@ -5,15 +5,27 @@ import (
"io"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/magic"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/signature"
)
func TestService_Get_WhitelistedHost(t *testing.T) {
// Test data literals used repeatedly in this file (goconst).
const (
testPathPhoto = "/images/photo.jpg"
testPathUpload = "/uploads/image.jpg"
testSigningKey = "test-signing-key-12345"
)
func TestService_Get_AllowlistedHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.GoodHost,
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathPhoto,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
@@ -24,7 +36,8 @@ func TestService_Get_WhitelistedHost(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get() error = %v", err)
}
defer resp.Content.Close()
defer func() { _ = resp.Content.Close() }()
// Verify we got content
data, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Content)
@@ -36,38 +49,42 @@ func TestService_Get_WhitelistedHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("expected non-empty response")
}
if resp.ContentType != "image/jpeg" {
t.Errorf("ContentType = %q, want %q", resp.ContentType, "image/jpeg")
if resp.ContentType != testContentTypeJPEG {
t.Errorf("ContentType = %q, want %q", resp.ContentType, testContentTypeJPEG)
}
}
func TestService_Get_NonWhitelistedHost_NoSignature(t *testing.T) {
func TestService_Get_NonAllowlistedHost_NoSignature(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t, WithSigningKey("test-key"))
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.OtherHost,
SourcePath: "/uploads/image.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathUpload,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
// Should fail validation - not whitelisted and no signature
// Should fail validation - not allowlisted and no signature
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
if err == nil {
t.Error("ValidateRequest() expected error for non-whitelisted host without signature")
t.Error("ValidateRequest() expected error for non-allowlisted host without signature")
}
}
func TestService_Get_NonWhitelistedHost_ValidSignature(t *testing.T) {
signingKey := "test-signing-key-12345"
func TestService_Get_NonAllowlistedHost_ValidSignature(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
signingKey := testSigningKey
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t, WithSigningKey(signingKey))
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.OtherHost,
SourcePath: "/uploads/image.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathUpload,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
@@ -75,9 +92,9 @@ func TestService_Get_NonWhitelistedHost_ValidSignature(t *testing.T) {
}
// Generate a valid signature
signer := NewSigner(signingKey)
signer := signature.New(signingKey)
req.Expires = time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
req.Signature = signer.Sign(req)
req.Signature = signer.Sign(signatureRequest(req))
// Should pass validation
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
@@ -90,7 +107,8 @@ func TestService_Get_NonWhitelistedHost_ValidSignature(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get() error = %v", err)
}
defer resp.Content.Close()
defer func() { _ = resp.Content.Close() }()
data, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Content)
if err != nil {
@@ -102,13 +120,15 @@ func TestService_Get_NonWhitelistedHost_ValidSignature(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestService_Get_NonWhitelistedHost_ExpiredSignature(t *testing.T) {
signingKey := "test-signing-key-12345"
func TestService_Get_NonAllowlistedHost_ExpiredSignature(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
signingKey := testSigningKey
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t, WithSigningKey(signingKey))
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.OtherHost,
SourcePath: "/uploads/image.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathUpload,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
@@ -116,9 +136,9 @@ func TestService_Get_NonWhitelistedHost_ExpiredSignature(t *testing.T) {
}
// Generate an expired signature
signer := NewSigner(signingKey)
signer := signature.New(signingKey)
req.Expires = time.Now().Add(-time.Hour) // Already expired
req.Signature = signer.Sign(req)
req.Signature = signer.Sign(signatureRequest(req))
// Should fail validation
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
@@ -127,13 +147,15 @@ func TestService_Get_NonWhitelistedHost_ExpiredSignature(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestService_Get_NonWhitelistedHost_InvalidSignature(t *testing.T) {
signingKey := "test-signing-key-12345"
func TestService_Get_NonAllowlistedHost_InvalidSignature(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
signingKey := testSigningKey
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t, WithSigningKey(signingKey))
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.OtherHost,
SourcePath: "/uploads/image.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathUpload,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
@@ -151,7 +173,84 @@ func TestService_Get_NonWhitelistedHost_InvalidSignature(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch verifies that
// ValidateRequest enforces exact host matching for signatures. A
// signature for one host must not verify for a different host, even
// if they share a domain suffix.
func TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
signingKey := "test-signing-key-must-be-32-chars"
svc, _ := SetupTestService(t,
WithSigningKey(signingKey),
WithNoAllowlist(),
)
signer := signature.New(signingKey)
// Sign a request for "cdn.example.com"
signedReq := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
Expires: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
}
signedReq.Signature = signer.Sign(signatureRequest(signedReq))
// The original request should pass validation
t.Run("exact host passes", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := svc.ValidateRequest(signedReq)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateRequest() exact host failed: %v", err)
}
})
// Try to reuse the signature with different hosts
tests := []struct {
name string
host string
}{
{"parent domain", testHostExample},
{"sibling subdomain", "images.example.com"},
{"deeper subdomain", "a.cdn.example.com"},
{"evil suffix domain", "cdn.example.com.evil.com"},
{"prefixed host", "evilcdn.example.com"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name+" rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: tt.host,
SourcePath: signedReq.SourcePath,
SourceQuery: signedReq.SourceQuery,
Size: signedReq.Size,
Format: signedReq.Format,
Quality: signedReq.Quality,
FitMode: signedReq.FitMode,
Expires: signedReq.Expires,
Signature: signedReq.Signature,
}
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf(
"ValidateRequest() should reject signature for host %q (signed for %q)",
tt.host, signedReq.SourceHost)
}
})
}
}
func TestService_Get_InvalidFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
ctx := context.Background()
@@ -172,6 +271,8 @@ func TestService_Get_InvalidFile(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestService_Get_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
ctx := context.Background()
@@ -191,6 +292,8 @@ func TestService_Get_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestService_Get_FormatConversion(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
ctx := context.Background()
@@ -202,7 +305,7 @@ func TestService_Get_FormatConversion(t *testing.T) {
}{
{
name: "JPEG to PNG",
sourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
sourcePath: testPathPhoto,
outFormat: FormatPNG,
wantMIME: "image/png",
},
@@ -210,7 +313,7 @@ func TestService_Get_FormatConversion(t *testing.T) {
name: "PNG to JPEG",
sourcePath: "/images/logo.png",
outFormat: FormatJPEG,
wantMIME: "image/jpeg",
wantMIME: testContentTypeJPEG,
},
{
name: "GIF to PNG",
@@ -222,6 +325,8 @@ func TestService_Get_FormatConversion(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.GoodHost,
SourcePath: tt.sourcePath,
@@ -235,7 +340,8 @@ func TestService_Get_FormatConversion(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get() error = %v", err)
}
defer resp.Content.Close()
defer func() { _ = resp.Content.Close() }()
if resp.ContentType != tt.wantMIME {
t.Errorf("ContentType = %q, want %q", resp.ContentType, tt.wantMIME)
@@ -247,17 +353,17 @@ func TestService_Get_FormatConversion(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("failed to read response: %v", err)
}
detectedMIME, err := DetectFormat(data)
detectedMIME, err := magic.DetectFormat(data)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to detect format: %v", err)
}
expectedFormat, ok := MIMEToImageFormat(tt.wantMIME)
expectedFormat, ok := magic.MIMEToImageFormat(tt.wantMIME)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("unknown format for MIME type: %s", tt.wantMIME)
}
detectedFormat, ok := MIMEToImageFormat(string(detectedMIME))
detectedFormat, ok := magic.MIMEToImageFormat(string(detectedMIME))
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("unknown format for detected MIME type: %s", detectedMIME)
}
@@ -270,12 +376,14 @@ func TestService_Get_FormatConversion(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestService_Get_Caching(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.GoodHost,
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathPhoto,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
@@ -296,7 +404,8 @@ func TestService_Get_Caching(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read first response: %v", err)
}
resp1.Content.Close()
_ = resp1.Content.Close()
// Second request - should be a cache hit
resp2, err := svc.Get(ctx, req)
@@ -312,7 +421,8 @@ func TestService_Get_Caching(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read second response: %v", err)
}
resp2.Content.Close()
_ = resp2.Content.Close()
// Content should be identical
if len(data1) != len(data2) {
@@ -321,6 +431,8 @@ func TestService_Get_Caching(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestService_Get_DifferentSizes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
ctx := context.Background()
@@ -331,12 +443,12 @@ func TestService_Get_DifferentSizes(t *testing.T) {
{Width: 75, Height: 75},
}
var responses [][]byte
responses := make([][]byte, 0, len(sizes))
for _, size := range sizes {
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.GoodHost,
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathPhoto,
Size: size,
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
@@ -352,27 +464,31 @@ func TestService_Get_DifferentSizes(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read response: %v", err)
}
resp.Content.Close()
_ = resp.Content.Close()
responses = append(responses, data)
}
// All responses should be different sizes (different cache entries)
for i := 0; i < len(responses)-1; i++ {
for i := range len(responses) - 1 {
if len(responses[i]) == len(responses[i+1]) {
// Not necessarily an error, but worth noting
t.Logf("responses %d and %d have same size: %d bytes", i, i+1, len(responses[i]))
t.Logf("responses %d and %d have same size: %d bytes",
i, i+1, len(responses[i]))
}
}
}
func TestService_ValidateRequest_NoSigningKey(t *testing.T) {
// Service with no signing key - all non-whitelisted requests should fail
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t, WithNoWhitelist())
t.Parallel()
// Service with no signing key - all non-allowlisted requests should fail
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t, WithNoAllowlist())
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.OtherHost,
SourcePath: "/uploads/image.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathUpload,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
@@ -381,11 +497,15 @@ func TestService_ValidateRequest_NoSigningKey(t *testing.T) {
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
if err == nil {
t.Error("ValidateRequest() expected error when no signing key and host not whitelisted")
t.Error(
"ValidateRequest() expected error when no signing key and host not allowlisted",
)
}
}
func TestService_Get_ContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
@@ -393,7 +513,7 @@ func TestService_Get_ContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.GoodHost,
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathPhoto,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
@@ -407,12 +527,14 @@ func TestService_Get_ContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestService_Get_ReturnsETag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.GoodHost,
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathPhoto,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
@@ -423,7 +545,8 @@ func TestService_Get_ReturnsETag(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get() error = %v", err)
}
defer resp.Content.Close()
defer func() { _ = resp.Content.Close() }()
// ETag should be set
if resp.ETag == "" {
@@ -437,12 +560,14 @@ func TestService_Get_ReturnsETag(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestService_Get_ETagConsistency(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
ctx := context.Background()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.GoodHost,
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathPhoto,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
@@ -454,16 +579,20 @@ func TestService_Get_ETagConsistency(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get() first request error = %v", err)
}
etag1 := resp1.ETag
resp1.Content.Close()
_ = resp1.Content.Close()
// Second request (from cache)
resp2, err := svc.Get(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get() second request error = %v", err)
}
etag2 := resp2.ETag
resp2.Content.Close()
_ = resp2.Content.Close()
// ETags should be identical for the same content
if etag1 != etag2 {
@@ -472,13 +601,15 @@ func TestService_Get_ETagConsistency(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestService_Get_DifferentETagsForDifferentContent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
ctx := context.Background()
// Request same image at different sizes - should get different ETags
req1 := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.GoodHost,
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathPhoto,
Size: Size{Width: 25, Height: 25},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
@@ -487,7 +618,7 @@ func TestService_Get_DifferentETagsForDifferentContent(t *testing.T) {
req2 := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.GoodHost,
SourcePath: "/images/photo.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathPhoto,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
@@ -498,15 +629,19 @@ func TestService_Get_DifferentETagsForDifferentContent(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get() first request error = %v", err)
}
etag1 := resp1.ETag
resp1.Content.Close()
_ = resp1.Content.Close()
resp2, err := svc.Get(ctx, req2)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get() second request error = %v", err)
}
etag2 := resp2.ETag
resp2.Content.Close()
_ = resp2.Content.Close()
// ETags should be different for different content
if etag1 == etag2 {
-142
View File
@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
package imgcache
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"time"
)
// Signature errors.
var (
ErrSignatureRequired = errors.New("signature required for non-whitelisted host")
ErrSignatureInvalid = errors.New("invalid signature")
ErrSignatureExpired = errors.New("signature has expired")
ErrMissingExpiration = errors.New("signature expiration is required")
)
// Signer handles HMAC-SHA256 signature generation and verification.
type Signer struct {
secretKey []byte
}
// NewSigner creates a new Signer with the given secret key.
func NewSigner(secretKey string) *Signer {
return &Signer{
secretKey: []byte(secretKey),
}
}
// Sign generates an HMAC-SHA256 signature for the given image request.
// The signature covers: host + path + query + width + height + format + expiration.
func (s *Signer) Sign(req *ImageRequest) string {
data := s.buildSignatureData(req)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.secretKey)
mac.Write([]byte(data))
sig := mac.Sum(nil)
return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig)
}
// Verify checks if the signature on the request is valid and not expired.
func (s *Signer) Verify(req *ImageRequest) error {
// Check expiration first
if req.Expires.IsZero() {
return ErrMissingExpiration
}
if time.Now().After(req.Expires) {
return ErrSignatureExpired
}
// Compute expected signature
expected := s.Sign(req)
// Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
if !hmac.Equal([]byte(req.Signature), []byte(expected)) {
return ErrSignatureInvalid
}
return nil
}
// buildSignatureData creates the string to be signed.
// Format: "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration"
func (s *Signer) buildSignatureData(req *ImageRequest) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%d",
req.SourceHost,
req.SourcePath,
req.SourceQuery,
req.Size.Width,
req.Size.Height,
req.Format,
req.Expires.Unix(),
)
}
// GenerateSignedURL creates a complete URL with signature and expiration.
// Returns the path portion that should be appended to the base URL.
func (s *Signer) GenerateSignedURL(req *ImageRequest, ttl time.Duration) (path string, sig string, exp int64) {
// Set expiration
req.Expires = time.Now().Add(ttl)
exp = req.Expires.Unix()
// Generate signature
sig = s.Sign(req)
req.Signature = sig
// Build the size component
var sizeStr string
if req.Size.OriginalSize() {
sizeStr = "orig"
} else {
sizeStr = fmt.Sprintf("%dx%d", req.Size.Width, req.Size.Height)
}
// Build the path.
// When a source query is present, it is embedded as a path segment
// (e.g. /host/path?query/size.fmt) so that ParseImagePath can extract
// it from the last-slash split. The "?" inside a path segment is
// percent-encoded by clients but chi delivers it decoded, which is
// exactly what the URL parser expects.
if req.SourceQuery != "" {
path = fmt.Sprintf("/v1/image/%s%s%%3F%s/%s.%s",
req.SourceHost,
req.SourcePath,
url.PathEscape(req.SourceQuery),
sizeStr,
req.Format,
)
} else {
path = fmt.Sprintf("/v1/image/%s%s/%s.%s",
req.SourceHost,
req.SourcePath,
sizeStr,
req.Format,
)
}
return path, sig, exp
}
// ParseSignatureParams extracts signature and expiration from query parameters.
func ParseSignatureParams(sig, expStr string) (signature string, expires time.Time, err error) {
signature = sig
if expStr == "" {
return signature, time.Time{}, nil
}
expUnix, err := strconv.ParseInt(expStr, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid expiration: %w", err)
}
expires = time.Unix(expUnix, 0)
return signature, expires, nil
}
-55
View File
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
package imgcache
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestGenerateSignedURL_WithQueryString(t *testing.T) {
signer := NewSigner("test-secret-key-for-testing!")
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceQuery: "token=abc&v=2",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
}
path, _, _ := signer.GenerateSignedURL(req, time.Hour)
// The path must NOT contain a bare "?" that would be interpreted as a query string delimiter.
// The size segment must appear as the last path component.
if strings.Contains(path, "?token=abc") {
t.Errorf("GenerateSignedURL() produced bare query string in path: %q", path)
}
// The size segment must be present in the path
if !strings.Contains(path, "/800x600.webp") {
t.Errorf("GenerateSignedURL() missing size segment in path: %q", path)
}
// Path should end with the size.format, not with query params
if !strings.HasSuffix(path, "/800x600.webp") {
t.Errorf("GenerateSignedURL() path should end with size.format: %q", path)
}
}
func TestGenerateSignedURL_WithoutQueryString(t *testing.T) {
signer := NewSigner("test-secret-key-for-testing!")
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
}
path, _, _ := signer.GenerateSignedURL(req, time.Hour)
expected := "/v1/image/cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp"
if path != expected {
t.Errorf("GenerateSignedURL() path = %q, want %q", path, expected)
}
}
-295
View File
@@ -1,295 +0,0 @@
package imgcache
import (
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestSigner_Sign(t *testing.T) {
signer := NewSigner("test-secret-key")
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceQuery: "",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Expires: time.Unix(1704067200, 0), // Fixed timestamp for reproducibility
}
sig1 := signer.Sign(req)
sig2 := signer.Sign(req)
// Same input should produce same signature
if sig1 != sig2 {
t.Errorf("Sign() produced different signatures for same input: %q vs %q", sig1, sig2)
}
// Signature should be non-empty
if sig1 == "" {
t.Error("Sign() produced empty signature")
}
// Different input should produce different signature
req2 := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/dog.jpg", // Different path
SourceQuery: "",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Expires: time.Unix(1704067200, 0),
}
sig3 := signer.Sign(req2)
if sig1 == sig3 {
t.Error("Sign() produced same signature for different input")
}
}
func TestSigner_Verify(t *testing.T) {
signer := NewSigner("test-secret-key")
tests := []struct {
name string
setup func() *ImageRequest
wantErr error
}{
{
name: "valid signature",
setup: func() *ImageRequest {
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Expires: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour),
}
req.Signature = signer.Sign(req)
return req
},
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "expired signature",
setup: func() *ImageRequest {
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Expires: time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour), // Expired
}
req.Signature = signer.Sign(req)
return req
},
wantErr: ErrSignatureExpired,
},
{
name: "invalid signature",
setup: func() *ImageRequest {
return &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Expires: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour),
Signature: "invalid-signature",
}
},
wantErr: ErrSignatureInvalid,
},
{
name: "missing expiration",
setup: func() *ImageRequest {
return &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Signature: "some-signature",
// Expires is zero
}
},
wantErr: ErrMissingExpiration,
},
{
name: "tampered request",
setup: func() *ImageRequest {
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Expires: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour),
}
req.Signature = signer.Sign(req)
// Tamper with the request
req.SourcePath = "/photos/secret.jpg"
return req
},
wantErr: ErrSignatureInvalid,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
req := tt.setup()
err := signer.Verify(req)
if tt.wantErr == nil {
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Verify() unexpected error = %v", err)
}
} else {
if err != tt.wantErr {
t.Errorf("Verify() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
}
}
})
}
}
func TestSigner_DifferentKeys(t *testing.T) {
signer1 := NewSigner("secret-key-1")
signer2 := NewSigner("secret-key-2")
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Expires: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour),
}
// Sign with key 1
req.Signature = signer1.Sign(req)
// Verify with key 1 should succeed
if err := signer1.Verify(req); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Verify() with same key failed: %v", err)
}
// Verify with key 2 should fail
if err := signer2.Verify(req); err != ErrSignatureInvalid {
t.Errorf("Verify() with different key should fail, got: %v", err)
}
}
func TestGenerateSignedURL(t *testing.T) {
signer := NewSigner("test-secret-key")
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceQuery: "",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
}
ttl := 1 * time.Hour
path, sig, exp := signer.GenerateSignedURL(req, ttl)
// Path should be correct format
expectedPath := "/v1/image/cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp"
if path != expectedPath {
t.Errorf("GenerateSignedURL() path = %q, want %q", path, expectedPath)
}
// Signature should be non-empty
if sig == "" {
t.Error("GenerateSignedURL() produced empty signature")
}
// Expiration should be approximately now + TTL
expTime := time.Unix(exp, 0)
expectedExp := time.Now().Add(ttl)
if expTime.Sub(expectedExp) > time.Second {
t.Errorf("GenerateSignedURL() exp time off by too much")
}
// Request should have been updated with signature and expiration
if req.Signature != sig {
t.Errorf("GenerateSignedURL() didn't update request signature")
}
}
func TestGenerateSignedURL_OrigSize(t *testing.T) {
signer := NewSigner("test-secret-key")
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 0, Height: 0}, // Original size
Format: FormatPNG,
}
path, _, _ := signer.GenerateSignedURL(req, time.Hour)
expectedPath := "/v1/image/cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/orig.png"
if path != expectedPath {
t.Errorf("GenerateSignedURL() path = %q, want %q", path, expectedPath)
}
}
func TestParseSignatureParams(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
sig string
expStr string
wantSig string
wantErr bool
checkTime bool
}{
{
name: "valid params",
sig: "abc123",
expStr: "1704067200",
wantSig: "abc123",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "empty expiration",
sig: "abc123",
expStr: "",
wantSig: "abc123",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "invalid expiration",
sig: "abc123",
expStr: "not-a-number",
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
sig, exp, err := ParseSignatureParams(tt.sig, tt.expStr)
if tt.wantErr {
if err == nil {
t.Error("ParseSignatureParams() expected error, got nil")
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("ParseSignatureParams() unexpected error = %v", err)
return
}
if sig != tt.wantSig {
t.Errorf("sig = %q, want %q", sig, tt.wantSig)
}
if tt.expStr != "" && exp.IsZero() {
t.Error("exp should not be zero when expStr is provided")
}
})
}
}
@@ -3,13 +3,16 @@ package imgcache
import "testing"
func TestImageRequest_SourceURL_DefaultHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
SourceQuery: "v=2",
}
got := req.SourceURL()
want := "https://cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg?v=2"
if got != want {
t.Errorf("SourceURL() = %q, want %q", got, want)
@@ -17,13 +20,16 @@ func TestImageRequest_SourceURL_DefaultHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestImageRequest_SourceURL_AllowHTTP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "localhost:8080",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourcePath: testPathCat,
AllowHTTP: true,
}
got := req.SourceURL()
want := "http://localhost:8080/photos/cat.jpg"
if got != want {
t.Errorf("SourceURL() = %q, want %q", got, want)
@@ -31,8 +37,10 @@ func TestImageRequest_SourceURL_AllowHTTP(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestImageRequest_SourceURL_AllowHTTPFalse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: "/img.jpg",
AllowHTTP: false,
}
+499
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,499 @@
package imgcache
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"image/color"
"io"
"io/fs"
"log/slog"
"math"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
)
func setupStatsTestDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
t.Helper()
db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", ":memory:")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err = database.ApplyMigrations(context.Background(), db, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
return db
}
func TestStats_HitRateIsRatio(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := setupStatsTestDB(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
cache, err := NewCache(db, CacheConfig{
StateDir: dir,
CacheTTL: time.Hour,
NegativeTTL: 5 * time.Minute,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ctx := context.Background()
// Set some hit/miss counts and a transform_count
_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE cache_stats
SET hit_count = 75, miss_count = 25, transform_count = 9999
WHERE id = 1
`)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stats, err := cache.Stats(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if stats.HitCount != 75 {
t.Errorf("HitCount = %d, want 75", stats.HitCount)
}
if stats.MissCount != 25 {
t.Errorf("MissCount = %d, want 25", stats.MissCount)
}
// HitRate should be 0.75, NOT 9999 (transform_count)
expectedRate := 0.75
if math.Abs(stats.HitRate-expectedRate) > 0.001 {
t.Errorf("HitRate = %f, want %f (was it scanning transform_count?)",
stats.HitRate, expectedRate)
}
}
func TestStats_ZeroCounts(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := setupStatsTestDB(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
cache, err := NewCache(db, CacheConfig{
StateDir: dir,
CacheTTL: time.Hour,
NegativeTTL: 5 * time.Minute,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stats, err := cache.Stats(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// With zero hits and misses, HitRate should be 0, not some garbage value
if stats.HitRate != 0.0 {
t.Errorf("HitRate = %f, want 0.0 for zero counts", stats.HitRate)
}
}
// TestStats_LogsFailedCountQueries verifies that a failed item count query
// and a failed size query are each logged at warn and Stats still succeeds.
func TestStats_LogsFailedCountQueries(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := setupStatsTestDB(t)
var logBuf bytes.Buffer
cache, err := NewCache(db, CacheConfig{
StateDir: t.TempDir(),
CacheTTL: time.Hour,
NegativeTTL: 5 * time.Minute,
Logger: slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logBuf, nil)),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, err = db.ExecContext(t.Context(),
`DROP TABLE source_content; DROP TABLE variant_content`)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, err = cache.Stats(t.Context())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Stats() error = %v, want nil", err)
}
for _, msg := range []string{
"failed to count cache items for stats",
"failed to sum cache size for stats",
} {
want := `"level":"WARN","msg":"` + msg + `"`
if !strings.Contains(logBuf.String(), want) {
t.Errorf("log missing %s; got %q", want, logBuf.String())
}
}
}
// TestIncrementStats_LogsFailedUpdates verifies that a failed hit or miss
// count update and a failed upstream fetch count update are each logged at
// warn.
func TestIncrementStats_LogsFailedUpdates(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := setupStatsTestDB(t)
var logBuf bytes.Buffer
cache, err := NewCache(db, CacheConfig{
StateDir: t.TempDir(),
CacheTTL: time.Hour,
NegativeTTL: 5 * time.Minute,
Logger: slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logBuf, nil)),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, err = db.ExecContext(t.Context(), `DROP TABLE cache_stats`)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cache.IncrementStats(t.Context(), false, 1024)
for _, msg := range []string{
"failed to count cache hit or miss",
"failed to count upstream fetch",
} {
want := `"level":"WARN","msg":"` + msg + `"`
if !strings.Contains(logBuf.String(), want) {
t.Errorf("log missing %s; got %q", want, logBuf.String())
}
}
}
// TestStats_TotalsCountSourcesAndVariants verifies that TotalItems and
// TotalSizeBytes cover the stored source images and processed variants.
func TestStats_TotalsCountSourcesAndVariants(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache, testHostCDN, testPathCat,
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAA}, 1000))
storeEvictionTestVariant(t, cache, testVariantKeyOne,
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAB}, 500))
storeEvictionTestVariant(t, cache, testVariantKeyTwo,
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAC}, 250))
stats, err := cache.Stats(t.Context())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Stats() error = %v", err)
}
if stats.TotalItems != 3 {
t.Errorf("TotalItems = %d, want 3 (1 source, 2 variants)", stats.TotalItems)
}
if stats.TotalSizeBytes != 1750 {
t.Errorf("TotalSizeBytes = %d, want 1750 (1000+500+250)",
stats.TotalSizeBytes)
}
}
// TestStats_DisabledCacheReportsNoItems verifies that a disabled disk cache
// reports no items and no size, even when its database still holds the
// rows of an earlier run with the disk cache enabled.
func TestStats_DisabledCacheReportsNoItems(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
enabled, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
storeEvictionTestSource(t, enabled, testHostCDN, testPathCat,
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAA}, 1000))
storeEvictionTestVariant(t, enabled, testVariantKeyOne,
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAB}, 500))
disabled, err := NewCache(enabled.db, CacheConfig{
StateDir: t.TempDir(),
CacheTTL: time.Hour,
NegativeTTL: 5 * time.Minute,
DisableDiskCache: true,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stats, err := disabled.Stats(t.Context())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Stats() error = %v", err)
}
if stats.TotalItems != 0 || stats.TotalSizeBytes != 0 {
t.Errorf("TotalItems = %d, TotalSizeBytes = %d, want 0 and 0",
stats.TotalItems, stats.TotalSizeBytes)
}
}
// cacheStatsCounters holds the counters of the cache_stats row, in column
// order.
type cacheStatsCounters struct {
hitCount int64
missCount int64
upstreamFetchCount int64
upstreamFetchBytes int64
transformCount int64
}
// readCacheStatsCounters reads the counters of the cache_stats row.
func readCacheStatsCounters(t *testing.T, cache *Cache) cacheStatsCounters {
t.Helper()
var got cacheStatsCounters
err := cache.db.QueryRowContext(t.Context(), `
SELECT hit_count, miss_count, upstream_fetch_count,
upstream_fetch_bytes, transform_count
FROM cache_stats WHERE id = 1
`).Scan(&got.hitCount, &got.missCount, &got.upstreamFetchCount,
&got.upstreamFetchBytes, &got.transformCount)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read cache_stats: %v", err)
}
return got
}
// TestService_Get_CountsStats walks Get through a miss that fetches the
// source, a hit, a miss that reuses the cached source, and two misses whose
// source cannot be used, checking every cache_stats counter after each.
func TestService_Get_CountsStats(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
// NewTestFS builds the same files the test service's fetcher serves.
testFS, _ := NewTestFS(t)
photo, err := fs.ReadFile(testFS, fixtures.GoodHostJPEG)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
fake, err := fs.ReadFile(testFS, fixtures.InvalidFile)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
photoBytes, fakeBytes := int64(len(photo)), int64(len(fake))
// want is hits, misses, upstream fetches, upstream bytes, transforms.
steps := []struct {
name string
path string
size int
wantErr bool
want cacheStatsCounters
}{
{"miss that fetches the source", testPathPhoto, 50, false,
cacheStatsCounters{0, 1, 1, photoBytes, 1}},
{"hit", testPathPhoto, 50, false,
cacheStatsCounters{1, 1, 1, photoBytes, 1}},
{"miss that reuses the cached source", testPathPhoto, 25, false,
cacheStatsCounters{1, 2, 1, photoBytes, 2}},
{"miss whose source fails the magic byte check", "/images/fake.jpg", 50, true,
cacheStatsCounters{1, 3, 2, photoBytes + fakeBytes, 2}},
{"miss whose source is not found", "/images/nonexistent.jpg", 50, true,
cacheStatsCounters{1, 4, 2, photoBytes + fakeBytes, 2}},
}
for _, step := range steps {
resp, err := svc.Get(t.Context(), &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.GoodHost,
SourcePath: step.path,
Size: Size{Width: step.size, Height: step.size},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
})
if (err != nil) != step.wantErr {
t.Fatalf("%s: Get() error = %v, want error %t", step.name, err, step.wantErr)
}
if err == nil {
_ = resp.Content.Close()
}
got := readCacheStatsCounters(t, svc.cache)
if got != step.want {
t.Fatalf("after the %s: counters = %+v, want %+v", step.name, got, step.want)
}
}
}
// fakeUpstream answers every fetch with itself as a JPEG body. The body
// serves data, then calls cancel, when set, and returns err; io.EOF ends
// the body normally.
type fakeUpstream struct {
data *bytes.Reader
cancel context.CancelFunc
err error
}
func (u *fakeUpstream) Fetch(
context.Context, string,
) (*httpfetcher.FetchResult, error) {
return &httpfetcher.FetchResult{
Content: io.NopCloser(u),
ContentLength: -1,
ContentType: testContentTypeJPEG,
}, nil
}
func (u *fakeUpstream) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
if u.data.Len() > 0 {
return u.data.Read(p)
}
if u.cancel != nil {
u.cancel()
}
return 0, u.err
}
// TestService_Get_CountsInterruptedMisses checks every cache_stats counter
// after a miss whose request context ends during or after the upstream
// fetch, and after a miss whose upstream body is over the size limit.
func TestService_Get_CountsInterruptedMisses(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
photo := generateTestJPEG(t, 100, 100, color.RGBA{255, 0, 0, 255})
half := len(photo) / 2
// want is hits, misses, upstream fetches, upstream bytes, transforms.
tests := []struct {
name string
served int // bytes of the photo the upstream body serves
cancel bool // whether the body then ends the request context
readErr error // what the body then returns
wantErr bool
want cacheStatsCounters
}{
{"request context ends during the fetch", half, true, context.Canceled, true,
cacheStatsCounters{0, 1, 1, int64(half), 0}},
{"request context ends after the fetch", len(photo), true, io.EOF, false,
cacheStatsCounters{0, 1, 1, int64(len(photo)), 1}},
{"upstream body over the size limit", half, false,
httpfetcher.ErrResponseTooLarge, true,
cacheStatsCounters{0, 1, 1, int64(half), 0}},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer cancel()
upstream := &fakeUpstream{
data: bytes.NewReader(photo[:tc.served]),
err: tc.readErr,
}
if tc.cancel {
upstream.cancel = cancel
}
svc.fetcher = upstream
resp, err := svc.Get(ctx, &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.GoodHost,
SourcePath: testPathPhoto,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
})
t.Logf("Get() error = %v", err)
if (err != nil) != tc.wantErr {
t.Fatalf("Get() error = %v, want error %t", err, tc.wantErr)
}
if err == nil {
_ = resp.Content.Close()
}
got := readCacheStatsCounters(t, svc.cache)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("counters = %+v, want %+v", got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestService_Get_CountsHitAfterRequestEnds checks every cache_stats counter
// after a hit served with a request context that has already ended: only
// the hit count moves.
func TestService_Get_CountsHitAfterRequestEnds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: fixtures.GoodHost,
SourcePath: testPathPhoto,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
// A first request caches the variant.
resp, err := svc.Get(t.Context(), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Get() error = %v", err)
}
_ = resp.Content.Close()
want := readCacheStatsCounters(t, svc.cache)
want.hitCount++
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
cancel()
resp, err = svc.Get(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get() with an ended request context: error = %v", err)
}
_ = resp.Content.Close()
if resp.CacheStatus != CacheHit {
t.Fatalf("CacheStatus = %v, want %v", resp.CacheStatus, CacheHit)
}
got := readCacheStatsCounters(t, svc.cache)
if got != want {
t.Errorf("counters = %+v, want %+v", got, want)
}
}
-90
View File
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
package imgcache
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"math"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/database"
)
func setupStatsTestDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
t.Helper()
db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", ":memory:")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := database.ApplyMigrations(db); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { db.Close() })
return db
}
func TestStats_HitRateIsRatio(t *testing.T) {
db := setupStatsTestDB(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
cache, err := NewCache(db, CacheConfig{
StateDir: dir,
CacheTTL: time.Hour,
NegativeTTL: 5 * time.Minute,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ctx := context.Background()
// Set some hit/miss counts and a transform_count
_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE cache_stats SET hit_count = 75, miss_count = 25, transform_count = 9999 WHERE id = 1
`)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stats, err := cache.Stats(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if stats.HitCount != 75 {
t.Errorf("HitCount = %d, want 75", stats.HitCount)
}
if stats.MissCount != 25 {
t.Errorf("MissCount = %d, want 25", stats.MissCount)
}
// HitRate should be 0.75, NOT 9999 (transform_count)
expectedRate := 0.75
if math.Abs(stats.HitRate-expectedRate) > 0.001 {
t.Errorf("HitRate = %f, want %f (was it scanning transform_count?)", stats.HitRate, expectedRate)
}
}
func TestStats_ZeroCounts(t *testing.T) {
db := setupStatsTestDB(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
cache, err := NewCache(db, CacheConfig{
StateDir: dir,
CacheTTL: time.Hour,
NegativeTTL: 5 * time.Minute,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stats, err := cache.Stats(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// With zero hits and misses, HitRate should be 0, not some garbage value
if stats.HitRate != 0.0 {
t.Errorf("HitRate = %f, want 0.0 for zero counts", stats.HitRate)
}
}
+169 -80
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"time"
@@ -44,7 +45,8 @@ type ContentStorage struct {
// NewContentStorage creates a new content storage at the given base directory.
func NewContentStorage(baseDir string) (*ContentStorage, error) {
if err := os.MkdirAll(baseDir, StorageDirPerm); err != nil {
err := os.MkdirAll(baseDir, StorageDirPerm)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create storage directory: %w", err)
}
@@ -53,7 +55,7 @@ func NewContentStorage(baseDir string) (*ContentStorage, error) {
// Store writes content to storage and returns its SHA256 hash.
// The content is read fully into memory to compute the hash before writing.
func (s *ContentStorage) Store(r io.Reader) (hash ContentHash, size int64, err error) {
func (s *ContentStorage) Store(r io.Reader) (ContentHash, int64, error) {
// Read all content to compute hash
data, err := io.ReadAll(r)
if err != nil {
@@ -62,55 +64,34 @@ func (s *ContentStorage) Store(r io.Reader) (hash ContentHash, size int64, err e
// Compute hash
h := sha256.Sum256(data)
hash = ContentHash(hex.EncodeToString(h[:]))
size = int64(len(data))
hash := ContentHash(hex.EncodeToString(h[:]))
size := int64(len(data))
// Build path: <basedir>/<ab>/<cd>/<hash>
path := s.hashToPath(hash)
// Check if already exists
if _, err := os.Stat(path); err == nil {
return hash, size, nil
}
// Create directory structure
dir := filepath.Dir(path)
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, StorageDirPerm); err != nil {
return "", 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to create directory: %w", err)
}
// Write to temp file first, then rename for atomicity
tmpFile, err := os.CreateTemp(dir, ".tmp-*")
err = s.writeIfAbsent(hash, data)
if err != nil {
return "", 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp file: %w", err)
}
tmpPath := tmpFile.Name()
defer func() {
if err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
}
}()
if _, err := tmpFile.Write(data); err != nil {
_ = tmpFile.Close()
return "", 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to write content: %w", err)
}
if err := tmpFile.Close(); err != nil {
return "", 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to close temp file: %w", err)
}
// Atomic rename
//nolint:gosec // G703: paths from internal SHA256 hashes
if err := os.Rename(filepath.Clean(tmpPath), filepath.Clean(path)); err != nil {
return "", 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to rename temp file: %w", err)
return "", 0, err
}
return hash, size, nil
}
// StoreHashed writes pre-hashed content to storage at the path derived
// from hash, without recomputing it. Callers that already know the
// hash before writing (e.g. because they must hold a hash-keyed lock
// across the whole store operation) use this instead of Store. Like
// Store, it is idempotent: content already on disk at that path is
// left untouched.
func (s *ContentStorage) StoreHashed(
hash ContentHash, data []byte,
) (int64, error) {
err := s.writeIfAbsent(hash, data)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return int64(len(data)), nil
}
// Load returns a reader for the content with the given hash.
func (s *ContentStorage) Load(hash ContentHash) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
path := s.hashToPath(hash)
@@ -170,6 +151,67 @@ func (s *ContentStorage) Exists(hash ContentHash) bool {
return err == nil
}
// writeIfAbsent writes data to the path derived from hash, unless
// content already exists there, via a temp-file-plus-rename so
// concurrent readers never observe a partial file.
func (s *ContentStorage) writeIfAbsent(hash ContentHash, data []byte) error {
// Build path: <basedir>/<ab>/<cd>/<hash>
path := s.hashToPath(hash)
// Check if already exists
_, statErr := os.Stat(path)
if statErr == nil {
return nil
}
// Create directory structure
dir := filepath.Dir(path)
err := os.MkdirAll(dir, StorageDirPerm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create directory: %w", err)
}
// Write to temp file first, then rename for atomicity
tmpFile, err := os.CreateTemp(dir, ".tmp-*")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp file: %w", err)
}
tmpPath := tmpFile.Name()
// Each failure path below unlinks the temp file explicitly. This
// replaces a deferred cleanup that read a named result, which the
// canonical config does not permit; the set of paths that remove
// tmpPath, and the order relative to Close, is unchanged. This
// mirrors how MetadataStorage.Store and VariantStorage.Store below
// already express the same cleanup.
_, err = tmpFile.Write(data)
if err != nil {
_ = tmpFile.Close()
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write content: %w", err)
}
err = tmpFile.Close()
if err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to close temp file: %w", err)
}
// Atomic rename
err = os.Rename(filepath.Clean(tmpPath), filepath.Clean(path))
if err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to rename temp file: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// hashToPath converts a hash to a file path: <basedir>/<ab>/<cd>/<hash>
func (s *ContentStorage) hashToPath(hash ContentHash) string {
h := string(hash)
@@ -188,7 +230,8 @@ type MetadataStorage struct {
// NewMetadataStorage creates a new metadata storage at the given base directory.
func NewMetadataStorage(baseDir string) (*MetadataStorage, error) {
if err := os.MkdirAll(baseDir, StorageDirPerm); err != nil {
err := os.MkdirAll(baseDir, StorageDirPerm)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create metadata directory: %w", err)
}
@@ -196,6 +239,8 @@ func NewMetadataStorage(baseDir string) (*MetadataStorage, error) {
}
// SourceMetadata represents cached metadata about a source URL.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // stored metadata format uses snake_case
type SourceMetadata struct {
Host string `json:"host"`
Path string `json:"path"`
@@ -214,12 +259,16 @@ type SourceMetadata struct {
}
// Store writes metadata to storage.
func (s *MetadataStorage) Store(host string, pathHash PathHash, meta *SourceMetadata) error {
func (s *MetadataStorage) Store(
host string, pathHash PathHash, meta *SourceMetadata,
) error {
path := s.metaPath(host, pathHash)
// Create directory structure
dir := filepath.Dir(path)
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, StorageDirPerm); err != nil {
err := os.MkdirAll(dir, StorageDirPerm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create directory: %w", err)
}
@@ -234,27 +283,29 @@ func (s *MetadataStorage) Store(host string, pathHash PathHash, meta *SourceMeta
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp file: %w", err)
}
tmpPath := tmpFile.Name()
defer func() {
if err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
}
}()
if _, err := tmpFile.Write(data); err != nil {
_, err = tmpFile.Write(data)
if err != nil {
_ = tmpFile.Close()
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write metadata: %w", err)
}
if err := tmpFile.Close(); err != nil {
err = tmpFile.Close()
if err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to close temp file: %w", err)
}
// Atomic rename
//nolint:gosec // G703: paths from internal SHA256 hashes
if err := os.Rename(filepath.Clean(tmpPath), filepath.Clean(path)); err != nil {
err = os.Rename(filepath.Clean(tmpPath), filepath.Clean(path))
if err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to rename temp file: %w", err)
}
@@ -262,7 +313,9 @@ func (s *MetadataStorage) Store(host string, pathHash PathHash, meta *SourceMeta
}
// Load reads metadata from storage.
func (s *MetadataStorage) Load(host string, pathHash PathHash) (*SourceMetadata, error) {
func (s *MetadataStorage) Load(
host string, pathHash PathHash,
) (*SourceMetadata, error) {
path := s.metaPath(host, pathHash)
data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // path derived from host+hash
@@ -275,7 +328,9 @@ func (s *MetadataStorage) Load(host string, pathHash PathHash) (*SourceMetadata,
}
var meta SourceMetadata
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &meta); err != nil {
err = json.Unmarshal(data, &meta)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal metadata: %w", err)
}
@@ -338,9 +393,12 @@ func CacheKey(req *ImageRequest) VariantKey {
// Unlike ContentStorage, the key is provided by the caller (not computed from content).
type VariantStorage struct {
baseDir string
log *slog.Logger
}
// VariantMeta contains metadata about a cached variant.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // stored metadata format uses snake_case
type VariantMeta struct {
ContentType string `json:"content_type"`
Size int64 `json:"size"`
@@ -348,28 +406,34 @@ type VariantMeta struct {
}
// NewVariantStorage creates a new variant storage at the given base directory.
func NewVariantStorage(baseDir string) (*VariantStorage, error) {
if err := os.MkdirAll(baseDir, StorageDirPerm); err != nil {
// A failed .meta write is logged to log.
func NewVariantStorage(baseDir string, log *slog.Logger) (*VariantStorage, error) {
err := os.MkdirAll(baseDir, StorageDirPerm)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create variant storage directory: %w", err)
}
return &VariantStorage{baseDir: baseDir}, nil
return &VariantStorage{baseDir: baseDir, log: log}, nil
}
// Store writes content and metadata to storage at the given key.
func (s *VariantStorage) Store(key VariantKey, r io.Reader, contentType string) (size int64, err error) {
func (s *VariantStorage) Store(
key VariantKey, r io.Reader, contentType string,
) (int64, error) {
data, err := io.ReadAll(r)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to read content: %w", err)
}
size = int64(len(data))
size := int64(len(data))
path := s.keyToPath(key)
metaPath := path + ".meta"
// Create directory structure
dir := filepath.Dir(path)
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, StorageDirPerm); err != nil {
err = os.MkdirAll(dir, StorageDirPerm)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to create directory: %w", err)
}
@@ -378,27 +442,29 @@ func (s *VariantStorage) Store(key VariantKey, r io.Reader, contentType string)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp file: %w", err)
}
tmpPath := tmpFile.Name()
defer func() {
if err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
}
}()
if _, err := tmpFile.Write(data); err != nil {
_, err = tmpFile.Write(data)
if err != nil {
_ = tmpFile.Close()
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to write content: %w", err)
}
if err := tmpFile.Close(); err != nil {
err = tmpFile.Close()
if err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to close temp file: %w", err)
}
// Atomic rename content
//nolint:gosec // G703: paths from internal SHA256 hashes
if err := os.Rename(filepath.Clean(tmpPath), filepath.Clean(path)); err != nil {
err = os.Rename(filepath.Clean(tmpPath), filepath.Clean(path))
if err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to rename temp file: %w", err)
}
@@ -414,9 +480,11 @@ func (s *VariantStorage) Store(key VariantKey, r io.Reader, contentType string)
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal metadata: %w", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(metaPath, metaData, StorageFilePerm); err != nil {
// Non-fatal, content is stored
_ = err
// Metadata write failure is non-fatal; content is already stored.
err = os.WriteFile(metaPath, metaData, StorageFilePerm)
if err != nil {
s.log.Warn("failed to write variant metadata sidecar",
"path", metaPath, "error", err)
}
return size, nil
@@ -438,8 +506,11 @@ func (s *VariantStorage) Load(key VariantKey) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
return f, nil
}
// LoadWithMeta returns a reader, size, and content type for the content at the given key.
func (s *VariantStorage) LoadWithMeta(key VariantKey) (io.ReadCloser, int64, string, error) {
// LoadWithMeta returns a reader, size, and content type for the content at
// the given key.
func (s *VariantStorage) LoadWithMeta(
key VariantKey,
) (io.ReadCloser, int64, string, error) {
path := s.keyToPath(key)
metaPath := path + ".meta"
@@ -493,6 +564,24 @@ func (s *VariantStorage) Delete(key VariantKey) error {
return nil
}
// DeleteWithMeta removes the content at the given key together with
// its .meta sidecar file. A missing file is not an error.
func (s *VariantStorage) DeleteWithMeta(key VariantKey) error {
err := s.Delete(key)
if err != nil {
return err
}
metaPath := s.keyToPath(key) + ".meta"
err = os.Remove(metaPath)
if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete variant metadata: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// keyToPath converts a key to a file path: <basedir>/<ab>/<cd>/<key>
func (s *VariantStorage) keyToPath(key VariantKey) string {
k := string(key)
@@ -2,20 +2,27 @@ package imgcache
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestContentStorage_StoreAndLoad(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
storage, err := NewContentStorage(tmpDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewContentStorage() error = %v", err)
}
content := []byte("hello world")
hash, size, err := storage.Store(bytes.NewReader(content))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Store() error = %v", err)
@@ -31,8 +38,11 @@ func TestContentStorage_StoreAndLoad(t *testing.T) {
// Verify file exists at expected path
hashStr := string(hash)
expectedPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, hashStr[0:2], hashStr[2:4], hashStr)
if _, err := os.Stat(expectedPath); err != nil {
_, err = os.Stat(expectedPath)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("File not at expected path %s: %v", expectedPath, err)
}
@@ -41,7 +51,8 @@ func TestContentStorage_StoreAndLoad(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Load() error = %v", err)
}
defer r.Close()
defer func() { _ = r.Close() }()
loaded, err := io.ReadAll(r)
if err != nil {
@@ -54,7 +65,10 @@ func TestContentStorage_StoreAndLoad(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestContentStorage_StoreIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
storage, err := NewContentStorage(tmpDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewContentStorage() error = %v", err)
@@ -78,26 +92,33 @@ func TestContentStorage_StoreIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestContentStorage_LoadNotFound(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
storage, err := NewContentStorage(tmpDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewContentStorage() error = %v", err)
}
_, err = storage.Load(ContentHash("nonexistent"))
if err != ErrNotFound {
if !errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
t.Errorf("Load() error = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
}
}
func TestContentStorage_Delete(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
storage, err := NewContentStorage(tmpDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewContentStorage() error = %v", err)
}
content := []byte("to be deleted")
hash, _, err := storage.Store(bytes.NewReader(content))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Store() error = %v", err)
@@ -107,7 +128,8 @@ func TestContentStorage_Delete(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("Exists() = false, want true")
}
if err := storage.Delete(hash); err != nil {
err = storage.Delete(hash)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Delete() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -117,20 +139,27 @@ func TestContentStorage_Delete(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestContentStorage_DeleteNonexistent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
storage, err := NewContentStorage(tmpDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewContentStorage() error = %v", err)
}
// Should not error
if err := storage.Delete(ContentHash("nonexistent")); err != nil {
err = storage.Delete(ContentHash("nonexistent"))
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Delete() error = %v, want nil", err)
}
}
func TestContentStorage_HashToPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
storage, err := NewContentStorage(tmpDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewContentStorage() error = %v", err)
@@ -138,50 +167,59 @@ func TestContentStorage_HashToPath(t *testing.T) {
// Test by storing and verifying the resulting path structure
content := []byte("test content for path verification")
hash, _, err := storage.Store(bytes.NewReader(content))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Store() error = %v", err)
}
hashStr := string(hash)
expectedPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, hashStr[0:2], hashStr[2:4], hashStr)
if _, err := os.Stat(expectedPath); err != nil {
_, err = os.Stat(expectedPath)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("File not at expected path %s: %v", expectedPath, err)
}
}
func TestMetadataStorage_StoreAndLoad(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
storage, err := NewMetadataStorage(tmpDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewMetadataStorage() error = %v", err)
}
meta := &SourceMetadata{
Host: "cdn.example.com",
Path: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Host: testHostCDN,
Path: testPathCat,
ContentHash: "abc123",
StatusCode: 200,
ContentType: "image/jpeg",
ContentType: testContentTypeJPEG,
FetchedAt: 1704067200,
ETag: `"etag123"`,
}
pathHash := HashPath("/photos/cat.jpg")
pathHash := HashPath(testPathCat)
err = storage.Store("cdn.example.com", pathHash, meta)
err = storage.Store(testHostCDN, pathHash, meta)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Store() error = %v", err)
}
// Verify file exists at expected path
expectedPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "cdn.example.com", string(pathHash)+".json")
if _, err := os.Stat(expectedPath); err != nil {
expectedPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, testHostCDN, string(pathHash)+".json")
_, err = os.Stat(expectedPath)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("File not at expected path %s: %v", expectedPath, err)
}
// Load and verify
loaded, err := storage.Load("cdn.example.com", pathHash)
loaded, err := storage.Load(testHostCDN, pathHash)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Load() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -208,55 +246,64 @@ func TestMetadataStorage_StoreAndLoad(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestMetadataStorage_LoadNotFound(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
storage, err := NewMetadataStorage(tmpDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewMetadataStorage() error = %v", err)
}
_, err = storage.Load("example.com", PathHash("nonexistent"))
if err != ErrNotFound {
_, err = storage.Load(testHostExample, PathHash("nonexistent"))
if !errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
t.Errorf("Load() error = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
}
}
func TestMetadataStorage_Delete(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
storage, err := NewMetadataStorage(tmpDir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewMetadataStorage() error = %v", err)
}
meta := &SourceMetadata{
Host: "example.com",
Host: testHostExample,
Path: "/test.jpg",
StatusCode: 200,
}
pathHash := HashPath("/test.jpg")
err = storage.Store("example.com", pathHash, meta)
err = storage.Store(testHostExample, pathHash, meta)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Store() error = %v", err)
}
if !storage.Exists("example.com", pathHash) {
if !storage.Exists(testHostExample, pathHash) {
t.Error("Exists() = false, want true")
}
if err := storage.Delete("example.com", pathHash); err != nil {
err = storage.Delete(testHostExample, pathHash)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Delete() error = %v", err)
}
if storage.Exists("example.com", pathHash) {
if storage.Exists(testHostExample, pathHash) {
t.Error("Exists() = true after delete, want false")
}
}
func TestHashPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Same input should produce same hash
hash1 := HashPath("/photos/cat.jpg")
hash2 := HashPath("/photos/cat.jpg")
hash1 := HashPath(testPathCat)
hash2 := HashPath(testPathCat)
if hash1 != hash2 {
t.Errorf("HashPath() not deterministic: %s vs %s", hash1, hash2)
@@ -276,9 +323,11 @@ func TestHashPath(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCacheKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req1 := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
SourceQuery: "",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
@@ -287,8 +336,8 @@ func TestCacheKey(t *testing.T) {
}
req2 := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
SourceQuery: "",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
@@ -311,8 +360,8 @@ func TestCacheKey(t *testing.T) {
// Different size should produce different key
req3 := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
SourceQuery: "",
Size: Size{Width: 400, Height: 300}, // Different size
Format: FormatWebP,
@@ -327,8 +376,8 @@ func TestCacheKey(t *testing.T) {
// Different format should produce different key
req4 := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
SourceQuery: "",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatPNG, // Different format
@@ -343,8 +392,8 @@ func TestCacheKey(t *testing.T) {
// Different quality should produce different key
req5 := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
SourceQuery: "",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
@@ -357,3 +406,35 @@ func TestCacheKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("CacheKey() produced same key for different quality")
}
}
// TestVariantStorage_StoreLogsFailedMetaWrite verifies that a .meta write
// that fails is logged at warn and the store still succeeds.
func TestVariantStorage_StoreLogsFailedMetaWrite(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var logBuf bytes.Buffer
storage, err := NewVariantStorage(
t.TempDir(), slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logBuf, nil)))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewVariantStorage() error = %v", err)
}
key := CacheKey(&ImageRequest{SourceHost: testHostCDN, SourcePath: testPathCat})
// A directory where the .meta file goes makes the .meta write fail.
err = os.MkdirAll(storage.keyToPath(key)+".meta", StorageDirPerm)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create directory: %v", err)
}
_, err = storage.Store(key, bytes.NewReader([]byte("variant data")), "image/webp")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Store() error = %v, want nil", err)
}
want := `"level":"WARN","msg":"failed to write variant metadata sidecar"`
if !strings.Contains(logBuf.String(), want) {
t.Errorf("log missing %s; got %q", want, logBuf.String())
}
}
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package imgcache
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"image"
"image/color"
@@ -14,16 +15,26 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
)
// Shared test data literals, extracted as constants for goconst.
const (
testHostCDN = "cdn.example.com"
testHostExample = "example.com"
testPathCat = "/photos/cat.jpg"
testContentTypeJPEG = "image/jpeg"
testHeaderContentType = "Content-Type"
)
// TestFixtures contains paths to test files in the mock filesystem.
type TestFixtures struct {
// Valid image files
GoodHostJPEG string // whitelisted host, valid JPEG
GoodHostPNG string // whitelisted host, valid PNG
GoodHostGIF string // whitelisted host, valid GIF
OtherHostJPEG string // non-whitelisted host, valid JPEG
OtherHostPNG string // non-whitelisted host, valid PNG
GoodHostJPEG string // allowlisted host, valid JPEG
GoodHostPNG string // allowlisted host, valid PNG
GoodHostGIF string // allowlisted host, valid GIF
OtherHostJPEG string // non-allowlisted host, valid JPEG
OtherHostPNG string // non-allowlisted host, valid PNG
// Invalid/edge case files
InvalidFile string // file with wrong magic bytes
@@ -31,8 +42,8 @@ type TestFixtures struct {
TextFile string // text file masquerading as image
// Hostnames
GoodHost string // whitelisted hostname
OtherHost string // non-whitelisted hostname
GoodHost string // allowlisted hostname
OtherHost string // non-allowlisted hostname
}
// DefaultFixtures returns the standard test fixture paths.
@@ -87,14 +98,16 @@ func generateTestJPEG(t *testing.T, width, height int, c color.Color) []byte {
t.Helper()
img := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, width, height))
for y := 0; y < height; y++ {
for x := 0; x < width; x++ {
for y := range height {
for x := range width {
img.Set(x, y, c)
}
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := jpeg.Encode(&buf, img, &jpeg.Options{Quality: 85}); err != nil {
err := jpeg.Encode(&buf, img, &jpeg.Options{Quality: 85})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encode test JPEG: %v", err)
}
@@ -106,14 +119,16 @@ func generateTestPNG(t *testing.T, width, height int, c color.Color) []byte {
t.Helper()
img := image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, width, height))
for y := 0; y < height; y++ {
for x := 0; x < width; x++ {
for y := range height {
for x := range width {
img.Set(x, y, c)
}
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := png.Encode(&buf, img); err != nil {
err := png.Encode(&buf, img)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encode test PNG: %v", err)
}
@@ -124,15 +139,20 @@ func generateTestPNG(t *testing.T, width, height int, c color.Color) []byte {
func generateTestGIF(t *testing.T, width, height int, c color.Color) []byte {
t.Helper()
img := image.NewPaletted(image.Rect(0, 0, width, height), []color.Color{c, color.White})
for y := 0; y < height; y++ {
for x := 0; x < width; x++ {
img := image.NewPaletted(
image.Rect(0, 0, width, height),
[]color.Color{c, color.White},
)
for y := range height {
for x := range width {
img.SetColorIndex(x, y, 0)
}
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := gif.Encode(&buf, img, nil); err != nil {
err := gif.Encode(&buf, img, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encode test GIF: %v", err)
}
@@ -140,13 +160,15 @@ func generateTestGIF(t *testing.T, width, height int, c color.Color) []byte {
}
// SetupTestService creates a Service with mock fetcher for testing.
func SetupTestService(t *testing.T, opts ...TestServiceOption) (*Service, *TestFixtures) {
func SetupTestService(
t *testing.T, opts ...TestServiceOption,
) (*Service, *TestFixtures) {
t.Helper()
mockFS, fixtures := NewTestFS(t)
cfg := &testServiceConfig{
whitelist: []string{fixtures.GoodHost},
allowlist: []string{fixtures.GoodHost},
signingKey: "test-signing-key-must-be-32-chars",
}
@@ -171,9 +193,9 @@ func SetupTestService(t *testing.T, opts ...TestServiceOption) (*Service, *TestF
svc, err := NewService(&ServiceConfig{
Cache: cache,
Fetcher: NewMockFetcher(mockFS),
Fetcher: httpfetcher.NewMock(mockFS),
SigningKey: cfg.signingKey,
Whitelist: cfg.whitelist,
Allowlist: cfg.allowlist,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create service: %v", err)
@@ -193,7 +215,8 @@ func setupServiceTestDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
}
// Use the real production schema via migrations
if err := database.ApplyMigrations(db); err != nil {
err = database.ApplyMigrations(context.Background(), db, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to apply migrations: %v", err)
}
@@ -201,17 +224,17 @@ func setupServiceTestDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
}
type testServiceConfig struct {
whitelist []string
allowlist []string
signingKey string
}
// TestServiceOption configures the test service.
type TestServiceOption func(*testServiceConfig)
// WithWhitelist sets the whitelist for the test service.
func WithWhitelist(hosts ...string) TestServiceOption {
// WithAllowlist sets the allowlist for the test service.
func WithAllowlist(hosts ...string) TestServiceOption {
return func(c *testServiceConfig) {
c.whitelist = hosts
c.allowlist = hosts
}
}
@@ -222,9 +245,9 @@ func WithSigningKey(key string) TestServiceOption {
}
}
// WithNoWhitelist removes all whitelisted hosts.
func WithNoWhitelist() TestServiceOption {
// WithNoAllowlist removes all allowlisted hosts.
func WithNoAllowlist() TestServiceOption {
return func(c *testServiceConfig) {
c.whitelist = nil
c.allowlist = nil
}
}
+35 -10
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,21 @@ var (
// MaxDimension is the maximum allowed width or height.
const MaxDimension = 8192
// ValidateDimension checks one requested width or height; name ("width" or
// "height") appears in the error. 0 means "original size" and is valid.
func ValidateDimension(name string, value int) error {
if value < 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is negative", ErrInvalidSize, name)
}
if value > MaxDimension {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is above %d",
ErrDimensionTooLarge, name, MaxDimension)
}
return nil
}
// sizeFormatRegex matches patterns like "800x600.webp", "0x0.jpeg", "orig.png"
var sizeFormatRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^(\d+)x(\d+)\.(\w+)$|^(orig)\.(\w+)$`)
@@ -40,7 +55,8 @@ type ParsedURL struct {
Format ImageFormat
}
// ParseImagePath parses the path captured by chi's wildcard: <host>/<path>/<size>.<format>
// ParseImagePath parses the path captured by chi's wildcard:
// <host>/<path>/<size>.<format>
// This is the primary entry point when using chi routing.
// Examples:
// - cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp
@@ -76,7 +92,8 @@ func ParseImageURL(urlPath string) (*ParsedURL, error) {
// parseImageComponents parses <host>/<path>/<size>.<format> structure.
func parseImageComponents(remainder string) (*ParsedURL, error) {
// Check for path traversal before any other processing
if err := checkPathTraversal(remainder); err != nil {
err := checkPathTraversal(remainder)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -102,6 +119,7 @@ func parseImageComponents(remainder string) (*ParsedURL, error) {
// Split host from path
// The first segment is the host, everything after is the path
firstSlash := strings.Index(hostAndPath, "/")
var host, path, query string
if firstSlash == -1 {
@@ -181,8 +199,7 @@ func checkPathTraversal(path string) error {
// Also check for ".." as a path segment in the original path
// This catches cases where the path hasn't been normalized
segments := strings.Split(path, "/")
for _, seg := range segments {
for seg := range strings.SplitSeq(path, "/") {
// URL decode the segment
decodedSeg, _ := url.PathUnescape(seg)
decodedSeg = strings.ReplaceAll(decodedSeg, "\\", "/")
@@ -202,8 +219,10 @@ func parseSizeFormat(s string) (Size, ImageFormat, error) {
return Size{}, "", ErrInvalidSize
}
var size Size
var formatStr string
var (
size Size
formatStr string
)
if matches[4] == "orig" {
// "orig.format" pattern
@@ -221,14 +240,20 @@ func parseSizeFormat(s string) (Size, ImageFormat, error) {
return Size{}, "", ErrInvalidSize
}
if width > MaxDimension || height > MaxDimension {
return Size{}, "", ErrDimensionTooLarge
}
size = Size{Width: width, Height: height}
formatStr = matches[3]
}
err := ValidateDimension("width", size.Width)
if err != nil {
return Size{}, "", err
}
err = ValidateDimension("height", size.Height)
if err != nil {
return Size{}, "", err
}
format, err := parseFormat(formatStr)
if err != nil {
return Size{}, "", err
@@ -1,93 +1,124 @@
package imgcache
import (
"errors"
"testing"
)
// assertParsedURL compares all fields of a parsed URL against the
// expected value.
func assertParsedURL(t *testing.T, got, want *ParsedURL) {
t.Helper()
if got.Host != want.Host {
t.Errorf("Host = %q, want %q", got.Host, want.Host)
}
if got.Path != want.Path {
t.Errorf("Path = %q, want %q", got.Path, want.Path)
}
if got.Query != want.Query {
t.Errorf("Query = %q, want %q", got.Query, want.Query)
}
if got.Size != want.Size {
t.Errorf("Size = %v, want %v", got.Size, want.Size)
}
if got.Format != want.Format {
t.Errorf("Format = %q, want %q", got.Format, want.Format)
}
}
func TestParseImageURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
input string
want *ParsedURL
wantErr error
name string
input string
want *ParsedURL
}{
{
name: "basic path with size",
input: "/v1/image/cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp",
want: &ParsedURL{
Host: "cdn.example.com",
Path: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Query: "",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Host: testHostCDN, Path: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600}, Format: FormatWebP,
},
},
{
name: "original size with 0x0",
input: "/v1/image/cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/0x0.jpeg",
want: &ParsedURL{
Host: "cdn.example.com",
Path: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Query: "",
Size: Size{Width: 0, Height: 0},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Host: testHostCDN, Path: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 0, Height: 0}, Format: FormatJPEG,
},
},
{
name: "original size with orig keyword",
input: "/v1/image/cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/orig.png",
want: &ParsedURL{
Host: "cdn.example.com",
Path: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Query: "",
Size: Size{Width: 0, Height: 0},
Format: FormatPNG,
Host: testHostCDN, Path: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 0, Height: 0}, Format: FormatPNG,
},
},
{
name: "path with query string",
input: "/v1/image/cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg?arg1=val1&arg2=val2/800x600.webp",
want: &ParsedURL{
Host: "cdn.example.com",
Path: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Query: "arg1=val1&arg2=val2",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Host: testHostCDN, Path: testPathCat, Query: "arg1=val1&arg2=val2",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600}, Format: FormatWebP,
},
},
{
name: "deep nested path",
input: "/v1/image/cdn.example.com/a/b/c/d/image.jpg/1920x1080.avif",
want: &ParsedURL{
Host: "cdn.example.com",
Path: "/a/b/c/d/image.jpg",
Query: "",
Size: Size{Width: 1920, Height: 1080},
Format: FormatAVIF,
Host: testHostCDN, Path: "/a/b/c/d/image.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 1920, Height: 1080}, Format: FormatAVIF,
},
},
{
name: "jpg alias for jpeg",
input: "/v1/image/example.com/img.png/100x100.jpg",
want: &ParsedURL{
Host: "example.com",
Path: "/img.png",
Query: "",
Size: Size{Width: 100, Height: 100},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Host: testHostExample, Path: "/img.png",
Size: Size{Width: 100, Height: 100}, Format: FormatJPEG,
},
},
{
name: "gif format",
input: "/v1/image/example.com/animated.gif/200x200.gif",
want: &ParsedURL{
Host: "example.com",
Path: "/animated.gif",
Query: "",
Size: Size{Width: 200, Height: 200},
Format: FormatGIF,
Host: testHostExample, Path: "/animated.gif",
Size: Size{Width: 200, Height: 200}, Format: FormatGIF,
},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := ParseImageURL(tt.input)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseImageURL() unexpected error = %v", err)
}
assertParsedURL(t, got, tt.want)
})
}
}
func TestParseImageURL_Errors(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
input string
wantErr error
}{
{
name: "missing prefix",
input: "/image/cdn.example.com/photo.jpg/800x600.webp",
@@ -122,47 +153,23 @@ func TestParseImageURL(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := ParseImageURL(tt.input)
t.Parallel()
if tt.wantErr != nil {
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("ParseImageURL() error = nil, wantErr %v", tt.wantErr)
return
}
if !errorIs(err, tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("ParseImageURL() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
}
return
_, err := ParseImageURL(tt.input)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseImageURL() error = nil, wantErr %v", tt.wantErr)
}
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("ParseImageURL() unexpected error = %v", err)
return
}
if got.Host != tt.want.Host {
t.Errorf("Host = %q, want %q", got.Host, tt.want.Host)
}
if got.Path != tt.want.Path {
t.Errorf("Path = %q, want %q", got.Path, tt.want.Path)
}
if got.Query != tt.want.Query {
t.Errorf("Query = %q, want %q", got.Query, tt.want.Query)
}
if got.Size != tt.want.Size {
t.Errorf("Size = %v, want %v", got.Size, tt.want.Size)
}
if got.Format != tt.want.Format {
t.Errorf("Format = %q, want %q", got.Format, tt.want.Format)
if !errorIs(err, tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("ParseImageURL() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
}
})
}
}
func TestParseImagePath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// ParseImagePath is for chi wildcard capture (no /v1/image/ prefix)
tests := []struct {
name string
@@ -174,8 +181,8 @@ func TestParseImagePath(t *testing.T) {
name: "chi wildcard capture",
input: "cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp",
want: &ParsedURL{
Host: "cdn.example.com",
Path: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Host: testHostCDN,
Path: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
},
@@ -184,8 +191,8 @@ func TestParseImagePath(t *testing.T) {
name: "with leading slash from chi",
input: "/cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp",
want: &ParsedURL{
Host: "cdn.example.com",
Path: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Host: testHostCDN,
Path: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
},
@@ -194,35 +201,30 @@ func TestParseImagePath(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := ParseImagePath(tt.input)
if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
t.Errorf("ParseImagePath() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
return
}
if err != nil {
return
}
if got.Host != tt.want.Host {
t.Errorf("Host = %q, want %q", got.Host, tt.want.Host)
}
if got.Path != tt.want.Path {
t.Errorf("Path = %q, want %q", got.Path, tt.want.Path)
}
if got.Size != tt.want.Size {
t.Errorf("Size = %v, want %v", got.Size, tt.want.Size)
}
if got.Format != tt.want.Format {
t.Errorf("Format = %q, want %q", got.Format, tt.want.Format)
}
assertParsedURL(t, got, tt.want)
})
}
}
func TestParsedURL_ToImageRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
parsed := &ParsedURL{
Host: "cdn.example.com",
Path: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Host: testHostCDN,
Path: testPathCat,
Query: "version=2",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
@@ -233,21 +235,27 @@ func TestParsedURL_ToImageRequest(t *testing.T) {
if req.SourceHost != parsed.Host {
t.Errorf("SourceHost = %q, want %q", req.SourceHost, parsed.Host)
}
if req.SourcePath != parsed.Path {
t.Errorf("SourcePath = %q, want %q", req.SourcePath, parsed.Path)
}
if req.SourceQuery != parsed.Query {
t.Errorf("SourceQuery = %q, want %q", req.SourceQuery, parsed.Query)
}
if req.Size != parsed.Size {
t.Errorf("Size = %v, want %v", req.Size, parsed.Size)
}
if req.Format != parsed.Format {
t.Errorf("Format = %q, want %q", req.Format, parsed.Format)
}
}
func TestParseImageURL_PathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// All path traversal attempts should be rejected
tests := []struct {
name string
@@ -293,12 +301,14 @@ func TestParseImageURL_PathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := ParseImageURL(tt.input)
if err == nil {
t.Error("ParseImageURL() should reject path traversal attempts")
}
if err != ErrPathTraversal {
if !errors.Is(err, ErrPathTraversal) {
t.Errorf("ParseImageURL() error = %v, want ErrPathTraversal", err)
}
})
@@ -306,6 +316,8 @@ func TestParseImageURL_PathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestParseImagePath_PathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Test path traversal via ParseImagePath (chi wildcard)
tests := []struct {
name string
@@ -323,12 +335,14 @@ func TestParseImagePath_PathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := ParseImagePath(tt.input)
if err == nil {
t.Error("ParseImagePath() should reject path traversal attempts")
}
if err != ErrPathTraversal {
if !errors.Is(err, ErrPathTraversal) {
t.Errorf("ParseImagePath() error = %v, want ErrPathTraversal", err)
}
})
@@ -337,7 +351,7 @@ func TestParseImagePath_PathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
// errorIs checks if err matches target (handles wrapped errors).
func errorIs(err, target error) bool {
if err == target {
if errors.Is(err, target) {
return true
}
// Check if error message contains target message for wrapped errors
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
package imgcache
import (
"errors"
"testing"
)
func TestValidateImageRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
req ImageRequest
wantErr error
}{
{
name: "within bounds",
req: ImageRequest{Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600}, FitMode: FitCover},
},
{
name: "original size and empty fit",
req: ImageRequest{Size: Size{Width: 0, Height: 0}},
},
{
name: "width over limit",
req: ImageRequest{Size: Size{Width: MaxDimension + 1, Height: 600}},
wantErr: ErrDimensionTooLarge,
},
{
name: "height over limit",
req: ImageRequest{Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: MaxDimension + 1}},
wantErr: ErrDimensionTooLarge,
},
{
name: "negative width",
req: ImageRequest{Size: Size{Width: -1, Height: 600}},
wantErr: ErrInvalidSize,
},
{
name: "invalid fit mode",
req: ImageRequest{Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600}, FitMode: "bogus"},
wantErr: ErrInvalidFitMode,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := ValidateImageRequest(&tt.req)
if tt.wantErr == nil {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ValidateImageRequest() error = %v, want nil", err)
}
return
}
if !errors.Is(err, tt.wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("ValidateImageRequest() error = %v, want %v", err, tt.wantErr)
}
})
}
}
-69
View File
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
package imgcache
import (
"net/url"
"strings"
)
// HostWhitelist implements the Whitelist interface for checking allowed source hosts.
// Only exact host matches are supported. Leading dots in patterns are stripped
// (e.g. ".example.com" becomes an exact match for "example.com").
type HostWhitelist struct {
// hosts contains hosts that must match exactly (e.g., "cdn.example.com")
hosts map[string]struct{}
}
// NewHostWhitelist creates a whitelist from a list of host patterns.
// All patterns are treated as exact matches. Leading dots are stripped
// for backwards compatibility (e.g. ".example.com" matches "example.com" only).
func NewHostWhitelist(patterns []string) *HostWhitelist {
w := &HostWhitelist{
hosts: make(map[string]struct{}),
}
for _, pattern := range patterns {
pattern = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(pattern))
if pattern == "" {
continue
}
// Strip leading dot — suffix matching is not supported.
// ".example.com" is treated as exact match for "example.com".
pattern = strings.TrimPrefix(pattern, ".")
if pattern == "" {
continue
}
w.hosts[pattern] = struct{}{}
}
return w
}
// IsWhitelisted checks if a URL's host is in the whitelist.
// Only exact host matches are supported.
func (w *HostWhitelist) IsWhitelisted(u *url.URL) bool {
if u == nil {
return false
}
host := strings.ToLower(u.Hostname())
if host == "" {
return false
}
_, ok := w.hosts[host]
return ok
}
// IsEmpty returns true if the whitelist has no entries.
func (w *HostWhitelist) IsEmpty() bool {
return len(w.hosts) == 0
}
// Count returns the total number of whitelist entries.
func (w *HostWhitelist) Count() int {
return len(w.hosts)
}
+1
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
// Params defines dependencies for Logger.
type Params struct {
fx.In
Globals *globals.Globals
}
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
package imgcache
// Package magic detects image formats from magic bytes and validates
// content against declared MIME types.
package magic
import (
"bytes"
@@ -27,9 +29,27 @@ const (
MIMETypeSVG = MIMEType("image/svg+xml")
)
// ImageFormat represents supported output image formats.
// This mirrors the type in imgcache to avoid circular imports.
type ImageFormat string
// Supported image output formats.
const (
FormatOriginal ImageFormat = "orig"
FormatJPEG ImageFormat = "jpeg"
FormatPNG ImageFormat = "png"
FormatWebP ImageFormat = "webp"
FormatAVIF ImageFormat = "avif"
FormatGIF ImageFormat = "gif"
)
// MinMagicBytes is the minimum number of bytes needed to detect format.
const MinMagicBytes = 12
// mimeOctetStream is the fallback MIME type for formats without a
// specific MIME type.
const mimeOctetStream = "application/octet-stream"
// Magic byte signatures for supported formats.
// These are effectively constants but Go doesn't support const slices.
//
@@ -174,14 +194,17 @@ func IsSupportedMIMEType(mimeType string) bool {
func PeekAndValidate(r io.Reader, declaredType string) (io.Reader, error) {
// Read minimum bytes for detection
buf := make([]byte, MinMagicBytes)
n, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf)
if err != nil && err != io.ErrUnexpectedEOF {
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
return nil, err
}
buf = buf[:n]
// Validate magic bytes
if err := ValidateMagicBytes(buf, declaredType); err != nil {
err = ValidateMagicBytes(buf, declaredType)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -189,7 +212,7 @@ func PeekAndValidate(r io.Reader, declaredType string) (io.Reader, error) {
return io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(buf), r), nil
}
// MIMEToImageFormat converts a MIME type to our ImageFormat type.
// MIMEToImageFormat converts a MIME type to an ImageFormat.
func MIMEToImageFormat(mimeType string) (ImageFormat, bool) {
normalized := normalizeMIMEType(mimeType)
switch MIMEType(normalized) {
@@ -203,12 +226,15 @@ func MIMEToImageFormat(mimeType string) (ImageFormat, bool) {
return FormatGIF, true
case MIMETypeAVIF:
return FormatAVIF, true
case MIMETypeSVG:
// SVG has no corresponding output format.
return "", false
default:
return "", false
}
}
// ImageFormatToMIME converts our ImageFormat to a MIME type string.
// ImageFormatToMIME converts an ImageFormat to a MIME type string.
func ImageFormatToMIME(format ImageFormat) string {
switch format {
case FormatJPEG:
@@ -221,7 +247,10 @@ func ImageFormatToMIME(format ImageFormat) string {
return string(MIMETypeGIF)
case FormatAVIF:
return string(MIMETypeAVIF)
case FormatOriginal:
// Original format passes content through unchanged.
return mimeOctetStream
default:
return "application/octet-stream"
return mimeOctetStream
}
}
@@ -1,122 +1,91 @@
package imgcache
package magic
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"io"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// Shared test fixture strings.
const (
testNameEmpty = "empty"
testMIMEJPEG = "image/jpeg"
testMIMEJPEGParams = "image/jpeg; charset=utf-8"
testMIMEPNG = "image/png"
testMIMEWebP = "image/webp"
testMIMEGIF = "image/gif"
testMIMEAVIF = "image/avif"
)
// pad appends zero bytes so data is comfortably above MinMagicBytes.
func pad(b ...byte) []byte {
return append(b, make([]byte, 100)...)
}
func TestDetectFormat(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
jpeg := pad(0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x10, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x49, 0x46, 0x00, 0x01)
png := pad(0x89, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D)
gif87a := pad(0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38, 0x37, 0x61, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
gif89a := pad(0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38, 0x39, 0x61, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
// RIFF + size placeholder + WEBP
webp := pad(0x52, 0x49, 0x46, 0x46, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x57, 0x45, 0x42, 0x50)
// box size + ftyp + brand
avif := pad(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1C, 0x66, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, 0x61, 0x76, 0x69, 0x66)
avis := pad(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1C, 0x66, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, 0x61, 0x76, 0x69, 0x73)
tests := []struct {
name string
data []byte
wantMIME MIMEType
wantErr error
}{
{
name: "JPEG",
data: append([]byte{0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x10, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x49, 0x46, 0x00, 0x01}, make([]byte, 100)...),
wantMIME: MIMETypeJPEG,
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "PNG",
data: append([]byte{0x89, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D}, make([]byte, 100)...),
wantMIME: MIMETypePNG,
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "GIF87a",
data: append([]byte{0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38, 0x37, 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, make([]byte, 100)...),
wantMIME: MIMETypeGIF,
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "GIF89a",
data: append([]byte{0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38, 0x39, 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, make([]byte, 100)...),
wantMIME: MIMETypeGIF,
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "WebP",
data: append([]byte{
0x52, 0x49, 0x46, 0x46, // RIFF
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // file size (placeholder)
0x57, 0x45, 0x42, 0x50, // WEBP
}, make([]byte, 100)...),
wantMIME: MIMETypeWebP,
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "AVIF",
data: append([]byte{
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1C, // box size
0x66, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, // ftyp
0x61, 0x76, 0x69, 0x66, // avif brand
}, make([]byte, 100)...),
wantMIME: MIMETypeAVIF,
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "AVIF sequence",
data: append([]byte{
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1C, // box size
0x66, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, // ftyp
0x61, 0x76, 0x69, 0x73, // avis brand
}, make([]byte, 100)...),
wantMIME: MIMETypeAVIF,
wantErr: nil,
},
{name: "JPEG", data: jpeg, wantMIME: MIMETypeJPEG},
{name: "PNG", data: png, wantMIME: MIMETypePNG},
{name: "GIF87a", data: gif87a, wantMIME: MIMETypeGIF},
{name: "GIF89a", data: gif89a, wantMIME: MIMETypeGIF},
{name: "WebP", data: webp, wantMIME: MIMETypeWebP},
{name: "AVIF", data: avif, wantMIME: MIMETypeAVIF},
{name: "AVIF sequence", data: avis, wantMIME: MIMETypeAVIF},
{
name: "SVG with XML declaration",
data: []byte(`<?xml version="1.0"?><svg></svg>`),
wantMIME: MIMETypeSVG,
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "SVG without declaration",
data: []byte(`<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"></svg>`),
wantMIME: MIMETypeSVG,
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "SVG with whitespace",
data: []byte(` <?xml version="1.0"?><svg></svg>`),
wantMIME: MIMETypeSVG,
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "SVG with BOM",
data: append([]byte{0xEF, 0xBB, 0xBF}, []byte(`<svg></svg>`)...),
wantMIME: MIMETypeSVG,
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "unknown format",
data: []byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
wantMIME: "",
wantErr: ErrUnknownFormat,
},
{
name: "too short",
data: []byte{0xFF, 0xD8},
wantMIME: "",
wantErr: ErrNotEnoughData,
},
{
name: "empty",
data: []byte{},
wantMIME: "",
wantErr: ErrNotEnoughData,
name: "unknown format",
data: make([]byte, MinMagicBytes),
wantErr: ErrUnknownFormat,
},
{name: "too short", data: []byte{0xFF, 0xD8}, wantErr: ErrNotEnoughData},
{name: testNameEmpty, data: []byte{}, wantErr: ErrNotEnoughData},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := DetectFormat(tt.data)
t.Parallel()
if err != tt.wantErr {
got, err := DetectFormat(tt.data)
if !errors.Is(err, tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("DetectFormat() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
return
@@ -130,8 +99,10 @@ func TestDetectFormat(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestValidateMagicBytes(t *testing.T) {
jpegData := append([]byte{0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x10, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x49, 0x46, 0x00, 0x01}, make([]byte, 100)...)
pngData := append([]byte{0x89, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D}, make([]byte, 100)...)
t.Parallel()
jpegData := pad(0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x10, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x49, 0x46, 0x00, 0x01)
pngData := pad(0x89, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D)
tests := []struct {
name string
@@ -142,40 +113,42 @@ func TestValidateMagicBytes(t *testing.T) {
{
name: "matching JPEG",
data: jpegData,
declaredType: "image/jpeg",
declaredType: testMIMEJPEG,
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "matching JPEG with params",
data: jpegData,
declaredType: "image/jpeg; charset=utf-8",
declaredType: testMIMEJPEGParams,
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "matching PNG",
data: pngData,
declaredType: "image/png",
declaredType: testMIMEPNG,
wantErr: nil,
},
{
name: "mismatched type",
data: jpegData,
declaredType: "image/png",
declaredType: testMIMEPNG,
wantErr: ErrMagicByteMismatch,
},
{
name: "unknown data",
data: []byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
declaredType: "image/jpeg",
data: make([]byte, MinMagicBytes),
declaredType: testMIMEJPEG,
wantErr: ErrUnknownFormat,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := ValidateMagicBytes(tt.data, tt.declaredType)
if err != tt.wantErr {
if !errors.Is(err, tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("ValidateMagicBytes() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
}
})
@@ -183,27 +156,31 @@ func TestValidateMagicBytes(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestIsSupportedMIMEType(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
mimeType string
want bool
}{
{"image/jpeg", true},
{"image/png", true},
{"image/webp", true},
{"image/gif", true},
{"image/avif", true},
{testMIMEJPEG, true},
{testMIMEPNG, true},
{testMIMEWebP, true},
{testMIMEGIF, true},
{testMIMEAVIF, true},
{"image/svg+xml", true},
{"IMAGE/JPEG", true},
{"image/jpeg; charset=utf-8", true},
{testMIMEJPEGParams, true},
{"image/tiff", false},
{"image/bmp", false},
{"application/octet-stream", false},
{mimeOctetStream, false},
{"text/plain", false},
{"", false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.mimeType, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
if got := IsSupportedMIMEType(tt.mimeType); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("IsSupportedMIMEType(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.mimeType, got, tt.want)
}
@@ -212,8 +189,16 @@ func TestIsSupportedMIMEType(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestPeekAndValidate(t *testing.T) {
jpegData := append([]byte{0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x10, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x49, 0x46, 0x00, 0x01}, []byte("rest of jpeg data")...)
pngData := append([]byte{0x89, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D}, []byte("rest of png data")...)
t.Parallel()
jpegMagic := []byte{
0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x10, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x49, 0x46, 0x00, 0x01,
}
pngMagic := []byte{
0x89, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D,
}
jpegData := slices.Concat(jpegMagic, []byte("rest of jpeg data"))
pngData := slices.Concat(pngMagic, []byte("rest of png data"))
tests := []struct {
name string
@@ -225,30 +210,32 @@ func TestPeekAndValidate(t *testing.T) {
{
name: "valid JPEG",
data: jpegData,
declaredType: "image/jpeg",
declaredType: testMIMEJPEG,
wantErr: false,
wantData: jpegData,
},
{
name: "valid PNG",
data: pngData,
declaredType: "image/png",
declaredType: testMIMEPNG,
wantErr: false,
wantData: pngData,
},
{
name: "mismatched type",
data: jpegData,
declaredType: "image/png",
declaredType: testMIMEPNG,
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
r := bytes.NewReader(tt.data)
result, err := PeekAndValidate(r, tt.declaredType)
t.Parallel()
r := bytes.NewReader(tt.data)
result, err := PeekAndValidate(r, tt.declaredType)
if tt.wantErr {
if err == nil {
t.Error("PeekAndValidate() expected error, got nil")
@@ -272,23 +259,28 @@ func TestPeekAndValidate(t *testing.T) {
}
if !bytes.Equal(got, tt.wantData) {
t.Errorf("PeekAndValidate() data mismatch: got %d bytes, want %d bytes", len(got), len(tt.wantData))
t.Errorf(
"PeekAndValidate() data mismatch: got %d bytes, want %d bytes",
len(got), len(tt.wantData),
)
}
})
}
}
func TestMIMEToImageFormat(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
mimeType string
wantFormat ImageFormat
wantOk bool
}{
{"image/jpeg", FormatJPEG, true},
{"image/png", FormatPNG, true},
{"image/webp", FormatWebP, true},
{"image/gif", FormatGIF, true},
{"image/avif", FormatAVIF, true},
{testMIMEJPEG, FormatJPEG, true},
{testMIMEPNG, FormatPNG, true},
{testMIMEWebP, FormatWebP, true},
{testMIMEGIF, FormatGIF, true},
{testMIMEAVIF, FormatAVIF, true},
{"image/svg+xml", "", false}, // SVG doesn't convert to ImageFormat
{"image/tiff", "", false},
{"text/plain", "", false},
@@ -296,6 +288,8 @@ func TestMIMEToImageFormat(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.mimeType, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, ok := MIMEToImageFormat(tt.mimeType)
if ok != tt.wantOk {
@@ -310,21 +304,25 @@ func TestMIMEToImageFormat(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestImageFormatToMIME(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
format ImageFormat
wantMIME string
}{
{FormatJPEG, "image/jpeg"},
{FormatPNG, "image/png"},
{FormatWebP, "image/webp"},
{FormatGIF, "image/gif"},
{FormatAVIF, "image/avif"},
{FormatOriginal, "application/octet-stream"},
{"unknown", "application/octet-stream"},
{FormatJPEG, testMIMEJPEG},
{FormatPNG, testMIMEPNG},
{FormatWebP, testMIMEWebP},
{FormatGIF, testMIMEGIF},
{FormatAVIF, testMIMEAVIF},
{FormatOriginal, mimeOctetStream},
{"unknown", mimeOctetStream},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(string(tt.format), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := ImageFormatToMIME(tt.format)
if got != tt.wantMIME {
@@ -335,19 +333,23 @@ func TestImageFormatToMIME(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestNormalizeMIMEType(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
input string
want string
}{
{"image/jpeg", "image/jpeg"},
{"IMAGE/JPEG", "image/jpeg"},
{"image/jpeg; charset=utf-8", "image/jpeg"},
{" image/jpeg ", "image/jpeg"},
{"image/jpeg; boundary=something", "image/jpeg"},
{testMIMEJPEG, testMIMEJPEG},
{"IMAGE/JPEG", testMIMEJPEG},
{testMIMEJPEGParams, testMIMEJPEG},
{" image/jpeg ", testMIMEJPEG},
{"image/jpeg; boundary=something", testMIMEJPEG},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.input, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := normalizeMIMEType(tt.input)
if got != tt.want {
@@ -358,6 +360,8 @@ func TestNormalizeMIMEType(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestDetectSVG(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
data string
@@ -365,17 +369,24 @@ func TestDetectSVG(t *testing.T) {
}{
{"xml declaration", `<?xml version="1.0"?><svg></svg>`, true},
{"svg element", `<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"></svg>`, true},
{"doctype", `<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" "http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd">`, true},
{
"doctype",
`<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" ` +
`"http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd">`,
true,
},
{"with whitespace", `
<?xml version="1.0"?><svg></svg>`, true},
{"uppercase", `<SVG></SVG>`, true},
{"not svg", `<html></html>`, false},
{"random text", `hello world`, false},
{"empty", ``, false},
{testNameEmpty, ``, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := detectSVG([]byte(tt.data))
if got != tt.want {
@@ -386,6 +397,8 @@ func TestDetectSVG(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestSkipBOM(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
data []byte
@@ -393,13 +406,15 @@ func TestSkipBOM(t *testing.T) {
}{
{"with BOM", []byte{0xEF, 0xBB, 0xBF, 'h', 'e', 'l', 'l', 'o'}, []byte("hello")},
{"without BOM", []byte("hello"), []byte("hello")},
{"empty", []byte{}, []byte{}},
{testNameEmpty, []byte{}, []byte{}},
{"only BOM", []byte{0xEF, 0xBB, 0xBF}, []byte{}},
{"partial BOM", []byte{0xEF, 0xBB}, []byte{0xEF, 0xBB}},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := skipBOM(tt.data)
if !bytes.Equal(got, tt.want) {
@@ -410,6 +425,8 @@ func TestSkipBOM(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRealWorldSVGPatterns(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Test various real-world SVG patterns
svgPatterns := []string{
`<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
@@ -419,7 +436,8 @@ func TestRealWorldSVGPatterns(t *testing.T) {
`<svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
<path d="M12 2L2 7l10 5 10-5-10-5z"/>
</svg>`,
`<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" "http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd">
`<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" ` +
`"http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd">` + `
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
</svg>`,
}
@@ -445,6 +463,8 @@ func TestRealWorldSVGPatterns(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestDetectFormatRIFFNotWebP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// RIFF container but not WebP (e.g., WAV file)
wavData := []byte{
0x52, 0x49, 0x46, 0x46, // RIFF
@@ -453,12 +473,14 @@ func TestDetectFormatRIFFNotWebP(t *testing.T) {
}
_, err := DetectFormat(wavData)
if err != ErrUnknownFormat {
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnknownFormat) {
t.Errorf("DetectFormat(WAV) error = %v, want %v", err, ErrUnknownFormat)
}
}
func TestDetectFormatFtypNotAVIF(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// ftyp container but not AVIF (e.g., MP4)
mp4Data := []byte{
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1C, // box size
@@ -467,20 +489,24 @@ func TestDetectFormatFtypNotAVIF(t *testing.T) {
}
_, err := DetectFormat(mp4Data)
if err != ErrUnknownFormat {
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnknownFormat) {
t.Errorf("DetectFormat(MP4) error = %v, want %v", err, ErrUnknownFormat)
}
}
func TestPeekAndValidatePreservesReader(t *testing.T) {
// Ensure that after PeekAndValidate, we can read the complete original content
t.Parallel()
// Ensure that after PeekAndValidate, we can read the complete
// original content
originalContent := append(
[]byte{0x89, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x0D, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D},
[]byte(strings.Repeat("PNG IDAT chunk data here ", 100))...,
)
r := bytes.NewReader(originalContent)
validated, err := PeekAndValidate(r, "image/png")
validated, err := PeekAndValidate(r, testMIMEPNG)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("PeekAndValidate() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -492,6 +518,9 @@ func TestPeekAndValidatePreservesReader(t *testing.T) {
}
if !bytes.Equal(got, originalContent) {
t.Errorf("Content mismatch: got %d bytes, want %d bytes", len(got), len(originalContent))
t.Errorf(
"Content mismatch: got %d bytes, want %d bytes",
len(got), len(originalContent),
)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
package middleware
import (
"bytes"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/clientip"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/config"
)
// testForwardedClient is the client address the proxy forwards.
const testForwardedClient = "203.0.113.7"
// newTestMiddleware builds a Middleware whose resolver trusts the given
// CIDRs and whose logger writes JSON to buf.
func newTestMiddleware(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer, trusted ...string) *Middleware {
t.Helper()
prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(trusted))
for _, c := range trusted {
p, err := netip.ParsePrefix(c)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("netip.ParsePrefix(%q) error = %v", c, err)
}
prefixes = append(prefixes, p)
}
return &Middleware{
log: slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(buf, nil)),
config: &config.Config{TrustedProxies: prefixes},
clientIP: clientip.NewResolver(prefixes),
}
}
// TestClientIPMiddlewareStoresResolvedIP verifies the ClientIP middleware
// puts the resolved address into the request context for a trusted and an
// untrusted peer.
func TestClientIPMiddlewareStoresResolvedIP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
forwarded string
want string
}{
{
name: "trusted peer honors forwarded client",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
forwarded: testForwardedClient,
want: testForwardedClient,
},
{
name: "untrusted peer ignores forwarded header",
remoteAddr: "198.51.100.9:5000",
forwarded: testForwardedClient,
want: "198.51.100.9",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mw := newTestMiddleware(t, &bytes.Buffer{}, "10.0.0.0/8")
var got string
handler := mw.ClientIP()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
got = clientip.FromContext(r.Context())
}))
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = tt.remoteAddr
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", tt.forwarded)
handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("client IP in context = %q, want %q", got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestLoggingUsesResolvedClientIP verifies the logging middleware records
// the resolved forwarded client IP rather than the proxy peer address.
func TestLoggingUsesResolvedClientIP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var buf bytes.Buffer
mw := newTestMiddleware(t, &buf, "10.0.0.0/8")
handler := mw.ClientIP()(mw.Logging()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})))
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:5000"
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", testForwardedClient)
handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
if !strings.Contains(buf.String(), `"remoteIP":"`+testForwardedClient+`"`) {
t.Errorf("log output missing resolved client IP; got %q", buf.String())
}
}
+85 -14
View File
@@ -3,17 +3,19 @@ package middleware
import (
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"time"
basicauth "github.com/99designs/basicauth-go"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
"github.com/go-chi/cors"
"github.com/go-chi/httprate"
metrics "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/metrics/prometheus"
ghmm "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/middleware"
"github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/middleware/std"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/clientip"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/logger"
)
@@ -21,43 +23,101 @@ import (
// CORSMaxAgeSeconds is the max age for CORS preflight cache (24 hours).
const CORSMaxAgeSeconds = 86400
// HSTSValue is the Strict-Transport-Security header value: one year with
// includeSubDomains. Emitted unconditionally even though pixa listens plain
// HTTP behind a TLS-terminating proxy; browsers ignore an HSTS header received
// over plaintext (RFC 6797 section 8.1), so it never lies about the connection,
// and emitting it here avoids trusting a forwarded-proto header.
const HSTSValue = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
// ContentSecurityPolicyValue is the Content-Security-Policy header value.
// default-src 'self' is the baseline and frame-ancestors 'none' is the primary
// clickjacking control. 'unsafe-inline' is required in script-src and style-src
// because the served templates carry inline onclick handlers (generator page)
// and the bundled Tailwind asset injects a runtime <style> element; dropping it
// needs template changes outside this issue's scope.
const ContentSecurityPolicyValue = "default-src 'self'; " +
"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; " +
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; " +
"object-src 'none'; " +
"base-uri 'self'; " +
"form-action 'self'; " +
"frame-ancestors 'none'"
// PermissionsPolicyValue is the Permissions-Policy header value. Every listed
// feature is denied because pixa uses none of them.
const PermissionsPolicyValue = "accelerometer=(), autoplay=(), camera=(), " +
"display-capture=(), geolocation=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), " +
"microphone=(), payment=(), usb=()"
// Params defines dependencies for Middleware.
type Params struct {
fx.In
Logger *logger.Logger
Config *config.Config
}
// Middleware provides HTTP middleware functions.
type Middleware struct {
log *slog.Logger
config *config.Config
log *slog.Logger
config *config.Config
clientIP *clientip.Resolver
}
// New creates a new Middleware instance.
func New(_ fx.Lifecycle, params Params) (*Middleware, error) {
s := &Middleware{
log: params.Logger.Get(),
config: params.Config,
log: params.Logger.Get(),
config: params.Config,
clientIP: clientip.NewResolver(params.Config.TrustedProxies),
}
return s, nil
}
func ipFromHostPort(hp string) string {
h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(hp)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
if len(h) > 0 && h[0] == '[' {
return h[1 : len(h)-1]
// ClientIP returns a middleware that resolves the real client IP,
// honoring X-Forwarded-For only from trusted proxies, and stores it in
// the request context for the logging middleware and handlers to read.
func (s *Middleware) ClientIP() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ip := s.clientIP.Resolve(
r.RemoteAddr, r.Header.Values(clientip.ForwardedForHeader))
ctx := clientip.WithClientIP(r.Context(), ip)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
}
return h
// RateLimit returns a middleware that limits each client to requestLimit
// requests per window and refuses a request over the limit with 429 Too Many
// Requests and a Retry-After header. Clients are told apart by the address
// the ClientIP middleware stored in the request context, so ClientIP must
// run first. An IPv6 client is counted by its /64, which one client usually
// holds whole; an IPv4-mapped address (::ffff:a.b.c.d) is counted as the
// IPv4 address it carries, since every such address falls in the same /64.
// Counts are kept only for the current and the previous window, so memory
// stays bounded.
func (s *Middleware) RateLimit(
requestLimit int, window time.Duration,
) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return httprate.LimitBy(requestLimit, window,
func(r *http.Request) (string, error) {
ip := clientip.FromContext(r.Context())
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(ip)
if err == nil {
ip = addr.Unmap().String()
}
return httprate.CanonicalizeIP(ip), nil
})
}
type loggingResponseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
statusCode int
bytesWritten int64
}
@@ -85,6 +145,7 @@ func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
start := time.Now()
lrw := newLoggingResponseWriter(w)
ctx := r.Context()
defer func() {
latency := time.Since(start)
reqID, _ := ctx.Value(middleware.RequestIDKey).(string)
@@ -96,7 +157,7 @@ func (s *Middleware) Logging() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
"request_id", reqID,
"referer", r.Referer(),
"proto", r.Proto,
"remoteIP", ipFromHostPort(r.RemoteAddr),
"remoteIP", clientip.FromContext(ctx),
"status", lrw.statusCode,
"response_bytes", lrw.bytesWritten,
"latency_ms", latency.Milliseconds(),
@@ -160,6 +221,16 @@ func (s *Middleware) SecurityHeaders() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
// Disable XSS filtering (modern browsers don't need it, can cause issues)
w.Header().Set("X-XSS-Protection", "0")
// Force HTTPS on future visits (ignored by browsers over plaintext)
w.Header().Set("Strict-Transport-Security", HSTSValue)
// Restrict content sources; frame-ancestors is the primary
// clickjacking control, X-Frame-Options the legacy fallback
w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", ContentSecurityPolicyValue)
// Deny browser features pixa does not use
w.Header().Set("Permissions-Policy", PermissionsPolicyValue)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ import (
)
func TestSecurityHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Create middleware instance
cfg := &config.Config{}
mw := &Middleware{
@@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ func TestSecurityHeaders(t *testing.T) {
handler := mw.SecurityHeaders()(testHandler)
// Make a test request
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/test", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/test", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
@@ -44,6 +46,63 @@ func TestSecurityHeaders(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.header, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := rec.Header().Get(tt.header)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("%s = %q, want %q", tt.header, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestSecurityHeaders_PolicyHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := &config.Config{}
mw := &Middleware{
log: slog.Default(),
config: cfg,
}
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
handler := mw.SecurityHeaders()(testHandler)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/test", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
tests := []struct {
header string
want string
}{
{"Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"},
{
"Content-Security-Policy",
"default-src 'self'; " +
"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; " +
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; " +
"object-src 'none'; " +
"base-uri 'self'; " +
"form-action 'self'; " +
"frame-ancestors 'none'",
},
{
"Permissions-Policy",
"accelerometer=(), autoplay=(), camera=(), " +
"display-capture=(), geolocation=(), gyroscope=(), " +
"magnetometer=(), microphone=(), payment=(), usb=()",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.header, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := rec.Header().Get(tt.header)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("%s = %q, want %q", tt.header, got, tt.want)
@@ -53,6 +112,8 @@ func TestSecurityHeaders(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestSecurityHeaders_PreservesExistingHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := &config.Config{}
mw := &Middleware{
log: slog.Default(),
@@ -68,7 +129,7 @@ func TestSecurityHeaders_PreservesExistingHeaders(t *testing.T) {
handler := mw.SecurityHeaders()(testHandler)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/test", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/test", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+5 -2
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ func DeriveKey(masterKey []byte, salt string) ([KeySize]byte, error) {
hkdfReader := hkdf.New(sha256.New, masterKey, []byte(salt), nil)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(hkdfReader, key[:]); err != nil {
_, err := io.ReadFull(hkdfReader, key[:])
if err != nil {
return key, ErrKeyDerivation
}
@@ -46,7 +47,9 @@ func DeriveKey(masterKey []byte, salt string) ([KeySize]byte, error) {
func Encrypt(key [KeySize]byte, plaintext []byte) (string, error) {
// Generate random nonce
var nonce [NonceSize]byte
if _, err := rand.Read(nonce[:]); err != nil {
_, err := rand.Read(nonce[:])
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
+56 -33
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,25 @@
package seal
package seal_test
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/seal"
)
func TestDeriveKey_Consistent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
masterKey := []byte("test-master-key-12345")
salt := "test-salt-v1"
key1, err := DeriveKey(masterKey, salt)
key1, err := seal.DeriveKey(masterKey, salt)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeriveKey() error = %v", err)
}
key2, err := DeriveKey(masterKey, salt)
key2, err := seal.DeriveKey(masterKey, salt)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeriveKey() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -25,14 +30,16 @@ func TestDeriveKey_Consistent(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestDeriveKey_DifferentSalts(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
masterKey := []byte("test-master-key-12345")
key1, err := DeriveKey(masterKey, "salt-1")
key1, err := seal.DeriveKey(masterKey, "salt-1")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeriveKey() error = %v", err)
}
key2, err := DeriveKey(masterKey, "salt-2")
key2, err := seal.DeriveKey(masterKey, "salt-2")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeriveKey() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -43,14 +50,16 @@ func TestDeriveKey_DifferentSalts(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestDeriveKey_DifferentMasterKeys(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
salt := "test-salt"
key1, err := DeriveKey([]byte("master-key-1"), salt)
key1, err := seal.DeriveKey([]byte("master-key-1"), salt)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeriveKey() error = %v", err)
}
key2, err := DeriveKey([]byte("master-key-2"), salt)
key2, err := seal.DeriveKey([]byte("master-key-2"), salt)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeriveKey() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -61,19 +70,21 @@ func TestDeriveKey_DifferentMasterKeys(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestEncryptDecrypt_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
key, err := DeriveKey([]byte("test-key"), "test-salt")
t.Parallel()
key, err := seal.DeriveKey([]byte("test-key"), "test-salt")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DeriveKey() error = %v", err)
}
plaintext := []byte("hello, world! this is a test message.")
ciphertext, err := Encrypt(key, plaintext)
ciphertext, err := seal.Encrypt(key, plaintext)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Encrypt() error = %v", err)
}
decrypted, err := Decrypt(key, ciphertext)
decrypted, err := seal.Decrypt(key, ciphertext)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Decrypt() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -84,15 +95,17 @@ func TestEncryptDecrypt_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestEncryptDecrypt_EmptyPlaintext(t *testing.T) {
key, _ := DeriveKey([]byte("test-key"), "test-salt")
t.Parallel()
key, _ := seal.DeriveKey([]byte("test-key"), "test-salt")
plaintext := []byte{}
ciphertext, err := Encrypt(key, plaintext)
ciphertext, err := seal.Encrypt(key, plaintext)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Encrypt() error = %v", err)
}
decrypted, err := Decrypt(key, ciphertext)
decrypted, err := seal.Decrypt(key, ciphertext)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Decrypt() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -103,31 +116,35 @@ func TestEncryptDecrypt_EmptyPlaintext(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestDecrypt_WrongKey(t *testing.T) {
key1, _ := DeriveKey([]byte("key-1"), "salt")
key2, _ := DeriveKey([]byte("key-2"), "salt")
t.Parallel()
key1, _ := seal.DeriveKey([]byte("key-1"), "salt")
key2, _ := seal.DeriveKey([]byte("key-2"), "salt")
plaintext := []byte("secret message")
ciphertext, err := Encrypt(key1, plaintext)
ciphertext, err := seal.Encrypt(key1, plaintext)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Encrypt() error = %v", err)
}
_, err = Decrypt(key2, ciphertext)
_, err = seal.Decrypt(key2, ciphertext)
if err == nil {
t.Error("Decrypt() should fail with wrong key")
}
if err != ErrDecryptionFailed {
t.Errorf("Decrypt() error = %v, want %v", err, ErrDecryptionFailed)
if !errors.Is(err, seal.ErrDecryptionFailed) {
t.Errorf("Decrypt() error = %v, want %v", err, seal.ErrDecryptionFailed)
}
}
func TestDecrypt_TamperedCiphertext(t *testing.T) {
key, _ := DeriveKey([]byte("test-key"), "test-salt")
t.Parallel()
key, _ := seal.DeriveKey([]byte("test-key"), "test-salt")
plaintext := []byte("secret message")
ciphertext, err := Encrypt(key, plaintext)
ciphertext, err := seal.Encrypt(key, plaintext)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Encrypt() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -138,45 +155,51 @@ func TestDecrypt_TamperedCiphertext(t *testing.T) {
tampered[10] ^= 0x01
}
_, err = Decrypt(key, string(tampered))
_, err = seal.Decrypt(key, string(tampered))
if err == nil {
t.Error("Decrypt() should fail with tampered ciphertext")
}
}
func TestDecrypt_InvalidBase64(t *testing.T) {
key, _ := DeriveKey([]byte("test-key"), "test-salt")
t.Parallel()
_, err := Decrypt(key, "not-valid-base64!!!")
key, _ := seal.DeriveKey([]byte("test-key"), "test-salt")
_, err := seal.Decrypt(key, "not-valid-base64!!!")
if err == nil {
t.Error("Decrypt() should fail with invalid base64")
}
if err != ErrInvalidPayload {
t.Errorf("Decrypt() error = %v, want %v", err, ErrInvalidPayload)
if !errors.Is(err, seal.ErrInvalidPayload) {
t.Errorf("Decrypt() error = %v, want %v", err, seal.ErrInvalidPayload)
}
}
func TestDecrypt_TooShort(t *testing.T) {
key, _ := DeriveKey([]byte("test-key"), "test-salt")
t.Parallel()
key, _ := seal.DeriveKey([]byte("test-key"), "test-salt")
// Create a base64 string that's too short to contain nonce + auth tag
_, err := Decrypt(key, "dG9vLXNob3J0")
_, err := seal.Decrypt(key, "dG9vLXNob3J0")
if err == nil {
t.Error("Decrypt() should fail with too-short ciphertext")
}
if err != ErrInvalidPayload {
t.Errorf("Decrypt() error = %v, want %v", err, ErrInvalidPayload)
if !errors.Is(err, seal.ErrInvalidPayload) {
t.Errorf("Decrypt() error = %v, want %v", err, seal.ErrInvalidPayload)
}
}
func TestEncrypt_ProducesDifferentCiphertexts(t *testing.T) {
key, _ := DeriveKey([]byte("test-key"), "test-salt")
t.Parallel()
key, _ := seal.DeriveKey([]byte("test-key"), "test-salt")
plaintext := []byte("same message")
ciphertext1, _ := Encrypt(key, plaintext)
ciphertext2, _ := Encrypt(key, plaintext)
ciphertext1, _ := seal.Encrypt(key, plaintext)
ciphertext2, _ := seal.Encrypt(key, plaintext)
if ciphertext1 == ciphertext2 {
t.Error("Encrypt() should produce different ciphertexts due to random nonce")
+32 -12
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package server
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"time"
@@ -8,26 +9,45 @@ import (
// HTTP server configuration constants.
const (
HTTPReadTimeout = 30 * time.Second
HTTPWriteTimeout = 60 * time.Second
HTTPReadTimeout = 30 * time.Second
// HTTPReadHeaderTimeout bounds the request-header read on its own,
// short, so a slowloris client dribbling headers is dropped well
// before it ties up a connection for the whole ReadTimeout window.
HTTPReadHeaderTimeout = 10 * time.Second
HTTPWriteTimeout = 60 * time.Second
// HTTPIdleTimeout bounds how long an idle keep-alive connection is
// held open, so idle connections cannot accumulate without limit on a
// service targeting high concurrency.
HTTPIdleTimeout = 120 * time.Second
HTTPMaxHeaderBytes = 8 << 10 // 8KB
)
func (s *Server) serveUntilShutdown() {
listenAddr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", s.config.Port)
s.httpServer = &http.Server{
Addr: listenAddr,
ReadTimeout: HTTPReadTimeout,
WriteTimeout: HTTPWriteTimeout,
MaxHeaderBytes: HTTPMaxHeaderBytes,
Handler: s,
// newHTTPServer builds the http.Server with the hardening timeouts and
// limits applied. It is separate from serveUntilShutdown so the
// configuration can be asserted in a test without binding a listener.
func (s *Server) newHTTPServer() *http.Server {
return &http.Server{
Addr: fmt.Sprintf(":%d", s.config.Port),
ReadTimeout: HTTPReadTimeout,
ReadHeaderTimeout: HTTPReadHeaderTimeout,
WriteTimeout: HTTPWriteTimeout,
IdleTimeout: HTTPIdleTimeout,
MaxHeaderBytes: HTTPMaxHeaderBytes,
Handler: s,
}
}
func (s *Server) serveUntilShutdown() {
s.httpServer = s.newHTTPServer()
s.SetupRoutes()
s.log.Info("http begin listen", "listenaddr", listenAddr)
if err := s.httpServer.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
s.log.Info("http begin listen", "listenaddr", s.httpServer.Addr)
err := s.httpServer.ListenAndServe()
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
s.log.Error("listen error", "error", err)
if s.cancelFunc != nil {
s.cancelFunc()
}

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More