harden: show a personal message's hex and its text in byte order, hidden characters marked (closes #403)

The signature screen showed only the text a personal message decodes
to, with bidirectional, right-to-left and zero-width characters acting
on it, so a site could make the message read differently from the
bytes that are signed, and a message that was not hex was decoded into
NUL characters. The screen now shows the hex as "Raw data" alongside
the text, lays the text out left to right in byte order, and shows each
control character, line and paragraph separator, and character that
paints nothing (the set src/shared/symbolSpoof.js already strips) as a
U+XXXX mark. A message is hex when getBytes, which signing uses, reads
it; one that is not cannot be signed, so it is shown as plain text with
"Sign" disabled.

Model: opus-5-5

Dockerfile

@@ -8,12 +8,11 @@ WORKDIR /app
 # image sets it.
 ENV AUTISTMASK_LINT_NATIVE=1
 
-# script/test's default 30s bound is the host figure, against a suite that
-# runs in about 8s there. In here the same suite starts on a cold jest cache
-# and shares the runner with the rest of the build, so 30s is marginal rather
-# than a bound — it killed a healthy suite at 30.6s on a cold CI cache. 180s
-# still catches a hang in three minutes and cannot be tripped by a suite that
-# is merely running on contended hardware.
+# script/test's default 30s bound is the host figure. In here the same suite
+# starts on a cold jest cache and shares the runner with the rest of the build,
+# so 30s is too tight — it killed a healthy suite at 30.6s on a cold CI cache.
+# 180s still catches a hang in three minutes and cannot be tripped by a suite
+# that is merely running on contended hardware.
 ENV AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT=180
 
 # script/bootstrap installs all prerequisites (make via apt here; node

README.md

@@ -64,7 +64,9 @@ release/SHA256SUMS
 ```
 
 Nothing is published by this. Tagging, CRX packing and any upload are
-outward-facing acts and are the owner's alone.
+outward-facing acts and are the owner's alone. The full procedure that turns a
+green `main` into a tagged, packaged release — the order of steps, who performs
+each, and how to check it worked — is in [docs/RELEASE.md](docs/RELEASE.md).
 
 The archives are deterministic — entries sorted, timestamps fixed, compression
 level fixed — so two builds of one commit produce byte-identical files and the
@@ -800,7 +802,12 @@ discoverable.
   addresses visually, as a security feature.
 - **Tailwind CSS**: Utility-first CSS via Tailwind. No custom CSS classes for
   styling. Tailwind is configured with a minimal monochrome palette. This keeps
-  the styling co-located with the markup and eliminates CSS file management.
+  the styling co-located with the markup and eliminates CSS file management. The
+  handful of classes in `styles/main.css` are not styling: `.copy-flash-*`
+  carries the copy feedback animation, and `.am-address` carries the rule that
+  an address never wraps. Both are invariants that hold in every place they
+  appear, and spelling either out as repeated utilities is how one of those
+  places drifts away from the rest.
 - **Vanilla JS**: No framework (React, Vue, Svelte, etc.). The popup UI is small
   enough that vanilla JS with simple view switching is sufficient. A framework
   would add bundle size, build complexity, and attack surface for no benefit at
@@ -849,6 +856,12 @@ that the portions still displayed will be more than adequate for the user to
 verify addresses even in the case of address spoofing attacks. Clicking an
 address will always copy the full, untruncated value.
 
+As of the address-row layout change, no view invokes that exception: every
+address in the popup is rendered on a row of its own, wide enough for all 42
+characters, and no screen truncates one to fit. The cap is still enforced in
+`truncateMiddle()` and the 32-character floor in `renderAddressHtml()`, so the
+guarantee holds for any future caller; there simply are none today.
+
 **Specific Exception — Transaction Detail view:** The transaction detail screen
 is the authoritative record of a specific transaction and shows the exact,
 untruncated amount with all meaningful decimal places (e.g. "0.00498824598498216
@@ -869,19 +882,31 @@ On those screens, when the truncated string would contain no digit from 1 to 9
 and the value does, the amount is extended to its first significant digit
 instead: `0.000000000000000001 DAI`, not `0.0000 DAI`. The test is on the whole
 truncated string, integer part included, so `1.00005` still shows as `1.0000` —
-the exception only fires where the entire displayed figure would read as zero. A
-genuine zero still renders `0.0000`, and truncation stays truncation: `0.99999`
-shows as `0.9999`, never rounded up.
+the exception only fires where the entire displayed figure would read as zero.
+Truncation stays truncation: `0.99999` shows as `0.9999`, never rounded up. The
+rule still renders a genuine zero as `0.0000`. Two lines of a swap say a zero in
+words instead: `Min. received` reads `None (no minimum guaranteed)` for a zero
+minimum, and `Amount` reads `All available (V4 open delta)` when the amount it
+shows is a V4 exact-in `amountIn` of zero.
 
 The rule and its exception live in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js` as
 `truncateAmount()` and `truncateAmountNeverZero()`. Everything the approval and
 confirmation screens display goes through the floored one — the ERC-20 amount,
-the ETH value and max fee (`src/popup/views/approval.js`), and the swap's
-`Amount` and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`). The history and
-balance lists (`src/shared/transactions.js`) use the unfloored one: the
-transaction detail view is the authoritative record and already shows exact
-precision. The 4-decimal rule is unchanged everywhere else, including for
-amounts at or above the floor on the approval screens.
+the ETH value and max fee (`src/popup/views/approval.js`), the swap's `Amount`
+and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`), the Send screen's
+`Current balance` (`src/popup/views/send.js`), and the balance and network fee
+on the confirmation screen for the wallet's own send
+(`src/popup/views/confirmTx.js`). Both screens render a network fee through
+`formatFee()` in `src/popup/views/helpers.js`, which prices the exact fee in USD
+rather than its truncated figure, so the same fee reads the same on both, USD
+value included. Balances are stored exactly (`src/shared/balances.js`), whatever
+decimals a token declares, so a balance below the floor reaches these screens as
+it is. The history list (`src/shared/transactions.js`) uses the unfloored one:
+the transaction detail view is the authoritative record and already shows exact
+precision. The balance lists use neither: they round to four places with
+`toFixed(4)` (`balanceLine()` in `src/popup/views/helpers.js`). The 4-decimal
+rule is unchanged everywhere else, including for amounts at or above the floor
+on the approval screens.
 
 The floor applies only where the token's scale is known. Where it is not, the
 approval screen states base units instead of a quantity — see Unknown token
@@ -898,9 +923,10 @@ approximation but a different number — 1,000 units of a 6-decimal token
 formatted at 18 decimals reads `0.000000001` — on the screen whose only job is
 to state what is being authorized. Both amount paths of that screen take this
 rule: the ERC-20 `transfer`/`approve` line (`src/popup/views/approval.js`) and
-the swap's `Amount` and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`). An
-unbounded allowance or permit needs no scale to describe and is still shown as
-`Unlimited`.
+the swap's `Amount` and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`). The
+token permission warning on the signature screen takes the same rule for its
+amounts. An unbounded allowance or permit needs no scale to describe and is
+still shown as `Unlimited`.
 
 The rule holds only if nothing invents a scale UPSTREAM of it. Those three
 sources are read as authoritative, so a value written into one of them cannot be
@@ -923,6 +949,62 @@ and compare against. Reading the stored field directly instead answers `null`
 for a bundled or tracked token the explorer merely omitted, which is not a
 refusal the wallet has any reason to make.
 
+The Send screen also consults every address's explorer reports, so a contract
+two addresses report different `decimals` for has no scale there, and the stored
+balance, formatted at one of those scales, is withdrawn with it. The Send
+screen's `Current balance` and the confirmation screen's balance line then both
+read `unknown (SYMBOL)`. The balance list formats each explorer row as it is
+fetched, without that cross-address check, and shows the row's figure.
+
+**Decoded amount lines on the transaction approval screen:** the `Amount` line
+of a decoded ERC-20 call, and the `Amount` and `Min. received` lines of a
+decoded swap (see TxApproval below), do not always read as a number. They can
+read:
+
+- A formatted quantity, e.g. `17.1900 USDT`, when the token's scale is known:
+  truncated to four decimals, with the floor and the zero cases described above.
+- `<amount> base units (decimals unknown)` when the scale is unknown: the
+  base-unit integer, rather than a figure at a guessed scale (see Unknown token
+  scale above).
+- `Unlimited`: on the ERC-20 `Amount` line, an `approve` of the `uint256`
+  maximum, an unbounded allowance. On the swap's `Amount` line, any amount at or
+  above the `uint160` maximum, whichever step set the line: a `PERMIT2_PERMIT`
+  amount at that maximum, which is an unbounded permit, or a V2 or V3 exact-in,
+  V2 exact-out or `WRAP_ETH` amount that large, which is not an allowance. The
+  router's whole-balance value, `CONTRACT_BALANCE` (`2^255`), is one such
+  amount.
+- `Up to <amount>`: the swap's `Amount` line, when the transaction has a V2
+  exact-out step, whichever step set the line, including the `WRAP_ETH` of a
+  swap paid in ETH and a `PERMIT2_PERMIT`. The swap spends at most that figure,
+  not necessarily all of it; the wait, success and error screens show it with
+  the same words. `Unlimited` and `All available (V4 open delta)` keep their
+  wording. When a V2 exact-out step sets `Min. received`, that line shows its
+  `amountOut`, the exact amount it buys.
+- `All available (V4 open delta)`: the swap's `Amount` line, when the amount it
+  shows is a V4 exact-in `amountIn` of zero. V4 reads that zero as "use the
+  whole open delta", so the calldata states no quantity. The line shows the
+  amount of one step that names an input token or amount: the last
+  `PERMIT2_PERMIT` step if there is one, otherwise the first V2 or V3 exact-in,
+  V2 exact-out, `WRAP_ETH` or V4 swap step. A V2 exact-out step gives its
+  `amountInMax`, and a V4 swap step the `amountIn` of its first readable
+  exact-in action.
+- `None (no minimum guaranteed)`: the swap's `Min. received` line, when the
+  minimum it shows is zero, whether a V2, V3 or V4 swap's minimum or a
+  `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step's `minBalance`. Before
+  [#359](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/359), a zero `minBalance`
+  read `0.0000` when the token's scale was known.
+
+The swap's `Token In` and `Token Out` lines name a currency, not an amount; each
+reads `Unknown (not named in the calldata)` when the decoder found no token for
+that side. An `UNWRAP_WETH` step makes `Token Out` ETH only when the output side
+is WETH, on mainnet or Sepolia, or when no step set the output side; a WETH
+`Min. received` figure then reads in ETH. Otherwise `Token Out` and
+`Min. received` keep the output side's own token and figure, whether the swap
+was paid in ETH or in a token: a V2 exact-out swap that buys USDC and then
+unwraps the WETH it did not spend shows USDC. The token permission warning on
+the signature screen has its own amount wording, including `Unknown`; the
+SignApproval section below describes it.
+
 #### Partial USD totals
 
 Prices are fetched for the top 25 tokens only, so an address can hold assets the
@@ -1003,8 +1085,13 @@ list from any other contract address is always dropped, and so is any token
 claiming a symbol that belongs to the native asset and therefore has no
 legitimate contract at all (`"ETH"`). That filter is unconditional — the "Hide
 tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders" setting governs the transaction history
-and the send-screen token selector, not this list. Tracked tokens with a zero
-balance are listed as well while "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" is on.
+and the send-screen token selector, not this list. `fetchTokenBalances()` stores
+every nonzero holding of a token it admits, however small, but a holding below
+0.000001 is left out of the balance lists, the send-screen token selector, the
+address total and the remove-address warning (`isBelowOneMillionth()` in
+`src/shared/amountDisplay.js`). The Send and confirmation screens show it when
+its token is the one being sent. Tracked tokens with a zero balance are listed
+as well while "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" is on.
 
 #### Stored state and its version
 
@@ -1070,7 +1157,7 @@ each caught only by a reviewer re-deriving thirty fields by hand.
 The `allowedSites` case is why the entry check is not optional. A stored
 `{"0x…": "notalist"}` is a well-formed object holding a malformed entry: it
 passed the gate, rendered a completely healthy popup, and then threw inside
-`saveState()`'s per-hostname merge, so every save from that moment on failed and
+`saveState()`'s per-origin merge, so every save from that moment on failed and
 the user went on operating a wallet that was persisting nothing
 ([#362](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362)). A save that fails is
 now also reported rather than swallowed: `onSaveFailure()` in
@@ -1182,13 +1269,20 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - Send / Receive quick-action buttons, both acting on the active address
     - ETH/USD price display
     - Wallet list: each wallet shows its name (tap to rename inline) and a "+"
-      button for HD and xprv wallets, then one block per address with "Address
-      N" (bold when active), the ENS name if resolved, the full address, an
-      `[info]` button, an `[x]` button (only on HD and xprv wallets holding more
-      than one address), the address USD total, and a balance line for ETH and
-      for each token shown for that address
+      button for HD and xprv wallets, then one block per address. The block
+      opens with a row carrying the colour dot, "Address N" (bold when active),
+      an `[info]` button and an `[x]` button (only on HD and xprv wallets
+      holding more than one address); the ENS name, if resolved, is below it;
+      then the full address on a row of its own, followed by the address USD
+      total and a balance line for ETH and for each token shown for that address
     - "Recent Transactions": up to 25 transactions merged across every address
-      of every wallet, deduplicated by hash and filtered
+      of every wallet, deduplicated by hash and filtered. Each row is three
+      lines: age and direction, then the counterparty's colour dot (with our own
+      name for it, where it is one of our addresses) and the amount, then the
+      counterparty's full address on a row of its own. A contract creation has
+      no counterparty: its second line is the amount alone and its third line
+      says "This transaction creates a new contract. It has no recipient." The
+      transaction lists on AddressDetail and AddressToken draw the same rows
     - "Add additional wallet..." link at bottom
 - **Transitions**:
     - Tap address row → sets the active address and broadcasts
@@ -1322,7 +1416,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - What to send: token dropdown (or static display with contract address when
       locked from AddressToken)
     - To: address or ENS name input, with an inline validation message
-    - Amount input with current balance display
+    - Amount input with current balance display, which reads
+      `Current balance: unknown (SYMBOL)` for a token whose scale is unknown, as
+      ConfirmTx's balance line does (see Unknown token scale)
     - "Review" button, disabled until the recipient validates
 - **Transitions**:
     - "Review" (valid inputs, ENS resolved) → **ConfirmTx**
@@ -1340,7 +1436,8 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - From: blockie + color dot + full address + etherscan link + wallet title
     - To: blockie + color dot + full address + etherscan link + ENS name
     - Amount: value + symbol (USD in parentheses)
-    - Your balance: value + symbol (USD in parentheses)
+    - Your balance: value + symbol (USD in parentheses), or `unknown (SYMBOL)`
+      for a token whose scale is unknown
     - Network fee: "Estimating..." then two lines, or "Unable to estimate",
       fetched async. The first line is what the transfer is expected to cost,
       `gasLimit * gasPrice` (USD in parentheses); the second is the
@@ -1356,7 +1453,11 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
       amount plus the fee exceeds the balance (ETH transfers), not enough ETH to
       pay the fee for the transfer (ERC-20 transfers), and the fee could not be
       estimated. The first two are mutually exclusive per transfer type, so only
-      the applicable one holds space
+      the applicable one holds space. The last names its cause: for a token
+      whose scale is unknown the fee can never be estimated, and it says the
+      wallet does not know how many decimal places the token uses and that the
+      transaction cannot be sent; for any other failure it asks the user to go
+      back and try again
     - Password: an inline field on this screen, not a modal, with its own error
       line
     - "Sign & Send" button (disabled if errors, and while the network fee
@@ -1381,7 +1482,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Transaction Broadcast" heading (no back button — tx is irreversible)
     - Amount + symbol
-    - To: color dot + full address + etherscan link
+    - To: color dot + full address + etherscan link; for a contract creation,
+      which has no recipient, "This transaction creates a new contract. It has
+      no recipient." instead
     - Transaction hash: full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
     - Count-up timer: "Waiting for confirmation... Ns"
 - **Behavior**: Polls `getTransactionReceipt` every 10 seconds. The wait is
@@ -1410,7 +1513,8 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - Decoded action well (shown when the transaction carried recognized
       calldata; the top-level Amount and To are hidden in that case)
     - Amount + symbol
-    - To: color dot + full address + etherscan link
+    - To: color dot + full address + etherscan link, or for a contract creation
+      the same sentence as on WaitTx
     - Block number
     - Transaction hash: full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
     - "Done" button
@@ -1425,7 +1529,8 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Transaction Failed" heading
     - Amount + symbol
-    - To: color dot + full address + etherscan link
+    - To: color dot + full address + etherscan link, or for a contract creation
+      the same sentence as on WaitTx
     - Error message (dashed border box)
     - Transaction hash section (hidden if broadcast failed before getting hash):
       full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
@@ -1463,7 +1568,7 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - From: blockie + color dot + full address (tap to copy) + etherscan link;
       ENS name if available
     - To: blockie + color dot + full address (tap to copy) + etherscan link; ENS
-      name if available
+      name if available. For a contract creation, the same sentence as on WaitTx
     - Time: ISO datetime + relative age in parentheses
     - Block: block number (tap to copy) + etherscan block link
     - Amount: value + symbol (bold)
@@ -1526,8 +1631,14 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
           a value carrying its unit, hex (`0x10`) or exponent (`1e3`) notation —
           is refused with a flash message and the field snaps back to the stored
           threshold, so a number the user did not type is never stored.
-    - Allowed Sites: list with remove buttons
-    - Denied Sites: list with remove buttons
+    - Allowed Sites: the origins (scheme, host and port) remembered as allowed,
+      under any address, with remove buttons
+    - Connected Sites: the origins of the sites allowed without "Remember my
+      choice" that are still connected, with remove buttons. Only the background
+      holds these, in memory, and Settings asks it for them with
+      `AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES`
+    - Denied Sites: the origins remembered as denied, under any address, with
+      remove buttons
     - About: project link, license, author, version, release date, and the
       commit, which links to the commit in the repository
     - Debug: hidden until revealed, then an "Enable debug mode" checkbox that
@@ -1538,8 +1649,16 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - `[recovery phrase]` on an HD wallet → **ShowRecoveryPhrase**
     - `[x]` on a wallet → **DeleteWallet**
     - Tap wallet name → inline rename field (no screen change)
-    - `[x]` on a tracked token or a site → removes it in place (no screen
-      change)
+    - `[x]` on a tracked token → removes it in place (no screen change)
+    - `[x]` on an allowed or connected site → disconnects that site, in place:
+      its origin is dropped from Allowed Sites under every address, and
+      `AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE` has the background end every connection approved
+      without "Remember" from that origin, under any address, and send
+      `accountsChanged` with an empty list to the open tabs of that origin. The
+      same host under another scheme or port is another site and is left alone.
+      Only the extension's own pages may send either message
+    - `[x]` on a denied site → forgets the refusal, in place; it connects
+      nothing and tells the background nothing
     - Ten clicks on the version → reveals the Debug well (no screen change)
     - "Back" (or Settings gear again) → previous screen (Home)
 
@@ -1590,6 +1709,10 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - Either way, the active address moves only if it belonged to the deleted
       wallet, and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED` is broadcast when it does
       (`src/shared/walletDelete.js`)
+    - Either way, every address the wallet held loses its site permissions of
+      both kinds: the remembered ones in storage, and the connections approved
+      without "Remember", which only the background holds, in memory, and drops
+      on `AUTISTMASK_ADDRESSES_REMOVED`
     - "Confirm Delete" (wrong password) → "That password is incorrect. Please
       try again." on the error line, nothing deleted
     - "I have lost my password" → **DeleteWalletLostPassword**
@@ -1686,6 +1809,10 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
   so a connected site stops being told about an address the user removed
   (`src/shared/walletDelete.js`). A selection in any other wallet is left alone;
   one in this wallet follows the splice.
+- The address loses its site permissions of both kinds, whether or not it was
+  the active one: the remembered ones in storage, and any connection approved
+  without "Remember", which only the background holds, in memory, and drops on
+  `AUTISTMASK_ADDRESSES_REMOVED`.
 - The wallet's derivation counter (`nextIndex`) is not rewound, so "+" derives a
   fresh address rather than handing back the one just removed.
 
@@ -1712,21 +1839,30 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 
 - **When**: A website requests wallet access via `eth_requestAccounts` or
   `wallet_requestPermissions` and is on neither the allowed nor the denied list.
-  The background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and
-  falls back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
-  `requestApproval()`).
+  A site is its full origin, `scheme://host[:port]`, on both lists and for a
+  connection allowed without "Remember": a choice for `https://dapp.example`
+  says nothing about `http://dapp.example` or another port of that host. The
+  background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and falls
+  back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
+  `requestApproval()`). Only one exists per site at a time: a further connection
+  request from a site whose prompt is still unanswered is refused with EIP-1193
+  code `-32002` and opens no new prompt. If that prompt was in a toolbar popup
+  that closed before it connected, and the toolbar popup has since been set to
+  open something else, the refused request shows that prompt again.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Connection Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
       blocklist)
-    - Site hostname (bold) + "wants to connect to your wallet"
+    - Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants to connect to your
+      wallet"
     - Address that will be shared (color dot + full address + etherscan link)
     - "Remember my choice for this site" checkbox
     - "Allow" / "Deny" buttons
 - **Transitions**:
     - "Allow" / "Deny" → closes popup (returns result to background script; the
       choice is persisted to the allowed or denied list when "Remember" is
-      checked)
+      checked, and an "Allow" without it is listed under Connected Sites in
+      **Settings**)
     - Popup closed without answering → treated as a denial
 
 #### TxApproval (`approve-tx`)
@@ -1737,23 +1873,27 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
   programmatically rather than by a user gesture. The background populates the
   transaction (nonce, gas limit, fees, chain id) against the RPC node _before_
   opening the window, so the screen shows a complete transaction and the signed
-  artifact can be compared with it field for field. A request that cannot be
-  populated — unreachable node, reverting gas estimate — opens no window and is
-  failed back to the site. Only one transaction approval exists at a time:
-  populating fixes the nonce, so a second `eth_sendTransaction` arriving while
-  one is unanswered is refused with EIP-1193 code `-32002` rather than being
-  populated at the same nonce. It opens no window and takes no nonce, and the
-  site can send it again once the pending one is answered.
+  artifact can be compared with it field for field. A nonce the site supplies is
+  ignored: the nonce is always the account's next nonce from the node, so a site
+  cannot replace one of the user's pending transactions or leave this one stuck
+  behind a gap. A request that cannot be populated — unreachable node, reverting
+  gas estimate — opens no window and is failed back to the site. Only one
+  transaction approval exists at a time: populating fixes the nonce, so a second
+  `eth_sendTransaction` arriving while one is unanswered is refused with
+  EIP-1193 code `-32002` rather than being populated at the same nonce. It opens
+  no window and takes no nonce, and the site can send it again once the pending
+  one is answered.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Transaction Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
       blocklist)
-    - Site hostname (bold) + "wants to send a transaction"
+    - Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants to send a
+      transaction"
     - Decoded action (if calldata is recognized): action name, token details,
       amounts, steps, deadline (see Transaction Decoding)
     - From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
-    - Contract: color dot + full address + etherscan link (or "contract
-      creation"), token symbol label if known
+    - Contract: color dot + full address + etherscan link, token symbol label if
+      known; for a contract creation, the same sentence as on WaitTx
     - Value: amount in ETH (4 decimal places, USD in parentheses)
     - Network fee (max): gas limit × fee per gas in ETH (4 decimal places, USD
       in parentheses), with the gas limit and the fee per gas in gwei below it
@@ -1774,20 +1914,57 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 
 - **When**: A connected website requests a message signature via
   `personal_sign`, `eth_sign`, or `eth_signTypedData_v4`. Opened the same way as
-  TxApproval, in a separate popup window.
+  TxApproval, in a separate popup window. Only one exists per site at a time: a
+  further signature request, by any of these methods, from a site whose
+  signature request is still unanswered is refused with EIP-1193 code `-32002`
+  and opens no window.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Signature Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
       blocklist)
-    - Site hostname (bold) + "wants you to sign a message"
+    - Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants you to sign a
+      message"
     - Danger warning box (shown for `eth_sign`, which signs a raw hash)
     - Type: "Personal message" or "Typed data (EIP-712)"
     - From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
-    - Message: decoded UTF-8 text (personal_sign) or formatted domain/type/
-      message fields (EIP-712 typed data)
+    - Message: for `personal_sign` and `eth_sign`, the text the message's bytes
+      decode to as UTF-8, laid out left to right in the order of the bytes that
+      are signed, right-to-left characters included. Each control character,
+      each line or paragraph separator (U+2028, U+2029; left in the text, a
+      paragraph separator would end that layout for the text after it), and each
+      character that paints nothing (format characters such as zero-width and
+      bidirectional ones, default-ignorable characters such as variation
+      selectors and Hangul fillers, and DELETE), is shown as a bordered `U+XXXX`
+      mark instead of acting on the text; a line feed is shown as a line break.
+      Bytes that are not UTF-8 are shown as "This message is not text." For
+      typed data, formatted domain/type/message fields (EIP-712). The primary
+      type shown is the one ethers signs, derived from the typed data's `types`,
+      not the type the site states.
+    - Token permission warning, at the top of the message (typed data whose
+      primary type is `Permit`, as in EIP-2612, or one of Permit2's signature
+      types): "⚠️ TOKEN PERMISSION: Signing this lets the spender below take the
+      tokens listed here from your address, without asking you again.", then the
+      spender's full address and, for each token, its symbol, full address and
+      amount (`Unlimited` for the largest amount the field holds). These are
+      read only from the fields the signed type declares, never from other keys
+      the site puts in the message, except a `Permit`'s token, which is the
+      domain's `verifyingContract`; any those fields do not give is shown as
+      `Unknown`, and the domain, type and message lines still follow. Only typed
+      data that cannot be read at all is shown as raw text.
+    - Raw data (`personal_sign` and `eth_sign`): the message's hex exactly as
+      the site sent it. The bytes it encodes are what is signed, as an EIP-191
+      personal message.
     - Password input and an error line
     - "Sign" / "Reject" buttons
 - **Transitions**:
+    - Typed data that states no primary type, or one other than the type it
+      would be signed as, or that cannot be read → shown with the error line
+      saying so and "Sign" disabled; only "Reject" remains
+    - A `personal_sign` or `eth_sign` message that is not hex (`0x` or `0X` and
+      an even number of hex digits, the form ethers' `getBytes` reads when
+      signing) → shown as plain text, with the error line "This message is plain
+      text, not hex, so it cannot be signed." and "Sign" disabled; signing takes
+      the bytes from the hex, so such a message has none to sign
     - "Sign" (correct password) → signs locally → closes popup (returns
       signature)
     - "Sign" (wrong password, or a signing failure) → error line, no screen
@@ -2008,6 +2185,17 @@ the log level and turns the banner on, and that is all it may ever do: it feeds
 constant directly, so no runtime toggle in a release build can reach the
 hardcoded test phrase.
 
+At the raised log level the console also shows the wallet's addresses with their
+balances and ENS names, the token contracts looked up, and a line for each
+request made through `debugFetch` in `src/shared/log.js` (the explorer, the
+price feed, the RPC calls a site makes, and the endpoint checks in settings) and
+for its response. A request is logged by its HTTP method, the origin of its URL
+(scheme, host and port) and, for a JSON-RPC call, the method name; the balance
+refresh, the token lookup and a failed endpoint check in settings name the
+endpoint by its origin too. The URL's path and query string, where RPC providers
+put API keys, any user name and password in it, and the request body are never
+logged.
+
 ### Key Decisions
 
 - **No framework**: The popup UI is vanilla JS and HTML. The extension is small

TODO.md

@@ -45,6 +45,356 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
 
 # Completed Steps
 
+- 2026-10-04: The signature screen shows a personal message as the bytes that
+  are signed ([#403](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/403)). It
+  showed only the decoded text, with bidirectional and zero-width characters
+  acting on it, so a site could make the message read differently from what is
+  signed, and a message that was not hex was shown as NUL characters. The hex is
+  now shown as "Raw data" alongside the decoded text, the text is laid out left
+  to right in byte order, control characters, line and paragraph separators and
+  characters that paint nothing are shown as `U+XXXX` marks, and a message that
+  is not hex by the rule signing reads it with is shown as plain text with
+  "Sign" disabled, since such a message has no bytes to sign.
+
+- 2026-10-04: Debug mode no longer writes RPC API keys to the console
+  ([#410](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410)). `debugFetch` logged
+  every request's full URL and body, so an RPC endpoint with a key in its path
+  or query string printed that key on every request. It now logs the HTTP
+  method, the URL's origin and, for a JSON-RPC call, the method name. The
+  balance refresh and token lookup log the RPC endpoint by its origin too. A
+  failed RPC call's error line prints the error's short message, which names the
+  HTTP status, not its full message, which carries the request URL. A failed
+  endpoint check in settings names the endpoint by its origin, not the `fetch`
+  error's message, which carries the whole URL, password included, for a URL
+  with a user name and password. The README's DEBUG Mode Policy says what debug
+  mode logs.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A site has at most one connection prompt and one signature prompt
+  open at a time ([#405](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/405)). Each
+  `eth_requestAccounts` or `personal_sign` call opened another approval window,
+  so a page calling in a loop could cover the screen with identical prompts. A
+  further request of the same kind from a site whose prompt is still unanswered
+  is now refused with EIP-1193 `-32002`, the code a second transaction already
+  gets, and opens no window. Signing by `personal_sign`, `eth_sign` and
+  `eth_signTypedData_v4` counts as one kind. Other sites are not affected, and
+  the site may ask again once the user has answered. A connection prompt whose
+  toolbar popup closed before it connected, and which nothing shows any more, is
+  shown again when the site asks again.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A nonce the site supplies with `eth_sendTransaction` is ignored
+  ([#404](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/404)). It was passed on to
+  the transaction, so a site could replace one of the user's pending
+  transactions (same nonce, higher fee) or leave the new one stuck behind a gap,
+  and the approval screen showed it as a bare number. `nonce` is no longer one
+  of the fields taken from the request in `src/shared/approvalTx.js`, so the
+  transaction always gets the account's next nonce from the node, and that is
+  the nonce the approval screen shows and the popup signs.
+
+- 2026-10-04: Remembered site permissions are held by full origin
+  ([#402](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402)). `allowedSites` and
+  `deniedSites` stored the hostname alone, so a grant to `https://dapp.example`
+  also authorised `http://dapp.example` and every port on that host, and the
+  prompts named only the hostname. Both lists now store and match the origin
+  (`scheme://host[:port]`), the key the connections approved without "Remember"
+  already used, in `src/background/index.js` and in Settings, whose site lists
+  and `AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE` carry the origin too. The connection, transaction
+  and signature prompts show the origin. Entries saved by hostname before this
+  change are not migrated (pre-1.0): they match no site, and Settings lists them
+  until they are removed.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A page's request is credited only to the site the browser says
+  sent it ([#407](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/407)). Where the
+  browser does not give the sender's origin (Firefox before 126), the background
+  used the tab's page, so a frame from another site would have been treated as
+  the site embedding it, and with no tab it used an origin the page wrote into
+  the message. It now uses the URL of the frame that sent the message, and
+  refuses the request with code 4100 when the browser gives neither. The content
+  script no longer writes an origin into the message.
+
+- 2026-10-04: `make test` takes 8-13s on the shared build host, down from
+  17-25s, measured in alternating runs before and after the change
+  ([#428](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/428)). Each popup boot in
+  the tests (`tests/support/popupBoot.js`) resets jest's module registry so that
+  everything under `src/` loads fresh, and that also reloaded `ethers`,
+  `libsodium-wrappers-sumo`, `qrcode` and `ethereum-blockies-base64` every time.
+  Those four libraries are now loaded once per test file and handed to every
+  boot. No test or assertion changed.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A token whose scale is unknown reads the same on the Send screen
+  as on the confirmation screen
+  ([#377](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/377)). When two addresses'
+  explorer reports disagree on a token's `decimals`, the Send screen showed the
+  stored figure while the confirmation screen it leads to said
+  `unknown (SYMBOL)`; both now say `unknown (SYMBOL)`, from one function in
+  `src/popup/views/send.js`. The confirmation screen's fee-unknown message names
+  its cause: for an unknown scale it says the wallet does not know how many
+  decimal places the token uses and that the transaction cannot be sent, instead
+  of asking the user to go back and try again, which cannot help. For any other
+  cause it is unchanged.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A Uniswap V2 exact-out swap (Universal Router command `0x09`) is
+  decoded on the approval screen
+  ([#283](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/283)). `decode()` in
+  `src/shared/uniswap.js` had no arm for it, so the screen named the step and
+  showed no token or amount. The input side is the path's first token with
+  `amountInMax`, the output side the last token with `amountOut`. When the
+  transaction has such a step, the `Amount` figure reads `Up to <amount>`,
+  whichever step set it, there and on the wait, success and error screens,
+  except where it reads `Unlimited` (an unbounded `PERMIT2_PERMIT`, or any
+  amount at or above the `uint160` maximum) or `All available (V4 open delta)`.
+  In every swap, `UNWRAP_WETH` makes `Token Out` ETH only when the output side
+  is WETH, on mainnet or Sepolia, or when no step set the output side; otherwise
+  `Token Out` and `Min. received` keep the output side's own token and figure.
+  V3 exact-out (`0x01`) is still not decoded.
+
+- 2026-10-04: `make test` runs jest in three worker processes
+  ([#426](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/426)). The `test` and
+  `test:verbose` scripts in `package.json` ran `jest --forceExit`, which starts
+  one worker per CPU core: about 47 processes and 7-8 GiB per run on the shared
+  48-core build host. They now pass `--maxWorkers=3`, and the suite takes 23-29s
+  there: inside the 30-second cap in `script/test`, which is unchanged, but not
+  by much, because `tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js` alone takes most of it
+  ([#428](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/428)). One or two workers
+  went past the cap. `make check`, the pre-commit hook and `script/cibuild` all
+  run the suite through these scripts.
+
+- 2026-10-04: The error container on each dApp approval screen keeps its height
+  when an error appears
+  ([#297](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/297)). `#approve-tx-error`
+  and `#approve-sign-error` reserved 20px, but their border and padding took
+  10px of it, so a one-line error grew them to 26px and pushed the buttons below
+  down 6px. They now reserve 30px. A new test in `tests/e2e/run.js` shows each
+  of the six password error containers on its own screen, empty and then with an
+  error, and fails if one changes height or the element below it moves. Some of
+  the longer messages these two containers can show still take two lines.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A transaction with no `to` says "This transaction creates a new
+  contract. It has no recipient." on its recipient line and in its transaction
+  history row ([#250](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/250)). The
+  wait, success and error screens, the transaction detail view and the history
+  rows on Home, AddressDetail and AddressToken showed a blank address there,
+  with a colour dot whose colour was `undefined`; the approval screen showed
+  "(contract creation)". A transaction with a real `to` is unchanged.
+
+- 2026-10-04: The Send and confirmation screens no longer show an ETH balance, a
+  token balance or a network fee below 0.000001 as zero
+  ([#343](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/343)). The stored balances
+  (`src/shared/balances.js`) and the confirmation screen's fee were each cut to
+  six decimal places by a rule of their own, and a token holding cut to zero was
+  dropped. Balances are now stored exactly, whatever decimals a token declares,
+  and every nonzero token holding is kept; the balance check reads a token
+  balance to its first 18 places, the most an amount can have. The balance
+  lists, the send-screen token selector, the address total and the
+  remove-address warning leave out a holding below 0.000001 themselves, as
+  before. The Send screen's `Current balance`, and the confirmation screen's
+  balance, fee, reserve and insufficient-balance messages, go through
+  `truncateAmountNeverZero()` in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js`, the helper the
+  approval screen already used. The confirmation and approval screens both
+  render the fee through `formatFee()` in `src/popup/views/helpers.js`, which
+  prices the exact fee in USD, so the same fee reads the same on both, USD value
+  included.
+
+- 2026-10-04: The flash line keeps to the one line it reserves at any message
+  length ([#252](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/252)). A message
+  that wrapped pushed the whole screen below it down. `#flash-msg` no longer
+  wraps: text too long for the line is cut with an ellipsis, and `showFlash()`
+  puts the whole message in the line's title. Every message is also reworded to
+  at most 50 characters so none is cut; none carries a wallet name or text from
+  a server, and the add-token screens flash a fixed line for any error other
+  than a contract that is not a token. A new test in `tests/e2e/run.js` puts a
+  message several lines long on the line and fails if the line or the screen
+  below it moves. The two approval-screen error boxes are left to
+  [#297](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/297).
+
+- 2026-10-04: A method the wallet does not implement is refused with EIP-1193
+  code `4200` ([#279](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/279)). The
+  background's `Unsupported method: <method>` error carried no code, so a site
+  probing for an optional method could not tell "not implemented" from "the call
+  failed". The message is unchanged; the background's other errors with no code
+  are untouched.
+
+- 2026-10-04: Settings lists the sites connected without "Remember", and
+  removing a site there disconnects it
+  ([#406](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/406)). Such a connection
+  lives only in the background's in-memory `connectedSites` map, so Settings
+  never showed it and the user could not end it; `AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE`, sent
+  on every remove, did nothing. Settings now asks the background for those sites
+  (`AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES`) and lists them under Connected Sites.
+  Removing a site from Allowed Sites or Connected Sites drops its remembered
+  entry under every address and sends `AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE` with the
+  hostname; the background deletes every `connectedSites` entry for that
+  hostname and sends `accountsChanged` with an empty list to its open tabs. Only
+  the extension's own pages may send either message. Removing a denied site no
+  longer sends it, since forgetting a refusal ends no connection.
+- 2026-10-04: Removing an address or deleting a wallet ends every site
+  connection approved without "Remember" for the addresses removed
+  ([#245](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/245)). Such a connection
+  lives only in the background's in-memory `connectedSites` map. Both removal
+  paths dropped the remembered `allowedSites`/`deniedSites` entries, but nothing
+  told the background, so its entry was cleared only as a side effect: every
+  change of active address empties the whole map, and removing the active
+  address changes it. `dropSitePermissions()` in `src/shared/walletDelete.js`,
+  shared by both paths, now also sends `AUTISTMASK_ADDRESSES_REMOVED` with the
+  removed addresses, and the background deletes their `connectedSites` entries;
+  only the extension's own pages may send it.
+- 2026-10-03: The typed-data signing screen warns for a token permission, and
+  names the primary type ethers signs
+  ([#400](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/400)). A Permit or Permit2
+  signature lets its spender take tokens from the signer's address, and the
+  screen listed it as plain key/value lines, exactly like a sign-in message. For
+  typed data signed as `Permit` (EIP-2612's, DAI's older one, or any other of
+  that name) or as one of Permit2's six signature types,
+  `src/popup/views/approval.js` now shows a red warning at the top of the
+  message naming the spender and each token and amount, read only from the
+  fields the signed type declares (a `Permit`'s token is the domain's
+  `verifyingContract`), with `Unlimited` for the largest amount the field holds,
+  the existing unknown-scale wording otherwise, and `Unknown` for whatever those
+  fields do not give. The screen printed the page's `primaryType`, but ethers
+  signs the type it derives from `types`; the screen now shows the derived type,
+  and typed data whose stated type is missing or differs, or that cannot be
+  read, is shown with an error line and Sign disabled, and is refused again
+  where signing starts. The warning names no deadline or expiry: those fields
+  mean different things across the shapes, and a date could read as the
+  permission ending when it does not.
+- 2026-09-21: The network fee a transaction can commit is bounded by the product
+  of the gas limit and the fee per gas, not by each field alone, and the
+  wallet's own send is bounded the same way
+  ([#399](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/399)). The two per-field
+  ceilings in `src/shared/approvalVerify.js` were checked independently, so a
+  gas limit and a fee that were each under their own ceiling still multiplied to
+  thousands of ETH — a fee a gas-consuming contract really collects — while the
+  comment claimed the ceiling caught exactly that. `assertWithinCeilings` now
+  also refuses a transaction whose gas limit times its fee per gas
+  (`maxFeePerGas` for a type-2 transaction, `gasPrice` for a legacy or type-1
+  one) exceeds `MAX_TOTAL_FEE`, a new constant of 1 ETH beside the existing
+  ceilings, so both callers — where the dApp transaction is populated and where
+  the signed artifact is verified — reject it with a full sentence naming the
+  fee and the limit. The wallet's own send in `src/popup/views/confirmTx.js`
+  pinned no fee fields, so ethers filled them from whatever the configured node
+  answered with nothing bounding them; it now populates the transaction and runs
+  the same check before signing, showing the same error in the confirmation
+  screen's reserved errors box so nothing on screen moves. Deliberately out of
+  scope: comparing a supplied fee against the node's own suggested fee, which
+  the absolute bound already makes unnecessary for the balance-draining case. 1
+  ETH is a plain constant, one line to change; the owner may prefer another
+  figure.
+- 2026-09-21: The test recovery phrase no longer survives in a release bundle,
+  and the committed-key guard matches by content
+  ([#351](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/351)). `DEBUG_MNEMONIC` in
+  `src/shared/constants.js` is now behind the `__BUILD_DEBUG__` define, so a
+  release build folds the phrase to `null` and no emitted bundle carries it; it
+  used to survive as dead text because `module.exports` keeps the const alive.
+  `script/verify-build` now fails a release build if the phrase appears in any
+  emitted file, so the fold cannot silently regress. `tests/extensionId.test.js`
+  scans the content of every tracked file for a PEM private-key header instead
+  of matching filename extensions alone.
+- 2026-09-21: A transaction response is honoured only for a transaction
+  approval, and the three remaining approval-settlement paths are pinned
+  ([#262](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/262)). The liveness fix
+  the issue asks for — settle `4001` on release when the window it would be
+  retried in is gone — already landed with
+  [#271](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/271); this closes the rest.
+  `AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE` now refuses any approval that is not a transaction
+  approval, so a reject no longer retires a sign or connection approval and a
+  signed artifact never runs the broadcast path against one, which before only
+  failed closed by throwing deeper in. Tests pin the site-connection port's
+  approve, reject and disconnect paths against a transaction approval
+  broadcasting behind them: each is declined and the dApp still receives its
+  broadcast result.
+- 2026-09-21: `docs/RELEASE.md`, linked from `README.md`, states the release
+  procedure as a numbered list a newcomer can follow: confirm `main` is green in
+  CI, confirm the one version in the three files matches the intended tag,
+  `make package` from a clean checkout, verify `SHA256SUMS`, tag `vX.Y.Z`, then
+  distribute per browser. Each step names who performs it (owner-only steps
+  marked) and the check that it worked. The distribution step is written as
+  pending the owner's choice on
+  [#386](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/386), with the Firefox and
+  Chrome options named but none settled. Docs only
+  ([#387](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/387)).
+
+- 2026-09-21: Adding a second wallet no longer accepts a different password with
+  nothing saying it is a separate one
+  ([#374](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/374)). Each wallet has its
+  own encrypted secret, so per-wallet passwords are by design; the add-wallet
+  screen said only "Choose a password". A note now appears on that screen when
+  the profile already holds a wallet, stating that each wallet has its own
+  password and this one need not match any already in use. It is shown only
+  then, since the first wallet has no other password to differ from, and it
+  stays consistent with the no-reset reality of
+  [#312](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/312) by promising no
+  recovery or reset.
+
+- 2026-09-21: The dApp approval and transaction-status screens resolve a token's
+  symbol from the bundled list, then the tokens the user tracks, then the block
+  explorer's report — the same sources and precedence the amount line already
+  used for the token's scale
+  ([#323](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/323), folding in
+  [#354](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/354)). A token the user
+  added by hand, or holds a balance of, is now named rather than labelled
+  `Unknown token`, and a non-bundled ERC-20 is no longer carried onto the wait
+  screen as `ETH`. A tracked or explorer-reported name stays subject to the
+  spoof rule, so resolving a symbol is not a new way to wear a known ticker.
+- 2026-09-21: The debug/testnet banner no longer shows the internal view id to
+  the user in a release build
+  ([#375](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/375)). The banner appended
+  the active view's id (e.g. `[TESTNET] (approve-tx)`), which is developer
+  vocabulary sitting directly above the approval screen's carefully worded
+  authorization text. The suffix is now gated on the compile-time `DEBUG`
+  constant rather than `isDebug()`, so it survives only in a debug build; a
+  testnet or the runtime debug toggle still raises the banner but without the
+  view id.
+
+- 2026-09-21: The Confirm Delete button on the delete-wallet screen no longer
+  stays dead after a successful delete
+  ([#335](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/335)). The password route
+  disabled the button before the decrypt and never re-enabled it, so a second
+  delete in the same popup session needed a reopen; the lost-password route
+  re-enabled its own button in its leave hook, so the two screens behaved
+  differently. Both now reset through the shared `finishDelete()`, the one path
+  both routes take, so they behave the same and the button is live for the next
+  delete.
+
+- 2026-09-21: The EIP-6963 provider UUID is generated fresh on each page load
+  and never persisted ([#398](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/398)).
+  It was created once and stored, then announced verbatim to every page on every
+  load and across restarts, so any site — connected or not — could read it as a
+  stable cross-site, cross-session identifier for the install, contradicting the
+  "no tracking" promise. inpage.js now announces a per-load
+  `crypto.randomUUID()` and the `eip6963Uuid` storage key and the
+  `AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID` content-script message are gone. That key was a
+  standalone storage entry, never part of the versioned `autistmask` profile, so
+  the state schema is untouched and no existing profile is affected.
+
+- 2026-09-21: `README.md` no longer says a genuine zero always renders `0.0000`
+  ([#369](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/369)). The amount rule
+  still renders one as `0.0000`, but two swap lines say a zero in words instead:
+  `Min. received` reads `None (no minimum guaranteed)` for a zero minimum, and
+  `Amount` reads `All available (V4 open delta)` when the amount it shows is a
+  V4 exact-in `amountIn` of zero. A new list says what the decoded ERC-20 and
+  swap amount lines on the transaction approval screen can read: a formatted
+  quantity, base units with decimals unknown, `Unlimited`,
+  `All available (V4 open delta)` and `None (no minimum guaranteed)`, which a
+  zero `minBalance` on a `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step now reads instead of
+  `0.0000` at a known scale. The README also names
+  `Unknown (not named in the calldata)` on the swap's token lines, and points to
+  SignApproval for the token permission warning's own wording. Docs only.
+
+- 2026-08-30: An address no longer wraps, or is shortened to fit, in any of the
+  common views ([#380](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/380)). The
+  wallet list was the reported case: the address shared one row with the
+  `[info]` and `[x]` controls and folded onto a second line, which turns one
+  42-character string the user is meant to compare into two shorter ones — the
+  shape an address-poisoning attack wants. The fix is layout, not CSS: every
+  address in the popup now sits alone on a full-width row, with the colour dot,
+  the wallet title, the ENS name and the explorer link moved onto a strip above
+  it, and the transaction rows carry the counterparty's whole address instead of
+  a `truncateMiddle()`d one squeezed in beside the amount. `truncateMiddle()`
+  keeps its 10-character cap and its 32-character floor moved into
+  `renderAddressHtml()`, so the guarantee outlives having no callers. The e2e
+  suite measures every rendered address in a real Chromium — whole, one line
+  box, inside its row and inside the popup — across Home, the address, token,
+  receive, send and transaction detail screens, the confirmation screen and the
+  dApp transaction prompt.
 - 2026-08-23: Both manifests declare toolbar icons, and real PNGs at
   16/32/48/128 ship inside both archives
   ([#371](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/371)). Neither manifest

docs/README.md

@@ -285,11 +285,13 @@ not appear and may be permanently lost.
 AutistMask injects a standard `window.ethereum` provider (EIP-1193) into web
 pages. When a site requests access to your wallet:
 
-1. A popup appears showing the site's hostname and the address that will be
-   shared.
+1. A popup appears showing the site's origin (its scheme, host and port, for
+   example `https://app.example`) and the address that will be shared.
 2. Click "Allow" to connect or "Deny" to reject.
 3. Optionally check "Remember my choice for this site" to skip the prompt next
-   time.
+   time. The choice applies to that exact origin only: a choice remembered for
+   `https://app.example` does not cover `http://app.example` or another port of
+   the same host, which ask again.
 
 When a connected site requests a transaction, a separate approval popup appears
 showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data, network fee, network and

docs/RELEASE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# Releasing AutistMask
+
+This is the procedure that turns a green `main` into a tagged, packaged release.
+It gathers into one place what is otherwise spread across the `Makefile` and
+three `README.md` sections, so the person cutting a release does not have to
+reconstruct the order from them.
+
+There is one version, declared in three files (`package.json`,
+`manifest/chrome.json`, `manifest/firefox.json`), and `make package` builds and
+packages but publishes nothing. `make build` and `make package` can be run by
+anyone; tagging, signing, packing a CRX and any upload need credentials only the
+owner ([@sneak](https://sneak.berlin)) holds and are marked **owner-only**
+below. Releases are tagged from `main` (see the Workflow section of `TODO.md`),
+so the "release commit" throughout is the `main` commit the milestone PR merged.
+
+## Procedure
+
+1. **Confirm `main` is green in CI.** The `check` workflow
+   (`.gitea/workflows/check.yml`) runs `script/cibuild`, i.e. `docker build .`,
+   and the `Dockerfile` runs `make check` as a build step, so a green `check`
+   run is a green `make check`. Find the run for the exact release commit on the
+   tracker's Actions view. _Check:_ that commit's `check` run succeeded; running
+   `make check` on a clean checkout of the commit reproduces it and exits 0.
+
+2. **Confirm the version matches the intended tag.** `package.json`,
+   `manifest/chrome.json` and `manifest/firefox.json` must all declare the same
+   `X.Y.Z`. `make build` fails when they disagree, but nothing checks that they
+   equal the tag you mean to create — that is this manual step. _Check:_ all
+   three files read the same `X.Y.Z`, and it is the version you intend to tag
+   `vX.Y.Z`.
+
+3. **Build and package from a clean checkout of that commit.** From a fresh
+   clone, or a working tree with no local modifications (`git status` clean),
+   checked out at the release commit: run `make setup`, then `make package`.
+   `make package` runs `make build` first, so the archives can only be made from
+   a `dist/` verified against that build's own receipt as a release (not debug)
+   build. It writes three files into `release/`:
+   `autistmask-chrome-<version>.zip`, `autistmask-firefox-<version>.xpi`, and
+   `SHA256SUMS`. _Check:_ those three files exist and `<version>` in the archive
+   names is the version confirmed in step 2. The Firefox `.xpi` is **unsigned**
+   (see step 6 and "Installing on Firefox" in `README.md`).
+
+4. **Verify `SHA256SUMS`.** The archives are deterministic — sorted entries,
+   fixed timestamps, fixed compression — so a second `make package` from another
+   clean checkout of the same commit produces byte-identical files. Verify the
+   recorded digests against the files with `sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS`, run from
+   `release/`. To confirm reproducibility, run `make package` again on a
+   separate clean checkout and compare the digests. _Check:_ `sha256sum -c`
+   reports `OK` for every file, and an independent build's digests match.
+
+5. **Tag the release commit.** _(owner-only)_ Create an annotated tag `vX.Y.Z`
+   on the release commit and push it: `git tag -a vX.Y.Z` (with a message), then
+   `git push origin vX.Y.Z`. _Check:_ `git tag` lists `vX.Y.Z`, and
+   `git rev-parse vX.Y.Z^{commit}` resolves to the release commit.
+
+6. **Distribute per browser.** _(owner-only; pending the owner's choice on
+   https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/386)_ How 1.0.0 is distributed on
+   each browser is not yet decided; it is the open question on that issue, and
+   the concrete steps cannot be written until the owner records a choice there.
+   These steps need credentials only the owner holds. The options under
+   consideration are:
+    - **Firefox** — the packaged `.xpi` is unsigned, and release Firefox and ESR
+      refuse an unsigned add-on:
+        - (a) AMO self-distribution signing (unlisted): submit the `.xpi` to AMO
+          with the owner's credentials; AMO returns a signed `.xpi` installable
+          on every Firefox, with nothing listed publicly.
+        - (b) AMO listed: as (a), plus a public AMO listing and review.
+        - (c) Ship the unsigned `.xpi` and state that Firefox support means
+          Developer Edition, Nightly, or an Unbranded build with
+          `xpinstall.signatures.required` set to `false`.
+    - **Chrome** — the repo packs no CRX and publishes nothing; the extension id
+      is fixed by the `key` in `manifest/chrome.json`:
+        - (a) Chrome Web Store (unlisted): upload the `.zip` with the owner's
+          developer account; the store delivers installs and updates.
+        - (b) Self-hosted CRX signed with the private key the owner holds
+          (`chrome --pack-extension=dist/chrome --pack-extension-key=<path to the .pem>`),
+          installable only via enterprise policy on Windows and macOS, so
+          realistically Linux-only.
+        - (c) "Load unpacked" from `dist/chrome/` only, as today.
+
+    Once the owner decides, the chosen steps — including which credentials they
+    need and who holds them — are written into this section and `README.md`'s
+    installation sections are updated to match, which is part of the definition
+    of done of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/386. _Check:_ for a
+    store or AMO route, the artifact installs from the store or AMO on a clean
+    browser profile; for the CRX or unpacked route, the documented load succeeds
+    and Chrome reports the extension id `gipbhkogfopeahplcjhipkgpcimdpkip`.

package.json

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
     "license": "GPL-3.0",
     "private": true,
     "scripts": {
-        "test": "jest --forceExit",
-        "test:verbose": "jest --forceExit --verbose",
+        "test": "jest --forceExit --maxWorkers=3",
+        "test:verbose": "jest --forceExit --maxWorkers=3 --verbose",
         "build": "node build.js",
         "lint": "eslint . && prettier --check .",
         "fmt": "prettier --write .",

script/test

@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # script/test: run the test suite.
 #
-# The timeout bounds a hung suite; it is not a performance budget. On a
-# developer host the suite finishes in about 8s and REPO_POLICIES' 30s cap is
-# the bound. Inside the image the same suite also pays a cold jest cache and
-# shares the runner with the rest of the build, which is not what that budget
-# describes, so the Dockerfile raises the bound through
+# jest runs three worker processes (package.json), not one per CPU core: on a
+# many-core shared host one per core took gigabytes of RAM per run.
+#
+# The timeout bounds a hung suite; it is not a performance budget. On the busy
+# shared build host the suite takes 8-13s with three workers, inside
+# REPO_POLICIES' 20s budget. Inside the image the same suite also pays a cold
+# jest cache and shares the runner with the rest of the build, which is not what
+# that budget describes, so the Dockerfile raises the bound through
 # AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT. A cap a healthy suite can trip on a cold cache
 # produces a red that means nothing, and teaches "just run it again".
 set -eu

script/test-verify-build

@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ DISCARD_DIST="$ROOT/script/discard-dist-on-failure"
 MARKER_ON="autistmask-build-debug=on"
 MARKER_OFF="autistmask-build-debug=off"
 
+# The same test recovery phrase verify-build searches release bundles for. Held
+# here too, the way the markers above are, so a case can plant it in a bundle.
+TEST_MNEMONIC="cube evolve unfold result inch risk jealous skill hotel bulb night wreck"
+
 RECEIPT_HEADER="autistmask-build-receipt v1"
 
 NEWLINE='
@@ -516,6 +520,24 @@ c_debug_build() {
     write_receipt
 }
 
+# A release bundle that still carries the test recovery phrase — the regression
+# verify-build guards against, and the reason DEBUG_MNEMONIC is behind the
+# __BUILD_DEBUG__ define in src/shared/constants.js. The receipt is regenerated
+# so the phrase is caught as bundle content, not incidentally as a stale digest.
+c_release_bundle_with_mnemonic() {
+    printf '/* %s */\n' "$TEST_MNEMONIC" >>dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js
+    write_receipt
+}
+
+# The same phrase in a debug build is expected: make build-debug ships it on
+# purpose, so the phrase check must stay quiet under --expect debug.
+c_debug_bundle_with_mnemonic() {
+    write_bundle dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js "$MARKER_ON"
+    write_bundle dist/firefox/src/popup/index.js "$MARKER_ON"
+    printf '/* %s */\n' "$TEST_MNEMONIC" >>dist/chrome/src/popup/index.js
+    write_receipt
+}
+
 c_no_dist() { rm -rf dist; }
 
 # --- dist discard -----------------------------------------------------------
@@ -753,6 +775,13 @@ run_cases() {
     check_case "debug bundles under --expect debug pass" \
         no debug 0 "2 bundle(s) $MARKER_ON" c_debug_build
 
+    check_case "release bundle carrying the test recovery phrase fails" \
+        no release 1 \
+        "carries the BIP-39 test recovery phrase" c_release_bundle_with_mnemonic
+
+    check_case "debug bundle carrying the test recovery phrase passes" \
+        no debug 0 "2 bundle(s) $MARKER_ON" c_debug_bundle_with_mnemonic
+
     check_case "no --expect argument" \
         no no-expect 1 "no --expect argument." c_control
 

script/verify-build

@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@
 # fallback branch; the property only exists in the emitted output, so it has to
 # be asserted against the emitted output.
 #
+# The DEBUG half also checks the phrase directly: a release build must not carry
+# the test recovery phrase in any emitted file. The phrase is behind the
+# __BUILD_DEBUG__ define in src/shared/constants.js and folds away in a release
+# build, but the marker only proves DEBUG compiled off, not that the fold
+# removed the string; the phrase grep is the assertion that it did.
+#
 # Which mode to expect is an ARGUMENT (--expect release|debug) and is never
 # taken from this script's environment. It used to be read from
 # AUTISTMASK_DEBUG here, which meant an operator with AUTISTMASK_DEBUG=1
@@ -67,6 +73,15 @@ TAB='	'
 MARKER_ON="autistmask-build-debug=on"
 MARKER_OFF="autistmask-build-debug=off"
 
+# The 12-word BIP-39 test recovery phrase from src/shared/constants.js. It is
+# behind the __BUILD_DEBUG__ define there, so a release build folds it out of
+# every bundle; this is the assertion that it stayed out. The phrase is a
+# publicly committed test value rather than a secret, but a BIP-39 phrase in a
+# distributed wallet artifact is exactly the string a scanner or auditor has to
+# stop and reason about, so a release build must not ship it. A debug build
+# ships it on purpose, so this is checked only when release is expected.
+TEST_MNEMONIC="cube evolve unfold result inch risk jealous skill hotel bulb night wreck"
+
 RECEIPT_HEADER="autistmask-build-receipt v1"
 
 # Set by the arguments.
@@ -283,6 +298,18 @@ check_entry() {
     receipt records $ENTRY_HASH and the file on disk is $SHA. Something wrote
     to dist/ after the build, so this artifact is not the one that was built."
 
+    # No emitted file of a release build may carry the test recovery phrase.
+    # Checked on every file, not only the audited bundles, so a copy that
+    # reached some other emitted file fails here too. A debug build ships the
+    # phrase deliberately, so this runs only when release was expected.
+    if [ "$EXPECT" = "$MARKER_OFF" ] && has_marker "$TEST_MNEMONIC" "$ENTRY_PATH"; then
+        fail "$ENTRY_PATH carries the BIP-39 test recovery phrase, which a
+    release build must fold out. The __BUILD_DEBUG__ define in build.js is what
+    drops it from src/shared/constants.js; check that DEBUG_MNEMONIC is still
+    behind that flag. A recovery phrase in a distributed bundle is exactly the
+    string an auditor or scanner has to stop on, so this is a hard failure."
+    fi
+
     if [ "$ENTRY_FLAG" = A ]; then
         read_marker "$ENTRY_PATH"
         [ "$MARKER" = "$EXPECT" ] ||

src/background/index.js

@@ -57,9 +57,13 @@ const windowsNs = windowsApi();
 const actionNs = actionApi();
 
 // Connected sites (in-memory, non-persisted): { "origin:address": true }
+//
+// A site is its full origin (scheme://host[:port]), here and in the
+// remembered allowedSites/deniedSites lists alike: a grant to
+// https://dapp.example says nothing about http://dapp.example or another port.
 const connectedSites = {};
 
-// Pending approval requests: { id: { origin, hostname, resolve } }
+// Pending approval requests: { id: { origin, resolve } }
 const pendingApprovals = {};
 
 // One transaction approval at a time, wallet-wide.
@@ -83,7 +87,8 @@ const pendingApprovals = {};
 // authority on a nonce the network has not accepted, which an abandoned
 // approval then leaves a hole in.
 //
-// Sign approvals are not gated: a signature consumes no nonce.
+// Sign approvals do not take this slot: a signature consumes no nonce. They are
+// limited per site instead; see findPendingApproval().
 //
 // The slot is null when free, and otherwise the handle of the request holding
 // it. Once that request has raised its approval the handle carries the
@@ -95,7 +100,7 @@ let txApprovalSlot = null;
 
 // EIP-1474 "resource unavailable": the standard code for a request that is
 // refused because another one is already pending.
-const TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE = -32002;
+const APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE = -32002;
 
 // True at every moment this can be sent: the slot is taken immediately before
 // the transaction is populated, so the other request is either being prepared
@@ -132,6 +137,22 @@ function releaseTxApprovalSlotFor(approvalId) {
     }
 }
 
+// One site-connection approval and one sign approval per site at a time: a
+// page that asks again before the user has answered is refused with the code
+// above instead of opening another window, so it cannot bury the user in
+// prompts. The pending approval itself holds the place, so a caller must test
+// this and raise its approval with nothing awaited in between.
+function findPendingApproval(origin, type) {
+    return Object.values(pendingApprovals).find(
+        (approval) => approval.origin === origin && approval.type === type,
+    );
+}
+
+const APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE =
+    "AutistMask is already waiting for your answer to a request of this kind" +
+    " from this site, so this one was not shown. Please answer that one," +
+    " then send this one again.";
+
 // Nonces this worker has already handed to the node, per chain and address.
 // This is the wallet's own knowledge that a nonce is spent, and it is checked
 // before a broadcast rather than after: a node's pending count can lag a
@@ -284,7 +305,12 @@ async function proxyRpc(method, params) {
     return json.result;
 }
 
+// The site-connection approval the toolbar popup is set to open, or null while
+// it opens the wallet. Set only by resetPopupUrl() and showInToolbarPopup().
+let toolbarPopupApprovalId = null;
+
 function resetPopupUrl() {
+    toolbarPopupApprovalId = null;
     if (actionNs && typeof actionNs.setPopup === "function") {
         actionNs.setPopup({ popup: "src/popup/index.html" });
     }
@@ -459,12 +485,23 @@ async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
 
 // Open an approval popup and return a promise that resolves with the user decision.
 // Prefers the browser-action popup (anchored to toolbar, no macOS Space switch).
-function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
+function requestApproval(origin) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
-        pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, hostname, resolve };
+        pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, resolve, type: "site" };
 
         if (actionNs && typeof actionNs.openPopup === "function") {
+            showInToolbarPopup(id);
+        } else {
+            openApprovalWindow(id);
+        }
+    });
+}
+
+// Show a site-connection approval in the toolbar popup, or in a separate popup
+// window when the browser will not open the toolbar popup.
+function showInToolbarPopup(id) {
+    toolbarPopupApprovalId = id;
     actionNs.setPopup({
         popup: "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
     });
@@ -476,10 +513,6 @@ function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
     } catch {
         openApprovalWindow(id);
     }
-        } else {
-            openApprovalWindow(id);
-        }
-    });
 }
 
 // Open a tx-approval popup and return a promise that resolves with txHash or error.
@@ -495,13 +528,12 @@ function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
 // screen never named.
 // `slot` is the transaction-approval slot its caller holds. Handing the
 // approval's id to it is what makes retiring the approval free the slot.
-function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
+function requestTxApproval(origin, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
         pendingApprovals[id] = {
             id,
             origin,
-            hostname,
             approvedTx,
             approvedFrom,
             resolve,
@@ -517,13 +549,12 @@ function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
 // Uses windows.create() directly because sign approvals are triggered programmatically
 // (from a dApp RPC call), not from a user gesture, so action.openPopup() is
 // unreliable in this context.
-function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams, approvedFrom) {
+function requestSignApproval(origin, signParams, approvedFrom) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
         pendingApprovals[id] = {
             id,
             origin,
-            hostname,
             signParams,
             approvedFrom,
             resolve,
@@ -601,11 +632,11 @@ runtime.onConnect.addListener((port) => {
 // in the worker — a balance refresh in flight, another site's approval — has
 // gone on running the whole time. Loading here used to replace the very
 // objects that work was holding.
-async function rememberSiteChoice(field, address, hostname) {
+async function rememberSiteChoice(field, address, origin) {
     await updateState((s) => {
         if (!s[field][address]) s[field][address] = [];
-        if (!s[field][address].includes(hostname)) {
-            s[field][address].push(hostname);
+        if (!s[field][address].includes(origin)) {
+            s[field][address].push(origin);
         }
     });
 }
@@ -618,12 +649,11 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
         return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
     }
 
-    const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
     const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
     const denied = s.deniedSites[activeAddress] || [];
 
     // Check denied list
-    if (denied.includes(hostname)) {
+    if (denied.includes(origin)) {
         return {
             error: {
                 code: 4001,
@@ -634,25 +664,50 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
 
     // Check allowed list or in-memory connected
     if (
-        allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+        allowed.includes(origin) ||
         connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
     ) {
         return { result: [activeAddress] };
     }
 
+    const pending = findPendingApproval(origin, "site");
+    if (pending) {
+        // A toolbar popup that closed before it connected leaves its prompt
+        // pending, and once the toolbar popup is set to open something else
+        // nothing shows that prompt: the site would be refused until the
+        // address changed. Show it again. A prompt in a window or in a
+        // connected popup is settled when that closes, and one the toolbar
+        // popup is still set to open is a click away, so those are left alone.
+        if (
+            actionNs &&
+            typeof actionNs.openPopup === "function" &&
+            !pending.windowId &&
+            !pending.portConnected &&
+            toolbarPopupApprovalId !== pending.id
+        ) {
+            showInToolbarPopup(pending.id);
+        }
+        return {
+            error: {
+                code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
+                message: APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
+            },
+        };
+    }
+
     // Open approval popup
-    const decision = await requestApproval(origin, hostname);
+    const decision = await requestApproval(origin);
 
     if (decision.approved) {
         if (decision.remember) {
-            await rememberSiteChoice("allowedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
+            await rememberSiteChoice("allowedSites", activeAddress, origin);
         } else {
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress] = true;
         }
         return { result: [activeAddress] };
     } else {
         if (decision.remember) {
-            await rememberSiteChoice("deniedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
+            await rememberSiteChoice("deniedSites", activeAddress, origin);
         }
         return {
             error: {
@@ -698,10 +753,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         const s = await getState();
         const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         if (!activeAddress) return { result: [] };
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+            allowed.includes(origin) ||
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { result: [activeAddress] };
@@ -731,10 +785,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         // [TESTNET] banner under a user who believed they were on Sepolia.
         const s = await getState();
         const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+            !allowed.includes(origin) &&
             !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -806,10 +859,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
     if (method === "wallet_getPermissions") {
         const s = await getState();
         const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         const isConnected =
-            allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+            allowed.includes(origin) ||
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress];
         if (!isConnected || !activeAddress) {
             return { result: [] };
@@ -835,10 +887,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         if (!activeAddress)
             return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+            !allowed.includes(origin) &&
             !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -868,9 +919,16 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
                 "Only proceed if you fully understand what you are signing.";
         }
 
+        if (findPendingApproval(origin, "sign")) {
+            return {
+                error: {
+                    code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
+                    message: APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
+                },
+            };
+        }
         const decision = await requestSignApproval(
             origin,
-            hostname,
             signParams,
             activeAddress,
         );
@@ -884,10 +942,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         if (!activeAddress)
             return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+            !allowed.includes(origin) &&
             !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -903,9 +960,16 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
                 },
             };
         }
+        if (findPendingApproval(origin, "sign")) {
+            return {
+                error: {
+                    code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
+                    message: APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
+                },
+            };
+        }
         const decision = await requestSignApproval(
             origin,
-            hostname,
             signParams,
             activeAddress,
         );
@@ -932,7 +996,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         }
     }
 
-    return { error: { message: "Unsupported method: " + method } };
+    // EIP-1193 4200 lets a site tell "this wallet does not implement that"
+    // from "that call failed", and fall back.
+    return { error: { code: 4200, message: "Unsupported method: " + method } };
 }
 
 // The body of eth_sendTransaction, from the connection check through to the
@@ -944,10 +1010,9 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
     const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
     if (!activeAddress) return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
-    const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
     const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
     if (
-        !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+        !allowed.includes(origin) &&
         !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
     ) {
         return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -974,7 +1039,7 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
     if (!slot) {
         return {
             error: {
-                code: TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
+                code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
                 message: TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
             },
         };
@@ -1021,7 +1086,6 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
 
         const decision = await requestTxApproval(
             origin,
-            hostname,
             approvedTx,
             activeAddress,
             slot,
@@ -1095,10 +1159,9 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
     }
     for (const tab of tabs) {
         const origin = tab.url ? new URL(tab.url).origin : "";
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const hasPermission =
             activeAddress &&
-            (allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+            (allowed.includes(origin) ||
                 connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]);
         // Same as chainChanged above: a tab without our content script
         // rejects, and that is expected rather than a fault.
@@ -1110,6 +1173,24 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
     }
 }
 
+// Tell every open tab of a site Settings removed that it has no account.
+async function broadcastSiteRemoved(origin) {
+    let tabs;
+    try {
+        tabs = await tabsQuery({});
+    } catch {
+        return;
+    }
+    for (const tab of tabs) {
+        if (!tab.url || new URL(tab.url).origin !== origin) continue;
+        tabsSendMessage(tab.id, {
+            type: "AUTISTMASK_EVENT",
+            eventName: "accountsChanged",
+            data: [],
+        }).catch(() => {});
+    }
+}
+
 // Background balance refresh: every 60 seconds when the popup isn't open.
 // When the popup IS open, its 10-second interval keeps lastBalanceRefresh
 // fresh, so this naturally skips.
@@ -1268,18 +1349,29 @@ if (windowsNs && windowsNs.onRemoved) {
 // Listen for messages from content scripts and popup
 runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_RPC") {
-        // Derive origin from trusted sender info to prevent origin spoofing.
-        // Chrome MV3 provides sender.origin; Firefox MV2 fallback uses sender.tab.url.
-        let trustedOrigin = msg.origin; // fallback only if sender info unavailable
-        if (sender.origin) {
-            trustedOrigin = sender.origin;
-        } else if (sender.tab && sender.tab.url) {
+        // The origin is the one the browser reports for the sender, never one
+        // the message carries. Firefox before 126 gives no sender.origin, so
+        // the origin of sender.url is used: the frame that sent the message,
+        // not the tab's page, which may be another site embedding that
+        // frame. With neither, the request is refused.
+        let trustedOrigin = sender.origin;
+        if (!trustedOrigin && sender.url) {
             try {
-                trustedOrigin = new URL(sender.tab.url).origin;
+                trustedOrigin = new URL(sender.url).origin;
             } catch {
-                // keep fallback
+                // an unparseable URL leaves the origin unknown
             }
         }
+        if (!trustedOrigin) {
+            sendResponse({
+                error: {
+                    code: 4100,
+                    message:
+                        "The wallet could not tell which site sent this request.",
+                },
+            });
+            return false;
+        }
         handleRpc(msg.method, msg.params, trustedOrigin)
             .then((response) => {
                 sendResponse(response);
@@ -1305,6 +1397,9 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
         "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL",
         "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
         "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
+        "AUTISTMASK_ADDRESSES_REMOVED",
+        "AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES",
+        "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE",
     ];
     if (POPUP_ONLY_TYPES.includes(msg.type) && !isExtensionSender(sender)) {
         sendResponse({ error: "Unauthorized sender" });
@@ -1314,10 +1409,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
         const approval = pendingApprovals[msg.id];
         if (approval) {
-            const resp = {
-                hostname: approval.hostname,
-                origin: approval.origin,
-            };
+            const resp = { origin: approval.origin };
             if (approval.type === "tx") {
                 resp.type = "tx";
                 // The populated transaction, and the address it was raised
@@ -1332,7 +1424,9 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
                 resp.approvedFrom = approval.approvedFrom;
             }
             // Flag if the requesting domain is on the phishing blocklist.
-            resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(approval.hostname);
+            resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(
+                extractHostname(approval.origin),
+            );
             sendResponse(resp);
         } else {
             sendResponse(null);
@@ -1344,6 +1438,15 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
         const approval = pendingApprovals[msg.id];
         if (!approval) return false;
 
+        // This message signs and broadcasts a transaction, so it is honoured
+        // only for a transaction approval. A sign or connection approval
+        // carries no approvedTx, and reaching the broadcast path with one used
+        // to fail closed by throwing deeper in; refusing here keeps a future
+        // refactor from turning that incidental throw into a live path, and
+        // keeps a reject on this message from retiring an approval of another
+        // kind.
+        if (approval.type !== "tx") return false;
+
         // A reject arriving while an attempt holds the approval is refused,
         // not honoured: the attempt is on its way to broadcasting the
         // transaction, and resolving 4001 here would tell the page the request
@@ -1638,8 +1741,41 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
         return false;
     }
 
+    // The popup removed these addresses, so no site stays connected to them.
+    // A connectedSites key is origin + ":" + address, and an origin can carry
+    // a port, so the address is what follows the last colon.
+    if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_ADDRESSES_REMOVED") {
+        const removed = Array.isArray(msg.addresses) ? msg.addresses : [];
+        for (const key of Object.keys(connectedSites)) {
+            const address = key.slice(key.lastIndexOf(":") + 1);
+            if (removed.some((a) => sameAddress(a, address))) {
+                delete connectedSites[key];
+            }
+        }
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // Settings lists the sites connected without "Remember", which only this
+    // worker knows. The origin is what precedes the key's last colon.
+    if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES") {
+        sendResponse(
+            Object.keys(connectedSites).map((key) =>
+                key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":")),
+            ),
+        );
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // Settings removed this site (msg.origin) and has already dropped its
+    // remembered entries. Its connections approved without "Remember" end
+    // here, under every address, and its open tabs are told it has no account.
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE") {
-        // Popup already saved state; nothing else needed
+        for (const key of Object.keys(connectedSites)) {
+            if (key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":")) === msg.origin) {
+                delete connectedSites[key];
+            }
+        }
+        broadcastSiteRemoved(msg.origin);
         return false;
     }
 });

src/content/index.js

@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ const {
     hasBrowserNamespace,
     runtimeApi,
     sendMessage,
-    storageGet,
-    storageSet,
 } = require("../shared/browserApi");
 
 // In Chrome (MV3), inpage.js runs as a MAIN-world content script declared
@@ -21,30 +19,6 @@ if (hasBrowserNamespace()) {
     (document.head || document.documentElement).appendChild(script);
 }
 
-// Send the persisted EIP-6963 provider UUID to the inpage script.
-// Generated once at install time and stored in extension storage.
-(async function sendProviderUuid() {
-    let uuid = null;
-    try {
-        const items = await storageGet("eip6963Uuid");
-        uuid = items?.eip6963Uuid;
-        if (!uuid) {
-            uuid = crypto.randomUUID();
-            await storageSet({ eip6963Uuid: uuid });
-        }
-    } catch {
-        // Storage was unavailable or refused the write. The announcement
-        // still has to go out — a provider that never announces is invisible
-        // to every EIP-6963 dApp — so it goes under a fresh uuid that this
-        // page load will not outlive.
-        if (!uuid) uuid = crypto.randomUUID();
-    }
-    window.postMessage(
-        { type: "AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID", uuid },
-        location.origin,
-    );
-})();
-
 // Relay requests from the page to the background script
 window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
     if (event.source !== window) return;
@@ -56,7 +30,6 @@ window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
         id,
         method,
         params,
-        origin: location.origin,
     })
         .then((response) => {
             if (response) {

src/content/inpage.js

@@ -31,11 +31,12 @@
     // an error instead of accepting the refusal.
     //
     // Whatever code arrived is passed through verbatim rather than being
-    // matched against a list: the extension emits 4001, 4100 and 4902 today,
-    // and a code this file has never heard of is still the truth about what
-    // happened. An error reported with no code at all stays a plain Error —
-    // a ProviderRpcError whose `code` is undefined would advertise a
-    // conformance it does not have. `message` is untouched in every case.
+    // matched against a list: the extension emits codes such as 4001, 4100,
+    // 4200 and 4902, and a code this file has never heard of is still the
+    // truth about what happened. An error reported with no code at all stays
+    // a plain Error — a ProviderRpcError whose `code` is undefined would
+    // advertise a conformance it does not have. `message` is untouched in
+    // every case.
     function toPageError(error) {
         const message = (error && error.message) || "Request failed";
         if (error && error.code !== undefined && error.code !== null) {
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@
     }
 
     // Listen for responses from the content script
-    window.addEventListener("message", function onUuid(event) {
+    window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
         if (event.source !== window) return;
         if (event.data?.type !== "AUTISTMASK_RESPONSE") return;
         const { id, result, error } = event.data;
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@
     });
 
     // Listen for events pushed from the extension
-    window.addEventListener("message", function onUuid(event) {
+    window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
         if (event.source !== window) return;
         if (event.data?.type !== "AUTISTMASK_EVENT") return;
         const { eventName, data } = event.data;
@@ -204,7 +205,13 @@
                 "</svg>",
         );
 
-    let providerUuid = crypto.randomUUID(); // fallback until real UUID arrives
+    // EIP-6963 asks for one UUIDv4 per provider for the life of the page: one
+    // per page load, shared by every announcement in that load. It is
+    // generated here and never stored: announcing one persisted value to every
+    // site, on every load and across restarts, turned it into a stable
+    // cross-site, cross-session tracking identifier any page could read
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/398).
+    const providerUuid = crypto.randomUUID();
 
     function buildProviderInfo() {
         return {
@@ -226,16 +233,6 @@
         );
     }
 
-    // Listen for the persisted UUID from the content script
-    function onProviderUuid(event) {
-        if (event.source !== window) return;
-        if (event.data?.type !== "AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID") return;
-        window.removeEventListener("message", onProviderUuid);
-        providerUuid = event.data.uuid;
-        announceProvider();
-    }
-    window.addEventListener("message", onProviderUuid);
-
     window.addEventListener("eip6963:requestProvider", announceProvider);
     announceProvider();
 

src/popup/dustThreshold.js

@@ -19,13 +19,9 @@
 // that the user did not type — the same silent substitution the visible
 // rejection message exists to end.
 
-// Must render on ONE line of #flash-msg, whose reserved height
-// (min-h-[1.25rem]) is exactly one line at text-xs. A string long enough to
-// wrap to two lines pushes the settings view down, which the No Layout Shift
-// policy forbids. Do not lengthen this without re-running the layout test in
-// tests/e2e/run.js, which measures the flash line and goes red on a shift.
-const DUST_THRESHOLD_MESSAGE =
-    "Please enter a whole number of gwei, zero or greater.";
+// Must render on ONE line of #flash-msg; see showFlash() in
+// src/popup/views/helpers.js for how long that is.
+const DUST_THRESHOLD_MESSAGE = "Enter a whole number of gwei, zero or greater.";
 
 // Returns the threshold in gwei, or null if the input is not one.
 function parseDustThresholdGwei(raw) {

src/popup/index.html

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
             <!-- ============ FLASH MESSAGE AREA ============ -->
             <div
                 id="flash-msg"
-                class="text-xs text-muted min-h-[1.25rem] mb-1"
+                class="text-xs text-muted min-h-[1.25rem] mb-1 truncate"
             ></div>
 
             <!-- ============ WELCOME / FIRST USE ============ -->
@@ -152,6 +152,21 @@
 
                 <!-- Shared password fields -->
                 <div class="mb-2" id="add-wallet-password-section">
+                    <!-- Shown only when the profile already holds a wallet:
+                         each wallet has its own password (its own
+                         encryptedSecret), so a second wallet does not reuse
+                         the first one's. addWallet.js toggles this on screen
+                         entry from state.wallets.length, so it is constant
+                         while the screen is up and moves nothing. -->
+                    <p
+                        class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 hidden"
+                        id="add-wallet-separate-password-note"
+                    >
+                        You already have a wallet. Each wallet has its own
+                        password: the one you choose here is only for this new
+                        wallet, and it need not match any password you already
+                        use.
+                    </p>
                     <label class="block mb-1">Choose a password</label>
                     <!-- The hint is swapped in place when the import tab
                          changes, and it sits directly above the password
@@ -213,10 +228,7 @@
                 </div>
 
                 <!-- active address display -->
-                <div
-                    id="active-address-display"
-                    class="text-xs break-all mb-3"
-                ></div>
+                <div id="active-address-display" class="text-xs mb-3"></div>
 
                 <!-- quick actions for active address -->
                 <div class="flex gap-2 mb-2">
@@ -292,7 +304,7 @@
                     class="font-bold mb-1 hidden flex items-center"
                 ></div>
                 <div
-                    class="text-xs mb-1 cursor-pointer break-all"
+                    class="text-xs mb-1 cursor-pointer"
                     title="Click to copy"
                     id="address-line"
                 >
@@ -380,14 +392,14 @@
                 ></div>
                 <h2 class="font-bold mb-1">Export Private Key</h2>
                 <p class="text-xs mb-1" id="export-privkey-title"></p>
-                <p class="text-xs mb-3">
+                <div class="text-xs mb-3">
                     <span id="export-privkey-dot"></span>
                     <span
                         id="export-privkey-address"
                         class="cursor-pointer"
                         title="Click to copy"
                     ></span>
-                </p>
+                </div>
                 <p class="text-xs mb-3 text-muted">
                     Warning: anyone with this private key can access and
                     transfer all funds from this address. Never share it.
@@ -440,7 +452,7 @@
                 </div>
 
                 <div
-                    class="text-xs mb-1 cursor-pointer break-all"
+                    class="text-xs mb-1 cursor-pointer"
                     title="Click to copy"
                     id="address-token-line"
                 >
@@ -573,19 +585,16 @@
                 <!-- ERC-20 token contract (hidden for ETH) -->
                 <div id="confirm-token-section" class="mb-3 hidden">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Token contract</div>
-                    <div
-                        id="confirm-token-contract"
-                        class="text-xs break-all"
-                    ></div>
+                    <div id="confirm-token-contract" class="text-xs"></div>
                 </div>
 
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">From</div>
-                    <div id="confirm-from" class="text-xs break-all"></div>
+                    <div id="confirm-from" class="text-xs"></div>
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">To</div>
-                    <div id="confirm-to" class="text-xs break-all"></div>
+                    <div id="confirm-to" class="text-xs"></div>
                     <div
                         id="confirm-to-ens"
                         class="text-xs text-muted hidden"
@@ -689,15 +698,13 @@
                     You do not have enough ETH to pay the network fee for this
                     transfer. Please add ETH to this address and try again.
                 </div>
+                <!-- Its sentence names why the fee could not be estimated,
+                so show() in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
                 <div
                     id="confirm-fee-unknown-error"
                     class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 text-xs"
                     style="visibility: hidden"
-                >
-                    The network fee could not be estimated, so this transaction
-                    cannot be checked against your balance. Please go back and
-                    try again.
-                </div>
+                ></div>
                 <div class="mb-2">
                     <label class="block mb-1 text-xs">Password</label>
                     <input
@@ -728,7 +735,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">To</div>
-                    <div id="wait-tx-to" class="text-xs break-all"></div>
+                    <div id="wait-tx-to" class="text-xs"></div>
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Transaction hash</div>
@@ -747,7 +754,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">To</div>
-                    <div id="success-tx-to" class="text-xs break-all"></div>
+                    <div id="success-tx-to" class="text-xs"></div>
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Block</div>
@@ -774,7 +781,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">To</div>
-                    <div id="error-tx-to" class="text-xs break-all"></div>
+                    <div id="error-tx-to" class="text-xs"></div>
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <div
@@ -811,9 +818,9 @@
                     <canvas id="receive-qr"></canvas>
                 </div>
                 <div
-                    class="border border-border p-2 break-all mb-3 text-xs cursor-pointer"
+                    class="border border-border p-2 mb-3 text-xs cursor-pointer"
                 >
-                    <span id="receive-address-block" class="select-all"></span>
+                    <div id="receive-address-block" class="select-all"></div>
                     <span id="receive-etherscan-link"></span>
                 </div>
                 <button
@@ -1055,6 +1062,15 @@
                     <div id="settings-allowed-sites"></div>
                 </div>
 
+                <div class="bg-well p-3 mx-1 mb-3">
+                    <h3 class="font-bold mb-1">Connected Sites</h3>
+                    <p class="text-xs text-muted mb-2">
+                        Sites you allowed without "Remember my choice".
+                        Switching address disconnects them.
+                    </p>
+                    <div id="settings-connected-sites"></div>
+                </div>
+
                 <div class="bg-well p-3 mx-1 mb-3">
                     <h3 class="font-bold mb-1">Denied Sites</h3>
                     <p class="text-xs text-muted mb-2">
@@ -1239,7 +1255,7 @@
                 </p>
                 <div
                     id="delete-address-value"
-                    class="text-xs mb-2 break-all min-h-[1rem]"
+                    class="text-xs mb-2 min-h-[1rem]"
                 ></div>
                 <div
                     class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2"
@@ -1429,14 +1445,11 @@
                     </div>
                     <div class="mb-2">
                         <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">From</div>
-                        <div
-                            id="tx-detail-from"
-                            class="text-xs break-all"
-                        ></div>
+                        <div id="tx-detail-from" class="text-xs"></div>
                     </div>
                     <div class="mb-2">
                         <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">To</div>
-                        <div id="tx-detail-to" class="text-xs break-all"></div>
+                        <div id="tx-detail-to" class="text-xs"></div>
                     </div>
                 </div>
 
@@ -1473,7 +1486,7 @@
                         </div>
                         <div
                             id="tx-detail-token-contract"
-                            class="text-xs break-all"
+                            class="text-xs"
                         ></div>
                     </div>
                 </div>
@@ -1548,7 +1561,7 @@
                     with extreme caution.
                 </div>
                 <p class="mb-2">
-                    <span id="approve-tx-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
+                    <span id="approve-tx-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
                     wants to send a transaction.
                 </p>
 
@@ -1567,11 +1580,11 @@
 
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">From</div>
-                    <div id="approve-tx-from" class="text-xs break-all"></div>
+                    <div id="approve-tx-from" class="text-xs"></div>
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Contract</div>
-                    <div id="approve-tx-to" class="text-xs break-all"></div>
+                    <div id="approve-tx-to" class="text-xs"></div>
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Value</div>
@@ -1618,7 +1631,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="approve-tx-error"
-                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.875rem]"
                     style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <div class="flex justify-between">
@@ -1649,7 +1662,7 @@
                     funds. Proceed with extreme caution.
                 </div>
                 <p class="mb-2">
-                    <span id="approve-sign-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
+                    <span id="approve-sign-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
                     wants you to sign a message.
                 </p>
 
@@ -1673,7 +1686,7 @@
 
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">From</div>
-                    <div id="approve-sign-from" class="text-xs break-all"></div>
+                    <div id="approve-sign-from" class="text-xs"></div>
                 </div>
 
                 <div class="mb-3">
@@ -1685,6 +1698,15 @@
                     ></div>
                 </div>
 
+                <div id="approve-sign-hex-section" class="mb-3 hidden">
+                    <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Raw data</div>
+                    <div
+                        id="approve-sign-hex"
+                        class="text-xs break-all"
+                        style="max-height: 6rem; overflow-y: auto"
+                    ></div>
+                </div>
+
                 <div class="mb-2">
                     <label class="block mb-1 text-xs">Password</label>
                     <input
@@ -1695,7 +1717,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="approve-sign-error"
-                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.875rem]"
                     style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <div class="flex justify-between">
@@ -1727,7 +1749,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <p class="mb-2">
-                        <span id="approve-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
+                        <span id="approve-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
                         wants to connect to your wallet.
                     </p>
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">

src/popup/styles/main.css

@@ -44,3 +44,33 @@ body {
         background-color 225ms ease-out,
         color 225ms ease-out;
 }
+
+/* An address is one atomic string, so it gets a row of its own and never
+ * breaks across lines. A wrapped address reads as two shorter strings, and
+ * two shorter strings are exactly what an address-poisoning attack needs
+ * the user to compare instead of the whole thing. Every view that shows an
+ * address puts it in one of these, alone: the colour dot, the wallet title,
+ * the ENS name and the explorer link all live on their own line above, so
+ * nothing competes with the 42 characters for width.
+ *
+ * overflow-x is the escape hatch, not the mechanism. The row is wide enough
+ * for a full address at every nesting depth the popup uses; if that ever
+ * stops being true — a font with wider glyphs, a browser zoom — the row
+ * scrolls and the user can still reach the last character, rather than the
+ * tail being clipped away by #app's overflow-x-hidden with nothing to say
+ * it happened. tests/e2e asserts the scroll is never actually needed. */
+.am-address {
+    display: block;
+    white-space: nowrap;
+    overflow-x: auto;
+}
+
+/* A personal message on the signature screen is laid out left to right in
+ * the order of its bytes. Without this, right-to-left characters in it move
+ * the characters around them: `5`, U+05C3, `00` would read as `500`
+ * followed by U+05C3. A paragraph separator (U+2029) ends this layout for
+ * the text after it, so src/popup/views/approval.js shows one as a mark. */
+.am-byte-order {
+    direction: ltr;
+    unicode-bidi: bidi-override;
+}

src/popup/views/addToken.js

@@ -28,9 +28,7 @@ function init(ctx) {
     $("btn-add-token-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
         const contractAddr = $("add-token-address").value.trim();
         if (!contractAddr || !contractAddr.startsWith("0x")) {
-            showFlash(
-                "Please enter a valid contract address starting with 0x.",
-            );
+            showFlash("Enter a valid contract address starting with 0x.");
             return;
         }
         const already = state.trackedTokens.find(
@@ -71,8 +69,15 @@ function init(ctx) {
             require("./addressDetail").show();
         } catch (e) {
             const detail = e.shortMessage || e.message || String(e);
-            log.errorf("Token lookup failed for", contractAddr, detail);
-            showFlash(detail);
+            log.errorf("Adding token failed for", contractAddr, detail);
+            // lookupTokenInfo() rejects a contract with a one-line message
+            // starting "Not a valid ERC-20 token". Any other error, such as a
+            // failed save, can be far longer, so it is only logged.
+            showFlash(
+                detail.startsWith("Not a valid ERC-20 token")
+                    ? detail
+                    : "Could not add the token.",
+            );
             infoEl.textContent = "";
             infoEl.style.visibility = "hidden";
         }

src/popup/views/addWallet.js

@@ -100,9 +100,24 @@ function clear() {
     $("add-wallet-phrase-warning").style.visibility = "hidden";
 }
 
+// Each wallet has its own password (its own encryptedSecret), so adding a
+// second wallet does not reuse the first one's. The note that says so is
+// only meaningful once a wallet exists — on the first wallet there is no
+// other password to be separate from — so it is shown only then. This is
+// decided on entry and stays put while the screen is up, so it does not
+// move the password fields the way a per-tab hint would.
+function updateSeparatePasswordNote() {
+    const hasExistingWallet = state.wallets.length > 0;
+    $("add-wallet-separate-password-note").classList.toggle(
+        "hidden",
+        !hasExistingWallet,
+    );
+}
+
 function show() {
     clear();
     switchMode("mnemonic");
+    updateSeparatePasswordNote();
     showView("add-wallet");
 }
 
@@ -127,15 +142,13 @@ function validatePassword() {
 async function importMnemonic(ctx) {
     const mnemonic = $("wallet-mnemonic").value.trim();
     if (!mnemonic) {
-        showFlash("Enter a recovery phrase or press the die to generate one.");
+        showFlash("Enter a recovery phrase, or press the die.");
         return;
     }
     const words = mnemonic.split(/\s+/);
     if (words.length !== 12 && words.length !== 24) {
         showFlash(
-            "Recovery phrase must be 12 or 24 words. You entered " +
-                words.length +
-                ".",
+            "Recovery phrase must be 12 or 24 words, not " + words.length + ".",
         );
         return;
     }
@@ -148,14 +161,12 @@ async function importMnemonic(ctx) {
     const { xpub, firstAddress } = hdWalletFromMnemonic(mnemonic);
     const xpubDup = findWalletByXpub(xpub);
     if (xpubDup) {
-        showFlash(
-            "This recovery phrase is already added (" + xpubDup.name + ").",
-        );
+        showFlash("This recovery phrase is already added.");
         return;
     }
     const addrDup = findWalletByAddress(firstAddress);
     if (addrDup) {
-        showFlash("Address already exists in wallet (" + addrDup.name + ").");
+        showFlash("Address already exists in a wallet.");
         return;
     }
     const encrypted = await encryptWithPassword(mnemonic, pw);
@@ -214,9 +225,7 @@ async function importPrivateKey(ctx) {
     if (!pw) return;
     const duplicate = findWalletByAddress(addr);
     if (duplicate) {
-        showFlash(
-            "This address already exists in wallet (" + duplicate.name + ").",
-        );
+        showFlash("This address already exists in a wallet.");
         return;
     }
     const encrypted = await encryptWithPassword(key, pw);
@@ -243,36 +252,29 @@ async function importXprvKey(ctx) {
         return;
     }
     if (!isValidXprv(xprv)) {
-        showFlash(
-            "That extended private key is not valid. Please check it and try again.",
-        );
+        showFlash("That extended private key is not valid.");
         return;
     }
     if (!isMasterExtendedKey(xprv)) {
-        showFlash(
-            "That is an account-level or child key, which cannot be imported. " +
-                "Please paste the master extended private key for the wallet.",
-        );
+        showFlash("Please paste the master key, not a child key.");
         return;
     }
     let result;
     try {
         result = hdWalletFromXprv(xprv);
     } catch {
-        showFlash(
-            "That extended private key is not valid. Please check it and try again.",
-        );
+        showFlash("That extended private key is not valid.");
         return;
     }
     const { xpub, firstAddress } = result;
     const xpubDup = findWalletByXpub(xpub);
     if (xpubDup) {
-        showFlash("This key is already added (" + xpubDup.name + ").");
+        showFlash("This key is already added.");
         return;
     }
     const addrDup = findWalletByAddress(firstAddress);
     if (addrDup) {
-        showFlash("Address already exists in wallet (" + addrDup.name + ").");
+        showFlash("Address already exists in a wallet.");
         return;
     }
     const pw = validatePassword();

src/popup/views/addressDetail.js

@@ -3,11 +3,10 @@ const {
     showView,
     showFlash,
     balanceLinesForAddress,
-    addressDotHtml,
+    txCounterpartyHtml,
     addressTitle,
     escapeHtml,
     displaySymbol,
-    truncateMiddle,
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     goBack,
@@ -229,18 +228,18 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
         const amountStr = tx.value
             ? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + sym)
             : escapeHtml(sym);
-        const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10));
-        const displayAddr =
-            title || ensName || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr);
-        const addrStr = escapeHtml(displayAddr);
-        const dot = addressDotHtml(counterparty);
+        // The counterparty used to be squeezed in beside the amount and
+        // truncated to whatever was left over. It gets its own row now and
+        // is shown whole; the title or ENS name, where there is one, names
+        // it on the line above rather than replacing it.
+        const nameStr = escapeHtml(title || ensName || "");
         const err = tx.isError ? " (failed)" : "";
         const opacity = tx.isError ? " opacity:0.5;" : "";
         const ago = escapeHtml(timeAgo(tx.timestamp));
         const iso = escapeHtml(isoDate(tx.timestamp));
         html += `<div class="tx-row py-2 border-b border-border-light text-xs cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover" data-tx="${i}" style="${opacity}">`;
         html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="text-muted" title="${iso}">${ago}</span><span>${dirLabel}${err}</span></div>`;
-        html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="flex items-center">${dot}${addrStr}</span><span>${amountStr}</span></div>`;
+        html += txCounterpartyHtml(counterparty, nameStr, amountStr);
         html += `</div>`;
         i++;
     }

src/popup/views/addressToken.js

@@ -6,11 +6,10 @@ const {
     showView,
     showFlash,
     flashCopyFeedback,
-    addressDotHtml,
+    txCounterpartyHtml,
     addressTitle,
     escapeHtml,
     displaySymbol,
-    truncateMiddle,
     balanceLine,
     unknownableAmount,
     renderAddressHtml,
@@ -305,18 +304,18 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
         const amountStr = tx.value
             ? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + sym)
             : escapeHtml(sym);
-        const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10));
-        const displayAddr =
-            title || ensName || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr);
-        const addrStr = escapeHtml(displayAddr);
-        const dot = addressDotHtml(counterparty);
+        // The counterparty used to be squeezed in beside the amount and
+        // truncated to whatever was left over. It gets its own row now and
+        // is shown whole; the title or ENS name, where there is one, names
+        // it on the line above rather than replacing it.
+        const nameStr = escapeHtml(title || ensName || "");
         const err = tx.isError ? " (failed)" : "";
         const opacity = tx.isError ? " opacity:0.5;" : "";
         const ago = escapeHtml(timeAgo(tx.timestamp));
         const iso = escapeHtml(isoDate(tx.timestamp));
         html += `<div class="tx-row py-2 border-b border-border-light text-xs cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover" data-tx="${i}" style="${opacity}">`;
         html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="text-muted" title="${iso}">${ago}</span><span>${dirLabel}${err}</span></div>`;
-        html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="flex items-center">${dot}${addrStr}</span><span>${amountStr}</span></div>`;
+        html += txCounterpartyHtml(counterparty, nameStr, amountStr);
         html += `</div>`;
         i++;
     }

src/popup/views/approval.js

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 const {
     $,
     addressTitle,
+    CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT,
     escapeHtml,
     showView,
     showError,
@@ -8,21 +9,27 @@ const {
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     onViewLeave,
+    formatFee,
 } = require("./helpers");
 const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { networkByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
 const {
     formatEther,
     formatUnits,
+    getAddress,
+    getBigInt,
     getBytes,
     Interface,
+    MaxUint256,
     toUtf8String,
+    TypedDataEncoder,
 } = require("ethers");
 const { getPrice, formatUsd } = require("../../shared/prices");
 const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../../shared/constants");
-const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
+const { INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS } = require("../../shared/symbolSpoof");
 const {
     resolveTokenDecimals,
+    resolveTokenSymbol,
     unknownDecimalsAmount,
 } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
 // Four decimals, with the nonzero floor these screens hold: every amount this
@@ -63,9 +70,15 @@ function tokenAmountText(rawAmount, decimals, symbol) {
     };
 }
 
+// The symbol shown for a token line, resolved from the bundled list, the
+// tokens the user tracks, and the explorer's report — the same chain the
+// amount line's scale comes from. Null when no source names one, so the token
+// lines keep saying `Unknown token` for a token nothing knows.
 function tokenLabel(address) {
-    const t = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(address.toLowerCase());
-    return t ? t.symbol : null;
+    return resolveTokenSymbol(address, {
+        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
+        wallets: state.wallets,
+    });
 }
 
 // Try to decode calldata using known ABIs.
@@ -85,8 +98,7 @@ function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
     try {
         const parsed = erc20Iface.parseTransaction({ data });
         if (parsed) {
-            const token = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(toAddress.toLowerCase());
-            const tokenSymbol = token ? token.symbol : null;
+            const tokenSymbol = resolveTokenSymbol(toAddress, decimalsSources);
             // null when no source knows this token's scale. It is not
             // defaulted to 18: an amount formatted with a guessed scale is
             // the wrong number, and for a token with fewer decimals than the
@@ -198,7 +210,7 @@ function showPhishingWarning(elementId, isPhishing) {
 // and the nonce. The background compares every one of them against the signed
 // artifact, so every one of them has to be on the screen — a number that is
 // verified but never displayed is verified against nothing the user agreed to.
-function showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice) {
+function showTxFee(approvedTx) {
     const network = networkByChainId(approvedTx.chainId);
     $("approve-tx-network").textContent = network
         ? network.name
@@ -206,12 +218,9 @@ function showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice) {
 
     const gasLimit = BigInt(approvedTx.gasLimit);
     const feePerGas = BigInt(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas || approvedTx.gasPrice);
-    const maxFeeEth = formatTxValue(formatEther(gasLimit * feePerGas));
-    const usdStr = formatUsd(
-        ethPrice ? parseFloat(maxFeeEth) * ethPrice : null,
-    );
-    $("approve-tx-fee").textContent =
-        maxFeeEth + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
+    // Through formatFee(), as the confirmation screen's fee is, so the same
+    // fee reads the same on both.
+    $("approve-tx-fee").textContent = formatFee(gasLimit * feePerGas);
 
     let detail =
         gasLimit.toString() +
@@ -242,8 +251,11 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     const approvedTx = details.approvedTx;
 
     const toAddr = approvedTx.to;
-    const token = toAddr ? TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(toAddr.toLowerCase()) : null;
     const ethValue = formatEther(approvedTx.value || "0");
+    const sources = {
+        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
+        wallets: state.wallets,
+    };
 
     // Build txInfo for status screens
     pendingTxDetails = {
@@ -251,14 +263,17 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
         to: toAddr || "",
         amount: formatTxValue(ethValue),
         token: "ETH",
-        tokenSymbol: token ? token.symbol : null,
+        tokenSymbol: null,
     };
 
     // If this is an ERC-20 call, try to extract the real recipient and amount
     const decoded = decodeCalldata(approvedTx.data, toAddr || "");
     if (decoded && decoded.details) {
-        let decodedTokenAddr = null;
-        let decodedTokenSymbol = null;
+        // The asset the status summary is counted in: an ERC-20 call's Token
+        // contract, or a swap's input token. Its symbol is resolved from the
+        // same sources as the approval screen, so a non-bundled token the
+        // wallet knows is not carried onto the wait and success screens as ETH.
+        let assetAddr = null;
         for (const d of decoded.details) {
             if (d.label === "Recipient" && d.address) {
                 pendingTxDetails.to = d.address;
@@ -266,20 +281,20 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
             if (d.label === "Amount") {
                 pendingTxDetails.amount = d.rawValue || d.value;
             }
-            if (d.label === "Token In" && d.isToken && d.address) {
-                const t = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(d.address.toLowerCase());
-                if (t) {
-                    decodedTokenAddr = d.address;
-                    decodedTokenSymbol = t.symbol;
+            if (
+                (d.label === "Token" || d.label === "Token In") &&
+                d.isToken &&
+                d.address
+            ) {
+                assetAddr = d.address;
             }
         }
-        }
-        if (token) {
-            pendingTxDetails.token = toAddr;
-            pendingTxDetails.tokenSymbol = token.symbol;
-        } else if (decodedTokenAddr) {
-            pendingTxDetails.token = decodedTokenAddr;
-            pendingTxDetails.tokenSymbol = decodedTokenSymbol;
+        if (assetAddr) {
+            pendingTxDetails.token = assetAddr;
+            pendingTxDetails.tokenSymbol = resolveTokenSymbol(
+                assetAddr,
+                sources,
+            );
         }
     }
 
@@ -292,7 +307,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
         };
     }
 
-    $("approve-tx-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
+    $("approve-tx-origin").textContent = details.origin;
     $("approve-tx-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(details.approvedFrom);
 
     // Show token symbol next to contract address if known
@@ -305,7 +320,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
         toHtml += approvalAddressHtml(toAddr);
         $("approve-tx-to").innerHTML = toHtml;
     } else {
-        $("approve-tx-to").innerHTML = escapeHtml("(contract creation)");
+        $("approve-tx-to").innerHTML = escapeHtml(CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT);
     }
 
     const ethValueFormatted = formatTxValue(
@@ -317,7 +332,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     $("approve-tx-value").textContent =
         ethValueFormatted + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
 
-    showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice);
+    showTxFee(approvedTx);
 
     // Decode calldata (reuse decoded from above)
     const decodedEl = $("approve-tx-decoded");
@@ -366,52 +381,287 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     );
 }
 
+// Whether a personal message is hex by the rule signing reads it with:
+// signing takes getBytes(message), which throws on anything else.
+function isHexMessage(message) {
+    try {
+        getBytes(message);
+        return true;
+    } catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+
+// The text the hex message's bytes decode to as UTF-8, or null when they are
+// not UTF-8. The caller has checked that the message is hex.
 function decodeHexMessage(hex) {
     try {
-        const bytes = Uint8Array.from(
-            hex
-                .slice(2)
-                .match(/.{1,2}/g)
-                .map((b) => parseInt(b, 16)),
-        );
-        return toUtf8String(bytes);
+        return toUtf8String(getBytes(hex));
     } catch {
         return null;
     }
 }
 
-function formatTypedDataHtml(jsonStr) {
+// A character shown as a bordered U+XXXX mark.
+function codePointMark(c) {
+    const code = c.codePointAt(0).toString(16).toUpperCase();
+    return `<span class="border border-border">U+${code.padStart(4, "0")}</span>`;
+}
+
+// The text as HTML, with each character that paints nothing (zero-width and
+// bidirectional characters, variation selectors and Hangul fillers among
+// them), each control character and each line or paragraph separator
+// (U+2028, U+2029) shown as a mark. A line feed is shown as a line break.
+// Left in the text, a paragraph separator would end the byte-order layout
+// for everything after it. The marks are plain ASCII, so the second pass
+// leaves them be.
+function markInvisibleCharacters(text) {
+    return escapeHtml(text)
+        .replace(INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS, codePointMark)
+        .replace(/[\p{Cc}\p{Zl}\p{Zp}]/gu, (c) =>
+            c === "\n" ? "<br>" : codePointMark(c),
+        );
+}
+
+// The type ethers will sign typed data as. ethers does not read the page's
+// `primaryType`: it takes the one struct in `types` that no other struct
+// refers to. Throws when the types name no such single struct, which ethers
+// would refuse to sign as well.
+function signedPrimaryType(types) {
+    const structs = { ...types };
+    // ethers derives EIP712Domain itself and rejects it as an input.
+    delete structs.EIP712Domain;
+    return TypedDataEncoder.getPrimaryType(structs);
+}
+
+// Why a signature request cannot be signed, as a sentence for the error line,
+// or null when it can. Only typed data is refused: the `primaryType` the page
+// states has to be the type ethers will sign, or this screen would name one
+// message while another is signed.
+function typedDataRefusal(sp) {
+    if (sp.method === "personal_sign" || sp.method === "eth_sign") return null;
+    let data;
+    let signed;
     try {
-        const data = JSON.parse(jsonStr);
-        let html = "";
+        data = JSON.parse(sp.typedData);
+        signed = signedPrimaryType(data.types);
+    } catch {
+        return "This typed data cannot be read, so it cannot be signed.";
+    }
+    if (!data.primaryType) {
+        return "This typed data does not name its primary type, so it cannot be signed.";
+    }
+    if (data.primaryType !== signed) {
+        return (
+            "This typed data names its primary type as " +
+            data.primaryType +
+            ", but it would be signed as " +
+            signed +
+            ", so it cannot be signed."
+        );
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
+// The largest amount a Permit2 allowance can hold, a uint160. Permit2 treats
+// it as an allowance that is never used up.
+const MAX_UINT160 = (1n << 160n) - 1n;
+
+// One field of a struct as typed data signs it: the field's declared type and
+// the struct's value for it, or null when the struct's type declares no field
+// of that name. ethers signs only the fields a type declares and drops every
+// other key, so a key the page adds beside them is never read here.
+function declaredField(types, typeName, struct, name) {
+    const field = (types[typeName] || []).find((f) => f.name === name);
+    if (!field || !struct || typeof struct !== "object") return null;
+    return { type: field.type, value: struct[name] };
+}
+
+// The tokens and amounts a Permit2 message grants, from its `details` or
+// `permitted` field: one struct of `token` and `amount`, or a list of them,
+// as the field's declared type says. When the field cannot be read the one
+// grant returned has no token or amount, so the warning still lists it.
+function permit2Grants(types, primaryType, message, name, max) {
+    const field = declaredField(types, primaryType, message, name);
+    if (!field) return [{ max }];
+    // `PermitDetails` is one grant, `PermitDetails[]` a list of them.
+    const itemType = field.type.replace(/\[\d*\]$/, "");
+    const items = itemType === field.type ? [field.value] : field.value;
+    if (!Array.isArray(items)) return [{ max }];
+    return items.map((item) => ({
+        token: declaredField(types, itemType, item, "token")?.value,
+        amount: declaredField(types, itemType, item, "amount")?.value,
+        max,
+    }));
+}
+
+// The address or number a permission field holds, or null when it holds
+// none; the warning then shows `Unknown` rather than failing.
+function addressOrNull(value) {
+    try {
+        return getAddress(value);
+    } catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+
+function amountOrNull(value) {
+    try {
+        return getBigInt(value);
+    } catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+
+// A warning for typed data that lets a spender take your tokens, naming the
+// spender and each token and amount, or "" for any other typed data. These
+// signatures are how most wallet drains are done, and as plain key/value
+// lines they read exactly like a sign-in message. They are recognised by the
+// type ethers signs, `Permit` or one of Permit2's six signature types: a
+// contract checks the type's exact name, so a renamed copy of one of these
+// would not be honoured. Everything named is read only from the fields that
+// type declares, except a `Permit`'s token, which is the domain's
+// `verifyingContract`; whatever they do not give is shown as `Unknown`.
+function permitWarningHtml(types, primaryType, domain, message) {
+    // Each entry is a token, the amount, and the largest value its amount
+    // field holds, which the contract treats as unlimited.
+    let grants;
+    switch (primaryType) {
+        case "Permit": {
+            // EIP-2612 declares a `value`. DAI's older permit, signed under
+            // the same name, declares only `allowed`: unlimited, or nothing.
+            // Others, such as the permit for a Uniswap v3 position, declare
+            // neither, and their amount is unknown.
+            const value = declaredField(types, primaryType, message, "value");
+            const allowed = declaredField(
+                types,
+                primaryType,
+                message,
+                "allowed",
+            );
+            let amount;
+            if (value) amount = value.value;
+            else if (allowed) amount = allowed.value ? MaxUint256 : 0n;
+            grants = [
+                { token: domain?.verifyingContract, amount, max: MaxUint256 },
+            ];
+            break;
+        }
+        case "PermitSingle":
+        case "PermitBatch":
+            grants = permit2Grants(
+                types,
+                primaryType,
+                message,
+                "details",
+                MAX_UINT160,
+            );
+            break;
+        case "PermitTransferFrom":
+        case "PermitWitnessTransferFrom":
+        case "PermitBatchTransferFrom":
+        case "PermitBatchWitnessTransferFrom":
+            grants = permit2Grants(
+                types,
+                primaryType,
+                message,
+                "permitted",
+                MaxUint256,
+            );
+            break;
+        default:
+            return "";
+    }
+
+    const sources = {
+        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
+        wallets: state.wallets,
+    };
+    const spender = addressOrNull(
+        declaredField(types, primaryType, message, "spender")?.value,
+    );
+    let html = `<div class="mb-2 p-2 font-bold bg-red-100 text-red-800 border-2 border-red-600 rounded-md">`;
+    html += `<div class="mb-2">⚠️ TOKEN PERMISSION: Signing this lets the spender below take the tokens listed here from your address, without asking you again.</div>`;
+    html += `<div class="mb-2"><div>Spender</div>`;
+    html += spender ? approvalAddressHtml(spender) : `<div>Unknown</div>`;
+    html += `</div>`;
+    for (const grant of grants) {
+        const token = addressOrNull(grant.token);
+        const amount = amountOrNull(grant.amount);
+        // `Unlimited` as on the ERC-20 approve line; otherwise the quantity,
+        // or base units when nothing knows the token's scale.
+        let amountText = "Unknown";
+        if (amount === grant.max) {
+            amountText = "Unlimited";
+        } else if (amount !== null && token === null) {
+            amountText = unknownDecimalsAmount(amount);
+        } else if (amount !== null) {
+            amountText = tokenAmountText(
+                amount,
+                resolveTokenDecimals(token, sources),
+                tokenLabel(token),
+            ).display;
+        }
+        html += `<div class="mb-2"><div>Token</div>`;
+        if (token) {
+            html += `<div>${escapeHtml(tokenLabel(token) || "Unknown token")}</div>`;
+            html += approvalAddressHtml(token);
+        } else {
+            html += `<div>Unknown</div>`;
+        }
+        html += `</div>`;
+        html += `<div class="mb-2"><div>Amount</div><div>${escapeHtml(amountText)}</div></div>`;
+    }
+    html += `</div>`;
+    return html;
+}
+
+// The typed data as the screen shows it. The primary type shown is the one
+// ethers signs, never the page's word for it; typedDataRefusal() keeps the two
+// from differing on anything that can be signed. Only typed data that cannot
+// be read at all is shown as raw text, and typedDataRefusal() refuses it.
+function formatTypedDataHtml(jsonStr) {
+    let data;
+    let primaryType;
+    try {
+        data = JSON.parse(jsonStr);
+        primaryType = signedPrimaryType(data.types);
+    } catch {
+        return `<div class="break-all">${escapeHtml(jsonStr)}</div>`;
+    }
+
+    let html = permitWarningHtml(
+        data.types,
+        primaryType,
+        data.domain,
+        data.message,
+    );
+
+    // A value that is an object is shown as JSON: String() of it says
+    // nothing, and throws for some objects a page can send.
+    const display = (val) =>
+        typeof val === "object" ? JSON.stringify(val) : String(val);
 
     if (data.domain) {
         html += `<div class="mb-2"><div class="text-muted">Domain</div>`;
         for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(data.domain)) {
-                html += `<div><span class="text-muted">${escapeHtml(key)}:</span> ${escapeHtml(String(val))}</div>`;
+            html += `<div><span class="text-muted">${escapeHtml(key)}:</span> ${escapeHtml(display(val))}</div>`;
         }
         html += `</div>`;
     }
 
-        if (data.primaryType) {
     html += `<div class="mb-2"><div class="text-muted">Primary type</div>`;
-            html += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(data.primaryType)}</div></div>`;
-        }
+    html += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(primaryType)}</div></div>`;
 
     if (data.message) {
         html += `<div class="mb-2"><div class="text-muted">Message</div>`;
         for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(data.message)) {
-                const display =
-                    typeof val === "object" ? JSON.stringify(val) : String(val);
-                html += `<div><span class="text-muted">${escapeHtml(key)}:</span> <span class="break-all">${escapeHtml(display)}</span></div>`;
+            html += `<div><span class="text-muted">${escapeHtml(key)}:</span> <span class="break-all">${escapeHtml(display(val))}</span></div>`;
         }
         html += `</div>`;
     }
 
     return html;
-    } catch {
-        return `<div class="break-all">${escapeHtml(jsonStr)}</div>`;
-    }
 }
 
 function showSignApproval(details) {
@@ -424,7 +674,7 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
     pendingSignParams = sp;
     pendingSignFrom = details.approvedFrom;
 
-    $("approve-sign-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
+    $("approve-sign-origin").textContent = details.origin;
     $("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(
         details.approvedFrom,
     );
@@ -436,15 +686,33 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
         ? "Typed data (EIP-712)"
         : "Personal message";
 
+    // A personal message is signed as the bytes its hex encodes, so the hex
+    // is shown as well as any text it decodes to, and that text is laid out
+    // left to right in the order of its bytes. Signing reads the bytes from
+    // the hex, so a message that is not hex cannot be signed: it is shown as
+    // the text it is, and refused.
+    let refusal = null;
+    $("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.add("hidden");
+    $("approve-sign-message").classList.toggle("am-byte-order", !isTyped);
     if (isTyped) {
         $("approve-sign-message").innerHTML = formatTypedDataHtml(sp.typedData);
-    } else {
+        refusal = typedDataRefusal(sp);
+    } else if (isHexMessage(sp.message)) {
         const decoded = decodeHexMessage(sp.message);
         if (decoded !== null) {
-            $("approve-sign-message").textContent = decoded;
+            $("approve-sign-message").innerHTML =
+                markInvisibleCharacters(decoded);
         } else {
-            $("approve-sign-message").textContent = sp.message;
+            $("approve-sign-message").textContent = "This message is not text.";
         }
+        $("approve-sign-hex").textContent = sp.message;
+        $("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.remove("hidden");
+    } else {
+        $("approve-sign-message").innerHTML = markInvisibleCharacters(
+            sp.message,
+        );
+        refusal =
+            "This message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed.";
     }
 
     // Display danger warning for eth_sign (raw hash signing)
@@ -466,6 +734,12 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
 
     showView("approve-sign");
     attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-sign");
+    if (refusal) {
+        showError("approve-sign-error", refusal);
+        $("btn-approve-sign").disabled = true;
+        $("btn-approve-sign").classList.add("text-muted");
+        return;
+    }
     gateOnWalletDefect(
         "approve-sign-error",
         "btn-approve-sign",
@@ -504,7 +778,7 @@ async function show(id) {
         "approve-site-phishing-warning",
         details.isPhishingDomain,
     );
-    $("approve-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
+    $("approve-origin").textContent = details.origin;
     $("approve-address").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(state.activeAddress);
     attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-site");
     $("approve-remember").checked = state.rememberSiteChoice;
@@ -771,6 +1045,16 @@ function init(_ctx) {
             return;
         }
 
+        // Checked again where the signing starts, not only when the screen
+        // was drawn, and the button stays disabled: this request can never be
+        // signed.
+        const refusal = typedDataRefusal(pendingSignParams);
+        if (refusal) {
+            password = null;
+            showError("approve-sign-error", refusal);
+            return;
+        }
+
         // Decrypt here, in the popup. The password must never cross the
         // extension messaging boundary; only the signature does.
         let decryptedSecret;
@@ -862,4 +1146,10 @@ function init(_ctx) {
     });
 }
 
-module.exports = { init, show, decodeCalldata };
+module.exports = {
+    init,
+    show,
+    decodeCalldata,
+    formatTypedDataHtml,
+    typedDataRefusal,
+};

src/popup/views/confirmTx.js

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ const {
     attachCopyHandlers,
     goBack,
     onViewLeave,
+    formatFee,
 } = require("./helpers");
 const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
@@ -30,6 +31,10 @@ const {
     displayedDecimals,
     transferAmountUnits,
 } = require("../../shared/transferAmount");
+const { assertWithinCeilings } = require("../../shared/approvalVerify");
+// The balance lines, the fee reserve and the insufficient-balance messages go
+// through it, as the approval screen's amounts do.
+const { truncateAmountNeverZero } = require("../../shared/amountDisplay");
 const {
     CODES,
     FEE_PENDING,
@@ -149,11 +154,17 @@ function show(txInfo) {
         $("confirm-balance").textContent =
             bal == null
                 ? "unknown (" + symbol + ")"
-                : valueWithUsd(bal + " " + symbol, balUsd);
+                : valueWithUsd(
+                      truncateAmountNeverZero(bal) + " " + symbol,
+                      balUsd,
+                  );
     } else {
         const bal = txInfo.balance || "0";
         const balUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(bal) * ethPrice : null;
-        $("confirm-balance").textContent = valueWithUsd(bal + " ETH", balUsd);
+        $("confirm-balance").textContent = valueWithUsd(
+            truncateAmountNeverZero(bal) + " ETH",
+            balUsd,
+        );
     }
 
     // Check for warnings (synchronous local checks)
@@ -187,6 +198,19 @@ function show(txInfo) {
     $("confirm-amount-fee-error").classList.toggle("hidden", isErc20);
     $("confirm-gas-error").classList.toggle("hidden", !isErc20);
 
+    // The fee-unknown message names its cause, which is also known here.
+    // Without the token's scale estimateGas() cannot encode the transfer, so
+    // the estimate fails every time and going back cannot help; any other
+    // failure may clear on a retry.
+    $("confirm-fee-unknown-error").textContent =
+        isErc20 && txInfo.tokenDecimals == null
+            ? "The network fee could not be estimated, because this wallet" +
+              " does not know how many decimal places this token uses, so" +
+              " this transaction cannot be sent."
+            : "The network fee could not be estimated, so this transaction" +
+              " cannot be checked against your balance. Please go back and" +
+              " try again.";
+
     renderValidation(txInfo);
 
     // Reset password field and error
@@ -233,7 +257,8 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
     });
 
     // Messages carrying the user's own numbers are built here; the fixed
-    // sentences live in the reserved elements in index.html.
+    // sentences live in the reserved elements in index.html, except the
+    // fee-unknown one, which show() sets.
     const messages = [];
     if (codes.includes(CODES.AMOUNT_INVALID)) {
         messages.push("Please enter a valid amount to send.");
@@ -248,7 +273,7 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
                 : "Insufficient " +
                       symbol +
                       " balance. You have " +
-                      txInfo.tokenBalance +
+                      truncateAmountNeverZero(txInfo.tokenBalance) +
                       " " +
                       symbol +
                       " but are trying to send " +
@@ -261,7 +286,7 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
     if (codes.includes(CODES.INSUFFICIENT_ETH)) {
         messages.push(
             "Insufficient balance. You have " +
-                txInfo.balance +
+                truncateAmountNeverZero(txInfo.balance || "0") +
                 " ETH but are trying to send " +
                 txInfo.amount +
                 " ETH.",
@@ -304,14 +329,6 @@ function setVisible(id, visible) {
     $(id).style.visibility = visible ? "visible" : "hidden";
 }
 
-// A fee in wei as an ETH string, truncated to 6 decimal places.
-function formatFeeEth(wei) {
-    const parts = formatEther(wei).split(".");
-    const dec =
-        parts.length > 1 ? parts[1].slice(0, 6).replace(/0+$/, "") || "0" : "0";
-    return parts[0] + "." + dec + " ETH";
-}
-
 async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
     try {
         const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
@@ -358,33 +375,27 @@ async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
         // flight; a stale fee must not reach the screen or the balance check.
         if (pendingTx !== txInfo) return;
 
-        const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
-        const usd = (wei) =>
-            ethPrice ? parseFloat(formatEther(wei)) * ethPrice : null;
-
+        // The fee line goes through formatFee(), as the approval screen's
+        // does, so the same fee reads the same on both.
         if (estimateWei !== null && estimateWei < gasCostWei) {
-            $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = valueWithUsd(
-                "~" + formatFeeEth(estimateWei),
-                usd(estimateWei),
-            );
+            $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = "~" + formatFee(estimateWei);
             $("confirm-fee-reserve").textContent =
-                "up to " + formatFeeEth(gasCostWei) + " reserved";
+                "up to " +
+                truncateAmountNeverZero(formatEther(gasCostWei)) +
+                " ETH reserved";
             setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", true);
         } else {
             // No spread to report: either there is no estimate, or the node
             // quotes a gas price at or above maxFeePerGas, so the expected
             // cost is not below the reserve. Show the reserve alone.
-            $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = valueWithUsd(
-                formatFeeEth(gasCostWei),
-                usd(gasCostWei),
-            );
+            $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = formatFee(gasCostWei);
             setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", false);
         }
         feeStatus = FEE_KNOWN;
         feeWei = gasCostWei;
         renderValidation(txInfo);
     } catch (e) {
-        log.errorf("gas estimation failed:", e.message);
+        log.errorf("gas estimation failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
         if (pendingTx !== txInfo) return;
         $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = "Unable to estimate";
         setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", false);
@@ -394,6 +405,46 @@ async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
     }
 }
 
+// Populate the transaction this send describes, enforce the fee bound against
+// the fees that were actually filled in, then sign and broadcast it. The send
+// pins no fee fields, so ethers fills maxFeePerGas and the gas limit from what
+// the configured RPC node answers, with nothing otherwise bounding what a
+// hostile node can set — the dApp path's ceilings never reached this one.
+// Populating before the check is what makes assertWithinCeilings() see the
+// same numbers that would be signed; it throws an ApprovalMismatchError when
+// the product gasLimit × maxFeePerGas is over the bound, which the caller
+// shows in the reserved error area rather than sending.
+async function populateVerifyAndSend(connectedSigner, tx) {
+    let request;
+    if (tx.token === "ETH") {
+        request = { to: tx.to, value: parseEther(tx.amount) };
+    } else {
+        const contract = new Contract(tx.token, ERC20_ABI, connectedSigner);
+        // The contract's decimals() is read to be COMPARED with the scale the
+        // screen rendered this amount at, not to encode with: encoding from it
+        // signs whatever the contract answers now, which is not what the user
+        // read. A disagreement throws. See transferAmount.js.
+        const amount = transferAmountUnits(
+            tx.amount,
+            tx.tokenDecimals,
+            await contract.decimals(),
+        );
+        request = await contract.transfer.populateTransaction(tx.to, amount);
+    }
+    const populated = await connectedSigner.populateTransaction(request);
+    assertWithinCeilings(populated);
+    return connectedSigner.sendTransaction(populated);
+}
+
+// Show a full-sentence send failure in the reserved errors box, the same
+// element and markup renderValidation() uses for messages carrying the user's
+// own numbers, so it never moves anything on the screen.
+function showSendError(message) {
+    const el = $("confirm-errors");
+    el.innerHTML = `<div class="text-xs">${escapeHtml(message)}</div>`;
+    el.style.visibility = "visible";
+}
+
 async function checkRecipientHistory(txInfo) {
     try {
         const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
@@ -467,29 +518,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
             const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
             const connectedSigner = signer.connect(provider);
 
-            if (pendingTx.token === "ETH") {
-                tx = await connectedSigner.sendTransaction({
-                    to: pendingTx.to,
-                    value: parseEther(pendingTx.amount),
-                });
-            } else {
-                const contract = new Contract(
-                    pendingTx.token,
-                    ERC20_ABI,
-                    connectedSigner,
-                );
-                // The contract's decimals() is read to be COMPARED with the
-                // scale the screen rendered this amount at, not to encode with:
-                // encoding from it signs whatever the contract answers now,
-                // which is not what the user read. A disagreement throws and is
-                // reported on the error screen. See transferAmount.js.
-                const amount = transferAmountUnits(
-                    pendingTx.amount,
-                    pendingTx.tokenDecimals,
-                    await contract.decimals(),
-                );
-                tx = await contract.transfer(pendingTx.to, amount);
-            }
+            tx = await populateVerifyAndSend(connectedSigner, pendingTx);
 
             // Best-effort: clear decrypted secret after use.
             // Note: JS strings are immutable; this nulls the reference but
@@ -498,6 +527,14 @@ function init(_ctx) {
             txStatus.showWait(pendingTx, tx.hash);
         } catch (e) {
             decryptedSecret = null;
+            // A fee over the bound is refused before anything is broadcast, so
+            // there is no transaction that may have reached the network to warn
+            // about: the message stays on the confirmation screen where the
+            // user can go back, rather than routing to the sent/failed screen.
+            if (e && e.approvalMismatch) {
+                showSendError(e.message);
+                return;
+            }
             const hash = tx ? tx.hash : null;
             txStatus.showError(pendingTx, hash, e.shortMessage || e.message);
         } finally {
@@ -511,4 +548,4 @@ function init(_ctx) {
     });
 }
 
-module.exports = { init, show, restore };
+module.exports = { init, show, restore, populateVerifyAndSend };

src/popup/views/deleteAddress.js

@@ -87,7 +87,8 @@ function recoveryPathText(wallet) {
 // AddressDetail, followed by the USD total when there is one to give — no
 // total line at all on testnet or before the first price fetch, and no figure
 // when every holding here is one with no price, since "$0.00" directly under
-// "This address holds a balance." is a contradiction.
+// "This address holds a balance." is a contradiction. A token holding below
+// 0.000001 does not count, as the lines below leave it out.
 function balanceWarningHtml(addr) {
     if (!addressHoldsFunds(addr)) return " ";
     const line = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));

src/popup/views/deleteWallet.js

@@ -51,16 +51,12 @@ function clear() {
 // The lost-password screen holds no secret — a wallet name is not one —
 // but it is wiped on leave for the neighbouring reason: a typed
 // confirmation left standing in a hidden view is one click away from
-// destroying a wallet the user has since navigated off. The button is
-// re-enabled here too, so a screen left mid-delete is usable on re-entry.
+// destroying a wallet the user has since navigated off.
 function clearLostPassword() {
     lostPasswordIndex = null;
     $("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "";
     $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent = "";
     $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility = "hidden";
-    const btn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
-    btn.disabled = false;
-    btn.classList.remove("text-muted");
 }
 
 function show(walletIdx) {
@@ -98,6 +94,17 @@ function showLostPassword() {
 // cleanup and the accountsChanged broadcast cannot drift apart between
 // them.
 async function finishDelete(walletIdx) {
+    // Each route's confirm button was disabled by its own click handler
+    // before the delete ran. Re-enable both here, on the one path they
+    // share, so the two routes reset the same way and a second delete in
+    // the same popup session finds a live button instead of a dead one.
+    const passwordBtn = $("btn-delete-wallet-confirm");
+    passwordBtn.disabled = false;
+    passwordBtn.classList.remove("text-muted");
+    const lostPasswordBtn = $("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+    lostPasswordBtn.disabled = false;
+    lostPasswordBtn.classList.remove("text-muted");
+
     const { activeAddressChanged } = removeWalletFromState(state, walletIdx);
 
     deleteWalletIndex = null;
@@ -187,8 +194,8 @@ function init(_ctx) {
         btn.disabled = true;
         btn.classList.add("text-muted");
 
-        // finishDelete() navigates, and the leave hook re-enables the
-        // button and wipes the typed name on the way out.
+        // finishDelete() re-enables the button; navigating away then runs
+        // the leave hook that wipes the typed name.
         await finishDelete(lostPasswordIndex);
     });
 

src/popup/views/helpers.js

@@ -12,6 +12,12 @@
 // escapeHtml lives in src/shared/html.js, where the escape and the
 // reasoning behind it are; it is re-exported below so views keep importing
 // it from here.
+const { formatEther } = require("ethers");
+const {
+    truncateAmountNeverZero,
+    isBelowOneMillionth,
+} = require("../../shared/amountDisplay");
+const { DEBUG } = require("../../shared/constants");
 const { escapeHtml } = require("../../shared/html");
 const { isDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
 const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
@@ -119,7 +125,11 @@ function updateDebugBanner(viewName) {
                 "background:#c00;color:#fff;text-align:center;font-size:10px;padding:1px 0;font-family:monospace;position:sticky;top:0;z-index:9999;";
             document.body.prepend(banner);
         }
-        const suffix = viewName ? " (" + viewName + ")" : "";
+        // The view id is internal vocabulary; it helps while developing but
+        // means nothing to a user. Only a debug build appends it, gated on the
+        // compile-time DEBUG constant so a release build never shows it — not
+        // isDebug(), which is also true for a testnet or the runtime toggle.
+        const suffix = DEBUG && viewName ? " (" + viewName + ")" : "";
         if (debug && net.isTestnet) {
             banner.textContent = "DEBUG / INSECURE [TESTNET]" + suffix;
         } else if (net.isTestnet) {
@@ -218,15 +228,19 @@ function clearFlash() {
         flashTimer = null;
     }
     $("flash-msg").textContent = "";
+    $("flash-msg").title = "";
 }
 
+// The flash line reserves exactly one line, and a message that wrapped would
+// push the screen below it down (README, No Layout Shift). So #flash-msg never
+// wraps: text too long for the line is cut with an ellipsis, and the whole
+// message is also put in the line's title. Write messages to fit, at most 50
+// characters, so none is cut.
 function showFlash(msg, duration = 2000) {
     clearFlash();
     $("flash-msg").textContent = msg;
-    flashTimer = setTimeout(() => {
-        $("flash-msg").textContent = "";
-        flashTimer = null;
-    }, duration);
+    $("flash-msg").title = msg;
+    flashTimer = setTimeout(clearFlash, duration);
 }
 
 // A stored token balance as a number, or null when there is no number in it.
@@ -238,6 +252,19 @@ function unknownableAmount(balance) {
     return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
 }
 
+// A network fee in wei as the confirmation and approval screens both show it:
+// the ETH figure through truncateAmountNeverZero(), then its USD value when the
+// ETH price is known. The USD value is of the exact fee, not of the truncated
+// figure.
+function formatFee(wei) {
+    const eth = formatEther(wei);
+    const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
+    const usd = ethPrice ? formatUsd(parseFloat(eth) * ethPrice) : "";
+    return (
+        truncateAmountNeverZero(eth) + " ETH" + (usd ? " (" + usd + ")" : "")
+    );
+}
+
 // One row of the balance list: symbol, quantity, fiat value.
 //
 // `symbol` is the ERC-20's own symbol() as the block explorer reported it,
@@ -283,6 +310,9 @@ function balanceLinesForAddress(addr, trackedTokens, showZero) {
     );
     const seen = new Set();
     for (const t of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
+        // A holding below 0.000001 is not listed, tracked or not. A tracked
+        // token then gets the zero row below while showZero is on.
+        if (isBelowOneMillionth(t.balance)) continue;
         // A null balance is a holding of an unstatable amount, not a holding
         // of zero, so the show-zero setting has no say over it: hiding it
         // would be asserting the zero nobody established. Anything that does
@@ -313,14 +343,16 @@ function balanceLinesForAddress(addr, trackedTokens, showZero) {
 }
 
 // Whether an address holds anything at all: ETH or any ERC-20 the wallet
-// knows about. Deliberately unrounded — the rendered lines round to four
-// decimals, so a dust balance displays as 0.0000 while still being real
-// money at a real address. Callers that warn about holdings must ask this,
-// not the rendered figure.
+// knows about, except a token holding below 0.000001, which the balance list
+// under the remove-address warning leaves out too. Deliberately unrounded —
+// the rendered lines round to four decimals, so a dust balance displays as
+// 0.0000 while still being real money at a real address. Callers that warn
+// about holdings must ask this, not the rendered figure.
 function addressHoldsFunds(addr) {
     if (!addr) return false;
     if (parseFloat(addr.balance || "0") > 0) return true;
     for (const t of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
+        if (isBelowOneMillionth(t.balance)) continue;
         // A null balance is a holding whose amount could not be stated —
         // balances.js drops a row of zero base units before the scale is
         // consulted, so a row that survived with no quantity is holding
@@ -331,6 +363,12 @@ function addressHoldsFunds(addr) {
     return false;
 }
 
+// The fewest characters of an address any caller may ask to display. The
+// 10-character cap inside truncateMiddle() is the other half of the same
+// guarantee; this is the half that used to be spelled out at each call
+// site, and is now enforced once in renderAddressHtml().
+const ADDRESS_MIN_DISPLAY_LEN = 32;
+
 // Truncate the middle of a string, replacing removed characters with "…".
 // Safety: refuses to truncate more than 10 characters, which is the maximum
 // that still prevents address spoofing attacks (see Display Consistency in
@@ -393,6 +431,29 @@ function addressTitle(address, wallets) {
     return null;
 }
 
+// What every recipient line and history row says for a transaction with no
+// `to`. Such a transaction creates a contract, so there is no address to show,
+// and a blank line on these screens reads as a rendering fault.
+const CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT =
+    "This transaction creates a new contract. It has no recipient.";
+
+// The last two lines of a transaction history row: the counterparty's colour
+// dot and name beside the amount, then its full address. A contract creation
+// the user sent has no counterparty (its `to` is ""), so its row has the
+// amount alone and the contract creation sentence in place of the address.
+function txCounterpartyHtml(address, nameHtml, amountHtml) {
+    if (!address) {
+        return (
+            `<div class="flex justify-between"><span></span><span>${amountHtml}</span></div>` +
+            `<div>${escapeHtml(CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT)}</div>`
+        );
+    }
+    return (
+        `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="flex items-center">${addressDotHtml(address)}${nameHtml}</span><span>${amountHtml}</span></div>` +
+        `<div class="am-address">${escapeHtml(address)}</div>`
+    );
+}
+
 // Render an address with color dot, optional ENS name, optional title,
 // and optional truncation. Title and ENS are shown as bold labels above
 // the full address.
@@ -518,17 +579,29 @@ function attachCopyHandlers(container) {
 
 // Unified address rendering.
 //
-// Produces consistent HTML for any Ethereum address:
-//   • Color dot
-//   • Optional title (e.g. "Wallet 1 — Address 2") shown bold above address
-//   • Optional ENS name shown bold above address
-//   • Full address (or truncated via maxLen) with dashed-underline click-to-copy
-//   • Etherscan external link icon
+// Two stacked rows, in this order:
+//   1. Identity strip — colour dot, optional title (e.g. "Wallet 1 —
+//      Address 2") and the explorer link icon. Optional ENS name below it.
+//   2. The address itself, alone on a full-width row that never wraps
+//      (see .am-address in styles/main.css).
+//
+// The split is the point. Everything used to sit on one line: dot, address
+// and link together, with `break-all` to let the address fold when the line
+// ran out. In the wallet list, where the row also carried [info] and [x],
+// it ran out every time — the bug in #380 — and a folded address is a
+// spoofing hazard, not a cosmetic one. Nothing shares the address's row
+// now, so all 42 characters fit at every nesting depth the popup uses and
+// nothing has to be dropped or folded to make room.
 //
 // Options object:
 //   title    — wallet title string (from addressTitle)
 //   ensName  — ENS name string
-//   maxLen   — if set, truncate address display (min 32 chars enforced)
+//   maxLen   — if set, truncate address display. Floored at 32 characters
+//              here rather than by the caller: no view passes it any more
+//              (every address row is wide enough for all 42 characters),
+//              so a floor that lived in the callers would have gone away
+//              with them, and the "at least 32 characters" guarantee has
+//              to survive having no current callers to be a guarantee.
 //   noLink   — if true, omit etherscan link
 //
 // After inserting the returned HTML into the DOM, call
@@ -536,22 +609,22 @@ function attachCopyHandlers(container) {
 function renderAddressHtml(address, opts) {
     const { title, ensName, maxLen, noLink } = opts || {};
     const dot = addressDotHtml(address);
-    const displayAddr = maxLen ? truncateMiddle(address, maxLen) : address;
+    const displayAddr = maxLen
+        ? truncateMiddle(address, Math.max(ADDRESS_MIN_DISPLAY_LEN, maxLen))
+        : address;
     const link = etherscanAddressUrl(address);
     const extLink = noLink ? "" : etherscanLinkHtml(link);
 
     let html = "";
+    html += `<div class="flex items-center">${dot}`;
     if (title) {
-        html += `<div class="flex items-center font-bold">${dot}${escapeHtml(title)}</div>`;
+        html += `<span class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(title)}</span>`;
     }
+    html += `${extLink}</div>`;
     if (ensName) {
-        html += `<div class="flex items-center font-bold">${title ? "" : dot}${escapeHtml(ensName)}</div>`;
-    }
-    if (title || ensName) {
-        html += `<div class="flex items-center">${copyableHtml(displayAddr, "break-all")}${extLink}</div>`;
-    } else {
-        html += `<div class="flex items-center">${dot}${copyableHtml(displayAddr, "break-all")}${extLink}</div>`;
+        html += `<div class="font-bold">${escapeHtml(ensName)}</div>`;
     }
+    html += `<div class="am-address">${copyableHtml(displayAddr)}</div>`;
     return html;
 }
 
@@ -587,11 +660,14 @@ module.exports = {
     balanceLinesForAddress,
     addressHoldsFunds,
     unknownableAmount,
+    formatFee,
     addressColor,
     addressDotHtml,
     escapeHtml,
     displaySymbol,
     addressTitle,
+    CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT,
+    txCounterpartyHtml,
     formatAddressHtml,
     renderAddressHtml,
     copyableHtml,

src/popup/views/home.js

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ const {
     isoDate,
     timeAgo,
     addressDotHtml,
+    txCounterpartyHtml,
     addressTitle,
     escapeHtml,
     displaySymbol,
-    truncateMiddle,
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     pushCurrentView,
@@ -117,18 +117,19 @@ function renderHomeTxList(ctx) {
         const amountStr = tx.value
             ? escapeHtml(tx.value + " " + sym)
             : escapeHtml(sym);
+        // The counterparty used to be squeezed in beside the amount and
+        // truncated to whatever was left over. It gets its own row now and
+        // is shown whole; the title, when it is one of our own addresses,
+        // names it on the line above rather than replacing it.
         const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets);
-        const maxAddr = Math.max(32, 36 - Math.max(0, amountStr.length - 10));
-        const displayAddr = title || truncateMiddle(counterparty, maxAddr);
-        const addrStr = escapeHtml(displayAddr);
-        const dot = addressDotHtml(counterparty);
+        const titleStr = title ? escapeHtml(title) : "";
         const err = tx.isError ? " (failed)" : "";
         const opacity = tx.isError ? " opacity:0.5;" : "";
         const ago = escapeHtml(timeAgo(tx.timestamp));
         const iso = escapeHtml(isoDate(tx.timestamp));
         html += `<div class="home-tx-row py-2 border-b border-border-light text-xs cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover" data-tx="${i}" style="${opacity}">`;
         html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="text-muted" title="${iso}">${ago}</span><span>${dirLabel}${err}</span></div>`;
-        html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="flex items-center">${dot}${addrStr}</span><span>${amountStr}</span></div>`;
+        html += txCounterpartyHtml(counterparty, titleStr, amountStr);
         html += `</div>`;
         i++;
     }
@@ -252,17 +253,22 @@ function walletListHtml() {
                 : "";
             const dot = addressDotHtml(addr.address);
             const titleBold = isActive ? "font-bold" : "";
-            html += `<div class="text-xs ${titleBold}">Address ${ai + 1}</div>`;
+            // [info] and [x] ride on the "Address N" line, which was empty
+            // to its right, so the address below gets the row to itself.
+            // They used to sit beside the address and take about a third of
+            // the width off it, which is what made a 42-character address
+            // fold onto a second line here and nowhere else (#380).
+            html += `<div class="flex text-xs items-center justify-between">`;
+            html += `<span class="flex items-center ${titleBold}">${dot}Address ${ai + 1}</span>`;
+            html += `<span class="flex-shrink-0 ml-1">${infoBtn}${removeBtn}</span>`;
+            html += `</div>`;
             if (addr.ensName) {
                 // An ENS reverse record is whatever the name owner set it
                 // to; renderAddressHtml() escapes its own copy of this and
                 // this list was the one that did not.
-                html += `<div class="text-xs font-bold flex items-center">${dot}${escapeHtml(addr.ensName)}</div>`;
+                html += `<div class="text-xs font-bold">${escapeHtml(addr.ensName)}</div>`;
             }
-            html += `<div class="flex text-xs items-center justify-between">`;
-            html += `<span class="flex items-center break-all">${addr.ensName ? "" : dot}${escapeHtml(addr.address)}</span>`;
-            html += `<span class="flex-shrink-0 ml-1">${infoBtn}${removeBtn}</span>`;
-            html += `</div>`;
+            html += `<div class="am-address text-xs">${escapeHtml(addr.address)}</div>`;
             const addrTotal = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));
             html += `<div class="text-xs text-muted text-right min-h-[1rem]">${addrTotal || "&nbsp;"}</div>`;
             html += balanceLinesForAddress(

src/popup/views/send.js

@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ const { resolveTokenDecimals } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
 const { resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
 const { isLowHolderCount } = require("../../shared/holders");
 const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("../../shared/symbolSpoof");
+const {
+    truncateAmountNeverZero,
+    isBelowOneMillionth,
+} = require("../../shared/amountDisplay");
 const { getAddress } = require("ethers");
 
 const ZERO_ADDRESS = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
@@ -63,13 +67,13 @@ function validateToAddress(value) {
             if (checksummed !== v) {
                 return {
                     valid: false,
-                    error: "Address checksum is invalid. Please double-check the address.",
+                    error: "Address checksum is invalid. Check the address.",
                 };
             }
         } catch {
             return {
                 valid: false,
-                error: "Address checksum is invalid. Please double-check the address.",
+                error: "Address checksum is invalid. Check the address.",
             };
         }
     }
@@ -125,6 +129,10 @@ function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
         (state.fraudContracts || []).map((a) => a.toLowerCase()),
     );
     for (const t of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
+        // A holding below 0.000001 is left out, as the balance lists leave it
+        // out. Its token's own screen can still send it: there
+        // state.selectedToken picks the token, not this list.
+        if (isBelowOneMillionth(t.balance)) continue;
         if (isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address)) continue;
         if (fraudSet.has(t.address.toLowerCase())) continue;
         // An unknown holder count does not withhold a token the user holds:
@@ -138,6 +146,50 @@ function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
     }
 }
 
+// The token balance and scale the Send screen states and hands the
+// confirmation screen, so the two screens describe the holding the same way.
+//
+// The scale is resolved the same way balances.js resolved the scale it
+// DISPLAYED this token's balance at: bundled list, then the user's tracked
+// tokens, then the explorer. The stored tokenBalances[].decimals is the
+// explorer's own answer alone, so reading it raw carries a null forward for a
+// token the wallet does know the scale of — and displayedDecimals() then throws
+// inside estimateGas(), which the confirmation screen reports as an unestimable
+// fee. Unsendable, over a scale that was never in doubt
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349). Still null when nothing
+// knows: no fallback.
+//
+// Resolved WITH `wallets`, which balances.js does not pass: that adds
+// explorerDecimals()'s cross-address check, so a contract two addresses report
+// different scales for answers null rather than picking one. That check has to
+// apply here, because this scale encodes the transfer — it is carried forward
+// so the transfer is encoded with the number the user read rather than with
+// whatever the contract answers at signing time (see
+// src/shared/transferAmount.js). balances.js is formatting one explorer row at
+// fetch time and cannot consult a state it is in the middle of replacing.
+//
+// The two resolutions can therefore differ, and where they do, the stored
+// `balance` is a quantity computed at a scale this screen has just declined to
+// stand behind. Stating it would leave validateTransfer() checking the amount
+// against a number the wallet does not vouch for, so it is withdrawn: unknown
+// scale means unknown balance. It is null rather than "0": both screens state
+// an unknown balance as unknown, and validateTransfer() treats it as no balance
+// to spend from, which is the fail-closed side of an amount nobody can check.
+// Only a stored quantity is withdrawn: the "0" for a token that has no row at
+// all is an absence of holdings, which is true at every scale.
+function tokenBalanceAndDecimals(addr, token) {
+    const tb = (addr.tokenBalances || []).find(
+        (t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === token.toLowerCase(),
+    );
+    const tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(token, {
+        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
+        wallets: state.wallets,
+    });
+    if (!tb) return { tokenBalance: "0", tokenDecimals };
+    if (tokenDecimals === null) return { tokenBalance: null, tokenDecimals };
+    return { tokenBalance: tb.balance ?? null, tokenDecimals };
+}
+
 function updateSendBalance() {
     const addr = currentAddress();
     if (!addr) return;
@@ -150,24 +202,27 @@ function updateSendBalance() {
     const token = state.selectedToken || $("send-token").value;
     if (token === "ETH") {
         $("send-balance").textContent =
-            "Current balance: " + (addr.balance || "0") + " ETH";
+            "Current balance: " +
+            truncateAmountNeverZero(addr.balance || "0") +
+            " ETH";
     } else {
-        const tb = (addr.tokenBalances || []).find(
-            (t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === token.toLowerCase(),
-        );
         const symbol = resolveSymbol(
             token,
             addr.tokenBalances,
             state.trackedTokens,
         );
-        // A null balance is a holding whose scale nothing knows. Saying "0"
-        // for it would be a claim about the amount; the send itself is
+        // A null balance is a holding whose scale is unknown. Saying a figure
+        // for it would be a claim about the amount, so it reads as the
+        // confirmation screen's balance line reads it; the send itself is
         // refused later by transferAmountUnits() for the same missing scale.
-        const bal = tb ? tb.balance : "0";
+        const bal = tokenBalanceAndDecimals(addr, token).tokenBalance;
         $("send-balance").textContent =
             bal == null
                 ? "Current balance: unknown (" + symbol + ")"
-                : "Current balance: " + bal + " " + symbol;
+                : "Current balance: " +
+                  truncateAmountNeverZero(bal) +
+                  " " +
+                  symbol;
     }
 }
 
@@ -211,7 +266,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
                 const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
                 const resolved = await provider.resolveName(to);
                 if (!resolved) {
-                    showFlash("Could not resolve " + to);
+                    showFlash("That ENS name has no address.");
                     return;
                 }
                 resolvedTo = resolved;
@@ -227,59 +282,17 @@ function init(_ctx) {
 
         let tokenSymbol = null;
         let tokenBalance = null;
-        // The scale the amount and the balance below are rendered at, carried
-        // forward so the transfer is encoded with the number the user read
-        // rather than with whatever the contract answers at signing time. See
-        // src/shared/transferAmount.js.
         let tokenDecimals = null;
         if (token !== "ETH") {
-            const tb = (addr.tokenBalances || []).find(
-                (t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === token.toLowerCase(),
-            );
             tokenSymbol = resolveSymbol(
                 token,
                 addr.tokenBalances,
                 state.trackedTokens,
             );
-            // null carried through rather than flattened to "0": the confirm
-            // screen states an unknown balance as unknown, and
-            // validateTransfer() treats it as no balance to spend from, which
-            // is the fail-closed side of an amount nobody can check.
-            tokenBalance = tb ? (tb.balance ?? null) : "0";
-            // Resolved the same way balances.js resolved the scale it
-            // DISPLAYED this token's balance at: bundled list, then the user's
-            // tracked tokens, then the explorer. The stored
-            // tokenBalances[].decimals is the explorer's own answer alone, so
-            // reading it raw carries a null forward for a token the wallet
-            // does know the scale of — and displayedDecimals() then throws
-            // inside estimateGas(), which the confirmation screen reports as
-            // an unestimable fee. Unsendable, over a scale that was never in
-            // doubt (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349).
-            // Still null when nothing knows: no fallback.
-            //
-            // Resolved WITH `wallets`, which balances.js does not pass: that
-            // adds explorerDecimals()'s cross-address check, so a contract two
-            // addresses report different scales for answers null rather than
-            // picking one. That check has to apply here, because this value
-            // encodes a transfer; balances.js is formatting one explorer row
-            // at fetch time and cannot consult a state it is in the middle of
-            // replacing.
-            tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(token, {
-                trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
-                wallets: state.wallets,
-            });
-            // The two resolutions can therefore differ, and where they do, the
-            // stored `balance` is a quantity computed at a scale this screen
-            // has just declined to stand behind. Stating it would leave
-            // validateTransfer() checking the amount against a number the
-            // wallet does not vouch for, and — since the unknown-balance path
-            // is gated on the balance, not on the scale — would leave the
-            // fee-estimate failure as the only thing on the confirmation
-            // screen, which says nothing about decimals. Unknown scale means
-            // unknown balance. Only a stored quantity is withdrawn: the "0"
-            // for a token that has no row at all is an absence of holdings,
-            // which is true at every scale.
-            if (tb && tokenDecimals === null) tokenBalance = null;
+            ({ tokenBalance, tokenDecimals } = tokenBalanceAndDecimals(
+                addr,
+                token,
+            ));
         }
 
         ctx.showConfirmTx({

src/popup/views/settings.js

@@ -16,7 +16,12 @@ const {
 } = require("../dustThreshold");
 const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { onChainSwitch } = require("../../shared/chainSwitch");
-const { log, debugFetch, setRuntimeDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
+const {
+    log,
+    debugFetch,
+    urlOrigin,
+    setRuntimeDebug,
+} = require("../../shared/log");
 const deleteWallet = require("./deleteWallet");
 const showPhrase = require("./showPhrase");
 const { walletHasRecoveryPhrase } = require("../../shared/wallet");
@@ -29,44 +34,61 @@ const {
     GITEA_COMMIT_URL,
 } = require("../../shared/buildInfo");
 
-const { notify } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
+const { notify, sendMessage } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
 
 let versionClickCount = 0;
 let versionClickTimer = null;
 
-function renderSiteList(containerId, siteMap, stateKey) {
+// One row per site origin, however many addresses it appears under, each with
+// an [x] that hands it to onRemove.
+function renderSiteList(containerId, origins, onRemove) {
     const container = $(containerId);
-    const hostnames = [...new Set(Object.values(siteMap).flat())];
-    if (hostnames.length === 0) {
+    const unique = [...new Set(origins)];
+    if (unique.length === 0) {
         container.innerHTML = '<p class="text-xs text-muted">None</p>';
         return;
     }
     let html = "";
-    hostnames.forEach((hostname) => {
+    unique.forEach((origin) => {
         html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`;
-        // A hostname the URL parser produced cannot carry a delimiter, so
+        // An origin the URL parser produced cannot carry a delimiter, so
         // this is escaped for the rule rather than for a known hole — the
         // rule being that nothing reaches innerHTML unescaped.
-        html += `<span>${escapeHtml(hostname)}</span>`;
-        html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-key="${escapeHtml(stateKey)}" data-hostname="${escapeHtml(hostname)}">[x]</button>`;
+        html += `<span>${escapeHtml(origin)}</span>`;
+        html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-origin="${escapeHtml(origin)}">[x]</button>`;
         html += `</div>`;
     });
     container.innerHTML = html;
     container.querySelectorAll(".btn-remove-site").forEach((btn) => {
-        btn.addEventListener("click", async () => {
-            const key = btn.dataset.key;
-            const host = btn.dataset.hostname;
-            for (const addr of Object.keys(state[key])) {
-                state[key][addr] = state[key][addr].filter((h) => h !== host);
-                if (state[key][addr].length === 0) {
-                    delete state[key][addr];
+        btn.addEventListener("click", () => onRemove(btn.dataset.origin));
+    });
+}
+
+// Drop a site origin from a remembered site list under every address.
+function forgetOrigin(siteMap, origin) {
+    for (const addr of Object.keys(siteMap)) {
+        siteMap[addr] = siteMap[addr].filter((o) => o !== origin);
+        if (siteMap[addr].length === 0) {
+            delete siteMap[addr];
         }
     }
+}
+
+// Removing a site from Allowed Sites or Connected Sites disconnects it: it is
+// no longer allowed under any address, and the background ends its
+// connections approved without "Remember" and tells its open tabs.
+async function removeAllowedSite(origin) {
+    forgetOrigin(state.allowedSites, origin);
     await saveState();
-            notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE" });
-            renderSiteList(containerId, state[key], key);
-        });
-    });
+    notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", origin });
+    await renderSiteLists();
+}
+
+// Removing a denied site only forgets the refusal; it connects nothing.
+async function removeDeniedSite(origin) {
+    forgetOrigin(state.deniedSites, origin);
+    await saveState();
+    await renderSiteLists();
 }
 
 function renderTrackedTokens() {
@@ -202,13 +224,24 @@ function show() {
     showView("settings");
 }
 
-function renderSiteLists() {
+async function renderSiteLists() {
     renderSiteList(
         "settings-allowed-sites",
-        state.allowedSites,
-        "allowedSites",
+        Object.values(state.allowedSites).flat(),
+        removeAllowedSite,
+    );
+    renderSiteList(
+        "settings-denied-sites",
+        Object.values(state.deniedSites).flat(),
+        removeDeniedSite,
+    );
+    // Sites allowed without "Remember" are held only by the background, in
+    // memory, so it is asked for them.
+    renderSiteList(
+        "settings-connected-sites",
+        await sendMessage({ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES" }),
+        removeAllowedSite,
     );
-    renderSiteList("settings-denied-sites", state.deniedSites, "deniedSites");
 }
 
 function init(ctx) {
@@ -236,22 +269,19 @@ function init(ctx) {
             const json = await resp.json();
             if (json.error) {
                 log.errorf("RPC validation error:", json.error);
-                showFlash("Endpoint returned error: " + json.error.message);
+                showFlash("Endpoint returned an error.");
                 return;
             }
             const net = currentNetwork();
             if (json.result !== net.chainId) {
-                showFlash(
-                    "Wrong network (expected " +
-                        net.name +
-                        ", got chain " +
-                        json.result +
-                        ").",
-                );
+                showFlash("Wrong network: expected " + net.name + ".");
                 return;
             }
-        } catch (e) {
-            log.errorf("RPC validation fetch failed:", e.message);
+        } catch {
+            // Not the error's message: fetch puts the whole URL, password and
+            // key included, in the message of the error it throws for a URL
+            // with a user name and password or one it cannot parse.
+            log.errorf("RPC validation fetch failed:", urlOrigin(url));
             showFlash("Could not reach endpoint.");
             return;
         }
@@ -273,8 +303,9 @@ function init(ctx) {
                 showFlash("Endpoint returned HTTP " + resp.status + ".");
                 return;
             }
-        } catch (e) {
-            log.errorf("Blockscout validation failed:", e.message);
+        } catch {
+            // Not the error's message, as for the RPC check above.
+            log.errorf("Blockscout validation failed:", urlOrigin(url));
             showFlash("Could not reach endpoint.");
             return;
         }

src/popup/views/settingsAddToken.js

@@ -115,9 +115,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
     $("btn-settings-addtoken-manual").addEventListener("click", async () => {
         const addr = $("settings-addtoken-address").value.trim();
         if (!addr || !addr.startsWith("0x")) {
-            showFlash(
-                "Please enter a valid contract address starting with 0x.",
-            );
+            showFlash("Enter a valid contract address starting with 0x.");
             return;
         }
         if (isTracked(addr)) {
@@ -155,8 +153,15 @@ function init(_ctx) {
             ctx.doRefreshAndRender();
         } catch (e) {
             const detail = e.shortMessage || e.message || String(e);
-            log.errorf("Token lookup failed for", addr, detail);
-            showFlash(detail);
+            log.errorf("Adding token failed for", addr, detail);
+            // lookupTokenInfo() rejects a contract with a one-line message
+            // starting "Not a valid ERC-20 token". Any other error, such as a
+            // failed save, can be far longer, so it is only logged.
+            showFlash(
+                detail.startsWith("Not a valid ERC-20 token")
+                    ? detail
+                    : "Could not add the token.",
+            );
             infoEl.textContent = "";
             infoEl.style.visibility = "hidden";
         }

src/popup/views/transactionDetail.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const {
     showFlash,
     flashCopyFeedback,
     addressTitle,
+    CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT,
     addressDotHtml,
     escapeHtml,
     isoDate,
@@ -94,13 +95,18 @@ function render() {
     $("tx-detail-hash").innerHTML = txHashHtml(tx.hash);
 
     const fromTitle = addressTitle(tx.from, state.wallets);
-    const toTitle = addressTitle(tx.to, state.wallets);
     $("tx-detail-from").innerHTML = txAddressHtml(
         tx.from,
         tx.fromEns,
         fromTitle,
     );
+    // A contract creation has no recipient: transactions.js gives it `to: ""`.
+    if (tx.to) {
+        const toTitle = addressTitle(tx.to, state.wallets);
         $("tx-detail-to").innerHTML = txAddressHtml(tx.to, tx.toEns, toTitle);
+    } else {
+        $("tx-detail-to").innerHTML = escapeHtml(CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT);
+    }
 
     // Exact amount (full precision, copyable)
     const detailSym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
@@ -137,10 +143,16 @@ function render() {
         if (tx.contractAddress) {
             const dot = addressDotHtml(tx.contractAddress);
             const link = explorerUrl("token", tx.contractAddress);
+            // Hand-rolled rather than renderAddressHtml() because the
+            // link goes to the explorer's /token/ page, not /address/.
+            // Same two-row shape though: dot and link on the strip, the
+            // contract address alone on the row below it.
             tokenContractEl.innerHTML =
                 `<div class="flex items-center">${dot}` +
-                copyableHtml(tx.contractAddress, "break-all") +
                 etherscanLinkHtml(link) +
+                `</div>` +
+                `<div class="am-address">` +
+                copyableHtml(tx.contractAddress) +
                 `</div>`;
             tokenContractSection.classList.remove("hidden");
         } else {

src/popup/views/txStatus.js

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ const {
     $,
     showView,
     addressTitle,
+    CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT,
     escapeHtml,
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
@@ -13,7 +14,7 @@ const {
     displaySymbol,
     clearViewStack,
 } = require("./helpers");
-const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
+const { resolveTokenSymbol } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
 const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
 const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
@@ -58,7 +59,10 @@ function endWait() {
     }
 }
 
+// A contract creation reaches these screens with `to` as "" (approval.js
+// writes `to: toAddr || ""`).
 function toAddressHtml(address) {
+    if (!address) return escapeHtml(CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT);
     const title = addressTitle(address, state.wallets);
     return renderAddressHtml(address, { title });
 }
@@ -129,7 +133,7 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
             // failed — which matters most on a resumed wait, where the
             // first poll is already past the deadline.
             answered = false;
-            log.errorf("poll receipt failed:", e.message);
+            log.errorf("poll receipt failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
         }
         // The lookup is async: the wait may have ended while it was in
         // flight, in which case this result must not touch the view.
@@ -202,8 +206,9 @@ function restoreWait() {
     if (!info || typeof info !== "object" || Array.isArray(info)) return false;
     // A string is the whole requirement: the empty string is what a
     // contract-deployment approval persists (approval.js writes `to: toAddr
-    // || ""`), and both fields render harmlessly when empty, so refusing it
-    // would abandon a wait the live path itself created.
+    // || ""`), an empty `to` renders as a contract creation and an empty
+    // amount renders harmlessly, so refusing it would abandon a wait the live
+    // path itself created.
     if (typeof info.to !== "string") return false;
     if (typeof info.amount !== "string") return false;
     if (typeof w.broadcastTime !== "number" || !isFinite(w.broadcastTime)) {
@@ -232,9 +237,15 @@ function showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, blockNumber) {
     ctx.doRefreshAndRender();
 }
 
+// The symbol shown for a decoded token line, resolved from the bundled list,
+// the tokens the user tracks, and the explorer's report — the same chain the
+// approval screen uses. Null when no source names one, so the line keeps
+// saying `Unknown token`.
 function tokenLabel(address) {
-    const t = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(address.toLowerCase());
-    return t ? t.symbol : null;
+    return resolveTokenSymbol(address, {
+        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
+        wallets: state.wallets,
+    });
 }
 
 function decodedDetailsHtml(decoded) {

src/shared/addressWarnings.js

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ async function getFullWarnings(address, provider, options = {}) {
             });
         }
     } catch (e) {
-        log.errorf("contract check failed:", e.message);
+        log.errorf("contract check failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
     }
 
     // Skip tx count check for contracts — they may legitimately have
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ async function getFullWarnings(address, provider, options = {}) {
                 });
             }
         } catch (e) {
-            log.errorf("tx count check failed:", e.message);
+            log.errorf("tx count check failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
         }
     }
 

src/shared/amountDisplay.js

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
 // (`src/shared/uniswap.js`) — and a fix applied to one of them left the other
 // two showing a different number for the same value.
 //
-// The two functions below are the two policies, not two implementations of
-// one: summary lists truncate, and the screens that state what is being
-// authorized truncate with a floor. Keeping them adjacent is the point, so a
-// change to the rule cannot reach one screen and miss another.
+// The two truncation functions below are the two policies, not two
+// implementations of one: summary lists truncate, and the screens that state
+// what is being authorized truncate with a floor. Keeping them adjacent is the
+// point, so a change to the rule cannot reach one screen and miss another.
 
 // Truncate to exactly four decimal places. Truncation, never rounding: an
 // amount must never be displayed as larger than it is, so 0.99999 stays
@@ -43,4 +43,18 @@ function truncateAmountNeverZero(val) {
     return parts[0] + "." + parts[1].slice(0, sig + 1);
 }
 
-module.exports = { truncateAmount, truncateAmountNeverZero };
+// Whether a stored token balance is a holding below 0.000001. The balance
+// lists, the send-screen token selector, the address total and the
+// remove-address warning leave such a holding out; the Send and confirmation
+// screens show it when its token is the one being sent. Exact, because
+// src/shared/balances.js stores plain decimal digits: below 0.000001 the
+// balance reads "0.000000" and then more digits.
+function isBelowOneMillionth(balance) {
+    return typeof balance === "string" && balance.startsWith("0.000000");
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+    truncateAmount,
+    truncateAmountNeverZero,
+    isBelowOneMillionth,
+};

src/shared/approvalAmount.js

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 // enumerated rather than coerced.
 const { toDecimals } = require("./transferAmount");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
+const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
 
 // Every decimals the explorer reported for this contract, across all the
 // addresses whose balances have been fetched. They describe one contract, so
@@ -74,6 +75,59 @@ function resolveTokenDecimals(tokenAddress, sources) {
     return explorerDecimals(lower, sources && sources.wallets);
 }
 
+// Every symbol the explorer reported for this contract, across the addresses
+// whose balances have been fetched. The counterpart to explorerDecimals(): one
+// contract, so the reports should agree, and a set that does not agree is a
+// name this screen has no way to choose between.
+function explorerSymbol(lower, wallets) {
+    let found = null;
+    for (const wallet of wallets || []) {
+        for (const addr of wallet.addresses || []) {
+            for (const tb of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
+                if ((tb.address || "").toLowerCase() !== lower) continue;
+                if (!tb.symbol) continue;
+                if (found !== null && found !== tb.symbol) return null;
+                found = tb.symbol;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return found;
+}
+
+// The symbol to label a token with, or null when no source the wallet trusts
+// names one — in which case the screen keeps saying `Unknown token` rather than
+// guessing. The bundled list, then the tokens the user tracks, then what the
+// explorer reported: the same sources and the same precedence
+// resolveTokenDecimals() uses, so a token's name and its scale are drawn from
+// the same place and the two can no longer disagree about which sources they
+// trust. `sources` is { trackedTokens, wallets }, shaped as on `state`.
+//
+// A tracked or explorer-reported symbol is attacker-influenced text, so it is
+// held to the spoof rule (symbolSpoof.js): a candidate that wears a bundled or
+// native ticker from a contract not entitled to it is refused and the next
+// source tried, so resolving a symbol never becomes a new way to claim a known
+// ticker. The bundled list is the wallet's own data and is trusted as it is.
+function resolveTokenSymbol(tokenAddress, sources) {
+    const lower = (tokenAddress || "").toLowerCase();
+    if (!lower) return null;
+
+    const bundled = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(lower);
+    if (bundled && bundled.symbol) return bundled.symbol;
+
+    const tracked = ((sources && sources.trackedTokens) || []).find(
+        (t) => (t.address || "").toLowerCase() === lower,
+    );
+    const candidates = [];
+    if (tracked && tracked.symbol) candidates.push(tracked.symbol);
+    const reported = explorerSymbol(lower, sources && sources.wallets);
+    if (reported) candidates.push(reported);
+
+    for (const symbol of candidates) {
+        if (!isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, tokenAddress)) return symbol;
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+
 // What the amount line reads when the scale is unknown. The base units are
 // exact and the caveat is part of the same string, so the number on the screen
 // cannot be mistaken for a token quantity, and it can never read as zero for a
@@ -84,5 +138,6 @@ function unknownDecimalsAmount(rawAmount) {
 
 module.exports = {
     resolveTokenDecimals,
+    resolveTokenSymbol,
     unknownDecimalsAmount,
 };

src/shared/approvalTx.js

@@ -51,11 +51,15 @@ const POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20000;
 // passed to ethers: the object is page-controlled, and a future ethers that
 // learns to carry a new transaction field must not start picking one up out of
 // it without this module knowing.
+//
+// The nonce is not taken from the page; it is always the account's next nonce
+// from the network. A page that chose it could replace one of the user's
+// pending transactions (the same nonce at a higher fee) or leave this one stuck
+// behind a gap (a nonce above the next one).
 const REQUEST_FIELDS = [
     "to",
     "value",
     "data",
-    "nonce",
     "gasLimit",
     "gasPrice",
     "maxFeePerGas",

src/shared/approvalVerify.js

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 const {
     Transaction,
     accessListify,
+    formatEther,
     getAddress,
     getBytes,
     verifyMessage,
@@ -134,10 +135,19 @@ const FORBIDDEN_FIELDS = [
 const MAX_GAS_LIMIT = 100000000n;
 
 // 100,000 gwei per gas: orders of magnitude above the highest fee either
-// supported network has produced, and low enough to catch a fee that would
-// hand the validator the balance.
+// supported network has produced.
 const MAX_FEE_PER_GAS = 100000000000000n;
 
+// The largest total fee this wallet will sign, in wei. The two ceilings above
+// bound the gas limit and the price per gas each on its own, but the fee a
+// validator is actually paid is their product, and a gas limit and a price
+// that are each under their own ceiling still multiply to thousands of ETH —
+// 30,000,000 gas at 100,000 gwei is about 3,000 ETH. Bounding the product is
+// what catches a fee that would hand the validator the balance; the per-field
+// ceilings alone do not. A full 30,000,000-gas block at 33 gwei reaches this,
+// which no ordinary wallet transaction approaches.
+const MAX_TOTAL_FEE = 1000000000000000000n; // 1 ETH
+
 // A refusal to act on an artifact: it is not the thing that was approved, so
 // the approval it was offered against is spent and must not be retried. Every
 // throw in this module is one of these; the background distinguishes them from
@@ -384,6 +394,28 @@ function assertWithinCeilings(tx) {
             );
         }
     }
+    // The product: gasLimit × the most this transaction could pay per gas —
+    // maxFeePerGas for a type-2 transaction, gasPrice for a legacy or type-1
+    // one. This is the fee a gas-consuming contract can really extract, and it
+    // is the bound the two per-field ceilings above cannot express.
+    if (present(tx.gasLimit)) {
+        const gasLimit = normalizeQuantity(tx.gasLimit, "gas limit");
+        let price = null;
+        if (present(tx.maxFeePerGas)) {
+            price = normalizeQuantity(tx.maxFeePerGas, "maximum fee per gas");
+        } else if (present(tx.gasPrice)) {
+            price = normalizeQuantity(tx.gasPrice, "gas price");
+        }
+        if (price !== null && gasLimit * price > MAX_TOTAL_FEE) {
+            throw refuse(
+                "This transaction would allow a network fee of up to " +
+                    formatEther(gasLimit * price) +
+                    " ETH, which is more than the " +
+                    formatEther(MAX_TOTAL_FEE) +
+                    " ETH this wallet will sign for.",
+            );
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 // Refuse a field only a transaction type this wallet does not sign can carry.
@@ -775,4 +807,5 @@ module.exports = {
     TX_STAGE_NONCE,
     MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
     MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
+    MAX_TOTAL_FEE,
 };

src/shared/balances.js

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ const {
 } = require("ethers");
 const { ERC20_ABI } = require("./constants");
 const { NETWORKS } = require("./networks");
-const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
+const { log, debugFetch, urlOrigin } = require("./log");
 const { deriveAddressFromXpub } = require("./wallet");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
 const { LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD, parseHoldersCount } = require("./holders");
@@ -52,19 +52,16 @@ function requireNetworkId(networkId) {
     return net;
 }
 
-function formatBalance(wei) {
-    const eth = formatEther(wei);
-    const parts = eth.split(".");
-    if (parts.length === 1) return eth + ".0";
-    const dec = parts[1].slice(0, 6).replace(/0+$/, "") || "0";
-    return parts[0] + "." + dec;
-}
-
+// A token balance as an exact decimal string, never cut: a cut stores a small
+// nonzero holding as zero. fetchTokenBalances() stores every nonzero holding of
+// a token it admits, however small; the screens that leave out one below
+// 0.000001 decide that themselves, through isBelowOneMillionth() in
+// src/shared/amountDisplay.js.
 function formatTokenBalance(raw, decimals) {
     const val = formatUnits(raw, decimals);
     const parts = val.split(".");
     if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0";
-    const dec = parts[1].slice(0, 6).replace(/0+$/, "") || "0";
+    const dec = parts[1].replace(/0+$/, "") || "0";
     return parts[0] + "." + dec;
 }
 
@@ -149,11 +146,7 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
             const scale = known !== null ? known : decimals;
             // null is a holding of an amount that cannot be stated, which is
             // not the same as a holding of zero, and must never render as one.
-            // With a scale, the display filter proper applies: a balance that
-            // rounds to zero at six places is dust and is not listed. Without
-            // one there is no such judgement to make, and the row is kept.
             const bal = scale === null ? null : formatTokenBalance(raw, scale);
-            if (bal === "0.0") continue;
             // null means the explorer reported no count, which is not the
             // same as a count of zero.  This gate is not the low-holder
             // display filter: it has no user-facing off switch and governs
@@ -210,7 +203,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
     trackedTokens,
     networkId,
 ) {
-    log.debugf("refreshBalances start, rpc:", rpcUrl);
+    log.debugf("refreshBalances start, rpc:", urlOrigin(rpcUrl));
     const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     const updates = [];
 
@@ -221,7 +214,9 @@ async function refreshBalances(
                 provider
                     .getBalance(addr.address)
                     .then((bal) => {
-                        addr.balance = formatBalance(bal);
+                        // Exact, never cut: a cut here stores a small nonzero
+                        // balance as zero.
+                        addr.balance = formatEther(bal);
                         log.debugf("ETH balance", addr.address, addr.balance);
                     })
                     .catch((e) => {
@@ -251,7 +246,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
                         log.errorf(
                             "ENS reverse failed",
                             addr.address,
-                            e.message,
+                            e.shortMessage || e.message,
                         );
                         // Keep existing addr.ensName if we had one
                     }),
@@ -285,7 +280,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
 // Look up token metadata from its contract.
 // Calls symbol() and decimals() to verify it implements ERC-20.
 async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl, networkId) {
-    log.debugf("lookupTokenInfo", contractAddress, "rpc:", rpcUrl);
+    log.debugf("lookupTokenInfo", contractAddress, "rpc:", urlOrigin(rpcUrl));
     const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     const contract = new Contract(contractAddress, ERC20_ABI, provider);
 
@@ -310,7 +305,10 @@ async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl, networkId) {
         name = await contract.name();
         log.debugf("name() =", name);
     } catch (e) {
-        log.warnf("name() failed, using symbol as name:", e.message);
+        log.warnf(
+            "name() failed, using symbol as name:",
+            e.shortMessage || e.message,
+        );
         name = symbol;
     }
 

src/shared/constants.js

@@ -22,8 +22,15 @@ const BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER = DEBUG
     ? "autistmask-build-debug=on"
     : "autistmask-build-debug=off";
 
-const DEBUG_MNEMONIC =
-    "cube evolve unfold result inch risk jealous skill hotel bulb night wreck";
+// Behind DEBUG for the same reason BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER is above: in a release
+// build __BUILD_DEBUG__ is a compile-time false, esbuild drops this branch, and
+// the phrase never reaches a distributed bundle. The literal used to survive as
+// dead text because module.exports keeps this const live even though wallet.js's
+// only use of it is folded away; making the value itself fold to null removes
+// it. script/verify-build fails a release build if the phrase appears anyway.
+const DEBUG_MNEMONIC = DEBUG
+    ? "cube evolve unfold result inch risk jealous skill hotel bulb night wreck"
+    : null;
 
 const ETHEREUM_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID = "0x1";
 const ETHEREUM_SEPOLIA_CHAIN_ID = "0xaa36a7";

src/shared/ens.js

@@ -42,7 +42,11 @@ async function resolveEnsName(address, rpcUrl, networkId) {
         setCache(address, name);
         return name;
     } catch (e) {
-        log.errorf("ENS reverse lookup failed", address, e.message);
+        log.errorf(
+            "ENS reverse lookup failed",
+            address,
+            e.shortMessage || e.message,
+        );
         // Don't cache failures — let subsequent lookups retry
         return null;
     }

src/shared/log.js

@@ -42,14 +42,34 @@ const log = {
     },
 };
 
-// Fetch wrapper that debug-logs every request and response.
+// The origin (scheme, host and port) of a URL, for logging in place of the
+// URL: RPC providers put API keys in the path or the query string, and a URL
+// can carry a user name and password, which the origin leaves out. A URL that
+// does not parse gives "", so logging never stops a request.
+function urlOrigin(url) {
+    try {
+        return new URL(url).origin;
+    } catch {
+        return "";
+    }
+}
+
+// Fetch wrapper that debug-logs every request and response. It logs the
+// URL's origin and, for a JSON-RPC body, the method name: never the full URL
+// or body, which can carry an API key or a signed transaction.
 async function debugFetch(url, opts) {
     const method = (opts && opts.method) || "GET";
-    const body = opts && opts.body;
-    log.debugf("fetch →", method, url, body || "");
+    const origin = urlOrigin(url);
+    let rpcMethod = "";
+    try {
+        rpcMethod = JSON.parse(opts.body).method || "";
+    } catch {
+        // no body, or a body that is not JSON
+    }
+    log.debugf("fetch →", method, origin, rpcMethod);
     const resp = await fetch(url, opts);
-    log.debugf("fetch ←", resp.status, url);
+    log.debugf("fetch ←", resp.status, origin);
     return resp;
 }
 
-module.exports = { log, debugFetch, setRuntimeDebug, isDebug };
+module.exports = { log, debugFetch, urlOrigin, setRuntimeDebug, isDebug };

src/shared/persistedState.js

@@ -102,11 +102,11 @@ function tokenRefs(value) {
 
 // A list of strings, for the fields whose entries are dereferenced as text:
 // fraudContracts (`a.toLowerCase()` in src/popup/views/send.js and
-// src/shared/transactions.js) and each address's hostname list in the site maps
-// below (`h !== host` filters, `list.includes(hostname)` in the background).
+// src/shared/transactions.js) and each address's origin list in the site maps
+// below (`o !== origin` filters, `list.includes(origin)` in the background).
 //
 // Same rule as tokenRefs(), for the same reason: the container AND the entries,
-// with a malformed entry DROPPED rather than repaired. A number in a hostname
+// with a malformed entry DROPPED rather than repaired. A number in an origin
 // list names no site and a number in fraudContracts names no contract, so there
 // is nothing to repair either to, and the empty list is a legitimate value that
 // survives. The result is a fresh array of primitives, so it shares no
@@ -116,21 +116,22 @@ function textList(value) {
     return value.filter((entry) => typeof entry === "string");
 }
 
-// allowedSites / deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }.
+// allowedSites / deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }, each origin the
+// full scheme://host[:port] of a site.
 //
 // The container check these had (truthy and not an array) is not the floor:
 // `{"0xabc…": "notalist"}` IS a non-array object, and the dereference is one
-// level below it. saveState() merges these maps per key and then per hostname
+// level below it. saveState() merges these maps per key and then per origin
 // WITHIN each key, so a stored value that is not a list reaches `base.map()` in
 // mergeListByIdentity() (src/shared/state.js) and throws — after the popup has
 // rendered, which is why every save from then on failed while the UI looked
 // healthy (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362). The Settings
 // revoke button (`list.filter()`), and the background's
-// `allowed.includes(hostname)` gate, dereference it the same way; on that last
+// `allowed.includes(origin)` gate, dereference it the same way; on that last
 // one a stored string would also answer a SUBSTRING match, so a corrupt map
 // could widen a site permission rather than merely throw.
 //
-// An address key whose value is not a list of hostnames is dropped entirely: it
+// An address key whose value is not a list of origins is dropped entirely: it
 // grants and denies nothing, and dropping it fails closed. A stored own
 // "__proto__" key — which JSON can carry — is dropped for the same reason: it
 // can never be a wallet address, so it grants nothing either, and keeping it
@@ -143,9 +144,9 @@ function siteMap(value) {
     if (!isRecord(value)) return out;
     for (const address of Object.keys(value)) {
         if (address === "__proto__") continue;
-        const hostnames = textList(value[address]);
-        if (hostnames.length === 0) continue;
-        defineOwn(out, address, hostnames);
+        const origins = textList(value[address]);
+        if (origins.length === 0) continue;
+        defineOwn(out, address, origins);
     }
     return out;
 }

src/shared/prices.js

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // Price fetching with 5-minute cache, USD formatting, value aggregation.
 
 const { getTopTokenPrices } = require("./tokenList");
+const { isBelowOneMillionth } = require("./amountDisplay");
 
 const PRICE_CACHE_TTL = 300000; // 5 minutes
 
@@ -78,6 +79,9 @@ function getAddressValue(addr) {
     let usd = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0") * prices.ETH;
     let partial = false;
     for (const token of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
+        // A holding below 0.000001 is left out, as the balance lists leave it
+        // out, so the total never counts a holding the list does not show.
+        if (isBelowOneMillionth(token.balance)) continue;
         // A null balance is a holding whose scale nothing knows, so it has no
         // quantity to price — but it is still a holding, and a total that
         // silently omits it would read as complete. That is exactly what

src/shared/state.js

@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ function mergeAddress(base, ours, theirs) {
 }
 
 // Merge a plain object keyed by string (allowedSites/deniedSites: address ->
-// hostname list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
+// origin list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
 // same way mergeListByIdentity() merges an array — by key, not by whole-
 // object diff — so a key one page added or removed applies independently of
 // a key another page edited. Unlike an array's identity function, an object
@@ -353,25 +353,25 @@ function mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeLeaf) {
     return result;
 }
 
-// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. The hostname
+// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }. The origin
 // list is itself membership, not a leaf — the background appends a newly
-// approved/denied hostname to it, and the Settings "revoke" button
-// (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters a hostname out of it in place, from a
+// approved/denied origin to it, and the Settings "revoke" button
+// (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters an origin out of it in place, from a
 // different page. Merge it the same way wallets are merged: identity is the
-// hostname itself, so a merged pair is always equal and mergeItem is a no-op
+// origin itself, so a merged pair is always equal and mergeItem is a no-op
 // pick.
-function mergeHostnameList(base, ours, theirs) {
+function mergeOriginList(base, ours, theirs) {
     return mergeListByIdentity(
         base,
         ours,
         theirs,
-        (hostname) => hostname,
+        (origin) => origin,
         (b, o, t) => t,
     );
 }
 
 function mergeSiteMap(base, ours, theirs) {
-    return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeHostnameList);
+    return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeOriginList);
 }
 
 // networkEndpoints: { [networkId]: {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl} }.
@@ -422,8 +422,8 @@ function mergeNetworkEndpoints(base, ours, theirs) {
 // address) apply independently instead of colliding as the same field.
 //
 // `allowedSites` and `deniedSites` get the same treatment (mergeSiteMap(),
-// by address key and then by hostname within each address's list), for the
-// identical reason: the background appends a newly approved/denied hostname
+// by address key and then by origin within each address's list), for the
+// identical reason: the background appends a newly approved/denied origin
 // to them, and the Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js)
 // filters one out in place, from a different page. A whole-field diff here
 // doesn't just lose data, it is a security defect — a stale page's save can

src/shared/symbolSpoof.js

@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
     return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
 }
 
+// The characters that paint nothing; normalizeSymbol below says which they
+// are. The signature screen marks them in a personal message
+// (src/popup/views/approval.js).
+const INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS = /[\p{Cf}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}\x7F]/gu;
+
 // Fold a symbol onto what a user actually sees, and no further:
 //
 //   NFKC        collapses compatibility variants that render as the ASCII
@@ -82,7 +87,7 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
 function normalizeSymbol(symbol) {
     return String(symbol || "")
         .normalize("NFKC")
-        .replace(/[\p{Cf}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}\x7F]/gu, "")
+        .replace(INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS, "")
         .trim()
         .toUpperCase();
 }
@@ -104,5 +109,6 @@ function isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, contractAddress) {
 }
 
 module.exports = {
+    INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS,
     isSpoofedSymbol,
 };

src/shared/txValidation.js

@@ -139,7 +139,15 @@ function validateTransfer({
     const feeFp = known ? feeWei : null;
 
     if (isErc20) {
-        const tokenFp = toFixedPoint(tokenBalance) ?? 0n;
+        // A token can declare more than 18 decimals, and its balance is
+        // stored with all of them. Only the first 18 places (SCALE_DECIMALS)
+        // are read: an amount with more was refused above, so the places
+        // after them cannot decide whether the amount fits.
+        const tokenText =
+            typeof tokenBalance === "string"
+                ? tokenBalance.replace(/(\.\d{18})\d+$/, "$1")
+                : tokenBalance;
+        const tokenFp = toFixedPoint(tokenText) ?? 0n;
         if (amountFp > tokenFp) codes.push(CODES.INSUFFICIENT_TOKEN);
         if (feeFp !== null && feeFp > ethFp) {
             codes.push(CODES.INSUFFICIENT_ETH_FOR_FEE);

src/shared/uniswap.js

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
 // swap details.  Designed to be extended with other DEX decoders later.
 
 const { Interface, AbiCoder, getBytes, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
-const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
 const { truncateAmountNeverZero } = require("./amountDisplay");
 const {
     resolveTokenDecimals,
+    resolveTokenSymbol,
     unknownDecimalsAmount,
 } = require("./approvalAmount");
 
@@ -100,6 +100,13 @@ const NO_MINIMUM = "None (no minimum guaranteed)";
 // Permit2 amounts are uint160; the maximum is Permit2's "unbounded".
 const MAX_UINT160 = BigInt("0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff");
 
+// WETH, the token UNWRAP_WETH turns into ETH: on mainnet, then on Sepolia.
+// decode() is not told the network, so it takes either.
+const WETH_ADDRESSES = [
+    "0xc02aaa39b223fe8d0a0e5c4f27ead9083c756cc2",
+    "0xfff9976782d46cc05630d1f6ebab18b2324d6b14",
+];
+
 // `decimals` is null when nothing knows this token's scale. It is not
 // defaulted to 18: the swap lines land on the same approval screen as the
 // ERC-20 line, and a scale guessed there is what showed a 1,000 USDT swap as
@@ -123,9 +130,8 @@ function tokenInfo(address, sources) {
     if (address === "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000") {
         return { symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18, address: null };
     }
-    const t = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(address.toLowerCase());
     return {
-        symbol: t ? t.symbol : null,
+        symbol: resolveTokenSymbol(address, sources),
         decimals: resolveTokenDecimals(address, sources),
         address,
     };
@@ -199,11 +205,6 @@ function decodeV2SwapExactIn(input) {
 // Decode V2_SWAP_EXACT_OUT (command 0x09) input bytes.
 // ABI: (address recipient, uint256 amountOut, uint256 amountInMax,
 //        address[] path, bool payerIsUser)
-//
-// Nothing calls this: decode() has no 0x09 arm, so a V2 exact-out swap gets
-// its command name and no token or amount detail. Kept for the fix, which is
-// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/283.
-// eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
 function decodeV2SwapExactOut(input) {
     try {
         const d = coder.decode(
@@ -448,6 +449,7 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
         let outputToken = null;
         let minOutput = null;
         let hasUnwrapWeth = false;
+        let hasV2ExactOut = false;
         const commandNames = [];
 
         // THE INVARIANT: an amount and the token it is counted in always come
@@ -522,6 +524,16 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
                     }
                 }
 
+                if (cmdId === 0x09) {
+                    // Buys exactly amountOut and spends at most amountInMax.
+                    hasV2ExactOut = true;
+                    const s = decodeV2SwapExactOut(inputs[i]);
+                    if (s) {
+                        setInputOnce(s.tokenIn, s.amountInMax);
+                        setOutput(s.tokenOut, s.amountOut);
+                    }
+                }
+
                 if (cmdId === 0x0b) {
                     const w = decodeWrapEth(inputs[i]);
                     if (w) {
@@ -560,10 +572,17 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
 
         // Resolve token info. A null token on either side means the calldata
         // named no currency for it; tokenInfo() refuses rather than calling it
-        // ETH. UNWRAP_WETH is the one output that is ETH without a currency to
-        // decode, and it is answered here rather than left to that rule.
+        // ETH. UNWRAP_WETH turns WETH into ETH, so it makes the output ETH
+        // when the output side is WETH, or when no step set the output side.
+        // Any other output keeps its own token and figure: a swap that buys
+        // USDC and then unwraps the WETH it did not spend receives USDC.
+        const outputIsWeth =
+            present(outputToken) &&
+            WETH_ADDRESSES.includes(outputToken.toLowerCase());
+        const outputUnset = !present(outputToken) && !present(minOutput);
         const inInfo = tokenInfo(inputToken, sources);
-        const outInfo = hasUnwrapWeth
+        const outInfo =
+            hasUnwrapWeth && (outputIsWeth || outputUnset)
                 ? { symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18, address: null }
                 : tokenInfo(outputToken, sources);
 
@@ -614,6 +633,17 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
                 amount = { raw: OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT, display: OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT };
             } else if (inputAmount >= MAX_UINT160) {
                 amount = { raw: "Unlimited", display: "Unlimited" };
+            } else if (hasV2ExactOut) {
+                // A V2 exact-out swap spends at most this figure, whichever
+                // step set the line (its amountInMax, the WRAP_ETH of a swap
+                // paid in ETH, a permit), so it is said to be a maximum, in
+                // `raw` too: the wait, success and error screens show `raw` as
+                // the transaction's amount.
+                const most = amountText(inputAmount, inInfo);
+                amount = {
+                    raw: "Up to " + most.raw,
+                    display: "Up to " + most.display,
+                };
             } else {
                 amount = amountText(inputAmount, inInfo);
             }

src/shared/walletDefects.js

@@ -41,12 +41,10 @@ const DEFECTS = {
                 "changed or removed, and this wallet stays until you delete " +
                 "it yourself.",
         ],
-        // One sentence for the places that have room for one: the flash on a
-        // blocked Send, the inline error on the approval screens.
-        shortMessage:
-            "This wallet cannot sign, because it was imported from an " +
-            "extended private key that is not a master key. The wallet list " +
-            "explains what happened.",
+        // One line, for the flash on a blocked Send and the inline error on
+        // the approval screens. It must fit on the flash line; see showFlash()
+        // in src/popup/views/helpers.js.
+        shortMessage: "This wallet cannot sign. See the wallet list.",
     },
 };
 

src/shared/walletDelete.js

@@ -12,12 +12,15 @@ function sameAddress(a, b) {
     return String(a).toLowerCase() === String(b).toLowerCase();
 }
 
-// Forget every site permission held against the given addresses.
+// Forget every site permission held against the given addresses: the
+// remembered ones in `state`, and the connections approved without
+// "Remember", which only the background holds, in memory.
 function dropSitePermissions(state, addresses) {
     for (const addr of addresses) {
         delete state.allowedSites[addr];
         delete state.deniedSites[addr];
     }
+    notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_ADDRESSES_REMOVED", addresses });
 }
 
 // Remove wallet `walletIdx` from `state` and repair the derived state.

tests/addWalletSeparatePassword.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+// Adding a second wallet accepts a password different from the first one's
+// with nothing on screen saying the two are separate — each wallet has its
+// own encryptedSecret, so per-wallet passwords are by design, but the add
+// screen said only "Choose a password"
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/374).
+//
+// The fix is copy: a note on the password screen that says each wallet has
+// its own password and this one need not match. It is only meaningful once
+// a wallet exists — on the very first wallet there is no other password to
+// be separate from — so it is shown then and hidden otherwise. These boot
+// the real popup and reach the add-wallet screen through the same button a
+// user presses, so the note's visibility is decided by the real show().
+
+const {
+    bootPopup,
+    cleanupPopup,
+    unversionedValidProfile,
+    POPUP_HTML,
+} = require("./support/popupBoot");
+
+const NOTE = "add-wallet-separate-password-note";
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    cleanupPopup();
+});
+
+describe("second-wallet password note", () => {
+    test("hidden while onboarding the first wallet", async () => {
+        const page = await bootPopup(undefined);
+        expect(page.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
+        await page.click("btn-welcome-add");
+        expect(page.visibleViews()).toContain("add-wallet");
+        expect(page.hidden(NOTE)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("shown when a wallet already exists", async () => {
+        const page = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+        expect(page.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
+        await page.click("btn-main-add-wallet");
+        expect(page.visibleViews()).toContain("add-wallet");
+        expect(page.hidden(NOTE)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    // The copy states the two facts the definition of done asks for — each
+    // wallet has its own password, and this one need not match — and stays
+    // consistent with the no-password-reset reality of
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/312 by not promising any
+    // recovery or reset here.
+    test("the note says the password is per-wallet and need not match", () => {
+        const note = /id="add-wallet-separate-password-note"[^>]*>([^]*?)<\/p>/
+            .exec(POPUP_HTML)[1]
+            .replace(/\s+/g, " ")
+            .trim();
+        expect(note).toContain("its own");
+        expect(note).toContain("need not match");
+        expect(note).not.toMatch(/recover|reset/i);
+    });
+});

tests/approvalAmount.test.js

@@ -143,16 +143,18 @@ describe("decodeCalldata amount", () => {
         state.trackedTokens = [
             { address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
         ];
+        // The tracked entry supplies both: the scale (5000.0000) and, since
+        // issue #323, the symbol that the scale is counted in.
         expect(
             amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL_TOKEN),
-        ).toBe("5000.0000");
+        ).toBe("5000.0000 NOVEL");
     });
 
     test("transfer priced off the explorer's decimals shows the true quantity", () => {
         state.wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL_TOKEN, "6");
         expect(
             amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL_TOKEN),
-        ).toBe("5000.0000");
+        ).toBe("5000.0000 NOVEL");
     });
 
     test("transfer of an unknown-decimals token shows base units, not a number", () => {
@@ -172,7 +174,7 @@ describe("decodeCalldata amount", () => {
             { address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
         ];
         expect(amountLine(approveData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL_TOKEN)).toBe(
-            "5000.0000",
+            "5000.0000 NOVEL",
         );
     });
 

tests/approvalNonce.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+// A nonce the page supplies is not used
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/404). With it a page could
+// replace one of the user's pending transactions (the same nonce at a higher
+// fee) or leave the new one stuck behind a gap, so the transaction is always
+// given the account's next nonce from the network.
+//
+// Driven through the preparation the background runs on a page's
+// eth_sendTransaction (src/shared/approvalTx.js) and the real approval screen,
+// password and Confirm included, against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/approvalOrigin.test.js uses. The vault is mocked so that no password
+// has to be hashed.
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+    decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { Network, Transaction } = require("ethers");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
+const { prepareApprovalTx } = require("../src/shared/approvalTx");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+// A well-known test phrase, and its first address.
+const PHRASE = "test test test test test test test test test test test junk";
+const FROM = "0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266";
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+// The account's next nonce, as the network reports it.
+const NETWORK_NONCE = 7;
+
+const network = {
+    getNetwork: async () => Network.from(1),
+    getTransactionCount: async () => NETWORK_NONCE,
+    estimateGas: async () => 21000n,
+    getFeeData: async () => ({
+        gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+        maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+        maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+    }),
+};
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
+            el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
+            el.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+function click(id) {
+    return Promise.all((node(id).listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn()));
+}
+
+// Open the transaction approval screen the way the popup does: the background
+// hands over the populated transaction and show() draws it. Returns every
+// message the screen sends to the background. The background's answer to the
+// signed transaction does not matter here; a retryable refusal keeps the
+// screen where it is.
+async function openTxApproval(approvedTx) {
+    const sent = [];
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" }, close: () => {} };
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            sent.push(msg);
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
+                return reply({ error: "Not sent.", retryable: true });
+            }
+            reply({
+                type: "tx",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                approvedTx,
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    state.activeAddress = FROM;
+    state.wallets = [
+        {
+            type: "hd",
+            name: "Wallet 1",
+            xpub: "xpub-wallet-1",
+            encryptedSecret: "encrypted-secret-1",
+            nextIndex: 1,
+            addresses: [{ address: FROM, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
+        },
+    ];
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+    return sent;
+}
+
+test("a page's nonce is replaced by the network's, on screen and in the signed transaction", async () => {
+    // What the background does with the page's request before it opens the
+    // approval window.
+    const approvedTx = await prepareApprovalTx(network, FROM, {
+        from: FROM,
+        to: RECIPIENT,
+        value: "0x0",
+        data: "0x",
+        nonce: "0x2",
+    });
+
+    const sent = await openTxApproval(approvedTx);
+    expect(node("approve-tx-nonce").textContent).toBe("7");
+
+    decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue(PHRASE);
+    node("approve-tx-password").value = "any password";
+    await click("btn-approve-tx");
+
+    const response = sent.find((msg) => msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE");
+    expect(Transaction.from(response.rawSignedTx).nonce).toBe(NETWORK_NONCE);
+});

tests/approvalOrigin.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+// The connection, transaction and signature prompts name the site by its full
+// origin, scheme and port included, not by its bare hostname
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402). A page served over http,
+// or on another port, of a host the user trusts over https must not raise a
+// prompt that reads as that trusted site.
+//
+// Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/contractCreation.test.js uses.
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+// The site asking, in cleartext and on a port, which is what the hostname
+// alone, dapp.example, used to hide.
+const ORIGIN = "http://dapp.example:8080";
+const FROM = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// Open the prompt the background describes with `details`, the way the popup
+// does: it asks for the approval and show() draws it.
+async function openApproval(details) {
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
+            reply({
+                origin: ORIGIN,
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                ...details,
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    state.wallets = [];
+    state.activeAddress = FROM;
+    state.viewData = {};
+    state.viewStack = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+});
+
+test("the connection prompt shows the origin", async () => {
+    await openApproval({});
+    expect(node("approve-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
+});
+
+test("the transaction prompt shows the origin", async () => {
+    await openApproval({
+        type: "tx",
+        approvedTx: {
+            type: 2,
+            from: FROM,
+            chainId: "0x1",
+            nonce: "0x7",
+            gasLimit: "0x5208",
+            maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
+            maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
+            to: RECIPIENT,
+            value: "0x0",
+            data: "0x",
+            accessList: [],
+        },
+    });
+    expect(node("approve-tx-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
+});
+
+test("the signature prompt shows the origin", async () => {
+    await openApproval({
+        type: "sign",
+        // "Hello" as the hex a dApp passes to personal_sign.
+        signParams: {
+            method: "personal_sign",
+            message: "0x48656c6c6f",
+            from: FROM,
+        },
+    });
+    expect(node("approve-sign-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
+});

tests/approvalTx.test.js

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
         );
     });
 
-    test("keeps a nonce, gas limit and fee the request did fix", async () => {
+    test("keeps a gas limit and fee the request did fix, but not its nonce", async () => {
         const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
             providerWith(),
             signer.address,
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
                 maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
             },
         );
-        expect(approved.nonce).toBe("0x2");
+        expect(approved.nonce).toBe("0x7");
         expect(approved.gasLimit).toBe("0x30d40");
         expect(approved.maxFeePerGas).toBe("0x12a05f200");
     });
@@ -212,6 +212,24 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
         ).rejects.toThrow(/gas limit no network this wallet supports/);
     });
 
+    // The combined bound at population: a gas limit and a fee that are each
+    // under their own ceiling but multiply to thousands of ETH is refused
+    // before the approval window opens, so the user is never shown a
+    // balance-draining fee to click past.
+    test("refuses a fee whose product with the gas limit is over the bound", async () => {
+        const gouging = providerWith({
+            estimateGas: async () => 30000000n,
+            getFeeData: async () => ({
+                gasPrice: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
+                maxFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
+                maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+            }),
+        });
+        await expect(
+            prepareApprovalTx(gouging, signer.address, TX_PARAMS),
+        ).rejects.toThrow(/network fee of up to/);
+    });
+
     // No approval and no window: the failure goes back to the page the click
     // came from, in a sentence.
     test("reports a failed estimate as a full sentence", async () => {

tests/approvalVerify.test.js

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ const {
     TX_STAGE_NONCE,
     MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
     MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
+    MAX_TOTAL_FEE,
 } = require("../src/shared/approvalVerify");
 const { prepareApprovalTx } = require("../src/shared/approvalTx");
 const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../src/shared/wallet");
@@ -475,18 +476,131 @@ describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
                 assertWithinCeilings({ [key]: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS + 1n }),
             ).toThrow(/fee per gas far above any plausible value/);
         }
+        // Each field at its own ceiling multiplies to about 10,000 ETH, which
+        // is exactly the combination the per-field ceilings cannot see and the
+        // product bound is for: it is refused, not accepted.
         expect(() =>
             assertWithinCeilings({
                 gasLimit: MAX_GAS_LIMIT,
                 maxFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
                 maxPriorityFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
             }),
+        ).toThrow(/network fee of up to/);
+        // An ordinary transaction — a modest gas limit and a modest fee, each
+        // far under its ceiling and their product far under the bound — passes.
+        expect(() =>
+            assertWithinCeilings({
+                gasLimit: 21000n,
+                maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+                maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+            }),
         ).not.toThrow();
         // Nothing to bound is not a failure: a type 2 approval carries no gas
         // price, and a bare object must not be refused for lacking one.
         expect(() => assertWithinCeilings({})).not.toThrow();
     });
 
+    // The defect this issue closes: gasLimit and maxFeePerGas each under their
+    // own ceiling, but their product — the fee a gas-consuming contract can
+    // really extract — thousands of ETH. The per-field ceilings accept it; the
+    // product bound refuses it, on either side of the screen.
+    describe("the combined fee bound", () => {
+        // A gas limit and a fee that are each comfortably under their own
+        // ceiling but multiply to well over 1 ETH: 30,000,000 gas at 100,000
+        // gwei is about 3,000 ETH.
+        const OVER = { gasLimit: 30000000n, maxFeePerGas: 100000000000000n };
+
+        test("each field is under its own ceiling", () => {
+            expect(OVER.gasLimit).toBeLessThan(MAX_GAS_LIMIT);
+            expect(OVER.maxFeePerGas).toBeLessThanOrEqual(MAX_FEE_PER_GAS);
+            expect(OVER.gasLimit * OVER.maxFeePerGas).toBeGreaterThan(
+                MAX_TOTAL_FEE,
+            );
+        });
+
+        test("assertWithinCeilings refuses the product over the bound", () => {
+            expect(() =>
+                assertWithinCeilings({
+                    ...OVER,
+                    maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+                }),
+            ).toThrow(/network fee of up to 3000\.0 ETH/);
+        });
+
+        test("assertWithinCeilings bounds a legacy gasPrice the same way", () => {
+            expect(() =>
+                assertWithinCeilings({
+                    gasLimit: OVER.gasLimit,
+                    gasPrice: OVER.maxFeePerGas,
+                }),
+            ).toThrow(/network fee of up to/);
+        });
+
+        // The boundary itself, pinned rather than only some value well past
+        // it. Both fields stay under their own ceilings, so it is the product
+        // and nothing else that decides these two cases: a gas limit of 10,000
+        // at the per-gas ceiling is exactly 1 ETH.
+        test("assertWithinCeilings accepts a product exactly at the bound and refuses one wei over", () => {
+            expect(MAX_FEE_PER_GAS * 10000n).toBe(MAX_TOTAL_FEE);
+            expect(() =>
+                assertWithinCeilings({
+                    gasLimit: 10000n,
+                    maxFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
+                }),
+            ).not.toThrow();
+            expect(() =>
+                assertWithinCeilings({
+                    gasLimit: 10001n,
+                    maxFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
+                }),
+            ).toThrow(/network fee of up to/);
+        });
+
+        // The dApp path: an artifact whose fee is within each field's ceiling
+        // but over the product bound, both displayed and signed, is refused at
+        // verification just as it is at population.
+        test("verifySignedTx refuses an over-bound product even when displayed", async () => {
+            const raw = await signedWith(OVER);
+            expect(() =>
+                verifySignedTx(
+                    raw,
+                    approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, OVER),
+                    signer.address,
+                    SELECTED,
+                ),
+            ).toThrow(/network fee of up to/);
+        });
+
+        test("verifySignedTx accepts a product just under the bound", async () => {
+            // 21,000 gas at 40 gwei is 0.00084 ETH — an ordinary send.
+            const under = { gasLimit: 21000n, maxFeePerGas: 40000000000n };
+            expect(under.gasLimit * under.maxFeePerGas).toBeLessThan(
+                MAX_TOTAL_FEE,
+            );
+            const raw = await signedWith(under);
+            expect(() =>
+                verifySignedTx(
+                    raw,
+                    approvedFor(TX_PARAMS, under),
+                    signer.address,
+                    SELECTED,
+                ),
+            ).not.toThrow();
+        });
+
+        test("the refusal names the fee and the limit in a full sentence", () => {
+            try {
+                assertWithinCeilings(OVER);
+                throw new Error("expected a rejection");
+            } catch (e) {
+                expect(e.approvalMismatch).toBe(true);
+                expect(e.message).toMatch(/^[A-Z].*\.$/);
+                expect(e.message).toContain("3000.0 ETH");
+                expect(e.message).toContain("1.0 ETH");
+            }
+        });
+    });
+
     test("every field mismatch is a refusal, not a warning", async () => {
         const raw = await signedWith({ nonce: 8 });
         try {

tests/backgroundApproval.test.js

@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ const { Network, Wallet } = require("ethers");
 // what the user is actually shown.
 const { describeSigningFailure } = require("../src/shared/approvalVerify");
 const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+const {
+    removeAddressFromState,
+    removeWalletFromState,
+} = require("../src/shared/walletDelete");
 
 const SIGNER_KEY =
     "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d";
@@ -35,7 +39,6 @@ const other = new Wallet(OTHER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 // A page the wallet has never been connected to, whose requests are refused.
 const UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
 const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
@@ -71,6 +74,22 @@ const NONCE = 7;
 // "Hello AutistMask" as the hex string a dApp passes to personal_sign.
 const MESSAGE = "0x48656c6c6f204175746973744d61736b";
 
+// An EIP-712 document as a dApp passes it to eth_signTypedData_v4. The
+// background only carries it to the approval screen, so a small one does.
+const TYPED_DATA = JSON.stringify({
+    domain: { name: "AutistMask Test", version: "1", chainId: 1 },
+    primaryType: "Note",
+    types: {
+        EIP712Domain: [
+            { name: "name", type: "string" },
+            { name: "version", type: "string" },
+            { name: "chainId", type: "uint256" },
+        ],
+        Note: [{ name: "contents", type: "string" }],
+    },
+    message: { contents: "Hello AutistMask" },
+});
+
 // The transaction the background populates and the approval screen displays.
 // The nonce is a parameter because the duplicate case turns on two artifacts
 // differing in a field the dApp fixed nothing for.
@@ -195,7 +214,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         networkId: "mainnet",
         rpcUrl: "https://rpc.invalid",
         activeAddress: signer.address,
-        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
     };
 
@@ -226,6 +245,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
     // raised through action.openPopup() opens no window at all, so this is
     // the only place its id appears.
     const actionPopups = [];
+    const openPopup = jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve());
 
     global.chrome = {
         storage,
@@ -280,7 +300,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
             // popup: no window is created, so windows.onRemoved can never
             // fire for it and the port disconnect is the only close signal
             // that exists.
-            ...(opts.actionPopup ? { openPopup: () => Promise.resolve() } : {}),
+            ...(opts.actionPopup ? { openPopup } : {}),
         },
     };
 
@@ -327,7 +347,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
 
     // The same for a message-signing approval, which pins the signing address
     // at approval time in exactly the same way.
-    function requestSign(from) {
+    function requestSign(from, origin) {
         let rpcResult = null;
         messageListener(
             {
@@ -335,7 +355,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
                 method: "personal_sign",
                 params: [MESSAGE, from || signer.address],
             },
-            { origin: ORIGIN },
+            { origin: origin || ORIGIN },
             (r) => {
                 rpcResult = r;
             },
@@ -349,6 +369,24 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         };
     }
 
+    // The same through eth_signTypedData_v4, whose params name the address
+    // first and the typed data second.
+    function requestTypedData() {
+        let rpcResult = null;
+        messageListener(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
+                method: "eth_signTypedData_v4",
+                params: [signer.address, TYPED_DATA],
+            },
+            { origin: ORIGIN },
+            (r) => {
+                rpcResult = r;
+            },
+        );
+        return { result: () => rpcResult };
+    }
+
     // A dApp asking to connect. The origin defaults to one the persisted
     // state has never allowed, so the request really does raise a prompt
     // instead of being answered from allowedSites.
@@ -423,12 +461,15 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         send,
         requestTx,
         requestSign,
+        requestTypedData,
         requestSite,
         connectApproval,
         closeWindow,
         broadcastTransaction,
         created,
         removed,
+        actionPopups,
+        openPopup,
         storage,
         // The user switching account in the toolbar popup, as the background
         // sees it: the persisted active address changes underneath a pending
@@ -818,6 +859,238 @@ describe("one transaction approval at a time", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// A page that asks again before the user has answered its last connection or
+// signature request is refused, instead of opening one more window per call.
+describe("one connection and one signature approval per site at a time", () => {
+    const PENDING_REFUSAL = {
+        error: {
+            code: -32002,
+            message: expect.stringMatching(/already waiting for your answer/),
+        },
+    };
+
+    test("a loop of eth_requestAccounts opens one approval and refuses the rest", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const requests = [];
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestSite());
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(requests[0].result()).toBeNull();
+        for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
+            expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        }
+
+        // Once the user has answered, the site may ask again.
+        bg.closeWindow(1);
+        await settle();
+        expect(requests[0].result()).toEqual({
+            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
+        });
+        const again = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(again.result()).toBeNull();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    test("a loop of personal_sign opens one approval and refuses the rest", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const requests = [];
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestSign());
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(requests[0].result()).toBeNull();
+        for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
+            expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a loop of eth_signTypedData_v4 opens one approval and refuses the rest", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const requests = [];
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestTypedData());
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(requests[0].result()).toBeNull();
+        for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
+            expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a pending personal_sign also refuses eth_signTypedData_v4", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        bg.requestSign();
+        const typed = bg.requestTypedData();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(typed.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    test("in the toolbar popup, a loop of eth_requestAccounts opens it once", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const requests = [];
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestSite());
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
+            expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        }
+    });
+
+    // A toolbar popup that closes before it connects tells the background
+    // nothing, so its prompt stays pending. Once the toolbar popup has been set
+    // to open something else, nothing shows that prompt, and the site asking
+    // again must show it again rather than be refused for good.
+    test("a toolbar prompt nothing shows any more is shown again when the site asks again", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const first = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        const id = first.id();
+
+        // Its popup closed without connecting. Another site's prompt takes the
+        // toolbar popup and is answered, which sets it back to the wallet.
+        const other = bg.requestSite(UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        const otherPort = bg.connectApproval(other.id());
+        otherPort.decide(false, false);
+        otherPort.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html",
+        );
+
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
+        );
+
+        // The user answers it, and the first request gets that answer.
+        bg.connectApproval(id).decide(true, false);
+        await settle();
+        expect(first.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+    });
+
+    // The user rejects a signature request from another site, which is
+    // connected already. Answering any approval sets the toolbar popup back to
+    // the wallet.
+    async function rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg) {
+        const sign = bg.requestSign(undefined, ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
+                id: sign.id(),
+                approved: false,
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        expect(sign.result()).toEqual({
+            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
+        });
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html",
+        );
+    }
+
+    test("a toolbar prompt is shown again after another site's signature request is answered", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const first = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        const id = first.id();
+
+        // Its popup closed without connecting.
+        await rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg);
+
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a prompt in a window is not opened again when the site asks again", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        // The browser will not open the toolbar popup, so the prompt goes to a
+        // window of its own.
+        bg.openPopup.mockImplementation(() =>
+            Promise.reject(new Error("no toolbar popup")),
+        );
+        bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+
+        await rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg);
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
+
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    test("a prompt in a connected toolbar popup is not opened again when the site asks again", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const first = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        // The popup is open and showing the prompt.
+        bg.connectApproval(first.id());
+
+        await rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg);
+
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("another site's connection request is not held up", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        bg.requestSite();
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        const other = bg.requestSite(UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(other.result()).toBeNull();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    test("another site's signature request is not held up", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        // Connect a second site, so that it may ask for a signature at all.
+        const connecting = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        const port = bg.connectApproval(connecting.id());
+        port.decide(true, false);
+        port.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+        expect(connecting.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+
+        bg.requestSign();
+        const repeat = bg.requestSign();
+        const other = bg.requestSign(signer.address, FRESH_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(other.result()).toBeNull();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(3);
+    });
+});
+
 // A nonce collision found before the transaction reaches the network is the
 // one send failure the wallet can speak about with certainty. The user is told
 // it did not go out and to send it again, rather than being warned it might
@@ -1541,6 +1814,149 @@ describe("a claimed approval outlives every other retirement path", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// The approval popup connects a port named for its approval whatever the
+// approval's kind, so a decision or a disconnect on that port can reach a
+// transaction approval. Both must be declined: the port decides only
+// site-connection approvals, and settling a transaction approval it does not
+// own — while an attempt is broadcasting behind it — is the round-3 fund-loss
+// bug, where the page is told the request was rejected as the transaction goes
+// out. These three paths route through settleApproval() and, before this
+// suite, were exercised only against site approvals.
+describe("the site-connection port never retires a transaction approval", () => {
+    async function txMidBroadcast() {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestTx();
+        await settle();
+        const id = pending.id();
+
+        const inFlight = deferred();
+        bg.broadcastTransaction.mockReturnValue(inFlight.promise);
+        const first = bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+                id,
+                approved: true,
+                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(7),
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        return { bg, pending, id, inFlight, first };
+    }
+
+    test("an approve on the port does not settle it", async () => {
+        const { bg, pending, id, inFlight, first } = await txMidBroadcast();
+
+        bg.connectApproval(id).decide(true, false);
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toBeNull();
+
+        inFlight.resolve({ hash: "0xfeed" });
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: "0xfeed" });
+        expect(first.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ txHash: "0xfeed" });
+    });
+
+    test("a reject on the port does not settle it", async () => {
+        const { bg, pending, id, inFlight, first } = await txMidBroadcast();
+
+        bg.connectApproval(id).decide(false, false);
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toBeNull();
+
+        inFlight.resolve({ hash: "0xfeed" });
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: "0xfeed" });
+        expect(first.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ txHash: "0xfeed" });
+    });
+
+    test("a port disconnect does not settle it", async () => {
+        const { bg, pending, id, inFlight, first } = await txMidBroadcast();
+
+        bg.connectApproval(id).disconnect();
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toBeNull();
+
+        inFlight.resolve({ hash: "0xfeed" });
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: "0xfeed" });
+        expect(first.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ txHash: "0xfeed" });
+    });
+});
+
+// AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE signs and broadcasts a transaction, so it is honoured
+// only for a transaction approval. A reject shaped as this message used to
+// retire a sign or connection approval outright, and an approve carrying a
+// signed artifact used to run the broadcast path against an approval that names
+// no transaction, failing closed only by throwing deeper in.
+describe("a transaction response is honoured only for a transaction approval", () => {
+    test("a reject does not retire a sign approval", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestSign();
+        await settle();
+        const id = pending.id();
+
+        bg.send(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE", id, approved: false },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toBeNull();
+
+        // Still live: its own reject settles it.
+        bg.send(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE", id, approved: false },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({
+            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
+        });
+    });
+
+    test("a reject does not retire a connection approval", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const pending = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        const id = pending.id();
+
+        bg.send(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE", id, approved: false },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toBeNull();
+
+        // Still live: the port that owns it connects the site.
+        const port = bg.connectApproval(id);
+        port.decide(true, false);
+        port.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+    });
+
+    test("an approve carrying a signed transaction never broadcasts against a sign approval", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const pending = bg.requestSign();
+        await settle();
+        const id = pending.id();
+
+        bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+                id,
+                approved: true,
+                rawSignedTx: await signedAtNonce(7),
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        expect(bg.broadcastTransaction).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(pending.result()).toBeNull();
+    });
+});
+
 // A handler that throws must still answer. `sendResponse` is the only thing
 // that settles the page's window.ethereum.request() promise, so a throw that
 // escapes a handler leaves that promise pending forever — no error, no
@@ -1953,3 +2369,329 @@ describe("a site connection decided as the popup closes", () => {
         });
     });
 });
+
+// What a site is told when it asks which account it may use.
+async function siteAccounts(bg, origin) {
+    const { sendResponse } = bg.send(
+        { type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC", method: "eth_accounts", params: [] },
+        { origin: origin || FRESH_ORIGIN },
+    );
+    await settle();
+    return sendResponse.mock.calls[0][0];
+}
+
+// A site connected without "Remember" is held only in the background's memory,
+// keyed to the address it was connected to. Removing that address, or the
+// wallet holding it, must end the connection as part of the removal itself.
+// The accountsChanged broadcast the views send afterwards also clears it, but
+// only when the active address moved, and nothing waits for it to arrive.
+//
+// Each test asks the background while storage still names the removed address
+// as active, because the popup has not saved yet, so the answer turns on the
+// connection alone.
+describe("removing an address ends a site's connection to it", () => {
+    // FRESH_ORIGIN connected to the active address without "Remember", in a
+    // wallet holding a second address so that one can be removed at all. The
+    // popup's messages reach the background as they would from the popup.
+    async function connectedBackground() {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const stored = bg.storage.read("autistmask");
+        stored.wallets[0].addresses.push({
+            address: other.address,
+            balance: "0",
+            tokenBalances: [],
+        });
+        bg.storage.write("autistmask", stored);
+
+        const pending = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        bg.connectApproval(pending.id()).decide(true, false);
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+
+        global.chrome.runtime.sendMessage = (msg) => {
+            bg.send(msg, bg.fromPopup);
+        };
+        return bg;
+    }
+
+    test("removing the connected address ends the connection", async () => {
+        const bg = await connectedBackground();
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+
+        const popupState = bg.storage.read("autistmask");
+        expect(removeAddressFromState(popupState, 0, 0).removed).toBe(true);
+
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+    });
+
+    test("deleting the wallet holding the connected address ends the connection", async () => {
+        const bg = await connectedBackground();
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+
+        const popupState = bg.storage.read("autistmask");
+        removeWalletFromState(popupState, 0);
+
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+    });
+
+    test("removing a different address leaves the connection alone", async () => {
+        const bg = await connectedBackground();
+
+        const popupState = bg.storage.read("autistmask");
+        expect(removeAddressFromState(popupState, 0, 1).removed).toBe(true);
+
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+    });
+
+    test("a page cannot end the connection", async () => {
+        const bg = await connectedBackground();
+
+        const spoof = bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_ADDRESSES_REMOVED",
+                addresses: [signer.address],
+            },
+            { url: FRESH_ORIGIN + "/index.html" },
+        );
+
+        expect(spoof.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+            error: "Unauthorized sender",
+        });
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+    });
+});
+
+// A remembered permission belongs to the origin it was granted to, scheme and
+// port included (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402). The stored
+// state allows ORIGIN, https://dapp.example. A cleartext page on the same host,
+// which a network attacker can serve, and another port on it are other sites.
+describe("a remembered permission is held by the full origin", () => {
+    for (const origin of ["http://dapp.example", "https://dapp.example:8443"]) {
+        test(`an https grant does not authorise ${origin}`, async () => {
+            const bg = loadBackground();
+            expect(await siteAccounts(bg, ORIGIN)).toEqual({
+                result: [signer.address],
+            });
+
+            expect(await siteAccounts(bg, origin)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+            const send = bg.requestTx(TX_PARAMS, origin);
+            await settle();
+            expect(send.result()).toEqual({
+                error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" },
+            });
+            expect(send.id()).toBeNull();
+        });
+    }
+
+    test("Remember stores the origin, so the cleartext page on that host is asked again", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const granted = bg.requestSite(FRESH_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        const grantedId = granted.id();
+        bg.connectApproval(grantedId).decide(true, true);
+        await settle();
+        expect(granted.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+        expect(
+            bg.storage.read("autistmask").allowedSites[signer.address],
+        ).toEqual([ORIGIN, FRESH_ORIGIN]);
+
+        const cleartext = bg.requestSite("http://fresh.example");
+        await settle();
+        // Unanswered: it is waiting on a prompt of its own.
+        expect(cleartext.result()).toBeNull();
+        expect(cleartext.id()).not.toBe(grantedId);
+    });
+});
+
+// Settings lists the sites allowed without "Remember", which only the
+// background holds, and removing a site there, from either list, disconnects
+// it. These drive the real Settings view against the real background and
+// click the [x] the user clicks.
+describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
+    // The host of FRESH_ORIGIN on another port, which makes it another site.
+    const FRESH_OTHER_PORT = "https://fresh.example:8443";
+
+    // A site list's container. Its [x] buttons, data attributes and all, are
+    // read back out of the rows the view wrote into it, so clicking one runs
+    // the handler the view attached to it.
+    function fakeSiteList() {
+        const list = {
+            innerHTML: "",
+            buttons: [],
+            querySelectorAll() {
+                const tags = list.innerHTML.match(/<button[^>]*>/g) || [];
+                list.buttons = tags.map((tag) => ({
+                    dataset: Object.fromEntries(
+                        [...tag.matchAll(/data-(\w+)="([^"]*)"/g)].map(
+                            (match) => [match[1], match[2]],
+                        ),
+                    ),
+                    addEventListener(event, handler) {
+                        this[event] = handler;
+                    },
+                }));
+                return list.buttons;
+            },
+        };
+        return list;
+    }
+
+    // The origins a site list shows.
+    function listed(list) {
+        return [...list.innerHTML.matchAll(/data-origin="([^"]*)"/g)].map(
+            (match) => match[1],
+        );
+    }
+
+    // A site connected the way the user does it, in the approval popup.
+    async function connect(bg, origin, remember) {
+        const pending = bg.requestSite(origin);
+        await settle();
+        bg.connectApproval(pending.id()).decide(true, remember);
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+    }
+
+    // Settings, opened over the background's storage and wired to it the way
+    // the popup is: what Settings sends reaches the background from the
+    // extension's own page, and the answer comes back.
+    async function openSettings(bg) {
+        const lists = {};
+        const element = (id) => (lists[id] ||= fakeSiteList());
+        global.document = { getElementById: element };
+        global.chrome.runtime.sendMessage = (msg, callback) => {
+            const { sendResponse } = bg.send(msg, bg.fromPopup);
+            if (callback) callback(sendResponse.mock.calls[0]?.[0]);
+        };
+        await require("../src/shared/state").loadState();
+        await require("../src/popup/views/settings").renderSiteLists();
+        return {
+            allowed: element("settings-allowed-sites"),
+            connected: element("settings-connected-sites"),
+            // Click the [x] beside a site, and let what it sends run.
+            remove: async (list, origin) => {
+                expect(listed(list)).toContain(origin);
+                const button = list.buttons.find(
+                    (b) => b.dataset.origin === origin,
+                );
+                await button.click();
+                await settle();
+            },
+        };
+    }
+
+    afterEach(() => {
+        delete global.document;
+    });
+
+    test("Settings lists each site by its origin", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, false);
+        await connect(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT, true);
+
+        const settings = await openSettings(bg);
+
+        expect(listed(settings.connected)).toEqual([FRESH_ORIGIN]);
+        expect(listed(settings.allowed)).toEqual([ORIGIN, FRESH_OTHER_PORT]);
+    });
+
+    test("removing a site connected without Remember disconnects it and tells its tabs", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, false);
+        const sentToTabs = [];
+        global.chrome.tabs = {
+            query: (q, cb) =>
+                cb([
+                    { id: 1, url: FRESH_ORIGIN + "/app" },
+                    { id: 2, url: ORIGIN + "/app" },
+                    { id: 3, url: FRESH_OTHER_PORT + "/app" },
+                ]),
+            sendMessage: (tabId, msg, cb) => {
+                sentToTabs.push({ tabId, msg });
+                cb();
+            },
+        };
+        const settings = await openSettings(bg);
+
+        await settings.remove(settings.connected, FRESH_ORIGIN);
+
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+        expect(sentToTabs).toEqual([
+            {
+                tabId: 1,
+                msg: {
+                    type: "AUTISTMASK_EVENT",
+                    eventName: "accountsChanged",
+                    data: [],
+                },
+            },
+        ]);
+        expect(listed(settings.connected)).toEqual([]);
+        // The other site is untouched.
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg, ORIGIN)).toEqual({
+            result: [signer.address],
+        });
+    });
+
+    // One origin can hold both kinds of connection under two addresses:
+    // remembered for one, allowed without Remember for the other.
+    test("removing a remembered site also ends its connection made without Remember", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const stored = bg.storage.read("autistmask");
+        stored.wallets[0].addresses.push({
+            address: other.address,
+            balance: "0",
+            tokenBalances: [],
+        });
+        bg.storage.write("autistmask", stored);
+        await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, true);
+        bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
+        const pending = bg.requestSite(FRESH_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        bg.connectApproval(pending.id()).decide(true, false);
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [other.address] });
+        const settings = await openSettings(bg);
+
+        await settings.remove(settings.allowed, FRESH_ORIGIN);
+
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+    });
+
+    test("removing a remembered site leaves the same host on another port connected", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, false);
+        await connect(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT, true);
+        const settings = await openSettings(bg);
+
+        await settings.remove(settings.allowed, FRESH_OTHER_PORT);
+
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT)).toEqual({
+            result: [],
+        });
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({
+            result: [signer.address],
+        });
+    });
+
+    test("a page can neither remove a site nor list the connected ones", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, false);
+        const page = { url: FRESH_ORIGIN + "/index.html" };
+
+        const remove = bg.send(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", origin: FRESH_ORIGIN },
+            page,
+        );
+        const list = bg.send({ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES" }, page);
+
+        expect(remove.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+            error: "Unauthorized sender",
+        });
+        expect(list.sendResponse).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+            error: "Unauthorized sender",
+        });
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+    });
+});

tests/backgroundStateIsolation.test.js

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -81,7 +80,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
         blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
         lastBalanceRefresh: 0,

tests/chainSwitchGate.test.js

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 // The site the persisted state has connected, and one it has never heard of.
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const STRANGER_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -86,7 +85,7 @@ function loadBackground() {
         tokenHolderCache: {},
         fraudContracts: [],
         activeAddress: ADDRESS,
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
     };
     const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: persisted });

tests/coldWorkerChainId.test.js

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const UNKNOWN_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -41,7 +40,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultRpcUrl,
         blockscoutUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
     };

tests/coldWorkerChainSwitch.test.js

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
 const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
@@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: CUSTOM_RPC,
         blockscoutUrl: CUSTOM_BLOCKSCOUT,
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [{ address: TOKEN, symbol: "DAI", decimals: 18 }],
         theme: "dark",
@@ -168,7 +167,7 @@ describe("a chain switch on a worker that never loaded state", () => {
         expect(after.wallets).toEqual(walletFixture());
         expect(after.hasWallet).toBe(true);
         expect(after.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
-        expect(after.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] });
+        expect(after.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] });
         expect(after.trackedTokens).toEqual([
             { address: TOKEN, symbol: "DAI", decimals: 18 },
         ]);

tests/coldWorkerSendTransaction.test.js

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
 
 const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
@@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
         blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
     };

tests/confirmTxFeeBound.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+// The wallet's OWN send path enforces the same combined fee bound the dApp
+// path does (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/399).
+//
+// The send in src/popup/views/confirmTx.js pins no fee fields, so ethers fills
+// maxFeePerGas and the gas limit from whatever the configured RPC node
+// answers. Nothing bounded that: a hostile node could report a fee whose
+// product with the gas limit is thousands of ETH, and it would be both
+// displayed and signed. populateVerifyAndSend() populates the transaction and
+// runs assertWithinCeilings() on the populated fees before signing, so an
+// over-bound send is refused before anything is broadcast.
+//
+// The check is driven here with a fake connected signer rather than a real
+// one: populateTransaction() returns the fees the node would have produced,
+// and sendTransaction() records whether the send actually happened. The real
+// DOM path around it — reading the fee error into the reserved errors box — is
+// covered by the Chrome e2e suite.
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
+    throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
+});
+
+const { populateVerifyAndSend } = require("../src/popup/views/confirmTx");
+const {
+    MAX_FEE_PER_GAS,
+    MAX_TOTAL_FEE,
+} = require("../src/shared/approvalVerify");
+
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+// A signer whose populateTransaction() fills in the fees a node quoted and
+// whose sendTransaction() records the call, so a test can assert whether the
+// send was reached at all.
+function fakeSigner(fees) {
+    const sent = [];
+    return {
+        sent,
+        populateTransaction: async (request) => ({
+            ...request,
+            from: RECIPIENT,
+            nonce: 0,
+            type: 2,
+            chainId: 1n,
+            gasLimit: fees.gasLimit,
+            maxFeePerGas: fees.maxFeePerGas,
+            maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+        }),
+        sendTransaction: async (tx) => {
+            sent.push(tx);
+            return { hash: "0xabc" };
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+const ETH_SEND = { token: "ETH", to: RECIPIENT, amount: "1.0" };
+
+describe("populateVerifyAndSend enforces the combined fee bound", () => {
+    // A gas limit and a fee that are each under their own field ceiling, but
+    // multiply to about 3,000 ETH — the combination the per-field ceilings
+    // cannot see.
+    const OVER = { gasLimit: 30000000n, maxFeePerGas: MAX_FEE_PER_GAS };
+
+    test("each field is under its ceiling but the product is over the bound", () => {
+        expect(OVER.maxFeePerGas).toBeLessThanOrEqual(MAX_FEE_PER_GAS);
+        expect(OVER.gasLimit * OVER.maxFeePerGas).toBeGreaterThan(
+            MAX_TOTAL_FEE,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("refuses an over-bound send without broadcasting it", async () => {
+        const signer = fakeSigner(OVER);
+        let thrown;
+        try {
+            await populateVerifyAndSend(signer, ETH_SEND);
+        } catch (e) {
+            thrown = e;
+        }
+        expect(thrown).toBeDefined();
+        expect(thrown.approvalMismatch).toBe(true);
+        expect(thrown.message).toMatch(/^[A-Z].*\.$/);
+        expect(thrown.message).toContain("3000.0 ETH");
+        expect(thrown.message).toContain("1.0 ETH");
+        // The one guarantee that matters: nothing was signed or sent.
+        expect(signer.sent).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    test("broadcasts a send whose product is just under the bound", async () => {
+        // 21,000 gas at 40 gwei is 0.00084 ETH — an ordinary send.
+        const under = { gasLimit: 21000n, maxFeePerGas: 40000000000n };
+        expect(under.gasLimit * under.maxFeePerGas).toBeLessThan(MAX_TOTAL_FEE);
+        const signer = fakeSigner(under);
+        const tx = await populateVerifyAndSend(signer, ETH_SEND);
+        expect(tx.hash).toBe("0xabc");
+        expect(signer.sent).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(signer.sent[0].gasLimit).toBe(under.gasLimit);
+    });
+});

tests/contractCreation.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+// The recipient line of a contract creation
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/250).
+//
+// A transaction with no `to` creates a contract. The approval screen, the
+// wait, success and error screens, the transaction detail view and the
+// transaction history rows each say so in a sentence, where they used to show
+// a blank line (an empty address, with a colour dot whose colour was
+// `undefined`) or, on the approval screen, "(contract creation)". A
+// transaction with a real `to` still shows that address.
+//
+// Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/typedDataPermit.test.js uses.
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
+    log: {
+        debugf: () => {},
+        infof: () => {},
+        warnf: () => {},
+        errorf: () => {},
+    },
+    // The transaction detail view fetches on-chain details after drawing; an
+    // answer that is not ok leaves the drawn lines as they are.
+    debugFetch: async () => ({ ok: false }),
+    setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
+    isDebug: () => false,
+}));
+
+// The wait screen polls for a receipt; this one never arrives.
+jest.mock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+    getProvider: () => ({ getTransactionReceipt: () => new Promise(() => {}) }),
+    refreshBalances: () => {},
+}));
+
+// The history lists ask the explorer for their transactions and resolve ENS
+// names for them; here the explorer answers with mockHistory and no name
+// resolves.
+let mockHistory = [];
+jest.mock("../src/shared/transactions", () => ({
+    ...jest.requireActual("../src/shared/transactions"),
+    fetchRecentTransactions: async () => mockHistory,
+}));
+jest.mock("../src/shared/ens", () => ({
+    ...jest.requireActual("../src/shared/ens"),
+    resolveEnsNames: async () => new Map(),
+}));
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+const txStatus = require("../src/popup/views/txStatus");
+const transactionDetail = require("../src/popup/views/transactionDetail");
+const home = require("../src/popup/views/home");
+const addressDetail = require("../src/popup/views/addressDetail");
+const addressToken = require("../src/popup/views/addressToken");
+
+const SENTENCE =
+    "This transaction creates a new contract. It has no recipient.";
+
+const FROM = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+const TX_HASH =
+    "0x85215772ed26ea8b39c2b3b18779030487efbe0b5fd7e882592b2f62b837be84";
+// Init code for a contract creation's data.
+const INIT_CODE = "0x600160005500";
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// The line a transaction with a real `to` shows: that address, and nothing
+// left over from an empty one.
+function expectAddressLine(html) {
+    expect(html).toContain(RECIPIENT);
+    expect(html).not.toContain(SENTENCE);
+    expect(html).not.toContain("undefined");
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
+    state.wallets = [];
+    state.trackedTokens = [];
+    state.viewData = {};
+    state.viewStack = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+    txStatus.init({ doRefreshAndRender: () => {} });
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    txStatus.endWait();
+});
+
+// Open the transaction approval screen the way the popup does: the background
+// hands over the populated transaction and show() draws it.
+async function openTxApproval(to, data) {
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
+            reply({
+                type: "tx",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                approvedTx: {
+                    type: 2,
+                    from: FROM,
+                    chainId: "0x1",
+                    nonce: "0x7",
+                    gasLimit: "0x5208",
+                    maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
+                    maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
+                    to,
+                    value: "0x0",
+                    data,
+                    accessList: [],
+                },
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+}
+
+describe("the transaction approval screen", () => {
+    test("a contract creation says so instead of naming a contract", async () => {
+        await openTxApproval(null, INIT_CODE);
+        expect(node("approve-tx-to").innerHTML).toBe(SENTENCE);
+    });
+
+    test("a transaction with a recipient shows its address", async () => {
+        await openTxApproval(RECIPIENT, "0x");
+        expectAddressLine(node("approve-tx-to").innerHTML);
+    });
+});
+
+// approval.js carries a contract creation to these screens with `to` as "".
+describe("the wait, success and error screens", () => {
+    const creation = {
+        to: "",
+        amount: "0.0000",
+        token: "ETH",
+        tokenSymbol: null,
+    };
+    const transfer = { ...creation, to: RECIPIENT };
+
+    test("a contract creation says so on the wait screen", () => {
+        txStatus.showWait(creation, TX_HASH);
+        expect(node("wait-tx-to").innerHTML).toBe(SENTENCE);
+    });
+
+    test("a transaction with a recipient shows its address on the wait screen", () => {
+        txStatus.showWait(transfer, TX_HASH);
+        expectAddressLine(node("wait-tx-to").innerHTML);
+    });
+
+    test("a contract creation says so on the success and error screens", () => {
+        state.viewData = {
+            amount: "0.0000",
+            symbol: "ETH",
+            to: "",
+            hash: TX_HASH,
+            blockNumber: 1,
+        };
+        txStatus.renderSuccess();
+        expect(node("success-tx-to").innerHTML).toBe(SENTENCE);
+
+        txStatus.showError(creation, TX_HASH, "The transaction failed.");
+        expect(node("error-tx-to").innerHTML).toBe(SENTENCE);
+    });
+
+    test("a transaction with a recipient shows its address on the success and error screens", () => {
+        state.viewData = {
+            amount: "0.0050",
+            symbol: "ETH",
+            to: RECIPIENT,
+            hash: TX_HASH,
+            blockNumber: 1,
+        };
+        txStatus.renderSuccess();
+        expectAddressLine(node("success-tx-to").innerHTML);
+
+        txStatus.showError(transfer, TX_HASH, "The transaction failed.");
+        expectAddressLine(node("error-tx-to").innerHTML);
+    });
+});
+
+// A transaction FROM sent, as the history lists hold it. The explorer reports a
+// contract creation with no `to`, which src/shared/transactions.js turns into
+// `to: ""`.
+function historyTx(to) {
+    return {
+        hash: TX_HASH,
+        from: FROM,
+        to,
+        value: "0.0000",
+        exactValue: "0.0",
+        rawAmount: "0",
+        rawUnit: "wei",
+        symbol: "ETH",
+        timestamp: 1790000000,
+        isError: false,
+        directionLabel: "Sent",
+        direction: "sent",
+        contractAddress: null,
+    };
+}
+
+// The detail view is opened with the transaction a history row holds.
+describe("the transaction detail view", () => {
+    test("a contract creation says so", () => {
+        transactionDetail.show(historyTx(""));
+        expect(node("tx-detail-to").innerHTML).toBe(SENTENCE);
+        expect(node("tx-detail-type").textContent).toBe("Contract Creation");
+    });
+
+    test("a transaction with a recipient shows its address", () => {
+        transactionDetail.show(historyTx(RECIPIENT));
+        expectAddressLine(node("tx-detail-to").innerHTML);
+    });
+});
+
+// The same rows are drawn on Home, AddressDetail and AddressToken (for ETH).
+describe.each([
+    ["Home", "home-tx-list", () => home.render({})],
+    ["AddressDetail", "tx-list", () => addressDetail.show()],
+    ["AddressToken", "address-token-tx-list", () => addressToken.show()],
+])("the transaction history on %s", (_name, listId, open) => {
+    async function rowsFor(tx) {
+        mockHistory = [tx];
+        open();
+        // The list is drawn once the history has been fetched.
+        await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0));
+        return node(listId).innerHTML;
+    }
+
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        state.wallets = [
+            {
+                name: "Main",
+                type: "key",
+                addresses: [{ address: FROM, balance: "0.0000" }],
+            },
+        ];
+        state.selectedWallet = 0;
+        state.selectedAddress = 0;
+        state.selectedToken = "ETH";
+    });
+
+    test("a contract creation's row says so, with no colour dot and no address line", async () => {
+        const html = await rowsFor(historyTx(""));
+        expect(html).toContain(SENTENCE);
+        expect(html).not.toContain("background:");
+        expect(html).not.toContain("am-address");
+        expect(html).not.toContain("undefined");
+    });
+
+    test("a transaction with a recipient shows its colour dot and address", async () => {
+        const html = await rowsFor(historyTx(RECIPIENT));
+        expectAddressLine(html);
+        expect(html).toContain("background:#");
+        expect(html).toContain(`<div class="am-address">${RECIPIENT}</div>`);
+    });
+});

tests/debugBanner.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+// Tests for the debug/testnet banner (issue #375).
+//
+// On a testnet the banner is raised even in a release build, but it must not
+// append the active view's internal id: the user should see "[TESTNET]", never
+// "[TESTNET] (approve-tx)". The suffix is gated on the compile-time DEBUG
+// constant, which is false in a plain test load, so this drives exactly the
+// text a shipped build renders. Revert the gate to the old unconditional
+// suffix and this fails.
+//
+// The banner is created on demand by updateDebugBanner(); the document stub
+// records what it prepends so the assertion can read the resulting text.
+
+function makeBanner() {
+    return {
+        id: "",
+        textContent: "",
+        style: { cssText: "" },
+        remove() {},
+    };
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    let banner = null;
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            return id === "debug-banner" ? banner : null;
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeBanner(),
+        body: {
+            prepend(node) {
+                banner = node;
+            },
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+function load() {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    globalThis.chrome = {
+        storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+    };
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    const helpers = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+    const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+    return { helpers, state };
+}
+
+describe("the release banner on a testnet", () => {
+    test("carries no internal view id", () => {
+        const { helpers, state } = load();
+        state.networkId = "sepolia";
+
+        helpers.updateDebugBanner("approve-tx");
+
+        expect(
+            globalThis.document.getElementById("debug-banner").textContent,
+        ).toBe("[TESTNET]");
+    });
+});

tests/debugFetch.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// What debugFetch writes to the console in debug mode.
+//
+// RPC providers put the API key in the URL's path or query string, and the
+// debug log used to print the whole URL and request body, so turning debug
+// mode on wrote the key to the console
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410). The log now names the
+// HTTP method, the URL's origin and the JSON-RPC method, and nothing else of
+// the request.
+
+const { debugFetch, urlOrigin, setRuntimeDebug } = require("../src/shared/log");
+
+const realFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    globalThis.fetch = realFetch;
+    setRuntimeDebug(false);
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+});
+
+test("logs the origin and JSON-RPC method, not the key in the URL", async () => {
+    setRuntimeDebug(true);
+    const consoleLog = jest.spyOn(console, "log").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    globalThis.fetch = jest.fn(async () => ({ status: 200 }));
+
+    await debugFetch(
+        "https://rpc.example.invalid/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456",
+        {
+            method: "POST",
+            headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+            body: JSON.stringify({
+                jsonrpc: "2.0",
+                id: 1,
+                method: "eth_chainId",
+                params: [],
+            }),
+        },
+    );
+
+    const logged = consoleLog.mock.calls.flat().join(" ");
+    expect(logged).not.toContain("PATHKEY123");
+    expect(logged).not.toContain("QUERYTOKEN456");
+    expect(logged).toContain("https://rpc.example.invalid");
+    expect(logged).toContain("eth_chainId");
+});
+
+test("the origin leaves out a user name and password in the URL", () => {
+    expect(
+        urlOrigin("https://user:SECRETPASS@rpc.example.invalid/v3/KEY"),
+    ).toBe("https://rpc.example.invalid");
+    expect(urlOrigin("wss://user:SECRETPASS@rpc.example.invalid:8546/")).toBe(
+        "wss://rpc.example.invalid:8546",
+    );
+});

tests/deleteWalletLostPassword.test.js

@@ -140,8 +140,14 @@ function load() {
     state.selectedWallet = 0;
     state.selectedAddress = 0;
     state.activeAddress = A0;
-    state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"], [B0]: ["b.example"] };
-    state.deniedSites = { [B0]: ["c.example"], [C0]: ["d.example"] };
+    state.allowedSites = {
+        [A0]: ["https://a.example"],
+        [B0]: ["https://b.example"],
+    };
+    state.deniedSites = {
+        [B0]: ["https://c.example"],
+        [C0]: ["https://d.example"],
+    };
     state.viewStack = ["main", "settings"];
     state.currentView = "settings";
 
@@ -172,6 +178,15 @@ async function openLostPassword(deleteWallet, walletIdx) {
     await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-password");
 }
 
+// Delete a wallet through the password route: open its confirm screen,
+// enter the password, and confirm. The vault is mocked, so the password
+// text itself is irrelevant — decryptWithPassword decides pass or fail.
+async function deleteWithPassword(deleteWallet, walletIdx) {
+    deleteWallet.show(walletIdx);
+    node("delete-wallet-password").value = "any password";
+    await click("btn-delete-wallet-confirm");
+}
+
 // ------------------------------------------------------------ tests
 
 // The stub is what every persistence assertion below rests on, so its one
@@ -379,8 +394,8 @@ describe("deleting without the password", () => {
         await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
 
         const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
-        expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] });
-        expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["d.example"] });
+        expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["https://a.example"] });
+        expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["https://d.example"] });
     });
 
     // The route shares finishDelete() with the password route, so the
@@ -398,7 +413,9 @@ describe("deleting without the password", () => {
         expect(saved.activeAddress).toBe(A0);
         expect(saved.selectedWallet).toBe(0);
         expect(saved.selectedAddress).toBe(0);
-        expect(sent).toEqual([]);
+        expect(sent).toEqual([
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_ADDRESSES_REMOVED", addresses: [B0] },
+        ]);
         // Settings is stubbed, so this is where the route hands over, not
         // where it renders.
         expect(mockSettingsShow).toHaveBeenCalled();
@@ -417,13 +434,16 @@ describe("deleting without the password", () => {
             "Wallet 3",
         ]);
         expect(saved.activeAddress).toBe(B0);
-        expect(sent).toEqual([{ type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED" }]);
+        expect(sent).toEqual([
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_ADDRESSES_REMOVED", addresses: [A0, A1] },
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED" },
+        ]);
     });
 
     test("deleting the last wallet lands on Welcome with nothing left", async () => {
         const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
         state.wallets = [wallet("Wallet 1", "secret-one", [A0])];
-        state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"] };
+        state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["https://a.example"] };
         state.deniedSites = {};
 
         await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 0);
@@ -456,15 +476,21 @@ describe("what the screen leaves behind", () => {
         );
     });
 
-    // Left mid-delete, the screen has to come back usable.
-    test("the confirm button is re-enabled on the way out", async () => {
-        const { helpers, deleteWallet } = load();
+    // Both routes now re-enable through finishDelete(), not their leave
+    // hooks, so the button comes back live once a delete completes.
+    test("the confirm button is re-enabled after a delete", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet } = load();
         await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
 
-        node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled = true;
-        helpers.showView("settings");
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
 
         expect(node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").disabled).toBe(false);
+        expect(
+            node("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm").classList.contains(
+                "text-muted",
+            ),
+        ).toBe(false);
     });
 
     // A wallet name is not a secret, so the screen is excluded for the
@@ -475,3 +501,48 @@ describe("what the screen leaves behind", () => {
         expect(RESTORABLE_VIEWS.has("delete-wallet-confirm")).toBe(false);
     });
 });
+
+// The password route is the pre-existing bug this file's fix addresses:
+// its Confirm Delete button was disabled before the decrypt and never
+// re-enabled on success, so a second delete in the same popup session
+// found a dead button. Now both routes re-enable through finishDelete().
+//
+// Against head these tests fail: with the re-enable absent, the button
+// stays disabled after the first delete, so the disabled assertions read
+// true where they expect false.
+describe("the password route's confirm button", () => {
+    test("is re-enabled after a successful delete", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, vault } = load();
+        vault.decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue();
+
+        await deleteWithPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        expect(node("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").disabled).toBe(false);
+        expect(
+            node("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").classList.contains("text-muted"),
+        ).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    // The reported symptom: delete one wallet, then open Delete Wallet for
+    // a second one without reopening the popup. The button must be live on
+    // that second visit, and the second delete must actually persist.
+    test("a second delete works in the same popup session", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, vault, storage } = load();
+        vault.decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue();
+
+        await deleteWithPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        // Wallet 2 is gone; the list is now [Wallet 1, Wallet 3]. Opening
+        // the confirm screen for the wallet now at index 1 (Wallet 3) must
+        // find its button live, not the dead one the first delete left.
+        deleteWallet.show(1);
+        expect(node("btn-delete-wallet-confirm").disabled).toBe(false);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-password").value = "any password";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-confirm");
+
+        expect((await persistedWallets(storage)).map((w) => w.name)).toEqual([
+            "Wallet 1",
+        ]);
+    });
+});

tests/dustThreshold.test.js

@@ -99,12 +99,13 @@ describe("the flash line the message is shown in", () => {
     // length, including one that wrapped to two lines and pushed the
     // settings view down 12px.
     //
-    // The assertion that actually measures — empty line vs. the message,
-    // real Chromium, documented 360x600 popup — is
-    // "a rejected dust threshold shifts no layout (#233)" in
-    // tests/e2e/run.js, run by make test-e2e. It is not in make check
-    // because REPO_POLICIES.md caps make test at 20 seconds and a browser
-    // suite does not fit; run it before changing the wording.
+    // The line cuts a message too long for it with an ellipsis (see
+    // showFlash() in src/popup/views/helpers.js). The assertions that
+    // measure that, in a real browser at the documented 360x600 popup, are
+    // "a rejected dust threshold shifts no layout (#233)" and "an over-long
+    // flash message keeps to one line (#252)" in tests/e2e/run.js, run by
+    // make test-e2e. They are not in make check because REPO_POLICIES.md
+    // caps make test at 20 seconds and a browser suite does not fit.
     test("reserves its height in the markup", () => {
         const flashLine = POPUP_HTML.match(
             /<div\s+id="flash-msg"\s+class="([^"]*)"/,

tests/e2e/firefox/run.js

@@ -372,10 +372,10 @@ step("the loopback dApp page gets the real inpage provider", async (env) => {
         STEP_TIMEOUT_MS,
     );
 
-    // EIP-6963, asked of the provider itself. The announcement carries the
-    // uuid src/content/index.js reads out of extension storage — call site 1
-    // in the issue — and it has to name this extension and hand back the very
-    // object on window.ethereum.
+    // EIP-6963, asked of the provider itself. The announcement carries a
+    // UUIDv4 inpage.js generates fresh for this page load (nothing persists
+    // it — see issue #398) and has to name this extension and hand back the
+    // very object on window.ethereum.
     const announced = await d.executeAsync(
         `const done = arguments[arguments.length - 1];
          const onAnnounce = (e) => {
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ step("the loopback dApp page gets the real inpage provider", async (env) => {
     );
     assert(
         typeof announced.uuid === "string" && announced.uuid.length === 36,
-        "the announcement carries no stored provider uuid: " +
+        "the announcement carries no provider uuid: " +
             JSON.stringify(announced.uuid),
     );
 
@@ -438,11 +438,10 @@ step(
         await d.switchToWindow(popup);
         await d.waitVisible("#view-approve-site");
 
-        const hostname = await d.text("#approve-hostname");
+        const origin = await d.text("#approve-origin");
         assert(
-            hostname === "127.0.0.1",
-            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(hostname),
+            origin === env.server.origin,
+            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " + JSON.stringify(origin),
         );
         const shown = await d.text("#approve-address");
         assert(
@@ -494,16 +493,16 @@ step(
 
         const screen = await d.execute(
             `return {
-             hostname: document.getElementById("approve-sign-hostname").textContent,
+             origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
              type: document.getElementById("approve-sign-type").textContent,
              message: document.getElementById("approve-sign-message").textContent,
              from: document.getElementById("approve-sign-from").textContent,
          };`,
         );
         assert(
-            screen.hostname === "127.0.0.1",
+            screen.origin === env.server.origin,
             "the sign prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+                JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
         );
         assert(
             screen.type === "Personal message",
@@ -571,7 +570,7 @@ step(
 
         const screen = await d.execute(
             `return {
-             hostname: document.getElementById("approve-tx-hostname").textContent,
+             origin: document.getElementById("approve-tx-origin").textContent,
              from: document.getElementById("approve-tx-from").textContent,
              to: document.getElementById("approve-tx-to").textContent,
              value: document.getElementById("approve-tx-value").textContent,
@@ -582,9 +581,9 @@ step(
          };`,
         );
         assert(
-            screen.hostname === "127.0.0.1",
+            screen.origin === env.server.origin,
             "the transaction prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+                JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
         );
         assert(
             screen.from.toLowerCase().includes(env.address.toLowerCase()),

tests/e2e/run.js

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ const {
 const {
     DAPP_ORIGIN,
     DAPP_URL,
+    PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN,
     PHISHING_DAPP_URL,
     FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI,
     FEE_RESERVE_WEI,
@@ -1320,17 +1321,13 @@ async function waitForFilledFlashLine(page) {
 }
 
 // README, No Layout Shift: the rejection message goes into #flash-msg,
-// whose min-h-[1.25rem] reserves exactly ONE line at text-xs. Reserving
-// the space is not enough on its own — a message too long for one line
-// wraps and pushes everything below it down anyway, which is what the
-// first version of this change shipped: 75 characters, 32px, the settings
-// view and the threshold field 12px lower than with an empty line.
-//
-// So this measures rather than inspects markup. It is the only assertion
-// in the repo that can see the wording grow: the unit suite runs on the
-// node environment with no layout engine, where every height is zero (see
-// the note in tests/dustThreshold.test.js). Lengthen
-// DUST_THRESHOLD_MESSAGE past one line and this test goes red.
+// whose min-h-[1.25rem] reserves exactly ONE line at text-xs, and which
+// cuts a message too long for that line with an ellipsis rather than wrap
+// it. This shows the real message and measures that nothing moves; the
+// test after it does the same with a message several lines long. Both
+// measure rather than inspect markup: the unit suite runs on the node
+// environment with no layout engine, where every height is zero (see the
+// note in tests/dustThreshold.test.js).
 test("a rejected dust threshold shifts no layout (#233)", async (env) => {
     const page = await openPopup(env.ctx, env.popupUrl);
     try {
@@ -1377,11 +1374,11 @@ test("a rejected dust threshold shifts no layout (#233)", async (env) => {
         );
         assert(
             after.flashHeight === before.flashHeight,
-            "the message does not fit the reserved line: " +
+            "the message does not keep to the reserved line: " +
                 before.flashHeight +
                 "px empty vs " +
                 after.flashHeight +
-                "px with the message. Shorten DUST_THRESHOLD_MESSAGE",
+                "px with the message",
         );
         assert(
             after.settingsTop === before.settingsTop,
@@ -1400,6 +1397,134 @@ test("a rejected dust threshold shifts no layout (#233)", async (env) => {
     }
 });
 
+// ------------------------------------------------ the flash line (#252)
+
+// #flash-msg never wraps: a message too long for its one line is cut with an
+// ellipsis (see showFlash() in src/popup/views/helpers.js). This puts a
+// message several lines long into it and measures that the line and the
+// screen below it stay where they were.
+test("an over-long flash message keeps to one line (#252)", async (env) => {
+    const page = await openPopup(env.ctx, env.popupUrl);
+    try {
+        await page.setViewportSize(POPUP_VIEWPORT);
+        await openSettings(page);
+
+        const before = await page.evaluate(measureFlashLine);
+        const overflows = await page.evaluate(() => {
+            const line = document.getElementById("flash-msg");
+            line.textContent =
+                "This message is far too long for one line. ".repeat(5);
+            return line.scrollWidth > line.clientWidth;
+        });
+        const after = await page.evaluate(measureFlashLine);
+
+        assert(
+            after.flashHeight === before.flashHeight,
+            "the flash line is " +
+                before.flashHeight +
+                "px before and " +
+                after.flashHeight +
+                "px with an over-long message, so it wraps",
+        );
+        assert(
+            after.settingsTop === before.settingsTop,
+            "the settings view moved " +
+                (after.settingsTop - before.settingsTop) +
+                "px when the message appeared",
+        );
+        assert(
+            after.fieldTop === before.fieldTop,
+            "the dust threshold field moved " +
+                (after.fieldTop - before.fieldTop) +
+                "px when the message appeared",
+        );
+        // Checked last: a line that wraps does not run past its right edge,
+        // so this only shows the message really was cut once nothing moved.
+        assert(
+            overflows,
+            "the message fits on the line, so it proves nothing: " +
+                JSON.stringify(after.text),
+        );
+    } finally {
+        await page.close();
+    }
+});
+
+// --------------------------------------- password error containers (#297)
+
+// Every screen that asks for a password reserves room for one line of error.
+// The two on the dApp approval screens also have a border and padding, which
+// that reserved height has to cover too.
+const PASSWORD_ERROR_CONTAINERS = [
+    "approve-tx-error",
+    "approve-sign-error",
+    "export-privkey-flash",
+    "show-phrase-flash",
+    "delete-wallet-flash",
+    "confirm-tx-password-error",
+];
+
+// Shows only the screen holding the container, then measures the container
+// and the element below it empty and again filled the way showError() in
+// src/popup/views/helpers.js fills it. Runs in the page.
+function measurePasswordError(id) {
+    const container = document.getElementById(id);
+    const screen = container.closest(".view");
+    for (const view of document.querySelectorAll(".view")) {
+        view.classList.toggle("hidden", view !== screen);
+    }
+    const below = container.nextElementSibling;
+    const measure = () => ({
+        height: container.getBoundingClientRect().height,
+        belowTop: below.getBoundingClientRect().top + window.scrollY,
+        belowHeight: below.getBoundingClientRect().height,
+    });
+    const empty = measure();
+    container.textContent = "Please enter your password.";
+    container.style.visibility = "visible";
+    const filled = measure();
+    container.textContent = "";
+    container.style.visibility = "hidden";
+    return { empty, filled };
+}
+
+test("a password error moves nothing on any screen (#297)", async (env) => {
+    const page = await openPopup(env.ctx, env.popupUrl);
+    try {
+        await page.setViewportSize(POPUP_VIEWPORT);
+        for (const id of PASSWORD_ERROR_CONTAINERS) {
+            const { empty, filled } = await page.evaluate(
+                measurePasswordError,
+                id,
+            );
+            assert(
+                empty.belowHeight > 0,
+                "nothing is shown below #" + id + ", so nothing was measured",
+            );
+            assert(
+                filled.height === empty.height,
+                "#" +
+                    id +
+                    " is " +
+                    empty.height +
+                    "px empty and " +
+                    filled.height +
+                    "px with an error",
+            );
+            assert(
+                filled.belowTop === empty.belowTop,
+                "the element below #" +
+                    id +
+                    " moved " +
+                    (filled.belowTop - empty.belowTop) +
+                    "px when the error appeared",
+            );
+        }
+    } finally {
+        await page.close();
+    }
+});
+
 // --------------------------------------------- confirmation screen (#238)
 //
 // The screen that decides what gets signed. The arithmetic underneath it
@@ -1414,9 +1539,10 @@ test("a rejected dust threshold shifts no layout (#233)", async (env) => {
 // on opposite sides of the reserve while sitting on the same side of the
 // estimate.
 
-// The balance the funded fixture serves, and the amounts sent against it.
+// The balance the funded fixture serves, as the Send and confirmation screens
+// show it, and the amounts sent against it.
 const FUNDED_ETH_WEI = 10n ** 18n;
-const FUNDED_ETH_TEXT = "1.0";
+const FUNDED_ETH_TEXT = "1.0000";
 const COMFORTABLE_AMOUNT = "0.1";
 const OVER_BALANCE_AMOUNT = "2.0";
 
@@ -1430,7 +1556,7 @@ const GAP_AMOUNT = formatEther(FUNDED_ETH_WEI - FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI);
 // fee test: it covers the expected cost to the wei and falls short of the
 // reserve, so the same swap flips this assertion too — through a different
 // balance and a different message than the ETH path uses.
-const TOKEN_BALANCE_TEXT = "1.5";
+const TOKEN_BALANCE_TEXT = "1.5000";
 const TOKEN_AMOUNT = "0.25";
 const OVER_TOKEN_AMOUNT = "9.0";
 const FEE_ONLY_ETH_WEI = FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI;
@@ -1439,16 +1565,15 @@ function toHexWei(wei) {
     return "0x" + wei.toString(16);
 }
 
-// A fee in wei as the confirmation screen writes it. Deliberately a second
-// implementation of formatFeeEth() from src/popup/views/confirmTx.js rather
-// than an import of it: that module pulls in the whole popup and cannot be
-// required outside a browser, and asserting against an independent rendering
-// is stronger than asserting a function equals itself.
+// A fee in wei as the confirmation screen writes it: truncated to four decimal
+// places (README.md, Display Consistency). Deliberately a second
+// implementation rather than an import of src/shared/amountDisplay.js:
+// asserting against an independent rendering is stronger than asserting a
+// function equals itself. The fixture's fees are above 0.0001 ETH, so the
+// nonzero floor never applies here.
 function feeEth(wei) {
-    const parts = formatEther(wei).split(".");
-    const dec =
-        parts.length > 1 ? parts[1].slice(0, 6).replace(/0+$/, "") || "0" : "0";
-    return parts[0] + "." + dec + " ETH";
+    const [whole, frac = ""] = formatEther(wei).split(".");
+    return whole + "." + (frac + "0000").slice(0, 4) + " ETH";
 }
 
 // What the confirmation screen is showing right now, read out of the DOM in
@@ -1505,11 +1630,10 @@ async function backToAddress(page) {
 
 // Drive the popup to the confirmation screen for one send.
 //
-// It waits for the send screen to be showing `balance` before filling
-// anything in. That figure is the exact number the spend gate compares
-// against, so waiting for it — rather than for a refresh to have probably
-// landed — is what keeps every assertion below deterministic after a
-// fixture change.
+// It waits for the send screen to be showing `balance`, the fixture's balance
+// as that screen displays it, before filling anything in. Waiting for it —
+// rather than for a refresh to have probably landed — is what keeps every
+// assertion below deterministic after a fixture change.
 async function goToConfirm(page, { token, balance, amount }) {
     await backToAddress(page);
     await page.click("#btn-send");
@@ -1525,6 +1649,7 @@ async function goToConfirm(page, { token, balance, amount }) {
     await page.fill("#send-amount", amount);
     await page.click("#btn-send-review");
     await visible(page, "#view-confirm-tx");
+    await assertAddressesFit(page, "the confirmation screen");
 }
 
 // A balance as the main view renders it: balanceLinesForAddress() writes
@@ -2347,8 +2472,6 @@ test("a token whose symbol() returns markup renders as text (#307)", async (env)
 // dApp, with real funds, against a real network. The RPC is stubbed
 // throughout. That pass stays on the human list before 1.0.0.
 
-const DAPP_HOSTNAME = new URL(DAPP_URL).hostname;
-
 // The personal_sign payload. Sent as hex, which is what dApps send and what
 // the popup requires — it calls getBytes() on the message — and displayed on
 // the approval screen as the decoded text, which is what the user is agreeing
@@ -2892,11 +3015,10 @@ test("eth_requestAccounts rejected at the prompt returns a rejection (#183)", as
     try {
         await visible(popup, "#view-approve-site");
 
-        const hostname = await popup.locator("#approve-hostname").innerText();
+        const origin = await popup.locator("#approve-origin").innerText();
         assert(
-            hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
-            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(hostname),
+            origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
+            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " + JSON.stringify(origin),
         );
 
         // The control for the phishing test below: this origin is not on the
@@ -2977,7 +3099,6 @@ test("a connect request from a blocklisted site is flagged (#219)", async (env)
     // check and the real approval screen. Nothing about the list is stubbed —
     // there is nothing left to stub, since the extension no longer fetches it.
     const phishingDapp = await openDapp(env.ctx, PHISHING_DAPP_URL);
-    const hostname = new URL(PHISHING_DAPP_URL).hostname;
     try {
         await reserveApprovalTab(env);
         await startRequest(
@@ -2990,15 +3111,15 @@ test("a connect request from a blocklisted site is flagged (#219)", async (env)
         try {
             await visible(popup, "#view-approve-site");
 
-            const shown = await popup.locator("#approve-hostname").innerText();
+            const shown = await popup.locator("#approve-origin").innerText();
             assert(
-                shown === hostname,
+                shown === PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN,
                 "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
                     JSON.stringify(shown),
             );
 
             await visible(popup, "#approve-site-phishing-warning");
-            console.log("# phishing warning shown for " + hostname);
+            console.log("# phishing warning shown for " + PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN);
 
             // Not remembered: a remembered decision for this origin would
             // outlive the test.
@@ -3028,15 +3149,15 @@ test("personal_sign signs, and the signature recovers to the address (#183)", as
     const boundary = await watchApprovalBoundary(popup, env);
 
     const screen = await popup.evaluate(() => ({
-        hostname: document.getElementById("approve-sign-hostname").textContent,
+        origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
         type: document.getElementById("approve-sign-type").textContent,
         message: document.getElementById("approve-sign-message").textContent,
         from: document.getElementById("approve-sign-from").textContent,
     }));
     assert(
-        screen.hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
+        screen.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
         "the sign prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-            JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+            JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
     );
     assert(
         screen.type === "Personal message",
@@ -3111,6 +3232,64 @@ test("personal_sign rejected returns a rejection to the page (#183)", async (env
     );
 });
 
+// A right-to-left character must not move the characters around it: U+05C3
+// between "5" and "00" would otherwise put "500" on screen before it. A
+// paragraph separator (U+2029) before it, left in the text, would end the
+// byte-order layout and bring that back
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/403).
+test("a personal message is laid out in the order of its bytes (#403)", async (env) => {
+    const rightToLeft = String.fromCodePoint(0x05c3);
+    const text =
+        "Sign in" +
+        String.fromCodePoint(0x2029) +
+        "Pay 5" +
+        rightToLeft +
+        "00 ETH";
+    await startRequest(env.dapp, "sign-bidi", "personal_sign", [
+        hexlify(toUtf8Bytes(text)),
+        env.expectedAddress,
+    ]);
+    const popup = await waitForApprovalWindow(env.ctx);
+    await visible(popup, "#view-approve-sign");
+
+    // The text on screen, marks included, and the left edge of each of its
+    // characters, in byte order. A character the browser's fonts draw with
+    // no width shares its neighbour's edge.
+    const shown = await popup.evaluate(() => {
+        const message = document.getElementById("approve-sign-message");
+        const walker = document.createTreeWalker(message, NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT);
+        const range = document.createRange();
+        let text = "";
+        const lefts = [];
+        for (let node = walker.nextNode(); node; node = walker.nextNode()) {
+            for (let i = 0; i < node.length; i++) {
+                range.setStart(node, i);
+                range.setEnd(node, i + 1);
+                lefts.push(range.getBoundingClientRect().left);
+            }
+            text += node.data;
+        }
+        return { text, lefts };
+    });
+    await clickAndClose(popup, "#btn-reject-sign");
+    await assertUserRejection(
+        env.dapp,
+        "sign-bidi",
+        "the byte-order personal_sign rejection",
+    );
+
+    assert(
+        shown.text === "Sign inU+2029Pay 5" + rightToLeft + "00 ETH",
+        "the paragraph separator is not shown as a mark: " +
+            JSON.stringify(shown.text),
+    );
+    assert(
+        shown.lefts.every((left, i) => i === 0 || left >= shown.lefts[i - 1]),
+        "the personal message is not laid out in byte order: " +
+            JSON.stringify(shown.lefts),
+    );
+});
+
 test("eth_signTypedData_v4 signs, and the signature recovers (#183)", async (env) => {
     await startRequest(env.dapp, "typed", "eth_signTypedData_v4", [
         env.expectedAddress,
@@ -3121,15 +3300,15 @@ test("eth_signTypedData_v4 signs, and the signature recovers (#183)", async (env
     const boundary = await watchApprovalBoundary(popup, env);
 
     const screen = await popup.evaluate(() => ({
-        hostname: document.getElementById("approve-sign-hostname").textContent,
+        origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
         type: document.getElementById("approve-sign-type").textContent,
         message: document.getElementById("approve-sign-message").innerText,
         from: document.getElementById("approve-sign-from").textContent,
     }));
     assert(
-        screen.hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
+        screen.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
         "the typed data prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-            JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+            JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
     );
     assert(
         screen.type === "Typed data (EIP-712)",
@@ -3227,7 +3406,7 @@ test("eth_sendTransaction signs the approved transaction and broadcasts it (#183
     const boundary = await watchApprovalBoundary(popup, env);
 
     const screen = await popup.evaluate(() => ({
-        hostname: document.getElementById("approve-tx-hostname").textContent,
+        origin: document.getElementById("approve-tx-origin").textContent,
         from: document.getElementById("approve-tx-from").textContent,
         to: document.getElementById("approve-tx-to").textContent,
         value: document.getElementById("approve-tx-value").textContent,
@@ -3237,9 +3416,9 @@ test("eth_sendTransaction signs the approved transaction and broadcasts it (#183
             .classList.contains("hidden"),
     }));
     assert(
-        screen.hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
+        screen.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
         "the transaction prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-            JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+            JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
     );
     assert(
         screen.from.toLowerCase().includes(env.expectedAddress.toLowerCase()),
@@ -3262,6 +3441,8 @@ test("eth_sendTransaction signs the approved transaction and broadcasts it (#183
             JSON.stringify(screen.data),
     );
 
+    await assertAddressesFit(popup, "the dApp transaction prompt");
+
     const broadcastBefore = env.routeOpts.broadcastTransactions.length;
     await popup.fill("#approve-tx-password", PASSWORD);
     await popup.click("#btn-approve-tx");
@@ -3425,6 +3606,206 @@ test("the password never crossed either boundary in this section (#183)", async
     await env.dapp.close();
 });
 
+// ------------------------------------------- address layout (#380)
+//
+// "addresses should never wrap in the common views. this doesn't mean to
+// just change the css, but update the layout itself so the untruncated
+// addresses are shown in full and don't mess up the layout."
+//
+// Every one of these questions is about glyph advances and the width of
+// the box an address landed in, and nothing in the markup answers any of
+// them: a row can hold `white-space: nowrap` and still be too narrow, and
+// the popup's own `overflow-x-hidden` would then hide the evidence by
+// clipping the tail. So they are measured in a real Chromium, on the real
+// rendered views, one assertion per property #380 names:
+//
+//   - the whole address is there (42 characters, no ellipsis)
+//   - it occupies exactly one line box
+//   - it fits its row, so the overflow-x escape hatch never engages
+//   - its row ends inside the popup's content box
+//   - and the document itself does not scroll sideways
+//
+// The narrowest containers the popup has are covered here — the
+// transaction detail wells (`bg-well p-3 mx-1`) and the token contract
+// well — so the wider ones cannot fail while these pass.
+
+// Everything on screen that carries an address, measured in one pass.
+// Views other than the current one are display:none and measure zero, so
+// filtering on width leaves exactly what a user can see right now.
+function addressRowReport(page) {
+    return page.evaluate(() => {
+        const app = document.getElementById("app");
+        const appRight = app.getBoundingClientRect().right;
+        const rows = [];
+        for (const el of document.querySelectorAll(".am-address")) {
+            const box = el.getBoundingClientRect();
+            if (box.width === 0) continue;
+            // Line boxes are counted off the inline content, because the
+            // element's own rect is one box whether the text inside it
+            // wrapped or not. A Range yields a rect per contained node as
+            // well as per line, so it is the distinct tops that count:
+            // a copyable span and the text inside it share one.
+            const range = document.createRange();
+            range.selectNodeContents(el);
+            const tops = new Set(
+                Array.from(range.getClientRects()).map((r) =>
+                    Math.round(r.top),
+                ),
+            );
+            rows.push({
+                text: el.innerText.trim(),
+                lineBoxes: tops.size,
+                overflow: el.scrollWidth - el.clientWidth,
+                overhang: Math.round(box.right - appRight),
+            });
+        }
+        return {
+            rows,
+            pageOverflow:
+                document.documentElement.scrollWidth -
+                document.documentElement.clientWidth,
+        };
+    });
+}
+
+async function assertAddressesFit(page, where) {
+    const report = await addressRowReport(page);
+    assert(
+        report.rows.length > 0,
+        where + ": no address rows were rendered, so nothing was measured",
+    );
+    for (const row of report.rows) {
+        assert(
+            /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/.test(row.text),
+            where +
+                ": the address is not shown whole: " +
+                JSON.stringify(row.text),
+        );
+        assert(
+            row.lineBoxes === 1,
+            where +
+                ": " +
+                row.text +
+                " wrapped onto " +
+                row.lineBoxes +
+                " lines",
+        );
+        assert(
+            row.overflow <= 1,
+            where +
+                ": " +
+                row.text +
+                " is " +
+                row.overflow +
+                "px wider than the row holding it",
+        );
+        assert(
+            row.overhang <= 1,
+            where +
+                ": " +
+                row.text +
+                " reaches " +
+                row.overhang +
+                "px past the popup's content box",
+        );
+    }
+    assert(
+        report.pageOverflow <= 0,
+        where + ": the popup scrolls sideways by " + report.pageOverflow + "px",
+    );
+    return report.rows.length;
+}
+
+// Back to Home from wherever the suite above finished, without assuming
+// which screen that was. Every screen the popup can rest on has a Back
+// button, and Home has none, so unwinding until Home shows is the one
+// route that does not depend on the order of the tests before this point.
+async function unwindToHome(page) {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
+        if (await page.isVisible("#view-main")) return;
+        const back = page
+            .locator(".view:not(.hidden) button", { hasText: "Back" })
+            .first();
+        if ((await back.count()) === 0) break;
+        await back.click();
+        await page.waitForTimeout(150);
+    }
+    await visible(page, "#view-main");
+}
+
+// The reproduction from the issue: a wallet holding more than one address.
+// Every address in the list is a full 42 characters competing with the
+// [info] and [x] controls for one row's width, which is the state the
+// wallet view was reported wrapping in.
+test("a wallet with two addresses lists both in full, unwrapped (#380)", async (env) => {
+    await unwindToHome(env.page);
+
+    const before = await env.page
+        .locator("#wallet-list .btn-addr-info")
+        .count();
+    await env.page.locator("#wallet-list .btn-add-address").first().click();
+    await env.page.waitForFunction(
+        (n) =>
+            document.querySelectorAll("#wallet-list .btn-addr-info").length > n,
+        before,
+        { timeout: 60000 },
+    );
+
+    const shown = await assertAddressesFit(env.page, "the wallet list");
+    assert(
+        shown >= before + 1,
+        "the wallet list measured " +
+            shown +
+            " addresses, fewer than the " +
+            (before + 1) +
+            " it now holds",
+    );
+
+    // The [x] control only exists on a wallet holding more than one
+    // address, so its presence is also the proof the second one landed.
+    const removable = await env.page
+        .locator("#wallet-list .btn-remove-address")
+        .count();
+    assert(removable > 0, "the second address did not reach the wallet list");
+});
+
+test("every common view shows its addresses in full on one line (#380)", async (env) => {
+    await unwindToHome(env.page);
+    await assertAddressesFit(env.page, "Home");
+
+    await env.page.locator("#wallet-list .btn-addr-info").first().click();
+    await visible(env.page, "#view-address");
+    await visible(env.page, "#tx-list .tx-row");
+    await assertAddressesFit(env.page, "the address screen");
+
+    await env.page.click("#btn-receive");
+    await visible(env.page, "#view-receive");
+    await assertAddressesFit(env.page, "the receive screen");
+    await env.page.click("#btn-receive-back");
+    await visible(env.page, "#view-address");
+
+    await env.page.click("#btn-send");
+    await visible(env.page, "#view-send");
+    await assertAddressesFit(env.page, "the send screen");
+    await env.page.click("#btn-send-back");
+    await visible(env.page, "#view-address");
+
+    // The transaction detail screen carries the narrowest address rows in
+    // the popup: its fields sit inside a well that takes another 24px of
+    // padding and 8px of margin off the content width, and the token
+    // contract row there is narrower still.
+    await env.page.locator("#address-balances .balance-row").first().click();
+    await visible(env.page, "#view-address-token");
+    await assertAddressesFit(env.page, "the token screen");
+    await env.page.click("#btn-address-token-back");
+    await visible(env.page, "#view-address");
+
+    await env.page.locator("#tx-list .tx-row").first().click();
+    await visible(env.page, "#view-transaction");
+    await visible(env.page, "#tx-detail-token-contract-section");
+    await assertAddressesFit(env.page, "the transaction detail screen");
+});
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------- runner
 
 async function main() {

tests/extensionId.test.js

@@ -89,19 +89,28 @@ describe("chrome extension identity", () => {
 
     // The private half is a credential. It has never been in this repo and no
     // target generates one into the working tree; this fails loudly if that
-    // ever changes, because a committed .pem is a key anyone can sign a CRX
-    // with under this extension's id.
+    // ever changes, because a committed private key is one anyone can sign a
+    // CRX with under this extension's id.
+    //
+    // Matched by CONTENT, not by filename: a key committed as notes.txt or with
+    // no extension carries the same risk as one named key.pem, and a
+    // filename-only check waves it through. The PEM header a private key opens
+    // with is the signature searched for. The pattern does not trip on its own
+    // source: the bracket-expression characters between the two anchors are not
+    // in the character class, so this file is not a match for it.
+    const PRIVATE_KEY_HEADER = /-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/;
     test("no private key is committed anywhere in the tree", () => {
+        const root = path.join(__dirname, "..");
         const tracked = require("child_process")
-            .execSync("git ls-files", {
-                cwd: path.join(__dirname, ".."),
-                encoding: "utf8",
-            })
+            .execSync("git ls-files", { cwd: root, encoding: "utf8" })
             .split("\n")
             .filter(Boolean);
-        expect(tracked.filter((f) => /\.(pem|key|p12|pfx)$/i.test(f))).toEqual(
-            [],
+        const offenders = tracked.filter((f) =>
+            PRIVATE_KEY_HEADER.test(
+                fs.readFileSync(path.join(root, f), "latin1"),
+            ),
         );
+        expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
     });
 });
 

tests/fabricatedDecimals.test.js

@@ -253,8 +253,9 @@ describe("the ERC-20 approval line reaches its refusal", () => {
 
     test("a scale the explorer did report still formats", async () => {
         await fetchOnto([row({ decimals: "6" })]);
+        // The same explorer entry now also names the token (issue #323).
         expect(erc20AmountLine(transferData(THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL)).toBe(
-            "1000.0000",
+            "1000.0000 NOVEL",
         );
     });
 });
@@ -273,7 +274,7 @@ describe("the swap approval line reaches its refusal", () => {
         await fetchOnto([row({ decimals: "6" })]);
         expect(
             swapAmountLine(swapData(NOVEL, THOUSAND_AT_SIX, WETH, HALF_WETH)),
-        ).toBe("1000.0000");
+        ).toBe("1000.0000 NOVEL");
     });
 });
 

tests/flashLine.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+// The flash line (#252). #flash-msg reserves one line and cuts a message too
+// long for it with an ellipsis; that is measured in a real browser by
+// tests/e2e/run.js. Here: showFlash() keeps the whole message readable in the
+// line's title, and the two add-token screens flash a fixed line, not the text
+// of whatever error adding the token threw.
+
+const ADDRESS = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
+
+let elements;
+
+function fakeElement() {
+    return {
+        value: "",
+        textContent: "",
+        title: "",
+        style: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        addEventListener(event, handler) {
+            this.listeners[event] = handler;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+// Stands in for document.getElementById(): one fake element per id.
+function element(id) {
+    return (elements[id] ||= fakeElement());
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    elements = {};
+    globalThis.document = { getElementById: element };
+    // state.js reads chrome.storage.local at load.
+    globalThis.chrome = {
+        storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+    };
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    jest.dontMock("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+    jest.dontMock("../src/shared/state");
+    jest.dontMock("../src/shared/balances");
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+    jest.useRealTimers();
+    delete globalThis.document;
+    delete globalThis.chrome;
+});
+
+test("showFlash() puts the whole message in the title, and clears both", () => {
+    jest.useFakeTimers();
+    const { showFlash } = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+
+    showFlash("Saved.");
+    expect(element("flash-msg").textContent).toBe("Saved.");
+    expect(element("flash-msg").title).toBe("Saved.");
+
+    jest.advanceTimersByTime(2000);
+    expect(element("flash-msg").textContent).toBe("");
+    expect(element("flash-msg").title).toBe("");
+});
+
+describe.each([
+    ["addToken", "add-token-address", "btn-add-token-confirm"],
+    [
+        "settingsAddToken",
+        "settings-addtoken-address",
+        "btn-settings-addtoken-manual",
+    ],
+])("adding a token on %s", (view, field, button) => {
+    let flashes;
+    let errors;
+
+    // Clicks the screen's add button with lookupTokenInfo() and saveState()
+    // replaced by the given functions.
+    async function add(lookupTokenInfo, saveState) {
+        flashes = [];
+        errors = jest.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {});
+        jest.spyOn(console, "log").mockImplementation(() => {});
+        jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({ lookupTokenInfo }));
+        jest.doMock("../src/shared/state", () => ({
+            state: { trackedTokens: [] },
+            saveState,
+        }));
+        jest.doMock("../src/popup/views/helpers", () => ({
+            $: element,
+            showView: () => {},
+            showFlash: (msg) => flashes.push(msg),
+            escapeHtml: (s) => s,
+            goBack: () => {},
+        }));
+
+        require("../src/popup/views/" + view).init({
+            doRefreshAndRender: () => {},
+        });
+        element(field).value = ADDRESS;
+        await element(button).listeners.click();
+    }
+
+    test("a failed save flashes a fixed line and logs the error", async () => {
+        const detail = "A sentence about the stored record. ".repeat(4);
+
+        await add(
+            async () => ({ symbol: "TKN", decimals: 18, name: "Token" }),
+            async () => {
+                throw new Error(detail);
+            },
+        );
+
+        expect(flashes).toEqual(["Could not add the token."]);
+        expect(errors).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            "[AutistMask]",
+            "Adding token failed for",
+            ADDRESS,
+            detail,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a contract that is not a token flashes the lookup message", async () => {
+        const detail = "Not a valid ERC-20 token (symbol() failed).";
+
+        await add(
+            async () => {
+                throw new Error(detail);
+            },
+            async () => {},
+        );
+
+        expect(flashes).toEqual([detail]);
+    });
+});

tests/inpageErrors.test.js

@@ -49,11 +49,12 @@ class StubCustomEvent extends StubEvent {
     }
 }
 
-// Every code the background emits on the RPC path today, read out of
-// src/background/index.js. The provider must not know this list — it passes
-// through whatever arrived — but the cases below are the real ones.
+// Examples of codes the background emits on the RPC path, read out of
+// src/background/index.js. The provider must not know any list of codes — it
+// passes through whatever arrived — but the cases below are real ones.
 const REJECTED = 4001; // user rejected the request
 const UNAUTHORIZED = 4100; // site not connected / wrong address
+const UNSUPPORTED_METHOD = 4200; // a method the wallet does not implement
 const UNRECOGNIZED_CHAIN = 4902; // switch/add to an unsupported chain
 
 // A stub window with the four things inpage.js touches: message listeners,
@@ -115,6 +116,41 @@ async function rejectionFrom(start, response) {
     return outcome.error;
 }
 
+// The reply the real background worker (src/background/index.js) sends for
+// `method`, loaded against just enough of the extension API to receive one
+// RPC message. Same shape as tests/coldWorkerChainId.test.js.
+function backgroundReply(method) {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
+        ensureRecurringAlarms: async () => {},
+        registerAlarmHandlers: () => {},
+    }));
+
+    let messageListener = null;
+    global.chrome = {
+        runtime: {
+            onMessage: {
+                addListener: (fn) => {
+                    messageListener = fn;
+                },
+            },
+            onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
+        },
+    };
+
+    require("../src/background/index");
+
+    return new Promise((resolve) => {
+        messageListener(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC", method, params: [] },
+            { origin: "https://dapp.example" },
+            resolve,
+        );
+    });
+}
+
 describe("an EIP-1193 code reaches the page", () => {
     test("a user rejection arrives as code 4001", async () => {
         const err = await rejectionFrom(
@@ -164,8 +200,9 @@ describe("an EIP-1193 code reaches the page", () => {
         expect(err.message).toBe(message);
     });
 
-    // The provider is not allowed to know the list above: a code added to the
-    // background later must reach the page without this file being edited.
+    // The provider is not allowed to know the codes above: any other code,
+    // including one added to the background later, must reach the page
+    // without inpage.js being edited.
     test("a code the provider has never heard of is passed through", async () => {
         const err = await rejectionFrom(
             (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_accounts" }),
@@ -203,6 +240,26 @@ describe("an EIP-1193 code reaches the page", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// The reply here is the background's own, not one written in this file: it
+// used to carry no code for a method the wallet does not implement
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/279), so a site probing for an
+// optional method could not tell "not implemented" from "the call failed".
+describe("a method the wallet does not implement", () => {
+    afterEach(() => {
+        delete global.chrome;
+    });
+
+    test("reaches the page as code 4200", async () => {
+        const method = "wallet_noSuchMethod";
+        const err = await rejectionFrom(
+            (p) => p.request({ method }),
+            await backgroundReply(method),
+        );
+        expect(err.code).toBe(UNSUPPORTED_METHOD);
+        expect(err.message).toBe("Unsupported method: " + method);
+    });
+});
+
 describe("the message is untouched", () => {
     test("a coded error keeps the message byte for byte", async () => {
         const message =

tests/inpageProviderUuid.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+// The EIP-6963 provider UUID inpage.js announces (src/content/inpage.js).
+//
+// The bug this pins down (issue #398): the UUID used to be generated once,
+// persisted in extension storage, and announced verbatim to every page on
+// every load and across browser restarts, so any site — connected or not —
+// could read a stable cross-site, cross-session identifier for the install.
+// EIP-6963 asks for one UUIDv4 per page load, shared by every announcement in
+// that load. The fix generates it per page load and stores nothing.
+//
+// The stored UUID reached inpage.js as an AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID page
+// message from the content script, and inpage.js then announced it. Each load
+// below is posted the same stored UUID that way, so on the old code both loads
+// announce it and the last two tests fail.
+//
+// inpage.js is a bare IIFE injected into the page's JS context, not a module;
+// see tests/inpageErrors.test.js for why it is evaluated against a stub window
+// rather than imported. Here the stub captures the CustomEvent that carries
+// the announcement, so the UUID this file reads is the one a real dApp's
+// eip6963:announceProvider listener would see.
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+const { webcrypto } = require("crypto");
+
+const SOURCE = fs.readFileSync(
+    path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "content", "inpage.js"),
+    "utf8",
+);
+
+const loadInto = new Function(
+    "window",
+    "self",
+    "crypto",
+    "Event",
+    "CustomEvent",
+    SOURCE,
+);
+
+class StubEvent {
+    constructor(type) {
+        this.type = type;
+    }
+}
+
+class StubCustomEvent extends StubEvent {
+    constructor(type, init) {
+        super(type);
+        this.detail = init && init.detail;
+    }
+}
+
+// What the old content script read out of extension storage and posted to
+// every page load.
+const STORED_UUID = "11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555";
+
+// Evaluate inpage.js once against a fresh stub window, post it STORED_UUID the
+// way the old content script did, then dispatch a `requestProvider` event so a
+// re-announcement is observed as well as the announcement at load. Returns
+// every UUID the load announced, in order.
+function announcedUuids() {
+    const listeners = {};
+    const uuids = [];
+
+    const win = {
+        addEventListener(type, fn) {
+            (listeners[type] || (listeners[type] = [])).push(fn);
+        },
+        removeEventListener(type, fn) {
+            const fns = listeners[type];
+            if (!fns) return;
+            const i = fns.indexOf(fn);
+            if (i !== -1) fns.splice(i, 1);
+        },
+        postMessage() {},
+        dispatchEvent(event) {
+            if (event.type === "eip6963:announceProvider") {
+                uuids.push(event.detail.info.uuid);
+            }
+            for (const fn of (listeners[event.type] || []).slice()) fn(event);
+            return true;
+        },
+    };
+    win.window = win;
+
+    loadInto(win, win, webcrypto, StubEvent, StubCustomEvent);
+    win.dispatchEvent({
+        type: "message",
+        source: win,
+        data: { type: "AUTISTMASK_PROVIDER_UUID", uuid: STORED_UUID },
+    });
+    win.dispatchEvent(new StubEvent("eip6963:requestProvider"));
+    return uuids;
+}
+
+const UUID_V4 =
+    /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-4[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/;
+
+describe("the EIP-6963 provider UUID is fresh per page load", () => {
+    test("a load announces a UUIDv4", () => {
+        const uuids = announcedUuids();
+        expect(uuids.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+        expect(uuids[0]).toMatch(UUID_V4);
+    });
+
+    test("every announcement within one load carries the same UUID", () => {
+        const uuids = announcedUuids();
+        expect(uuids.length).toBeGreaterThan(1);
+        expect(new Set(uuids).size).toBe(1);
+    });
+
+    test("two page loads announce different UUIDs, neither the stored one", () => {
+        const first = announcedUuids();
+        const second = announcedUuids();
+        expect(first).not.toContain(STORED_UUID);
+        expect(second).not.toContain(STORED_UUID);
+        expect(second[0]).not.toBe(first[0]);
+    });
+});

tests/persistedEntryFloors.test.js

@@ -59,24 +59,32 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
             }
         });
 
-        test(`an ${field} entry whose value is not a hostname list is dropped`, () => {
-            for (const bad of ["dapp.example", 42, null, { a: 1 }, true]) {
+        test(`an ${field} entry whose value is not an origin list is dropped`, () => {
+            for (const bad of [
+                "https://dapp.example",
+                42,
+                null,
+                { a: 1 },
+                true,
+            ]) {
                 expect(
                     normalizePersisted({ [field]: { [ADDRESS]: bad } })[field],
                 ).toEqual({});
             }
         });
 
-        test(`a hostname that is not text is dropped from an ${field} entry`, () => {
+        test(`an origin that is not text is dropped from an ${field} entry`, () => {
             expect(
                 normalizePersisted({
-                    [field]: { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, "dapp.example", {}] },
+                    [field]: {
+                        [ADDRESS]: [42, null, "https://dapp.example", {}],
+                    },
                 })[field],
-            ).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+            ).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] });
         });
 
         test(`a real ${field} map survives, copied not shared`, () => {
-            const saved = { [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] } };
+            const saved = { [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] } };
 
             const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
 
@@ -87,10 +95,13 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
 
         test(`a good ${field} entry beside a malformed one survives`, () => {
             const out = normalizePersisted({
-                [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"], [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: 42 },
+                [field]: {
+                    [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
+                    [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: 42,
+                },
             });
 
-            expect(out[field]).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+            expect(out[field]).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] });
         });
 
         test(`a stored own "__proto__" key in ${field} is dropped`, () => {
@@ -100,7 +111,7 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
             // saveState()'s merge hands to the prototype setter on the next
             // write.
             const saved = JSON.parse(
-                '{"' + field + '":{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}}',
+                '{"' + field + '":{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}}',
             );
 
             const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
@@ -197,7 +208,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
     const MALFORMED = [
         { name: "a string", value: "notalist" },
         { name: "a number", value: 42 },
-        { name: "a record", value: { hostnames: ["dapp.example"] } },
+        { name: "a record", value: { origins: ["https://dapp.example"] } },
     ];
 
     for (const { name, value } of MALFORMED) {
@@ -231,7 +242,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
         const env = await bootPopup(
             unversionedValidProfile({
                 allowedSites: {
-                    [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"],
+                    [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
                     [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: "notalist",
                 },
             }),
@@ -239,7 +250,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
 
         expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
         expect(env.storage.read("autistmask").allowedSites).toEqual({
-            [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"],
+            [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
         });
     });
 

tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ const CONTRACT = [
             [ADDRESS],
             { [ADDRESS]: 42 },
             { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
-            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
+            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}'),
         ],
         holds: siteMapHolds,
     },
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ const CONTRACT = [
             [ADDRESS],
             { [ADDRESS]: 42 },
             { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
-            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
+            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}'),
         ],
         holds: siteMapHolds,
     },

tests/personalSignDisplay.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+// The signature prompt shows a personal message as the bytes that are signed
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/403): the raw data in hex, the
+// text it decodes to with control characters, line and paragraph separators
+// and characters that paint nothing marked rather than obeyed, markup shown as
+// text, laid out in byte order, and a message that is not hex as plain text
+// that cannot be signed.
+//
+// Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/approvalOrigin.test.js uses. That the layout keeps right-to-left
+// characters in byte order needs a real browser: tests/e2e/run.js checks it.
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { hexlify, toUtf8Bytes } = require("ethers");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+const FROM = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
+
+// Built from their code points so that this file holds none of them.
+const RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE = String.fromCodePoint(0x202e);
+const POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING = String.fromCodePoint(0x202c);
+const ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE = String.fromCodePoint(0x200b);
+const VARIATION_SELECTOR_1 = String.fromCodePoint(0xfe00);
+const VARIATION_SELECTOR_17 = String.fromCodePoint(0xe0100);
+const HANGUL_FILLER = String.fromCodePoint(0x3164);
+const LINE_SEPARATOR = String.fromCodePoint(0x2028);
+const PARAGRAPH_SEPARATOR = String.fromCodePoint(0x2029);
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    return {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// Open the signature prompt for a personal_sign of `message`, the way the
+// popup does: it asks the background for the approval and show() draws it.
+async function openPersonalSign(message) {
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
+            reply({
+                type: "sign",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                signParams: { method: "personal_sign", message, from: FROM },
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+}
+
+// The message box's markup as the text a reader sees: tags dropped.
+function shownMessage() {
+    return node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, "");
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    state.wallets = [];
+    state.activeAddress = FROM;
+    state.viewData = {};
+    state.viewStack = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+});
+
+test("a right-to-left override is marked, so the text reads in byte order", async () => {
+    // Obeyed, the override shows "0001" as "1000".
+    const text =
+        "Pay " +
+        RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE +
+        "0001" +
+        POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING +
+        " ETH";
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes(text)));
+    const html = node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML;
+    expect(html).not.toContain(RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE);
+    expect(html).not.toContain(POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING);
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Pay U+202E0001U+202C ETH");
+});
+
+test("a zero-width character is marked", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(
+        hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("pay" + ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE + "pal.com")),
+    );
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML).not.toContain(
+        ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE,
+    );
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("payU+200Bpal.com");
+});
+
+test("variation selectors and a Hangul filler are marked", async () => {
+    // Each paints nothing, so a page could hide bytes after "Sign in".
+    await openPersonalSign(
+        hexlify(
+            toUtf8Bytes(
+                "Sign in" +
+                    VARIATION_SELECTOR_1 +
+                    VARIATION_SELECTOR_17 +
+                    HANGUL_FILLER,
+            ),
+        ),
+    );
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Sign inU+FE00U+E0100U+3164");
+});
+
+test("the message is laid out in byte order", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("Hello")));
+    expect(
+        node("approve-sign-message").classList.contains("am-byte-order"),
+    ).toBe(true);
+});
+
+test("a control character other than a line feed is marked", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("a\u0000b\tc")));
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("aU+0000bU+0009c");
+});
+
+test("line and paragraph separators are marked", async () => {
+    // Left in the text, a paragraph separator would end the byte-order
+    // layout for everything after it.
+    await openPersonalSign(
+        hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("a" + LINE_SEPARATOR + "b" + PARAGRAPH_SEPARATOR)),
+    );
+    const html = node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML;
+    expect(html).not.toContain(LINE_SEPARATOR);
+    expect(html).not.toContain(PARAGRAPH_SEPARATOR);
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("aU+2028bU+2029");
+});
+
+test("a line feed is shown as a line break", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("Sign in\nNonce: 7")));
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML).toBe("Sign in<br>Nonce: 7");
+});
+
+// The message box is written as HTML, so a site's markup has to arrive there
+// escaped, as the text it is.
+const MARKUP = "<b>x</b><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>";
+
+test.each([
+    ["a hex message", hexlify(toUtf8Bytes(MARKUP))],
+    ["a message that is not hex", MARKUP],
+])("markup in %s is shown as text, not as markup", async (_, message) => {
+    await openPersonalSign(message);
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML).toBe(
+        "&lt;b&gt;x&lt;/b&gt;&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&gt;",
+    );
+});
+
+test("the raw hex is shown alongside the text", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("0x48656c6c6f");
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Hello");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex").textContent).toBe("0x48656c6c6f");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
+        false,
+    );
+});
+
+test("hex with an uppercase 0X is read as hex, as signing reads it", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("0X48656C6C6F");
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Hello");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex").textContent).toBe("0X48656C6C6F");
+    expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(false);
+});
+
+test("bytes that are not text are shown only as hex", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("0xff00");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").textContent).toBe(
+        "This message is not text.",
+    );
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex").textContent).toBe("0xff00");
+});
+
+test("a message that is not hex is shown as text and cannot be signed", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("Hello world");
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Hello world");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(
+        "This message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed.",
+    );
+    expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
+        true,
+    );
+});

tests/resolveTokenSymbol.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+// The symbol the dApp approval and status screens label a token with.
+//
+// Issue #323: the approval screen labelled anything outside the bundled list
+// `Unknown token`, even a token the user tracks or holds a balance of, while
+// the amount line already read that token's *scale* from those same sources
+// (issue #306). The name and the scale disagreed about which sources they
+// trust. resolveTokenSymbol() closes that gap: it draws the symbol from the
+// bundled list, then the tracked tokens, then the explorer's report — the
+// precedence resolveTokenDecimals() uses — and returns null, not a guess,
+// when nothing names it, so the screens keep saying `Unknown token`.
+//
+// A tracked or explorer-reported symbol is attacker-influenced text, so it
+// stays subject to the spoof rule (src/shared/symbolSpoof.js): resolving a
+// symbol must not become a new way for a stray contract to wear a bundled or
+// native ticker.
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { Interface } = require("ethers");
+const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../src/shared/constants");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { resolveTokenSymbol } = require("../src/shared/approvalAmount");
+const { decodeCalldata } = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+const iface = new Interface(ERC20_ABI);
+
+// Outside the bundled list, as the great majority of ERC-20s are.
+const NOVEL_TOKEN = "0xE2E0000000000000000000000000000000000E2e";
+// In the bundled list: USDC at 6 decimals, DAI at 18.
+const USDC = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
+const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
+const FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX = 5000000000n;
+
+function transferData(amount) {
+    return iface.encodeFunctionData("transfer", [RECIPIENT, amount]);
+}
+
+// A wallet whose block-explorer balance for `token` reports `symbol`, shaped
+// as balances.js writes it onto state.
+function walletsReporting(token, symbol) {
+    return [
+        {
+            name: "Wallet 1",
+            addresses: [
+                {
+                    address: "0x" + "a".repeat(40),
+                    balance: "1.0",
+                    tokenBalances: [
+                        {
+                            address: token,
+                            symbol,
+                            decimals: 6,
+                            balance: "5000.0",
+                        },
+                    ],
+                },
+            ],
+        },
+    ];
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    state.trackedTokens = [];
+    state.wallets = [];
+});
+
+describe("resolveTokenSymbol", () => {
+    test("reads the bundled list", () => {
+        expect(resolveTokenSymbol(USDC, state)).toBe("USDC");
+    });
+
+    test("prefers the bundled list over a tracked entry", () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [{ address: USDC, symbol: "NOTUSDC" }];
+        expect(resolveTokenSymbol(USDC, state)).toBe("USDC");
+    });
+
+    test("reads a token the user tracks", () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL" }];
+        expect(resolveTokenSymbol(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBe("NOVEL");
+    });
+
+    test("reads the symbol the explorer reported", () => {
+        state.wallets = walletsReporting(NOVEL_TOKEN, "NOVEL");
+        expect(resolveTokenSymbol(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBe("NOVEL");
+    });
+
+    test("is null when no source names the token", () => {
+        expect(resolveTokenSymbol(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("refuses a name the explorer's own entries disagree about", () => {
+        const wallets = walletsReporting(NOVEL_TOKEN, "NOVEL");
+        wallets[0].addresses.push({
+            address: "0x" + "b".repeat(40),
+            balance: "0.0",
+            tokenBalances: [{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "OTHER" }],
+        });
+        state.wallets = wallets;
+        expect(resolveTokenSymbol(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("rejects a tracked entry claiming a bundled ticker it is not", () => {
+        // NOVEL_TOKEN is not the real USDC contract, so it may not wear USDC.
+        state.trackedTokens = [{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "USDC" }];
+        expect(resolveTokenSymbol(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("rejects an explorer entry claiming the native ETH ticker", () => {
+        state.wallets = walletsReporting(NOVEL_TOKEN, "ETH");
+        expect(resolveTokenSymbol(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBeNull();
+    });
+});
+
+describe("decodeCalldata symbol", () => {
+    test("a tracked token is named, not called Unknown", () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
+        ];
+        const decoded = decodeCalldata(
+            transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX),
+            NOVEL_TOKEN,
+        );
+        expect(decoded.description).toBe("Transfer NOVEL");
+        const amount = decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === "Amount");
+        expect(amount.value).toBe("5000.0000 NOVEL");
+    });
+
+    test("a token nothing knows keeps a symbol-less label", () => {
+        const decoded = decodeCalldata(
+            transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX),
+            NOVEL_TOKEN,
+        );
+        expect(decoded.description).toBe("Transfer ERC-20 token");
+        const token = decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === "Token");
+        // The Token line carries the address and is flagged for the screen's
+        // symbol lookup, which resolves to nothing here — so `Unknown token`.
+        expect(token.isToken).toBe(true);
+        expect(token.address).toBe(NOVEL_TOKEN);
+        expect(resolveTokenSymbol(token.address, state)).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("a tracked token spoofing a bundled ticker is not named by it", () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "USDC", decimals: 6 },
+        ];
+        const decoded = decodeCalldata(
+            transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX),
+            NOVEL_TOKEN,
+        );
+        expect(decoded.description).toBe("Transfer ERC-20 token");
+        const amount = decoded.details.find((d) => d.label === "Amount");
+        expect(amount.value).not.toMatch(/USDC/);
+    });
+});

tests/rpcErrorLog.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+// What reaches the console when the RPC endpoint answers with an HTTP error.
+//
+// RPC providers put the API key in the endpoint URL's path or query string.
+// When the endpoint answers with an HTTP error (a wrong or expired key, a rate
+// limit, a server error), the error ethers throws carries the full request URL
+// in its message, so a line logging that message printed the key
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410). Those lines log the
+// error's short message, which names the HTTP status and not the URL.
+//
+// The real ethers provider runs; only its HTTP transport is replaced, by one
+// that answers every request with 401 Unauthorized. Debug mode is on, so
+// every log level is printed.
+
+const { FetchRequest } = require("ethers");
+const {
+    getProvider,
+    lookupTokenInfo,
+    refreshBalances,
+} = require("../src/shared/balances");
+const { getFullWarnings } = require("../src/shared/addressWarnings");
+const { resolveEnsName } = require("../src/shared/ens");
+const { setRuntimeDebug } = require("../src/shared/log");
+
+const RPC_URL = "https://rpc.example.invalid/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456";
+const ADDRESS = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
+
+const realFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+let printed;
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    setRuntimeDebug(true);
+    printed = [];
+    for (const method of ["log", "warn", "error"]) {
+        jest.spyOn(console, method).mockImplementation((...args) => {
+            printed.push(args.map(String).join(" "));
+        });
+    }
+    FetchRequest.registerGetUrl(async () => ({
+        statusCode: 401,
+        statusMessage: "Unauthorized",
+        headers: {},
+        body: new Uint8Array(),
+    }));
+    // The explorer requests the balance refresh makes go nowhere.
+    globalThis.fetch = jest.fn(async () => {
+        throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
+    });
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    FetchRequest.registerGetUrl(FetchRequest.createGetUrlFunc());
+    globalThis.fetch = realFetch;
+    setRuntimeDebug(false);
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+});
+
+// The line carrying `label` was printed and names the HTTP status, and nothing
+// printed carries the key.
+function expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey(label) {
+    const line = printed.find((text) => text.includes(label));
+    expect(line).toContain("401");
+    const all = printed.join("\n");
+    expect(all).not.toContain("PATHKEY123");
+    expect(all).not.toContain("QUERYTOKEN456");
+}
+
+test("ethers puts the URL in the error message, not in the short message", async () => {
+    const provider = getProvider(RPC_URL, "mainnet");
+    const error = await provider.getCode(ADDRESS).catch((e) => e);
+    expect(error.message).toContain("PATHKEY123");
+    expect(error.shortMessage).not.toContain("PATHKEY123");
+});
+
+test("the recipient checks before a send", async () => {
+    await getFullWarnings(ADDRESS, getProvider(RPC_URL, "mainnet"));
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("contract check failed");
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("tx count check failed");
+});
+
+test("the ENS reverse lookup", async () => {
+    expect(await resolveEnsName(ADDRESS, RPC_URL, "mainnet")).toBeNull();
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("ENS reverse lookup failed");
+});
+
+test("the balance refresh", async () => {
+    const wallets = [{ addresses: [{ address: ADDRESS }] }];
+    await refreshBalances(
+        wallets,
+        RPC_URL,
+        "https://explorer.example.invalid/api/v2",
+        [],
+        "mainnet",
+    );
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("ETH balance failed");
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("ENS reverse failed");
+});
+
+// The lookup's first line, at debug level, names the RPC endpoint; the check
+// of everything printed covers it too.
+test("the token lookup", async () => {
+    await expect(lookupTokenInfo(ADDRESS, RPC_URL, "mainnet")).rejects.toThrow(
+        "Not a valid ERC-20 token",
+    );
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("symbol() failed:");
+});

tests/rpcOrigin.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+// Which site a page's request is attributed to.
+//
+// The background takes a request's origin from what the browser says sent the
+// message: sender.origin, or on Firefox before 126, which has no
+// sender.origin, the origin of sender.url — the frame that sent it. It used to
+// fall back to the tab's page and then to an origin the message itself
+// carried, so a request from a frame was credited to the site embedding it,
+// and a request the browser said nothing about was credited to whatever the
+// page wrote (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/407).
+//
+// Every sender here lacks sender.origin, as on old Firefox. The connection
+// check on eth_accounts is what shows which site a request was credited to.
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+// The site the persisted state has connected, and one it has never heard of.
+const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
+const STRANGER_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
+
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete global.chrome;
+});
+
+function loadBackground() {
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+        getProvider: () => ({}),
+        refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
+        isPhishingDomain: () => false,
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
+        ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({
+        autistmask: {
+            networkId: "mainnet",
+            wallets: [
+                {
+                    name: "Wallet 1",
+                    type: "hd",
+                    addresses: [
+                        { address: ADDRESS, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] },
+                    ],
+                },
+            ],
+            activeAddress: ADDRESS,
+            allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
+            deniedSites: {},
+        },
+    });
+
+    let messageListener = null;
+    global.chrome = {
+        storage,
+        runtime: {
+            getURL: (path) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + path,
+            onMessage: {
+                addListener: (fn) => {
+                    messageListener = fn;
+                },
+            },
+            onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
+            lastError: null,
+        },
+        windows: { onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} } },
+        action: { setPopup: () => {} },
+    };
+
+    require("../src/background/index");
+
+    // Ask for eth_accounts. `claimedOrigin` is an origin written into the
+    // message, as the content script used to send.
+    return async function accounts(sender, claimedOrigin) {
+        let result = null;
+        messageListener(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
+                method: "eth_accounts",
+                params: [],
+                origin: claimedOrigin,
+            },
+            sender,
+            (r) => {
+                result = r;
+            },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        return result;
+    };
+}
+
+describe("a request is attributed to the frame that sent it", () => {
+    test("a stranger's frame on a connected site gets no address", async () => {
+        const accounts = loadBackground();
+
+        const result = await accounts({
+            url: STRANGER_ORIGIN + "/frame.html",
+            tab: { url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/" },
+        });
+
+        expect(result).toEqual({ result: [] });
+    });
+
+    test("a connected site's frame on a stranger's page gets the address", async () => {
+        const accounts = loadBackground();
+
+        const result = await accounts({
+            url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/frame.html",
+            tab: { url: STRANGER_ORIGIN + "/" },
+        });
+
+        expect(result).toEqual({ result: [ADDRESS] });
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a request the browser does not say the sender of", () => {
+    test("is refused, whatever the tab or the message says", async () => {
+        const accounts = loadBackground();
+
+        const result = await accounts(
+            { tab: { url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/" } },
+            CONNECTED_ORIGIN,
+        );
+
+        expect(result).toEqual({
+            error: {
+                code: 4100,
+                message:
+                    "The wallet could not tell which site sent this request.",
+            },
+        });
+    });
+});

tests/sendDisplayFloor.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
+// The balance and fee lines of the Send and confirmation screens, and the fee
+// line they must share with the approval screen.
+//
+// An ETH balance, a token balance or a fee below 0.000001 rendered as zero on
+// these screens (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/343): the stored
+// balances and the fee were each cut to six decimal places, a rule of their
+// own, and a token holding cut to zero was dropped, while the approval screen
+// showed the same fee through src/shared/amountDisplay.js with the nonzero
+// floor. The balances are now stored exactly, every nonzero token holding
+// kept, and the screens show them and the fee through that helper.
+//
+// Driven through the real refreshBalances(), Send screen, confirmation screen
+// and approval screen, with only the node, the explorer and the DOM stubbed: a
+// balance written onto state by hand would skip the place the cut happened.
+
+"use strict";
+
+// What the stub node answers. Each test sets what it needs.
+const mockNode = {
+    balanceWei: 0n,
+    feeData: { maxFeePerGas: 1n, gasPrice: 1n },
+};
+
+// The token rows the stub explorer reports for the address.
+const mockExplorer = { items: [] };
+
+jest.mock("ethers", () => {
+    const actual = jest.requireActual("ethers");
+    class StubProvider {
+        async getBalance() {
+            return mockNode.balanceWei;
+        }
+        async lookupAddress() {
+            return null;
+        }
+        async getFeeData() {
+            return mockNode.feeData;
+        }
+        async estimateGas() {
+            return 21000n;
+        }
+        async getCode() {
+            return "0x";
+        }
+        async getTransactionCount() {
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        ...actual,
+        JsonRpcProvider: StubProvider,
+        Network: { from: () => ({}) },
+    };
+});
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
+    log: {
+        debugf: () => {},
+        infof: () => {},
+        warnf: () => {},
+        errorf: () => {},
+    },
+    // The explorer's token list, which refreshBalances() also fetches.
+    debugFetch: jest.fn(async () => ({
+        ok: true,
+        status: 200,
+        json: async () => mockExplorer.items,
+    })),
+    urlOrigin: () => "",
+    setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
+    isDebug: () => false,
+}));
+
+// The confirmation screen's Etherscan label lookup is the only fetch() these
+// screens make; it fails, as it does offline.
+global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
+    throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
+});
+
+// The approval the background hands the approval screen. Set per test.
+let approvalDetails = null;
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+global.chrome = {
+    storage: makeStorageStub(),
+    runtime: {
+        connect: () => ({
+            postMessage() {},
+            disconnect() {},
+            onDisconnect: { addListener() {} },
+        }),
+        sendMessage(message, callback) {
+            callback(
+                message.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL"
+                    ? approvalDetails
+                    : undefined,
+            );
+        },
+    },
+};
+
+// A stub DOM: every id resolves to a recording element.
+const elements = new Map();
+
+function makeEl(id) {
+    const handlers = new Map();
+    return {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        value: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add() {},
+            remove() {},
+            toggle() {},
+            contains: () => false,
+        },
+        handlers,
+        children: [],
+        addEventListener(name, fn) {
+            handlers.set(name, fn);
+        },
+        appendChild(child) {
+            this.children.push(child);
+            return child;
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        querySelector: () => null,
+        remove() {},
+        focus() {},
+    };
+}
+
+global.document = {
+    getElementById(id) {
+        if (!elements.has(id)) elements.set(id, makeEl(id));
+        return elements.get(id);
+    },
+    createElement: (tag) => makeEl(tag),
+    body: { prepend() {}, appendChild() {} },
+    addEventListener() {},
+};
+global.navigator = { clipboard: { writeText() {} } };
+
+const { refreshBalances } = require("../src/shared/balances");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const {
+    prices,
+    clearPrices,
+    formatAddressTotal,
+    getAddressValue,
+} = require("../src/shared/prices");
+const send = require("../src/popup/views/send");
+const confirmTx = require("../src/popup/views/confirmTx");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+const {
+    addressHoldsFunds,
+    balanceLinesForAddress,
+} = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+
+const HOLDER = "0x" + "a".repeat(40);
+const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
+
+// 0.0000005 ETH, or 0.0000005 of an 18-decimal token.
+const HALF_MICRO_ETH = 500000000000n;
+
+// A token the bundled list does not know.
+const TOKEN = "0x" + "d".repeat(40);
+
+// The explorer's row for TOKEN, holding `value` base units. With only five
+// holders, it is listed only when the user tracks the token.
+function tokenRow(value, token = {}) {
+    return {
+        value: String(value),
+        token: {
+            type: "ERC-20",
+            address_hash: TOKEN,
+            symbol: "TOK",
+            name: "Token",
+            decimals: "18",
+            holders_count: "5",
+            ...token,
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+function text(id) {
+    return global.document.getElementById(id).textContent;
+}
+
+function errors() {
+    return global.document.getElementById("confirm-errors").innerHTML;
+}
+
+// The ETH balance the node reports and the token rows the explorer reports,
+// fetched and stored exactly where the popup stores them.
+async function refreshWith(balanceWei, tokenItems = []) {
+    mockNode.balanceWei = balanceWei;
+    mockExplorer.items = tokenItems;
+    state.wallets = [{ name: "Wallet 1", addresses: [{ address: HOLDER }] }];
+    state.selectedWallet = 0;
+    state.selectedAddress = 0;
+    await refreshBalances(
+        state.wallets,
+        "https://rpc.example.invalid",
+        "https://blockscout.example/api/v2",
+        state.trackedTokens,
+        "mainnet",
+    );
+}
+
+// Press Review on the Send screen for a send of `token` ("ETH" or a token
+// address), and show the confirmation screen it leads to with its fee estimate
+// settled.
+async function confirmSend(amount, token = "ETH") {
+    let txInfo = null;
+    send.init({ showConfirmTx: (info) => (txInfo = info) });
+    state.selectedToken = token;
+    global.document.getElementById("send-to").value = RECIPIENT;
+    global.document.getElementById("send-amount").value = amount;
+    await global.document
+        .getElementById("btn-send-review")
+        .handlers.get("click")();
+    confirmTx.show(txInfo);
+    for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
+}
+
+// The approval screen for a dApp transaction of 21000 gas, the gas the stub
+// node estimates for the send above.
+async function approveTxWithFeePerGas(maxFeePerGas) {
+    approvalDetails = {
+        type: "tx",
+        origin: "https://dapp.example",
+        approvedFrom: HOLDER,
+        approvedTx: {
+            to: RECIPIENT,
+            value: "0",
+            data: "0x",
+            chainId: "0x1",
+            gasLimit: "21000",
+            maxFeePerGas: String(maxFeePerGas),
+            nonce: 0,
+        },
+    };
+    await approval.show("1");
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    elements.clear();
+    state.selectedToken = null;
+    state.trackedTokens = [];
+    state.fraudContracts = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+    mockNode.feeData = { maxFeePerGas: 1n, gasPrice: 1n };
+});
+
+describe("an ETH balance below 0.000001 never renders as zero", () => {
+    test("on the Send screen", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(HALF_MICRO_ETH);
+        state.selectedToken = "ETH";
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 0.0000005 ETH");
+    });
+
+    test("on the confirmation screen", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(HALF_MICRO_ETH);
+        await confirmSend("0.0000001");
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("0.0000005 ETH");
+    });
+
+    test("while a balance above the floor keeps four decimals", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(1234567890000000000n);
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("1.2345 ETH");
+    });
+});
+
+// A token the user tracks stays on the balance list when the explorer's row is
+// dropped, so a holding of it below 0.000001 reached these screens as zero, and
+// the send was checked against zero.
+describe("a tracked token holding below 0.000001 never renders as zero", () => {
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: TOKEN, symbol: "TOK", name: "Token", decimals: 18 },
+        ];
+    });
+
+    test("on the Send screen", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n, [tokenRow(HALF_MICRO_ETH)]);
+        state.selectedToken = TOKEN;
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 0.0000005 TOK");
+    });
+
+    test("on the confirmation screen, which checks the send against it", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n, [tokenRow(HALF_MICRO_ETH)]);
+        await confirmSend("0.0000005", TOKEN);
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("0.0000005 TOK");
+        expect(errors()).toBe("");
+        await confirmSend("0.0000006", TOKEN);
+        expect(errors()).toContain(
+            "You have 0.0000005 TOK but are trying to send 0.0000006 TOK.",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // The stored balance keeps all 24 places, and the balance check reads the
+    // first 18 of them rather than refusing it as no balance at all.
+    test("with more than 18 decimals, the send is checked against 18 of them", async () => {
+        state.trackedTokens[0].decimals = 24;
+        // 1.5 plus one base unit.
+        const value = 15n * 10n ** 23n + 1n;
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n, [tokenRow(value, { decimals: "24" })]);
+        await confirmSend("1.5", TOKEN);
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("1.5000 TOK");
+        expect(errors()).toBe("");
+    });
+
+    test("with more than 18 decimals and a holding below 10^-18", async () => {
+        state.trackedTokens[0].decimals = 24;
+        // One base unit, 0.000000000000000000000001 TOK.
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n, [tokenRow(1n, { decimals: "24" })]);
+        state.selectedToken = TOKEN;
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe(
+            "Current balance: 0.000000000000000000000001 TOK",
+        );
+        await confirmSend("0.000000000000000001", TOKEN);
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("0.000000000000000000000001 TOK");
+        expect(errors()).toContain(
+            "You have 0.000000000000000000000001 TOK but are trying to send" +
+                " 0.000000000000000001 TOK.",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+// A token the user does not track, with enough holders to be admitted. The
+// balance fetch dropped a holding of it below 0.000001, but the token stays
+// selected while its own screen is open: after sending 2 of a 2.0000003
+// holding, the user is back on that screen, and Send read the missing row as
+// zero.
+describe("an untracked token holding below 0.000001 never renders as zero", () => {
+    const row = () => tokenRow(HALF_MICRO_ETH, { holders_count: "50000" });
+
+    test("on the Send screen", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n, [row()]);
+        state.selectedToken = TOKEN;
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 0.0000005 TOK");
+    });
+
+    test("on the confirmation screen, which checks the send against it", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n, [row()]);
+        await confirmSend("0.0000005", TOKEN);
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("0.0000005 TOK");
+        expect(errors()).toBe("");
+        await confirmSend("0.0000006", TOKEN);
+        expect(errors()).toContain(
+            "You have 0.0000005 TOK but are trying to send 0.0000006 TOK.",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+// The fetch keeps every holding, so the screens that showed only what it kept
+// leave out a holding below 0.000001 themselves, and look as they did.
+describe("a token holding below 0.000001 is still not listed", () => {
+    afterEach(() => {
+        clearPrices();
+    });
+
+    test("for a token the user does not track", async () => {
+        prices.ETH = 3000;
+        await refreshWith(0n, [
+            tokenRow(HALF_MICRO_ETH, { holders_count: "50000" }),
+        ]);
+        const addr = state.wallets[0].addresses[0];
+        expect(balanceLinesForAddress(addr, [], true)).not.toContain(TOKEN);
+        expect(balanceLinesForAddress(addr, [], false)).not.toContain(TOKEN);
+        send.renderSendTokenSelect(addr);
+        const options = global.document.getElementById("send-token").children;
+        expect(options.map((o) => o.value)).toEqual([]);
+        // Not an unpriced token in the total, and not funds on the
+        // remove-address warning.
+        expect(formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr))).toBe("Total: $0.00");
+        expect(addressHoldsFunds(addr)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    // As a tracked token holding nothing: listed only while zero balances are
+    // shown.
+    test("for a tracked token, unless zero balances are shown", async () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: TOKEN, symbol: "TOK", name: "Token", decimals: 18 },
+        ];
+        await refreshWith(0n, [tokenRow(HALF_MICRO_ETH)]);
+        const addr = state.wallets[0].addresses[0];
+        expect(
+            balanceLinesForAddress(addr, state.trackedTokens, false),
+        ).not.toContain(TOKEN);
+        expect(
+            balanceLinesForAddress(addr, state.trackedTokens, true),
+        ).toContain(`data-token="${TOKEN}"`);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a fee below 0.000001 ETH never renders as zero", () => {
+    test("when the estimate and the reserve are the same", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n);
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        // 21000 gas at 1 wei is 0.000000000000021 ETH, shown to its first
+        // significant digit.
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-amount")).toBe("0.00000000000002 ETH");
+    });
+
+    test("when they differ, on both lines", async () => {
+        mockNode.feeData = { maxFeePerGas: 2n, gasPrice: 1n };
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n);
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-amount")).toBe("~0.00000000000002 ETH");
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-reserve")).toBe(
+            "up to 0.00000000000004 ETH reserved",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+// The confirmation screen shows the reserve alone when the node quotes no
+// cheaper estimate, and that reserve is the same gas limit times maximum fee
+// per gas that the approval screen calls the max fee. An ETH price is set, as
+// it is on mainnet, so the USD value has to match too.
+describe("the same fee reads the same on the confirmation and approval screens", () => {
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        prices.ETH = 3000;
+    });
+    afterEach(() => {
+        clearPrices();
+    });
+
+    test.each([
+        // 21000 gas at 1 wei.
+        ["below the floor", 1n, "0.00000000000002 ETH (< $0.01)"],
+        // 0.001235294117631 ETH, which is $3.71. Pricing the truncated
+        // 0.0012 instead would read $3.60.
+        ["with more than four decimals", 58823529411n, "0.0012 ETH ($3.71)"],
+    ])("%s", async (_label, feePerGas, expected) => {
+        mockNode.feeData = { maxFeePerGas: feePerGas, gasPrice: feePerGas };
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n);
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-amount")).toBe(expected);
+        await approveTxWithFeePerGas(feePerGas);
+        expect(text("approve-tx-fee")).toBe(expected);
+    });
+});

tests/settingsEndpointCheck.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+// What reaches the console when an endpoint check in Settings fails.
+//
+// fetch refuses a URL with a user name and password in it, or one it cannot
+// parse, with an error whose message carries the whole URL: the password, and
+// any API key in the path or query string. The checks behind the RPC and
+// Blockscout Save buttons printed that message
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410); they now name the
+// endpoint by its origin.
+//
+// The real fetch runs; it throws before making any request. Debug mode is on,
+// so every log level is printed.
+
+const SECRETS = ["SECRETPASS789", "PATHKEY123", "QUERYTOKEN456"];
+const RPC_WITH_PASSWORD =
+    "https://user:SECRETPASS789@rpc.example.invalid/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456";
+// Port 99999 is out of range, so the URL does not parse.
+const RPC_UNPARSEABLE =
+    "https://rpc.example.invalid:99999/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456";
+const BLOCKSCOUT_WITH_PASSWORD =
+    "https://user:SECRETPASS789@explorer.example.invalid/PATHKEY123/api/v2";
+
+const SAVED_RPC = "https://saved-rpc.example.invalid";
+const SAVED_BLOCKSCOUT = "https://saved-explorer.example.invalid/api/v2";
+
+let elements;
+let flashes;
+let printed;
+let state;
+
+// A stand-in for one DOM node: enough of an element for init() to set
+// properties on it and hang listeners off it.
+function fakeElement() {
+    return {
+        value: "",
+        checked: false,
+        textContent: "",
+        href: "",
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: { add() {}, remove() {} },
+        listeners: {},
+        addEventListener(event, handler) {
+            this.listeners[event] = handler;
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+    };
+}
+
+function element(id) {
+    return (elements[id] ||= fakeElement());
+}
+
+function loadSettingsView() {
+    elements = {};
+    flashes = [];
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock("../src/popup/views/helpers", () => ({
+        $: element,
+        showView: () => {},
+        updateDebugBanner: () => {},
+        showFlash: (msg) => flashes.push(msg),
+        escapeHtml: (s) => s,
+        flashCopyFeedback: () => {},
+        goBack: () => {},
+        pushCurrentView: () => {},
+        onViewLeave: () => {},
+        VIEWS: [],
+    }));
+
+    state = require("../src/shared/state").state;
+    state.rpcUrl = SAVED_RPC;
+    state.blockscoutUrl = SAVED_BLOCKSCOUT;
+    require("../src/shared/log").setRuntimeDebug(true);
+
+    require("../src/popup/views/settings").init({});
+}
+
+async function save(fieldId, buttonId, typed) {
+    element(fieldId).value = typed;
+    await element(buttonId).listeners.click();
+}
+
+// The check failed, nothing was saved, and nothing printed carries the
+// password or the key.
+function expectFailedWithoutSecrets(label) {
+    expect(flashes).toContain("Could not reach endpoint.");
+    expect(state.rpcUrl).toBe(SAVED_RPC);
+    expect(state.blockscoutUrl).toBe(SAVED_BLOCKSCOUT);
+    const line = printed.find((text) => text.includes(label));
+    expect(line).toBeDefined();
+    const all = printed.join("\n");
+    for (const secret of SECRETS) {
+        expect(all).not.toContain(secret);
+    }
+    return line;
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    printed = [];
+    for (const method of ["log", "warn", "error"]) {
+        jest.spyOn(console, method).mockImplementation((...args) => {
+            printed.push(args.map(String).join(" "));
+        });
+    }
+    globalThis.chrome = {
+        runtime: { sendMessage: () => {} },
+        storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+    };
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    jest.dontMock("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+    delete globalThis.chrome;
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+});
+
+test("fetch puts the whole URL in the error it throws for such a URL", async () => {
+    for (const url of [RPC_WITH_PASSWORD, RPC_UNPARSEABLE]) {
+        const error = await fetch(url).catch((e) => e);
+        expect(error.message).toContain("PATHKEY123");
+    }
+});
+
+test("the RPC check of a URL with a user name and password", async () => {
+    loadSettingsView();
+    await save("settings-rpc", "btn-save-rpc", RPC_WITH_PASSWORD);
+    const line = expectFailedWithoutSecrets("RPC validation fetch failed");
+    expect(line).toContain("https://rpc.example.invalid");
+});
+
+test("the RPC check of a URL that does not parse", async () => {
+    loadSettingsView();
+    await save("settings-rpc", "btn-save-rpc", RPC_UNPARSEABLE);
+    expectFailedWithoutSecrets("RPC validation fetch failed");
+});
+
+test("the Blockscout check of a URL with a user name and password", async () => {
+    loadSettingsView();
+    await save(
+        "settings-blockscout",
+        "btn-save-blockscout",
+        BLOCKSCOUT_WITH_PASSWORD,
+    );
+    const line = expectFailedWithoutSecrets("Blockscout validation failed");
+    expect(line).toContain("https://explorer.example.invalid");
+});

tests/stateMerge.test.js

@@ -270,31 +270,32 @@ describe("background refresh racing a wallet deleted on another page", () => {
     });
 });
 
-// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. Mutated in place
-// from two different contexts — src/background/index.js:592-599 pushes a
-// newly approved hostname onto state.allowedSites[activeAddress], and the
-// Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68) filters a
-// hostname out of state[key][addr] in place, deleting the address key
-// entirely once its list is empty — the exact membership-vs-whole-field
-// pattern that made the whole-field `wallets` diff unsafe, on a
-// security-relevant field: a stale whole-field save here can resurrect a
-// revoked permission or wipe a freshly granted one.
+// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }. Mutated in place
+// from two different contexts — rememberSiteChoice() in
+// src/background/index.js pushes a newly approved origin onto
+// state.allowedSites[activeAddress], and the Settings "revoke" button
+// (forgetOrigin() in src/popup/views/settings.js) filters an origin out of
+// state[key][addr] in place, deleting the address key entirely once its list
+// is empty — the exact membership-vs-whole-field pattern that made the
+// whole-field `wallets` diff unsafe, on a security-relevant field: a stale
+// whole-field save here can resurrect a revoked permission or wipe a freshly
+// granted one.
 const ADDR1 = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 const ADDR2 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
 
-function approveSite(pageState, address, hostname) {
+function approveSite(pageState, address, origin) {
     if (!pageState.allowedSites[address]) {
         pageState.allowedSites[address] = [];
     }
-    if (!pageState.allowedSites[address].includes(hostname)) {
-        pageState.allowedSites[address].push(hostname);
+    if (!pageState.allowedSites[address].includes(origin)) {
+        pageState.allowedSites[address].push(origin);
     }
 }
 
-function revokeSite(pageState, hostname) {
+function revokeSite(pageState, origin) {
     for (const addr of Object.keys(pageState.allowedSites)) {
         pageState.allowedSites[addr] = pageState.allowedSites[addr].filter(
-            (h) => h !== hostname,
+            (o) => o !== origin,
         );
         if (pageState.allowedSites[addr].length === 0) {
             delete pageState.allowedSites[addr];
@@ -308,7 +309,7 @@ describe("a dApp approval racing a stale Settings page's later save", () => {
         await storage.set({
             autistmask: {
                 wallets: [W1],
-                allowedSites: { [ADDR2]: ["other.example"] },
+                allowedSites: { [ADDR2]: ["https://other.example"] },
             },
         });
 
@@ -318,24 +319,24 @@ describe("a dApp approval racing a stale Settings page's later save", () => {
         await settings.state.loadState();
 
         // A dApp approval window, opened later, approves a new site for a
-        // different address and saves — the real sequence at
-        // src/background/index.js:592-599.
+        // different address and saves — the real sequence in
+        // rememberSiteChoice(), src/background/index.js.
         const approval = loadPage(storage);
         await approval.state.loadState();
-        approveSite(approval.state.state, ADDR1, "dapp.example");
+        approveSite(approval.state.state, ADDR1, "https://dapp.example");
         await approval.state.saveState();
         expect(
             (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
-        ).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
+        ).toEqual(["https://dapp.example"]);
 
-        // Settings revokes its own, unrelated site — the real sequence at
-        // src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — and saves from state loaded
-        // before the dApp approval ever happened.
-        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "other.example");
+        // Settings revokes its own, unrelated site — the real sequence in
+        // forgetOrigin(), src/popup/views/settings.js — and saves from state
+        // loaded before the dApp approval ever happened.
+        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "https://other.example");
         await settings.state.saveState();
 
         const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
-        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toEqual(["https://dapp.example"]);
         expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toBeUndefined();
     });
 });
@@ -346,7 +347,7 @@ describe("a revoked site permission against a stale page's later save", () => {
         await storage.set({
             autistmask: {
                 wallets: [W1],
-                allowedSites: { [ADDR1]: ["evil.example"] },
+                allowedSites: { [ADDR1]: ["https://evil.example"] },
             },
         });
 
@@ -354,23 +355,24 @@ describe("a revoked site permission against a stale page's later save", () => {
         const stale = loadPage(storage);
         await stale.state.loadState();
 
-        // Settings revokes it — src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — from a
-        // second page.
+        // Settings revokes it — forgetOrigin(), src/popup/views/settings.js —
+        // from a second page.
         const settings = loadPage(storage);
         await settings.state.loadState();
-        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "evil.example");
+        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "https://evil.example");
         await settings.state.saveState();
         expect(
             (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
         ).toBeUndefined();
 
         // The stale page, unaware of the revoke, approves an unrelated site
-        // for a different address and saves — src/background/index.js:592-599.
-        approveSite(stale.state.state, ADDR2, "good.example");
+        // for a different address and saves — rememberSiteChoice(),
+        // src/background/index.js.
+        approveSite(stale.state.state, ADDR2, "https://good.example");
         await stale.state.saveState();
 
         const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
-        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toEqual(["good.example"]);
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toEqual(["https://good.example"]);
         expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toBeUndefined();
     });
 });

tests/stateRecovery.test.js

@@ -167,7 +167,9 @@ describe("an unversioned profile that is perfectly valid", () => {
         expect(stored.wallets[0].encryptedSecret).toBe("encrypted-secret-1");
         expect(stored.wallets[0].addresses[0].address).toBe(ADDRESS);
         expect(stored.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
-        expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+        expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({
+            [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
+        });
     });
 });
 

tests/support/popupBoot.js

@@ -20,6 +20,26 @@ const path = require("path");
 
 const { makeStorageStub } = require("./storageStub");
 
+// The four libraries the popup loads from node_modules, loaded once per test
+// file and handed to every boot. jest.resetModules() in bootPopup() empties the
+// module cache but keeps what jest.doMock() registered, so these registrations
+// hold for every boot in the file and the libraries are not loaded again. None
+// of them holds popup state; everything under src/ is still loaded fresh on
+// each boot.
+//
+// A test's own mock of one of them: a jest.doMock() made inside the test
+// replaces the registration here, as it would for any module. A top-of-file
+// jest.mock() is what the require() below gets, so it is kept, but its factory
+// runs once per file and every boot shares the same mock object.
+const ethers = require("ethers");
+const sodium = require("libsodium-wrappers-sumo");
+const QRCode = require("qrcode");
+const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
+jest.doMock("ethers", () => ethers);
+jest.doMock("libsodium-wrappers-sumo", () => sodium);
+jest.doMock("qrcode", () => QRCode);
+jest.doMock("ethereum-blockies-base64", () => makeBlockie);
+
 const POPUP_HTML = fs.readFileSync(
     path.join(__dirname, "..", "..", "src", "popup", "index.html"),
     "utf8",
@@ -51,7 +71,7 @@ function unversionedValidProfile(extra) {
         networkId: "mainnet",
         rpcUrl: "https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com",
         blockscoutUrl: "https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2",
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
         theme: "system",

tests/symbolSpoof.test.js

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
         errorf: () => {},
     },
     debugFetch: jest.fn(),
+    urlOrigin: () => "",
     setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
     isDebug: () => false,
 }));

tests/typedDataPermit.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,534 @@
+// The typed-data signing screen
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/400).
+//
+// A Permit or Permit2 signature lets its spender take tokens from the signer's
+// address, and it is how most wallet drains are done. Listed as plain
+// key/value lines it reads exactly like a sign-in message, so the screen has
+// to warn for it, naming the spender and the amount, and must not warn for a
+// sign-in message.
+//
+// ethers signs only the fields a type declares in `types` and drops any other
+// key in the message, so the warning reads the spender, tokens and amounts
+// from those fields alone, except a `Permit`'s token, which is the domain's
+// `verifyingContract`: a key the page adds beside them must not change what
+// the warning says.
+//
+// ethers signs the type it derives from `types`, not the page's
+// `primaryType`, so the screen names the derived type, and a request whose
+// stated type is missing or differs is refused rather than shown under a name
+// it is not signed as. The refusal is checked on the sign screen itself,
+// driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/deleteWalletLostPassword.test.js uses.
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+    decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { getAddress, MaxUint256 } = require("ethers");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+const { formatTypedDataHtml, typedDataRefusal } = approval;
+
+const SPENDER = getAddress("0xbad000000000000000000000000000000000bad0");
+const DECOY = getAddress("0xdec0000000000000000000000000000000000dec");
+const OWNER = getAddress("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11");
+// Bundled, so the symbol and the 6-decimal scale come from the list.
+const USDC = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
+const DAI = "0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F";
+const PERMIT2 = "0x000000000022D473030F116dDEE9F6B43aC78BA3";
+
+const WARNING = "TOKEN PERMISSION";
+
+// Permit2's PermitSingle, granting the largest uint160 allowance there is.
+const PERMIT_SINGLE = {
+    types: {
+        EIP712Domain: [
+            { name: "name", type: "string" },
+            { name: "chainId", type: "uint256" },
+            { name: "verifyingContract", type: "address" },
+        ],
+        PermitSingle: [
+            { name: "details", type: "PermitDetails" },
+            { name: "spender", type: "address" },
+            { name: "sigDeadline", type: "uint256" },
+        ],
+        PermitDetails: [
+            { name: "token", type: "address" },
+            { name: "amount", type: "uint160" },
+            { name: "expiration", type: "uint48" },
+            { name: "nonce", type: "uint48" },
+        ],
+    },
+    primaryType: "PermitSingle",
+    domain: { name: "Permit2", chainId: 1, verifyingContract: PERMIT2 },
+    message: {
+        details: {
+            token: USDC,
+            amount: ((1n << 160n) - 1n).toString(),
+            expiration: "1790000000",
+            nonce: "0",
+        },
+        spender: SPENDER,
+        sigDeadline: "1790000000",
+    },
+};
+
+// Permit2's PermitBatch: 5 USDC and 7 DAI, a line for each token.
+const PERMIT_BATCH = {
+    types: {
+        EIP712Domain: PERMIT_SINGLE.types.EIP712Domain,
+        PermitBatch: [
+            { name: "details", type: "PermitDetails[]" },
+            { name: "spender", type: "address" },
+            { name: "sigDeadline", type: "uint256" },
+        ],
+        PermitDetails: PERMIT_SINGLE.types.PermitDetails,
+    },
+    primaryType: "PermitBatch",
+    domain: PERMIT_SINGLE.domain,
+    message: {
+        details: [
+            {
+                token: USDC,
+                amount: "5000000",
+                expiration: "1790000000",
+                nonce: "0",
+            },
+            {
+                token: DAI,
+                amount: "7000000000000000000",
+                expiration: "1790000000",
+                nonce: "0",
+            },
+        ],
+        spender: SPENDER,
+        sigDeadline: "1790000000",
+    },
+};
+
+// One of Permit2's four transfer types, letting SPENDER take 5 USDC. The
+// batch types take a list of `TokenPermissions`; the witness types add a
+// struct of the site's own as their last field.
+function permit2Transfer(primaryType, { batch = false, witness = false }) {
+    const fields = [
+        {
+            name: "permitted",
+            type: batch ? "TokenPermissions[]" : "TokenPermissions",
+        },
+        { name: "spender", type: "address" },
+        { name: "nonce", type: "uint256" },
+        { name: "deadline", type: "uint256" },
+    ];
+    const types = {
+        EIP712Domain: PERMIT_SINGLE.types.EIP712Domain,
+        [primaryType]: fields,
+        TokenPermissions: [
+            { name: "token", type: "address" },
+            { name: "amount", type: "uint256" },
+        ],
+    };
+    const permitted = { token: USDC, amount: "5000000" };
+    const message = {
+        permitted: batch ? [permitted] : permitted,
+        spender: SPENDER,
+        nonce: "0",
+        deadline: "1790000000",
+    };
+    if (witness) {
+        fields.push({ name: "witness", type: "Order" });
+        types.Order = [{ name: "recipient", type: "address" }];
+        message.witness = { recipient: OWNER };
+    }
+    return { types, primaryType, domain: PERMIT_SINGLE.domain, message };
+}
+
+// EIP-2612's Permit for 5 USDC; the token is the domain's contract.
+const PERMIT = {
+    types: {
+        EIP712Domain: [
+            { name: "name", type: "string" },
+            { name: "version", type: "string" },
+            { name: "chainId", type: "uint256" },
+            { name: "verifyingContract", type: "address" },
+        ],
+        Permit: [
+            { name: "owner", type: "address" },
+            { name: "spender", type: "address" },
+            { name: "value", type: "uint256" },
+            { name: "nonce", type: "uint256" },
+            { name: "deadline", type: "uint256" },
+        ],
+    },
+    primaryType: "Permit",
+    domain: {
+        name: "USD Coin",
+        version: "2",
+        chainId: 1,
+        verifyingContract: USDC,
+    },
+    message: {
+        owner: OWNER,
+        spender: SPENDER,
+        value: "5000000",
+        nonce: "0",
+        deadline: "1790000000",
+    },
+};
+
+// DAI's older permit: the same name, no amount, all or nothing by `allowed`.
+const DAI_PERMIT = {
+    types: {
+        EIP712Domain: PERMIT.types.EIP712Domain,
+        Permit: [
+            { name: "holder", type: "address" },
+            { name: "spender", type: "address" },
+            { name: "nonce", type: "uint256" },
+            { name: "expiry", type: "uint256" },
+            { name: "allowed", type: "bool" },
+        ],
+    },
+    primaryType: "Permit",
+    domain: {
+        name: "Dai Stablecoin",
+        version: "1",
+        chainId: 1,
+        verifyingContract: DAI,
+    },
+    message: {
+        holder: OWNER,
+        spender: SPENDER,
+        nonce: "0",
+        expiry: "0",
+        allowed: true,
+    },
+};
+
+const LOGIN = {
+    types: {
+        EIP712Domain: [
+            { name: "name", type: "string" },
+            { name: "version", type: "string" },
+            { name: "chainId", type: "uint256" },
+        ],
+        Login: [
+            { name: "contents", type: "string" },
+            { name: "nonce", type: "uint256" },
+        ],
+    },
+    primaryType: "Login",
+    domain: { name: "Example", version: "1", chainId: 1 },
+    message: { contents: "Sign in to example.com", nonce: "7" },
+};
+
+// The warning box alone. It comes before the key/value lines, which list the
+// spender and the raw amount too, so an assertion on the whole screen would
+// pass with no warning at all.
+function warningOf(data) {
+    const html = formatTypedDataHtml(JSON.stringify(data));
+    return html.slice(0, html.indexOf(">Domain<"));
+}
+
+function request(data) {
+    return { method: "eth_signTypedData_v4", typedData: JSON.stringify(data) };
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    state.trackedTokens = [];
+    state.wallets = [];
+});
+
+describe("a token permission is warned about, naming spender and amount", () => {
+    test("a Permit2 PermitSingle for an unlimited allowance", () => {
+        const warning = warningOf(PERMIT_SINGLE);
+        expect(warning).toContain(WARNING);
+        expect(warning).toContain(SPENDER);
+        expect(warning).toContain(USDC);
+        expect(warning).toContain("Unlimited");
+    });
+
+    test("a Permit2 PermitBatch names both tokens and both amounts", () => {
+        const warning = warningOf(PERMIT_BATCH);
+        expect(warning).toContain(WARNING);
+        expect(warning).toContain(SPENDER);
+        expect(warning).toContain(USDC);
+        expect(warning).toContain("5.0000 USDC");
+        expect(warning).toContain(DAI);
+        expect(warning).toContain("7.0000 DAI");
+    });
+
+    test.each([
+        ["PermitTransferFrom", {}],
+        ["PermitWitnessTransferFrom", { witness: true }],
+        ["PermitBatchTransferFrom", { batch: true }],
+        ["PermitBatchWitnessTransferFrom", { batch: true, witness: true }],
+    ])("a Permit2 %s", (primaryType, shape) => {
+        const warning = warningOf(permit2Transfer(primaryType, shape));
+        expect(warning).toContain(WARNING);
+        expect(warning).toContain(SPENDER);
+        expect(warning).toContain(USDC);
+        expect(warning).toContain("5.0000 USDC");
+    });
+
+    test("an EIP-2612 Permit for 5 USDC", () => {
+        const warning = warningOf(PERMIT);
+        expect(warning).toContain(WARNING);
+        expect(warning).toContain(SPENDER);
+        expect(warning).toContain("5.0000 USDC");
+    });
+
+    test("DAI's older permit, which grants everything", () => {
+        const warning = warningOf(DAI_PERMIT);
+        expect(warning).toContain(WARNING);
+        expect(warning).toContain(SPENDER);
+        expect(warning).toContain("Unlimited");
+    });
+
+    test("a sign-in message carries no warning, and is still shown", () => {
+        const html = formatTypedDataHtml(JSON.stringify(LOGIN));
+        expect(html).not.toContain(WARNING);
+        expect(html).toContain("Sign in to example.com");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the warning reads only the fields the signed type declares", () => {
+    // An unlimited EIP-2612 permit with DAI's `allowed` added as a key the
+    // type does not declare. ethers signs exactly the unlimited permit.
+    test("an added key does not change the amount", () => {
+        const data = {
+            ...PERMIT,
+            message: {
+                ...PERMIT.message,
+                value: MaxUint256.toString(),
+                allowed: false,
+            },
+        };
+        expect(warningOf(data)).toContain("Unlimited");
+    });
+
+    // A Permit whose type names its spender `operator`; the page adds a
+    // `spender` key the type does not declare.
+    test("an added key is not named as the spender", () => {
+        const data = {
+            ...PERMIT,
+            types: {
+                ...PERMIT.types,
+                Permit: [
+                    { name: "owner", type: "address" },
+                    { name: "operator", type: "address" },
+                    { name: "value", type: "uint256" },
+                    { name: "nonce", type: "uint256" },
+                    { name: "deadline", type: "uint256" },
+                ],
+            },
+            message: { ...PERMIT.message, operator: SPENDER, spender: DECOY },
+        };
+        const warning = warningOf(data);
+        expect(warning).toContain(WARNING);
+        expect(warning).not.toContain(DECOY);
+    });
+
+    // The permit for a Uniswap v3 position NFT: a `Permit` with no amount
+    // field at all, which ethers signs and its contract accepts.
+    test("a Permit with no amount still warns, above the normal lines", () => {
+        const data = {
+            types: {
+                EIP712Domain: PERMIT.types.EIP712Domain,
+                Permit: [
+                    { name: "spender", type: "address" },
+                    { name: "tokenId", type: "uint256" },
+                    { name: "nonce", type: "uint256" },
+                    { name: "deadline", type: "uint256" },
+                ],
+            },
+            primaryType: "Permit",
+            domain: {
+                name: "Uniswap V3 Positions NFT-V1",
+                version: "1",
+                chainId: 1,
+                verifyingContract: "0xC36442b4a4522E871399CD717aBDD847Ab11FE88",
+            },
+            message: {
+                spender: SPENDER,
+                tokenId: "12345",
+                nonce: "0",
+                deadline: "1790000000",
+            },
+        };
+        const html = formatTypedDataHtml(JSON.stringify(data));
+        const warning = warningOf(data);
+        expect(warning).toContain(WARNING);
+        expect(warning).toContain(SPENDER);
+        expect(warning).toContain("<div>Amount</div><div>Unknown</div>");
+        expect(html).toContain(">Domain<");
+        expect(html).toContain(">Primary type<");
+        expect(html).toContain("tokenId:");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("the primary type shown is the one ethers signs", () => {
+    // A drain stated as a sign-in: the page says Login, the types say
+    // PermitSingle, and ethers would sign PermitSingle.
+    const disguised = { ...PERMIT_SINGLE, primaryType: "Login" };
+
+    test("a stated type that differs from the signed one is refused", () => {
+        expect(typedDataRefusal(request(disguised))).toBe(
+            "This typed data names its primary type as Login, but it would be signed as PermitSingle, so it cannot be signed.",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("the screen names the signed type, and still warns", () => {
+        const html = formatTypedDataHtml(JSON.stringify(disguised));
+        expect(html).toContain(">PermitSingle<");
+        expect(html).not.toContain(">Login<");
+        expect(html).toContain(WARNING);
+    });
+
+    test("a missing primary type is refused", () => {
+        const unnamed = { ...PERMIT_SINGLE, primaryType: undefined };
+        expect(typedDataRefusal(request(unnamed))).toBe(
+            "This typed data does not name its primary type, so it cannot be signed.",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a stated type that is the signed one is not refused", () => {
+        expect(typedDataRefusal(request(PERMIT_SINGLE))).toBeNull();
+        expect(typedDataRefusal(request(LOGIN))).toBeNull();
+    });
+});
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------ the sign screen
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
+            el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
+            el.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+    };
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+function click(id) {
+    return Promise.all((node(id).listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn()));
+}
+
+// Open the sign screen for a typed-data request from OWNER, the way the popup
+// does: the background hands over the request and show() draws it. Returns
+// every message the screen sends to the background.
+async function openSignScreen(data) {
+    const sent = [];
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            sent.push(msg);
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
+            reply({
+                type: "sign",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: OWNER,
+                signParams: request(data),
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    state.wallets = [
+        {
+            type: "hd",
+            name: "Wallet 1",
+            xpub: "xpub-wallet-1",
+            encryptedSecret: "encrypted-secret-1",
+            nextIndex: 1,
+            addresses: [
+                { address: OWNER, balance: "0.0000", tokenBalances: [] },
+            ],
+        },
+    ];
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+    return sent;
+}
+
+describe("the sign screen refuses a mismatched primary type", () => {
+    const disguised = { ...PERMIT_SINGLE, primaryType: "Login" };
+    const REFUSAL =
+        "This typed data names its primary type as Login, but it would be signed as PermitSingle, so it cannot be signed.";
+
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        decryptWithPassword.mockClear();
+    });
+
+    test("a matching primary type leaves Sign enabled", async () => {
+        await openSignScreen(PERMIT_SINGLE);
+        expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe("");
+        expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("a mismatched one shows the error, with Sign disabled", async () => {
+        await openSignScreen(disguised);
+        expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(REFUSAL);
+        expect(node("approve-sign-error").style.visibility).toBe("visible");
+        expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    // The handler is called directly, as a button re-enabled by some other
+    // path would call it: the refusal must not rest on the button alone.
+    test("Sign clicked anyway decrypts and signs nothing", async () => {
+        const sent = await openSignScreen(disguised);
+        node("approve-sign-password").value = "any password";
+        await click("btn-approve-sign");
+
+        expect(decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(sent.map((msg) => msg.type)).not.toContain(
+            "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
+        );
+        expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(REFUSAL);
+        expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
+    });
+});

tests/uniswap.test.js

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ const ROUTER_ADDR = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
 const USDT_ADDR = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
 const WETH_ADDR = "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2";
 const USDC_ADDR = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
+const DAI_ADDR = "0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F";
+const SEPOLIA_WETH_ADDR = "0xfFf9976782d46CC05630D1f6eBAb18b2324d6B14";
 const USER_ADDR = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 // AutistMask's first-ever swap, 2026-02-27.
@@ -75,6 +77,14 @@ function encodeV2SwapExactIn(recipient, amountIn, amountOutMin, pathAddrs) {
     );
 }
 
+// Helper: encode a V2_SWAP_EXACT_OUT input (command 0x09)
+function encodeV2SwapExactOut(recipient, amountOut, amountInMax, pathAddrs) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        ["address", "uint256", "uint256", "address[]", "bool"],
+        [recipient, amountOut, amountInMax, pathAddrs, true],
+    );
+}
+
 // Helper: encode a V3_SWAP_EXACT_IN input (command 0x00)
 function encodeV3SwapExactIn(recipient, amountIn, amountOutMin, pathTokens) {
     // V3 path: token(20) + fee(3) + token(20) ...
@@ -223,6 +233,233 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
         expect(minOut.value).toContain("WETH");
     });
 
+    // Buy exactly 0.5 WETH for at most 1,500 USDC, paid by the user, sent to
+    // the caller (the router's MSG_SENDER recipient, address(1)).
+    test("decodes V2_SWAP_EXACT_OUT, stating the input amount as a maximum", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            "0x09", // V2_SWAP_EXACT_OUT
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactOut(
+                    "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
+                    500000000000000000n, // amountOut: 0.5 WETH
+                    1500000000n, // amountInMax: 1,500 USDC (6 decimals)
+                    [USDC_ADDR, WETH_ADDR],
+                ),
+            ],
+            1767225600n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result.name).toBe("Swap USDC → WETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Token In").address).toBe(USDC_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").address).toBe(WETH_ADDR);
+
+        // The wait, success and error screens show rawValue as the amount, so
+        // it says "Up to" as well.
+        const amount = detail(result, "Amount");
+        expect(amount.value).toBe("Up to 1500.0000 USDC");
+        expect(amount.rawValue).toBe("Up to 1500.0000");
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.5000 WETH");
+    });
+
+    // Buy exactly 1,500 USDC for at most 0.5 ETH: WRAP_ETH of the maximum, the
+    // swap, then UNWRAP_WETH of 0, which returns the ETH the swap did not spend.
+    test("a V2 exact-out swap paid in ETH shows the token it buys and a maximum", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8", "uint8"], [0x0b, 0x09, 0x0c]),
+            [
+                encodeWrapEth(ROUTER_ADDR, 500000000000000000n),
+                encodeV2SwapExactOut(
+                    USER_ADDR,
+                    1500000000n, // amountOut: 1,500 USDC
+                    500000000000000000n, // amountInMax: 0.5 WETH
+                    [WETH_ADDR, USDC_ADDR],
+                ),
+                encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH same encoding
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result.name).toBe("Swap ETH → USDC");
+
+        const amount = detail(result, "Amount");
+        expect(amount.value).toBe("Up to 0.5000 ETH");
+        expect(amount.rawValue).toBe("Up to 0.5000");
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").address).toBe(USDC_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("1500.0000 USDC");
+    });
+
+    // Buy exactly 0.5 ETH for at most 1,500 USDC under a permit: the swap buys
+    // WETH and UNWRAP_WETH turns it into ETH.
+    test("a V2 exact-out swap that buys ETH shows ETH and the permit as a maximum", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8", "uint8"], [0x0a, 0x09, 0x0c]),
+            [
+                encodePermit2(USDC_ADDR, 1500000000n, ROUTER_ADDR),
+                encodeV2SwapExactOut(
+                    ROUTER_ADDR,
+                    500000000000000000n, // amountOut: 0.5 WETH
+                    1500000000n, // amountInMax: 1,500 USDC
+                    [USDC_ADDR, WETH_ADDR],
+                ),
+                encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 500000000000000000n), // UNWRAP_WETH
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result.name).toBe("Swap USDC → ETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Amount").value).toBe("Up to 1500.0000 USDC");
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe("ETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.5000 ETH");
+    });
+
+    // Paid in a token, an UNWRAP_WETH of 0 after a swap that buys something
+    // other than WETH leaves the output side as it is: Token Out and Min.
+    // received are the token bought and its figure, not ETH.
+    test.each([
+        {
+            paidIn: "WETH",
+            tokenIn: WETH_ADDR,
+            amountInMax: 500000000000000000n, // 0.5 WETH
+            tokenOut: USDC_ADDR,
+            amountOut: 1300000000n, // 1,300 USDC
+            minReceived: "1300.0000 USDC",
+        },
+        {
+            paidIn: "USDC",
+            tokenIn: USDC_ADDR,
+            amountInMax: 8000000n, // 8 USDC
+            tokenOut: DAI_ADDR,
+            amountOut: 7000000000000000000n, // 7 DAI
+            minReceived: "7.0000 DAI",
+        },
+    ])(
+        "a V2 exact-out swap paid in $paidIn, then UNWRAP_WETH, shows the token it buys",
+        ({ tokenIn, amountInMax, tokenOut, amountOut, minReceived }) => {
+            const data = buildExecute(
+                solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8", "uint8"], [0x0a, 0x09, 0x0c]),
+                [
+                    encodePermit2(tokenIn, amountInMax, ROUTER_ADDR),
+                    encodeV2SwapExactOut(USER_ADDR, amountOut, amountInMax, [
+                        tokenIn,
+                        tokenOut,
+                    ]),
+                    encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH
+                ],
+                9999999999n,
+            );
+
+            const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+            expect(detail(result, "Token Out").address).toBe(tokenOut);
+            expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe(minReceived);
+        },
+    );
+
+    // An exact-in swap is held to the same rule: buying USDC, then UNWRAP_WETH,
+    // receives USDC.
+    test("an exact-in swap to a token other than WETH, then UNWRAP_WETH, shows that token", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x08, 0x0c]),
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 2000000n, 1900000n, [
+                    USDT_ADDR,
+                    USDC_ADDR,
+                ]),
+                encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result.name).toBe("Swap USDT → USDC");
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").address).toBe(USDC_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("1.9000 USDC");
+    });
+
+    // Paid in ETH, with an exact-out step, the last swap step buys WETH, so
+    // UNWRAP_WETH makes the output ETH.
+    test("an ETH-paid swap whose last step buys WETH, then UNWRAP_WETH, shows ETH", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(
+                ["uint8", "uint8", "uint8", "uint8"],
+                [0x0b, 0x09, 0x08, 0x0c],
+            ),
+            [
+                encodeWrapEth(ROUTER_ADDR, 500000000000000000n),
+                encodeV2SwapExactOut(
+                    ROUTER_ADDR,
+                    1500000000n, // amountOut: 1,500 USDC
+                    500000000000000000n, // amountInMax: 0.5 WETH
+                    [WETH_ADDR, USDC_ADDR],
+                ),
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(
+                    ROUTER_ADDR,
+                    1500000000n, // amountIn: 1,500 USDC
+                    400000000000000000n, // amountOutMin: 0.4 WETH
+                    [USDC_ADDR, WETH_ADDR],
+                ),
+                encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe("ETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.4000 ETH");
+    });
+
+    // Sepolia's WETH is a different contract; UNWRAP_WETH makes it ETH too.
+    test("a swap to Sepolia WETH, then UNWRAP_WETH, shows ETH", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x08, 0x0c]),
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 1000000n, 500000000000000n, [
+                    USDC_ADDR,
+                    SEPOLIA_WETH_ADDR,
+                ]),
+                encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe("ETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.0005 ETH");
+    });
+
+    // A step that states a Min. received figure but names no output token has
+    // set the output side, so UNWRAP_WETH does not make it ETH: nothing says
+    // the figure is counted in WETH.
+    test("a step with a minimum but no output token, then UNWRAP_WETH, names no token", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x10, 0x0c]),
+            [
+                encodeV4Swap(new Uint8Array([V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN]), [
+                    encodeV4ExactIn(
+                        USDC_ADDR,
+                        [], // no path: this step names no output currency
+                        1000000000n, // 1,000 USDC
+                        400000000000000000n, // amountOutMin
+                    ),
+                ]),
+                encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe(
+            "Unknown (not named in the calldata)",
+        );
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            "400000000000000000 base units (decimals unknown)",
+        );
+    });
+
     test("decodes V3_SWAP_EXACT_IN with known tokens", () => {
         const data = buildExecute(
             "0x00", // V3_SWAP_EXACT_IN

tests/uniswapTokenOut.test.js

@@ -78,15 +78,20 @@ describe("a swap to a token absent from the bundled list", () => {
         );
     });
 
-    test("names the address when the scale is known but the symbol is not", () => {
+    test("names the tracked symbol alongside the address (issue #323)", () => {
+        // The tracked entry supplies both halves now: the scale, and the
+        // symbol the output line is named by. Before #323 the symbol was read
+        // from the bundled list alone, so this line fell back to the address.
         const sources = {
             trackedTokens: [
                 { address: NOVEL_OUT, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
             ],
         };
-        expect(detail(data(), "Token Out", sources).value).toBe(NOVEL_OUT);
+        expect(detail(data(), "Token Out", sources).value).toBe(
+            "NOVEL (" + NOVEL_OUT + ")",
+        );
         expect(detail(data(), "Min. received", sources).value).toBe(
-            "1000.0000",
+            "1000.0000 NOVEL",
         );
     });
 });

tests/uniswapUnknownDecimals.test.js

@@ -98,12 +98,13 @@ describe("a swap of a token outside the bundled list", () => {
         state.trackedTokens = [
             { address: NOVEL, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
         ];
-        expect(swapDetail(data(), "Amount").value).toBe("1000.0000");
+        // The tracked entry names the token as well as scaling it (issue #323).
+        expect(swapDetail(data(), "Amount").value).toBe("1000.0000 NOVEL");
     });
 
     test("shows the true quantity from the explorer's decimals", () => {
         state.wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL, "6");
-        expect(swapDetail(data(), "Amount").value).toBe("1000.0000");
+        expect(swapDetail(data(), "Amount").value).toBe("1000.0000 NOVEL");
     });
 
     test("refuses to format when nothing knows the scale", () => {
@@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ describe("the Min. received line takes the same rule", () => {
             { address: NOVEL_OUT, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 6 },
         ];
         const data = swapData(WETH, HALF_WETH, NOVEL_OUT, THOUSAND_AT_SIX);
-        expect(swapDetail(data, "Min. received").value).toBe("1000.0000");
+        expect(swapDetail(data, "Min. received").value).toBe("1000.0000 NOVEL");
     });
 });
 

tests/unknownScaleSend.test.js

@@ -382,14 +382,62 @@ describe("a scale the explorer's own rows disagree about", () => {
         );
     });
 
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/377. The Send screen read the
+    // stored balance and said "5.0000 NOVEL", the confirmation screen it leads
+    // to said "unknown (NOVEL)", and the fee message asked the user to go back
+    // and try again, which cannot supply a scale.
+    test("reads the same on the Send screen and the confirmation screen, and the fee message names the scale", async () => {
+        await fetchOntoBoth([novel("6", 5000000n)], [novel("18", FIVE_WETH)]);
+        state.selectedToken = NOVEL;
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: unknown (NOVEL)");
+
+        const txInfo = await reviewSend(NOVEL, "1.5");
+        confirmTx.show(txInfo);
+        await settle();
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("unknown (NOVEL)");
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-unknown-error")).toBe(
+            "The network fee could not be estimated, because this wallet" +
+                " does not know how many decimal places this token uses, so" +
+                " this transaction cannot be sent.",
+        );
+        expect(el("confirm-fee-unknown-error").style.visibility).toBe(
+            "visible",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("while a fee that fails for any other reason keeps its retry", async () => {
+        await fetchOntoBoth([novel("6", 5000000n)], [novel("6", 5000000n)]);
+        const txInfo = await reviewSend(NOVEL, "1.5");
+        const getFeeData = mockProvider.getFeeData;
+        mockProvider.getFeeData = async () => {
+            throw new Error("the node did not answer");
+        };
+        try {
+            confirmTx.show(txInfo);
+            await settle();
+        } finally {
+            mockProvider.getFeeData = getFeeData;
+        }
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-amount")).toBe("Unable to estimate");
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-unknown-error")).toBe(
+            "The network fee could not be estimated, so this transaction" +
+                " cannot be checked against your balance. Please go back and" +
+                " try again.",
+        );
+    });
+
     test("while agreeing rows leave the scale usable", async () => {
         await fetchOntoBoth([novel("6", 5000000n)], [novel("6", 5000000n)]);
+        state.selectedToken = NOVEL;
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 5.0000 NOVEL");
         const txInfo = await reviewSend(NOVEL, "1.5");
         expect(txInfo.tokenDecimals).toBe(6);
         expect(txInfo.tokenBalance).toBe("5.0");
         confirmTx.show(txInfo);
         await settle();
-        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("5.0 NOVEL");
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("5.0000 NOVEL");
         expect(errors()).toBe("");
         expect(sendDisabled()).toBe(false);
     });
@@ -431,7 +479,7 @@ describe("the confirmation screen tells an unknown balance from a zero one", ()
         const zero = await render("0.0");
         expect(unknown.balance).not.toBe(zero.balance);
         expect(unknown.balance).toBe("unknown (NOVEL)");
-        expect(zero.balance).toBe("0.0 NOVEL");
+        expect(zero.balance).toBe("0.0000 NOVEL");
     });
 
     // Both hit INSUFFICIENT_TOKEN — an unknown balance is treated as nothing to
@@ -443,7 +491,7 @@ describe("the confirmation screen tells an unknown balance from a zero one", ()
         expect(unknown.errors).not.toBe(zero.errors);
         expect(unknown.errors).toContain("This token's balance is unknown");
         expect(unknown.errors).not.toContain("You have");
-        expect(zero.errors).toContain("You have 0.0 NOVEL");
+        expect(zero.errors).toContain("You have 0.0000 NOVEL");
         expect(zero.errors).not.toContain("balance is unknown");
     });
 });

tests/wallet.test.js

@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@ describe("generateMnemonic in a release build", () => {
         expect(constants.DEBUG).toBe(false);
     });
 
+    test("the test phrase folds away when DEBUG is false", () => {
+        // The release bundle is what must not carry the phrase; here, with the
+        // define absent, DEBUG_MNEMONIC is the null branch the bundler keeps,
+        // and the literal only exists in the branch it drops.
+        const { constants } = loadWallet();
+        expect(constants.DEBUG_MNEMONIC).toBeNull();
+    });
+
     test("returns fresh, valid 12-word phrases that are not the test phrase", () => {
         const { constants, wallet } = loadWallet();
 

tests/walletDelete.test.js

@@ -28,11 +28,14 @@ function makeState(overrides = {}) {
         selectedAddress: 0,
         activeAddress: A0,
         allowedSites: {
-            [A0]: ["a.example"],
-            [A1]: ["b.example"],
-            [B0]: ["c.example"],
+            [A0]: ["https://a.example"],
+            [A1]: ["https://b.example"],
+            [B0]: ["https://c.example"],
+        },
+        deniedSites: {
+            [A1]: ["https://d.example"],
+            [C0]: ["https://e.example"],
         },
-        deniedSites: { [A1]: ["d.example"], [C0]: ["e.example"] },
         ...overrides,
     };
 }
@@ -41,7 +44,7 @@ describe("removeWalletFromState", () => {
     test("deleting the last wallet clears hasWallet", () => {
         const state = makeState({
             wallets: [wallet("A", [A0])],
-            allowedSites: { [A0]: ["a.example"] },
+            allowedSites: { [A0]: ["https://a.example"] },
             deniedSites: {},
         });
 
@@ -109,8 +112,8 @@ describe("removeWalletFromState", () => {
 
         removeWalletFromState(state, 0);
 
-        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["c.example"] });
-        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["e.example"] });
+        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["https://c.example"] });
+        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["https://e.example"] });
     });
 });
 
@@ -126,8 +129,14 @@ function makeAddressState(overrides = {}) {
         selectedWallet: 0,
         selectedAddress: 0,
         activeAddress: A0,
-        allowedSites: { [A0]: ["a.example"], [A1]: ["b.example"] },
-        deniedSites: { [A1]: ["d.example"], [B0]: ["e.example"] },
+        allowedSites: {
+            [A0]: ["https://a.example"],
+            [A1]: ["https://b.example"],
+        },
+        deniedSites: {
+            [A1]: ["https://d.example"],
+            [B0]: ["https://e.example"],
+        },
         ...overrides,
     };
 }
@@ -273,8 +282,8 @@ describe("removeAddressFromState", () => {
 
         removeAddressFromState(state, 0, 1);
 
-        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] });
-        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["e.example"] });
+        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["https://a.example"] });
+        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["https://e.example"] });
     });
 
     // The derivation counter is a high-water mark, never rewound: "+" derives