chore: the native token's label follows the active network (closes #372)

networks.js gives each network a nativeCurrency (ETH, SepoliaETH) and nothing
read it: every screen wrote ETH. A nativeCurrency() helper returns the active
network's, and every native balance, value, fee, reserve, type line, history
entry, the contract-recipient warning and the fee-limit refusal use it. The
"ETH" that selectedToken and txInfo.token hold is the native token's id and is
unchanged. A token reporting any network's nativeCurrency is a spoof, as one
reporting ETH already was, and the transaction detail screen calls an entry a
token transfer when it has a token contract, not by its symbol.

Model: opus-5-5

Dockerfile

@@ -8,12 +8,11 @@ WORKDIR /app
 # image sets it.
 ENV AUTISTMASK_LINT_NATIVE=1
 
-# script/test's default 30s bound is the host figure, against a suite that
-# runs in about 8s there. In here the same suite starts on a cold jest cache
-# and shares the runner with the rest of the build, so 30s is marginal rather
-# than a bound — it killed a healthy suite at 30.6s on a cold CI cache. 180s
-# still catches a hang in three minutes and cannot be tripped by a suite that
-# is merely running on contended hardware.
+# script/test's default 30s bound is the host figure. In here the same suite
+# starts on a cold jest cache and shares the runner with the rest of the build,
+# so 30s is too tight — it killed a healthy suite at 30.6s on a cold CI cache.
+# 180s still catches a hang in three minutes and cannot be tripped by a suite
+# that is merely running on contended hardware.
 ENV AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT=180
 
 # script/bootstrap installs all prerequisites (make via apt here; node

README.md

@@ -846,6 +846,14 @@ wherever shown. If a formatting rule applies in one place, it applies in every
 place. Users should never see the same value rendered differently on two
 screens.
 
+The native token's label is the active network's `nativeCurrency` in
+`src/shared/networks.js`: `ETH` on mainnet, `SepoliaETH` on Sepolia. Wherever
+this document shows ETH as the label of a native balance, value or fee, in a
+"Native ETH transfer" type line, in the contract-recipient warning or in the
+refusal of a fee above 1 ETH, Sepolia shows `SepoliaETH`. The swap lines keep
+`ETH`, the router's own name for the native currency, and the ETH/USD price
+line, shown on mainnet only, keeps its fixed wording.
+
 **Specific Exception — Truncation:** On some non-critical display locations, we
 may truncate _a small number_ of characters from the middle of an address solely
 due to display size constraints. Wherever possible, and, notably, **in all
@@ -887,17 +895,28 @@ Truncation stays truncation: `0.99999` shows as `0.9999`, never rounded up. The
 rule still renders a genuine zero as `0.0000`. Two lines of a swap say a zero in
 words instead: `Min. received` reads `None (no minimum guaranteed)` for a zero
 minimum, and `Amount` reads `All available (V4 open delta)` when the amount it
-shows is a V4 exact-in `amountIn` of zero.
+shows is a V4 exact-in `amountIn` of zero and
+`Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)` when it is a V2
+exact-in `amountIn` of zero.
 
 The rule and its exception live in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js` as
 `truncateAmount()` and `truncateAmountNeverZero()`. Everything the approval and
 confirmation screens display goes through the floored one — the ERC-20 amount,
-the ETH value and max fee (`src/popup/views/approval.js`), and the swap's
-`Amount` and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`). The history and
-balance lists (`src/shared/transactions.js`) use the unfloored one: the
-transaction detail view is the authoritative record and already shows exact
-precision. The 4-decimal rule is unchanged everywhere else, including for
-amounts at or above the floor on the approval screens.
+the ETH value and max fee (`src/popup/views/approval.js`), the swap's `Amount`
+and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`), the Send screen's
+`Current balance` (`src/popup/views/send.js`), and the balance and network fee
+on the confirmation screen for the wallet's own send
+(`src/popup/views/confirmTx.js`). Both screens render a network fee through
+`formatFee()` in `src/popup/views/helpers.js`, which prices the exact fee in USD
+rather than its truncated figure, so the same fee reads the same on both, USD
+value included. Balances are stored exactly (`src/shared/balances.js`), whatever
+decimals a token declares, so a balance below the floor reaches these screens as
+it is. The history list (`src/shared/transactions.js`) uses the unfloored one:
+the transaction detail view is the authoritative record and already shows exact
+precision. The balance lists use neither: they round to four places with
+`toFixed(4)` (`balanceLine()` in `src/popup/views/helpers.js`). The 4-decimal
+rule is unchanged everywhere else, including for amounts at or above the floor
+on the approval screens.
 
 The floor applies only where the token's scale is known. Where it is not, the
 approval screen states base units instead of a quantity — see Unknown token
@@ -917,7 +936,10 @@ rule: the ERC-20 `transfer`/`approve` line (`src/popup/views/approval.js`) and
 the swap's `Amount` and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`). The
 token permission warning on the signature screen takes the same rule for its
 amounts. An unbounded allowance or permit needs no scale to describe and is
-still shown as `Unlimited`.
+still shown as `Unlimited`. A source's answer counts only if it is a whole
+number from 0 to 80: `decimals()` returns a `uint8`, but `formatUnits()` cannot
+format more than 80 decimal places, so a token that reports 81 to 255 is shown
+as one whose scale nothing knows.
 
 The rule holds only if nothing invents a scale UPSTREAM of it. Those three
 sources are read as authoritative, so a value written into one of them cannot be
@@ -940,6 +962,13 @@ and compare against. Reading the stored field directly instead answers `null`
 for a bundled or tracked token the explorer merely omitted, which is not a
 refusal the wallet has any reason to make.
 
+The Send screen also consults every address's explorer reports, so a contract
+two addresses report different `decimals` for has no scale there, and the stored
+balance, formatted at one of those scales, is withdrawn with it. The Send
+screen's `Current balance` and the confirmation screen's balance line then both
+read `unknown (SYMBOL)`. The balance list formats each explorer row as it is
+fetched, without that cross-address check, and shows the row's figure.
+
 **Decoded amount lines on the transaction approval screen:** the `Amount` line
 of a decoded ERC-20 call, and the `Amount` and `Min. received` lines of a
 decoded swap (see TxApproval below), do not always read as a number. They can
@@ -953,27 +982,59 @@ read:
 - `Unlimited`: on the ERC-20 `Amount` line, an `approve` of the `uint256`
   maximum, an unbounded allowance. On the swap's `Amount` line, any amount at or
   above the `uint160` maximum, whichever step set the line: a `PERMIT2_PERMIT`
-  amount at that maximum, which is an unbounded permit, or a V2 or V3 exact-in
-  or `WRAP_ETH` amount that large, which is not an allowance. The router's
-  whole-balance value, `CONTRACT_BALANCE` (`2^255`), is one such amount.
+  amount at that maximum, which is an unbounded permit, or a V2 or V3 exact-in,
+  V2 exact-out or `WRAP_ETH` amount that large, which is not an allowance. The
+  router's whole-balance value, `CONTRACT_BALANCE` (`2^255`), is one such
+  amount.
+- `Up to <amount>`: the swap's `Amount` line, when the transaction has a V2
+  exact-out step, whichever step set the line, including the `WRAP_ETH` of a
+  swap paid in ETH and a `PERMIT2_PERMIT`. The swap spends at most that figure,
+  not necessarily all of it; the wait, success and error screens show it with
+  the same words. `Unlimited`, `All available (V4 open delta)` and
+  `Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)` keep their
+  wording. When a V2 exact-out step sets `Min. received`, that line shows its
+  `amountOut`, the exact amount it buys.
 - `All available (V4 open delta)`: the swap's `Amount` line, when the amount it
   shows is a V4 exact-in `amountIn` of zero. V4 reads that zero as "use the
   whole open delta", so the calldata states no quantity. The line shows the
   amount of one step that names an input token or amount: the last
   `PERMIT2_PERMIT` step if there is one, otherwise the first V2 or V3 exact-in,
-  `WRAP_ETH` or V4 swap step, a V4 swap step giving the `amountIn` of its first
-  readable exact-in action.
+  V2 exact-out, `WRAP_ETH` or V4 swap step. A V2 exact-out step gives its
+  `amountInMax`, and a V4 swap step the `amountIn` of its first readable
+  exact-in action.
+- `Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)`: the swap's
+  `Amount` line, when the amount it shows is a V2 exact-in `amountIn` of zero.
+  The router reads that zero as "the pair already holds the input tokens": the
+  step pays nothing itself and swaps whatever an earlier step sent to the pair,
+  so the calldata states no quantity. A V3 exact-in `amountIn` of zero has no
+  such meaning and is shown as a zero.
 - `None (no minimum guaranteed)`: the swap's `Min. received` line, when the
   minimum it shows is zero, whether a V2, V3 or V4 swap's minimum or a
   `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step's `minBalance`. Before
   [#359](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/359), a zero `minBalance`
-  read `0.0000` when the token's scale was known.
+  read `0.0000` when the token's scale was known. The router passes a balance
+  check whenever the balance is at least `minBalance`, so a zero `minBalance`
+  guarantees nothing: it sets `Token Out` and `Min. received` only when the
+  output side holds no minimum, not even a zero one, at the point the check is
+  reached, and otherwise leaves the current token and figure in place. A nonzero
+  `minBalance` sets both lines, as a swap step does.
 
 The swap's `Token In` and `Token Out` lines name a currency, not an amount; each
 reads `Unknown (not named in the calldata)` when the decoder found no token for
-that side. The token permission warning on the signature screen has its own
-amount wording, including `Unknown`; the SignApproval section below describes
-it.
+that side. An `UNWRAP_WETH` step makes `Token Out` ETH only when the output side
+is WETH, on mainnet or Sepolia, or when no step set the output side; a WETH
+`Min. received` figure then reads in ETH. Otherwise `Token Out` and
+`Min. received` keep the output side's own token and figure, whether the swap
+was paid in ETH or in a token: a V2 exact-out swap that buys USDC and then
+unwraps the WETH it did not spend shows USDC. The token permission warning on
+the signature screen has its own amount wording, including `Unknown`; the
+SignApproval section below describes it.
+
+The swap's `Deadline` line is the router's deadline as a UTC date and time, e.g.
+`2026-02-27 08:25:51`. A JavaScript date reaches only to 275760-09-13 00:00:00
+UTC, so a later deadline, such as the `uint256` maximum, reads
+`After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)` rather than leaving the
+whole swap undecoded.
 
 #### Partial USD totals
 
@@ -1053,10 +1114,16 @@ balance is nonzero and it is in the bundled known-token list, is tracked by the
 user, or has 1,000 or more holders; a token claiming a symbol from the bundled
 list from any other contract address is always dropped, and so is any token
 claiming a symbol that belongs to the native asset and therefore has no
-legitimate contract at all (`"ETH"`). That filter is unconditional — the "Hide
+legitimate contract at all (`"ETH"`, and every network's `nativeCurrency`, such
+as `"SepoliaETH"`, on every network). That filter is unconditional — the "Hide
 tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders" setting governs the transaction history
-and the send-screen token selector, not this list. Tracked tokens with a zero
-balance are listed as well while "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" is on.
+and the send-screen token selector, not this list. `fetchTokenBalances()` stores
+every nonzero holding of a token it admits, however small, but a holding below
+0.000001 is left out of the balance lists, the send-screen token selector, the
+address total and the remove-address warning (`isBelowOneMillionth()` in
+`src/shared/amountDisplay.js`). The Send and confirmation screens show it when
+its token is the one being sent. Tracked tokens with a zero balance are listed
+as well while "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" is on.
 
 #### Stored state and its version
 
@@ -1076,16 +1143,18 @@ because bumping for one would send every older install to StateRecovery for
 nothing.
 
 Every read of the record goes through `assertStateUsable()` first, on the raw
-bytes, before normalization: `loadState()` for the popup and `getState()` for
-the background. It refuses a record that is not an object, a `schemaVersion`
-this build does not understand (a newer one included), a `wallets` that is not a
-list of wallet records with address records in them, and a `networkId` that is
-not a network in `src/shared/networks.js`. Refusing is the whole point — a
-record the wallet cannot vouch for is never normalized, never written back, and
-never half-loaded. The popup shows StateRecovery; a dApp gets a specific error
-(`-32007`, an EIP-1474 server-error code the spec leaves unassigned) saying the
-saved data cannot be read and that nothing was signed or sent, rather than the
-generic `-32603` every request used to answer.
+bytes, before normalization: `loadState()` and every `saveState()` for the
+popup, and `getState()` for the background. It refuses a record that is not an
+object, a `schemaVersion` this build does not understand (a newer one included),
+a `wallets` that is not a list of wallet records with address records in them,
+and a `networkId` that is not a network in `src/shared/networks.js`. Refusing is
+the whole point — a record the wallet cannot vouch for is never normalized,
+never written back, and never half-loaded. The popup shows StateRecovery,
+whether it finds the record unreadable when it opens or at a save while it is
+open; a dApp gets a specific error (`-32007`, an EIP-1474 server-error code the
+spec leaves unassigned) saying the saved data cannot be read and that nothing
+was signed or sent, rather than the generic `-32603` every request used to
+answer.
 
 Every other field of the record is floored in `normalizePersisted()` rather than
 gated, and the floor is not the same for every field. Some are type-checked as a
@@ -1122,15 +1191,16 @@ each caught only by a reviewer re-deriving thirty fields by hand.
 The `allowedSites` case is why the entry check is not optional. A stored
 `{"0x…": "notalist"}` is a well-formed object holding a malformed entry: it
 passed the gate, rendered a completely healthy popup, and then threw inside
-`saveState()`'s per-hostname merge, so every save from that moment on failed and
+`saveState()`'s per-origin merge, so every save from that moment on failed and
 the user went on operating a wallet that was persisting nothing
 ([#362](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362)). A save that fails is
 now also reported rather than swallowed: `onSaveFailure()` in
 `src/shared/state.js` is called for every failed save, awaited or not, and the
 popup puts up a persistent "NOT SAVED" banner (`showSaveFailureBanner()` in
 `src/popup/views/helpers.js`). Storage can still fail for reasons no floor
-covers — a quota, a revoked permission, a record a newer build wrote — and the
-wallet must never look healthy while that is true.
+covers — a quota, a revoked permission — and the wallet must never look healthy
+while that is true. A save that fails because the stored record fails the gate,
+such as one a newer build wrote, gets StateRecovery instead of the banner.
 
 The `networkId` check is not cosmetic: that value is an object KEY into
 `state.networkEndpoints`, so an unvalidated `"__proto__"` would set the map's
@@ -1244,7 +1314,10 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
       of every wallet, deduplicated by hash and filtered. Each row is three
       lines: age and direction, then the counterparty's colour dot (with our own
       name for it, where it is one of our addresses) and the amount, then the
-      counterparty's full address on a row of its own
+      counterparty's full address on a row of its own. A contract creation has
+      no counterparty: its second line is the amount alone and its third line
+      says "This transaction creates a new contract. It has no recipient." The
+      transaction lists on AddressDetail and AddressToken draw the same rows
     - "Add additional wallet..." link at bottom
 - **Transitions**:
     - Tap address row → sets the active address and broadcasts
@@ -1378,7 +1451,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - What to send: token dropdown (or static display with contract address when
       locked from AddressToken)
     - To: address or ENS name input, with an inline validation message
-    - Amount input with current balance display
+    - Amount input with current balance display, which reads
+      `Current balance: unknown (SYMBOL)` for a token whose scale is unknown, as
+      ConfirmTx's balance line does (see Unknown token scale)
     - "Review" button, disabled until the recipient validates
 - **Transitions**:
     - "Review" (valid inputs, ENS resolved) → **ConfirmTx**
@@ -1396,7 +1471,8 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - From: blockie + color dot + full address + etherscan link + wallet title
     - To: blockie + color dot + full address + etherscan link + ENS name
     - Amount: value + symbol (USD in parentheses)
-    - Your balance: value + symbol (USD in parentheses)
+    - Your balance: value + symbol (USD in parentheses), or `unknown (SYMBOL)`
+      for a token whose scale is unknown
     - Network fee: "Estimating..." then two lines, or "Unable to estimate",
       fetched async. The first line is what the transfer is expected to cost,
       `gasLimit * gasPrice` (USD in parentheses); the second is the
@@ -1412,7 +1488,11 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
       amount plus the fee exceeds the balance (ETH transfers), not enough ETH to
       pay the fee for the transfer (ERC-20 transfers), and the fee could not be
       estimated. The first two are mutually exclusive per transfer type, so only
-      the applicable one holds space
+      the applicable one holds space. The last names its cause: for a token
+      whose scale is unknown the fee can never be estimated, and it says the
+      wallet does not know how many decimal places the token uses and that the
+      transaction cannot be sent; for any other failure it asks the user to go
+      back and try again
     - Password: an inline field on this screen, not a modal, with its own error
       line
     - "Sign & Send" button (disabled if errors, and while the network fee
@@ -1437,7 +1517,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Transaction Broadcast" heading (no back button — tx is irreversible)
     - Amount + symbol
-    - To: color dot + full address + etherscan link
+    - To: color dot + full address + etherscan link; for a contract creation,
+      which has no recipient, "This transaction creates a new contract. It has
+      no recipient." instead
     - Transaction hash: full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
     - Count-up timer: "Waiting for confirmation... Ns"
 - **Behavior**: Polls `getTransactionReceipt` every 10 seconds. The wait is
@@ -1466,7 +1548,8 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - Decoded action well (shown when the transaction carried recognized
       calldata; the top-level Amount and To are hidden in that case)
     - Amount + symbol
-    - To: color dot + full address + etherscan link
+    - To: color dot + full address + etherscan link, or for a contract creation
+      the same sentence as on WaitTx
     - Block number
     - Transaction hash: full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
     - "Done" button
@@ -1481,7 +1564,8 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Transaction Failed" heading
     - Amount + symbol
-    - To: color dot + full address + etherscan link
+    - To: color dot + full address + etherscan link, or for a contract creation
+      the same sentence as on WaitTx
     - Error message (dashed border box)
     - Transaction hash section (hidden if broadcast failed before getting hash):
       full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
@@ -1514,12 +1598,14 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - "Transaction" heading, "Back" button
     - Transaction hash: full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
     - Type: transaction classification — one of: Native ETH Transfer, ERC-20
-      Token Transfer, Swap, Token Approval, Contract Call, Contract Creation
+      Token Transfer, Swap, Token Approval, Contract Call, Contract Creation. A
+      transfer with a token contract is an ERC-20 Token Transfer whatever symbol
+      the token reports.
     - Status: "Success" or "Failed"
     - From: blockie + color dot + full address (tap to copy) + etherscan link;
       ENS name if available
     - To: blockie + color dot + full address (tap to copy) + etherscan link; ENS
-      name if available
+      name if available. For a contract creation, the same sentence as on WaitTx
     - Time: ISO datetime + relative age in parentheses
     - Block: block number (tap to copy) + etherscan block link
     - Amount: value + symbol (bold)
@@ -1582,13 +1668,13 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
           a value carrying its unit, hex (`0x10`) or exponent (`1e3`) notation —
           is refused with a flash message and the field snaps back to the stored
           threshold, so a number the user did not type is never stored.
-    - Allowed Sites: the hostnames remembered as allowed, under any address,
-      with remove buttons
-    - Connected Sites: the hostnames of the sites allowed without "Remember my
+    - Allowed Sites: the origins (scheme, host and port) remembered as allowed,
+      under any address, with remove buttons
+    - Connected Sites: the origins of the sites allowed without "Remember my
       choice" that are still connected, with remove buttons. Only the background
       holds these, in memory, and Settings asks it for them with
       `AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES`
-    - Denied Sites: the hostnames remembered as denied, under any address, with
+    - Denied Sites: the origins remembered as denied, under any address, with
       remove buttons
     - About: project link, license, author, version, release date, and the
       commit, which links to the commit in the repository
@@ -1602,10 +1688,11 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - Tap wallet name → inline rename field (no screen change)
     - `[x]` on a tracked token → removes it in place (no screen change)
     - `[x]` on an allowed or connected site → disconnects that site, in place:
-      its hostname is dropped from Allowed Sites under every address, and
+      its origin is dropped from Allowed Sites under every address, and
       `AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE` has the background end every connection approved
-      without "Remember" from an origin with that hostname, under any address,
-      and send `accountsChanged` with an empty list to the site's open tabs.
+      without "Remember" from that origin, under any address, and send
+      `accountsChanged` with an empty list to the open tabs of that origin. The
+      same host under another scheme or port is another site and is left alone.
       Only the extension's own pages may send either message
     - `[x]` on a denied site → forgets the refusal, in place; it connects
       nothing and tells the background nothing
@@ -1789,14 +1876,22 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 
 - **When**: A website requests wallet access via `eth_requestAccounts` or
   `wallet_requestPermissions` and is on neither the allowed nor the denied list.
-  The background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and
-  falls back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
-  `requestApproval()`).
+  A site is its full origin, `scheme://host[:port]`, on both lists and for a
+  connection allowed without "Remember": a choice for `https://dapp.example`
+  says nothing about `http://dapp.example` or another port of that host. The
+  background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and falls
+  back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
+  `requestApproval()`). Only one exists per site at a time: a further connection
+  request from a site whose prompt is still unanswered is refused with EIP-1193
+  code `-32002` and opens no new prompt. If that prompt was in a toolbar popup
+  that closed before it connected, and the toolbar popup has since been set to
+  open something else, the refused request shows that prompt again.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Connection Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
       blocklist)
-    - Site hostname (bold) + "wants to connect to your wallet"
+    - Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants to connect to your
+      wallet"
     - Address that will be shared (color dot + full address + etherscan link)
     - "Remember my choice for this site" checkbox
     - "Allow" / "Deny" buttons
@@ -1815,23 +1910,27 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
   programmatically rather than by a user gesture. The background populates the
   transaction (nonce, gas limit, fees, chain id) against the RPC node _before_
   opening the window, so the screen shows a complete transaction and the signed
-  artifact can be compared with it field for field. A request that cannot be
-  populated — unreachable node, reverting gas estimate — opens no window and is
-  failed back to the site. Only one transaction approval exists at a time:
-  populating fixes the nonce, so a second `eth_sendTransaction` arriving while
-  one is unanswered is refused with EIP-1193 code `-32002` rather than being
-  populated at the same nonce. It opens no window and takes no nonce, and the
-  site can send it again once the pending one is answered.
+  artifact can be compared with it field for field. A nonce the site supplies is
+  ignored: the nonce is always the account's next nonce from the node, so a site
+  cannot replace one of the user's pending transactions or leave this one stuck
+  behind a gap. A request that cannot be populated — unreachable node, reverting
+  gas estimate — opens no window and is failed back to the site. Only one
+  transaction approval exists at a time: populating fixes the nonce, so a second
+  `eth_sendTransaction` arriving while one is unanswered is refused with
+  EIP-1193 code `-32002` rather than being populated at the same nonce. It opens
+  no window and takes no nonce, and the site can send it again once the pending
+  one is answered.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Transaction Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
       blocklist)
-    - Site hostname (bold) + "wants to send a transaction"
+    - Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants to send a
+      transaction"
     - Decoded action (if calldata is recognized): action name, token details,
       amounts, steps, deadline (see Transaction Decoding)
     - From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
-    - Contract: color dot + full address + etherscan link (or "contract
-      creation"), token symbol label if known
+    - Contract: color dot + full address + etherscan link, token symbol label if
+      known; for a contract creation, the same sentence as on WaitTx
     - Value: amount in ETH (4 decimal places, USD in parentheses)
     - Network fee (max): gas limit × fee per gas in ETH (4 decimal places, USD
       in parentheses), with the gas limit and the fee per gas in gwei below it
@@ -1852,19 +1951,32 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 
 - **When**: A connected website requests a message signature via
   `personal_sign`, `eth_sign`, or `eth_signTypedData_v4`. Opened the same way as
-  TxApproval, in a separate popup window.
+  TxApproval, in a separate popup window. Only one exists per site at a time: a
+  further signature request, by any of these methods, from a site whose
+  signature request is still unanswered is refused with EIP-1193 code `-32002`
+  and opens no window.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Signature Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
       blocklist)
-    - Site hostname (bold) + "wants you to sign a message"
+    - Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants you to sign a
+      message"
     - Danger warning box (shown for `eth_sign`, which signs a raw hash)
     - Type: "Personal message" or "Typed data (EIP-712)"
     - From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
-    - Message: decoded UTF-8 text (personal_sign) or formatted domain/type/
-      message fields (EIP-712 typed data). The primary type shown is the one
-      ethers signs, derived from the typed data's `types`, not the type the site
-      states.
+    - Message: for `personal_sign` and `eth_sign`, the text the message's bytes
+      decode to as UTF-8, laid out left to right in the order of the bytes that
+      are signed, right-to-left characters included. Each control character,
+      each line or paragraph separator (U+2028, U+2029; left in the text, a
+      paragraph separator would end that layout for the text after it), and each
+      character that paints nothing (format characters such as zero-width and
+      bidirectional ones, default-ignorable characters such as variation
+      selectors and Hangul fillers, and DELETE), is shown as a bordered `U+XXXX`
+      mark instead of acting on the text; a line feed is shown as a line break.
+      Bytes that are not UTF-8 are shown as "This message is not text." For
+      typed data, formatted domain/type/message fields (EIP-712). The primary
+      type shown is the one ethers signs, derived from the typed data's `types`,
+      not the type the site states.
     - Token permission warning, at the top of the message (typed data whose
       primary type is `Permit`, as in EIP-2612, or one of Permit2's signature
       types): "⚠️ TOKEN PERMISSION: Signing this lets the spender below take the
@@ -1876,12 +1988,20 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
       domain's `verifyingContract`; any those fields do not give is shown as
       `Unknown`, and the domain, type and message lines still follow. Only typed
       data that cannot be read at all is shown as raw text.
+    - Raw data (`personal_sign` and `eth_sign`): the message's hex exactly as
+      the site sent it. The bytes it encodes are what is signed, as an EIP-191
+      personal message.
     - Password input and an error line
     - "Sign" / "Reject" buttons
 - **Transitions**:
     - Typed data that states no primary type, or one other than the type it
       would be signed as, or that cannot be read → shown with the error line
       saying so and "Sign" disabled; only "Reject" remains
+    - A `personal_sign` or `eth_sign` message that is not hex (`0x` or `0X` and
+      an even number of hex digits, the form ethers' `getBytes` reads when
+      signing) → shown as plain text, with the error line "This message is plain
+      text, not hex, so it cannot be signed." and "Sign" disabled; signing takes
+      the bytes from the hex, so such a message has none to sign
     - "Sign" (correct password) → signs locally → closes popup (returns
       signature)
     - "Sign" (wrong password, or a signing failure) → error line, no screen
@@ -1892,9 +2012,19 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 
 #### StateRecovery (`state-recovery`)
 
-- **When**: `loadState()` refused the stored profile, so the popup has no
-  profile at all. It is the only screen reached without one, and the only one
-  that never appears during ordinary use.
+- **When**: the stored profile fails `assertStateUsable()`. At open, that is
+  `loadState()` refusing it, so the popup has no profile at all. While the popup
+  is open, on any screen, it is a save refusing it: every `saveState()` reads
+  the stored record and runs the same check before writing, so the popup finds
+  it at the next navigation or ten-second refresh, whether or not the network
+  answers ([#373](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373)). A save that
+  fails for any other reason, such as a storage read or write that errors, gets
+  the "NOT SAVED" banner instead and leaves the screen as it is. The screen it
+  replaces is left as any navigation leaves it, so a revealed phrase or key, or
+  a typed password, is wiped. Once up, the screen stays until the popup closes
+  or reloads: work still running in the popup, such as a transaction wait,
+  cannot replace it, even after the record is erased in another window. It is
+  the only screen that never appears during ordinary use.
 - **Why it exists**: a record the wallet cannot read used to render nothing — no
   view, no message, no control — while every dApp call answered a generic
   internal error, and no reset or wipe control existed anywhere in the product.
@@ -1921,16 +2051,20 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
       Nothing was erased." on the error line
 - **No other control is reachable.** The Settings gear is hidden while this
   screen is up, because every screen behind it renders from the profile that
-  could not be read, and `showView()` is not used to raise it for the same
-  reason — it reads and writes the state singleton.
+  could not be read. `showView()` is not used to raise it, for the same reason:
+  it reads and writes the state singleton. Under an open popup the screen is
+  passed to `showView()` only to run the replaced screen's cleanup; from then on
+  `showView()` shows nothing else in that popup.
 - **Both controls are required.** An export with no reset leaves the user
   looking at a broken profile with no way to use the wallet again; a reset with
   no export destroys the only copy of a record that may hold recoverable key
   material. The typed phrase is the same barrier DeleteWalletLostPassword uses,
   and for the same reason: there is no password to gate this with, since there
   is no profile to check one against.
-- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`: it is never persisted as the current view, because
-  nothing on this path writes state at all.
+- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`, and never recorded as the current view: the record
+  can become readable again under an open popup, erased in another window, and
+  the next save from that popup then succeeds. A popup opened after that opens
+  normally.
 
 ### External Services
 
@@ -2102,6 +2236,17 @@ the log level and turns the banner on, and that is all it may ever do: it feeds
 constant directly, so no runtime toggle in a release build can reach the
 hardcoded test phrase.
 
+At the raised log level the console also shows the wallet's addresses with their
+balances and ENS names, the token contracts looked up, and a line for each
+request made through `debugFetch` in `src/shared/log.js` (the explorer, the
+price feed, the RPC calls a site makes, and the endpoint checks in settings) and
+for its response. A request is logged by its HTTP method, the origin of its URL
+(scheme, host and port) and, for a JSON-RPC call, the method name; the balance
+refresh, the token lookup and a failed endpoint check in settings name the
+endpoint by its origin too. The URL's path and query string, where RPC providers
+put API keys, any user name and password in it, and the request body are never
+logged.
+
 ### Key Decisions
 
 - **No framework**: The popup UI is vanilla JS and HTML. The extension is small
@@ -2228,7 +2373,8 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
   act on and what the user believes they own rather than what the history
   displays. All three surfaces read the rule from `src/shared/symbolSpoof.js`,
   so they cannot answer the question differently. A symbol the list maps to no
-  contract at all — `"ETH"`, the native asset, is the only one — may be borne by
+  contract at all — the native asset's labels: `"ETH"` and every network's
+  `nativeCurrency`, such as `"SepoliaETH"`, on every network — may be borne by
   no contract, so every ERC-20 claiming it is a spoof on all three. The user's
   real ETH balance is not an ERC-20 and is read over RPC, so the rule never sees
   it.

TODO.md

@@ -45,6 +45,216 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
 
 # Completed Steps
 
+- 2026-10-04: The native token's label follows the active network
+  ([#372](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/372)). `networks.js` gives
+  each network a `nativeCurrency` and nothing read it: every screen wrote `ETH`,
+  so on Sepolia the balance, the value and the fee all read `ETH`. The balance
+  lists, Send, confirmation, approval, wait, success and error screens, the
+  transaction history, the contract-recipient warning and the refusal of a fee
+  above the limit now read `nativeCurrency`, which is `ETH` on mainnet and
+  `SepoliaETH` on Sepolia. A token claiming any network's `nativeCurrency` is
+  dropped as a fake, as one claiming `ETH` already was, and the transaction
+  detail screen calls an entry a token transfer when it has a token contract,
+  not by its symbol.
+- 2026-10-04: A popup that is already open when the stored profile becomes
+  unreadable moves to the recovery screen
+  ([#373](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373)). It used to stay on
+  the last good profile, with the "NOT SAVED" banner at most, until reopened.
+  Every save already ran the check the popup runs at open, so the popup finds
+  the record at the next navigation or ten-second refresh, whether or not the
+  network answers; a save that fails that check now raises the recovery screen
+  and stops the refresh. The screen it replaces is left as any navigation leaves
+  it, so a revealed phrase or key or a typed password is wiped. Once up, nothing
+  else in that popup can replace it, and a later save or a transaction wait that
+  ends does not clear an export or a typed confirmation. It is never saved as
+  the current view, so a popup opened after the record is erased in another
+  window opens normally. Any other failed save still gets the banner and leaves
+  the screen alone.
+- 2026-10-04: A swap whose deadline is later than a JavaScript date can hold is
+  decoded ([#437](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/437)). A date
+  reaches only to 275760-09-13, so a later deadline, such as the `uint256`
+  maximum, made the `Deadline` line throw, and the approval screen showed the
+  swap as an undecoded contract call with nothing saying why. That line now
+  reads `After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)`.
+- 2026-10-04: The swap decoder reads two router zeros the way the router does
+  ([#415](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/415)). A V2 exact-in
+  `amountIn` of zero means an earlier step already sent the tokens to the pair;
+  `Amount` showed `0.0000` for it and now reads
+  `Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)`. A
+  `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` with a zero `minBalance` guarantees nothing, yet it
+  replaced the minimum an earlier swap step stated, so `Min. received` read
+  `None (no minimum guaranteed)`; it now sets the output side only when that
+  side holds no minimum at the point the check is reached. A nonzero
+  `minBalance` still sets the output side.
+- 2026-10-04: The signature screen shows a personal message as the bytes that
+  are signed ([#403](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/403)). It
+  showed only the decoded text, with bidirectional and zero-width characters
+  acting on it, so a site could make the message read differently from what is
+  signed, and a message that was not hex was shown as NUL characters. The hex is
+  now shown as "Raw data" alongside the decoded text, the text is laid out left
+  to right in byte order, control characters, line and paragraph separators and
+  characters that paint nothing are shown as `U+XXXX` marks, and a message that
+  is not hex by the rule signing reads it with is shown as plain text with
+  "Sign" disabled, since such a message has no bytes to sign.
+- 2026-10-04: A token that reports more than 80 decimal places has no known
+  scale ([#350](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/350)). The shared
+  scale check `toDecimals()` accepted any `uint8`, but `formatUnits()` throws
+  above 80, so such a token left a swap or an ERC-20 call on the approval screen
+  undecoded, with nothing saying why. The check now stops at 80, and both
+  approval paths show the base-unit amount with the scale stated as unknown. The
+  balance list and the history list use the same check, so the same token no
+  longer stops an address's token balances from refreshing or its history from
+  loading.
+- 2026-10-04: Debug mode no longer writes RPC API keys to the console
+  ([#410](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410)). `debugFetch` logged
+  every request's full URL and body, so an RPC endpoint with a key in its path
+  or query string printed that key on every request. It now logs the HTTP
+  method, the URL's origin and, for a JSON-RPC call, the method name. The
+  balance refresh and token lookup log the RPC endpoint by its origin too. A
+  failed RPC call's error line prints the error's short message, which names the
+  HTTP status, not its full message, which carries the request URL. A failed
+  endpoint check in settings names the endpoint by its origin, not the `fetch`
+  error's message, which carries the whole URL, password included, for a URL
+  with a user name and password. The README's DEBUG Mode Policy says what debug
+  mode logs.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A site has at most one connection prompt and one signature prompt
+  open at a time ([#405](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/405)). Each
+  `eth_requestAccounts` or `personal_sign` call opened another approval window,
+  so a page calling in a loop could cover the screen with identical prompts. A
+  further request of the same kind from a site whose prompt is still unanswered
+  is now refused with EIP-1193 `-32002`, the code a second transaction already
+  gets, and opens no window. Signing by `personal_sign`, `eth_sign` and
+  `eth_signTypedData_v4` counts as one kind. Other sites are not affected, and
+  the site may ask again once the user has answered. A connection prompt whose
+  toolbar popup closed before it connected, and which nothing shows any more, is
+  shown again when the site asks again.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A nonce the site supplies with `eth_sendTransaction` is ignored
+  ([#404](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/404)). It was passed on to
+  the transaction, so a site could replace one of the user's pending
+  transactions (same nonce, higher fee) or leave the new one stuck behind a gap,
+  and the approval screen showed it as a bare number. `nonce` is no longer one
+  of the fields taken from the request in `src/shared/approvalTx.js`, so the
+  transaction always gets the account's next nonce from the node, and that is
+  the nonce the approval screen shows and the popup signs.
+
+- 2026-10-04: Remembered site permissions are held by full origin
+  ([#402](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402)). `allowedSites` and
+  `deniedSites` stored the hostname alone, so a grant to `https://dapp.example`
+  also authorised `http://dapp.example` and every port on that host, and the
+  prompts named only the hostname. Both lists now store and match the origin
+  (`scheme://host[:port]`), the key the connections approved without "Remember"
+  already used, in `src/background/index.js` and in Settings, whose site lists
+  and `AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE` carry the origin too. The connection, transaction
+  and signature prompts show the origin. Entries saved by hostname before this
+  change are not migrated (pre-1.0): they match no site, and Settings lists them
+  until they are removed.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A page's request is credited only to the site the browser says
+  sent it ([#407](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/407)). Where the
+  browser does not give the sender's origin (Firefox before 126), the background
+  used the tab's page, so a frame from another site would have been treated as
+  the site embedding it, and with no tab it used an origin the page wrote into
+  the message. It now uses the URL of the frame that sent the message, and
+  refuses the request with code 4100 when the browser gives neither. The content
+  script no longer writes an origin into the message.
+
+- 2026-10-04: `make test` takes 8-13s on the shared build host, down from
+  17-25s, measured in alternating runs before and after the change
+  ([#428](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/428)). Each popup boot in
+  the tests (`tests/support/popupBoot.js`) resets jest's module registry so that
+  everything under `src/` loads fresh, and that also reloaded `ethers`,
+  `libsodium-wrappers-sumo`, `qrcode` and `ethereum-blockies-base64` every time.
+  Those four libraries are now loaded once per test file and handed to every
+  boot. No test or assertion changed.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A token whose scale is unknown reads the same on the Send screen
+  as on the confirmation screen
+  ([#377](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/377)). When two addresses'
+  explorer reports disagree on a token's `decimals`, the Send screen showed the
+  stored figure while the confirmation screen it leads to said
+  `unknown (SYMBOL)`; both now say `unknown (SYMBOL)`, from one function in
+  `src/popup/views/send.js`. The confirmation screen's fee-unknown message names
+  its cause: for an unknown scale it says the wallet does not know how many
+  decimal places the token uses and that the transaction cannot be sent, instead
+  of asking the user to go back and try again, which cannot help. For any other
+  cause it is unchanged.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A Uniswap V2 exact-out swap (Universal Router command `0x09`) is
+  decoded on the approval screen
+  ([#283](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/283)). `decode()` in
+  `src/shared/uniswap.js` had no arm for it, so the screen named the step and
+  showed no token or amount. The input side is the path's first token with
+  `amountInMax`, the output side the last token with `amountOut`. When the
+  transaction has such a step, the `Amount` figure reads `Up to <amount>`,
+  whichever step set it, there and on the wait, success and error screens,
+  except where it reads `Unlimited` (an unbounded `PERMIT2_PERMIT`, or any
+  amount at or above the `uint160` maximum) or `All available (V4 open delta)`.
+  In every swap, `UNWRAP_WETH` makes `Token Out` ETH only when the output side
+  is WETH, on mainnet or Sepolia, or when no step set the output side; otherwise
+  `Token Out` and `Min. received` keep the output side's own token and figure.
+  V3 exact-out (`0x01`) is still not decoded.
+
+- 2026-10-04: `make test` runs jest in three worker processes
+  ([#426](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/426)). The `test` and
+  `test:verbose` scripts in `package.json` ran `jest --forceExit`, which starts
+  one worker per CPU core: about 47 processes and 7-8 GiB per run on the shared
+  48-core build host. They now pass `--maxWorkers=3`, and the suite takes 23-29s
+  there: inside the 30-second cap in `script/test`, which is unchanged, but not
+  by much, because `tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js` alone takes most of it
+  ([#428](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/428)). One or two workers
+  went past the cap. `make check`, the pre-commit hook and `script/cibuild` all
+  run the suite through these scripts.
+
+- 2026-10-04: The error container on each dApp approval screen keeps its height
+  when an error appears
+  ([#297](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/297)). `#approve-tx-error`
+  and `#approve-sign-error` reserved 20px, but their border and padding took
+  10px of it, so a one-line error grew them to 26px and pushed the buttons below
+  down 6px. They now reserve 30px. A new test in `tests/e2e/run.js` shows each
+  of the six password error containers on its own screen, empty and then with an
+  error, and fails if one changes height or the element below it moves. Some of
+  the longer messages these two containers can show still take two lines.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A transaction with no `to` says "This transaction creates a new
+  contract. It has no recipient." on its recipient line and in its transaction
+  history row ([#250](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/250)). The
+  wait, success and error screens, the transaction detail view and the history
+  rows on Home, AddressDetail and AddressToken showed a blank address there,
+  with a colour dot whose colour was `undefined`; the approval screen showed
+  "(contract creation)". A transaction with a real `to` is unchanged.
+
+- 2026-10-04: The Send and confirmation screens no longer show an ETH balance, a
+  token balance or a network fee below 0.000001 as zero
+  ([#343](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/343)). The stored balances
+  (`src/shared/balances.js`) and the confirmation screen's fee were each cut to
+  six decimal places by a rule of their own, and a token holding cut to zero was
+  dropped. Balances are now stored exactly, whatever decimals a token declares,
+  and every nonzero token holding is kept; the balance check reads a token
+  balance to its first 18 places, the most an amount can have. The balance
+  lists, the send-screen token selector, the address total and the
+  remove-address warning leave out a holding below 0.000001 themselves, as
+  before. The Send screen's `Current balance`, and the confirmation screen's
+  balance, fee, reserve and insufficient-balance messages, go through
+  `truncateAmountNeverZero()` in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js`, the helper the
+  approval screen already used. The confirmation and approval screens both
+  render the fee through `formatFee()` in `src/popup/views/helpers.js`, which
+  prices the exact fee in USD, so the same fee reads the same on both, USD value
+  included.
+
+- 2026-10-04: The flash line keeps to the one line it reserves at any message
+  length ([#252](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/252)). A message
+  that wrapped pushed the whole screen below it down. `#flash-msg` no longer
+  wraps: text too long for the line is cut with an ellipsis, and `showFlash()`
+  puts the whole message in the line's title. Every message is also reworded to
+  at most 50 characters so none is cut; none carries a wallet name or text from
+  a server, and the add-token screens flash a fixed line for any error other
+  than a contract that is not a token. A new test in `tests/e2e/run.js` puts a
+  message several lines long on the line and fails if the line or the screen
+  below it moves. The two approval-screen error boxes are left to
+  [#297](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/297).
+
 - 2026-10-04: A method the wallet does not implement is refused with EIP-1193
   code `4200` ([#279](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/279)). The
   background's `Unsupported method: <method>` error carried no code, so a site

docs/README.md

@@ -285,11 +285,13 @@ not appear and may be permanently lost.
 AutistMask injects a standard `window.ethereum` provider (EIP-1193) into web
 pages. When a site requests access to your wallet:
 
-1. A popup appears showing the site's hostname and the address that will be
-   shared.
+1. A popup appears showing the site's origin (its scheme, host and port, for
+   example `https://app.example`) and the address that will be shared.
 2. Click "Allow" to connect or "Deny" to reject.
 3. Optionally check "Remember my choice for this site" to skip the prompt next
-   time.
+   time. The choice applies to that exact origin only: a choice remembered for
+   `https://app.example` does not cover `http://app.example` or another port of
+   the same host, which ask again.
 
 When a connected site requests a transaction, a separate approval popup appears
 showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data, network fee, network and

package.json

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
     "license": "GPL-3.0",
     "private": true,
     "scripts": {
-        "test": "jest --forceExit",
-        "test:verbose": "jest --forceExit --verbose",
+        "test": "jest --forceExit --maxWorkers=3",
+        "test:verbose": "jest --forceExit --maxWorkers=3 --verbose",
         "build": "node build.js",
         "lint": "eslint . && prettier --check .",
         "fmt": "prettier --write .",

script/test

@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # script/test: run the test suite.
 #
-# The timeout bounds a hung suite; it is not a performance budget. On a
-# developer host the suite finishes in about 8s and REPO_POLICIES' 30s cap is
-# the bound. Inside the image the same suite also pays a cold jest cache and
-# shares the runner with the rest of the build, which is not what that budget
-# describes, so the Dockerfile raises the bound through
+# jest runs three worker processes (package.json), not one per CPU core: on a
+# many-core shared host one per core took gigabytes of RAM per run.
+#
+# The timeout bounds a hung suite; it is not a performance budget. On the busy
+# shared build host the suite takes 8-13s with three workers, inside
+# REPO_POLICIES' 20s budget. Inside the image the same suite also pays a cold
+# jest cache and shares the runner with the rest of the build, which is not what
+# that budget describes, so the Dockerfile raises the bound through
 # AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT. A cap a healthy suite can trip on a cold cache
 # produces a red that means nothing, and teaches "just run it again".
 set -eu

src/background/index.js

@@ -57,9 +57,13 @@ const windowsNs = windowsApi();
 const actionNs = actionApi();
 
 // Connected sites (in-memory, non-persisted): { "origin:address": true }
+//
+// A site is its full origin (scheme://host[:port]), here and in the
+// remembered allowedSites/deniedSites lists alike: a grant to
+// https://dapp.example says nothing about http://dapp.example or another port.
 const connectedSites = {};
 
-// Pending approval requests: { id: { origin, hostname, resolve } }
+// Pending approval requests: { id: { origin, resolve } }
 const pendingApprovals = {};
 
 // One transaction approval at a time, wallet-wide.
@@ -83,7 +87,8 @@ const pendingApprovals = {};
 // authority on a nonce the network has not accepted, which an abandoned
 // approval then leaves a hole in.
 //
-// Sign approvals are not gated: a signature consumes no nonce.
+// Sign approvals do not take this slot: a signature consumes no nonce. They are
+// limited per site instead; see findPendingApproval().
 //
 // The slot is null when free, and otherwise the handle of the request holding
 // it. Once that request has raised its approval the handle carries the
@@ -95,7 +100,7 @@ let txApprovalSlot = null;
 
 // EIP-1474 "resource unavailable": the standard code for a request that is
 // refused because another one is already pending.
-const TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE = -32002;
+const APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE = -32002;
 
 // True at every moment this can be sent: the slot is taken immediately before
 // the transaction is populated, so the other request is either being prepared
@@ -132,6 +137,22 @@ function releaseTxApprovalSlotFor(approvalId) {
     }
 }
 
+// One site-connection approval and one sign approval per site at a time: a
+// page that asks again before the user has answered is refused with the code
+// above instead of opening another window, so it cannot bury the user in
+// prompts. The pending approval itself holds the place, so a caller must test
+// this and raise its approval with nothing awaited in between.
+function findPendingApproval(origin, type) {
+    return Object.values(pendingApprovals).find(
+        (approval) => approval.origin === origin && approval.type === type,
+    );
+}
+
+const APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE =
+    "AutistMask is already waiting for your answer to a request of this kind" +
+    " from this site, so this one was not shown. Please answer that one," +
+    " then send this one again.";
+
 // Nonces this worker has already handed to the node, per chain and address.
 // This is the wallet's own knowledge that a nonce is spent, and it is checked
 // before a broadcast rather than after: a node's pending count can lag a
@@ -284,7 +305,12 @@ async function proxyRpc(method, params) {
     return json.result;
 }
 
+// The site-connection approval the toolbar popup is set to open, or null while
+// it opens the wallet. Set only by resetPopupUrl() and showInToolbarPopup().
+let toolbarPopupApprovalId = null;
+
 function resetPopupUrl() {
+    toolbarPopupApprovalId = null;
     if (actionNs && typeof actionNs.setPopup === "function") {
         actionNs.setPopup({ popup: "src/popup/index.html" });
     }
@@ -459,29 +485,36 @@ async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
 
 // Open an approval popup and return a promise that resolves with the user decision.
 // Prefers the browser-action popup (anchored to toolbar, no macOS Space switch).
-function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
+function requestApproval(origin) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
-        pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, hostname, resolve };
+        pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, resolve, type: "site" };
 
         if (actionNs && typeof actionNs.openPopup === "function") {
-            actionNs.setPopup({
-                popup: "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
-            });
-            try {
-                const result = actionNs.openPopup();
-                if (result && typeof result.catch === "function") {
-                    result.catch(() => openApprovalWindow(id));
-                }
-            } catch {
-                openApprovalWindow(id);
-            }
+            showInToolbarPopup(id);
         } else {
             openApprovalWindow(id);
         }
     });
 }
 
+// Show a site-connection approval in the toolbar popup, or in a separate popup
+// window when the browser will not open the toolbar popup.
+function showInToolbarPopup(id) {
+    toolbarPopupApprovalId = id;
+    actionNs.setPopup({
+        popup: "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
+    });
+    try {
+        const result = actionNs.openPopup();
+        if (result && typeof result.catch === "function") {
+            result.catch(() => openApprovalWindow(id));
+        }
+    } catch {
+        openApprovalWindow(id);
+    }
+}
+
 // Open a tx-approval popup and return a promise that resolves with txHash or error.
 // Uses windows.create() directly because tx approvals are triggered programmatically
 // (from a dApp RPC call), not from a user gesture, so action.openPopup() is
@@ -495,13 +528,12 @@ function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
 // screen never named.
 // `slot` is the transaction-approval slot its caller holds. Handing the
 // approval's id to it is what makes retiring the approval free the slot.
-function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
+function requestTxApproval(origin, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
         pendingApprovals[id] = {
             id,
             origin,
-            hostname,
             approvedTx,
             approvedFrom,
             resolve,
@@ -517,13 +549,12 @@ function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
 // Uses windows.create() directly because sign approvals are triggered programmatically
 // (from a dApp RPC call), not from a user gesture, so action.openPopup() is
 // unreliable in this context.
-function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams, approvedFrom) {
+function requestSignApproval(origin, signParams, approvedFrom) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
         pendingApprovals[id] = {
             id,
             origin,
-            hostname,
             signParams,
             approvedFrom,
             resolve,
@@ -601,11 +632,11 @@ runtime.onConnect.addListener((port) => {
 // in the worker — a balance refresh in flight, another site's approval — has
 // gone on running the whole time. Loading here used to replace the very
 // objects that work was holding.
-async function rememberSiteChoice(field, address, hostname) {
+async function rememberSiteChoice(field, address, origin) {
     await updateState((s) => {
         if (!s[field][address]) s[field][address] = [];
-        if (!s[field][address].includes(hostname)) {
-            s[field][address].push(hostname);
+        if (!s[field][address].includes(origin)) {
+            s[field][address].push(origin);
         }
     });
 }
@@ -618,12 +649,11 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
         return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
     }
 
-    const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
     const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
     const denied = s.deniedSites[activeAddress] || [];
 
     // Check denied list
-    if (denied.includes(hostname)) {
+    if (denied.includes(origin)) {
         return {
             error: {
                 code: 4001,
@@ -634,25 +664,50 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
 
     // Check allowed list or in-memory connected
     if (
-        allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+        allowed.includes(origin) ||
         connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
     ) {
         return { result: [activeAddress] };
     }
 
+    const pending = findPendingApproval(origin, "site");
+    if (pending) {
+        // A toolbar popup that closed before it connected leaves its prompt
+        // pending, and once the toolbar popup is set to open something else
+        // nothing shows that prompt: the site would be refused until the
+        // address changed. Show it again. A prompt in a window or in a
+        // connected popup is settled when that closes, and one the toolbar
+        // popup is still set to open is a click away, so those are left alone.
+        if (
+            actionNs &&
+            typeof actionNs.openPopup === "function" &&
+            !pending.windowId &&
+            !pending.portConnected &&
+            toolbarPopupApprovalId !== pending.id
+        ) {
+            showInToolbarPopup(pending.id);
+        }
+        return {
+            error: {
+                code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
+                message: APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
+            },
+        };
+    }
+
     // Open approval popup
-    const decision = await requestApproval(origin, hostname);
+    const decision = await requestApproval(origin);
 
     if (decision.approved) {
         if (decision.remember) {
-            await rememberSiteChoice("allowedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
+            await rememberSiteChoice("allowedSites", activeAddress, origin);
         } else {
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress] = true;
         }
         return { result: [activeAddress] };
     } else {
         if (decision.remember) {
-            await rememberSiteChoice("deniedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
+            await rememberSiteChoice("deniedSites", activeAddress, origin);
         }
         return {
             error: {
@@ -698,10 +753,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         const s = await getState();
         const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         if (!activeAddress) return { result: [] };
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+            allowed.includes(origin) ||
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { result: [activeAddress] };
@@ -731,10 +785,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         // [TESTNET] banner under a user who believed they were on Sepolia.
         const s = await getState();
         const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+            !allowed.includes(origin) &&
             !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -806,10 +859,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
     if (method === "wallet_getPermissions") {
         const s = await getState();
         const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         const isConnected =
-            allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+            allowed.includes(origin) ||
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress];
         if (!isConnected || !activeAddress) {
             return { result: [] };
@@ -835,10 +887,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         if (!activeAddress)
             return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+            !allowed.includes(origin) &&
             !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -868,9 +919,16 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
                 "Only proceed if you fully understand what you are signing.";
         }
 
+        if (findPendingApproval(origin, "sign")) {
+            return {
+                error: {
+                    code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
+                    message: APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
+                },
+            };
+        }
         const decision = await requestSignApproval(
             origin,
-            hostname,
             signParams,
             activeAddress,
         );
@@ -884,10 +942,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         if (!activeAddress)
             return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+            !allowed.includes(origin) &&
             !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -903,9 +960,16 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
                 },
             };
         }
+        if (findPendingApproval(origin, "sign")) {
+            return {
+                error: {
+                    code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
+                    message: APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
+                },
+            };
+        }
         const decision = await requestSignApproval(
             origin,
-            hostname,
             signParams,
             activeAddress,
         );
@@ -946,10 +1010,9 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
     const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
     if (!activeAddress) return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
-    const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
     const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
     if (
-        !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+        !allowed.includes(origin) &&
         !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
     ) {
         return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -976,7 +1039,7 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
     if (!slot) {
         return {
             error: {
-                code: TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
+                code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
                 message: TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
             },
         };
@@ -1023,7 +1086,6 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
 
         const decision = await requestTxApproval(
             origin,
-            hostname,
             approvedTx,
             activeAddress,
             slot,
@@ -1097,10 +1159,9 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
     }
     for (const tab of tabs) {
         const origin = tab.url ? new URL(tab.url).origin : "";
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const hasPermission =
             activeAddress &&
-            (allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+            (allowed.includes(origin) ||
                 connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]);
         // Same as chainChanged above: a tab without our content script
         // rejects, and that is expected rather than a fault.
@@ -1113,7 +1174,7 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
 }
 
 // Tell every open tab of a site Settings removed that it has no account.
-async function broadcastSiteRemoved(hostname) {
+async function broadcastSiteRemoved(origin) {
     let tabs;
     try {
         tabs = await tabsQuery({});
@@ -1121,7 +1182,7 @@ async function broadcastSiteRemoved(hostname) {
         return;
     }
     for (const tab of tabs) {
-        if (!tab.url || extractHostname(tab.url) !== hostname) continue;
+        if (!tab.url || new URL(tab.url).origin !== origin) continue;
         tabsSendMessage(tab.id, {
             type: "AUTISTMASK_EVENT",
             eventName: "accountsChanged",
@@ -1288,18 +1349,29 @@ if (windowsNs && windowsNs.onRemoved) {
 // Listen for messages from content scripts and popup
 runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_RPC") {
-        // Derive origin from trusted sender info to prevent origin spoofing.
-        // Chrome MV3 provides sender.origin; Firefox MV2 fallback uses sender.tab.url.
-        let trustedOrigin = msg.origin; // fallback only if sender info unavailable
-        if (sender.origin) {
-            trustedOrigin = sender.origin;
-        } else if (sender.tab && sender.tab.url) {
+        // The origin is the one the browser reports for the sender, never one
+        // the message carries. Firefox before 126 gives no sender.origin, so
+        // the origin of sender.url is used: the frame that sent the message,
+        // not the tab's page, which may be another site embedding that
+        // frame. With neither, the request is refused.
+        let trustedOrigin = sender.origin;
+        if (!trustedOrigin && sender.url) {
             try {
-                trustedOrigin = new URL(sender.tab.url).origin;
+                trustedOrigin = new URL(sender.url).origin;
             } catch {
-                // keep fallback
+                // an unparseable URL leaves the origin unknown
             }
         }
+        if (!trustedOrigin) {
+            sendResponse({
+                error: {
+                    code: 4100,
+                    message:
+                        "The wallet could not tell which site sent this request.",
+                },
+            });
+            return false;
+        }
         handleRpc(msg.method, msg.params, trustedOrigin)
             .then((response) => {
                 sendResponse(response);
@@ -1337,10 +1409,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
         const approval = pendingApprovals[msg.id];
         if (approval) {
-            const resp = {
-                hostname: approval.hostname,
-                origin: approval.origin,
-            };
+            const resp = { origin: approval.origin };
             if (approval.type === "tx") {
                 resp.type = "tx";
                 // The populated transaction, and the address it was raised
@@ -1355,7 +1424,9 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
                 resp.approvedFrom = approval.approvedFrom;
             }
             // Flag if the requesting domain is on the phishing blocklist.
-            resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(approval.hostname);
+            resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(
+                extractHostname(approval.origin),
+            );
             sendResponse(resp);
         } else {
             sendResponse(null);
@@ -1689,23 +1760,22 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES") {
         sendResponse(
             Object.keys(connectedSites).map((key) =>
-                extractHostname(key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":"))),
+                key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":")),
             ),
         );
         return false;
     }
 
-    // Settings removed this site and has already dropped its remembered
-    // entries. Its connections approved without "Remember" end here, under
-    // every address, and its open tabs are told it has no account.
+    // Settings removed this site (msg.origin) and has already dropped its
+    // remembered entries. Its connections approved without "Remember" end
+    // here, under every address, and its open tabs are told it has no account.
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE") {
         for (const key of Object.keys(connectedSites)) {
-            const origin = key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":"));
-            if (extractHostname(origin) === msg.hostname) {
+            if (key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":")) === msg.origin) {
                 delete connectedSites[key];
             }
         }
-        broadcastSiteRemoved(msg.hostname);
+        broadcastSiteRemoved(msg.origin);
         return false;
     }
 });

src/content/index.js

@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
         id,
         method,
         params,
-        origin: location.origin,
     })
         .then((response) => {
             if (response) {

src/content/inpage.js

@@ -31,11 +31,12 @@
     // an error instead of accepting the refusal.
     //
     // Whatever code arrived is passed through verbatim rather than being
-    // matched against a list: the extension emits 4001, 4100, 4200 and 4902,
-    // and a code this file has never heard of is still the truth about what
-    // happened. An error reported with no code at all stays a plain Error —
-    // a ProviderRpcError whose `code` is undefined would advertise a
-    // conformance it does not have. `message` is untouched in every case.
+    // matched against a list: the extension emits codes such as 4001, 4100,
+    // 4200 and 4902, and a code this file has never heard of is still the
+    // truth about what happened. An error reported with no code at all stays
+    // a plain Error — a ProviderRpcError whose `code` is undefined would
+    // advertise a conformance it does not have. `message` is untouched in
+    // every case.
     function toPageError(error) {
         const message = (error && error.message) || "Request failed";
         if (error && error.code !== undefined && error.code !== null) {

src/popup/dustThreshold.js

@@ -19,13 +19,9 @@
 // that the user did not type — the same silent substitution the visible
 // rejection message exists to end.
 
-// Must render on ONE line of #flash-msg, whose reserved height
-// (min-h-[1.25rem]) is exactly one line at text-xs. A string long enough to
-// wrap to two lines pushes the settings view down, which the No Layout Shift
-// policy forbids. Do not lengthen this without re-running the layout test in
-// tests/e2e/run.js, which measures the flash line and goes red on a shift.
-const DUST_THRESHOLD_MESSAGE =
-    "Please enter a whole number of gwei, zero or greater.";
+// Must render on ONE line of #flash-msg; see showFlash() in
+// src/popup/views/helpers.js for how long that is.
+const DUST_THRESHOLD_MESSAGE = "Enter a whole number of gwei, zero or greater.";
 
 // Returns the threshold in gwei, or null if the input is not one.
 function parseDustThresholdGwei(raw) {

src/popup/index.html

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
             <!-- ============ FLASH MESSAGE AREA ============ -->
             <div
                 id="flash-msg"
-                class="text-xs text-muted min-h-[1.25rem] mb-1"
+                class="text-xs text-muted min-h-[1.25rem] mb-1 truncate"
             ></div>
 
             <!-- ============ WELCOME / FIRST USE ============ -->
@@ -640,19 +640,13 @@
                         Double-check the address before sending.
                     </div>
                 </div>
+                <!-- Its sentence names the network's native token, so show()
+                in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
                 <div
                     id="confirm-contract-warning"
-                    class="mb-2"
+                    class="mb-2 border border-red-500 border-dashed p-2 text-xs font-bold text-red-500"
                     style="visibility: hidden"
-                >
-                    <div
-                        class="border border-red-500 border-dashed p-2 text-xs font-bold text-red-500"
-                    >
-                        WARNING: The recipient is a smart contract. Sending ETH
-                        or tokens directly to a contract may result in permanent
-                        loss of funds.
-                    </div>
-                </div>
+                ></div>
                 <div
                     id="confirm-burn-warning"
                     class="mb-2"
@@ -690,23 +684,20 @@
                     Your balance does not cover this amount plus the network
                     fee. Please go back and send a smaller amount.
                 </div>
+                <!-- Its sentence names the network's native token, so show()
+                in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
                 <div
                     id="confirm-gas-error"
                     class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 text-xs"
                     style="visibility: hidden"
-                >
-                    You do not have enough ETH to pay the network fee for this
-                    transfer. Please add ETH to this address and try again.
-                </div>
+                ></div>
+                <!-- Its sentence names why the fee could not be estimated,
+                so show() in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
                 <div
                     id="confirm-fee-unknown-error"
                     class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 text-xs"
                     style="visibility: hidden"
-                >
-                    The network fee could not be estimated, so this transaction
-                    cannot be checked against your balance. Please go back and
-                    try again.
-                </div>
+                ></div>
                 <div class="mb-2">
                     <label class="block mb-1 text-xs">Password</label>
                     <input
@@ -1563,7 +1554,7 @@
                     with extreme caution.
                 </div>
                 <p class="mb-2">
-                    <span id="approve-tx-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
+                    <span id="approve-tx-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
                     wants to send a transaction.
                 </p>
 
@@ -1633,7 +1624,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="approve-tx-error"
-                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.875rem]"
                     style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <div class="flex justify-between">
@@ -1664,7 +1655,7 @@
                     funds. Proceed with extreme caution.
                 </div>
                 <p class="mb-2">
-                    <span id="approve-sign-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
+                    <span id="approve-sign-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
                     wants you to sign a message.
                 </p>
 
@@ -1700,6 +1691,15 @@
                     ></div>
                 </div>
 
+                <div id="approve-sign-hex-section" class="mb-3 hidden">
+                    <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Raw data</div>
+                    <div
+                        id="approve-sign-hex"
+                        class="text-xs break-all"
+                        style="max-height: 6rem; overflow-y: auto"
+                    ></div>
+                </div>
+
                 <div class="mb-2">
                     <label class="block mb-1 text-xs">Password</label>
                     <input
@@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="approve-sign-error"
-                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.875rem]"
                     style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <div class="flex justify-between">
@@ -1742,7 +1742,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <p class="mb-2">
-                        <span id="approve-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
+                        <span id="approve-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
                         wants to connect to your wallet.
                     </p>
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">

src/popup/index.js

@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ function renderWalletList() {
 
 let refreshInFlight = false;
 
+// The ten-second refresh init() starts, stopped when the popup moves to the
+// recovery screen: there is no profile left to refresh.
+let refreshTimer = null;
+
 async function doRefreshAndRender() {
     if (refreshInFlight) return;
     refreshInFlight = true;
@@ -155,7 +159,28 @@ async function init() {
     // reported rather than being swallowed by the save queue
     // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362). Registered ahead of
     // the approval-window branch below too, since that window saves as well.
-    onSaveFailure(showSaveFailureBanner);
+    //
+    // Every save first reads the stored record and refuses it with the same
+    // check loadState() runs below. So a record that becomes unreadable while
+    // the popup is open is found by the next save, a navigation or the
+    // ten-second refresh, and gets the screen it would get at open
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373). Passing the recovery
+    // screen to showView() first leaves the current screen as any navigation
+    // does, so a phrase, key or password on it is wiped, and from then on
+    // showView() shows nothing else. A later save that fails the same way,
+    // such as a refresh already in flight, comes back here, where both calls
+    // see the screen already up and do nothing. Any other failed save is a
+    // read or write that failed, and gets the banner without changing the
+    // screen.
+    onSaveFailure((e) => {
+        if (e instanceof StateUnusableError) {
+            clearInterval(refreshTimer);
+            showView("state-recovery");
+            stateRecovery.show(e);
+        } else {
+            showSaveFailureBanner(e);
+        }
+    });
     try {
         await loadState();
     } catch (e) {
@@ -244,7 +269,7 @@ async function init() {
         renderWalletList();
         restoreView();
         doRefreshAndRender();
-        setInterval(doRefreshAndRender, 10000);
+        refreshTimer = setInterval(doRefreshAndRender, 10000);
     }
 }
 

src/popup/styles/main.css

@@ -64,3 +64,13 @@ body {
     white-space: nowrap;
     overflow-x: auto;
 }
+
+/* A personal message on the signature screen is laid out left to right in
+ * the order of its bytes. Without this, right-to-left characters in it move
+ * the characters around them: `5`, U+05C3, `00` would read as `500`
+ * followed by U+05C3. A paragraph separator (U+2029) ends this layout for
+ * the text after it, so src/popup/views/approval.js shows one as a mark. */
+.am-byte-order {
+    direction: ltr;
+    unicode-bidi: bidi-override;
+}

src/popup/views/addToken.js

@@ -28,9 +28,7 @@ function init(ctx) {
     $("btn-add-token-confirm").addEventListener("click", async () => {
         const contractAddr = $("add-token-address").value.trim();
         if (!contractAddr || !contractAddr.startsWith("0x")) {
-            showFlash(
-                "Please enter a valid contract address starting with 0x.",
-            );
+            showFlash("Enter a valid contract address starting with 0x.");
             return;
         }
         const already = state.trackedTokens.find(
@@ -71,8 +69,15 @@ function init(ctx) {
             require("./addressDetail").show();
         } catch (e) {
             const detail = e.shortMessage || e.message || String(e);
-            log.errorf("Token lookup failed for", contractAddr, detail);
-            showFlash(detail);
+            log.errorf("Adding token failed for", contractAddr, detail);
+            // lookupTokenInfo() rejects a contract with a one-line message
+            // starting "Not a valid ERC-20 token". Any other error, such as a
+            // failed save, can be far longer, so it is only logged.
+            showFlash(
+                detail.startsWith("Not a valid ERC-20 token")
+                    ? detail
+                    : "Could not add the token.",
+            );
             infoEl.textContent = "";
             infoEl.style.visibility = "hidden";
         }

src/popup/views/addWallet.js

@@ -142,15 +142,13 @@ function validatePassword() {
 async function importMnemonic(ctx) {
     const mnemonic = $("wallet-mnemonic").value.trim();
     if (!mnemonic) {
-        showFlash("Enter a recovery phrase or press the die to generate one.");
+        showFlash("Enter a recovery phrase, or press the die.");
         return;
     }
     const words = mnemonic.split(/\s+/);
     if (words.length !== 12 && words.length !== 24) {
         showFlash(
-            "Recovery phrase must be 12 or 24 words. You entered " +
-                words.length +
-                ".",
+            "Recovery phrase must be 12 or 24 words, not " + words.length + ".",
         );
         return;
     }
@@ -163,14 +161,12 @@ async function importMnemonic(ctx) {
     const { xpub, firstAddress } = hdWalletFromMnemonic(mnemonic);
     const xpubDup = findWalletByXpub(xpub);
     if (xpubDup) {
-        showFlash(
-            "This recovery phrase is already added (" + xpubDup.name + ").",
-        );
+        showFlash("This recovery phrase is already added.");
         return;
     }
     const addrDup = findWalletByAddress(firstAddress);
     if (addrDup) {
-        showFlash("Address already exists in wallet (" + addrDup.name + ").");
+        showFlash("Address already exists in a wallet.");
         return;
     }
     const encrypted = await encryptWithPassword(mnemonic, pw);
@@ -229,9 +225,7 @@ async function importPrivateKey(ctx) {
     if (!pw) return;
     const duplicate = findWalletByAddress(addr);
     if (duplicate) {
-        showFlash(
-            "This address already exists in wallet (" + duplicate.name + ").",
-        );
+        showFlash("This address already exists in a wallet.");
         return;
     }
     const encrypted = await encryptWithPassword(key, pw);
@@ -258,36 +252,29 @@ async function importXprvKey(ctx) {
         return;
     }
     if (!isValidXprv(xprv)) {
-        showFlash(
-            "That extended private key is not valid. Please check it and try again.",
-        );
+        showFlash("That extended private key is not valid.");
         return;
     }
     if (!isMasterExtendedKey(xprv)) {
-        showFlash(
-            "That is an account-level or child key, which cannot be imported. " +
-                "Please paste the master extended private key for the wallet.",
-        );
+        showFlash("Please paste the master key, not a child key.");
         return;
     }
     let result;
     try {
         result = hdWalletFromXprv(xprv);
     } catch {
-        showFlash(
-            "That extended private key is not valid. Please check it and try again.",
-        );
+        showFlash("That extended private key is not valid.");
         return;
     }
     const { xpub, firstAddress } = result;
     const xpubDup = findWalletByXpub(xpub);
     if (xpubDup) {
-        showFlash("This key is already added (" + xpubDup.name + ").");
+        showFlash("This key is already added.");
         return;
     }
     const addrDup = findWalletByAddress(firstAddress);
     if (addrDup) {
-        showFlash("Address already exists in wallet (" + addrDup.name + ").");
+        showFlash("Address already exists in a wallet.");
         return;
     }
     const pw = validatePassword();

src/popup/views/addressDetail.js

@@ -3,10 +3,11 @@ const {
     showView,
     showFlash,
     balanceLinesForAddress,
-    addressDotHtml,
+    txCounterpartyHtml,
     addressTitle,
     escapeHtml,
     displaySymbol,
+    nativeCurrency,
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     goBack,
@@ -153,6 +154,7 @@ async function loadTransactions(address) {
         const rawTxs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
             address,
             state.blockscoutUrl,
+            nativeCurrency(),
         );
         const result = filterTransactions(rawTxs, {
             hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
@@ -233,16 +235,13 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
         // is shown whole; the title or ENS name, where there is one, names
         // it on the line above rather than replacing it.
         const nameStr = escapeHtml(title || ensName || "");
-        const addrStr = escapeHtml(counterparty);
-        const dot = addressDotHtml(counterparty);
         const err = tx.isError ? " (failed)" : "";
         const opacity = tx.isError ? " opacity:0.5;" : "";
         const ago = escapeHtml(timeAgo(tx.timestamp));
         const iso = escapeHtml(isoDate(tx.timestamp));
         html += `<div class="tx-row py-2 border-b border-border-light text-xs cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover" data-tx="${i}" style="${opacity}">`;
         html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="text-muted" title="${iso}">${ago}</span><span>${dirLabel}${err}</span></div>`;
-        html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="flex items-center">${dot}${nameStr}</span><span>${amountStr}</span></div>`;
-        html += `<div class="am-address">${addrStr}</div>`;
+        html += txCounterpartyHtml(counterparty, nameStr, amountStr);
         html += `</div>`;
         i++;
     }

src/popup/views/addressToken.js

@@ -6,10 +6,11 @@ const {
     showView,
     showFlash,
     flashCopyFeedback,
-    addressDotHtml,
+    txCounterpartyHtml,
     addressTitle,
     escapeHtml,
     displaySymbol,
+    nativeCurrency,
     balanceLine,
     unknownableAmount,
     renderAddressHtml,
@@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ function show() {
     let symbol, amount, price;
     const knownToken = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(tokenId.toLowerCase());
     if (tokenId === "ETH") {
-        symbol = "ETH";
+        symbol = nativeCurrency();
         amount = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0");
         price = getPrice("ETH");
     } else {
@@ -226,6 +227,7 @@ async function loadTransactions(address, tokenId) {
         const rawTxs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
             address,
             state.blockscoutUrl,
+            nativeCurrency(),
         );
         const result = filterTransactions(rawTxs, {
             hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
@@ -309,16 +311,13 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
         // is shown whole; the title or ENS name, where there is one, names
         // it on the line above rather than replacing it.
         const nameStr = escapeHtml(title || ensName || "");
-        const addrStr = escapeHtml(counterparty);
-        const dot = addressDotHtml(counterparty);
         const err = tx.isError ? " (failed)" : "";
         const opacity = tx.isError ? " opacity:0.5;" : "";
         const ago = escapeHtml(timeAgo(tx.timestamp));
         const iso = escapeHtml(isoDate(tx.timestamp));
         html += `<div class="tx-row py-2 border-b border-border-light text-xs cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover" data-tx="${i}" style="${opacity}">`;
         html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="text-muted" title="${iso}">${ago}</span><span>${dirLabel}${err}</span></div>`;
-        html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="flex items-center">${dot}${nameStr}</span><span>${amountStr}</span></div>`;
-        html += `<div class="am-address">${addrStr}</div>`;
+        html += txCounterpartyHtml(counterparty, nameStr, amountStr);
         html += `</div>`;
         i++;
     }

src/popup/views/approval.js

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 const {
     $,
     addressTitle,
+    CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT,
     escapeHtml,
     showView,
     showError,
@@ -8,6 +9,8 @@ const {
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     onViewLeave,
+    formatFee,
+    nativeCurrency,
 } = require("./helpers");
 const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { networkByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
@@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ const {
 } = require("ethers");
 const { getPrice, formatUsd } = require("../../shared/prices");
 const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../../shared/constants");
+const { INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS } = require("../../shared/symbolSpoof");
 const {
     resolveTokenDecimals,
     resolveTokenSymbol,
@@ -207,7 +211,7 @@ function showPhishingWarning(elementId, isPhishing) {
 // and the nonce. The background compares every one of them against the signed
 // artifact, so every one of them has to be on the screen — a number that is
 // verified but never displayed is verified against nothing the user agreed to.
-function showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice) {
+function showTxFee(approvedTx) {
     const network = networkByChainId(approvedTx.chainId);
     $("approve-tx-network").textContent = network
         ? network.name
@@ -215,12 +219,9 @@ function showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice) {
 
     const gasLimit = BigInt(approvedTx.gasLimit);
     const feePerGas = BigInt(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas || approvedTx.gasPrice);
-    const maxFeeEth = formatTxValue(formatEther(gasLimit * feePerGas));
-    const usdStr = formatUsd(
-        ethPrice ? parseFloat(maxFeeEth) * ethPrice : null,
-    );
-    $("approve-tx-fee").textContent =
-        maxFeeEth + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
+    // Through formatFee(), as the confirmation screen's fee is, so the same
+    // fee reads the same on both.
+    $("approve-tx-fee").textContent = formatFee(gasLimit * feePerGas);
 
     let detail =
         gasLimit.toString() +
@@ -307,7 +308,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
         };
     }
 
-    $("approve-tx-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
+    $("approve-tx-origin").textContent = details.origin;
     $("approve-tx-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(details.approvedFrom);
 
     // Show token symbol next to contract address if known
@@ -320,7 +321,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
         toHtml += approvalAddressHtml(toAddr);
         $("approve-tx-to").innerHTML = toHtml;
     } else {
-        $("approve-tx-to").innerHTML = escapeHtml("(contract creation)");
+        $("approve-tx-to").innerHTML = escapeHtml(CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT);
     }
 
     const ethValueFormatted = formatTxValue(
@@ -330,9 +331,12 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     const ethUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(ethValueFormatted) * ethPrice : null;
     const usdStr = formatUsd(ethUsd);
     $("approve-tx-value").textContent =
-        ethValueFormatted + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
+        ethValueFormatted +
+        " " +
+        nativeCurrency() +
+        (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
 
-    showTxFee(approvedTx, ethPrice);
+    showTxFee(approvedTx);
 
     // Decode calldata (reuse decoded from above)
     const decodedEl = $("approve-tx-decoded");
@@ -381,20 +385,48 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     );
 }
 
+// Whether a personal message is hex by the rule signing reads it with:
+// signing takes getBytes(message), which throws on anything else.
+function isHexMessage(message) {
+    try {
+        getBytes(message);
+        return true;
+    } catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+
+// The text the hex message's bytes decode to as UTF-8, or null when they are
+// not UTF-8. The caller has checked that the message is hex.
 function decodeHexMessage(hex) {
     try {
-        const bytes = Uint8Array.from(
-            hex
-                .slice(2)
-                .match(/.{1,2}/g)
-                .map((b) => parseInt(b, 16)),
-        );
-        return toUtf8String(bytes);
+        return toUtf8String(getBytes(hex));
     } catch {
         return null;
     }
 }
 
+// A character shown as a bordered U+XXXX mark.
+function codePointMark(c) {
+    const code = c.codePointAt(0).toString(16).toUpperCase();
+    return `<span class="border border-border">U+${code.padStart(4, "0")}</span>`;
+}
+
+// The text as HTML, with each character that paints nothing (zero-width and
+// bidirectional characters, variation selectors and Hangul fillers among
+// them), each control character and each line or paragraph separator
+// (U+2028, U+2029) shown as a mark. A line feed is shown as a line break.
+// Left in the text, a paragraph separator would end the byte-order layout
+// for everything after it. The marks are plain ASCII, so the second pass
+// leaves them be.
+function markInvisibleCharacters(text) {
+    return escapeHtml(text)
+        .replace(INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS, codePointMark)
+        .replace(/[\p{Cc}\p{Zl}\p{Zp}]/gu, (c) =>
+            c === "\n" ? "<br>" : codePointMark(c),
+        );
+}
+
 // The type ethers will sign typed data as. ethers does not read the page's
 // `primaryType`: it takes the one struct in `types` that no other struct
 // refers to. Throws when the types name no such single struct, which ethers
@@ -646,7 +678,7 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
     pendingSignParams = sp;
     pendingSignFrom = details.approvedFrom;
 
-    $("approve-sign-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
+    $("approve-sign-origin").textContent = details.origin;
     $("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(
         details.approvedFrom,
     );
@@ -658,15 +690,33 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
         ? "Typed data (EIP-712)"
         : "Personal message";
 
+    // A personal message is signed as the bytes its hex encodes, so the hex
+    // is shown as well as any text it decodes to, and that text is laid out
+    // left to right in the order of its bytes. Signing reads the bytes from
+    // the hex, so a message that is not hex cannot be signed: it is shown as
+    // the text it is, and refused.
+    let refusal = null;
+    $("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.add("hidden");
+    $("approve-sign-message").classList.toggle("am-byte-order", !isTyped);
     if (isTyped) {
         $("approve-sign-message").innerHTML = formatTypedDataHtml(sp.typedData);
-    } else {
+        refusal = typedDataRefusal(sp);
+    } else if (isHexMessage(sp.message)) {
         const decoded = decodeHexMessage(sp.message);
         if (decoded !== null) {
-            $("approve-sign-message").textContent = decoded;
+            $("approve-sign-message").innerHTML =
+                markInvisibleCharacters(decoded);
         } else {
-            $("approve-sign-message").textContent = sp.message;
+            $("approve-sign-message").textContent = "This message is not text.";
         }
+        $("approve-sign-hex").textContent = sp.message;
+        $("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.remove("hidden");
+    } else {
+        $("approve-sign-message").innerHTML = markInvisibleCharacters(
+            sp.message,
+        );
+        refusal =
+            "This message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed.";
     }
 
     // Display danger warning for eth_sign (raw hash signing)
@@ -688,7 +738,6 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
 
     showView("approve-sign");
     attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-sign");
-    const refusal = typedDataRefusal(sp);
     if (refusal) {
         showError("approve-sign-error", refusal);
         $("btn-approve-sign").disabled = true;
@@ -733,7 +782,7 @@ async function show(id) {
         "approve-site-phishing-warning",
         details.isPhishingDomain,
     );
-    $("approve-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
+    $("approve-origin").textContent = details.origin;
     $("approve-address").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(state.activeAddress);
     attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-site");
     $("approve-remember").checked = state.rememberSiteChoice;

src/popup/views/confirmTx.js

@@ -11,10 +11,12 @@ const {
     addressTitle,
     escapeHtml,
     displaySymbol,
+    nativeCurrency,
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     goBack,
     onViewLeave,
+    formatFee,
 } = require("./helpers");
 const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
@@ -31,6 +33,9 @@ const {
     transferAmountUnits,
 } = require("../../shared/transferAmount");
 const { assertWithinCeilings } = require("../../shared/approvalVerify");
+// The balance lines, the fee reserve and the insufficient-balance messages go
+// through it, as the approval screen's amounts do.
+const { truncateAmountNeverZero } = require("../../shared/amountDisplay");
 const {
     CODES,
     FEE_PENDING,
@@ -86,7 +91,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
     // The raw symbol is the price-table key; the capped one is what the
     // screen says. Truncating before the lookup would silently drop the
     // price of any token whose symbol is long enough to be capped.
-    const rawSymbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : "ETH";
+    const rawSymbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : nativeCurrency();
     const symbol = displaySymbol(rawSymbol);
 
     // Transaction type
@@ -94,7 +99,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
         $("confirm-type").textContent =
             "ERC-20 token transfer (" + symbol + ")";
     } else {
-        $("confirm-type").textContent = "Native ETH transfer";
+        $("confirm-type").textContent = "Native " + symbol + " transfer";
     }
 
     // Token contract section (ERC-20 only)
@@ -150,11 +155,17 @@ function show(txInfo) {
         $("confirm-balance").textContent =
             bal == null
                 ? "unknown (" + symbol + ")"
-                : valueWithUsd(bal + " " + symbol, balUsd);
+                : valueWithUsd(
+                      truncateAmountNeverZero(bal) + " " + symbol,
+                      balUsd,
+                  );
     } else {
         const bal = txInfo.balance || "0";
         const balUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(bal) * ethPrice : null;
-        $("confirm-balance").textContent = valueWithUsd(bal + " ETH", balUsd);
+        $("confirm-balance").textContent = valueWithUsd(
+            truncateAmountNeverZero(bal) + " " + symbol,
+            balUsd,
+        );
     }
 
     // Check for warnings (synchronous local checks)
@@ -187,6 +198,32 @@ function show(txInfo) {
     // estimate landing later never moves anything.
     $("confirm-amount-fee-error").classList.toggle("hidden", isErc20);
     $("confirm-gas-error").classList.toggle("hidden", !isErc20);
+    $("confirm-gas-error").textContent =
+        "You do not have enough " +
+        nativeCurrency() +
+        " to pay the network fee for this transfer. Please add " +
+        nativeCurrency() +
+        " to this address and try again.";
+
+    // Shown later, once checkRecipientHistory() finds a contract.
+    $("confirm-contract-warning").textContent =
+        "WARNING: The recipient is a smart contract. Sending " +
+        nativeCurrency() +
+        " or tokens directly to a contract may result in permanent loss of" +
+        " funds.";
+
+    // The fee-unknown message names its cause, which is also known here.
+    // Without the token's scale estimateGas() cannot encode the transfer, so
+    // the estimate fails every time and going back cannot help; any other
+    // failure may clear on a retry.
+    $("confirm-fee-unknown-error").textContent =
+        isErc20 && txInfo.tokenDecimals == null
+            ? "The network fee could not be estimated, because this wallet" +
+              " does not know how many decimal places this token uses, so" +
+              " this transaction cannot be sent."
+            : "The network fee could not be estimated, so this transaction" +
+              " cannot be checked against your balance. Please go back and" +
+              " try again.";
 
     renderValidation(txInfo);
 
@@ -222,7 +259,9 @@ function show(txInfo) {
 // touches already occupies its space, so re-running it never moves anything.
 function renderValidation(txInfo) {
     const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH";
-    const symbol = isErc20 ? displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?") : "ETH";
+    const symbol = isErc20
+        ? displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?")
+        : nativeCurrency();
 
     const { canSend, codes } = validateTransfer({
         isErc20,
@@ -234,7 +273,8 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
     });
 
     // Messages carrying the user's own numbers are built here; the fixed
-    // sentences live in the reserved elements in index.html.
+    // sentences live in the reserved elements in index.html, except the
+    // gas and fee-unknown ones, which show() sets.
     const messages = [];
     if (codes.includes(CODES.AMOUNT_INVALID)) {
         messages.push("Please enter a valid amount to send.");
@@ -249,7 +289,7 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
                 : "Insufficient " +
                       symbol +
                       " balance. You have " +
-                      txInfo.tokenBalance +
+                      truncateAmountNeverZero(txInfo.tokenBalance) +
                       " " +
                       symbol +
                       " but are trying to send " +
@@ -262,10 +302,14 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
     if (codes.includes(CODES.INSUFFICIENT_ETH)) {
         messages.push(
             "Insufficient balance. You have " +
-                txInfo.balance +
-                " ETH but are trying to send " +
+                truncateAmountNeverZero(txInfo.balance || "0") +
+                " " +
+                symbol +
+                " but are trying to send " +
                 txInfo.amount +
-                " ETH.",
+                " " +
+                symbol +
+                ".",
         );
     }
 
@@ -305,14 +349,6 @@ function setVisible(id, visible) {
     $(id).style.visibility = visible ? "visible" : "hidden";
 }
 
-// A fee in wei as an ETH string, truncated to 6 decimal places.
-function formatFeeEth(wei) {
-    const parts = formatEther(wei).split(".");
-    const dec =
-        parts.length > 1 ? parts[1].slice(0, 6).replace(/0+$/, "") || "0" : "0";
-    return parts[0] + "." + dec + " ETH";
-}
-
 async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
     try {
         const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
@@ -359,33 +395,29 @@ async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
         // flight; a stale fee must not reach the screen or the balance check.
         if (pendingTx !== txInfo) return;
 
-        const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
-        const usd = (wei) =>
-            ethPrice ? parseFloat(formatEther(wei)) * ethPrice : null;
-
+        // The fee line goes through formatFee(), as the approval screen's
+        // does, so the same fee reads the same on both.
         if (estimateWei !== null && estimateWei < gasCostWei) {
-            $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = valueWithUsd(
-                "~" + formatFeeEth(estimateWei),
-                usd(estimateWei),
-            );
+            $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = "~" + formatFee(estimateWei);
             $("confirm-fee-reserve").textContent =
-                "up to " + formatFeeEth(gasCostWei) + " reserved";
+                "up to " +
+                truncateAmountNeverZero(formatEther(gasCostWei)) +
+                " " +
+                nativeCurrency() +
+                " reserved";
             setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", true);
         } else {
             // No spread to report: either there is no estimate, or the node
             // quotes a gas price at or above maxFeePerGas, so the expected
             // cost is not below the reserve. Show the reserve alone.
-            $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = valueWithUsd(
-                formatFeeEth(gasCostWei),
-                usd(gasCostWei),
-            );
+            $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = formatFee(gasCostWei);
             setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", false);
         }
         feeStatus = FEE_KNOWN;
         feeWei = gasCostWei;
         renderValidation(txInfo);
     } catch (e) {
-        log.errorf("gas estimation failed:", e.message);
+        log.errorf("gas estimation failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
         if (pendingTx !== txInfo) return;
         $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = "Unable to estimate";
         setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", false);

src/popup/views/deleteAddress.js

@@ -87,7 +87,8 @@ function recoveryPathText(wallet) {
 // AddressDetail, followed by the USD total when there is one to give — no
 // total line at all on testnet or before the first price fetch, and no figure
 // when every holding here is one with no price, since "$0.00" directly under
-// "This address holds a balance." is a contradiction.
+// "This address holds a balance." is a contradiction. A token holding below
+// 0.000001 does not count, as the lines below leave it out.
 function balanceWarningHtml(addr) {
     if (!addressHoldsFunds(addr)) return " ";
     const line = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));

src/popup/views/helpers.js

@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@
 // escapeHtml lives in src/shared/html.js, where the escape and the
 // reasoning behind it are; it is re-exported below so views keep importing
 // it from here.
+const { formatEther } = require("ethers");
+const {
+    truncateAmountNeverZero,
+    isBelowOneMillionth,
+} = require("../../shared/amountDisplay");
 const { DEBUG } = require("../../shared/constants");
 const { escapeHtml } = require("../../shared/html");
 const { isDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
@@ -47,9 +52,8 @@ const VIEWS = [
     "export-privkey",
     "show-phrase",
     // Shown by src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js when the stored profile
-    // cannot be read. It is never reached through showView() — by then the
-    // state singleton this file writes on every navigation refuses to be read
-    // — but it is listed so that every view-hiding loop covers it.
+    // cannot be read, never by showView() (see there), but listed so that
+    // every view-hiding loop covers it.
     "state-recovery",
 ];
 
@@ -80,12 +84,28 @@ function hideError(id) {
     el.style.visibility = "hidden";
 }
 
+// Set when src/popup/index.js passes the recovery screen to showView(), and
+// never cleared. Kept in memory for this popup's life, never in
+// state.currentView, which is saved: a popup opened later must not inherit it.
+let stateRecoveryShown = false;
+
 function showView(name) {
+    // The recovery screen, once up, is never replaced: work still running
+    // when it went up, such as a transaction wait, must not take the user off
+    // it or clear what they exported or typed there
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373).
+    if (stateRecoveryShown) return;
     const leaving = state.currentView;
     if (leaving && leaving !== name) {
         const onLeave = viewLeaveHandlers.get(leaving);
         if (onLeave) onLeave();
     }
+    // Passed here only so the screen it replaces is left like any other;
+    // stateRecovery.show() raises it, and it is never the current view.
+    if (name === "state-recovery") {
+        stateRecoveryShown = true;
+        return;
+    }
     for (const v of VIEWS) {
         const el = document.getElementById(`view-${v}`);
         if (el) {
@@ -223,15 +243,19 @@ function clearFlash() {
         flashTimer = null;
     }
     $("flash-msg").textContent = "";
+    $("flash-msg").title = "";
 }
 
+// The flash line reserves exactly one line, and a message that wrapped would
+// push the screen below it down (README, No Layout Shift). So #flash-msg never
+// wraps: text too long for the line is cut with an ellipsis, and the whole
+// message is also put in the line's title. Write messages to fit, at most 50
+// characters, so none is cut.
 function showFlash(msg, duration = 2000) {
     clearFlash();
     $("flash-msg").textContent = msg;
-    flashTimer = setTimeout(() => {
-        $("flash-msg").textContent = "";
-        flashTimer = null;
-    }, duration);
+    $("flash-msg").title = msg;
+    flashTimer = setTimeout(clearFlash, duration);
 }
 
 // A stored token balance as a number, or null when there is no number in it.
@@ -243,6 +267,30 @@ function unknownableAmount(balance) {
     return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
 }
 
+// The active network's native token symbol, `ETH` on mainnet and `SepoliaETH`
+// on Sepolia, as src/shared/networks.js names it. Every screen labels a native
+// amount with this. The "ETH" that state.selectedToken and txInfo.token hold
+// is the native token's id, not its label, and stays "ETH" on every network.
+function nativeCurrency() {
+    return currentNetwork().nativeCurrency;
+}
+
+// A network fee in wei as the confirmation and approval screens both show it:
+// the ETH figure through truncateAmountNeverZero(), then its USD value when the
+// ETH price is known. The USD value is of the exact fee, not of the truncated
+// figure.
+function formatFee(wei) {
+    const eth = formatEther(wei);
+    const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
+    const usd = ethPrice ? formatUsd(parseFloat(eth) * ethPrice) : "";
+    return (
+        truncateAmountNeverZero(eth) +
+        " " +
+        nativeCurrency() +
+        (usd ? " (" + usd + ")" : "")
+    );
+}
+
 // One row of the balance list: symbol, quantity, fiat value.
 //
 // `symbol` is the ERC-20's own symbol() as the block explorer reported it,
@@ -281,13 +329,16 @@ function balanceLine(symbol, amount, price, tokenId) {
 
 function balanceLinesForAddress(addr, trackedTokens, showZero) {
     let html = balanceLine(
-        "ETH",
+        nativeCurrency(),
         parseFloat(addr.balance || "0"),
         getPrice("ETH"),
         "ETH",
     );
     const seen = new Set();
     for (const t of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
+        // A holding below 0.000001 is not listed, tracked or not. A tracked
+        // token then gets the zero row below while showZero is on.
+        if (isBelowOneMillionth(t.balance)) continue;
         // A null balance is a holding of an unstatable amount, not a holding
         // of zero, so the show-zero setting has no say over it: hiding it
         // would be asserting the zero nobody established. Anything that does
@@ -318,14 +369,16 @@ function balanceLinesForAddress(addr, trackedTokens, showZero) {
 }
 
 // Whether an address holds anything at all: ETH or any ERC-20 the wallet
-// knows about. Deliberately unrounded — the rendered lines round to four
-// decimals, so a dust balance displays as 0.0000 while still being real
-// money at a real address. Callers that warn about holdings must ask this,
-// not the rendered figure.
+// knows about, except a token holding below 0.000001, which the balance list
+// under the remove-address warning leaves out too. Deliberately unrounded —
+// the rendered lines round to four decimals, so a dust balance displays as
+// 0.0000 while still being real money at a real address. Callers that warn
+// about holdings must ask this, not the rendered figure.
 function addressHoldsFunds(addr) {
     if (!addr) return false;
     if (parseFloat(addr.balance || "0") > 0) return true;
     for (const t of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
+        if (isBelowOneMillionth(t.balance)) continue;
         // A null balance is a holding whose amount could not be stated —
         // balances.js drops a row of zero base units before the scale is
         // consulted, so a row that survived with no quantity is holding
@@ -404,6 +457,29 @@ function addressTitle(address, wallets) {
     return null;
 }
 
+// What every recipient line and history row says for a transaction with no
+// `to`. Such a transaction creates a contract, so there is no address to show,
+// and a blank line on these screens reads as a rendering fault.
+const CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT =
+    "This transaction creates a new contract. It has no recipient.";
+
+// The last two lines of a transaction history row: the counterparty's colour
+// dot and name beside the amount, then its full address. A contract creation
+// the user sent has no counterparty (its `to` is ""), so its row has the
+// amount alone and the contract creation sentence in place of the address.
+function txCounterpartyHtml(address, nameHtml, amountHtml) {
+    if (!address) {
+        return (
+            `<div class="flex justify-between"><span></span><span>${amountHtml}</span></div>` +
+            `<div>${escapeHtml(CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT)}</div>`
+        );
+    }
+    return (
+        `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="flex items-center">${addressDotHtml(address)}${nameHtml}</span><span>${amountHtml}</span></div>` +
+        `<div class="am-address">${escapeHtml(address)}</div>`
+    );
+}
+
 // Render an address with color dot, optional ENS name, optional title,
 // and optional truncation. Title and ENS are shown as bold labels above
 // the full address.
@@ -610,11 +686,15 @@ module.exports = {
     balanceLinesForAddress,
     addressHoldsFunds,
     unknownableAmount,
+    nativeCurrency,
+    formatFee,
     addressColor,
     addressDotHtml,
     escapeHtml,
     displaySymbol,
     addressTitle,
+    CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT,
+    txCounterpartyHtml,
     formatAddressHtml,
     renderAddressHtml,
     copyableHtml,

src/popup/views/home.js

@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ const {
     isoDate,
     timeAgo,
     addressDotHtml,
+    txCounterpartyHtml,
     addressTitle,
     escapeHtml,
     displaySymbol,
+    nativeCurrency,
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     pushCurrentView,
@@ -67,7 +69,7 @@ function renderTotalValue() {
         return;
     }
     const ethBal = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0");
-    const ethStr = ethBal.toFixed(4) + " ETH";
+    const ethStr = ethBal.toFixed(4) + " " + nativeCurrency();
     const ethUsd = ethPrice ? " (" + formatUsd(ethBal * ethPrice) + ")" : "";
     el.textContent = ethStr + ethUsd;
 
@@ -122,16 +124,13 @@ function renderHomeTxList(ctx) {
         // names it on the line above rather than replacing it.
         const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets);
         const titleStr = title ? escapeHtml(title) : "";
-        const addrStr = escapeHtml(counterparty);
-        const dot = addressDotHtml(counterparty);
         const err = tx.isError ? " (failed)" : "";
         const opacity = tx.isError ? " opacity:0.5;" : "";
         const ago = escapeHtml(timeAgo(tx.timestamp));
         const iso = escapeHtml(isoDate(tx.timestamp));
         html += `<div class="home-tx-row py-2 border-b border-border-light text-xs cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover" data-tx="${i}" style="${opacity}">`;
         html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="text-muted" title="${iso}">${ago}</span><span>${dirLabel}${err}</span></div>`;
-        html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="flex items-center">${dot}${titleStr}</span><span>${amountStr}</span></div>`;
-        html += `<div class="am-address">${addrStr}</div>`;
+        html += txCounterpartyHtml(counterparty, titleStr, amountStr);
         html += `</div>`;
         i++;
     }
@@ -184,7 +183,11 @@ async function loadHomeTxs(ctx) {
 
     try {
         const fetches = allAddresses.map((addr) =>
-            fetchRecentTransactions(addr, state.blockscoutUrl),
+            fetchRecentTransactions(
+                addr,
+                state.blockscoutUrl,
+                nativeCurrency(),
+            ),
         );
         const results = await Promise.all(fetches);
 

src/popup/views/send.js

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ const {
     showFlash,
     addressTitle,
     displaySymbol,
+    escapeHtml,
+    nativeCurrency,
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     goBack,
@@ -16,6 +18,10 @@ const { resolveTokenDecimals } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
 const { resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
 const { isLowHolderCount } = require("../../shared/holders");
 const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("../../shared/symbolSpoof");
+const {
+    truncateAmountNeverZero,
+    isBelowOneMillionth,
+} = require("../../shared/amountDisplay");
 const { getAddress } = require("ethers");
 
 const ZERO_ADDRESS = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
@@ -63,13 +69,13 @@ function validateToAddress(value) {
             if (checksummed !== v) {
                 return {
                     valid: false,
-                    error: "Address checksum is invalid. Please double-check the address.",
+                    error: "Address checksum is invalid. Check the address.",
                 };
             }
         } catch {
             return {
                 valid: false,
-                error: "Address checksum is invalid. Please double-check the address.",
+                error: "Address checksum is invalid. Check the address.",
             };
         }
     }
@@ -120,11 +126,15 @@ function updateToValidation() {
 
 function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
     const sel = $("send-token");
-    sel.innerHTML = '<option value="ETH">ETH</option>';
+    sel.innerHTML = `<option value="ETH">${escapeHtml(nativeCurrency())}</option>`;
     const fraudSet = new Set(
         (state.fraudContracts || []).map((a) => a.toLowerCase()),
     );
     for (const t of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
+        // A holding below 0.000001 is left out, as the balance lists leave it
+        // out. Its token's own screen can still send it: there
+        // state.selectedToken picks the token, not this list.
+        if (isBelowOneMillionth(t.balance)) continue;
         if (isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address)) continue;
         if (fraudSet.has(t.address.toLowerCase())) continue;
         // An unknown holder count does not withhold a token the user holds:
@@ -138,6 +148,50 @@ function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
     }
 }
 
+// The token balance and scale the Send screen states and hands the
+// confirmation screen, so the two screens describe the holding the same way.
+//
+// The scale is resolved the same way balances.js resolved the scale it
+// DISPLAYED this token's balance at: bundled list, then the user's tracked
+// tokens, then the explorer. The stored tokenBalances[].decimals is the
+// explorer's own answer alone, so reading it raw carries a null forward for a
+// token the wallet does know the scale of — and displayedDecimals() then throws
+// inside estimateGas(), which the confirmation screen reports as an unestimable
+// fee. Unsendable, over a scale that was never in doubt
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349). Still null when nothing
+// knows: no fallback.
+//
+// Resolved WITH `wallets`, which balances.js does not pass: that adds
+// explorerDecimals()'s cross-address check, so a contract two addresses report
+// different scales for answers null rather than picking one. That check has to
+// apply here, because this scale encodes the transfer — it is carried forward
+// so the transfer is encoded with the number the user read rather than with
+// whatever the contract answers at signing time (see
+// src/shared/transferAmount.js). balances.js is formatting one explorer row at
+// fetch time and cannot consult a state it is in the middle of replacing.
+//
+// The two resolutions can therefore differ, and where they do, the stored
+// `balance` is a quantity computed at a scale this screen has just declined to
+// stand behind. Stating it would leave validateTransfer() checking the amount
+// against a number the wallet does not vouch for, so it is withdrawn: unknown
+// scale means unknown balance. It is null rather than "0": both screens state
+// an unknown balance as unknown, and validateTransfer() treats it as no balance
+// to spend from, which is the fail-closed side of an amount nobody can check.
+// Only a stored quantity is withdrawn: the "0" for a token that has no row at
+// all is an absence of holdings, which is true at every scale.
+function tokenBalanceAndDecimals(addr, token) {
+    const tb = (addr.tokenBalances || []).find(
+        (t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === token.toLowerCase(),
+    );
+    const tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(token, {
+        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
+        wallets: state.wallets,
+    });
+    if (!tb) return { tokenBalance: "0", tokenDecimals };
+    if (tokenDecimals === null) return { tokenBalance: null, tokenDecimals };
+    return { tokenBalance: tb.balance ?? null, tokenDecimals };
+}
+
 function updateSendBalance() {
     const addr = currentAddress();
     if (!addr) return;
@@ -150,24 +204,28 @@ function updateSendBalance() {
     const token = state.selectedToken || $("send-token").value;
     if (token === "ETH") {
         $("send-balance").textContent =
-            "Current balance: " + (addr.balance || "0") + " ETH";
+            "Current balance: " +
+            truncateAmountNeverZero(addr.balance || "0") +
+            " " +
+            nativeCurrency();
     } else {
-        const tb = (addr.tokenBalances || []).find(
-            (t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === token.toLowerCase(),
-        );
         const symbol = resolveSymbol(
             token,
             addr.tokenBalances,
             state.trackedTokens,
         );
-        // A null balance is a holding whose scale nothing knows. Saying "0"
-        // for it would be a claim about the amount; the send itself is
+        // A null balance is a holding whose scale is unknown. Saying a figure
+        // for it would be a claim about the amount, so it reads as the
+        // confirmation screen's balance line reads it; the send itself is
         // refused later by transferAmountUnits() for the same missing scale.
-        const bal = tb ? tb.balance : "0";
+        const bal = tokenBalanceAndDecimals(addr, token).tokenBalance;
         $("send-balance").textContent =
             bal == null
                 ? "Current balance: unknown (" + symbol + ")"
-                : "Current balance: " + bal + " " + symbol;
+                : "Current balance: " +
+                  truncateAmountNeverZero(bal) +
+                  " " +
+                  symbol;
     }
 }
 
@@ -211,7 +269,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
                 const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
                 const resolved = await provider.resolveName(to);
                 if (!resolved) {
-                    showFlash("Could not resolve " + to);
+                    showFlash("That ENS name has no address.");
                     return;
                 }
                 resolvedTo = resolved;
@@ -227,59 +285,17 @@ function init(_ctx) {
 
         let tokenSymbol = null;
         let tokenBalance = null;
-        // The scale the amount and the balance below are rendered at, carried
-        // forward so the transfer is encoded with the number the user read
-        // rather than with whatever the contract answers at signing time. See
-        // src/shared/transferAmount.js.
         let tokenDecimals = null;
         if (token !== "ETH") {
-            const tb = (addr.tokenBalances || []).find(
-                (t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === token.toLowerCase(),
-            );
             tokenSymbol = resolveSymbol(
                 token,
                 addr.tokenBalances,
                 state.trackedTokens,
             );
-            // null carried through rather than flattened to "0": the confirm
-            // screen states an unknown balance as unknown, and
-            // validateTransfer() treats it as no balance to spend from, which
-            // is the fail-closed side of an amount nobody can check.
-            tokenBalance = tb ? (tb.balance ?? null) : "0";
-            // Resolved the same way balances.js resolved the scale it
-            // DISPLAYED this token's balance at: bundled list, then the user's
-            // tracked tokens, then the explorer. The stored
-            // tokenBalances[].decimals is the explorer's own answer alone, so
-            // reading it raw carries a null forward for a token the wallet
-            // does know the scale of — and displayedDecimals() then throws
-            // inside estimateGas(), which the confirmation screen reports as
-            // an unestimable fee. Unsendable, over a scale that was never in
-            // doubt (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349).
-            // Still null when nothing knows: no fallback.
-            //
-            // Resolved WITH `wallets`, which balances.js does not pass: that
-            // adds explorerDecimals()'s cross-address check, so a contract two
-            // addresses report different scales for answers null rather than
-            // picking one. That check has to apply here, because this value
-            // encodes a transfer; balances.js is formatting one explorer row
-            // at fetch time and cannot consult a state it is in the middle of
-            // replacing.
-            tokenDecimals = resolveTokenDecimals(token, {
-                trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
-                wallets: state.wallets,
-            });
-            // The two resolutions can therefore differ, and where they do, the
-            // stored `balance` is a quantity computed at a scale this screen
-            // has just declined to stand behind. Stating it would leave
-            // validateTransfer() checking the amount against a number the
-            // wallet does not vouch for, and — since the unknown-balance path
-            // is gated on the balance, not on the scale — would leave the
-            // fee-estimate failure as the only thing on the confirmation
-            // screen, which says nothing about decimals. Unknown scale means
-            // unknown balance. Only a stored quantity is withdrawn: the "0"
-            // for a token that has no row at all is an absence of holdings,
-            // which is true at every scale.
-            if (tb && tokenDecimals === null) tokenBalance = null;
+            ({ tokenBalance, tokenDecimals } = tokenBalanceAndDecimals(
+                addr,
+                token,
+            ));
         }
 
         ctx.showConfirmTx({

src/popup/views/settings.js

@@ -16,7 +16,12 @@ const {
 } = require("../dustThreshold");
 const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { onChainSwitch } = require("../../shared/chainSwitch");
-const { log, debugFetch, setRuntimeDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
+const {
+    log,
+    debugFetch,
+    urlOrigin,
+    setRuntimeDebug,
+} = require("../../shared/log");
 const deleteWallet = require("./deleteWallet");
 const showPhrase = require("./showPhrase");
 const { walletHasRecoveryPhrase } = require("../../shared/wallet");
@@ -34,35 +39,35 @@ const { notify, sendMessage } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
 let versionClickCount = 0;
 let versionClickTimer = null;
 
-// One row per hostname, however many addresses or origins it appears under,
-// each with an [x] that hands it to onRemove.
-function renderSiteList(containerId, hostnames, onRemove) {
+// One row per site origin, however many addresses it appears under, each with
+// an [x] that hands it to onRemove.
+function renderSiteList(containerId, origins, onRemove) {
     const container = $(containerId);
-    const unique = [...new Set(hostnames)];
+    const unique = [...new Set(origins)];
     if (unique.length === 0) {
         container.innerHTML = '<p class="text-xs text-muted">None</p>';
         return;
     }
     let html = "";
-    unique.forEach((hostname) => {
+    unique.forEach((origin) => {
         html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`;
-        // A hostname the URL parser produced cannot carry a delimiter, so
+        // An origin the URL parser produced cannot carry a delimiter, so
         // this is escaped for the rule rather than for a known hole — the
         // rule being that nothing reaches innerHTML unescaped.
-        html += `<span>${escapeHtml(hostname)}</span>`;
-        html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-hostname="${escapeHtml(hostname)}">[x]</button>`;
+        html += `<span>${escapeHtml(origin)}</span>`;
+        html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-origin="${escapeHtml(origin)}">[x]</button>`;
         html += `</div>`;
     });
     container.innerHTML = html;
     container.querySelectorAll(".btn-remove-site").forEach((btn) => {
-        btn.addEventListener("click", () => onRemove(btn.dataset.hostname));
+        btn.addEventListener("click", () => onRemove(btn.dataset.origin));
     });
 }
 
-// Drop a hostname from a remembered site list under every address.
-function forgetHostname(siteMap, hostname) {
+// Drop a site origin from a remembered site list under every address.
+function forgetOrigin(siteMap, origin) {
     for (const addr of Object.keys(siteMap)) {
-        siteMap[addr] = siteMap[addr].filter((h) => h !== hostname);
+        siteMap[addr] = siteMap[addr].filter((o) => o !== origin);
         if (siteMap[addr].length === 0) {
             delete siteMap[addr];
         }
@@ -72,16 +77,16 @@ function forgetHostname(siteMap, hostname) {
 // Removing a site from Allowed Sites or Connected Sites disconnects it: it is
 // no longer allowed under any address, and the background ends its
 // connections approved without "Remember" and tells its open tabs.
-async function removeAllowedSite(hostname) {
-    forgetHostname(state.allowedSites, hostname);
+async function removeAllowedSite(origin) {
+    forgetOrigin(state.allowedSites, origin);
     await saveState();
-    notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", hostname });
+    notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", origin });
     await renderSiteLists();
 }
 
 // Removing a denied site only forgets the refusal; it connects nothing.
-async function removeDeniedSite(hostname) {
-    forgetHostname(state.deniedSites, hostname);
+async function removeDeniedSite(origin) {
+    forgetOrigin(state.deniedSites, origin);
     await saveState();
     await renderSiteLists();
 }
@@ -264,22 +269,19 @@ function init(ctx) {
             const json = await resp.json();
             if (json.error) {
                 log.errorf("RPC validation error:", json.error);
-                showFlash("Endpoint returned error: " + json.error.message);
+                showFlash("Endpoint returned an error.");
                 return;
             }
             const net = currentNetwork();
             if (json.result !== net.chainId) {
-                showFlash(
-                    "Wrong network (expected " +
-                        net.name +
-                        ", got chain " +
-                        json.result +
-                        ").",
-                );
+                showFlash("Wrong network: expected " + net.name + ".");
                 return;
             }
-        } catch (e) {
-            log.errorf("RPC validation fetch failed:", e.message);
+        } catch {
+            // Not the error's message: fetch puts the whole URL, password and
+            // key included, in the message of the error it throws for a URL
+            // with a user name and password or one it cannot parse.
+            log.errorf("RPC validation fetch failed:", urlOrigin(url));
             showFlash("Could not reach endpoint.");
             return;
         }
@@ -301,8 +303,9 @@ function init(ctx) {
                 showFlash("Endpoint returned HTTP " + resp.status + ".");
                 return;
             }
-        } catch (e) {
-            log.errorf("Blockscout validation failed:", e.message);
+        } catch {
+            // Not the error's message, as for the RPC check above.
+            log.errorf("Blockscout validation failed:", urlOrigin(url));
             showFlash("Could not reach endpoint.");
             return;
         }

src/popup/views/settingsAddToken.js

@@ -115,9 +115,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
     $("btn-settings-addtoken-manual").addEventListener("click", async () => {
         const addr = $("settings-addtoken-address").value.trim();
         if (!addr || !addr.startsWith("0x")) {
-            showFlash(
-                "Please enter a valid contract address starting with 0x.",
-            );
+            showFlash("Enter a valid contract address starting with 0x.");
             return;
         }
         if (isTracked(addr)) {
@@ -155,8 +153,15 @@ function init(_ctx) {
             ctx.doRefreshAndRender();
         } catch (e) {
             const detail = e.shortMessage || e.message || String(e);
-            log.errorf("Token lookup failed for", addr, detail);
-            showFlash(detail);
+            log.errorf("Adding token failed for", addr, detail);
+            // lookupTokenInfo() rejects a contract with a one-line message
+            // starting "Not a valid ERC-20 token". Any other error, such as a
+            // failed save, can be far longer, so it is only logged.
+            showFlash(
+                detail.startsWith("Not a valid ERC-20 token")
+                    ? detail
+                    : "Could not add the token.",
+            );
             infoEl.textContent = "";
             infoEl.style.visibility = "hidden";
         }

src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js

@@ -3,8 +3,10 @@
 // Everything else in the popup assumes a loaded profile: showView() reads and
 // writes the state singleton, every view renders from it, and the Settings
 // gear leads to a screen that does both. None of that is available here — by
-// the time this runs, loadState() has REFUSED, deliberately, and reading the
-// singleton throws (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
+// the time this runs, the stored record has been REFUSED, deliberately: at
+// open loadState() refused it and reading the singleton throws
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311), and under an open popup
+// a save refused it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373).
 //
 // So this module talks to the DOM directly and touches no state at all. It is
 // the one screen that must work when nothing else can, which is also why it
@@ -170,6 +172,11 @@ function wire() {
  *     refused, or its sentence.
  */
 function show(problem) {
+    // Already up: a later save that trips over the same record, such as a
+    // refresh that was in flight when the screen went up, must not clear what
+    // the user has exported or typed here.
+    if (!$("view-state-recovery").classList.contains("hidden")) return;
+
     const sentence =
         (problem && (problem.problem || problem.message)) || String(problem);
 

src/popup/views/transactionDetail.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const {
     showFlash,
     flashCopyFeedback,
     addressTitle,
+    CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT,
     addressDotHtml,
     escapeHtml,
     isoDate,
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ const {
     etherscanLinkHtml,
     explorerUrl,
     displaySymbol,
+    nativeCurrency,
     goBack,
 } = require("./helpers");
 const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
@@ -40,8 +42,10 @@ function getTransactionType(tx) {
             return "Token Approval";
         return "Contract Call";
     }
-    if (tx.symbol && tx.symbol !== "ETH") return "ERC-20 Token Transfer";
-    return "Native ETH Transfer";
+    // By the token contract, not the symbol: a token chooses its own symbol
+    // and can report the native token's, but only a token transfer has one.
+    if (tx.contractAddress) return "ERC-20 Token Transfer";
+    return "Native " + nativeCurrency() + " Transfer";
 }
 
 function blockieHtml(address) {
@@ -94,13 +98,18 @@ function render() {
     $("tx-detail-hash").innerHTML = txHashHtml(tx.hash);
 
     const fromTitle = addressTitle(tx.from, state.wallets);
-    const toTitle = addressTitle(tx.to, state.wallets);
     $("tx-detail-from").innerHTML = txAddressHtml(
         tx.from,
         tx.fromEns,
         fromTitle,
     );
-    $("tx-detail-to").innerHTML = txAddressHtml(tx.to, tx.toEns, toTitle);
+    // A contract creation has no recipient: transactions.js gives it `to: ""`.
+    if (tx.to) {
+        const toTitle = addressTitle(tx.to, state.wallets);
+        $("tx-detail-to").innerHTML = txAddressHtml(tx.to, tx.toEns, toTitle);
+    } else {
+        $("tx-detail-to").innerHTML = escapeHtml(CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT);
+    }
 
     // Exact amount (full precision, copyable)
     const detailSym = displaySymbol(tx.symbol);
@@ -221,7 +230,7 @@ function populateOnChainDetails(txData) {
         showDetailField(
             "tx-detail-fee-section",
             "tx-detail-fee",
-            feeEth + " ETH",
+            feeEth + " " + nativeCurrency(),
         );
     }
 

src/popup/views/txStatus.js

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ const {
     $,
     showView,
     addressTitle,
+    CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT,
     escapeHtml,
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
@@ -11,6 +12,7 @@ const {
     etherscanLinkHtml,
     explorerUrl,
     displaySymbol,
+    nativeCurrency,
     clearViewStack,
 } = require("./helpers");
 const { resolveTokenSymbol } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
@@ -58,7 +60,10 @@ function endWait() {
     }
 }
 
+// A contract creation reaches these screens with `to` as "" (approval.js
+// writes `to: toAddr || ""`).
 function toAddressHtml(address) {
+    if (!address) return escapeHtml(CONTRACT_CREATION_TEXT);
     const title = addressTitle(address, state.wallets);
     return renderAddressHtml(address, { title });
 }
@@ -84,7 +89,7 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
 
     const symbol =
         txInfo.token === "ETH"
-            ? "ETH"
+            ? nativeCurrency()
             : displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
     $("wait-tx-summary").textContent = txInfo.amount + " " + symbol;
     $("wait-tx-to").innerHTML = toAddressHtml(txInfo.to);
@@ -129,7 +134,7 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
             // failed — which matters most on a resumed wait, where the
             // first poll is already past the deadline.
             answered = false;
-            log.errorf("poll receipt failed:", e.message);
+            log.errorf("poll receipt failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
         }
         // The lookup is async: the wait may have ended while it was in
         // flight, in which case this result must not touch the view.
@@ -202,8 +207,9 @@ function restoreWait() {
     if (!info || typeof info !== "object" || Array.isArray(info)) return false;
     // A string is the whole requirement: the empty string is what a
     // contract-deployment approval persists (approval.js writes `to: toAddr
-    // || ""`), and both fields render harmlessly when empty, so refusing it
-    // would abandon a wait the live path itself created.
+    // || ""`), an empty `to` renders as a contract creation and an empty
+    // amount renders harmlessly, so refusing it would abandon a wait the live
+    // path itself created.
     if (typeof info.to !== "string") return false;
     if (typeof info.amount !== "string") return false;
     if (typeof w.broadcastTime !== "number" || !isFinite(w.broadcastTime)) {
@@ -218,7 +224,7 @@ function showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, blockNumber) {
 
     const symbol =
         txInfo.token === "ETH"
-            ? "ETH"
+            ? nativeCurrency()
             : displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
     state.viewData = {
         amount: txInfo.amount,
@@ -315,7 +321,7 @@ function showError(txInfo, txHash, message) {
 
     const symbol =
         txInfo.token === "ETH"
-            ? "ETH"
+            ? nativeCurrency()
             : displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
     state.viewData = {
         amount: txInfo.amount,

src/shared/addressWarnings.js

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ async function getFullWarnings(address, provider, options = {}) {
             });
         }
     } catch (e) {
-        log.errorf("contract check failed:", e.message);
+        log.errorf("contract check failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
     }
 
     // Skip tx count check for contracts — they may legitimately have
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ async function getFullWarnings(address, provider, options = {}) {
                 });
             }
         } catch (e) {
-            log.errorf("tx count check failed:", e.message);
+            log.errorf("tx count check failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
         }
     }
 

src/shared/amountDisplay.js

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
 // (`src/shared/uniswap.js`) — and a fix applied to one of them left the other
 // two showing a different number for the same value.
 //
-// The two functions below are the two policies, not two implementations of
-// one: summary lists truncate, and the screens that state what is being
-// authorized truncate with a floor. Keeping them adjacent is the point, so a
-// change to the rule cannot reach one screen and miss another.
+// The two truncation functions below are the two policies, not two
+// implementations of one: summary lists truncate, and the screens that state
+// what is being authorized truncate with a floor. Keeping them adjacent is the
+// point, so a change to the rule cannot reach one screen and miss another.
 
 // Truncate to exactly four decimal places. Truncation, never rounding: an
 // amount must never be displayed as larger than it is, so 0.99999 stays
@@ -43,4 +43,18 @@ function truncateAmountNeverZero(val) {
     return parts[0] + "." + parts[1].slice(0, sig + 1);
 }
 
-module.exports = { truncateAmount, truncateAmountNeverZero };
+// Whether a stored token balance is a holding below 0.000001. The balance
+// lists, the send-screen token selector, the address total and the
+// remove-address warning leave such a holding out; the Send and confirmation
+// screens show it when its token is the one being sent. Exact, because
+// src/shared/balances.js stores plain decimal digits: below 0.000001 the
+// balance reads "0.000000" and then more digits.
+function isBelowOneMillionth(balance) {
+    return typeof balance === "string" && balance.startsWith("0.000000");
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+    truncateAmount,
+    truncateAmountNeverZero,
+    isBelowOneMillionth,
+};

src/shared/approvalAmount.js

@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@
 // disputed is refused rather than guessed at.
 
 // Solidity's decimals() is a uint8, and every source here is ultimately
-// reporting that call's result. toDecimals() is that check, shared with the
-// send path rather than copied: the bundled list stores numbers, the
-// explorer's copy arrives as a string, and a token the user added by hand
-// carries whatever lookupTokenInfo() got back, so the accepted types are
-// enumerated rather than coerced.
+// reporting that call's result. toDecimals() is that check, stopping at the 80
+// places formatUnits() accepts, and shared with the send path rather than
+// copied: the bundled list stores numbers, the explorer's copy arrives as a
+// string, and a token the user added by hand carries whatever lookupTokenInfo()
+// got back, so the accepted types are enumerated rather than coerced.
 const { toDecimals } = require("./transferAmount");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
 const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");

src/shared/approvalTx.js

@@ -51,11 +51,15 @@ const POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20000;
 // passed to ethers: the object is page-controlled, and a future ethers that
 // learns to carry a new transaction field must not start picking one up out of
 // it without this module knowing.
+//
+// The nonce is not taken from the page; it is always the account's next nonce
+// from the network. A page that chose it could replace one of the user's
+// pending transactions (the same nonce at a higher fee) or leave this one stuck
+// behind a gap (a nonce above the next one).
 const REQUEST_FIELDS = [
     "to",
     "value",
     "data",
-    "nonce",
     "gasLimit",
     "gasPrice",
     "maxFeePerGas",

src/shared/approvalVerify.js

@@ -54,9 +54,11 @@ const {
     formatEther,
     getAddress,
     getBytes,
+    toQuantity,
     verifyMessage,
     verifyTypedData,
 } = require("ethers");
+const { networkByChainId } = require("./networks");
 
 // The only transaction types this wallet signs: legacy, EIP-2930 and
 // EIP-1559. populateTransaction() produces nothing else, so nothing else can
@@ -407,12 +409,23 @@ function assertWithinCeilings(tx) {
             price = normalizeQuantity(tx.gasPrice, "gas price");
         }
         if (price !== null && gasLimit * price > MAX_TOTAL_FEE) {
+            // The fee is paid in the native currency of the network the
+            // transaction is for. Every caller's transaction names it; one
+            // that does not, or names a network not in networks.js, says ETH.
+            const network = present(tx.chainId)
+                ? networkByChainId(toQuantity(tx.chainId))
+                : null;
+            const nativeCurrency = network ? network.nativeCurrency : "ETH";
             throw refuse(
                 "This transaction would allow a network fee of up to " +
                     formatEther(gasLimit * price) +
-                    " ETH, which is more than the " +
+                    " " +
+                    nativeCurrency +
+                    ", which is more than the " +
                     formatEther(MAX_TOTAL_FEE) +
-                    " ETH this wallet will sign for.",
+                    " " +
+                    nativeCurrency +
+                    " this wallet will sign for.",
             );
         }
     }

src/shared/balances.js

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ const {
 } = require("ethers");
 const { ERC20_ABI } = require("./constants");
 const { NETWORKS } = require("./networks");
-const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
+const { log, debugFetch, urlOrigin } = require("./log");
 const { deriveAddressFromXpub } = require("./wallet");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
 const { LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD, parseHoldersCount } = require("./holders");
@@ -52,19 +52,16 @@ function requireNetworkId(networkId) {
     return net;
 }
 
-function formatBalance(wei) {
-    const eth = formatEther(wei);
-    const parts = eth.split(".");
-    if (parts.length === 1) return eth + ".0";
-    const dec = parts[1].slice(0, 6).replace(/0+$/, "") || "0";
-    return parts[0] + "." + dec;
-}
-
+// A token balance as an exact decimal string, never cut: a cut stores a small
+// nonzero holding as zero. fetchTokenBalances() stores every nonzero holding of
+// a token it admits, however small; the screens that leave out one below
+// 0.000001 decide that themselves, through isBelowOneMillionth() in
+// src/shared/amountDisplay.js.
 function formatTokenBalance(raw, decimals) {
     const val = formatUnits(raw, decimals);
     const parts = val.split(".");
     if (parts.length === 1) return val + ".0";
-    const dec = parts[1].slice(0, 6).replace(/0+$/, "") || "0";
+    const dec = parts[1].replace(/0+$/, "") || "0";
     return parts[0] + "." + dec;
 }
 
@@ -149,11 +146,7 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
             const scale = known !== null ? known : decimals;
             // null is a holding of an amount that cannot be stated, which is
             // not the same as a holding of zero, and must never render as one.
-            // With a scale, the display filter proper applies: a balance that
-            // rounds to zero at six places is dust and is not listed. Without
-            // one there is no such judgement to make, and the row is kept.
             const bal = scale === null ? null : formatTokenBalance(raw, scale);
-            if (bal === "0.0") continue;
             // null means the explorer reported no count, which is not the
             // same as a count of zero.  This gate is not the low-holder
             // display filter: it has no user-facing off switch and governs
@@ -210,7 +203,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
     trackedTokens,
     networkId,
 ) {
-    log.debugf("refreshBalances start, rpc:", rpcUrl);
+    log.debugf("refreshBalances start, rpc:", urlOrigin(rpcUrl));
     const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     const updates = [];
 
@@ -221,7 +214,9 @@ async function refreshBalances(
                 provider
                     .getBalance(addr.address)
                     .then((bal) => {
-                        addr.balance = formatBalance(bal);
+                        // Exact, never cut: a cut here stores a small nonzero
+                        // balance as zero.
+                        addr.balance = formatEther(bal);
                         log.debugf("ETH balance", addr.address, addr.balance);
                     })
                     .catch((e) => {
@@ -251,7 +246,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
                         log.errorf(
                             "ENS reverse failed",
                             addr.address,
-                            e.message,
+                            e.shortMessage || e.message,
                         );
                         // Keep existing addr.ensName if we had one
                     }),
@@ -285,7 +280,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
 // Look up token metadata from its contract.
 // Calls symbol() and decimals() to verify it implements ERC-20.
 async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl, networkId) {
-    log.debugf("lookupTokenInfo", contractAddress, "rpc:", rpcUrl);
+    log.debugf("lookupTokenInfo", contractAddress, "rpc:", urlOrigin(rpcUrl));
     const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     const contract = new Contract(contractAddress, ERC20_ABI, provider);
 
@@ -310,7 +305,10 @@ async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl, networkId) {
         name = await contract.name();
         log.debugf("name() =", name);
     } catch (e) {
-        log.warnf("name() failed, using symbol as name:", e.message);
+        log.warnf(
+            "name() failed, using symbol as name:",
+            e.shortMessage || e.message,
+        );
         name = symbol;
     }
 

src/shared/ens.js

@@ -42,7 +42,11 @@ async function resolveEnsName(address, rpcUrl, networkId) {
         setCache(address, name);
         return name;
     } catch (e) {
-        log.errorf("ENS reverse lookup failed", address, e.message);
+        log.errorf(
+            "ENS reverse lookup failed",
+            address,
+            e.shortMessage || e.message,
+        );
         // Don't cache failures — let subsequent lookups retry
         return null;
     }

src/shared/log.js

@@ -42,14 +42,34 @@ const log = {
     },
 };
 
-// Fetch wrapper that debug-logs every request and response.
+// The origin (scheme, host and port) of a URL, for logging in place of the
+// URL: RPC providers put API keys in the path or the query string, and a URL
+// can carry a user name and password, which the origin leaves out. A URL that
+// does not parse gives "", so logging never stops a request.
+function urlOrigin(url) {
+    try {
+        return new URL(url).origin;
+    } catch {
+        return "";
+    }
+}
+
+// Fetch wrapper that debug-logs every request and response. It logs the
+// URL's origin and, for a JSON-RPC body, the method name: never the full URL
+// or body, which can carry an API key or a signed transaction.
 async function debugFetch(url, opts) {
     const method = (opts && opts.method) || "GET";
-    const body = opts && opts.body;
-    log.debugf("fetch →", method, url, body || "");
+    const origin = urlOrigin(url);
+    let rpcMethod = "";
+    try {
+        rpcMethod = JSON.parse(opts.body).method || "";
+    } catch {
+        // no body, or a body that is not JSON
+    }
+    log.debugf("fetch →", method, origin, rpcMethod);
     const resp = await fetch(url, opts);
-    log.debugf("fetch ←", resp.status, url);
+    log.debugf("fetch ←", resp.status, origin);
     return resp;
 }
 
-module.exports = { log, debugFetch, setRuntimeDebug, isDebug };
+module.exports = { log, debugFetch, urlOrigin, setRuntimeDebug, isDebug };

src/shared/persistedState.js

@@ -102,11 +102,11 @@ function tokenRefs(value) {
 
 // A list of strings, for the fields whose entries are dereferenced as text:
 // fraudContracts (`a.toLowerCase()` in src/popup/views/send.js and
-// src/shared/transactions.js) and each address's hostname list in the site maps
-// below (`h !== host` filters, `list.includes(hostname)` in the background).
+// src/shared/transactions.js) and each address's origin list in the site maps
+// below (`o !== origin` filters, `list.includes(origin)` in the background).
 //
 // Same rule as tokenRefs(), for the same reason: the container AND the entries,
-// with a malformed entry DROPPED rather than repaired. A number in a hostname
+// with a malformed entry DROPPED rather than repaired. A number in an origin
 // list names no site and a number in fraudContracts names no contract, so there
 // is nothing to repair either to, and the empty list is a legitimate value that
 // survives. The result is a fresh array of primitives, so it shares no
@@ -116,21 +116,22 @@ function textList(value) {
     return value.filter((entry) => typeof entry === "string");
 }
 
-// allowedSites / deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }.
+// allowedSites / deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }, each origin the
+// full scheme://host[:port] of a site.
 //
 // The container check these had (truthy and not an array) is not the floor:
 // `{"0xabc…": "notalist"}` IS a non-array object, and the dereference is one
-// level below it. saveState() merges these maps per key and then per hostname
+// level below it. saveState() merges these maps per key and then per origin
 // WITHIN each key, so a stored value that is not a list reaches `base.map()` in
 // mergeListByIdentity() (src/shared/state.js) and throws — after the popup has
 // rendered, which is why every save from then on failed while the UI looked
 // healthy (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362). The Settings
 // revoke button (`list.filter()`), and the background's
-// `allowed.includes(hostname)` gate, dereference it the same way; on that last
+// `allowed.includes(origin)` gate, dereference it the same way; on that last
 // one a stored string would also answer a SUBSTRING match, so a corrupt map
 // could widen a site permission rather than merely throw.
 //
-// An address key whose value is not a list of hostnames is dropped entirely: it
+// An address key whose value is not a list of origins is dropped entirely: it
 // grants and denies nothing, and dropping it fails closed. A stored own
 // "__proto__" key — which JSON can carry — is dropped for the same reason: it
 // can never be a wallet address, so it grants nothing either, and keeping it
@@ -143,9 +144,9 @@ function siteMap(value) {
     if (!isRecord(value)) return out;
     for (const address of Object.keys(value)) {
         if (address === "__proto__") continue;
-        const hostnames = textList(value[address]);
-        if (hostnames.length === 0) continue;
-        defineOwn(out, address, hostnames);
+        const origins = textList(value[address]);
+        if (origins.length === 0) continue;
+        defineOwn(out, address, origins);
     }
     return out;
 }

src/shared/prices.js

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // Price fetching with 5-minute cache, USD formatting, value aggregation.
 
 const { getTopTokenPrices } = require("./tokenList");
+const { isBelowOneMillionth } = require("./amountDisplay");
 
 const PRICE_CACHE_TTL = 300000; // 5 minutes
 
@@ -78,6 +79,9 @@ function getAddressValue(addr) {
     let usd = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0") * prices.ETH;
     let partial = false;
     for (const token of addr.tokenBalances || []) {
+        // A holding below 0.000001 is left out, as the balance lists leave it
+        // out, so the total never counts a holding the list does not show.
+        if (isBelowOneMillionth(token.balance)) continue;
         // A null balance is a holding whose scale nothing knows, so it has no
         // quantity to price — but it is still a holding, and a total that
         // silently omits it would read as complete. That is exactly what

src/shared/state.js

@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ function mergeAddress(base, ours, theirs) {
 }
 
 // Merge a plain object keyed by string (allowedSites/deniedSites: address ->
-// hostname list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
+// origin list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
 // same way mergeListByIdentity() merges an array — by key, not by whole-
 // object diff — so a key one page added or removed applies independently of
 // a key another page edited. Unlike an array's identity function, an object
@@ -353,25 +353,25 @@ function mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeLeaf) {
     return result;
 }
 
-// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. The hostname
+// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }. The origin
 // list is itself membership, not a leaf — the background appends a newly
-// approved/denied hostname to it, and the Settings "revoke" button
-// (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters a hostname out of it in place, from a
+// approved/denied origin to it, and the Settings "revoke" button
+// (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters an origin out of it in place, from a
 // different page. Merge it the same way wallets are merged: identity is the
-// hostname itself, so a merged pair is always equal and mergeItem is a no-op
+// origin itself, so a merged pair is always equal and mergeItem is a no-op
 // pick.
-function mergeHostnameList(base, ours, theirs) {
+function mergeOriginList(base, ours, theirs) {
     return mergeListByIdentity(
         base,
         ours,
         theirs,
-        (hostname) => hostname,
+        (origin) => origin,
         (b, o, t) => t,
     );
 }
 
 function mergeSiteMap(base, ours, theirs) {
-    return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeHostnameList);
+    return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeOriginList);
 }
 
 // networkEndpoints: { [networkId]: {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl} }.
@@ -422,8 +422,8 @@ function mergeNetworkEndpoints(base, ours, theirs) {
 // address) apply independently instead of colliding as the same field.
 //
 // `allowedSites` and `deniedSites` get the same treatment (mergeSiteMap(),
-// by address key and then by hostname within each address's list), for the
-// identical reason: the background appends a newly approved/denied hostname
+// by address key and then by origin within each address's list), for the
+// identical reason: the background appends a newly approved/denied origin
 // to them, and the Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js)
 // filters one out in place, from a different page. A whole-field diff here
 // doesn't just lose data, it is a security defect — a stale page's save can

src/shared/symbolSpoof.js

@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
 // KNOWN_SYMBOLS maps a symbol to the set of lowercased contract addresses
 // that may bear it, or to null.  Null means the symbol belongs to the native
 // asset, which has no contract at all, so no contract may bear it and every
-// one that does is a spoof.  "ETH" is the only such entry today; the rule is
-// written so that a second one needs no change here or at any call site.
+// one that does is a spoof.  "ETH" is one such entry, and every network's
+// `nativeCurrency` in networks.js (`SepoliaETH`) is another, on every network.
 //
 // The value is a set because a ticker is not unique: seven symbols in the
 // bundled list belong to two real contracts each, and answering with one of
@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
     return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
 }
 
+// The characters that paint nothing; normalizeSymbol below says which they
+// are. The signature screen marks them in a personal message
+// (src/popup/views/approval.js).
+const INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS = /[\p{Cf}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}\x7F]/gu;
+
 // Fold a symbol onto what a user actually sees, and no further:
 //
 //   NFKC        collapses compatibility variants that render as the ASCII
@@ -82,7 +87,7 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
 function normalizeSymbol(symbol) {
     return String(symbol || "")
         .normalize("NFKC")
-        .replace(/[\p{Cf}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}\x7F]/gu, "")
+        .replace(INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS, "")
         .trim()
         .toUpperCase();
 }
@@ -104,5 +109,6 @@ function isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, contractAddress) {
 }
 
 module.exports = {
+    INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS,
     isSpoofedSymbol,
 };

src/shared/tokenList.js

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 // 511 tokens.
 
 const { debugFetch } = require("./log");
+const { NETWORKS } = require("./networks");
 
 const COINDESK_API = "https://data-api.coindesk.com/index/cc/v1/latest/tick";
 
@@ -3610,7 +3611,9 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
 // Build a map of symbol (uppercased) -> the set of contract addresses
 // (lowercased) that legitimately bear it.  Used for spoofed-symbol detection.
 // "ETH" maps to null: the native asset has no contract, so no contract may
-// bear its symbol.
+// bear its symbol. So does every network's `nativeCurrency` in networks.js
+// (`SepoliaETH`), on every network, since that is the label the wallet shows
+// its native asset under on that network.
 //
 // The value is a set and not a single address because tickers are not unique
 // and the list above proves it: seven of these 512 tokens share a symbol with
@@ -3624,6 +3627,9 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
 // loosen the rule, because a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
 const KNOWN_SYMBOLS = new Map();
 KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set("ETH", null);
+for (const network of Object.values(NETWORKS)) {
+    KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set(network.nativeCurrency.toUpperCase(), null);
+}
 for (const t of TOKENS) {
     const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
     if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(upper)) {

src/shared/transactions.js

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
     return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
 }
 
-function parseTx(tx, addrLower) {
+function parseTx(tx, addrLower, nativeCurrency) {
     const from = tx.from?.hash || "";
     const to = tx.to?.hash || "";
     const rawWei = tx.value || "0";
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ function parseTx(tx, addrLower) {
     const method = tx.method || null;
 
     // For contract calls, produce a meaningful label instead of "0.0000 ETH"
-    let symbol = "ETH";
+    let symbol = nativeCurrency;
     let value = formatTxValue(formatEther(rawWei));
     let exactValue = formatEther(rawWei);
     let rawAmount = rawWei;
@@ -221,7 +221,14 @@ function mergeTransactions(txs, tokenTransfers) {
     return merged;
 }
 
-async function fetchRecentTransactions(address, blockscoutUrl, count = 25) {
+// `nativeCurrency` is the active network's native token symbol from
+// networks.js (`ETH`, `SepoliaETH`), which a native entry is labelled with.
+async function fetchRecentTransactions(
+    address,
+    blockscoutUrl,
+    nativeCurrency,
+    count = 25,
+) {
     log.debugf("fetchRecentTransactions", address);
     const addrLower = normalizeAddress(address);
 
@@ -254,7 +261,9 @@ async function fetchRecentTransactions(address, blockscoutUrl, count = 25) {
     const ttJson = ttResp.ok ? await ttResp.json() : {};
 
     const txs = mergeTransactions(
-        (txJson.items || []).map((tx) => parseTx(tx, addrLower)),
+        (txJson.items || []).map((tx) =>
+            parseTx(tx, addrLower, nativeCurrency),
+        ),
         (ttJson.items || []).map((tt) => parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower)),
     );
 

src/shared/transferAmount.js

@@ -27,9 +27,11 @@
 
 const { parseUnits } = require("ethers");
 
-// Solidity's decimals() returns a uint8, so anything outside that range is not
-// an answer this wallet can use.
-const MAX_DECIMALS = 255;
+// Solidity's decimals() returns a uint8, but ethers' formatUnits() and
+// parseUnits() refuse more than 80 decimal places ("invalid FixedNumber
+// decimals (too large)"). A scale of 81 to 255 can be neither displayed nor
+// encoded, so it is not an answer this wallet can use, the same as no answer.
+const MAX_DECIMALS = 80;
 
 const UNKNOWN_DISPLAYED_DECIMALS_MESSAGE =
     "The transfer was not sent, because the number of decimal places this" +
@@ -55,7 +57,7 @@ function mismatchMessage(displayed, onChain) {
 // A decimals value from any source as a number, or null if it is not one.
 // decimals() comes back from ethers as a bigint and the explorer's copy arrives
 // as a string, so both of those are accepted alongside a plain number; anything
-// fractional, negative, out of uint8 range, or of any other type at all is not.
+// fractional, negative, above MAX_DECIMALS, or of any other type at all is not.
 //
 // The types are enumerated rather than coerced because Number() is far too
 // willing: Number([]) is 0 and Number(true) is 1, so a coercing check would

src/shared/txValidation.js

@@ -139,7 +139,15 @@ function validateTransfer({
     const feeFp = known ? feeWei : null;
 
     if (isErc20) {
-        const tokenFp = toFixedPoint(tokenBalance) ?? 0n;
+        // A token can declare more than 18 decimals, and its balance is
+        // stored with all of them. Only the first 18 places (SCALE_DECIMALS)
+        // are read: an amount with more was refused above, so the places
+        // after them cannot decide whether the amount fits.
+        const tokenText =
+            typeof tokenBalance === "string"
+                ? tokenBalance.replace(/(\.\d{18})\d+$/, "$1")
+                : tokenBalance;
+        const tokenFp = toFixedPoint(tokenText) ?? 0n;
         if (amountFp > tokenFp) codes.push(CODES.INSUFFICIENT_TOKEN);
         if (feeFp !== null && feeFp > ethFp) {
             codes.push(CODES.INSUFFICIENT_ETH_FOR_FEE);

src/shared/uniswap.js

@@ -84,22 +84,43 @@ function present(value) {
 //
 // `amountOutMinimum` gets no such mapping: V4Router compares it directly
 // (`if (amountOut < params.amountOutMinimum) revert V4TooLittleReceived`), so
-// a zero minimum is a literal zero slippage floor and is stated as one. Nor do
-// the V2/V3 paths have it — universal-router's `V3SwapRouter.v3SwapExactInput`
+// a zero minimum is a literal zero slippage floor and is stated as one. Nor
+// does the V3 path have it — universal-router's `V3SwapRouter.v3SwapExactInput`
 // special-cases only `ActionConstants.CONTRACT_BALANCE` (1<<255), never zero —
-// so a zero `amountIn` there is a literal zero and is displayed as one.
+// so a zero V3 `amountIn` is a literal zero and is displayed as one. The V2
+// exact-in path gives zero a meaning of its own: see ALREADY_PAID.
 const OPEN_DELTA = Symbol("v4-open-delta");
 
-// The two amount lines that state a fact instead of a quantity. Same register
-// as UNNAMED_CURRENCY — a sentence in the value slot, so it cannot be misread
-// as a number — and deliberately not a third phrasing of "not named": these
-// say different things.
+// The Universal Router's V2 exact-in spells "the pair already holds the input
+// tokens" as an amount of zero: universal-router
+// `contracts/libraries/Constants.sol` declares
+// `uint256 internal constant ALREADY_PAID = 0` ("Used for identifying cases
+// when a v2 pair has already received input tokens"), and
+// `V2SwapRouter.v2SwapExactInput` makes no payment of its own when `amountIn`
+// equals it. The swap then spends whatever an earlier step sent to the pair.
+// As with OPEN_DELTA, the calldata states no quantity, and "0.0000" would say
+// that nothing is swapped.
+const ALREADY_PAID = Symbol("v2-already-paid");
+
+// The amount lines that state a fact instead of a quantity. Same register as
+// UNNAMED_CURRENCY — a sentence in the value slot, so it cannot be misread as a
+// number — and deliberately not another phrasing of "not named": these say
+// different things.
 const OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT = "All available (V4 open delta)";
+const ALREADY_PAID_AMOUNT =
+    "Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)";
 const NO_MINIMUM = "None (no minimum guaranteed)";
 
 // Permit2 amounts are uint160; the maximum is Permit2's "unbounded".
 const MAX_UINT160 = BigInt("0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff");
 
+// WETH, the token UNWRAP_WETH turns into ETH: on mainnet, then on Sepolia.
+// decode() is not told the network, so it takes either.
+const WETH_ADDRESSES = [
+    "0xc02aaa39b223fe8d0a0e5c4f27ead9083c756cc2",
+    "0xfff9976782d46cc05630d1f6ebab18b2324d6b14",
+];
+
 // `decimals` is null when nothing knows this token's scale. It is not
 // defaulted to 18: the swap lines land on the same approval screen as the
 // ERC-20 line, and a scale guessed there is what showed a 1,000 USDT swap as
@@ -178,6 +199,7 @@ function decodeBalanceCheck(input) {
 // Decode V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN (command 0x08) input bytes.
 // ABI: (address recipient, uint256 amountIn, uint256 amountOutMin,
 //        address[] path, bool payerIsUser)
+// A zero `amountIn` is read the way the router reads it, as ALREADY_PAID.
 function decodeV2SwapExactIn(input) {
     try {
         const d = coder.decode(
@@ -185,7 +207,7 @@ function decodeV2SwapExactIn(input) {
             input,
         );
         return {
-            amountIn: d[1],
+            amountIn: d[1] === 0n ? ALREADY_PAID : d[1],
             amountOutMin: d[2],
             tokenIn: d[3][0],
             tokenOut: d[3][d[3].length - 1],
@@ -198,11 +220,6 @@ function decodeV2SwapExactIn(input) {
 // Decode V2_SWAP_EXACT_OUT (command 0x09) input bytes.
 // ABI: (address recipient, uint256 amountOut, uint256 amountInMax,
 //        address[] path, bool payerIsUser)
-//
-// Nothing calls this: decode() has no 0x09 arm, so a V2 exact-out swap gets
-// its command name and no token or amount detail. Kept for the fix, which is
-// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/283.
-// eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
 function decodeV2SwapExactOut(input) {
     try {
         const d = coder.decode(
@@ -447,6 +464,7 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
         let outputToken = null;
         let minOutput = null;
         let hasUnwrapWeth = false;
+        let hasV2ExactOut = false;
         const commandNames = [];
 
         // THE INVARIANT: an amount and the token it is counted in always come
@@ -499,7 +517,13 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
 
                 if (cmdId === 0x0e) {
                     const b = decodeBalanceCheck(inputs[i]);
-                    if (b) setOutput(b.token, b.minBalance);
+                    // The router passes this check whenever the owner holds at
+                    // least minBalance, so a zero one guarantees nothing and
+                    // does not replace a minimum an earlier step stated. Any
+                    // other minBalance sets the output side as a swap does.
+                    if (b && !(b.minBalance === 0n && present(minOutput))) {
+                        setOutput(b.token, b.minBalance);
+                    }
                 }
 
                 if (cmdId === 0x00) {
@@ -521,6 +545,16 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
                     }
                 }
 
+                if (cmdId === 0x09) {
+                    // Buys exactly amountOut and spends at most amountInMax.
+                    hasV2ExactOut = true;
+                    const s = decodeV2SwapExactOut(inputs[i]);
+                    if (s) {
+                        setInputOnce(s.tokenIn, s.amountInMax);
+                        setOutput(s.tokenOut, s.amountOut);
+                    }
+                }
+
                 if (cmdId === 0x0b) {
                     const w = decodeWrapEth(inputs[i]);
                     if (w) {
@@ -559,12 +593,19 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
 
         // Resolve token info. A null token on either side means the calldata
         // named no currency for it; tokenInfo() refuses rather than calling it
-        // ETH. UNWRAP_WETH is the one output that is ETH without a currency to
-        // decode, and it is answered here rather than left to that rule.
+        // ETH. UNWRAP_WETH turns WETH into ETH, so it makes the output ETH
+        // when the output side is WETH, or when no step set the output side.
+        // Any other output keeps its own token and figure: a swap that buys
+        // USDC and then unwraps the WETH it did not spend receives USDC.
+        const outputIsWeth =
+            present(outputToken) &&
+            WETH_ADDRESSES.includes(outputToken.toLowerCase());
+        const outputUnset = !present(outputToken) && !present(minOutput);
         const inInfo = tokenInfo(inputToken, sources);
-        const outInfo = hasUnwrapWeth
-            ? { symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18, address: null }
-            : tokenInfo(outputToken, sources);
+        const outInfo =
+            hasUnwrapWeth && (outputIsWeth || outputUnset)
+                ? { symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18, address: null }
+                : tokenInfo(outputToken, sources);
 
         const inSymbol = inInfo.symbol;
         const outSymbol = outInfo.symbol;
@@ -603,16 +644,33 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
         }
 
         if (present(inputAmount)) {
-            // Two amounts need no scale to describe and are named rather than
-            // formatted: V4's open delta, which is not a quantity at all (see
-            // OPEN_DELTA), and an unbounded permit. The open-delta test comes
-            // first — the sentinel is not a bigint and cannot be compared with
-            // one.
+            // Three amounts need no scale to describe and are named rather
+            // than formatted: V4's open delta and V2's already-paid zero,
+            // neither of which is a quantity at all (see OPEN_DELTA and
+            // ALREADY_PAID), and an unbounded permit. Those two tests come
+            // first — the sentinels are not bigints and cannot be compared
+            // with one.
             let amount;
             if (inputAmount === OPEN_DELTA) {
                 amount = { raw: OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT, display: OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT };
+            } else if (inputAmount === ALREADY_PAID) {
+                amount = {
+                    raw: ALREADY_PAID_AMOUNT,
+                    display: ALREADY_PAID_AMOUNT,
+                };
             } else if (inputAmount >= MAX_UINT160) {
                 amount = { raw: "Unlimited", display: "Unlimited" };
+            } else if (hasV2ExactOut) {
+                // A V2 exact-out swap spends at most this figure, whichever
+                // step set the line (its amountInMax, the WRAP_ETH of a swap
+                // paid in ETH, a permit), so it is said to be a maximum, in
+                // `raw` too: the wait, success and error screens show `raw` as
+                // the transaction's amount.
+                const most = amountText(inputAmount, inInfo);
+                amount = {
+                    raw: "Up to " + most.raw,
+                    display: "Up to " + most.display,
+                };
             } else {
                 amount = amountText(inputAmount, inInfo);
             }
@@ -666,10 +724,15 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
 
         details.push({ label: "Steps", value: commandNames.join(" \u2192 ") });
 
+        // A JavaScript date reaches only to 275760-09-13 00:00:00 UTC. A
+        // later deadline, such as the uint256 maximum, makes an invalid date,
+        // and toISOString() throws on one, so that deadline is said in words.
         const deadlineDate = new Date(Number(deadline) * 1000);
         details.push({
             label: "Deadline",
-            value: deadlineDate.toISOString().replace("T", " ").slice(0, 19),
+            value: isNaN(deadlineDate.getTime())
+                ? "After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)"
+                : deadlineDate.toISOString().replace("T", " ").slice(0, 19),
         });
 
         return {

src/shared/walletDefects.js

@@ -41,12 +41,10 @@ const DEFECTS = {
                 "changed or removed, and this wallet stays until you delete " +
                 "it yourself.",
         ],
-        // One sentence for the places that have room for one: the flash on a
-        // blocked Send, the inline error on the approval screens.
-        shortMessage:
-            "This wallet cannot sign, because it was imported from an " +
-            "extended private key that is not a master key. The wallet list " +
-            "explains what happened.",
+        // One line, for the flash on a blocked Send and the inline error on
+        // the approval screens. It must fit on the flash line; see showFlash()
+        // in src/popup/views/helpers.js.
+        shortMessage: "This wallet cannot sign. See the wallet list.",
     },
 };
 

tests/approvalAmount.test.js

@@ -184,6 +184,22 @@ describe("decodeCalldata amount", () => {
         expect(line).not.toMatch(/0\.0000/);
     });
 
+    // A token added by hand carries whatever its decimals() returned, and a
+    // uint8 reaches 255, but formatUnits() throws above 80. The throw left the
+    // call undecoded rather than refused
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/350).
+    test("a token reporting more than 80 decimals shows base units", () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 81 },
+        ];
+        expect(
+            amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL_TOKEN),
+        ).toBe("5000000000 base units (decimals unknown)");
+        expect(amountLine(approveData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL_TOKEN)).toBe(
+            "5000000000 base units (decimals unknown)",
+        );
+    });
+
     test("an unbounded allowance is still named, with or without a scale", () => {
         expect(amountLine(approveData(MAX_UINT256), NOVEL_TOKEN)).toBe(
             "Unlimited",

tests/approvalNonce.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+// A nonce the page supplies is not used
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/404). With it a page could
+// replace one of the user's pending transactions (the same nonce at a higher
+// fee) or leave the new one stuck behind a gap, so the transaction is always
+// given the account's next nonce from the network.
+//
+// Driven through the preparation the background runs on a page's
+// eth_sendTransaction (src/shared/approvalTx.js) and the real approval screen,
+// password and Confirm included, against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/approvalOrigin.test.js uses. The vault is mocked so that no password
+// has to be hashed.
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+    decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { Network, Transaction } = require("ethers");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
+const { prepareApprovalTx } = require("../src/shared/approvalTx");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+// A well-known test phrase, and its first address.
+const PHRASE = "test test test test test test test test test test test junk";
+const FROM = "0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266";
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+// The account's next nonce, as the network reports it.
+const NETWORK_NONCE = 7;
+
+const network = {
+    getNetwork: async () => Network.from(1),
+    getTransactionCount: async () => NETWORK_NONCE,
+    estimateGas: async () => 21000n,
+    getFeeData: async () => ({
+        gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+        maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+        maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+    }),
+};
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
+            el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
+            el.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+function click(id) {
+    return Promise.all((node(id).listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn()));
+}
+
+// Open the transaction approval screen the way the popup does: the background
+// hands over the populated transaction and show() draws it. Returns every
+// message the screen sends to the background. The background's answer to the
+// signed transaction does not matter here; a retryable refusal keeps the
+// screen where it is.
+async function openTxApproval(approvedTx) {
+    const sent = [];
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" }, close: () => {} };
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            sent.push(msg);
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
+                return reply({ error: "Not sent.", retryable: true });
+            }
+            reply({
+                type: "tx",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                approvedTx,
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    state.activeAddress = FROM;
+    state.wallets = [
+        {
+            type: "hd",
+            name: "Wallet 1",
+            xpub: "xpub-wallet-1",
+            encryptedSecret: "encrypted-secret-1",
+            nextIndex: 1,
+            addresses: [{ address: FROM, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
+        },
+    ];
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+    return sent;
+}
+
+test("a page's nonce is replaced by the network's, on screen and in the signed transaction", async () => {
+    // What the background does with the page's request before it opens the
+    // approval window.
+    const approvedTx = await prepareApprovalTx(network, FROM, {
+        from: FROM,
+        to: RECIPIENT,
+        value: "0x0",
+        data: "0x",
+        nonce: "0x2",
+    });
+
+    const sent = await openTxApproval(approvedTx);
+    expect(node("approve-tx-nonce").textContent).toBe("7");
+
+    decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue(PHRASE);
+    node("approve-tx-password").value = "any password";
+    await click("btn-approve-tx");
+
+    const response = sent.find((msg) => msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE");
+    expect(Transaction.from(response.rawSignedTx).nonce).toBe(NETWORK_NONCE);
+});

tests/approvalOrigin.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+// The connection, transaction and signature prompts name the site by its full
+// origin, scheme and port included, not by its bare hostname
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402). A page served over http,
+// or on another port, of a host the user trusts over https must not raise a
+// prompt that reads as that trusted site.
+//
+// Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/contractCreation.test.js uses.
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+// The site asking, in cleartext and on a port, which is what the hostname
+// alone, dapp.example, used to hide.
+const ORIGIN = "http://dapp.example:8080";
+const FROM = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// Open the prompt the background describes with `details`, the way the popup
+// does: it asks for the approval and show() draws it.
+async function openApproval(details) {
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
+            reply({
+                origin: ORIGIN,
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                ...details,
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    state.wallets = [];
+    state.activeAddress = FROM;
+    state.viewData = {};
+    state.viewStack = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+});
+
+test("the connection prompt shows the origin", async () => {
+    await openApproval({});
+    expect(node("approve-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
+});
+
+test("the transaction prompt shows the origin", async () => {
+    await openApproval({
+        type: "tx",
+        approvedTx: {
+            type: 2,
+            from: FROM,
+            chainId: "0x1",
+            nonce: "0x7",
+            gasLimit: "0x5208",
+            maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
+            maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
+            to: RECIPIENT,
+            value: "0x0",
+            data: "0x",
+            accessList: [],
+        },
+    });
+    expect(node("approve-tx-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
+});
+
+test("the signature prompt shows the origin", async () => {
+    await openApproval({
+        type: "sign",
+        // "Hello" as the hex a dApp passes to personal_sign.
+        signParams: {
+            method: "personal_sign",
+            message: "0x48656c6c6f",
+            from: FROM,
+        },
+    });
+    expect(node("approve-sign-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
+});

tests/approvalTx.test.js

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
         );
     });
 
-    test("keeps a nonce, gas limit and fee the request did fix", async () => {
+    test("keeps a gas limit and fee the request did fix, but not its nonce", async () => {
         const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
             providerWith(),
             signer.address,
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
                 maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
             },
         );
-        expect(approved.nonce).toBe("0x2");
+        expect(approved.nonce).toBe("0x7");
         expect(approved.gasLimit).toBe("0x30d40");
         expect(approved.maxFeePerGas).toBe("0x12a05f200");
     });

tests/approvalVerify.test.js

@@ -599,6 +599,24 @@ describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
                 expect(e.message).toContain("1.0 ETH");
             }
         });
+
+        // The fee is in the native currency of the network the transaction is
+        // for, whether its chain id is the hex string the background prepares
+        // or the number ethers parses from a signed transaction.
+        test.each([
+            ["0x1", "ETH"],
+            [1n, "ETH"],
+            ["0xaa36a7", "SepoliaETH"],
+            [11155111n, "SepoliaETH"],
+        ])("the refusal on chain %p names %s", (chainId, nativeCurrency) => {
+            expect(() => assertWithinCeilings({ ...OVER, chainId })).toThrow(
+                "up to 3000.0 " +
+                    nativeCurrency +
+                    ", which is more than the 1.0 " +
+                    nativeCurrency +
+                    " this wallet",
+            );
+        });
     });
 
     test("every field mismatch is a refusal, not a warning", async () => {

tests/backgroundApproval.test.js

@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ const other = new Wallet(OTHER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 // A page the wallet has never been connected to, whose requests are refused.
 const UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
 const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
@@ -75,6 +74,22 @@ const NONCE = 7;
 // "Hello AutistMask" as the hex string a dApp passes to personal_sign.
 const MESSAGE = "0x48656c6c6f204175746973744d61736b";
 
+// An EIP-712 document as a dApp passes it to eth_signTypedData_v4. The
+// background only carries it to the approval screen, so a small one does.
+const TYPED_DATA = JSON.stringify({
+    domain: { name: "AutistMask Test", version: "1", chainId: 1 },
+    primaryType: "Note",
+    types: {
+        EIP712Domain: [
+            { name: "name", type: "string" },
+            { name: "version", type: "string" },
+            { name: "chainId", type: "uint256" },
+        ],
+        Note: [{ name: "contents", type: "string" }],
+    },
+    message: { contents: "Hello AutistMask" },
+});
+
 // The transaction the background populates and the approval screen displays.
 // The nonce is a parameter because the duplicate case turns on two artifacts
 // differing in a field the dApp fixed nothing for.
@@ -199,7 +214,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         networkId: "mainnet",
         rpcUrl: "https://rpc.invalid",
         activeAddress: signer.address,
-        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
     };
 
@@ -230,6 +245,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
     // raised through action.openPopup() opens no window at all, so this is
     // the only place its id appears.
     const actionPopups = [];
+    const openPopup = jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve());
 
     global.chrome = {
         storage,
@@ -284,7 +300,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
             // popup: no window is created, so windows.onRemoved can never
             // fire for it and the port disconnect is the only close signal
             // that exists.
-            ...(opts.actionPopup ? { openPopup: () => Promise.resolve() } : {}),
+            ...(opts.actionPopup ? { openPopup } : {}),
         },
     };
 
@@ -331,7 +347,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
 
     // The same for a message-signing approval, which pins the signing address
     // at approval time in exactly the same way.
-    function requestSign(from) {
+    function requestSign(from, origin) {
         let rpcResult = null;
         messageListener(
             {
@@ -339,7 +355,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
                 method: "personal_sign",
                 params: [MESSAGE, from || signer.address],
             },
-            { origin: ORIGIN },
+            { origin: origin || ORIGIN },
             (r) => {
                 rpcResult = r;
             },
@@ -353,6 +369,24 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         };
     }
 
+    // The same through eth_signTypedData_v4, whose params name the address
+    // first and the typed data second.
+    function requestTypedData() {
+        let rpcResult = null;
+        messageListener(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
+                method: "eth_signTypedData_v4",
+                params: [signer.address, TYPED_DATA],
+            },
+            { origin: ORIGIN },
+            (r) => {
+                rpcResult = r;
+            },
+        );
+        return { result: () => rpcResult };
+    }
+
     // A dApp asking to connect. The origin defaults to one the persisted
     // state has never allowed, so the request really does raise a prompt
     // instead of being answered from allowedSites.
@@ -427,12 +461,15 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         send,
         requestTx,
         requestSign,
+        requestTypedData,
         requestSite,
         connectApproval,
         closeWindow,
         broadcastTransaction,
         created,
         removed,
+        actionPopups,
+        openPopup,
         storage,
         // The user switching account in the toolbar popup, as the background
         // sees it: the persisted active address changes underneath a pending
@@ -822,6 +859,238 @@ describe("one transaction approval at a time", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// A page that asks again before the user has answered its last connection or
+// signature request is refused, instead of opening one more window per call.
+describe("one connection and one signature approval per site at a time", () => {
+    const PENDING_REFUSAL = {
+        error: {
+            code: -32002,
+            message: expect.stringMatching(/already waiting for your answer/),
+        },
+    };
+
+    test("a loop of eth_requestAccounts opens one approval and refuses the rest", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const requests = [];
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestSite());
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(requests[0].result()).toBeNull();
+        for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
+            expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        }
+
+        // Once the user has answered, the site may ask again.
+        bg.closeWindow(1);
+        await settle();
+        expect(requests[0].result()).toEqual({
+            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
+        });
+        const again = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(again.result()).toBeNull();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    test("a loop of personal_sign opens one approval and refuses the rest", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const requests = [];
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestSign());
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(requests[0].result()).toBeNull();
+        for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
+            expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a loop of eth_signTypedData_v4 opens one approval and refuses the rest", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const requests = [];
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestTypedData());
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(requests[0].result()).toBeNull();
+        for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
+            expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a pending personal_sign also refuses eth_signTypedData_v4", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        bg.requestSign();
+        const typed = bg.requestTypedData();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(typed.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    test("in the toolbar popup, a loop of eth_requestAccounts opens it once", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const requests = [];
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestSite());
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
+            expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        }
+    });
+
+    // A toolbar popup that closes before it connects tells the background
+    // nothing, so its prompt stays pending. Once the toolbar popup has been set
+    // to open something else, nothing shows that prompt, and the site asking
+    // again must show it again rather than be refused for good.
+    test("a toolbar prompt nothing shows any more is shown again when the site asks again", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const first = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        const id = first.id();
+
+        // Its popup closed without connecting. Another site's prompt takes the
+        // toolbar popup and is answered, which sets it back to the wallet.
+        const other = bg.requestSite(UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        const otherPort = bg.connectApproval(other.id());
+        otherPort.decide(false, false);
+        otherPort.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html",
+        );
+
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
+        );
+
+        // The user answers it, and the first request gets that answer.
+        bg.connectApproval(id).decide(true, false);
+        await settle();
+        expect(first.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+    });
+
+    // The user rejects a signature request from another site, which is
+    // connected already. Answering any approval sets the toolbar popup back to
+    // the wallet.
+    async function rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg) {
+        const sign = bg.requestSign(undefined, ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
+                id: sign.id(),
+                approved: false,
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        expect(sign.result()).toEqual({
+            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
+        });
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html",
+        );
+    }
+
+    test("a toolbar prompt is shown again after another site's signature request is answered", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const first = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        const id = first.id();
+
+        // Its popup closed without connecting.
+        await rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg);
+
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a prompt in a window is not opened again when the site asks again", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        // The browser will not open the toolbar popup, so the prompt goes to a
+        // window of its own.
+        bg.openPopup.mockImplementation(() =>
+            Promise.reject(new Error("no toolbar popup")),
+        );
+        bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+
+        await rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg);
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
+
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    test("a prompt in a connected toolbar popup is not opened again when the site asks again", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const first = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        // The popup is open and showing the prompt.
+        bg.connectApproval(first.id());
+
+        await rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg);
+
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("another site's connection request is not held up", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        bg.requestSite();
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        const other = bg.requestSite(UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(other.result()).toBeNull();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    test("another site's signature request is not held up", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        // Connect a second site, so that it may ask for a signature at all.
+        const connecting = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        const port = bg.connectApproval(connecting.id());
+        port.decide(true, false);
+        port.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+        expect(connecting.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+
+        bg.requestSign();
+        const repeat = bg.requestSign();
+        const other = bg.requestSign(signer.address, FRESH_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(other.result()).toBeNull();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(3);
+    });
+});
+
 // A nonce collision found before the transaction reaches the network is the
 // one send failure the wallet can speak about with certainty. The user is told
 // it did not go out and to send it again, rather than being warned it might
@@ -2193,12 +2462,54 @@ describe("removing an address ends a site's connection to it", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// A remembered permission belongs to the origin it was granted to, scheme and
+// port included (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402). The stored
+// state allows ORIGIN, https://dapp.example. A cleartext page on the same host,
+// which a network attacker can serve, and another port on it are other sites.
+describe("a remembered permission is held by the full origin", () => {
+    for (const origin of ["http://dapp.example", "https://dapp.example:8443"]) {
+        test(`an https grant does not authorise ${origin}`, async () => {
+            const bg = loadBackground();
+            expect(await siteAccounts(bg, ORIGIN)).toEqual({
+                result: [signer.address],
+            });
+
+            expect(await siteAccounts(bg, origin)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+            const send = bg.requestTx(TX_PARAMS, origin);
+            await settle();
+            expect(send.result()).toEqual({
+                error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" },
+            });
+            expect(send.id()).toBeNull();
+        });
+    }
+
+    test("Remember stores the origin, so the cleartext page on that host is asked again", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const granted = bg.requestSite(FRESH_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        const grantedId = granted.id();
+        bg.connectApproval(grantedId).decide(true, true);
+        await settle();
+        expect(granted.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+        expect(
+            bg.storage.read("autistmask").allowedSites[signer.address],
+        ).toEqual([ORIGIN, FRESH_ORIGIN]);
+
+        const cleartext = bg.requestSite("http://fresh.example");
+        await settle();
+        // Unanswered: it is waiting on a prompt of its own.
+        expect(cleartext.result()).toBeNull();
+        expect(cleartext.id()).not.toBe(grantedId);
+    });
+});
+
 // Settings lists the sites allowed without "Remember", which only the
 // background holds, and removing a site there, from either list, disconnects
 // it. These drive the real Settings view against the real background and
 // click the [x] the user clicks.
 describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
-    // FRESH_ORIGIN on another port, so its hostname is FRESH_ORIGIN's.
+    // The host of FRESH_ORIGIN on another port, which makes it another site.
     const FRESH_OTHER_PORT = "https://fresh.example:8443";
 
     // A site list's container. Its [x] buttons, data attributes and all, are
@@ -2226,9 +2537,9 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         return list;
     }
 
-    // The hostnames a site list shows.
+    // The origins a site list shows.
     function listed(list) {
-        return [...list.innerHTML.matchAll(/data-hostname="([^"]*)"/g)].map(
+        return [...list.innerHTML.matchAll(/data-origin="([^"]*)"/g)].map(
             (match) => match[1],
         );
     }
@@ -2259,10 +2570,10 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
             allowed: element("settings-allowed-sites"),
             connected: element("settings-connected-sites"),
             // Click the [x] beside a site, and let what it sends run.
-            remove: async (list, hostname) => {
-                expect(listed(list)).toContain(hostname);
+            remove: async (list, origin) => {
+                expect(listed(list)).toContain(origin);
                 const button = list.buttons.find(
-                    (b) => b.dataset.hostname === hostname,
+                    (b) => b.dataset.origin === origin,
                 );
                 await button.click();
                 await settle();
@@ -2274,14 +2585,15 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         delete global.document;
     });
 
-    test("Settings lists a site connected without Remember", async () => {
+    test("Settings lists each site by its origin", async () => {
         const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
         await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, false);
+        await connect(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT, true);
 
         const settings = await openSettings(bg);
 
-        expect(listed(settings.connected)).toEqual(["fresh.example"]);
-        expect(listed(settings.allowed)).toEqual([HOSTNAME]);
+        expect(listed(settings.connected)).toEqual([FRESH_ORIGIN]);
+        expect(listed(settings.allowed)).toEqual([ORIGIN, FRESH_OTHER_PORT]);
     });
 
     test("removing a site connected without Remember disconnects it and tells its tabs", async () => {
@@ -2293,6 +2605,7 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
                 cb([
                     { id: 1, url: FRESH_ORIGIN + "/app" },
                     { id: 2, url: ORIGIN + "/app" },
+                    { id: 3, url: FRESH_OTHER_PORT + "/app" },
                 ]),
             sendMessage: (tabId, msg, cb) => {
                 sentToTabs.push({ tabId, msg });
@@ -2301,7 +2614,7 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         };
         const settings = await openSettings(bg);
 
-        await settings.remove(settings.connected, "fresh.example");
+        await settings.remove(settings.connected, FRESH_ORIGIN);
 
         expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [] });
         expect(sentToTabs).toEqual([
@@ -2321,20 +2634,45 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         });
     });
 
-    // The same hostname can hold both kinds of connection: one origin allowed
-    // without Remember, then another, on a different port, allowed with it.
+    // One origin can hold both kinds of connection under two addresses:
+    // remembered for one, allowed without Remember for the other.
     test("removing a remembered site also ends its connection made without Remember", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const stored = bg.storage.read("autistmask");
+        stored.wallets[0].addresses.push({
+            address: other.address,
+            balance: "0",
+            tokenBalances: [],
+        });
+        bg.storage.write("autistmask", stored);
+        await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, true);
+        bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
+        const pending = bg.requestSite(FRESH_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        bg.connectApproval(pending.id()).decide(true, false);
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [other.address] });
+        const settings = await openSettings(bg);
+
+        await settings.remove(settings.allowed, FRESH_ORIGIN);
+
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+    });
+
+    test("removing a remembered site leaves the same host on another port connected", async () => {
         const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
         await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, false);
         await connect(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT, true);
         const settings = await openSettings(bg);
 
-        await settings.remove(settings.allowed, "fresh.example");
+        await settings.remove(settings.allowed, FRESH_OTHER_PORT);
 
         expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT)).toEqual({
             result: [],
         });
-        expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({
+            result: [signer.address],
+        });
     });
 
     test("a page can neither remove a site nor list the connected ones", async () => {
@@ -2343,7 +2681,7 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         const page = { url: FRESH_ORIGIN + "/index.html" };
 
         const remove = bg.send(
-            { type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", hostname: "fresh.example" },
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", origin: FRESH_ORIGIN },
             page,
         );
         const list = bg.send({ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES" }, page);

tests/backgroundStateIsolation.test.js

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -81,7 +80,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
         blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
         lastBalanceRefresh: 0,

tests/chainSwitchGate.test.js

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 // The site the persisted state has connected, and one it has never heard of.
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const STRANGER_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -86,7 +85,7 @@ function loadBackground() {
         tokenHolderCache: {},
         fraudContracts: [],
         activeAddress: ADDRESS,
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
     };
     const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: persisted });

tests/coldWorkerChainId.test.js

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const UNKNOWN_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -41,7 +40,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultRpcUrl,
         blockscoutUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
     };

tests/coldWorkerChainSwitch.test.js

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
 const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
@@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: CUSTOM_RPC,
         blockscoutUrl: CUSTOM_BLOCKSCOUT,
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [{ address: TOKEN, symbol: "DAI", decimals: 18 }],
         theme: "dark",
@@ -168,7 +167,7 @@ describe("a chain switch on a worker that never loaded state", () => {
         expect(after.wallets).toEqual(walletFixture());
         expect(after.hasWallet).toBe(true);
         expect(after.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
-        expect(after.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] });
+        expect(after.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] });
         expect(after.trackedTokens).toEqual([
             { address: TOKEN, symbol: "DAI", decimals: 18 },
         ]);

tests/coldWorkerSendTransaction.test.js

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
 
 const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
@@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
         blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
     };

tests/contractCreation.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+// The recipient line of a contract creation
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/250).
+//
+// A transaction with no `to` creates a contract. The approval screen, the
+// wait, success and error screens, the transaction detail view and the
+// transaction history rows each say so in a sentence, where they used to show
+// a blank line (an empty address, with a colour dot whose colour was
+// `undefined`) or, on the approval screen, "(contract creation)". A
+// transaction with a real `to` still shows that address.
+//
+// Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/typedDataPermit.test.js uses.
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
+    log: {
+        debugf: () => {},
+        infof: () => {},
+        warnf: () => {},
+        errorf: () => {},
+    },
+    // The transaction detail view fetches on-chain details after drawing; an
+    // answer that is not ok leaves the drawn lines as they are.
+    debugFetch: async () => ({ ok: false }),
+    setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
+    isDebug: () => false,
+}));
+
+// The wait screen polls for a receipt; this one never arrives.
+jest.mock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+    getProvider: () => ({ getTransactionReceipt: () => new Promise(() => {}) }),
+    refreshBalances: () => {},
+}));
+
+// The history lists ask the explorer for their transactions and resolve ENS
+// names for them; here the explorer answers with mockHistory and no name
+// resolves.
+let mockHistory = [];
+jest.mock("../src/shared/transactions", () => ({
+    ...jest.requireActual("../src/shared/transactions"),
+    fetchRecentTransactions: async () => mockHistory,
+}));
+jest.mock("../src/shared/ens", () => ({
+    ...jest.requireActual("../src/shared/ens"),
+    resolveEnsNames: async () => new Map(),
+}));
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+const txStatus = require("../src/popup/views/txStatus");
+const transactionDetail = require("../src/popup/views/transactionDetail");
+const home = require("../src/popup/views/home");
+const addressDetail = require("../src/popup/views/addressDetail");
+const addressToken = require("../src/popup/views/addressToken");
+
+const SENTENCE =
+    "This transaction creates a new contract. It has no recipient.";
+
+const FROM = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+const TX_HASH =
+    "0x85215772ed26ea8b39c2b3b18779030487efbe0b5fd7e882592b2f62b837be84";
+// Init code for a contract creation's data.
+const INIT_CODE = "0x600160005500";
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// The line a transaction with a real `to` shows: that address, and nothing
+// left over from an empty one.
+function expectAddressLine(html) {
+    expect(html).toContain(RECIPIENT);
+    expect(html).not.toContain(SENTENCE);
+    expect(html).not.toContain("undefined");
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
+    state.wallets = [];
+    state.trackedTokens = [];
+    state.viewData = {};
+    state.viewStack = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+    txStatus.init({ doRefreshAndRender: () => {} });
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    txStatus.endWait();
+});
+
+// Open the transaction approval screen the way the popup does: the background
+// hands over the populated transaction and show() draws it.
+async function openTxApproval(to, data) {
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
+            reply({
+                type: "tx",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                approvedTx: {
+                    type: 2,
+                    from: FROM,
+                    chainId: "0x1",
+                    nonce: "0x7",
+                    gasLimit: "0x5208",
+                    maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
+                    maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
+                    to,
+                    value: "0x0",
+                    data,
+                    accessList: [],
+                },
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+}
+
+describe("the transaction approval screen", () => {
+    test("a contract creation says so instead of naming a contract", async () => {
+        await openTxApproval(null, INIT_CODE);
+        expect(node("approve-tx-to").innerHTML).toBe(SENTENCE);
+    });
+
+    test("a transaction with a recipient shows its address", async () => {
+        await openTxApproval(RECIPIENT, "0x");
+        expectAddressLine(node("approve-tx-to").innerHTML);
+    });
+});
+
+// approval.js carries a contract creation to these screens with `to` as "".
+describe("the wait, success and error screens", () => {
+    const creation = {
+        to: "",
+        amount: "0.0000",
+        token: "ETH",
+        tokenSymbol: null,
+    };
+    const transfer = { ...creation, to: RECIPIENT };
+
+    test("a contract creation says so on the wait screen", () => {
+        txStatus.showWait(creation, TX_HASH);
+        expect(node("wait-tx-to").innerHTML).toBe(SENTENCE);
+    });
+
+    test("a transaction with a recipient shows its address on the wait screen", () => {
+        txStatus.showWait(transfer, TX_HASH);
+        expectAddressLine(node("wait-tx-to").innerHTML);
+    });
+
+    test("a contract creation says so on the success and error screens", () => {
+        state.viewData = {
+            amount: "0.0000",
+            symbol: "ETH",
+            to: "",
+            hash: TX_HASH,
+            blockNumber: 1,
+        };
+        txStatus.renderSuccess();
+        expect(node("success-tx-to").innerHTML).toBe(SENTENCE);
+
+        txStatus.showError(creation, TX_HASH, "The transaction failed.");
+        expect(node("error-tx-to").innerHTML).toBe(SENTENCE);
+    });
+
+    test("a transaction with a recipient shows its address on the success and error screens", () => {
+        state.viewData = {
+            amount: "0.0050",
+            symbol: "ETH",
+            to: RECIPIENT,
+            hash: TX_HASH,
+            blockNumber: 1,
+        };
+        txStatus.renderSuccess();
+        expectAddressLine(node("success-tx-to").innerHTML);
+
+        txStatus.showError(transfer, TX_HASH, "The transaction failed.");
+        expectAddressLine(node("error-tx-to").innerHTML);
+    });
+});
+
+// A transaction FROM sent, as the history lists hold it. The explorer reports a
+// contract creation with no `to`, which src/shared/transactions.js turns into
+// `to: ""`.
+function historyTx(to) {
+    return {
+        hash: TX_HASH,
+        from: FROM,
+        to,
+        value: "0.0000",
+        exactValue: "0.0",
+        rawAmount: "0",
+        rawUnit: "wei",
+        symbol: "ETH",
+        timestamp: 1790000000,
+        isError: false,
+        directionLabel: "Sent",
+        direction: "sent",
+        contractAddress: null,
+    };
+}
+
+// The detail view is opened with the transaction a history row holds.
+describe("the transaction detail view", () => {
+    test("a contract creation says so", () => {
+        transactionDetail.show(historyTx(""));
+        expect(node("tx-detail-to").innerHTML).toBe(SENTENCE);
+        expect(node("tx-detail-type").textContent).toBe("Contract Creation");
+    });
+
+    test("a transaction with a recipient shows its address", () => {
+        transactionDetail.show(historyTx(RECIPIENT));
+        expectAddressLine(node("tx-detail-to").innerHTML);
+    });
+});
+
+// The same rows are drawn on Home, AddressDetail and AddressToken (for ETH).
+describe.each([
+    ["Home", "home-tx-list", () => home.render({})],
+    ["AddressDetail", "tx-list", () => addressDetail.show()],
+    ["AddressToken", "address-token-tx-list", () => addressToken.show()],
+])("the transaction history on %s", (_name, listId, open) => {
+    async function rowsFor(tx) {
+        mockHistory = [tx];
+        open();
+        // The list is drawn once the history has been fetched.
+        await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0));
+        return node(listId).innerHTML;
+    }
+
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        state.wallets = [
+            {
+                name: "Main",
+                type: "key",
+                addresses: [{ address: FROM, balance: "0.0000" }],
+            },
+        ];
+        state.selectedWallet = 0;
+        state.selectedAddress = 0;
+        state.selectedToken = "ETH";
+    });
+
+    test("a contract creation's row says so, with no colour dot and no address line", async () => {
+        const html = await rowsFor(historyTx(""));
+        expect(html).toContain(SENTENCE);
+        expect(html).not.toContain("background:");
+        expect(html).not.toContain("am-address");
+        expect(html).not.toContain("undefined");
+    });
+
+    test("a transaction with a recipient shows its colour dot and address", async () => {
+        const html = await rowsFor(historyTx(RECIPIENT));
+        expectAddressLine(html);
+        expect(html).toContain("background:#");
+        expect(html).toContain(`<div class="am-address">${RECIPIENT}</div>`);
+    });
+});

tests/debugFetch.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// What debugFetch writes to the console in debug mode.
+//
+// RPC providers put the API key in the URL's path or query string, and the
+// debug log used to print the whole URL and request body, so turning debug
+// mode on wrote the key to the console
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410). The log now names the
+// HTTP method, the URL's origin and the JSON-RPC method, and nothing else of
+// the request.
+
+const { debugFetch, urlOrigin, setRuntimeDebug } = require("../src/shared/log");
+
+const realFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    globalThis.fetch = realFetch;
+    setRuntimeDebug(false);
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+});
+
+test("logs the origin and JSON-RPC method, not the key in the URL", async () => {
+    setRuntimeDebug(true);
+    const consoleLog = jest.spyOn(console, "log").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    globalThis.fetch = jest.fn(async () => ({ status: 200 }));
+
+    await debugFetch(
+        "https://rpc.example.invalid/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456",
+        {
+            method: "POST",
+            headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+            body: JSON.stringify({
+                jsonrpc: "2.0",
+                id: 1,
+                method: "eth_chainId",
+                params: [],
+            }),
+        },
+    );
+
+    const logged = consoleLog.mock.calls.flat().join(" ");
+    expect(logged).not.toContain("PATHKEY123");
+    expect(logged).not.toContain("QUERYTOKEN456");
+    expect(logged).toContain("https://rpc.example.invalid");
+    expect(logged).toContain("eth_chainId");
+});
+
+test("the origin leaves out a user name and password in the URL", () => {
+    expect(
+        urlOrigin("https://user:SECRETPASS@rpc.example.invalid/v3/KEY"),
+    ).toBe("https://rpc.example.invalid");
+    expect(urlOrigin("wss://user:SECRETPASS@rpc.example.invalid:8546/")).toBe(
+        "wss://rpc.example.invalid:8546",
+    );
+});

tests/deleteWalletLostPassword.test.js

@@ -140,8 +140,14 @@ function load() {
     state.selectedWallet = 0;
     state.selectedAddress = 0;
     state.activeAddress = A0;
-    state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"], [B0]: ["b.example"] };
-    state.deniedSites = { [B0]: ["c.example"], [C0]: ["d.example"] };
+    state.allowedSites = {
+        [A0]: ["https://a.example"],
+        [B0]: ["https://b.example"],
+    };
+    state.deniedSites = {
+        [B0]: ["https://c.example"],
+        [C0]: ["https://d.example"],
+    };
     state.viewStack = ["main", "settings"];
     state.currentView = "settings";
 
@@ -388,8 +394,8 @@ describe("deleting without the password", () => {
         await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
 
         const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
-        expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] });
-        expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["d.example"] });
+        expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["https://a.example"] });
+        expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["https://d.example"] });
     });
 
     // The route shares finishDelete() with the password route, so the
@@ -437,7 +443,7 @@ describe("deleting without the password", () => {
     test("deleting the last wallet lands on Welcome with nothing left", async () => {
         const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
         state.wallets = [wallet("Wallet 1", "secret-one", [A0])];
-        state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"] };
+        state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["https://a.example"] };
         state.deniedSites = {};
 
         await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 0);

tests/dustThreshold.test.js

@@ -99,12 +99,13 @@ describe("the flash line the message is shown in", () => {
     // length, including one that wrapped to two lines and pushed the
     // settings view down 12px.
     //
-    // The assertion that actually measures — empty line vs. the message,
-    // real Chromium, documented 360x600 popup — is
-    // "a rejected dust threshold shifts no layout (#233)" in
-    // tests/e2e/run.js, run by make test-e2e. It is not in make check
-    // because REPO_POLICIES.md caps make test at 20 seconds and a browser
-    // suite does not fit; run it before changing the wording.
+    // The line cuts a message too long for it with an ellipsis (see
+    // showFlash() in src/popup/views/helpers.js). The assertions that
+    // measure that, in a real browser at the documented 360x600 popup, are
+    // "a rejected dust threshold shifts no layout (#233)" and "an over-long
+    // flash message keeps to one line (#252)" in tests/e2e/run.js, run by
+    // make test-e2e. They are not in make check because REPO_POLICIES.md
+    // caps make test at 20 seconds and a browser suite does not fit.
     test("reserves its height in the markup", () => {
         const flashLine = POPUP_HTML.match(
             /<div\s+id="flash-msg"\s+class="([^"]*)"/,

tests/e2e/firefox/run.js

@@ -438,11 +438,10 @@ step(
         await d.switchToWindow(popup);
         await d.waitVisible("#view-approve-site");
 
-        const hostname = await d.text("#approve-hostname");
+        const origin = await d.text("#approve-origin");
         assert(
-            hostname === "127.0.0.1",
-            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(hostname),
+            origin === env.server.origin,
+            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " + JSON.stringify(origin),
         );
         const shown = await d.text("#approve-address");
         assert(
@@ -494,16 +493,16 @@ step(
 
         const screen = await d.execute(
             `return {
-             hostname: document.getElementById("approve-sign-hostname").textContent,
+             origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
              type: document.getElementById("approve-sign-type").textContent,
              message: document.getElementById("approve-sign-message").textContent,
              from: document.getElementById("approve-sign-from").textContent,
          };`,
         );
         assert(
-            screen.hostname === "127.0.0.1",
+            screen.origin === env.server.origin,
             "the sign prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+                JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
         );
         assert(
             screen.type === "Personal message",
@@ -571,7 +570,7 @@ step(
 
         const screen = await d.execute(
             `return {
-             hostname: document.getElementById("approve-tx-hostname").textContent,
+             origin: document.getElementById("approve-tx-origin").textContent,
              from: document.getElementById("approve-tx-from").textContent,
              to: document.getElementById("approve-tx-to").textContent,
              value: document.getElementById("approve-tx-value").textContent,
@@ -582,9 +581,9 @@ step(
          };`,
         );
         assert(
-            screen.hostname === "127.0.0.1",
+            screen.origin === env.server.origin,
             "the transaction prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+                JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
         );
         assert(
             screen.from.toLowerCase().includes(env.address.toLowerCase()),

tests/e2e/run.js

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ const {
 const {
     DAPP_ORIGIN,
     DAPP_URL,
+    PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN,
     PHISHING_DAPP_URL,
     FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI,
     FEE_RESERVE_WEI,
@@ -1320,17 +1321,13 @@ async function waitForFilledFlashLine(page) {
 }
 
 // README, No Layout Shift: the rejection message goes into #flash-msg,
-// whose min-h-[1.25rem] reserves exactly ONE line at text-xs. Reserving
-// the space is not enough on its own — a message too long for one line
-// wraps and pushes everything below it down anyway, which is what the
-// first version of this change shipped: 75 characters, 32px, the settings
-// view and the threshold field 12px lower than with an empty line.
-//
-// So this measures rather than inspects markup. It is the only assertion
-// in the repo that can see the wording grow: the unit suite runs on the
-// node environment with no layout engine, where every height is zero (see
-// the note in tests/dustThreshold.test.js). Lengthen
-// DUST_THRESHOLD_MESSAGE past one line and this test goes red.
+// whose min-h-[1.25rem] reserves exactly ONE line at text-xs, and which
+// cuts a message too long for that line with an ellipsis rather than wrap
+// it. This shows the real message and measures that nothing moves; the
+// test after it does the same with a message several lines long. Both
+// measure rather than inspect markup: the unit suite runs on the node
+// environment with no layout engine, where every height is zero (see the
+// note in tests/dustThreshold.test.js).
 test("a rejected dust threshold shifts no layout (#233)", async (env) => {
     const page = await openPopup(env.ctx, env.popupUrl);
     try {
@@ -1377,11 +1374,11 @@ test("a rejected dust threshold shifts no layout (#233)", async (env) => {
         );
         assert(
             after.flashHeight === before.flashHeight,
-            "the message does not fit the reserved line: " +
+            "the message does not keep to the reserved line: " +
                 before.flashHeight +
                 "px empty vs " +
                 after.flashHeight +
-                "px with the message. Shorten DUST_THRESHOLD_MESSAGE",
+                "px with the message",
         );
         assert(
             after.settingsTop === before.settingsTop,
@@ -1400,6 +1397,134 @@ test("a rejected dust threshold shifts no layout (#233)", async (env) => {
     }
 });
 
+// ------------------------------------------------ the flash line (#252)
+
+// #flash-msg never wraps: a message too long for its one line is cut with an
+// ellipsis (see showFlash() in src/popup/views/helpers.js). This puts a
+// message several lines long into it and measures that the line and the
+// screen below it stay where they were.
+test("an over-long flash message keeps to one line (#252)", async (env) => {
+    const page = await openPopup(env.ctx, env.popupUrl);
+    try {
+        await page.setViewportSize(POPUP_VIEWPORT);
+        await openSettings(page);
+
+        const before = await page.evaluate(measureFlashLine);
+        const overflows = await page.evaluate(() => {
+            const line = document.getElementById("flash-msg");
+            line.textContent =
+                "This message is far too long for one line. ".repeat(5);
+            return line.scrollWidth > line.clientWidth;
+        });
+        const after = await page.evaluate(measureFlashLine);
+
+        assert(
+            after.flashHeight === before.flashHeight,
+            "the flash line is " +
+                before.flashHeight +
+                "px before and " +
+                after.flashHeight +
+                "px with an over-long message, so it wraps",
+        );
+        assert(
+            after.settingsTop === before.settingsTop,
+            "the settings view moved " +
+                (after.settingsTop - before.settingsTop) +
+                "px when the message appeared",
+        );
+        assert(
+            after.fieldTop === before.fieldTop,
+            "the dust threshold field moved " +
+                (after.fieldTop - before.fieldTop) +
+                "px when the message appeared",
+        );
+        // Checked last: a line that wraps does not run past its right edge,
+        // so this only shows the message really was cut once nothing moved.
+        assert(
+            overflows,
+            "the message fits on the line, so it proves nothing: " +
+                JSON.stringify(after.text),
+        );
+    } finally {
+        await page.close();
+    }
+});
+
+// --------------------------------------- password error containers (#297)
+
+// Every screen that asks for a password reserves room for one line of error.
+// The two on the dApp approval screens also have a border and padding, which
+// that reserved height has to cover too.
+const PASSWORD_ERROR_CONTAINERS = [
+    "approve-tx-error",
+    "approve-sign-error",
+    "export-privkey-flash",
+    "show-phrase-flash",
+    "delete-wallet-flash",
+    "confirm-tx-password-error",
+];
+
+// Shows only the screen holding the container, then measures the container
+// and the element below it empty and again filled the way showError() in
+// src/popup/views/helpers.js fills it. Runs in the page.
+function measurePasswordError(id) {
+    const container = document.getElementById(id);
+    const screen = container.closest(".view");
+    for (const view of document.querySelectorAll(".view")) {
+        view.classList.toggle("hidden", view !== screen);
+    }
+    const below = container.nextElementSibling;
+    const measure = () => ({
+        height: container.getBoundingClientRect().height,
+        belowTop: below.getBoundingClientRect().top + window.scrollY,
+        belowHeight: below.getBoundingClientRect().height,
+    });
+    const empty = measure();
+    container.textContent = "Please enter your password.";
+    container.style.visibility = "visible";
+    const filled = measure();
+    container.textContent = "";
+    container.style.visibility = "hidden";
+    return { empty, filled };
+}
+
+test("a password error moves nothing on any screen (#297)", async (env) => {
+    const page = await openPopup(env.ctx, env.popupUrl);
+    try {
+        await page.setViewportSize(POPUP_VIEWPORT);
+        for (const id of PASSWORD_ERROR_CONTAINERS) {
+            const { empty, filled } = await page.evaluate(
+                measurePasswordError,
+                id,
+            );
+            assert(
+                empty.belowHeight > 0,
+                "nothing is shown below #" + id + ", so nothing was measured",
+            );
+            assert(
+                filled.height === empty.height,
+                "#" +
+                    id +
+                    " is " +
+                    empty.height +
+                    "px empty and " +
+                    filled.height +
+                    "px with an error",
+            );
+            assert(
+                filled.belowTop === empty.belowTop,
+                "the element below #" +
+                    id +
+                    " moved " +
+                    (filled.belowTop - empty.belowTop) +
+                    "px when the error appeared",
+            );
+        }
+    } finally {
+        await page.close();
+    }
+});
+
 // --------------------------------------------- confirmation screen (#238)
 //
 // The screen that decides what gets signed. The arithmetic underneath it
@@ -1414,9 +1539,10 @@ test("a rejected dust threshold shifts no layout (#233)", async (env) => {
 // on opposite sides of the reserve while sitting on the same side of the
 // estimate.
 
-// The balance the funded fixture serves, and the amounts sent against it.
+// The balance the funded fixture serves, as the Send and confirmation screens
+// show it, and the amounts sent against it.
 const FUNDED_ETH_WEI = 10n ** 18n;
-const FUNDED_ETH_TEXT = "1.0";
+const FUNDED_ETH_TEXT = "1.0000";
 const COMFORTABLE_AMOUNT = "0.1";
 const OVER_BALANCE_AMOUNT = "2.0";
 
@@ -1430,7 +1556,7 @@ const GAP_AMOUNT = formatEther(FUNDED_ETH_WEI - FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI);
 // fee test: it covers the expected cost to the wei and falls short of the
 // reserve, so the same swap flips this assertion too — through a different
 // balance and a different message than the ETH path uses.
-const TOKEN_BALANCE_TEXT = "1.5";
+const TOKEN_BALANCE_TEXT = "1.5000";
 const TOKEN_AMOUNT = "0.25";
 const OVER_TOKEN_AMOUNT = "9.0";
 const FEE_ONLY_ETH_WEI = FEE_ESTIMATE_WEI;
@@ -1439,16 +1565,15 @@ function toHexWei(wei) {
     return "0x" + wei.toString(16);
 }
 
-// A fee in wei as the confirmation screen writes it. Deliberately a second
-// implementation of formatFeeEth() from src/popup/views/confirmTx.js rather
-// than an import of it: that module pulls in the whole popup and cannot be
-// required outside a browser, and asserting against an independent rendering
-// is stronger than asserting a function equals itself.
+// A fee in wei as the confirmation screen writes it: truncated to four decimal
+// places (README.md, Display Consistency). Deliberately a second
+// implementation rather than an import of src/shared/amountDisplay.js:
+// asserting against an independent rendering is stronger than asserting a
+// function equals itself. The fixture's fees are above 0.0001 ETH, so the
+// nonzero floor never applies here.
 function feeEth(wei) {
-    const parts = formatEther(wei).split(".");
-    const dec =
-        parts.length > 1 ? parts[1].slice(0, 6).replace(/0+$/, "") || "0" : "0";
-    return parts[0] + "." + dec + " ETH";
+    const [whole, frac = ""] = formatEther(wei).split(".");
+    return whole + "." + (frac + "0000").slice(0, 4) + " ETH";
 }
 
 // What the confirmation screen is showing right now, read out of the DOM in
@@ -1505,11 +1630,10 @@ async function backToAddress(page) {
 
 // Drive the popup to the confirmation screen for one send.
 //
-// It waits for the send screen to be showing `balance` before filling
-// anything in. That figure is the exact number the spend gate compares
-// against, so waiting for it — rather than for a refresh to have probably
-// landed — is what keeps every assertion below deterministic after a
-// fixture change.
+// It waits for the send screen to be showing `balance`, the fixture's balance
+// as that screen displays it, before filling anything in. Waiting for it —
+// rather than for a refresh to have probably landed — is what keeps every
+// assertion below deterministic after a fixture change.
 async function goToConfirm(page, { token, balance, amount }) {
     await backToAddress(page);
     await page.click("#btn-send");
@@ -2348,8 +2472,6 @@ test("a token whose symbol() returns markup renders as text (#307)", async (env)
 // dApp, with real funds, against a real network. The RPC is stubbed
 // throughout. That pass stays on the human list before 1.0.0.
 
-const DAPP_HOSTNAME = new URL(DAPP_URL).hostname;
-
 // The personal_sign payload. Sent as hex, which is what dApps send and what
 // the popup requires — it calls getBytes() on the message — and displayed on
 // the approval screen as the decoded text, which is what the user is agreeing
@@ -2893,11 +3015,10 @@ test("eth_requestAccounts rejected at the prompt returns a rejection (#183)", as
     try {
         await visible(popup, "#view-approve-site");
 
-        const hostname = await popup.locator("#approve-hostname").innerText();
+        const origin = await popup.locator("#approve-origin").innerText();
         assert(
-            hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
-            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(hostname),
+            origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
+            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " + JSON.stringify(origin),
         );
 
         // The control for the phishing test below: this origin is not on the
@@ -2978,7 +3099,6 @@ test("a connect request from a blocklisted site is flagged (#219)", async (env)
     // check and the real approval screen. Nothing about the list is stubbed —
     // there is nothing left to stub, since the extension no longer fetches it.
     const phishingDapp = await openDapp(env.ctx, PHISHING_DAPP_URL);
-    const hostname = new URL(PHISHING_DAPP_URL).hostname;
     try {
         await reserveApprovalTab(env);
         await startRequest(
@@ -2991,15 +3111,15 @@ test("a connect request from a blocklisted site is flagged (#219)", async (env)
         try {
             await visible(popup, "#view-approve-site");
 
-            const shown = await popup.locator("#approve-hostname").innerText();
+            const shown = await popup.locator("#approve-origin").innerText();
             assert(
-                shown === hostname,
+                shown === PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN,
                 "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
                     JSON.stringify(shown),
             );
 
             await visible(popup, "#approve-site-phishing-warning");
-            console.log("# phishing warning shown for " + hostname);
+            console.log("# phishing warning shown for " + PHISHING_DAPP_ORIGIN);
 
             // Not remembered: a remembered decision for this origin would
             // outlive the test.
@@ -3029,15 +3149,15 @@ test("personal_sign signs, and the signature recovers to the address (#183)", as
     const boundary = await watchApprovalBoundary(popup, env);
 
     const screen = await popup.evaluate(() => ({
-        hostname: document.getElementById("approve-sign-hostname").textContent,
+        origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
         type: document.getElementById("approve-sign-type").textContent,
         message: document.getElementById("approve-sign-message").textContent,
         from: document.getElementById("approve-sign-from").textContent,
     }));
     assert(
-        screen.hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
+        screen.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
         "the sign prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-            JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+            JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
     );
     assert(
         screen.type === "Personal message",
@@ -3112,6 +3232,64 @@ test("personal_sign rejected returns a rejection to the page (#183)", async (env
     );
 });
 
+// A right-to-left character must not move the characters around it: U+05C3
+// between "5" and "00" would otherwise put "500" on screen before it. A
+// paragraph separator (U+2029) before it, left in the text, would end the
+// byte-order layout and bring that back
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/403).
+test("a personal message is laid out in the order of its bytes (#403)", async (env) => {
+    const rightToLeft = String.fromCodePoint(0x05c3);
+    const text =
+        "Sign in" +
+        String.fromCodePoint(0x2029) +
+        "Pay 5" +
+        rightToLeft +
+        "00 ETH";
+    await startRequest(env.dapp, "sign-bidi", "personal_sign", [
+        hexlify(toUtf8Bytes(text)),
+        env.expectedAddress,
+    ]);
+    const popup = await waitForApprovalWindow(env.ctx);
+    await visible(popup, "#view-approve-sign");
+
+    // The text on screen, marks included, and the left edge of each of its
+    // characters, in byte order. A character the browser's fonts draw with
+    // no width shares its neighbour's edge.
+    const shown = await popup.evaluate(() => {
+        const message = document.getElementById("approve-sign-message");
+        const walker = document.createTreeWalker(message, NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT);
+        const range = document.createRange();
+        let text = "";
+        const lefts = [];
+        for (let node = walker.nextNode(); node; node = walker.nextNode()) {
+            for (let i = 0; i < node.length; i++) {
+                range.setStart(node, i);
+                range.setEnd(node, i + 1);
+                lefts.push(range.getBoundingClientRect().left);
+            }
+            text += node.data;
+        }
+        return { text, lefts };
+    });
+    await clickAndClose(popup, "#btn-reject-sign");
+    await assertUserRejection(
+        env.dapp,
+        "sign-bidi",
+        "the byte-order personal_sign rejection",
+    );
+
+    assert(
+        shown.text === "Sign inU+2029Pay 5" + rightToLeft + "00 ETH",
+        "the paragraph separator is not shown as a mark: " +
+            JSON.stringify(shown.text),
+    );
+    assert(
+        shown.lefts.every((left, i) => i === 0 || left >= shown.lefts[i - 1]),
+        "the personal message is not laid out in byte order: " +
+            JSON.stringify(shown.lefts),
+    );
+});
+
 test("eth_signTypedData_v4 signs, and the signature recovers (#183)", async (env) => {
     await startRequest(env.dapp, "typed", "eth_signTypedData_v4", [
         env.expectedAddress,
@@ -3122,15 +3300,15 @@ test("eth_signTypedData_v4 signs, and the signature recovers (#183)", async (env
     const boundary = await watchApprovalBoundary(popup, env);
 
     const screen = await popup.evaluate(() => ({
-        hostname: document.getElementById("approve-sign-hostname").textContent,
+        origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
         type: document.getElementById("approve-sign-type").textContent,
         message: document.getElementById("approve-sign-message").innerText,
         from: document.getElementById("approve-sign-from").textContent,
     }));
     assert(
-        screen.hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
+        screen.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
         "the typed data prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-            JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+            JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
     );
     assert(
         screen.type === "Typed data (EIP-712)",
@@ -3228,7 +3406,7 @@ test("eth_sendTransaction signs the approved transaction and broadcasts it (#183
     const boundary = await watchApprovalBoundary(popup, env);
 
     const screen = await popup.evaluate(() => ({
-        hostname: document.getElementById("approve-tx-hostname").textContent,
+        origin: document.getElementById("approve-tx-origin").textContent,
         from: document.getElementById("approve-tx-from").textContent,
         to: document.getElementById("approve-tx-to").textContent,
         value: document.getElementById("approve-tx-value").textContent,
@@ -3238,9 +3416,9 @@ test("eth_sendTransaction signs the approved transaction and broadcasts it (#183
             .classList.contains("hidden"),
     }));
     assert(
-        screen.hostname === DAPP_HOSTNAME,
+        screen.origin === DAPP_ORIGIN,
         "the transaction prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-            JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+            JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
     );
     assert(
         screen.from.toLowerCase().includes(env.expectedAddress.toLowerCase()),

tests/flashLine.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+// The flash line (#252). #flash-msg reserves one line and cuts a message too
+// long for it with an ellipsis; that is measured in a real browser by
+// tests/e2e/run.js. Here: showFlash() keeps the whole message readable in the
+// line's title, and the two add-token screens flash a fixed line, not the text
+// of whatever error adding the token threw.
+
+const ADDRESS = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
+
+let elements;
+
+function fakeElement() {
+    return {
+        value: "",
+        textContent: "",
+        title: "",
+        style: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        addEventListener(event, handler) {
+            this.listeners[event] = handler;
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+// Stands in for document.getElementById(): one fake element per id.
+function element(id) {
+    return (elements[id] ||= fakeElement());
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    elements = {};
+    globalThis.document = { getElementById: element };
+    // state.js reads chrome.storage.local at load.
+    globalThis.chrome = {
+        storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+    };
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    jest.dontMock("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+    jest.dontMock("../src/shared/state");
+    jest.dontMock("../src/shared/balances");
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+    jest.useRealTimers();
+    delete globalThis.document;
+    delete globalThis.chrome;
+});
+
+test("showFlash() puts the whole message in the title, and clears both", () => {
+    jest.useFakeTimers();
+    const { showFlash } = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+
+    showFlash("Saved.");
+    expect(element("flash-msg").textContent).toBe("Saved.");
+    expect(element("flash-msg").title).toBe("Saved.");
+
+    jest.advanceTimersByTime(2000);
+    expect(element("flash-msg").textContent).toBe("");
+    expect(element("flash-msg").title).toBe("");
+});
+
+describe.each([
+    ["addToken", "add-token-address", "btn-add-token-confirm"],
+    [
+        "settingsAddToken",
+        "settings-addtoken-address",
+        "btn-settings-addtoken-manual",
+    ],
+])("adding a token on %s", (view, field, button) => {
+    let flashes;
+    let errors;
+
+    // Clicks the screen's add button with lookupTokenInfo() and saveState()
+    // replaced by the given functions.
+    async function add(lookupTokenInfo, saveState) {
+        flashes = [];
+        errors = jest.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {});
+        jest.spyOn(console, "log").mockImplementation(() => {});
+        jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({ lookupTokenInfo }));
+        jest.doMock("../src/shared/state", () => ({
+            state: { trackedTokens: [] },
+            saveState,
+        }));
+        jest.doMock("../src/popup/views/helpers", () => ({
+            $: element,
+            showView: () => {},
+            showFlash: (msg) => flashes.push(msg),
+            escapeHtml: (s) => s,
+            goBack: () => {},
+        }));
+
+        require("../src/popup/views/" + view).init({
+            doRefreshAndRender: () => {},
+        });
+        element(field).value = ADDRESS;
+        await element(button).listeners.click();
+    }
+
+    test("a failed save flashes a fixed line and logs the error", async () => {
+        const detail = "A sentence about the stored record. ".repeat(4);
+
+        await add(
+            async () => ({ symbol: "TKN", decimals: 18, name: "Token" }),
+            async () => {
+                throw new Error(detail);
+            },
+        );
+
+        expect(flashes).toEqual(["Could not add the token."]);
+        expect(errors).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+            "[AutistMask]",
+            "Adding token failed for",
+            ADDRESS,
+            detail,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a contract that is not a token flashes the lookup message", async () => {
+        const detail = "Not a valid ERC-20 token (symbol() failed).";
+
+        await add(
+            async () => {
+                throw new Error(detail);
+            },
+            async () => {},
+        );
+
+        expect(flashes).toEqual([detail]);
+    });
+});

tests/inpageErrors.test.js

@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ class StubCustomEvent extends StubEvent {
     }
 }
 
-// Every code the background emits on the RPC path today, read out of
-// src/background/index.js. The provider must not know this list — it passes
-// through whatever arrived — but the cases below are the real ones.
+// Examples of codes the background emits on the RPC path, read out of
+// src/background/index.js. The provider must not know any list of codes — it
+// passes through whatever arrived — but the cases below are real ones.
 const REJECTED = 4001; // user rejected the request
 const UNAUTHORIZED = 4100; // site not connected / wrong address
 const UNSUPPORTED_METHOD = 4200; // a method the wallet does not implement
@@ -200,8 +200,9 @@ describe("an EIP-1193 code reaches the page", () => {
         expect(err.message).toBe(message);
     });
 
-    // The provider is not allowed to know the list above: a code added to the
-    // background later must reach the page without this file being edited.
+    // The provider is not allowed to know the codes above: any other code,
+    // including one added to the background later, must reach the page
+    // without inpage.js being edited.
     test("a code the provider has never heard of is passed through", async () => {
         const err = await rejectionFrom(
             (p) => p.request({ method: "eth_accounts" }),

tests/nativeCurrency.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+// The native token's label on the screens that show a native amount.
+//
+// src/shared/networks.js gives each network a nativeCurrency, `ETH` on mainnet
+// and `SepoliaETH` on Sepolia, and nothing read it: every screen wrote a
+// hardcoded "ETH", so on Sepolia the balance, the value and the fee all read
+// ETH (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/372). Each line is asserted
+// on both networks, through the real Send, confirmation and approval screens,
+// with only the node and the DOM stubbed. So is that a token cannot pass for
+// the native token by reporting its label.
+
+"use strict";
+
+jest.mock("ethers", () => {
+    const actual = jest.requireActual("ethers");
+    class StubProvider {
+        async lookupAddress() {
+            return null;
+        }
+        // 10 gwei expected, 20 gwei reserved per gas.
+        async getFeeData() {
+            return { maxFeePerGas: 20000000000n, gasPrice: 10000000000n };
+        }
+        async estimateGas() {
+            return 21000n;
+        }
+        async getCode() {
+            return "0x";
+        }
+        async getTransactionCount() {
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        ...actual,
+        JsonRpcProvider: StubProvider,
+        Network: { from: () => ({}) },
+    };
+});
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
+    log: {
+        debugf: () => {},
+        infof: () => {},
+        warnf: () => {},
+        errorf: () => {},
+    },
+    debugFetch: jest.fn(async () => ({
+        ok: true,
+        status: 200,
+        json: async () => ({ items: [] }),
+    })),
+    urlOrigin: () => "",
+    setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
+    isDebug: () => false,
+}));
+
+global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
+    throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
+});
+
+// The approval the background hands the approval screen. Set per test.
+let approvalDetails = null;
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+global.chrome = {
+    storage: makeStorageStub(),
+    runtime: {
+        connect: () => ({
+            postMessage() {},
+            disconnect() {},
+            onDisconnect: { addListener() {} },
+        }),
+        sendMessage(message, callback) {
+            callback(
+                message.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL"
+                    ? approvalDetails
+                    : undefined,
+            );
+        },
+    },
+};
+
+// A stub DOM: every id resolves to a recording element.
+const elements = new Map();
+
+function makeEl(id) {
+    const handlers = new Map();
+    return {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        value: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add() {},
+            remove() {},
+            toggle() {},
+            contains: () => false,
+        },
+        handlers,
+        children: [],
+        addEventListener(name, fn) {
+            handlers.set(name, fn);
+        },
+        appendChild(child) {
+            this.children.push(child);
+            return child;
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        querySelector: () => null,
+        remove() {},
+        focus() {},
+        // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+        get parentElement() {
+            return global.document.getElementById(id + "-parent");
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+global.document = {
+    getElementById(id) {
+        if (!elements.has(id)) elements.set(id, makeEl(id));
+        return elements.get(id);
+    },
+    createElement: (tag) => makeEl(tag),
+    body: { prepend() {}, appendChild() {} },
+    addEventListener() {},
+};
+global.navigator = { clipboard: { writeText() {} } };
+
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { NETWORKS } = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { clearPrices } = require("../src/shared/prices");
+const send = require("../src/popup/views/send");
+const confirmTx = require("../src/popup/views/confirmTx");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+const transactionDetail = require("../src/popup/views/transactionDetail");
+const { balanceLinesForAddress } = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+const { filterTransactions } = require("../src/shared/transactions");
+
+const HOLDER = "0x" + "a".repeat(40);
+const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
+// A token contract that is not in the bundled token list.
+const TOKEN_CONTRACT = "0xd05339f9ea5ab9d9f03b9d57f671d2abd1f55c82";
+
+function text(id) {
+    return global.document.getElementById(id).textContent;
+}
+
+// Press Review on the Send screen for a native send of `amount`, and show the
+// confirmation screen it leads to with its fee estimate settled.
+async function confirmSend(amount) {
+    let txInfo = null;
+    send.init({ showConfirmTx: (info) => (txInfo = info) });
+    state.selectedToken = "ETH";
+    global.document.getElementById("send-to").value = RECIPIENT;
+    global.document.getElementById("send-amount").value = amount;
+    await global.document
+        .getElementById("btn-send-review")
+        .handlers.get("click")();
+    confirmTx.show(txInfo);
+    for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
+}
+
+// The approval screen for a dApp transaction sending 0.01 of the native token
+// with 21000 gas at up to 20 gwei, on the active network.
+async function approveTx() {
+    approvalDetails = {
+        type: "tx",
+        origin: "https://dapp.example",
+        approvedFrom: HOLDER,
+        approvedTx: {
+            to: RECIPIENT,
+            value: "10000000000000000",
+            data: "0x",
+            chainId: NETWORKS[state.networkId].chainId,
+            gasLimit: "21000",
+            maxFeePerGas: "20000000000",
+            nonce: 0,
+        },
+    };
+    await approval.show("1");
+}
+
+describe.each([
+    ["mainnet", "ETH"],
+    ["sepolia", "SepoliaETH"],
+])("on %s the native token reads %s", (networkId, symbol) => {
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        elements.clear();
+        clearPrices();
+        state.networkId = networkId;
+        state.wallets = [
+            {
+                name: "Wallet 1",
+                addresses: [{ address: HOLDER, balance: "1.5" }],
+            },
+        ];
+        state.selectedWallet = 0;
+        state.selectedAddress = 0;
+        state.trackedTokens = [];
+        state.fraudContracts = [];
+        state.currentView = null;
+    });
+
+    test("the balance", async () => {
+        const addr = state.wallets[0].addresses[0];
+        expect(balanceLinesForAddress(addr, [], false)).toContain(
+            `<span>${symbol}</span><span>1.5000</span>`,
+        );
+        state.selectedToken = "ETH";
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 1.5000 " + symbol);
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("1.5000 " + symbol);
+    });
+
+    test("the value", async () => {
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        expect(text("confirm-type")).toBe("Native " + symbol + " transfer");
+        expect(text("confirm-amount")).toBe("0.1 " + symbol);
+        await approveTx();
+        expect(text("approve-tx-value")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
+    });
+
+    test("the fee", async () => {
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        // 21000 gas at 10 gwei expected, at 20 gwei reserved.
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-amount")).toBe("~0.0002 " + symbol);
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-reserve")).toBe(
+            "up to 0.0004 " + symbol + " reserved",
+        );
+        expect(text("confirm-gas-error")).toContain(
+            "You do not have enough " + symbol + " to pay the network fee",
+        );
+        await approveTx();
+        expect(text("approve-tx-fee")).toBe("0.0004 " + symbol);
+    });
+
+    test("the contract-recipient warning", async () => {
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        expect(text("confirm-contract-warning")).toContain(
+            "Sending " + symbol + " or tokens directly to a contract",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // A token reports whatever symbol it likes. One reporting the label the
+    // wallet shows its native token under, on this network or any other, is
+    // a fake, exactly as one reporting `ETH` always was.
+    test.each(["ETH", symbol])(
+        "a token claiming %s is dropped from the history and the Send selector",
+        (claim) => {
+            const result = filterTransactions(
+                [
+                    {
+                        hash: "0x" + "1".repeat(64),
+                        symbol: claim,
+                        contractAddress: TOKEN_CONTRACT,
+                        holders: 900000,
+                        valueGwei: null,
+                        isContractCall: false,
+                    },
+                ],
+                { hideSpoofedSymbols: true },
+            );
+            expect(result.transactions).toEqual([]);
+            expect(result.newFraudContracts).toEqual([TOKEN_CONTRACT]);
+
+            send.renderSendTokenSelect({
+                address: HOLDER,
+                tokenBalances: [
+                    {
+                        address: TOKEN_CONTRACT,
+                        symbol: claim,
+                        decimals: 18,
+                        balance: "5",
+                        holders: 900000,
+                    },
+                ],
+            });
+            expect(
+                global.document.getElementById("send-token").children,
+            ).toEqual([]);
+        },
+    );
+
+    // The detail screen tells the two apart by the token contract, which only
+    // a token transfer has, so a token reporting the native label still reads
+    // as a token transfer.
+    test("the transaction detail screen's type line", () => {
+        const entry = {
+            hash: "0x" + "2".repeat(64),
+            from: RECIPIENT,
+            to: HOLDER,
+            value: "1.0000",
+            exactValue: "1.0",
+            symbol,
+            timestamp: 1790000000,
+            isError: false,
+            direction: "received",
+            directionLabel: "Received",
+        };
+        transactionDetail.show({ ...entry, contractAddress: null });
+        expect(text("tx-detail-type")).toBe("Native " + symbol + " Transfer");
+        transactionDetail.show({ ...entry, contractAddress: TOKEN_CONTRACT });
+        expect(text("tx-detail-type")).toBe("ERC-20 Token Transfer");
+    });
+
+    test("the insufficient-balance error", async () => {
+        await confirmSend("2");
+        expect(
+            global.document.getElementById("confirm-errors").innerHTML,
+        ).toContain(
+            "You have 1.5000 " +
+                symbol +
+                " but are trying to send 2 " +
+                symbol +
+                ".",
+        );
+    });
+});

tests/persistedEntryFloors.test.js

@@ -59,24 +59,32 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
             }
         });
 
-        test(`an ${field} entry whose value is not a hostname list is dropped`, () => {
-            for (const bad of ["dapp.example", 42, null, { a: 1 }, true]) {
+        test(`an ${field} entry whose value is not an origin list is dropped`, () => {
+            for (const bad of [
+                "https://dapp.example",
+                42,
+                null,
+                { a: 1 },
+                true,
+            ]) {
                 expect(
                     normalizePersisted({ [field]: { [ADDRESS]: bad } })[field],
                 ).toEqual({});
             }
         });
 
-        test(`a hostname that is not text is dropped from an ${field} entry`, () => {
+        test(`an origin that is not text is dropped from an ${field} entry`, () => {
             expect(
                 normalizePersisted({
-                    [field]: { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, "dapp.example", {}] },
+                    [field]: {
+                        [ADDRESS]: [42, null, "https://dapp.example", {}],
+                    },
                 })[field],
-            ).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+            ).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] });
         });
 
         test(`a real ${field} map survives, copied not shared`, () => {
-            const saved = { [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] } };
+            const saved = { [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] } };
 
             const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
 
@@ -87,10 +95,13 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
 
         test(`a good ${field} entry beside a malformed one survives`, () => {
             const out = normalizePersisted({
-                [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"], [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: 42 },
+                [field]: {
+                    [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
+                    [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: 42,
+                },
             });
 
-            expect(out[field]).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+            expect(out[field]).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] });
         });
 
         test(`a stored own "__proto__" key in ${field} is dropped`, () => {
@@ -100,7 +111,7 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
             // saveState()'s merge hands to the prototype setter on the next
             // write.
             const saved = JSON.parse(
-                '{"' + field + '":{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}}',
+                '{"' + field + '":{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}}',
             );
 
             const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
@@ -197,7 +208,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
     const MALFORMED = [
         { name: "a string", value: "notalist" },
         { name: "a number", value: 42 },
-        { name: "a record", value: { hostnames: ["dapp.example"] } },
+        { name: "a record", value: { origins: ["https://dapp.example"] } },
     ];
 
     for (const { name, value } of MALFORMED) {
@@ -231,7 +242,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
         const env = await bootPopup(
             unversionedValidProfile({
                 allowedSites: {
-                    [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"],
+                    [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
                     [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: "notalist",
                 },
             }),
@@ -239,7 +250,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
 
         expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
         expect(env.storage.read("autistmask").allowedSites).toEqual({
-            [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"],
+            [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
         });
     });
 

tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ const CONTRACT = [
             [ADDRESS],
             { [ADDRESS]: 42 },
             { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
-            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
+            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}'),
         ],
         holds: siteMapHolds,
     },
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ const CONTRACT = [
             [ADDRESS],
             { [ADDRESS]: 42 },
             { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
-            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
+            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}'),
         ],
         holds: siteMapHolds,
     },

tests/personalSignDisplay.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+// The signature prompt shows a personal message as the bytes that are signed
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/403): the raw data in hex, the
+// text it decodes to with control characters, line and paragraph separators
+// and characters that paint nothing marked rather than obeyed, markup shown as
+// text, laid out in byte order, and a message that is not hex as plain text
+// that cannot be signed.
+//
+// Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/approvalOrigin.test.js uses. That the layout keeps right-to-left
+// characters in byte order needs a real browser: tests/e2e/run.js checks it.
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { hexlify, toUtf8Bytes } = require("ethers");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+const FROM = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
+
+// Built from their code points so that this file holds none of them.
+const RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE = String.fromCodePoint(0x202e);
+const POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING = String.fromCodePoint(0x202c);
+const ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE = String.fromCodePoint(0x200b);
+const VARIATION_SELECTOR_1 = String.fromCodePoint(0xfe00);
+const VARIATION_SELECTOR_17 = String.fromCodePoint(0xe0100);
+const HANGUL_FILLER = String.fromCodePoint(0x3164);
+const LINE_SEPARATOR = String.fromCodePoint(0x2028);
+const PARAGRAPH_SEPARATOR = String.fromCodePoint(0x2029);
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    return {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// Open the signature prompt for a personal_sign of `message`, the way the
+// popup does: it asks the background for the approval and show() draws it.
+async function openPersonalSign(message) {
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
+            reply({
+                type: "sign",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                signParams: { method: "personal_sign", message, from: FROM },
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+}
+
+// The message box's markup as the text a reader sees: tags dropped.
+function shownMessage() {
+    return node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, "");
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    state.wallets = [];
+    state.activeAddress = FROM;
+    state.viewData = {};
+    state.viewStack = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+});
+
+test("a right-to-left override is marked, so the text reads in byte order", async () => {
+    // Obeyed, the override shows "0001" as "1000".
+    const text =
+        "Pay " +
+        RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE +
+        "0001" +
+        POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING +
+        " ETH";
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes(text)));
+    const html = node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML;
+    expect(html).not.toContain(RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE);
+    expect(html).not.toContain(POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING);
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Pay U+202E0001U+202C ETH");
+});
+
+test("a zero-width character is marked", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(
+        hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("pay" + ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE + "pal.com")),
+    );
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML).not.toContain(
+        ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE,
+    );
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("payU+200Bpal.com");
+});
+
+test("variation selectors and a Hangul filler are marked", async () => {
+    // Each paints nothing, so a page could hide bytes after "Sign in".
+    await openPersonalSign(
+        hexlify(
+            toUtf8Bytes(
+                "Sign in" +
+                    VARIATION_SELECTOR_1 +
+                    VARIATION_SELECTOR_17 +
+                    HANGUL_FILLER,
+            ),
+        ),
+    );
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Sign inU+FE00U+E0100U+3164");
+});
+
+test("the message is laid out in byte order", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("Hello")));
+    expect(
+        node("approve-sign-message").classList.contains("am-byte-order"),
+    ).toBe(true);
+});
+
+test("a control character other than a line feed is marked", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("a\u0000b\tc")));
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("aU+0000bU+0009c");
+});
+
+test("line and paragraph separators are marked", async () => {
+    // Left in the text, a paragraph separator would end the byte-order
+    // layout for everything after it.
+    await openPersonalSign(
+        hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("a" + LINE_SEPARATOR + "b" + PARAGRAPH_SEPARATOR)),
+    );
+    const html = node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML;
+    expect(html).not.toContain(LINE_SEPARATOR);
+    expect(html).not.toContain(PARAGRAPH_SEPARATOR);
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("aU+2028bU+2029");
+});
+
+test("a line feed is shown as a line break", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("Sign in\nNonce: 7")));
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML).toBe("Sign in<br>Nonce: 7");
+});
+
+// The message box is written as HTML, so a site's markup has to arrive there
+// escaped, as the text it is.
+const MARKUP = "<b>x</b><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>";
+
+test.each([
+    ["a hex message", hexlify(toUtf8Bytes(MARKUP))],
+    ["a message that is not hex", MARKUP],
+])("markup in %s is shown as text, not as markup", async (_, message) => {
+    await openPersonalSign(message);
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML).toBe(
+        "&lt;b&gt;x&lt;/b&gt;&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&gt;",
+    );
+});
+
+test("the raw hex is shown alongside the text", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("0x48656c6c6f");
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Hello");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex").textContent).toBe("0x48656c6c6f");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
+        false,
+    );
+});
+
+test("hex with an uppercase 0X is read as hex, as signing reads it", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("0X48656C6C6F");
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Hello");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex").textContent).toBe("0X48656C6C6F");
+    expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(false);
+});
+
+test("bytes that are not text are shown only as hex", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("0xff00");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").textContent).toBe(
+        "This message is not text.",
+    );
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex").textContent).toBe("0xff00");
+});
+
+test("a message that is not hex is shown as text and cannot be signed", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("Hello world");
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Hello world");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(
+        "This message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed.",
+    );
+    expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
+        true,
+    );
+});

tests/rpcErrorLog.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+// What reaches the console when the RPC endpoint answers with an HTTP error.
+//
+// RPC providers put the API key in the endpoint URL's path or query string.
+// When the endpoint answers with an HTTP error (a wrong or expired key, a rate
+// limit, a server error), the error ethers throws carries the full request URL
+// in its message, so a line logging that message printed the key
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410). Those lines log the
+// error's short message, which names the HTTP status and not the URL.
+//
+// The real ethers provider runs; only its HTTP transport is replaced, by one
+// that answers every request with 401 Unauthorized. Debug mode is on, so
+// every log level is printed.
+
+const { FetchRequest } = require("ethers");
+const {
+    getProvider,
+    lookupTokenInfo,
+    refreshBalances,
+} = require("../src/shared/balances");
+const { getFullWarnings } = require("../src/shared/addressWarnings");
+const { resolveEnsName } = require("../src/shared/ens");
+const { setRuntimeDebug } = require("../src/shared/log");
+
+const RPC_URL = "https://rpc.example.invalid/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456";
+const ADDRESS = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
+
+const realFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+let printed;
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    setRuntimeDebug(true);
+    printed = [];
+    for (const method of ["log", "warn", "error"]) {
+        jest.spyOn(console, method).mockImplementation((...args) => {
+            printed.push(args.map(String).join(" "));
+        });
+    }
+    FetchRequest.registerGetUrl(async () => ({
+        statusCode: 401,
+        statusMessage: "Unauthorized",
+        headers: {},
+        body: new Uint8Array(),
+    }));
+    // The explorer requests the balance refresh makes go nowhere.
+    globalThis.fetch = jest.fn(async () => {
+        throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
+    });
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    FetchRequest.registerGetUrl(FetchRequest.createGetUrlFunc());
+    globalThis.fetch = realFetch;
+    setRuntimeDebug(false);
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+});
+
+// The line carrying `label` was printed and names the HTTP status, and nothing
+// printed carries the key.
+function expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey(label) {
+    const line = printed.find((text) => text.includes(label));
+    expect(line).toContain("401");
+    const all = printed.join("\n");
+    expect(all).not.toContain("PATHKEY123");
+    expect(all).not.toContain("QUERYTOKEN456");
+}
+
+test("ethers puts the URL in the error message, not in the short message", async () => {
+    const provider = getProvider(RPC_URL, "mainnet");
+    const error = await provider.getCode(ADDRESS).catch((e) => e);
+    expect(error.message).toContain("PATHKEY123");
+    expect(error.shortMessage).not.toContain("PATHKEY123");
+});
+
+test("the recipient checks before a send", async () => {
+    await getFullWarnings(ADDRESS, getProvider(RPC_URL, "mainnet"));
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("contract check failed");
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("tx count check failed");
+});
+
+test("the ENS reverse lookup", async () => {
+    expect(await resolveEnsName(ADDRESS, RPC_URL, "mainnet")).toBeNull();
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("ENS reverse lookup failed");
+});
+
+test("the balance refresh", async () => {
+    const wallets = [{ addresses: [{ address: ADDRESS }] }];
+    await refreshBalances(
+        wallets,
+        RPC_URL,
+        "https://explorer.example.invalid/api/v2",
+        [],
+        "mainnet",
+    );
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("ETH balance failed");
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("ENS reverse failed");
+});
+
+// The lookup's first line, at debug level, names the RPC endpoint; the check
+// of everything printed covers it too.
+test("the token lookup", async () => {
+    await expect(lookupTokenInfo(ADDRESS, RPC_URL, "mainnet")).rejects.toThrow(
+        "Not a valid ERC-20 token",
+    );
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("symbol() failed:");
+});

tests/rpcOrigin.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+// Which site a page's request is attributed to.
+//
+// The background takes a request's origin from what the browser says sent the
+// message: sender.origin, or on Firefox before 126, which has no
+// sender.origin, the origin of sender.url — the frame that sent it. It used to
+// fall back to the tab's page and then to an origin the message itself
+// carried, so a request from a frame was credited to the site embedding it,
+// and a request the browser said nothing about was credited to whatever the
+// page wrote (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/407).
+//
+// Every sender here lacks sender.origin, as on old Firefox. The connection
+// check on eth_accounts is what shows which site a request was credited to.
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+// The site the persisted state has connected, and one it has never heard of.
+const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
+const STRANGER_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
+
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete global.chrome;
+});
+
+function loadBackground() {
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+        getProvider: () => ({}),
+        refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
+        isPhishingDomain: () => false,
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
+        ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({
+        autistmask: {
+            networkId: "mainnet",
+            wallets: [
+                {
+                    name: "Wallet 1",
+                    type: "hd",
+                    addresses: [
+                        { address: ADDRESS, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] },
+                    ],
+                },
+            ],
+            activeAddress: ADDRESS,
+            allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
+            deniedSites: {},
+        },
+    });
+
+    let messageListener = null;
+    global.chrome = {
+        storage,
+        runtime: {
+            getURL: (path) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + path,
+            onMessage: {
+                addListener: (fn) => {
+                    messageListener = fn;
+                },
+            },
+            onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
+            lastError: null,
+        },
+        windows: { onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} } },
+        action: { setPopup: () => {} },
+    };
+
+    require("../src/background/index");
+
+    // Ask for eth_accounts. `claimedOrigin` is an origin written into the
+    // message, as the content script used to send.
+    return async function accounts(sender, claimedOrigin) {
+        let result = null;
+        messageListener(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
+                method: "eth_accounts",
+                params: [],
+                origin: claimedOrigin,
+            },
+            sender,
+            (r) => {
+                result = r;
+            },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        return result;
+    };
+}
+
+describe("a request is attributed to the frame that sent it", () => {
+    test("a stranger's frame on a connected site gets no address", async () => {
+        const accounts = loadBackground();
+
+        const result = await accounts({
+            url: STRANGER_ORIGIN + "/frame.html",
+            tab: { url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/" },
+        });
+
+        expect(result).toEqual({ result: [] });
+    });
+
+    test("a connected site's frame on a stranger's page gets the address", async () => {
+        const accounts = loadBackground();
+
+        const result = await accounts({
+            url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/frame.html",
+            tab: { url: STRANGER_ORIGIN + "/" },
+        });
+
+        expect(result).toEqual({ result: [ADDRESS] });
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a request the browser does not say the sender of", () => {
+    test("is refused, whatever the tab or the message says", async () => {
+        const accounts = loadBackground();
+
+        const result = await accounts(
+            { tab: { url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/" } },
+            CONNECTED_ORIGIN,
+        );
+
+        expect(result).toEqual({
+            error: {
+                code: 4100,
+                message:
+                    "The wallet could not tell which site sent this request.",
+            },
+        });
+    });
+});

tests/sendDisplayFloor.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
+// The balance and fee lines of the Send and confirmation screens, and the fee
+// line they must share with the approval screen.
+//
+// An ETH balance, a token balance or a fee below 0.000001 rendered as zero on
+// these screens (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/343): the stored
+// balances and the fee were each cut to six decimal places, a rule of their
+// own, and a token holding cut to zero was dropped, while the approval screen
+// showed the same fee through src/shared/amountDisplay.js with the nonzero
+// floor. The balances are now stored exactly, every nonzero token holding
+// kept, and the screens show them and the fee through that helper.
+//
+// Driven through the real refreshBalances(), Send screen, confirmation screen
+// and approval screen, with only the node, the explorer and the DOM stubbed: a
+// balance written onto state by hand would skip the place the cut happened.
+
+"use strict";
+
+// What the stub node answers. Each test sets what it needs.
+const mockNode = {
+    balanceWei: 0n,
+    feeData: { maxFeePerGas: 1n, gasPrice: 1n },
+};
+
+// The token rows the stub explorer reports for the address.
+const mockExplorer = { items: [] };
+
+jest.mock("ethers", () => {
+    const actual = jest.requireActual("ethers");
+    class StubProvider {
+        async getBalance() {
+            return mockNode.balanceWei;
+        }
+        async lookupAddress() {
+            return null;
+        }
+        async getFeeData() {
+            return mockNode.feeData;
+        }
+        async estimateGas() {
+            return 21000n;
+        }
+        async getCode() {
+            return "0x";
+        }
+        async getTransactionCount() {
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        ...actual,
+        JsonRpcProvider: StubProvider,
+        Network: { from: () => ({}) },
+    };
+});
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
+    log: {
+        debugf: () => {},
+        infof: () => {},
+        warnf: () => {},
+        errorf: () => {},
+    },
+    // The explorer's token list, which refreshBalances() also fetches.
+    debugFetch: jest.fn(async () => ({
+        ok: true,
+        status: 200,
+        json: async () => mockExplorer.items,
+    })),
+    urlOrigin: () => "",
+    setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
+    isDebug: () => false,
+}));
+
+// The confirmation screen's Etherscan label lookup is the only fetch() these
+// screens make; it fails, as it does offline.
+global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
+    throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
+});
+
+// The approval the background hands the approval screen. Set per test.
+let approvalDetails = null;
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+global.chrome = {
+    storage: makeStorageStub(),
+    runtime: {
+        connect: () => ({
+            postMessage() {},
+            disconnect() {},
+            onDisconnect: { addListener() {} },
+        }),
+        sendMessage(message, callback) {
+            callback(
+                message.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL"
+                    ? approvalDetails
+                    : undefined,
+            );
+        },
+    },
+};
+
+// A stub DOM: every id resolves to a recording element.
+const elements = new Map();
+
+function makeEl(id) {
+    const handlers = new Map();
+    return {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        value: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add() {},
+            remove() {},
+            toggle() {},
+            contains: () => false,
+        },
+        handlers,
+        children: [],
+        addEventListener(name, fn) {
+            handlers.set(name, fn);
+        },
+        appendChild(child) {
+            this.children.push(child);
+            return child;
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        querySelector: () => null,
+        remove() {},
+        focus() {},
+    };
+}
+
+global.document = {
+    getElementById(id) {
+        if (!elements.has(id)) elements.set(id, makeEl(id));
+        return elements.get(id);
+    },
+    createElement: (tag) => makeEl(tag),
+    body: { prepend() {}, appendChild() {} },
+    addEventListener() {},
+};
+global.navigator = { clipboard: { writeText() {} } };
+
+const { refreshBalances } = require("../src/shared/balances");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const {
+    prices,
+    clearPrices,
+    formatAddressTotal,
+    getAddressValue,
+} = require("../src/shared/prices");
+const send = require("../src/popup/views/send");
+const confirmTx = require("../src/popup/views/confirmTx");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+const {
+    addressHoldsFunds,
+    balanceLinesForAddress,
+} = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+
+const HOLDER = "0x" + "a".repeat(40);
+const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
+
+// 0.0000005 ETH, or 0.0000005 of an 18-decimal token.
+const HALF_MICRO_ETH = 500000000000n;
+
+// A token the bundled list does not know.
+const TOKEN = "0x" + "d".repeat(40);
+
+// The explorer's row for TOKEN, holding `value` base units. With only five
+// holders, it is listed only when the user tracks the token.
+function tokenRow(value, token = {}) {
+    return {
+        value: String(value),
+        token: {
+            type: "ERC-20",
+            address_hash: TOKEN,
+            symbol: "TOK",
+            name: "Token",
+            decimals: "18",
+            holders_count: "5",
+            ...token,
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+function text(id) {
+    return global.document.getElementById(id).textContent;
+}
+
+function errors() {
+    return global.document.getElementById("confirm-errors").innerHTML;
+}
+
+// The ETH balance the node reports and the token rows the explorer reports,
+// fetched and stored exactly where the popup stores them.
+async function refreshWith(balanceWei, tokenItems = []) {
+    mockNode.balanceWei = balanceWei;
+    mockExplorer.items = tokenItems;
+    state.wallets = [{ name: "Wallet 1", addresses: [{ address: HOLDER }] }];
+    state.selectedWallet = 0;
+    state.selectedAddress = 0;
+    await refreshBalances(
+        state.wallets,
+        "https://rpc.example.invalid",
+        "https://blockscout.example/api/v2",
+        state.trackedTokens,
+        "mainnet",
+    );
+}
+
+// Press Review on the Send screen for a send of `token` ("ETH" or a token
+// address), and show the confirmation screen it leads to with its fee estimate
+// settled.
+async function confirmSend(amount, token = "ETH") {
+    let txInfo = null;
+    send.init({ showConfirmTx: (info) => (txInfo = info) });
+    state.selectedToken = token;
+    global.document.getElementById("send-to").value = RECIPIENT;
+    global.document.getElementById("send-amount").value = amount;
+    await global.document
+        .getElementById("btn-send-review")
+        .handlers.get("click")();
+    confirmTx.show(txInfo);
+    for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
+}
+
+// The approval screen for a dApp transaction of 21000 gas, the gas the stub
+// node estimates for the send above.
+async function approveTxWithFeePerGas(maxFeePerGas) {
+    approvalDetails = {
+        type: "tx",
+        origin: "https://dapp.example",
+        approvedFrom: HOLDER,
+        approvedTx: {
+            to: RECIPIENT,
+            value: "0",
+            data: "0x",
+            chainId: "0x1",
+            gasLimit: "21000",
+            maxFeePerGas: String(maxFeePerGas),
+            nonce: 0,
+        },
+    };
+    await approval.show("1");
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    elements.clear();
+    state.selectedToken = null;
+    state.trackedTokens = [];
+    state.fraudContracts = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+    mockNode.feeData = { maxFeePerGas: 1n, gasPrice: 1n };
+});
+
+describe("an ETH balance below 0.000001 never renders as zero", () => {
+    test("on the Send screen", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(HALF_MICRO_ETH);
+        state.selectedToken = "ETH";
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 0.0000005 ETH");
+    });
+
+    test("on the confirmation screen", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(HALF_MICRO_ETH);
+        await confirmSend("0.0000001");
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("0.0000005 ETH");
+    });
+
+    test("while a balance above the floor keeps four decimals", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(1234567890000000000n);
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("1.2345 ETH");
+    });
+});
+
+// A token the user tracks stays on the balance list when the explorer's row is
+// dropped, so a holding of it below 0.000001 reached these screens as zero, and
+// the send was checked against zero.
+describe("a tracked token holding below 0.000001 never renders as zero", () => {
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: TOKEN, symbol: "TOK", name: "Token", decimals: 18 },
+        ];
+    });
+
+    test("on the Send screen", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n, [tokenRow(HALF_MICRO_ETH)]);
+        state.selectedToken = TOKEN;
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 0.0000005 TOK");
+    });
+
+    test("on the confirmation screen, which checks the send against it", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n, [tokenRow(HALF_MICRO_ETH)]);
+        await confirmSend("0.0000005", TOKEN);
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("0.0000005 TOK");
+        expect(errors()).toBe("");
+        await confirmSend("0.0000006", TOKEN);
+        expect(errors()).toContain(
+            "You have 0.0000005 TOK but are trying to send 0.0000006 TOK.",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // The stored balance keeps all 24 places, and the balance check reads the
+    // first 18 of them rather than refusing it as no balance at all.
+    test("with more than 18 decimals, the send is checked against 18 of them", async () => {
+        state.trackedTokens[0].decimals = 24;
+        // 1.5 plus one base unit.
+        const value = 15n * 10n ** 23n + 1n;
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n, [tokenRow(value, { decimals: "24" })]);
+        await confirmSend("1.5", TOKEN);
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("1.5000 TOK");
+        expect(errors()).toBe("");
+    });
+
+    test("with more than 18 decimals and a holding below 10^-18", async () => {
+        state.trackedTokens[0].decimals = 24;
+        // One base unit, 0.000000000000000000000001 TOK.
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n, [tokenRow(1n, { decimals: "24" })]);
+        state.selectedToken = TOKEN;
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe(
+            "Current balance: 0.000000000000000000000001 TOK",
+        );
+        await confirmSend("0.000000000000000001", TOKEN);
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("0.000000000000000000000001 TOK");
+        expect(errors()).toContain(
+            "You have 0.000000000000000000000001 TOK but are trying to send" +
+                " 0.000000000000000001 TOK.",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+// A token the user does not track, with enough holders to be admitted. The
+// balance fetch dropped a holding of it below 0.000001, but the token stays
+// selected while its own screen is open: after sending 2 of a 2.0000003
+// holding, the user is back on that screen, and Send read the missing row as
+// zero.
+describe("an untracked token holding below 0.000001 never renders as zero", () => {
+    const row = () => tokenRow(HALF_MICRO_ETH, { holders_count: "50000" });
+
+    test("on the Send screen", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n, [row()]);
+        state.selectedToken = TOKEN;
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 0.0000005 TOK");
+    });
+
+    test("on the confirmation screen, which checks the send against it", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n, [row()]);
+        await confirmSend("0.0000005", TOKEN);
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("0.0000005 TOK");
+        expect(errors()).toBe("");
+        await confirmSend("0.0000006", TOKEN);
+        expect(errors()).toContain(
+            "You have 0.0000005 TOK but are trying to send 0.0000006 TOK.",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+// The fetch keeps every holding, so the screens that showed only what it kept
+// leave out a holding below 0.000001 themselves, and look as they did.
+describe("a token holding below 0.000001 is still not listed", () => {
+    afterEach(() => {
+        clearPrices();
+    });
+
+    test("for a token the user does not track", async () => {
+        prices.ETH = 3000;
+        await refreshWith(0n, [
+            tokenRow(HALF_MICRO_ETH, { holders_count: "50000" }),
+        ]);
+        const addr = state.wallets[0].addresses[0];
+        expect(balanceLinesForAddress(addr, [], true)).not.toContain(TOKEN);
+        expect(balanceLinesForAddress(addr, [], false)).not.toContain(TOKEN);
+        send.renderSendTokenSelect(addr);
+        const options = global.document.getElementById("send-token").children;
+        expect(options.map((o) => o.value)).toEqual([]);
+        // Not an unpriced token in the total, and not funds on the
+        // remove-address warning.
+        expect(formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr))).toBe("Total: $0.00");
+        expect(addressHoldsFunds(addr)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    // As a tracked token holding nothing: listed only while zero balances are
+    // shown.
+    test("for a tracked token, unless zero balances are shown", async () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: TOKEN, symbol: "TOK", name: "Token", decimals: 18 },
+        ];
+        await refreshWith(0n, [tokenRow(HALF_MICRO_ETH)]);
+        const addr = state.wallets[0].addresses[0];
+        expect(
+            balanceLinesForAddress(addr, state.trackedTokens, false),
+        ).not.toContain(TOKEN);
+        expect(
+            balanceLinesForAddress(addr, state.trackedTokens, true),
+        ).toContain(`data-token="${TOKEN}"`);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a fee below 0.000001 ETH never renders as zero", () => {
+    test("when the estimate and the reserve are the same", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n);
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        // 21000 gas at 1 wei is 0.000000000000021 ETH, shown to its first
+        // significant digit.
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-amount")).toBe("0.00000000000002 ETH");
+    });
+
+    test("when they differ, on both lines", async () => {
+        mockNode.feeData = { maxFeePerGas: 2n, gasPrice: 1n };
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n);
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-amount")).toBe("~0.00000000000002 ETH");
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-reserve")).toBe(
+            "up to 0.00000000000004 ETH reserved",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+// The confirmation screen shows the reserve alone when the node quotes no
+// cheaper estimate, and that reserve is the same gas limit times maximum fee
+// per gas that the approval screen calls the max fee. An ETH price is set, as
+// it is on mainnet, so the USD value has to match too.
+describe("the same fee reads the same on the confirmation and approval screens", () => {
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        prices.ETH = 3000;
+    });
+    afterEach(() => {
+        clearPrices();
+    });
+
+    test.each([
+        // 21000 gas at 1 wei.
+        ["below the floor", 1n, "0.00000000000002 ETH (< $0.01)"],
+        // 0.001235294117631 ETH, which is $3.71. Pricing the truncated
+        // 0.0012 instead would read $3.60.
+        ["with more than four decimals", 58823529411n, "0.0012 ETH ($3.71)"],
+    ])("%s", async (_label, feePerGas, expected) => {
+        mockNode.feeData = { maxFeePerGas: feePerGas, gasPrice: feePerGas };
+        await refreshWith(10n ** 18n);
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-amount")).toBe(expected);
+        await approveTxWithFeePerGas(feePerGas);
+        expect(text("approve-tx-fee")).toBe(expected);
+    });
+});

tests/settingsEndpointCheck.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+// What reaches the console when an endpoint check in Settings fails.
+//
+// fetch refuses a URL with a user name and password in it, or one it cannot
+// parse, with an error whose message carries the whole URL: the password, and
+// any API key in the path or query string. The checks behind the RPC and
+// Blockscout Save buttons printed that message
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410); they now name the
+// endpoint by its origin.
+//
+// The real fetch runs; it throws before making any request. Debug mode is on,
+// so every log level is printed.
+
+const SECRETS = ["SECRETPASS789", "PATHKEY123", "QUERYTOKEN456"];
+const RPC_WITH_PASSWORD =
+    "https://user:SECRETPASS789@rpc.example.invalid/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456";
+// Port 99999 is out of range, so the URL does not parse.
+const RPC_UNPARSEABLE =
+    "https://rpc.example.invalid:99999/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456";
+const BLOCKSCOUT_WITH_PASSWORD =
+    "https://user:SECRETPASS789@explorer.example.invalid/PATHKEY123/api/v2";
+
+const SAVED_RPC = "https://saved-rpc.example.invalid";
+const SAVED_BLOCKSCOUT = "https://saved-explorer.example.invalid/api/v2";
+
+let elements;
+let flashes;
+let printed;
+let state;
+
+// A stand-in for one DOM node: enough of an element for init() to set
+// properties on it and hang listeners off it.
+function fakeElement() {
+    return {
+        value: "",
+        checked: false,
+        textContent: "",
+        href: "",
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: { add() {}, remove() {} },
+        listeners: {},
+        addEventListener(event, handler) {
+            this.listeners[event] = handler;
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+    };
+}
+
+function element(id) {
+    return (elements[id] ||= fakeElement());
+}
+
+function loadSettingsView() {
+    elements = {};
+    flashes = [];
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock("../src/popup/views/helpers", () => ({
+        $: element,
+        showView: () => {},
+        updateDebugBanner: () => {},
+        showFlash: (msg) => flashes.push(msg),
+        escapeHtml: (s) => s,
+        flashCopyFeedback: () => {},
+        goBack: () => {},
+        pushCurrentView: () => {},
+        onViewLeave: () => {},
+        VIEWS: [],
+    }));
+
+    state = require("../src/shared/state").state;
+    state.rpcUrl = SAVED_RPC;
+    state.blockscoutUrl = SAVED_BLOCKSCOUT;
+    require("../src/shared/log").setRuntimeDebug(true);
+
+    require("../src/popup/views/settings").init({});
+}
+
+async function save(fieldId, buttonId, typed) {
+    element(fieldId).value = typed;
+    await element(buttonId).listeners.click();
+}
+
+// The check failed, nothing was saved, and nothing printed carries the
+// password or the key.
+function expectFailedWithoutSecrets(label) {
+    expect(flashes).toContain("Could not reach endpoint.");
+    expect(state.rpcUrl).toBe(SAVED_RPC);
+    expect(state.blockscoutUrl).toBe(SAVED_BLOCKSCOUT);
+    const line = printed.find((text) => text.includes(label));
+    expect(line).toBeDefined();
+    const all = printed.join("\n");
+    for (const secret of SECRETS) {
+        expect(all).not.toContain(secret);
+    }
+    return line;
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    printed = [];
+    for (const method of ["log", "warn", "error"]) {
+        jest.spyOn(console, method).mockImplementation((...args) => {
+            printed.push(args.map(String).join(" "));
+        });
+    }
+    globalThis.chrome = {
+        runtime: { sendMessage: () => {} },
+        storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+    };
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    jest.dontMock("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+    delete globalThis.chrome;
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+});
+
+test("fetch puts the whole URL in the error it throws for such a URL", async () => {
+    for (const url of [RPC_WITH_PASSWORD, RPC_UNPARSEABLE]) {
+        const error = await fetch(url).catch((e) => e);
+        expect(error.message).toContain("PATHKEY123");
+    }
+});
+
+test("the RPC check of a URL with a user name and password", async () => {
+    loadSettingsView();
+    await save("settings-rpc", "btn-save-rpc", RPC_WITH_PASSWORD);
+    const line = expectFailedWithoutSecrets("RPC validation fetch failed");
+    expect(line).toContain("https://rpc.example.invalid");
+});
+
+test("the RPC check of a URL that does not parse", async () => {
+    loadSettingsView();
+    await save("settings-rpc", "btn-save-rpc", RPC_UNPARSEABLE);
+    expectFailedWithoutSecrets("RPC validation fetch failed");
+});
+
+test("the Blockscout check of a URL with a user name and password", async () => {
+    loadSettingsView();
+    await save(
+        "settings-blockscout",
+        "btn-save-blockscout",
+        BLOCKSCOUT_WITH_PASSWORD,
+    );
+    const line = expectFailedWithoutSecrets("Blockscout validation failed");
+    expect(line).toContain("https://explorer.example.invalid");
+});

tests/stateMerge.test.js

@@ -270,31 +270,32 @@ describe("background refresh racing a wallet deleted on another page", () => {
     });
 });
 
-// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. Mutated in place
-// from two different contexts — src/background/index.js:592-599 pushes a
-// newly approved hostname onto state.allowedSites[activeAddress], and the
-// Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68) filters a
-// hostname out of state[key][addr] in place, deleting the address key
-// entirely once its list is empty — the exact membership-vs-whole-field
-// pattern that made the whole-field `wallets` diff unsafe, on a
-// security-relevant field: a stale whole-field save here can resurrect a
-// revoked permission or wipe a freshly granted one.
+// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }. Mutated in place
+// from two different contexts — rememberSiteChoice() in
+// src/background/index.js pushes a newly approved origin onto
+// state.allowedSites[activeAddress], and the Settings "revoke" button
+// (forgetOrigin() in src/popup/views/settings.js) filters an origin out of
+// state[key][addr] in place, deleting the address key entirely once its list
+// is empty — the exact membership-vs-whole-field pattern that made the
+// whole-field `wallets` diff unsafe, on a security-relevant field: a stale
+// whole-field save here can resurrect a revoked permission or wipe a freshly
+// granted one.
 const ADDR1 = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 const ADDR2 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
 
-function approveSite(pageState, address, hostname) {
+function approveSite(pageState, address, origin) {
     if (!pageState.allowedSites[address]) {
         pageState.allowedSites[address] = [];
     }
-    if (!pageState.allowedSites[address].includes(hostname)) {
-        pageState.allowedSites[address].push(hostname);
+    if (!pageState.allowedSites[address].includes(origin)) {
+        pageState.allowedSites[address].push(origin);
     }
 }
 
-function revokeSite(pageState, hostname) {
+function revokeSite(pageState, origin) {
     for (const addr of Object.keys(pageState.allowedSites)) {
         pageState.allowedSites[addr] = pageState.allowedSites[addr].filter(
-            (h) => h !== hostname,
+            (o) => o !== origin,
         );
         if (pageState.allowedSites[addr].length === 0) {
             delete pageState.allowedSites[addr];
@@ -308,7 +309,7 @@ describe("a dApp approval racing a stale Settings page's later save", () => {
         await storage.set({
             autistmask: {
                 wallets: [W1],
-                allowedSites: { [ADDR2]: ["other.example"] },
+                allowedSites: { [ADDR2]: ["https://other.example"] },
             },
         });
 
@@ -318,24 +319,24 @@ describe("a dApp approval racing a stale Settings page's later save", () => {
         await settings.state.loadState();
 
         // A dApp approval window, opened later, approves a new site for a
-        // different address and saves — the real sequence at
-        // src/background/index.js:592-599.
+        // different address and saves — the real sequence in
+        // rememberSiteChoice(), src/background/index.js.
         const approval = loadPage(storage);
         await approval.state.loadState();
-        approveSite(approval.state.state, ADDR1, "dapp.example");
+        approveSite(approval.state.state, ADDR1, "https://dapp.example");
         await approval.state.saveState();
         expect(
             (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
-        ).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
+        ).toEqual(["https://dapp.example"]);
 
-        // Settings revokes its own, unrelated site — the real sequence at
-        // src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — and saves from state loaded
-        // before the dApp approval ever happened.
-        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "other.example");
+        // Settings revokes its own, unrelated site — the real sequence in
+        // forgetOrigin(), src/popup/views/settings.js — and saves from state
+        // loaded before the dApp approval ever happened.
+        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "https://other.example");
         await settings.state.saveState();
 
         const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
-        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toEqual(["https://dapp.example"]);
         expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toBeUndefined();
     });
 });
@@ -346,7 +347,7 @@ describe("a revoked site permission against a stale page's later save", () => {
         await storage.set({
             autistmask: {
                 wallets: [W1],
-                allowedSites: { [ADDR1]: ["evil.example"] },
+                allowedSites: { [ADDR1]: ["https://evil.example"] },
             },
         });
 
@@ -354,23 +355,24 @@ describe("a revoked site permission against a stale page's later save", () => {
         const stale = loadPage(storage);
         await stale.state.loadState();
 
-        // Settings revokes it — src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — from a
-        // second page.
+        // Settings revokes it — forgetOrigin(), src/popup/views/settings.js —
+        // from a second page.
         const settings = loadPage(storage);
         await settings.state.loadState();
-        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "evil.example");
+        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "https://evil.example");
         await settings.state.saveState();
         expect(
             (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
         ).toBeUndefined();
 
         // The stale page, unaware of the revoke, approves an unrelated site
-        // for a different address and saves — src/background/index.js:592-599.
-        approveSite(stale.state.state, ADDR2, "good.example");
+        // for a different address and saves — rememberSiteChoice(),
+        // src/background/index.js.
+        approveSite(stale.state.state, ADDR2, "https://good.example");
         await stale.state.saveState();
 
         const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
-        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toEqual(["good.example"]);
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toEqual(["https://good.example"]);
         expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toBeUndefined();
     });
 });

tests/stateRecovery.test.js

@@ -148,6 +148,173 @@ describe("the destructive reset on the recovery screen", () => {
     });
 });
 
+describe("a popup already open when the stored profile becomes unreadable", () => {
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373. The popup used to stay
+    // on the wallet list with the last good balances, and only a reopen
+    // reached the recovery screen.
+    test("moves to the recovery screen at its next refresh", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
+
+        env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+        await env.tick();
+
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
+        expect(env.text("state-recovery-problem").length).toBeGreaterThan(10);
+        expect(env.hidden("btn-settings")).toBe(true);
+        expect(env.storage.read("autistmask")).toEqual(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+    });
+
+    test("stops the ten-second refresh", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+        env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+        await env.tick();
+        const { refreshBalances } = require("../src/shared/balances");
+        const calls = refreshBalances.mock.calls.length;
+
+        await env.tick();
+
+        expect(refreshBalances).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(calls);
+    });
+
+    test("a later save does not clear what the user exported or typed", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+        env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
+        await env.tick();
+
+        await env.click("btn-state-recovery-export");
+        env.node("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "erase my";
+        // Such as the save of a refresh already in flight when the screen
+        // went up.
+        const { saveState } = require("../src/shared/state");
+        await expect(saveState()).rejects.toThrow();
+        await env.settle();
+
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
+        expect(env.hidden("state-recovery-blob")).toBe(false);
+        expect(env.value("state-recovery-reset-input")).toBe("erase my");
+    });
+
+    // The record can become readable again under this popup, erased from the
+    // recovery screen of another window, so a save from this one can succeed.
+    test("a popup opened after the record is erased elsewhere shows a screen", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+        env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+        await env.tick();
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
+
+        await env.storage.remove("autistmask");
+        const { saveState } = require("../src/shared/state");
+        await saveState();
+
+        const reopened = await bootPopup(env.storage.read("autistmask"));
+        expect(reopened.visibleViews()).toEqual(["welcome"]);
+    });
+
+    test("a stored current view of the recovery screen does not blank the popup", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(
+            unversionedValidProfile({ currentView: "state-recovery" }),
+        );
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
+    });
+
+    test("a transaction wait that ends under it does not replace it", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(
+            unversionedValidProfile({
+                currentView: "wait-tx",
+                viewData: {
+                    pendingWait: {
+                        hash: "0x1",
+                        txInfo: { to: ADDRESS, amount: "1", token: "ETH" },
+                        broadcastTime: Date.now(),
+                    },
+                },
+            }),
+        );
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["wait-tx"]);
+        env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
+        await env.tick();
+        await env.click("btn-state-recovery-export");
+        env.node("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "erase my";
+
+        // The test provider answers no receipt lookup, and six that fail in
+        // a row end the wait with an error.
+        for (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) await env.tick();
+
+        expect(env.text("error-tx-message")).toMatch(/could not be reached/);
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
+        expect(env.hidden("state-recovery-blob")).toBe(false);
+        expect(env.value("state-recovery-reset-input")).toBe("erase my");
+    });
+
+    test("a storage read that fails once leaves the wallet list up", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+
+        env.storage.local.get.mockRejectedValueOnce(
+            new Error("IO error: storage busy"),
+        );
+        await env.tick();
+
+        // Reported as a failed save, not mistaken for an unreadable profile.
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(env.node("save-failure-banner")).not.toBeNull();
+
+        await env.tick();
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
+    });
+
+    // The screen it replaces is left as any navigation leaves it: the rules
+    // at the top of src/popup/views/showPhrase.js and exportPrivkey.js hold
+    // for this way off them too.
+    describe("from a screen holding a secret", () => {
+        const PHRASE =
+            "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon" +
+            " abandon abandon abandon abandon about";
+
+        afterEach(() => jest.dontMock("../src/shared/vault"));
+
+        test("a recovery phrase on screen is wiped", async () => {
+            jest.doMock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+                decryptWithPassword: async () => PHRASE,
+            }));
+            const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+            require("../src/popup/views/showPhrase").show(0);
+            env.node("show-phrase-password").value = "password";
+            await env.click("btn-show-phrase-reveal");
+            expect(env.text("show-phrase-value")).toBe(PHRASE);
+
+            env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+            await env.tick();
+
+            expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
+            expect(env.text("show-phrase-value")).toBe("");
+        });
+
+        test("a private key still being decrypted is never written", async () => {
+            let answer;
+            jest.doMock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+                decryptWithPassword: () =>
+                    new Promise((resolve) => {
+                        answer = resolve;
+                    }),
+            }));
+            const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+            require("../src/popup/views/exportPrivkey").show(0, 0);
+            env.node("export-privkey-password").value = "password";
+            const revealing = env.click("btn-export-privkey-confirm");
+
+            env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+            await env.tick();
+            expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
+            expect(env.value("export-privkey-password")).toBe("");
+
+            answer(PHRASE);
+            await revealing;
+            expect(env.text("export-privkey-value")).toBe("");
+        });
+    });
+});
+
 describe("an unversioned profile that is perfectly valid", () => {
     // The upgrade case. Every install in the field is in this state, and the
     // popup must load it, not offer to wipe it.
@@ -167,7 +334,9 @@ describe("an unversioned profile that is perfectly valid", () => {
         expect(stored.wallets[0].encryptedSecret).toBe("encrypted-secret-1");
         expect(stored.wallets[0].addresses[0].address).toBe(ADDRESS);
         expect(stored.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
-        expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+        expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({
+            [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
+        });
     });
 });
 

tests/support/popupBoot.js

@@ -20,6 +20,30 @@ const path = require("path");
 
 const { makeStorageStub } = require("./storageStub");
 
+// The four libraries the popup loads from node_modules, loaded once per test
+// file and handed to every boot. jest.resetModules() in bootPopup() empties the
+// module cache but keeps what jest.doMock() registered, so these registrations
+// hold for every boot in the file and the libraries are not loaded again. None
+// of them holds popup state; everything under src/ is still loaded fresh on
+// each boot.
+//
+// A test's own mock of one of them: a jest.doMock() made inside the test
+// replaces the registration here, as it would for any module. A top-of-file
+// jest.mock() is what the require() below gets, so it is kept, but its factory
+// runs once per file and every boot shares the same mock object.
+const ethers = require("ethers");
+const sodium = require("libsodium-wrappers-sumo");
+const QRCode = require("qrcode");
+const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
+jest.doMock("ethers", () => ethers);
+jest.doMock("libsodium-wrappers-sumo", () => sodium);
+jest.doMock("qrcode", () => QRCode);
+jest.doMock("ethereum-blockies-base64", () => makeBlockie);
+
+// Taken before any boot replaces them; see bootPopup().
+const realSetInterval = globalThis.setInterval;
+const realClearInterval = globalThis.clearInterval;
+
 const POPUP_HTML = fs.readFileSync(
     path.join(__dirname, "..", "..", "src", "popup", "index.html"),
     "utf8",
@@ -51,7 +75,7 @@ function unversionedValidProfile(extra) {
         networkId: "mainnet",
         rpcUrl: "https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com",
         blockscoutUrl: "https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2",
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
         theme: "system",
@@ -272,9 +296,20 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
         }),
         addEventListener: () => {},
     };
-    // The 10s refresh loop init() starts would outlive the test.
-    const realSetInterval = globalThis.setInterval;
-    globalThis.setInterval = () => 0;
+    // The ten-second refresh init() starts, and a transaction wait's timers,
+    // would outlive the test. So every interval is recorded rather than
+    // started, clearInterval() removes it as a browser would, and tick() below
+    // runs the ones still set. Put back by cleanupPopup().
+    const intervals = new Map();
+    let lastId = 0;
+    globalThis.setInterval = (fn) => {
+        lastId += 1;
+        intervals.set(lastId, fn);
+        return lastId;
+    };
+    globalThis.clearInterval = (id) => {
+        intervals.delete(id);
+    };
 
     require("../../src/popup/index");
 
@@ -296,8 +331,6 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
     }
     await settle();
 
-    globalThis.setInterval = realSetInterval;
-
     return {
         storage,
         document,
@@ -317,6 +350,12 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
             for (const fn of fns) await fn();
             await settle();
         },
+        // Every interval still set runs once: the ten-second refresh, and a
+        // transaction wait's receipt poll and elapsed counter while one runs.
+        tick: async () => {
+            for (const fn of intervals.values()) await fn();
+            await settle();
+        },
         settle,
         // The view ids whose section is not hidden, as the audit measured them.
         visibleViews: () => {
@@ -334,6 +373,8 @@ function cleanupPopup() {
     delete globalThis.chrome;
     delete globalThis.document;
     delete globalThis.window;
+    globalThis.setInterval = realSetInterval;
+    globalThis.clearInterval = realClearInterval;
 }
 
 module.exports = {

tests/symbolSpoof.test.js

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
         errorf: () => {},
     },
     debugFetch: jest.fn(),
+    urlOrigin: () => "",
     setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
     isDebug: () => false,
 }));

tests/transactions.test.js

@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
 
     test("queries only the two Blockscout endpoints for the address", async () => {
         respondWith([], []);
-        await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "ETH");
         expect(debugFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
         const urls = debugFetch.mock.calls.map((c) => c[0]);
         expect(urls).toContain(
@@ -1283,7 +1283,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
             ],
         );
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "ETH");
         expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
         const merged = txs[0];
         // The received leg (the swap output) supplies the display amount.
@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
             ],
         );
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "ETH");
         expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
         expect(txs[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
         expect(txs[0].value).toBe("1500.5000");
@@ -1346,7 +1346,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
         });
         respondWith([], [leg("1000000"), leg("2000000")]);
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "ETH");
         expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
         // Keyed by hash plus contract, so the later leg wins.
         expect(txs[0].exactValue).toBe("2.0");
@@ -1386,7 +1386,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
             ],
         );
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "ETH");
         expect(txs.map((t) => t.symbol).sort()).toEqual(["USDC", "WETH"]);
     });
 
@@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
             ],
         );
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "ETH");
         expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
         expect(txs[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
         expect(txs[0].exactValue).toBe("1.0");
@@ -1452,10 +1452,43 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
         });
         respondWith([item(6), item(8), item(7)], []);
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, 2);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "ETH", 2);
         expect(txs.map((t) => t.blockNumber)).toEqual([21000008, 21000007]);
     });
 
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/372: the caller hands in
+    // the active network's nativeCurrency, and a native entry carries it.
+    test("a native entry is labelled with the native token symbol handed in", async () => {
+        respondWith(
+            [
+                {
+                    hash: "0x" + "a".repeat(64),
+                    block_number: 21000090,
+                    timestamp: TS,
+                    from: { hash: ORDINARY_PEER },
+                    to: { hash: VICTIM, is_contract: false },
+                    value: "10000000000000000",
+                    method: null,
+                    status: "ok",
+                },
+            ],
+            [],
+        );
+        const sepolia = await fetchRecentTransactions(
+            VICTIM,
+            BLOCKSCOUT,
+            "SepoliaETH",
+        );
+        expect(sepolia[0].symbol).toBe("SepoliaETH");
+        expect(sepolia[0].value).toBe("0.0100");
+        const mainnet = await fetchRecentTransactions(
+            VICTIM,
+            BLOCKSCOUT,
+            "ETH",
+        );
+        expect(mainnet[0].symbol).toBe("ETH");
+    });
+
     test("the fake token transfer survives fetching and is then filtered", async () => {
         respondWith(
             [],
@@ -1476,7 +1509,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
             ],
         );
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "ETH");
         expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
         expect(txs[0].contractAddress).toBe(FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT);
         expect(txs[0].holders).toBe(0);
@@ -1515,19 +1548,31 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
 
         test("an omitted holders_count parses to null", async () => {
             respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(OMITTED));
-            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
+                VICTIM,
+                BLOCKSCOUT,
+                "ETH",
+            );
             expect(txs[0].holders).toBeNull();
         });
 
         test("a null holders_count parses to null", async () => {
             respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(NULLED));
-            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
+                VICTIM,
+                BLOCKSCOUT,
+                "ETH",
+            );
             expect(txs[0].holders).toBeNull();
         });
 
         test("the transfer survives the low-holder filter", async () => {
             respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(OMITTED));
-            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
+                VICTIM,
+                BLOCKSCOUT,
+                "ETH",
+            );
             expect(filterTransactions(txs, filters()).transactions).toEqual(
                 txs,
             );
@@ -1539,7 +1584,11 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
         // holder count is the only rule that can catch it.
         test('a reported holders_count of "0" still parses to 0 and is filtered', async () => {
             respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(ZERO));
-            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
+                VICTIM,
+                BLOCKSCOUT,
+                "ETH",
+            );
             expect(txs[0].holders).toBe(0);
             expect(filterTransactions(txs, filters()).transactions).toEqual([]);
         });
@@ -1555,7 +1604,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
             },
         }));
         await expect(
-            fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT),
+            fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "ETH"),
         ).resolves.toEqual([]);
     });
 

tests/transferAmount.test.js

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 // contract at signing time, with nothing comparing the two, so a token whose
 // on-chain scale differed signed an amount that was never displayed.
 
-const { parseUnits } = require("ethers");
+const { formatUnits, parseUnits } = require("ethers");
 const {
     displayedDecimals,
     transferAmountUnits,
@@ -25,7 +25,17 @@ describe("displayedDecimals", () => {
         expect(displayedDecimals(MAX_DECIMALS)).toBe(MAX_DECIMALS);
     });
 
-    test("refuses anything that is not a uint8", () => {
+    // decimals() is a uint8, but formatUnits() and parseUnits() stop at 80
+    // places, so a larger scale cannot be shown or encoded
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/350).
+    test("accepts exactly the scales the formatter accepts", () => {
+        expect(() => formatUnits(1n, MAX_DECIMALS)).not.toThrow();
+        expect(() => parseUnits("1", MAX_DECIMALS)).not.toThrow();
+        expect(() => formatUnits(1n, MAX_DECIMALS + 1)).toThrow();
+        expect(() => parseUnits("1", MAX_DECIMALS + 1)).toThrow();
+    });
+
+    test("refuses anything that is not a uint8 the formatter accepts", () => {
         for (const bad of [
             null,
             undefined,

tests/typedDataPermit.test.js

@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ async function openSignScreen(data) {
             if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
             reply({
                 type: "sign",
-                hostname: "dapp.example",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
                 isPhishingDomain: false,
                 approvedFrom: OWNER,
                 signParams: request(data),

tests/uniswap.test.js

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ const ROUTER_ADDR = "0x66a9893cc07d91d95644aedd05d03f95e1dba8af";
 const USDT_ADDR = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
 const WETH_ADDR = "0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2";
 const USDC_ADDR = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
+const DAI_ADDR = "0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F";
+const SEPOLIA_WETH_ADDR = "0xfFf9976782d46CC05630D1f6eBAb18b2324d6B14";
 const USER_ADDR = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 // AutistMask's first-ever swap, 2026-02-27.
@@ -75,6 +77,14 @@ function encodeV2SwapExactIn(recipient, amountIn, amountOutMin, pathAddrs) {
     );
 }
 
+// Helper: encode a V2_SWAP_EXACT_OUT input (command 0x09)
+function encodeV2SwapExactOut(recipient, amountOut, amountInMax, pathAddrs) {
+    return coder.encode(
+        ["address", "uint256", "uint256", "address[]", "bool"],
+        [recipient, amountOut, amountInMax, pathAddrs, true],
+    );
+}
+
 // Helper: encode a V3_SWAP_EXACT_IN input (command 0x00)
 function encodeV3SwapExactIn(recipient, amountIn, amountOutMin, pathTokens) {
     // V3 path: token(20) + fee(3) + token(20) ...
@@ -223,6 +233,233 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
         expect(minOut.value).toContain("WETH");
     });
 
+    // Buy exactly 0.5 WETH for at most 1,500 USDC, paid by the user, sent to
+    // the caller (the router's MSG_SENDER recipient, address(1)).
+    test("decodes V2_SWAP_EXACT_OUT, stating the input amount as a maximum", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            "0x09", // V2_SWAP_EXACT_OUT
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactOut(
+                    "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
+                    500000000000000000n, // amountOut: 0.5 WETH
+                    1500000000n, // amountInMax: 1,500 USDC (6 decimals)
+                    [USDC_ADDR, WETH_ADDR],
+                ),
+            ],
+            1767225600n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result.name).toBe("Swap USDC → WETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Token In").address).toBe(USDC_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").address).toBe(WETH_ADDR);
+
+        // The wait, success and error screens show rawValue as the amount, so
+        // it says "Up to" as well.
+        const amount = detail(result, "Amount");
+        expect(amount.value).toBe("Up to 1500.0000 USDC");
+        expect(amount.rawValue).toBe("Up to 1500.0000");
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.5000 WETH");
+    });
+
+    // Buy exactly 1,500 USDC for at most 0.5 ETH: WRAP_ETH of the maximum, the
+    // swap, then UNWRAP_WETH of 0, which returns the ETH the swap did not spend.
+    test("a V2 exact-out swap paid in ETH shows the token it buys and a maximum", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8", "uint8"], [0x0b, 0x09, 0x0c]),
+            [
+                encodeWrapEth(ROUTER_ADDR, 500000000000000000n),
+                encodeV2SwapExactOut(
+                    USER_ADDR,
+                    1500000000n, // amountOut: 1,500 USDC
+                    500000000000000000n, // amountInMax: 0.5 WETH
+                    [WETH_ADDR, USDC_ADDR],
+                ),
+                encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH same encoding
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result.name).toBe("Swap ETH → USDC");
+
+        const amount = detail(result, "Amount");
+        expect(amount.value).toBe("Up to 0.5000 ETH");
+        expect(amount.rawValue).toBe("Up to 0.5000");
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").address).toBe(USDC_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("1500.0000 USDC");
+    });
+
+    // Buy exactly 0.5 ETH for at most 1,500 USDC under a permit: the swap buys
+    // WETH and UNWRAP_WETH turns it into ETH.
+    test("a V2 exact-out swap that buys ETH shows ETH and the permit as a maximum", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8", "uint8"], [0x0a, 0x09, 0x0c]),
+            [
+                encodePermit2(USDC_ADDR, 1500000000n, ROUTER_ADDR),
+                encodeV2SwapExactOut(
+                    ROUTER_ADDR,
+                    500000000000000000n, // amountOut: 0.5 WETH
+                    1500000000n, // amountInMax: 1,500 USDC
+                    [USDC_ADDR, WETH_ADDR],
+                ),
+                encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 500000000000000000n), // UNWRAP_WETH
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result.name).toBe("Swap USDC → ETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Amount").value).toBe("Up to 1500.0000 USDC");
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe("ETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.5000 ETH");
+    });
+
+    // Paid in a token, an UNWRAP_WETH of 0 after a swap that buys something
+    // other than WETH leaves the output side as it is: Token Out and Min.
+    // received are the token bought and its figure, not ETH.
+    test.each([
+        {
+            paidIn: "WETH",
+            tokenIn: WETH_ADDR,
+            amountInMax: 500000000000000000n, // 0.5 WETH
+            tokenOut: USDC_ADDR,
+            amountOut: 1300000000n, // 1,300 USDC
+            minReceived: "1300.0000 USDC",
+        },
+        {
+            paidIn: "USDC",
+            tokenIn: USDC_ADDR,
+            amountInMax: 8000000n, // 8 USDC
+            tokenOut: DAI_ADDR,
+            amountOut: 7000000000000000000n, // 7 DAI
+            minReceived: "7.0000 DAI",
+        },
+    ])(
+        "a V2 exact-out swap paid in $paidIn, then UNWRAP_WETH, shows the token it buys",
+        ({ tokenIn, amountInMax, tokenOut, amountOut, minReceived }) => {
+            const data = buildExecute(
+                solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8", "uint8"], [0x0a, 0x09, 0x0c]),
+                [
+                    encodePermit2(tokenIn, amountInMax, ROUTER_ADDR),
+                    encodeV2SwapExactOut(USER_ADDR, amountOut, amountInMax, [
+                        tokenIn,
+                        tokenOut,
+                    ]),
+                    encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH
+                ],
+                9999999999n,
+            );
+
+            const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+            expect(detail(result, "Token Out").address).toBe(tokenOut);
+            expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe(minReceived);
+        },
+    );
+
+    // An exact-in swap is held to the same rule: buying USDC, then UNWRAP_WETH,
+    // receives USDC.
+    test("an exact-in swap to a token other than WETH, then UNWRAP_WETH, shows that token", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x08, 0x0c]),
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 2000000n, 1900000n, [
+                    USDT_ADDR,
+                    USDC_ADDR,
+                ]),
+                encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result.name).toBe("Swap USDT → USDC");
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").address).toBe(USDC_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("1.9000 USDC");
+    });
+
+    // Paid in ETH, with an exact-out step, the last swap step buys WETH, so
+    // UNWRAP_WETH makes the output ETH.
+    test("an ETH-paid swap whose last step buys WETH, then UNWRAP_WETH, shows ETH", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(
+                ["uint8", "uint8", "uint8", "uint8"],
+                [0x0b, 0x09, 0x08, 0x0c],
+            ),
+            [
+                encodeWrapEth(ROUTER_ADDR, 500000000000000000n),
+                encodeV2SwapExactOut(
+                    ROUTER_ADDR,
+                    1500000000n, // amountOut: 1,500 USDC
+                    500000000000000000n, // amountInMax: 0.5 WETH
+                    [WETH_ADDR, USDC_ADDR],
+                ),
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(
+                    ROUTER_ADDR,
+                    1500000000n, // amountIn: 1,500 USDC
+                    400000000000000000n, // amountOutMin: 0.4 WETH
+                    [USDC_ADDR, WETH_ADDR],
+                ),
+                encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe("ETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.4000 ETH");
+    });
+
+    // Sepolia's WETH is a different contract; UNWRAP_WETH makes it ETH too.
+    test("a swap to Sepolia WETH, then UNWRAP_WETH, shows ETH", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x08, 0x0c]),
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 1000000n, 500000000000000n, [
+                    USDC_ADDR,
+                    SEPOLIA_WETH_ADDR,
+                ]),
+                encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe("ETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.0005 ETH");
+    });
+
+    // A step that states a Min. received figure but names no output token has
+    // set the output side, so UNWRAP_WETH does not make it ETH: nothing says
+    // the figure is counted in WETH.
+    test("a step with a minimum but no output token, then UNWRAP_WETH, names no token", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x10, 0x0c]),
+            [
+                encodeV4Swap(new Uint8Array([V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN]), [
+                    encodeV4ExactIn(
+                        USDC_ADDR,
+                        [], // no path: this step names no output currency
+                        1000000000n, // 1,000 USDC
+                        400000000000000000n, // amountOutMin
+                    ),
+                ]),
+                encodeWrapEth(USER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe(
+            "Unknown (not named in the calldata)",
+        );
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            "400000000000000000 base units (decimals unknown)",
+        );
+    });
+
     test("decodes V3_SWAP_EXACT_IN with known tokens", () => {
         const data = buildExecute(
             "0x00", // V3_SWAP_EXACT_IN
@@ -317,6 +554,33 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
         );
     });
 
+    test("shows the deadline as a UTC date and time", () => {
+        const result = uniswap.decode(FIRST_SWAP_CALLDATA, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Deadline").value).toBe("2026-02-27 08:25:51");
+    });
+
+    // A JavaScript date cannot hold this deadline. It used to make the whole
+    // swap undecoded.
+    test("a deadline of the uint256 maximum is stated in words", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            "0x08", // V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 1000000n, 500000000000000n, [
+                    USDT_ADDR,
+                    WETH_ADDR,
+                ]),
+            ],
+            2n ** 256n - 1n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+        expect(result.name).toBe("Swap USDT \u2192 WETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Deadline").value).toBe(
+            "After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)",
+        );
+    });
+
     test("formats permit amount when not unlimited", () => {
         const data = buildExecute(
             "0x0a",
@@ -594,6 +858,104 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
         expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.9900 USDC");
     });
 
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/415 — the router's V2
+    // exact-in reads an amountIn of zero as universal-router
+    // Constants.ALREADY_PAID: an earlier step sent the tokens to the pair, and
+    // the swap uses all of them. Against 375998b this read "0.0000 USDT".
+    test("a V2 exact-in already-paid amountIn is named, not printed as zero", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            "0x08",
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(
+                    USER_ADDR,
+                    0n, // Constants.ALREADY_PAID
+                    500000000000000n,
+                    [USDT_ADDR, WETH_ADDR],
+                ),
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token In").value).toContain("USDT");
+        expect(detail(result, "Amount").value).toBe(
+            "Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)",
+        );
+        expect(detail(result, "Amount").rawValue).toBe(
+            "Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)",
+        );
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.0005 WETH");
+    });
+
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/415 — the router passes a
+    // BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20 whenever the balance is at least minBalance, so a
+    // zero one guarantees nothing. Against 375998b it replaced the swap's
+    // output side: Token Out = USDC, Min. received = "None (no minimum
+    // guaranteed)".
+    test("a zero balance check keeps the minimum a swap step stated", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x08, 0x0e]),
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 1000000n, 500000000000000n, [
+                    USDT_ADDR,
+                    WETH_ADDR,
+                ]),
+                encodeBalanceCheck(USER_ADDR, USDC_ADDR, 0n),
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toContain("WETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.0005 WETH");
+    });
+
+    // A nonzero balance check still replaces the output side, as before.
+    test("a nonzero balance check replaces the minimum a swap step stated", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x08, 0x0e]),
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 1000000n, 500000000000000n, [
+                    USDT_ADDR,
+                    WETH_ADDR,
+                ]),
+                encodeBalanceCheck(USER_ADDR, USDC_ADDR, 2000000n),
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toContain("USDC");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("2.0000 USDC");
+    });
+
+    // With no minimum stated before it, a zero balance check is what sets the
+    // output side, and it guarantees nothing.
+    test("a zero balance check with no earlier minimum states no minimum", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x0b, 0x0e]),
+            [
+                encodeWrapEth(ROUTER_ADDR, 1000000000000000000n),
+                encodeBalanceCheck(USER_ADDR, USDT_ADDR, 0n),
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toContain("USDT");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            "None (no minimum guaranteed)",
+        );
+    });
+
     // Pins what https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/pulls/356 changed without
     // testing: a non-swap execute() carrying only PERMIT2_PERMIT names no
     // output currency, so it says so and titles itself "Uniswap Swap" rather

tests/uniswapUnknownDecimals.test.js

@@ -126,6 +126,19 @@ describe("a swap of a token outside the bundled list", () => {
     test("a bundled token on the other side still formats", () => {
         expect(swapDetail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe("0.5000 WETH");
     });
+
+    // A token added by hand carries whatever its decimals() returned, and a
+    // uint8 reaches 255, but formatUnits() throws above 80. The throw left the
+    // whole swap undecoded rather than refused
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/350).
+    test("refuses to format when the token reports more than 80 decimals", () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: NOVEL, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 81 },
+        ];
+        expect(swapDetail(data(), "Amount").value).toBe(
+            "1000000000 base units (decimals unknown)",
+        );
+    });
 });
 
 describe("the Min. received line takes the same rule", () => {

tests/unknownScaleSend.test.js

@@ -382,14 +382,62 @@ describe("a scale the explorer's own rows disagree about", () => {
         );
     });
 
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/377. The Send screen read the
+    // stored balance and said "5.0000 NOVEL", the confirmation screen it leads
+    // to said "unknown (NOVEL)", and the fee message asked the user to go back
+    // and try again, which cannot supply a scale.
+    test("reads the same on the Send screen and the confirmation screen, and the fee message names the scale", async () => {
+        await fetchOntoBoth([novel("6", 5000000n)], [novel("18", FIVE_WETH)]);
+        state.selectedToken = NOVEL;
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: unknown (NOVEL)");
+
+        const txInfo = await reviewSend(NOVEL, "1.5");
+        confirmTx.show(txInfo);
+        await settle();
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("unknown (NOVEL)");
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-unknown-error")).toBe(
+            "The network fee could not be estimated, because this wallet" +
+                " does not know how many decimal places this token uses, so" +
+                " this transaction cannot be sent.",
+        );
+        expect(el("confirm-fee-unknown-error").style.visibility).toBe(
+            "visible",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("while a fee that fails for any other reason keeps its retry", async () => {
+        await fetchOntoBoth([novel("6", 5000000n)], [novel("6", 5000000n)]);
+        const txInfo = await reviewSend(NOVEL, "1.5");
+        const getFeeData = mockProvider.getFeeData;
+        mockProvider.getFeeData = async () => {
+            throw new Error("the node did not answer");
+        };
+        try {
+            confirmTx.show(txInfo);
+            await settle();
+        } finally {
+            mockProvider.getFeeData = getFeeData;
+        }
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-amount")).toBe("Unable to estimate");
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-unknown-error")).toBe(
+            "The network fee could not be estimated, so this transaction" +
+                " cannot be checked against your balance. Please go back and" +
+                " try again.",
+        );
+    });
+
     test("while agreeing rows leave the scale usable", async () => {
         await fetchOntoBoth([novel("6", 5000000n)], [novel("6", 5000000n)]);
+        state.selectedToken = NOVEL;
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 5.0000 NOVEL");
         const txInfo = await reviewSend(NOVEL, "1.5");
         expect(txInfo.tokenDecimals).toBe(6);
         expect(txInfo.tokenBalance).toBe("5.0");
         confirmTx.show(txInfo);
         await settle();
-        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("5.0 NOVEL");
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("5.0000 NOVEL");
         expect(errors()).toBe("");
         expect(sendDisabled()).toBe(false);
     });
@@ -431,7 +479,7 @@ describe("the confirmation screen tells an unknown balance from a zero one", ()
         const zero = await render("0.0");
         expect(unknown.balance).not.toBe(zero.balance);
         expect(unknown.balance).toBe("unknown (NOVEL)");
-        expect(zero.balance).toBe("0.0 NOVEL");
+        expect(zero.balance).toBe("0.0000 NOVEL");
     });
 
     // Both hit INSUFFICIENT_TOKEN — an unknown balance is treated as nothing to
@@ -443,7 +491,7 @@ describe("the confirmation screen tells an unknown balance from a zero one", ()
         expect(unknown.errors).not.toBe(zero.errors);
         expect(unknown.errors).toContain("This token's balance is unknown");
         expect(unknown.errors).not.toContain("You have");
-        expect(zero.errors).toContain("You have 0.0 NOVEL");
+        expect(zero.errors).toContain("You have 0.0000 NOVEL");
         expect(zero.errors).not.toContain("balance is unknown");
     });
 });

tests/walletDelete.test.js

@@ -28,11 +28,14 @@ function makeState(overrides = {}) {
         selectedAddress: 0,
         activeAddress: A0,
         allowedSites: {
-            [A0]: ["a.example"],
-            [A1]: ["b.example"],
-            [B0]: ["c.example"],
+            [A0]: ["https://a.example"],
+            [A1]: ["https://b.example"],
+            [B0]: ["https://c.example"],
+        },
+        deniedSites: {
+            [A1]: ["https://d.example"],
+            [C0]: ["https://e.example"],
         },
-        deniedSites: { [A1]: ["d.example"], [C0]: ["e.example"] },
         ...overrides,
     };
 }
@@ -41,7 +44,7 @@ describe("removeWalletFromState", () => {
     test("deleting the last wallet clears hasWallet", () => {
         const state = makeState({
             wallets: [wallet("A", [A0])],
-            allowedSites: { [A0]: ["a.example"] },
+            allowedSites: { [A0]: ["https://a.example"] },
             deniedSites: {},
         });
 
@@ -109,8 +112,8 @@ describe("removeWalletFromState", () => {
 
         removeWalletFromState(state, 0);
 
-        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["c.example"] });
-        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["e.example"] });
+        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["https://c.example"] });
+        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["https://e.example"] });
     });
 });
 
@@ -126,8 +129,14 @@ function makeAddressState(overrides = {}) {
         selectedWallet: 0,
         selectedAddress: 0,
         activeAddress: A0,
-        allowedSites: { [A0]: ["a.example"], [A1]: ["b.example"] },
-        deniedSites: { [A1]: ["d.example"], [B0]: ["e.example"] },
+        allowedSites: {
+            [A0]: ["https://a.example"],
+            [A1]: ["https://b.example"],
+        },
+        deniedSites: {
+            [A1]: ["https://d.example"],
+            [B0]: ["https://e.example"],
+        },
         ...overrides,
     };
 }
@@ -273,8 +282,8 @@ describe("removeAddressFromState", () => {
 
         removeAddressFromState(state, 0, 1);
 
-        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] });
-        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["e.example"] });
+        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["https://a.example"] });
+        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["https://e.example"] });
     });
 
     // The derivation counter is a high-water mark, never rewound: "+" derives