chore: drop eth_chainId and net_version from PROXY_METHODS (closes #326)

handleRpc answers both methods itself before it reaches its proxy branch, so
the two list entries were never used and the list named two methods that are
never sent to the RPC endpoint. No other entry is answered earlier.

PROXY_METHODS is now exported from the background script so that
tests/proxyMethods.test.js can send every listed method from a page and fail
on any that does not reach the RPC endpoint.

Model: opus-5-5

.gitea/workflows/e2e.yml

@@ -22,11 +22,10 @@ on: [push]
 # These jobs REPORT, they do not gate. Whether a check blocks a merge is
 # Gitea branch protection, which this repo does not configure, so a failure
 # here is a red mark a reviewer has to account for rather than a hard
-# block. Making e2e-chrome a required check is blocked on the measured
+# block. Making e2e-chrome a required check is blocked while reports of the
-# flake in the dApp signing wait -- two of six runs of unmutated code on a
+# Chrome suite failing under load are still open; the "In CI" section of
-# loaded machine -- tracked as
+# README.md names them. A gate that fails at random teaches people to merge
-# https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287. A gate that fails at
+# past red.
-# random teaches people to merge past red.
 #
 # Nothing here may pass vacuously. There is no continue-on-error and no
 # `|| true`. Both scripts exit non-zero when docker is missing, when the

.prettierignore

@@ -2,4 +2,3 @@ node_modules/
 yarn.lock
 dist/
 release/
-.claude/

Dockerfile

@@ -8,12 +8,11 @@ WORKDIR /app
 # image sets it.
 ENV AUTISTMASK_LINT_NATIVE=1
 
-# script/test's default 30s bound is the host figure, against a suite that
+# script/test's default 30s bound is the host figure. In here the same suite
-# takes 23-29s there with three jest workers. In here the same suite starts on
+# starts on a cold jest cache and shares the runner with the rest of the build,
-# a cold jest cache and shares the runner with the rest of the build, so 30s
+# so 30s is too tight — it killed a healthy suite at 30.6s on a cold CI cache.
-# is too tight — it killed a healthy suite at 30.6s on a cold CI cache. 180s
+# 180s still catches a hang in three minutes and cannot be tripped by a suite
-# still catches a hang in three minutes and cannot be tripped by a suite that
+# that is merely running on contended hardware.
-# is merely running on contended hardware.
 ENV AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT=180
 
 # script/bootstrap installs all prerequisites (make via apt here; node

README.md

@@ -342,6 +342,11 @@ fixtures in `tests/e2e/network.js`, so the run is deterministic and fully
 offline; unrecognised outbound requests are reported as failures rather than
 silently allowed.
 
+It also covers the StateRecovery screen, under the shipped CSP: a stored record
+this build cannot read opens the popup on it, its export text box holds that
+record exactly as stored, a near-miss confirmation phrase erases nothing, and
+the exact one erases the record and reloads into Welcome.
+
 It also covers the **Settings screen**, which holds the densest run of element
 id lookups in the codebase and where one wrong id leaves the whole popup blank
 rather than only degrading Settings: that the screen renders populated — the
@@ -371,6 +376,12 @@ reserve while sitting on the same side of the estimate, so swapping the two in
 what [#154](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/154) was, and it was
 previously correct by reading only.
 
+It also covers both ways the wait for a sent transaction's receipt ends on the
+error screen: lookups that still find no receipt 60 seconds after the broadcast,
+and six lookups in a row that fail. Each must show its own message, and Done
+must lead back to the address screen. Both wait in real time, about a minute
+each.
+
 It also covers the **dApp approval round trips** — the one place where the
 content script, the inpage provider, the background worker and the approval
 popup all have to work together. A local test page is served by the route
@@ -381,11 +392,13 @@ handler on a reserved-TLD origin, gets `window.ethereum` from the shipped
 the runner and compared against the active address, the transaction assertions
 run against the raw signed transaction captured at `eth_sendRawTransaction`
 rather than against anything the extension reported, rejecting each prompt is
-required to return a rejection to the page rather than hang or resolve, and the
+required to return a rejection to the page rather than hang or resolve, a prompt
-password is required to be absent from every message the approval window sends
+raised while another approval window has focus is required to open a window of
-to the background — with the message that would carry it required to be present,
+its own, and the password is required to be absent from every message the
-so that check cannot pass by observing nothing. That last one is the standing
+approval window sends to the background — with the message that would carry it
-floor under [#157](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/157).
+required to be present, so that check cannot pass by observing nothing. That
+last one is the standing floor under
+[#157](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/157).
 
 Two limits of that coverage, neither of them papered over. The RPC is stubbed
 throughout, so this is **not** a real dApp against a real network with real
@@ -462,10 +475,11 @@ Chrome that ever changes this fails the run instead of passing it.
 
 `make test-e2e-firefox` builds `dist/firefox/` and drives the **real popup in a
 real Firefox**, installed as an unpacked MV2 temporary add-on via geckodriver.
-It covers popup load, wallet creation through the UI, the Add Token screen, and
+It covers popup load, the StateRecovery screen (the same cases as the Chrome
-the four dApp round trips — `eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`,
+suite), wallet creation through the UI, the Add Token screen, and the four dApp
-`eth_sendTransaction`, and a closed approval window rejecting with EIP-1193 4001
+round trips — `eth_requestAccounts`, `personal_sign`, `eth_sendTransaction`, and
-— driven through the real content script, background page and approval windows.
+a closed approval window rejecting with EIP-1193 4001 — driven through the real
+content script, background page and approval windows.
 
 The suite lives in `tests/e2e/firefox/`. Its WebDriver client (`driver.js`) has
 **no npm dependencies at all**: it is built on global `fetch` and
@@ -619,14 +633,10 @@ The jobs **report, they do not gate.** A failure is a red mark against the
 commit that a reviewer has to account for, not a hard block: whether a check
 blocks a merge is Gitea branch protection, which this repo does not configure.
 
-That is not only a statement about configuration. The Chrome suite is
+That is not only a statement about configuration. No report of the Chrome suite
-**measurably flaky under load** — two of six runs of unmutated code on a busy
+**failing under load** is open now, but it has failed that way before, so a red
-machine lost the approval popup out from under the dApp signing wait, always in
+`e2e-chrome` is read before it is believed. Do not answer one with a retry
-the `#183` section, tracked as
+wrapper: a suite that reruns until it is green stops being evidence.
-[#287](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287). So a red `e2e-chrome`
-has to be read before it is believed, and that flake is the blocker to ever
-making this a required check. Do not answer it with a retry wrapper: a suite
-that reruns until it is green stops being evidence.
 
 Nothing in either job can pass vacuously. There is no `continue-on-error` and no
 `|| true`; both scripts exit non-zero when docker is missing, when the image
@@ -636,7 +646,9 @@ suite outright if its network interception is not in effect.
 Measured on this repo's runner: `e2e-chrome` about 1m55s cold, almost all of it
 the one-time pull of the pinned ~800MB Playwright layer, and well under a minute
 once that layer is cached. `e2e-firefox` about 1m05s cold, and it caches its
-Firefox and geckodriver downloads the same way.
+Firefox and geckodriver downloads the same way. The `e2e-chrome` figures predate
+the two cases that wait for a receipt to end in error, which add about two
+minutes of real waiting.
 
 ### Element id guard (part of `make check`)
 
@@ -695,6 +707,7 @@ src/
     balances.js       — ETH + ERC-20 balance fetching via RPC + Blockscout
     constants.js      — chain IDs, default RPC endpoint, ERC-20 ABI
     ens.js            — ENS forward/reverse resolution (popup only)
+    holders.js        — holder-count parsing and the low-holder rule
     prices.js         — ETH/USD and token/USD via CoinDesk API
     scamlist.js       — known fraud contract addresses
     state.js          — persisted state (extension storage)
@@ -801,13 +814,15 @@ discoverable.
   on critical screens and when space is available to allow users to disambiguate
   addresses visually, as a security feature.
 - **Tailwind CSS**: Utility-first CSS via Tailwind. No custom CSS classes for
-  styling. Tailwind is configured with a minimal monochrome palette. This keeps
+  styling, and no `style="..."` attributes, which the
-  the styling co-located with the markup and eliminates CSS file management. The
+  [Content Security Policy](#content-security-policy) refuses. Tailwind is
-  handful of classes in `styles/main.css` are not styling: `.copy-flash-*`
+  configured with a minimal monochrome palette. This keeps the styling
-  carries the copy feedback animation, and `.am-address` carries the rule that
+  co-located with the markup and eliminates CSS file management. The handful of
-  an address never wraps. Both are invariants that hold in every place they
+  classes in `styles/main.css` are not styling: `.copy-flash-*` carries the copy
-  appear, and spelling either out as repeated utilities is how one of those
+  feedback animation, and `.am-address` carries the rule that an address never
-  places drifts away from the rest.
+  wraps. Both are invariants that hold in every place they appear, and spelling
+  either out as repeated utilities is how one of those places drifts away from
+  the rest.
 - **Vanilla JS**: No framework (React, Vue, Svelte, etc.). The popup UI is small
   enough that vanilla JS with simple view switching is sufficient. A framework
   would add bundle size, build complexity, and attack surface for no benefit at
@@ -841,10 +856,26 @@ something when you click it.
 The same data must be formatted identically everywhere it appears. Token and ETH
 amounts are displayed with exactly 4 decimal places (e.g. "1.0500 ETH", "17.1900
 USDT") in balance lists, transaction lists, send confirmations, and approval
-screens. Timestamps include both an ISO datetime and a humanized relative age
+screens. A transaction's time includes both an ISO datetime and a humanized
-wherever shown. If a formatting rule applies in one place, it applies in every
+relative age, written by `isoDate()` and `timeAgo()` in
-place. Users should never see the same value rendered differently on two
+`src/popup/views/helpers.js` on every screen that shows one; the ISO datetime is
-screens.
+in UTC when the UTC Timestamps setting is on. If a formatting rule applies in
+one place, it applies in every place. Users should never see the same value
+rendered differently on two screens.
+
+The native token's label is a network's `nativeCurrency` in
+`src/shared/networks.js`: `ETH` on mainnet, `SepoliaETH` on Sepolia. The
+wallet's balances and the Send and confirmation screens, which send on the
+active network, use the active network's. A transaction's figures use the one of
+the network its chain id names, whichever network is active: the value and fee
+on the approval screen, the amount on the wait, success and error screens, the
+transaction history and the transaction detail screen, and the refusal of a fee
+above 1 ETH. A chain id that names no network reads `ETH`. Wherever this
+document shows ETH as the label of a native balance, value or fee, in a "Native
+ETH transfer" type line, in the contract-recipient warning or in that refusal,
+Sepolia shows `SepoliaETH`. The swap lines keep `ETH`, the router's own name for
+the native currency, and the ETH/USD price line, shown on mainnet only, keeps
+its fixed wording.
 
 **Specific Exception — Truncation:** On some non-critical display locations, we
 may truncate _a small number_ of characters from the middle of an address solely
@@ -887,7 +918,9 @@ Truncation stays truncation: `0.99999` shows as `0.9999`, never rounded up. The
 rule still renders a genuine zero as `0.0000`. Two lines of a swap say a zero in
 words instead: `Min. received` reads `None (no minimum guaranteed)` for a zero
 minimum, and `Amount` reads `All available (V4 open delta)` when the amount it
-shows is a V4 exact-in `amountIn` of zero.
+shows is a V4 exact-in `amountIn` of zero and
+`Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)` when it is a V2
+exact-in `amountIn` of zero.
 
 The rule and its exception live in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js` as
 `truncateAmount()` and `truncateAmountNeverZero()`. Everything the approval and
@@ -926,7 +959,10 @@ rule: the ERC-20 `transfer`/`approve` line (`src/popup/views/approval.js`) and
 the swap's `Amount` and `Min. received` lines (`src/shared/uniswap.js`). The
 token permission warning on the signature screen takes the same rule for its
 amounts. An unbounded allowance or permit needs no scale to describe and is
-still shown as `Unlimited`.
+still shown as `Unlimited`. A source's answer counts only if it is a whole
+number from 0 to 80: `decimals()` returns a `uint8`, but `formatUnits()` cannot
+format more than 80 decimal places, so a token that reports 81 to 255 is shown
+as one whose scale nothing knows.
 
 The rule holds only if nothing invents a scale UPSTREAM of it. Those three
 sources are read as authoritative, so a value written into one of them cannot be
@@ -977,7 +1013,8 @@ read:
   exact-out step, whichever step set the line, including the `WRAP_ETH` of a
   swap paid in ETH and a `PERMIT2_PERMIT`. The swap spends at most that figure,
   not necessarily all of it; the wait, success and error screens show it with
-  the same words. `Unlimited` and `All available (V4 open delta)` keep their
+  the same words. `Unlimited`, `All available (V4 open delta)` and
+  `Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)` keep their
   wording. When a V2 exact-out step sets `Min. received`, that line shows its
   `amountOut`, the exact amount it buys.
 - `All available (V4 open delta)`: the swap's `Amount` line, when the amount it
@@ -988,11 +1025,22 @@ read:
   V2 exact-out, `WRAP_ETH` or V4 swap step. A V2 exact-out step gives its
   `amountInMax`, and a V4 swap step the `amountIn` of its first readable
   exact-in action.
+- `Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)`: the swap's
+  `Amount` line, when the amount it shows is a V2 exact-in `amountIn` of zero.
+  The router reads that zero as "the pair already holds the input tokens": the
+  step pays nothing itself and swaps whatever an earlier step sent to the pair,
+  so the calldata states no quantity. A V3 exact-in `amountIn` of zero has no
+  such meaning and is shown as a zero.
 - `None (no minimum guaranteed)`: the swap's `Min. received` line, when the
   minimum it shows is zero, whether a V2, V3 or V4 swap's minimum or a
   `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step's `minBalance`. Before
   [#359](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/359), a zero `minBalance`
-  read `0.0000` when the token's scale was known.
+  read `0.0000` when the token's scale was known. The router passes a balance
+  check whenever the balance is at least `minBalance`, so a zero `minBalance`
+  guarantees nothing: it sets `Token Out` and `Min. received` only when the
+  output side holds no minimum, not even a zero one, at the point the check is
+  reached, and otherwise leaves the current token and figure in place. A nonzero
+  `minBalance` sets both lines, as a swap step does.
 
 The swap's `Token In` and `Token Out` lines name a currency, not an amount; each
 reads `Unknown (not named in the calldata)` when the decoder found no token for
@@ -1005,6 +1053,12 @@ unwraps the WETH it did not spend shows USDC. The token permission warning on
 the signature screen has its own amount wording, including `Unknown`; the
 SignApproval section below describes it.
 
+The swap's `Deadline` line is the router's deadline as a UTC date and time, e.g.
+`2026-02-27 08:25:51`. A JavaScript date reaches only to 275760-09-13 00:00:00
+UTC, so a later deadline, such as the `uint256` maximum, reads
+`After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)` rather than leaving the
+whole swap undecoded.
+
 #### Partial USD totals
 
 Prices are fetched for the top 25 tokens only, so an address can hold assets the
@@ -1083,15 +1137,21 @@ balance is nonzero and it is in the bundled known-token list, is tracked by the
 user, or has 1,000 or more holders; a token claiming a symbol from the bundled
 list from any other contract address is always dropped, and so is any token
 claiming a symbol that belongs to the native asset and therefore has no
-legitimate contract at all (`"ETH"`). That filter is unconditional — the "Hide
+legitimate contract at all (`"ETH"`, and every network's `nativeCurrency`, such
+as `"SepoliaETH"`, on every network). That filter is unconditional — the "Hide
 tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders" setting governs the transaction history
-and the send-screen token selector, not this list. `fetchTokenBalances()` stores
+and the send-screen token selector, not this list. A token's holder count is
-every nonzero holding of a token it admits, however small, but a holding below
+unknown when the explorer reports none, or reports anything other than a whole
-0.000001 is left out of the balance lists, the send-screen token selector, the
+number written in digits alone, such as `1,000` or `1e3` (`parseHoldersCount()`
-address total and the remove-address warning (`isBelowOneMillionth()` in
+in `src/shared/holders.js`). This list does not take an unknown count as 1,000
-`src/shared/amountDisplay.js`). The Send and confirmation screens show it when
+or more, so such a token is shown only when it is on the bundled list or
-its token is the one being sent. Tracked tokens with a zero balance are listed
+tracked. `fetchTokenBalances()` stores every nonzero holding of a token it
-as well while "Show tracked tokens with zero balance" is on.
+admits, however small, but a holding below 0.000001 is left out of the balance
+lists, the send-screen token selector, the address total and the remove-address
+warning (`isBelowOneMillionth()` in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js`). The Send and
+confirmation screens show it when its token is the one being sent. Tracked
+tokens with a zero balance are listed as well while "Show tracked tokens with
+zero balance" is on.
 
 #### Stored state and its version
 
@@ -1111,16 +1171,18 @@ because bumping for one would send every older install to StateRecovery for
 nothing.
 
 Every read of the record goes through `assertStateUsable()` first, on the raw
-bytes, before normalization: `loadState()` for the popup and `getState()` for
+bytes, before normalization: `loadState()` and every `saveState()` for the
-the background. It refuses a record that is not an object, a `schemaVersion`
+popup, and `getState()` for the background. It refuses a record that is not an
-this build does not understand (a newer one included), a `wallets` that is not a
+object, a `schemaVersion` this build does not understand (a newer one included),
-list of wallet records with address records in them, and a `networkId` that is
+a `wallets` that is not a list of wallet records with address records in them,
-not a network in `src/shared/networks.js`. Refusing is the whole point — a
+and a `networkId` that is not a network in `src/shared/networks.js`. Refusing is
-record the wallet cannot vouch for is never normalized, never written back, and
+the whole point — a record the wallet cannot vouch for is never normalized,
-never half-loaded. The popup shows StateRecovery; a dApp gets a specific error
+never written back, and never half-loaded. The popup shows StateRecovery,
-(`-32007`, an EIP-1474 server-error code the spec leaves unassigned) saying the
+whether it finds the record unreadable when it opens or at a save while it is
-saved data cannot be read and that nothing was signed or sent, rather than the
+open; a dApp gets a specific error (`-32007`, an EIP-1474 server-error code the
-generic `-32603` every request used to answer.
+spec leaves unassigned) saying the saved data cannot be read and that nothing
+was signed or sent, rather than the generic `-32603` every request used to
+answer.
 
 Every other field of the record is floored in `normalizePersisted()` rather than
 gated, and the floor is not the same for every field. Some are type-checked as a
@@ -1157,15 +1219,16 @@ each caught only by a reviewer re-deriving thirty fields by hand.
 The `allowedSites` case is why the entry check is not optional. A stored
 `{"0x…": "notalist"}` is a well-formed object holding a malformed entry: it
 passed the gate, rendered a completely healthy popup, and then threw inside
-`saveState()`'s per-hostname merge, so every save from that moment on failed and
+`saveState()`'s per-origin merge, so every save from that moment on failed and
 the user went on operating a wallet that was persisting nothing
 ([#362](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362)). A save that fails is
 now also reported rather than swallowed: `onSaveFailure()` in
 `src/shared/state.js` is called for every failed save, awaited or not, and the
 popup puts up a persistent "NOT SAVED" banner (`showSaveFailureBanner()` in
 `src/popup/views/helpers.js`). Storage can still fail for reasons no floor
-covers — a quota, a revoked permission, a record a newer build wrote — and the
+covers — a quota, a revoked permission — and the wallet must never look healthy
-wallet must never look healthy while that is true.
+while that is true. A save that fails because the stored record fails the gate,
+such as one a newer build wrote, gets StateRecovery instead of the banner.
 
 The `networkId` check is not cosmetic: that value is an object KEY into
 `state.networkEndpoints`, so an unvalidated `"__proto__"` would set the map's
@@ -1397,7 +1460,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - Send / Receive buttons
     - Token contract well (ERC-20 only): full contract address (tap to copy,
       etherscan link) plus name, symbol, decimals, holder count and project
-      website where known
+      website where known. The "Holders:" row is left out, not shown as 0, when
+      the token's balance-list entry has no holder count: the explorer did not
+      report a readable one, or the token is not in the balance list
     - Token-filtered transaction list (only this token's transfers)
 - **Transitions**:
     - "Send" → **Send** (token locked: the dropdown is replaced by a static
@@ -1419,6 +1484,17 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - Amount input with current balance display, which reads
       `Current balance: unknown (SYMBOL)` for a token whose scale is unknown, as
       ConfirmTx's balance line does (see Unknown token scale)
+    - "Max" button beside the amount input, always in place. It fills in a
+      token's balance, cut down to the 18 decimal places ConfirmTx accepts for a
+      token that has more, or for ETH the exact balance minus the network fee
+      reserve that ConfirmTx's balance check gates on, never the rounded balance
+      shown above it. The ETH fee is estimated for the recipient entered, so it
+      asks for a recipient first; an estimate that finishes after the screen was
+      left or the address, holding or recipient changed fills nothing in. Where
+      there is nothing to fill in, a flash message says why: the balance does
+      not cover the fee, the fee could not be estimated, or the token's balance
+      is unknown or zero. Typing in the amount makes it an ordinary amount;
+      changing what to send clears an amount Max filled in
     - "Review" button, disabled until the recipient validates
 - **Transitions**:
     - "Review" (valid inputs, ENS resolved) → **ConfirmTx**
@@ -1435,7 +1511,14 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - Token contract: full address + etherscan link (ERC-20 only)
     - From: blockie + color dot + full address + etherscan link + wallet title
     - To: blockie + color dot + full address + etherscan link + ENS name
-    - Amount: value + symbol (USD in parentheses)
+    - Amount: value + symbol (USD in parentheses). An ETH amount Send's "Max"
+      filled in is worked out again from this screen's own fee estimate when it
+      arrives, as the balance minus the reserve, and the transaction is signed
+      with that estimate's fee fields, so a fee fetched again at signing cannot
+      exceed what the amount leaves behind. The address keeps whatever part of
+      the reserve the transaction does not use. If the balance no longer covers
+      the fee, the amount is left as it was and the amount-plus-fee error below
+      blocks the send
     - Your balance: value + symbol (USD in parentheses), or `unknown (SYMBOL)`
       for a token whose scale is unknown
     - Network fee: "Estimating..." then two lines, or "Unable to estimate",
@@ -1563,7 +1646,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - "Transaction" heading, "Back" button
     - Transaction hash: full hash (tap to copy) + etherscan link
     - Type: transaction classification — one of: Native ETH Transfer, ERC-20
-      Token Transfer, Swap, Token Approval, Contract Call, Contract Creation
+      Token Transfer, Swap, Token Approval, Contract Call, Contract Creation. A
+      transfer with a token contract is an ERC-20 Token Transfer whatever symbol
+      the token reports.
     - Status: "Success" or "Failed"
     - From: blockie + color dot + full address (tap to copy) + etherscan link;
       ENS name if available
@@ -1631,13 +1716,13 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
           a value carrying its unit, hex (`0x10`) or exponent (`1e3`) notation —
           is refused with a flash message and the field snaps back to the stored
           threshold, so a number the user did not type is never stored.
-    - Allowed Sites: the hostnames remembered as allowed, under any address,
+    - Allowed Sites: the origins (scheme, host and port) remembered as allowed,
-      with remove buttons
+      under any address, with remove buttons
-    - Connected Sites: the hostnames of the sites allowed without "Remember my
+    - Connected Sites: the origins of the sites allowed without "Remember my
       choice" that are still connected, with remove buttons. Only the background
       holds these, in memory, and Settings asks it for them with
       `AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES`
-    - Denied Sites: the hostnames remembered as denied, under any address, with
+    - Denied Sites: the origins remembered as denied, under any address, with
       remove buttons
     - About: project link, license, author, version, release date, and the
       commit, which links to the commit in the repository
@@ -1651,10 +1736,11 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
     - Tap wallet name → inline rename field (no screen change)
     - `[x]` on a tracked token → removes it in place (no screen change)
     - `[x]` on an allowed or connected site → disconnects that site, in place:
-      its hostname is dropped from Allowed Sites under every address, and
+      its origin is dropped from Allowed Sites under every address, and
       `AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE` has the background end every connection approved
-      without "Remember" from an origin with that hostname, under any address,
+      without "Remember" from that origin, under any address, and send
-      and send `accountsChanged` with an empty list to the site's open tabs.
+      `accountsChanged` with an empty list to the open tabs of that origin. The
+      same host under another scheme or port is another site and is left alone.
       Only the extension's own pages may send either message
     - `[x]` on a denied site → forgets the refusal, in place; it connects
       nothing and tells the background nothing
@@ -1736,7 +1822,10 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
       new password — and, in bold, that without that phrase written down the
       deletion loses everything the wallet holds, forever
     - That the other wallets are not touched
-    - The wallet's name, and a text input asking for it to be typed back
+    - The wallet's name, and a text input asking for it to be typed back. A name
+      that shows nothing at all (only spaces, or only characters that paint
+      nothing) is shown as "Wallet N", its position in the list, and that is
+      what is typed back.
     - Error line
     - "Delete This Wallet Forever" button
 - **Transitions**:
@@ -1744,9 +1833,9 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
       outcomes as "Confirm Delete" above, through the same `finishDelete()`, so
       the selection repair, permission cleanup and `AUTISTMASK_ACTIVE_CHANGED`
       broadcast are identical on both routes
-    - "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name does not match) → "That is not the name
+    - "Delete This Wallet Forever" (name does not match, or the field is empty)
-      of this wallet. Type <name> to confirm." on the error line, nothing
+      → "That is not the name of this wallet. Type <name> to confirm." on
-      deleted
+      the error line, nothing deleted
     - "Back" → **DeleteWallet**, re-entered through its `show()` so the wallet
       selection comes back with it. The two delete screens are siblings rather
       than parent and child: nothing is pushed on the way here, so both have
@@ -1755,8 +1844,13 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
   secret protects nobody: an attacker at the popup who wants the wallet gone can
   uninstall the extension, so the only person such a gate stops is the owner who
   forgot it. The typed name is a check that the user knows which wallet they are
-  on, not a secret, so it is matched with surrounding spaces and letter case
+  on, not a secret, so it is matched as the user can see it: letter case,
-  ignored.
+  surrounding spaces and repeated inner spaces are ignored, and characters that
+  paint nothing (format characters such as the zero-width space,
+  default-ignorable characters, and DELETE — the same set
+  `src/shared/symbolSpoof.js` strips) are removed from both sides before
+  comparing. An empty field, or one holding only spaces or such characters, is
+  refused whatever the wallet is called.
 - Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`, alongside `delete-wallet-confirm`: a popup reopened
   by accident must not land on a screen whose button erases key material.
 
@@ -1838,14 +1932,22 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 
 - **When**: A website requests wallet access via `eth_requestAccounts` or
   `wallet_requestPermissions` and is on neither the allowed nor the denied list.
-  The background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and
+  A site is its full origin, `scheme://host[:port]`, on both lists and for a
-  falls back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
+  connection allowed without "Remember": a choice for `https://dapp.example`
-  `requestApproval()`).
+  says nothing about `http://dapp.example` or another port of that host. The
+  background script prefers the toolbar popup (`action.openPopup()`) and falls
+  back to a separate popup window (`src/background/index.js`,
+  `requestApproval()`). Only one exists per site at a time: a further connection
+  request from a site whose prompt is still unanswered is refused with EIP-1193
+  code `-32002` and opens no new prompt. If that prompt was in a toolbar popup
+  that closed before it connected, and the toolbar popup has since been set to
+  open something else, the refused request shows that prompt again.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Connection Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
       blocklist)
-    - Site hostname (bold) + "wants to connect to your wallet"
+    - Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants to connect to your
+      wallet"
     - Address that will be shared (color dot + full address + etherscan link)
     - "Remember my choice for this site" checkbox
     - "Allow" / "Deny" buttons
@@ -1864,18 +1966,24 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
   programmatically rather than by a user gesture. The background populates the
   transaction (nonce, gas limit, fees, chain id) against the RPC node _before_
   opening the window, so the screen shows a complete transaction and the signed
-  artifact can be compared with it field for field. A request that cannot be
+  artifact can be compared with it field for field. A nonce the site supplies is
-  populated — unreachable node, reverting gas estimate — opens no window and is
+  ignored: the nonce is always the account's next nonce from the node, so a site
-  failed back to the site. Only one transaction approval exists at a time:
+  cannot replace one of the user's pending transactions or leave this one stuck
-  populating fixes the nonce, so a second `eth_sendTransaction` arriving while
+  behind a gap. A request that cannot be populated — unreachable node, reverting
-  one is unanswered is refused with EIP-1193 code `-32002` rather than being
+  gas estimate — opens no window and is failed back to the site. Only one
-  populated at the same nonce. It opens no window and takes no nonce, and the
+  transaction approval exists at a time: populating fixes the nonce, so a second
-  site can send it again once the pending one is answered.
+  `eth_sendTransaction` arriving while one is unanswered is refused with
+  EIP-1193 code `-32002` rather than being populated at the same nonce. It opens
+  no window and takes no nonce, and the site can send it again once the pending
+  one is answered. The window is centred on the browser window the user was last
+  in; if that was another approval window, or the browser refuses the centred
+  position, the browser picks the position.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Transaction Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
       blocklist)
-    - Site hostname (bold) + "wants to send a transaction"
+    - Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants to send a
+      transaction"
     - Decoded action (if calldata is recognized): action name, token details,
       amounts, steps, deadline (see Transaction Decoding)
     - From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
@@ -1901,19 +2009,32 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 
 - **When**: A connected website requests a message signature via
   `personal_sign`, `eth_sign`, or `eth_signTypedData_v4`. Opened the same way as
-  TxApproval, in a separate popup window.
+  TxApproval, in a separate popup window. Only one exists per site at a time: a
+  further signature request, by any of these methods, from a site whose
+  signature request is still unanswered is refused with EIP-1193 code `-32002`
+  and opens no window.
 - **Elements**:
     - "Signature Request" heading
     - Phishing warning banner (shown when the hostname is on the phishing
       blocklist)
-    - Site hostname (bold) + "wants you to sign a message"
+    - Site origin (bold, scheme and port included) + "wants you to sign a
+      message"
     - Danger warning box (shown for `eth_sign`, which signs a raw hash)
     - Type: "Personal message" or "Typed data (EIP-712)"
     - From: color dot + full address + etherscan link
-    - Message: decoded UTF-8 text (personal_sign) or formatted domain/type/
+    - Message: for `personal_sign` and `eth_sign`, the text the message's bytes
-      message fields (EIP-712 typed data). The primary type shown is the one
+      decode to as UTF-8, laid out left to right in the order of the bytes that
-      ethers signs, derived from the typed data's `types`, not the type the site
+      are signed, right-to-left characters included. Each control character,
-      states.
+      each line or paragraph separator (U+2028, U+2029; left in the text, a
+      paragraph separator would end that layout for the text after it), and each
+      character that paints nothing (format characters such as zero-width and
+      bidirectional ones, default-ignorable characters such as variation
+      selectors and Hangul fillers, and DELETE), is shown as a bordered `U+XXXX`
+      mark instead of acting on the text; a line feed is shown as a line break.
+      Bytes that are not UTF-8 are shown as "This message is not text." For
+      typed data, formatted domain/type/message fields (EIP-712). The primary
+      type shown is the one ethers signs, derived from the typed data's `types`,
+      not the type the site states.
     - Token permission warning, at the top of the message (typed data whose
       primary type is `Permit`, as in EIP-2612, or one of Permit2's signature
       types): "⚠️ TOKEN PERMISSION: Signing this lets the spender below take the
@@ -1925,12 +2046,20 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
       domain's `verifyingContract`; any those fields do not give is shown as
       `Unknown`, and the domain, type and message lines still follow. Only typed
       data that cannot be read at all is shown as raw text.
+    - Raw data (`personal_sign` and `eth_sign`): the message's hex exactly as
+      the site sent it. The bytes it encodes are what is signed, as an EIP-191
+      personal message.
     - Password input and an error line
     - "Sign" / "Reject" buttons
 - **Transitions**:
     - Typed data that states no primary type, or one other than the type it
       would be signed as, or that cannot be read → shown with the error line
       saying so and "Sign" disabled; only "Reject" remains
+    - A `personal_sign` or `eth_sign` message that is not hex (`0x` or `0X` and
+      an even number of hex digits, the form ethers' `getBytes` reads when
+      signing) → shown as plain text, with the error line "This message is plain
+      text, not hex, so it cannot be signed." and "Sign" disabled; signing takes
+      the bytes from the hex, so such a message has none to sign
     - "Sign" (correct password) → signs locally → closes popup (returns
       signature)
     - "Sign" (wrong password, or a signing failure) → error line, no screen
@@ -1941,9 +2070,19 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
 
 #### StateRecovery (`state-recovery`)
 
-- **When**: `loadState()` refused the stored profile, so the popup has no
+- **When**: the stored profile fails `assertStateUsable()`. At open, that is
-  profile at all. It is the only screen reached without one, and the only one
+  `loadState()` refusing it, so the popup has no profile at all. While the popup
-  that never appears during ordinary use.
+  is open, on any screen, it is a save refusing it: every `saveState()` reads
+  the stored record and runs the same check before writing, so the popup finds
+  it at the next navigation or ten-second refresh, whether or not the network
+  answers ([#373](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373)). A save that
+  fails for any other reason, such as a storage read or write that errors, gets
+  the "NOT SAVED" banner instead and leaves the screen as it is. The screen it
+  replaces is left as any navigation leaves it, so a revealed phrase or key, or
+  a typed password, is wiped. Once up, the screen stays until the popup closes
+  or reloads: work still running in the popup, such as a transaction wait,
+  cannot replace it, even after the record is erased in another window. It is
+  the only screen that never appears during ordinary use.
 - **Why it exists**: a record the wallet cannot read used to render nothing — no
   view, no message, no control — while every dApp call answered a generic
   internal error, and no reset or wipe control existed anywhere in the product.
@@ -1970,16 +2109,20 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
       Nothing was erased." on the error line
 - **No other control is reachable.** The Settings gear is hidden while this
   screen is up, because every screen behind it renders from the profile that
-  could not be read, and `showView()` is not used to raise it for the same
+  could not be read. `showView()` is not used to raise it, for the same reason:
-  reason — it reads and writes the state singleton.
+  it reads and writes the state singleton. Under an open popup the screen is
+  passed to `showView()` only to run the replaced screen's cleanup; from then on
+  `showView()` shows nothing else in that popup.
 - **Both controls are required.** An export with no reset leaves the user
   looking at a broken profile with no way to use the wallet again; a reset with
   no export destroys the only copy of a record that may hold recoverable key
   material. The typed phrase is the same barrier DeleteWalletLostPassword uses,
   and for the same reason: there is no password to gate this with, since there
   is no profile to check one against.
-- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`: it is never persisted as the current view, because
+- Not in `RESTORABLE_VIEWS`, and never recorded as the current view: the record
-  nothing on this path writes state at all.
+  can become readable again under an open popup, erased in another window, and
+  the next save from that popup then succeeds. A popup opened after that opens
+  normally.
 
 ### External Services
 
@@ -2072,7 +2215,7 @@ a bare string in `manifest/firefox.json` (MV2):
 
 ```
 default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self';
-style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:;
+style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:;
 connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none';
 base-uri 'none'
 ```
@@ -2084,15 +2227,17 @@ wallet's own UI. Escaping is the primary fix for that (see
 `src/shared/html.js`); this is the second line, so an escape that does slip
 cannot reach the network.
 
-Four directives are looser than `'self'`, each for a reason that does not
+`style-src 'self'` admits the stylesheet and nothing inline: both browsers
+refuse a `style="..."` attribute and a `<style>` block. So the popup's markup,
+in `src/popup/index.html` and in the HTML the view helpers build, carries
+Tailwind classes and never a `style` attribute. Script that sets `element.style`
+is not affected; that is how the views show and hide their error lines. An
+inline style that slips in anyway is refused with a console error, which fails
+both end-to-end suites.
+
+These directives differ from a plain `'self'`, each for a reason that does not
 generalise:
 
-- `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` — `src/popup/index.html` and the view helpers set
-  presentation through `style="..."` attributes, which CSP blocks without this.
-  Chrome enforces `style-src` on attributes, not only on `<style>` blocks, and
-  Firefox has never implemented `style-src-attr`, so there is no narrower
-  spelling that works on both targets. It permits inline **style**; script stays
-  under `script-src`, which does not allow `'unsafe-inline'`.
 - `img-src data:` — identicons are generated in the popup by
   `ethereum-blockies-base64` and assigned to `img.src` as `data:` PNGs.
 - `connect-src https: http:` — the RPC endpoint is user-configurable and a local
@@ -2151,6 +2296,17 @@ the log level and turns the banner on, and that is all it may ever do: it feeds
 constant directly, so no runtime toggle in a release build can reach the
 hardcoded test phrase.
 
+At the raised log level the console also shows the wallet's addresses with their
+balances and ENS names, the token contracts looked up, and a line for each
+request made through `debugFetch` in `src/shared/log.js` (the explorer, the
+price feed, the RPC calls a site makes, and the endpoint checks in settings) and
+for its response. A request is logged by its HTTP method, the origin of its URL
+(scheme, host and port) and, for a JSON-RPC call, the method name; the balance
+refresh, the token lookup and a failed endpoint check in settings name the
+endpoint by its origin too. The URL's path and query string, where RPC providers
+put API keys, any user name and password in it, and the request body are never
+logged.
+
 ### Key Decisions
 
 - **No framework**: The popup UI is vanilla JS and HTML. The extension is small
@@ -2277,7 +2433,8 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
   act on and what the user believes they own rather than what the history
   displays. All three surfaces read the rule from `src/shared/symbolSpoof.js`,
   so they cannot answer the question differently. A symbol the list maps to no
-  contract at all — `"ETH"`, the native asset, is the only one — may be borne by
+  contract at all — the native asset's labels: `"ETH"` and every network's
+  `nativeCurrency`, such as `"SepoliaETH"`, on every network — may be borne by
   no contract, so every ERC-20 claiming it is a spoof on all three. The user's
   real ETH balance is not an ERC-20 and is read over RPC, so the rule never sees
   it.
@@ -2286,7 +2443,8 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
   fewer than 1,000 holders are hidden from transaction history by default.
   Legitimate tokens have substantial holder counts; poisoning tokens typically
   have zero. This catches new poisoning contracts that use novel symbols not in
-  the known token list.
+  the known token list. A transfer whose token's holder count is unknown (see
+  Data Model) is kept: only a reported count below 1,000 hides it.
 
 - **Fraud contract blocklist**: AutistMask maintains a local list of known fraud
   contract addresses. Token transfers involving these contracts are filtered
@@ -2296,7 +2454,9 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
 - **Send-side token filtering**: Tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders are
   excluded from the token selector on the send screen. This prevents users from
   accidentally interacting with a spoofed token that appeared in their balance
-  via a fake Transfer event.
+  via a fake Transfer event. A token whose holder count is unknown is kept in
+  the selector. The selector offers only tokens in the balance list, so such a
+  token is one on the bundled list or one the user tracks.
 
 - **Dust transaction filtering**: A second wave of the same attack used real
   native ETH transfers instead of fake tokens. Transaction
@@ -2320,8 +2480,9 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
   both cases identically to the history. The fraud contract blocklist is applied
   unconditionally on that selector and is not consulted by the balance list at
   all. The low-holder setting also gates the send selector, while the balance
-  list's own 1,000-holder floor is unconditional (see Data Model). The dust
+  list's own 1,000-holder floor is unconditional (see Data Model). An unknown
-  threshold applies to the transaction history alone.
+  holder count passes the history and send-selector filters but not that floor.
+  The dust threshold applies to the transaction history alone.
 
 #### Phishing Domain Protection
 

TODO.md

@@ -45,6 +45,358 @@ but the review is broader than any of them.
 
 # Completed Steps
 
+- 2026-10-05: `PROXY_METHODS` in `src/background/index.js` no longer lists
+  `eth_chainId` and `net_version`
+  ([#326](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/326)). `handleRpc` answers
+  both itself before its proxy branch, so the list named two methods that are
+  never sent to the RPC endpoint. No other entry is answered earlier.
+  `tests/proxyMethods.test.js` sends every listed method from a page and fails
+  on any that does not reach the RPC endpoint.
+
+- 2026-10-05: The popup's Content Security Policy no longer allows inline style
+  ([#328](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/328)): `style-src` is
+  `'self'` in both manifests, pinned in `tests/manifest.test.js`. The 42
+  `style="..."` attributes in `src/popup/index.html` and in the markup the view
+  helpers build are now Tailwind classes, each computing to the value it
+  replaced. The 16 address dot colours are written out as whole classes, because
+  Tailwind builds only the classes it finds in the source. The Settings debug
+  well is shown and hidden with the `hidden` class, since clearing an inline
+  `display` no longer uncovers it. Script that sets `element.style` is
+  unaffected.
+
+- 2026-10-05: `.prettierignore` no longer lists an AI vendor's tool directory
+  ([#363](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/363)). The directory is
+  not tracked, so the line ignored nothing.
+
+- 2026-10-05: The Chrome end-to-end suite drives both ways the wait for a
+  transaction's receipt ends on the error screen
+  ([#315](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/315)): lookups that still
+  find no receipt 60 seconds after the broadcast end it with the timeout
+  message, and six lookups that fail in a row end it with the message naming the
+  unreachable network. Done then returns to the address screen. Both cases wait
+  in real time, about a minute each. Playwright's clock would apply to every
+  later test in the run and cannot be removed, and moving the stored broadcast
+  time back can be undone by the save the popup makes every ten seconds.
+
+- 2026-10-05: The Chrome end-to-end suite covers the last of the
+  [#150](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/150) and
+  [#151](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/151) items
+  ([#295](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/295)): a token added on
+  Add Token by its contract address is listed on the address screen;
+  TransactionDetail opened from the token screen leaves that screen on the
+  persisted navigation stack, and Back returns to it; and the token contract row
+  links to the explorer's token page, read off the link rather than followed.
+  The network stub answers `symbol()` and `name()` for the stub token, which
+  adding it reads.
+
+- 2026-10-05: Each control that leads to a signature or to the private key has a
+  test that it refuses a defective wallet before asking for a password
+  ([#254](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/254)): Send on the main,
+  address and token screens, Export Private Key, and both approval screens, as
+  drawn and as clicked. Send on the confirmation screen refuses it too now,
+  because the popup reopens onto that screen from a saved view. The comments
+  that said the wallet's key cannot be derived now say that
+  `getSignerForAddress` refuses it, and the module comment in
+  `src/shared/walletDefects.js` names both earlier import paths.
+
+- 2026-10-05: The Chrome end-to-end suite drives the private key export screen
+  as it drives the recovery phrase screen
+  ([#253](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/253)): the correct
+  password shows the key, leaving by the settings gear empties the screen, and
+  leaving while the password is still being checked never puts the key on it.
+  The cases use the imported key wallet rather than the HD one. Leaving drops
+  the address the screen was showing, and an HD wallet's key cannot be derived
+  without it, so on an HD wallet a late decrypt fails by itself and would never
+  exercise the check that discards it. The screen cannot yet be opened twice in
+  one popup session ([#460](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/460)),
+  so the cases reopen the popup before the second open.
+
+- 2026-10-05: The StateRecovery screen is driven in a real browser under the
+  shipped CSP, in both end-to-end suites
+  ([#361](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/361)). A stored record
+  this build cannot read opens the popup on it; its export text box holds the
+  record exactly as stored; a near-miss confirmation phrase erases nothing; and
+  the exact phrase erases the record and reloads into Welcome. The cases run
+  before any wallet exists: with no wallet nothing saves on a timer, so no save
+  can write a good record over the unreadable one, and the erase leaves the
+  popup on Welcome for wallet creation.
+
+- 2026-10-05: Escaping in the popup's views follows its own rule with no
+  exceptions ([#329](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/329)). The
+  decimals and holder count on a token's screen, and every USD figure (the ETH
+  price, each total and each balance row's value), went into `innerHTML`
+  unescaped; they are escaped now. None could carry markup, but `formatUsd()`
+  writes a value under a cent as `< $0.01`. `displaySymbol()` counts a symbol in
+  code points rather than UTF-16 units, so a cut never splits an emoji into a
+  half that renders as U+FFFD. `explorerLink()`, also named in the issue, was
+  already removed by [#168](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/168).
+
+- 2026-10-05: A Chrome end-to-end test that fails no longer takes later tests
+  down with it ([#318](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/318)). Each
+  test that turns a fixture switch on for itself alone (a held or failing gas
+  estimate, a seeded native transfer or receipt, a token's lying `decimals()` or
+  markup symbol) turns it off again in a `finally`, and the two tests that drive
+  the popup's own send end on the address screen whether they pass or not,
+  reopening the popup to leave a wait for a receipt. The lying-`decimals()` test
+  checks that nothing was broadcast as soon as the send ends, before it waits
+  for the failure screen, so a broadcast fails it in seconds rather than after a
+  60-second wait. The fixture's `decimals()` override tells 0 from no override,
+  so a token with no decimal places can be fixtured.
+
+- 2026-10-05: Chrome draws the popup in its monospace font
+  ([#418](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/418)), as Firefox does.
+  Chrome adds a stylesheet of its own to extension pages that sets the font on
+  `body`, and it beat Tailwind's `font-mono`: Tailwind 4 puts its classes in a
+  cascade layer, and a rule outside any layer wins over them. `body` now carries
+  `font-mono!`, which marks the class important. Both end-to-end suites check
+  the popup's font. The same stylesheet also makes Chrome draw the popup's text
+  at 12px rather than the 14px `text-sm` asks for; that is unchanged, and filed
+  as [#456](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/456).
+
+- 2026-10-05: Dead code removed and copied view helpers shared
+  ([#168](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/168)). AddressDetail and
+  AddressToken each defined their own `isoDate()` and `timeAgo()` in place of
+  the ones in `src/popup/views/helpers.js`, so a fix to the shared pair would
+  not have reached them. The copies were identical; every screen now uses the
+  shared pair. `blockieHtml()` and `tokenLabel()`, each defined twice, live in
+  `helpers.js` too. Removed as never called: `explorerLink()` (the views build
+  explorer links with `explorerUrl()`), `ETHEREUM_SEPOLIA_CHAIN_ID` (the chain
+  id lives in `src/shared/networks.js`), and `getWalletValue()` and
+  `getTotalValue()`: Home's "Total:" is the active address's total, as
+  `README.md` says. `addressColor()` and `etherscanAddressUrl()` are no longer
+  exported. Nothing the user sees changed.
+
+- 2026-10-05: A prompt raised while another approval window has focus opens a
+  window of its own ([#290](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/290)).
+  The background centred each approval window on the last focused window, which
+  could be an earlier approval window still open; headless Chrome reports one as
+  1280x720, so the new window came out where the browser refused to create it,
+  and the request failed with no window at all. It now centres only on a browser
+  window, and when the browser refuses the position it asks again without one
+  and lets the browser place the window. In the Chrome end-to-end suite a test
+  could raise its prompt while the previous test's window was still closing, and
+  then either hit that refusal or take the closing window for its own. After a
+  test that passed, the runner now waits a few seconds for approval windows to
+  close and fails the test if one is still open; after a test that failed, it
+  closes them.
+
+- 2026-10-05: The Send screen has a "Max" button
+  ([#198](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/198)). Emptying an ETH
+  address took guessing an amount and being refused by the confirmation screen's
+  balance check. Max fills in a token's whole balance, cut to the 18 decimal
+  places the confirmation screen accepts, or for ETH the exact balance minus the
+  fee reserve that check gates on, never the four-decimal balance shown; a fee
+  estimate that finishes after the Send screen was left, or its address, holding
+  or recipient changed, fills nothing in. The confirmation screen works a max
+  ETH amount out again from its own fee estimate and signs it with that
+  estimate's fee fields: fetched again at signing, a fee that had risen since
+  would leave amount plus fee above the balance, and the node would refuse the
+  send. A token's maximum is still refused when ETH cannot pay the fee. Where
+  there is nothing to fill in, a flash message says why.
+
+- 2026-10-05: A token scale of zero decimals is tested
+  ([#325](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/325)).
+  `resolveTokenDecimals()` already used a scale of 0 from the bundled list or
+  from a tracked token, but no test said so: turning either of its `d !== null`
+  checks into a plain truthiness check left every test green while a
+  zero-decimal token fell through to the next source, or to "decimals unknown".
+  The approval tests now assert a scale of 0 from each of those two sources,
+  both where it is resolved and on the approval screen's Amount line. The second
+  half of the issue, one shared `toDecimals()`, had already landed with
+  [#349](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349).
+
+- 2026-10-05: The e2e suite waits for a save to land before it closes the popup
+  ([#446](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/446)). The Settings round
+  trip switched the theme and the network and closed the popup at once, and a
+  close before the save lands loses the switch; with the network left on
+  Sepolia, a dozen later tests failed too. Each Settings switch and spam-filter
+  toggle is now waited for in storage before the close, and `reopenPopup()`
+  waits until the view it expects to reopen on is the saved one. The restore
+  half of the round trip and the second filter toggle change a setting right
+  after a reopen, while the reopened popup's own saves may still be running;
+  they rely on the fix for
+  [#448](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/448).
+
+- 2026-10-05: A change made while an earlier save from the same page is still
+  running is stored ([#448](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/448)).
+  `saveStateOnce()` took its baseline from the page's state after the write, so
+  a change made while the save waited on storage counted as already stored and
+  the save queued after it wrote nothing. A setting changed during the read was
+  lost; so was a wallet added, a site revoked or an endpoint changed during the
+  write, and a wallet deleted then stayed in storage. The save now copies the
+  page's fields when it starts, writes from that copy, and keeps the copy as the
+  baseline.
+
+- 2026-10-05: The extension no longer opens a window for a site-connection
+  prompt already answered
+  ([#287](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/287)). When the prompt was
+  decided before the toolbar popup raised for it had loaded, that popup was torn
+  down, `chrome.action.openPopup()` rejected, and the background opened its
+  fallback window for the answered approval and then removed it. In the Chrome
+  end-to-end suite the next test could take that window for its own prompt and
+  lose it under its wait. `openApprovalWindow()` now opens nothing for an
+  approval that is no longer pending. The blocklist test's Reject, whose window
+  closes itself, is clicked as the other site Reject is, with the click
+  witnessed. Making `e2e-chrome` a required check is still blocked: other
+  reports of the Chrome suite failing under load are open, among them
+  [#290](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/290) and
+  [#446](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/446), as `README.md` says.
+
+- 2026-10-05: The lost-password delete confirmation refuses an empty field and
+  ignores characters that paint nothing
+  ([#336](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/336)). A wallet named only
+  with spaces compared equal to an empty field, so typing nothing would have
+  deleted it, and a zero-width space in a name made the name impossible to type
+  back. An empty field is now refused whatever the name is, the same invisible
+  characters `src/shared/symbolSpoof.js` strips are removed from both sides, and
+  a name that shows nothing is shown and typed back as "Wallet N".
+
+- 2026-10-05: A `holders_count` that is not a whole number in plain digits is
+  unknown, not read in part
+  ([#251](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/251)). `parseInt` read
+  `1,000` as 1, `0x10` as 0 and `1e3` as 1, a reported low count that hides the
+  token in the transaction history and the send-screen token selector. A count
+  above `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER` is unknown too, not rounded or `Infinity`. The
+  balance list's `holders !== null` check, which did nothing, is dropped.
+  `README.md` and `docs/README.md` now say how each filter treats an unknown
+  count and that the token screen leaves out its "Holders:" row then, and
+  `README.md` lists `src/shared/holders.js`.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A popup boot in the tests loads transactions without failing
+  ([#429](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/429)). The stand-in for
+  `filterTransactions` in `tests/support/popupBoot.js` returned a bare list,
+  while the real one returns `{ transactions, newFraudContracts }`, so every
+  boot onto Home, AddressDetail or AddressToken failed inside its transaction
+  loading and logged `loadHomeTxs failed` or `loadTransactions failed`; the rest
+  of that code never ran. The stand-in now returns the real shape, and
+  `tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js` boots onto each of the three and
+  asserts neither message is logged. `make test` time did not change measurably.
+
+- 2026-10-04: The native token's label follows the network
+  ([#372](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/372)). `networks.js` gives
+  each network a `nativeCurrency` and nothing read it: every screen wrote `ETH`,
+  so on Sepolia the balance, the value and the fee all read `ETH`. Every native
+  figure now reads `nativeCurrency`, which is `ETH` on mainnet and `SepoliaETH`
+  on Sepolia: the balance lists, Send and confirmation screens and the
+  contract-recipient warning the active network's; the approval, wait, success,
+  error and transaction detail screens, the transaction history and the refusal
+  of a fee above the limit that of the network the transaction's chain id names.
+  A token claiming any network's `nativeCurrency` is dropped as a fake, as one
+  claiming `ETH` already was, and the transaction detail screen calls an entry a
+  token transfer when it has a token contract, not by its symbol.
+- 2026-10-04: A popup that is already open when the stored profile becomes
+  unreadable moves to the recovery screen
+  ([#373](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373)). It used to stay on
+  the last good profile, with the "NOT SAVED" banner at most, until reopened.
+  Every save already ran the check the popup runs at open, so the popup finds
+  the record at the next navigation or ten-second refresh, whether or not the
+  network answers; a save that fails that check now raises the recovery screen
+  and stops the refresh. The screen it replaces is left as any navigation leaves
+  it, so a revealed phrase or key or a typed password is wiped. Once up, nothing
+  else in that popup can replace it, and a later save or a transaction wait that
+  ends does not clear an export or a typed confirmation. It is never saved as
+  the current view, so a popup opened after the record is erased in another
+  window opens normally. Any other failed save still gets the banner and leaves
+  the screen alone.
+- 2026-10-04: A swap whose deadline is later than a JavaScript date can hold is
+  decoded ([#437](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/437)). A date
+  reaches only to 275760-09-13, so a later deadline, such as the `uint256`
+  maximum, made the `Deadline` line throw, and the approval screen showed the
+  swap as an undecoded contract call with nothing saying why. That line now
+  reads `After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)`.
+- 2026-10-04: The swap decoder reads two router zeros the way the router does
+  ([#415](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/415)). A V2 exact-in
+  `amountIn` of zero means an earlier step already sent the tokens to the pair;
+  `Amount` showed `0.0000` for it and now reads
+  `Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)`. A
+  `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` with a zero `minBalance` guarantees nothing, yet it
+  replaced the minimum an earlier swap step stated, so `Min. received` read
+  `None (no minimum guaranteed)`; it now sets the output side only when that
+  side holds no minimum at the point the check is reached. A nonzero
+  `minBalance` still sets the output side.
+- 2026-10-04: The signature screen shows a personal message as the bytes that
+  are signed ([#403](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/403)). It
+  showed only the decoded text, with bidirectional and zero-width characters
+  acting on it, so a site could make the message read differently from what is
+  signed, and a message that was not hex was shown as NUL characters. The hex is
+  now shown as "Raw data" alongside the decoded text, the text is laid out left
+  to right in byte order, control characters, line and paragraph separators and
+  characters that paint nothing are shown as `U+XXXX` marks, and a message that
+  is not hex by the rule signing reads it with is shown as plain text with
+  "Sign" disabled, since such a message has no bytes to sign.
+- 2026-10-04: A token that reports more than 80 decimal places has no known
+  scale ([#350](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/350)). The shared
+  scale check `toDecimals()` accepted any `uint8`, but `formatUnits()` throws
+  above 80, so such a token left a swap or an ERC-20 call on the approval screen
+  undecoded, with nothing saying why. The check now stops at 80, and both
+  approval paths show the base-unit amount with the scale stated as unknown. The
+  balance list and the history list use the same check, so the same token no
+  longer stops an address's token balances from refreshing or its history from
+  loading.
+- 2026-10-04: Debug mode no longer writes RPC API keys to the console
+  ([#410](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410)). `debugFetch` logged
+  every request's full URL and body, so an RPC endpoint with a key in its path
+  or query string printed that key on every request. It now logs the HTTP
+  method, the URL's origin and, for a JSON-RPC call, the method name. The
+  balance refresh and token lookup log the RPC endpoint by its origin too. A
+  failed RPC call's error line prints the error's short message, which names the
+  HTTP status, not its full message, which carries the request URL. A failed
+  endpoint check in settings names the endpoint by its origin, not the `fetch`
+  error's message, which carries the whole URL, password included, for a URL
+  with a user name and password. The README's DEBUG Mode Policy says what debug
+  mode logs.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A site has at most one connection prompt and one signature prompt
+  open at a time ([#405](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/405)). Each
+  `eth_requestAccounts` or `personal_sign` call opened another approval window,
+  so a page calling in a loop could cover the screen with identical prompts. A
+  further request of the same kind from a site whose prompt is still unanswered
+  is now refused with EIP-1193 `-32002`, the code a second transaction already
+  gets, and opens no window. Signing by `personal_sign`, `eth_sign` and
+  `eth_signTypedData_v4` counts as one kind. Other sites are not affected, and
+  the site may ask again once the user has answered. A connection prompt whose
+  toolbar popup closed before it connected, and which nothing shows any more, is
+  shown again when the site asks again.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A nonce the site supplies with `eth_sendTransaction` is ignored
+  ([#404](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/404)). It was passed on to
+  the transaction, so a site could replace one of the user's pending
+  transactions (same nonce, higher fee) or leave the new one stuck behind a gap,
+  and the approval screen showed it as a bare number. `nonce` is no longer one
+  of the fields taken from the request in `src/shared/approvalTx.js`, so the
+  transaction always gets the account's next nonce from the node, and that is
+  the nonce the approval screen shows and the popup signs.
+
+- 2026-10-04: Remembered site permissions are held by full origin
+  ([#402](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402)). `allowedSites` and
+  `deniedSites` stored the hostname alone, so a grant to `https://dapp.example`
+  also authorised `http://dapp.example` and every port on that host, and the
+  prompts named only the hostname. Both lists now store and match the origin
+  (`scheme://host[:port]`), the key the connections approved without "Remember"
+  already used, in `src/background/index.js` and in Settings, whose site lists
+  and `AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE` carry the origin too. The connection, transaction
+  and signature prompts show the origin. Entries saved by hostname before this
+  change are not migrated (pre-1.0): they match no site, and Settings lists them
+  until they are removed.
+
+- 2026-10-04: A page's request is credited only to the site the browser says
+  sent it ([#407](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/407)). Where the
+  browser does not give the sender's origin (Firefox before 126), the background
+  used the tab's page, so a frame from another site would have been treated as
+  the site embedding it, and with no tab it used an origin the page wrote into
+  the message. It now uses the URL of the frame that sent the message, and
+  refuses the request with code 4100 when the browser gives neither. The content
+  script no longer writes an origin into the message.
+
+- 2026-10-04: `make test` takes 8-13s on the shared build host, down from
+  17-25s, measured in alternating runs before and after the change
+  ([#428](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/428)). Each popup boot in
+  the tests (`tests/support/popupBoot.js`) resets jest's module registry so that
+  everything under `src/` loads fresh, and that also reloaded `ethers`,
+  `libsodium-wrappers-sumo`, `qrcode` and `ethereum-blockies-base64` every time.
+  Those four libraries are now loaded once per test file and handed to every
+  boot. No test or assertion changed.
+
 - 2026-10-04: A token whose scale is unknown reads the same on the Send screen
   as on the confirmation screen
   ([#377](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/377)). When two addresses'

docs/README.md

@@ -240,7 +240,9 @@ screen. Tokens can also be added from Settings, under "Tracked Tokens".
 2. Select what to send (ETH, or any ERC-20 token with a balance on this address
    that survives the spam filters).
 3. Enter the recipient address or ENS name (e.g. `vitalik.eth`).
-4. Enter the amount.
+4. Enter the amount, or click "Max" to fill it in: a token's balance, cut to 18
+   decimal places, or your ETH balance minus the amount reserved for the network
+   fee.
 5. Click "Review" to see the confirmation screen.
 
 The confirmation screen shows:
@@ -285,11 +287,13 @@ not appear and may be permanently lost.
 AutistMask injects a standard `window.ethereum` provider (EIP-1193) into web
 pages. When a site requests access to your wallet:
 
-1. A popup appears showing the site's hostname and the address that will be
+1. A popup appears showing the site's origin (its scheme, host and port, for
-   shared.
+   example `https://app.example`) and the address that will be shared.
 2. Click "Allow" to connect or "Deny" to reject.
 3. Optionally check "Remember my choice for this site" to skip the prompt next
-   time.
+   time. The choice applies to that exact origin only: a choice remembered for
+   `https://app.example` does not cover `http://app.example` or another port of
+   the same host, which ask again.
 
 When a connected site requests a transaction, a separate approval popup appears
 showing the transaction details (from, to, value, data, network fee, network and
@@ -331,7 +335,13 @@ it is hidden from your transaction history and from the send token list.
 from transaction history and the send token list, and are left out of your
 balances unless they are on the bundled known-token list or you added them
 yourself. Legitimate tokens have substantial holder counts; scam tokens deployed
-for address poisoning typically have zero.
+for address poisoning typically have zero. When the explorer reports no holder
+count for a token, or reports something other than a whole number in plain
+digits (such as "1,000"), the count is unknown. An unknown count does not hide a
+token from your transaction history or the send token list, and it does not get
+a token into your balances either: such a token is listed only if it is on the
+bundled known-token list or you added it yourself. The screen you reach by
+clicking a token balance shows a "Holders:" line only when the count is known.
 
 **Fraud contract blocklist.** When AutistMask detects a fraudulent transfer, it
 adds the contract address to a local blocklist. Future transactions from that

manifest/chrome.json

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
     "permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms"],
     "host_permissions": ["<all_urls>"],
     "content_security_policy": {
-        "extension_pages": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'"
+        "extension_pages": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'"
     },
     "icons": {
         "16": "icons/icon16.png",

manifest/firefox.json

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
     "version": "0.1.0",
     "description": "Minimal Ethereum wallet for Firefox",
     "permissions": ["storage", "activeTab", "alarms", "<all_urls>"],
-    "content_security_policy": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'",
+    "content_security_policy": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https: http:; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'",
     "icons": {
         "16": "icons/icon16.png",
         "32": "icons/icon32.png",

script/test

@@ -5,12 +5,12 @@
 # many-core shared host one per core took gigabytes of RAM per run.
 #
 # The timeout bounds a hung suite; it is not a performance budget. On the busy
-# shared build host the suite takes 23-29s with three workers, so
+# shared build host the suite takes 8-13s with three workers, inside
-# REPO_POLICIES' 30s cap is tight there, not comfortable. Inside the image the
+# REPO_POLICIES' 20s budget. Inside the image the same suite also pays a cold
-# same suite also pays a cold jest cache and shares the runner with the rest of
+# jest cache and shares the runner with the rest of the build, which is not what
-# the build, which is not what that budget describes, so the Dockerfile raises
+# that budget describes, so the Dockerfile raises the bound through
-# the bound through AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT. A cap a healthy suite can trip on a
+# AUTISTMASK_TEST_TIMEOUT. A cap a healthy suite can trip on a cold cache
-# cold cache produces a red that means nothing, and teaches "just run it again".
+# produces a red that means nothing, and teaches "just run it again".
 set -eu
 
 ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"

src/background/index.js

@@ -57,9 +57,13 @@ const windowsNs = windowsApi();
 const actionNs = actionApi();
 
 // Connected sites (in-memory, non-persisted): { "origin:address": true }
+//
+// A site is its full origin (scheme://host[:port]), here and in the
+// remembered allowedSites/deniedSites lists alike: a grant to
+// https://dapp.example says nothing about http://dapp.example or another port.
 const connectedSites = {};
 
-// Pending approval requests: { id: { origin, hostname, resolve } }
+// Pending approval requests: { id: { origin, resolve } }
 const pendingApprovals = {};
 
 // One transaction approval at a time, wallet-wide.
@@ -83,7 +87,8 @@ const pendingApprovals = {};
 // authority on a nonce the network has not accepted, which an abandoned
 // approval then leaves a hole in.
 //
-// Sign approvals are not gated: a signature consumes no nonce.
+// Sign approvals do not take this slot: a signature consumes no nonce. They are
+// limited per site instead; see findPendingApproval().
 //
 // The slot is null when free, and otherwise the handle of the request holding
 // it. Once that request has raised its approval the handle carries the
@@ -95,7 +100,7 @@ let txApprovalSlot = null;
 
 // EIP-1474 "resource unavailable": the standard code for a request that is
 // refused because another one is already pending.
-const TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE = -32002;
+const APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE = -32002;
 
 // True at every moment this can be sent: the slot is taken immediately before
 // the transaction is populated, so the other request is either being prepared
@@ -132,6 +137,22 @@ function releaseTxApprovalSlotFor(approvalId) {
     }
 }
 
+// One site-connection approval and one sign approval per site at a time: a
+// page that asks again before the user has answered is refused with the code
+// above instead of opening another window, so it cannot bury the user in
+// prompts. The pending approval itself holds the place, so a caller must test
+// this and raise its approval with nothing awaited in between.
+function findPendingApproval(origin, type) {
+    return Object.values(pendingApprovals).find(
+        (approval) => approval.origin === origin && approval.type === type,
+    );
+}
+
+const APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE =
+    "AutistMask is already waiting for your answer to a request of this kind" +
+    " from this site, so this one was not shown. Please answer that one," +
+    " then send this one again.";
+
 // Nonces this worker has already handed to the node, per chain and address.
 // This is the wallet's own knowledge that a nonce is spent, and it is checked
 // before a broadcast rather than after: a node's pending count can lag a
@@ -284,7 +305,12 @@ async function proxyRpc(method, params) {
     return json.result;
 }
 
+// The site-connection approval the toolbar popup is set to open, or null while
+// it opens the wallet. Set only by resetPopupUrl() and showInToolbarPopup().
+let toolbarPopupApprovalId = null;
+
 function resetPopupUrl() {
+    toolbarPopupApprovalId = null;
     if (actionNs && typeof actionNs.setPopup === "function") {
         actionNs.setPopup({ popup: "src/popup/index.html" });
     }
@@ -387,7 +413,7 @@ function releaseApproval(approval) {
     }
 }
 
-// Open approval in a separate popup window.
+// Open approval in a separate popup window, unless it is no longer pending.
 // This is the primary mechanism for tx/sign approvals (triggered programmatically,
 // not from a user gesture) and the fallback for site-connection approvals.
 // Never rejects. Its callers raise it from inside a Promise executor and drop
@@ -411,7 +437,13 @@ async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
         width: popupWidth,
         height: popupHeight,
     };
-    if (currentWin) {
+    // Centred on a browser window only. The last focused window can be
+    // another approval window still open, and centring on one can give a
+    // position the browser refuses ("Bounds must be at least 50% within
+    // visible screen space"): headless Chrome reports this 360x600 popup as
+    // 1280x720. The request then failed with no window at all. Over a popup,
+    // the browser picks the position.
+    if (currentWin && currentWin.type === "normal") {
         opts.left = Math.round(
             currentWin.left + (currentWin.width - popupWidth) / 2,
         );
@@ -420,15 +452,32 @@ async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
         );
     }
 
+    // Already answered: a site-connection prompt decided before the toolbar
+    // popup raised for it had loaded, whose openPopup() rejects only now.
+    if (!pendingApprovals[id]) return;
+
     let win = null;
     try {
         win = await windowsCreate(opts);
     } catch (e) {
         // The promise namespace reports the failure by rejecting where the
-        // callback namespace reported it by handing back no window; both land
+        // callback namespace reported it by handing back no window; both
-        // on the !win branch below, which settles the approval.
+        // leave win null.
         log.errorf("could not open the approval window:", e);
     }
+    // The browser also refuses a centred position that is too far off screen,
+    // as it is over a browser window near the screen edge. Asked again
+    // without a position, it places the window itself. If that fails too,
+    // the !win branch below settles the approval.
+    if (!win && opts.left !== undefined) {
+        delete opts.left;
+        delete opts.top;
+        try {
+            win = await windowsCreate(opts);
+        } catch (e) {
+            log.errorf("could not open the approval window:", e);
+        }
+    }
 
     const approval = pendingApprovals[id];
     if (!approval) {
@@ -459,12 +508,23 @@ async function openApprovalWindow(id) {
 
 // Open an approval popup and return a promise that resolves with the user decision.
 // Prefers the browser-action popup (anchored to toolbar, no macOS Space switch).
-function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
+function requestApproval(origin) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
-        pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, hostname, resolve };
+        pendingApprovals[id] = { id, origin, resolve, type: "site" };
 
         if (actionNs && typeof actionNs.openPopup === "function") {
+            showInToolbarPopup(id);
+        } else {
+            openApprovalWindow(id);
+        }
+    });
+}
+
+// Show a site-connection approval in the toolbar popup, or in a separate popup
+// window when the browser will not open the toolbar popup.
+function showInToolbarPopup(id) {
+    toolbarPopupApprovalId = id;
     actionNs.setPopup({
         popup: "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
     });
@@ -476,10 +536,6 @@ function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
     } catch {
         openApprovalWindow(id);
     }
-        } else {
-            openApprovalWindow(id);
-        }
-    });
 }
 
 // Open a tx-approval popup and return a promise that resolves with txHash or error.
@@ -495,13 +551,12 @@ function requestApproval(origin, hostname) {
 // screen never named.
 // `slot` is the transaction-approval slot its caller holds. Handing the
 // approval's id to it is what makes retiring the approval free the slot.
-function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
+function requestTxApproval(origin, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
         pendingApprovals[id] = {
             id,
             origin,
-            hostname,
             approvedTx,
             approvedFrom,
             resolve,
@@ -517,13 +572,12 @@ function requestTxApproval(origin, hostname, approvedTx, approvedFrom, slot) {
 // Uses windows.create() directly because sign approvals are triggered programmatically
 // (from a dApp RPC call), not from a user gesture, so action.openPopup() is
 // unreliable in this context.
-function requestSignApproval(origin, hostname, signParams, approvedFrom) {
+function requestSignApproval(origin, signParams, approvedFrom) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
         const id = crypto.randomUUID();
         pendingApprovals[id] = {
             id,
             origin,
-            hostname,
             signParams,
             approvedFrom,
             resolve,
@@ -601,11 +655,11 @@ runtime.onConnect.addListener((port) => {
 // in the worker — a balance refresh in flight, another site's approval — has
 // gone on running the whole time. Loading here used to replace the very
 // objects that work was holding.
-async function rememberSiteChoice(field, address, hostname) {
+async function rememberSiteChoice(field, address, origin) {
     await updateState((s) => {
         if (!s[field][address]) s[field][address] = [];
-        if (!s[field][address].includes(hostname)) {
+        if (!s[field][address].includes(origin)) {
-            s[field][address].push(hostname);
+            s[field][address].push(origin);
         }
     });
 }
@@ -618,12 +672,11 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
         return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
     }
 
-    const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
     const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
     const denied = s.deniedSites[activeAddress] || [];
 
     // Check denied list
-    if (denied.includes(hostname)) {
+    if (denied.includes(origin)) {
         return {
             error: {
                 code: 4001,
@@ -634,25 +687,50 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
 
     // Check allowed list or in-memory connected
     if (
-        allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+        allowed.includes(origin) ||
         connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
     ) {
         return { result: [activeAddress] };
     }
 
+    const pending = findPendingApproval(origin, "site");
+    if (pending) {
+        // A toolbar popup that closed before it connected leaves its prompt
+        // pending, and once the toolbar popup is set to open something else
+        // nothing shows that prompt: the site would be refused until the
+        // address changed. Show it again. A prompt in a window or in a
+        // connected popup is settled when that closes, and one the toolbar
+        // popup is still set to open is a click away, so those are left alone.
+        if (
+            actionNs &&
+            typeof actionNs.openPopup === "function" &&
+            !pending.windowId &&
+            !pending.portConnected &&
+            toolbarPopupApprovalId !== pending.id
+        ) {
+            showInToolbarPopup(pending.id);
+        }
+        return {
+            error: {
+                code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
+                message: APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
+            },
+        };
+    }
+
     // Open approval popup
-    const decision = await requestApproval(origin, hostname);
+    const decision = await requestApproval(origin);
 
     if (decision.approved) {
         if (decision.remember) {
-            await rememberSiteChoice("allowedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
+            await rememberSiteChoice("allowedSites", activeAddress, origin);
         } else {
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress] = true;
         }
         return { result: [activeAddress] };
     } else {
         if (decision.remember) {
-            await rememberSiteChoice("deniedSites", activeAddress, hostname);
+            await rememberSiteChoice("deniedSites", activeAddress, origin);
         }
         return {
             error: {
@@ -663,11 +741,12 @@ async function handleConnectionRequest(origin) {
     }
 }
 
-// Methods that are safe to proxy directly to the RPC node
+// Methods that are safe to proxy directly to the RPC node. A method handleRpc
+// answers before its proxy branch does not belong here: it would never reach
+// the node. tests/proxyMethods.test.js sends every one of these.
 const PROXY_METHODS = [
     "eth_blockNumber",
     "eth_call",
-    "eth_chainId",
     "eth_estimateGas",
     "eth_gasPrice",
     "eth_getBalance",
@@ -681,7 +760,6 @@ const PROXY_METHODS = [
     "eth_getTransactionReceipt",
     "eth_maxPriorityFeePerGas",
     "eth_sendRawTransaction",
-    "net_version",
     "web3_clientVersion",
     "eth_feeHistory",
     "eth_getBlockTransactionCountByHash",
@@ -698,10 +776,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         const s = await getState();
         const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
         if (!activeAddress) return { result: [] };
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+            allowed.includes(origin) ||
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { result: [activeAddress] };
@@ -731,10 +808,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         // [TESTNET] banner under a user who believed they were on Sepolia.
         const s = await getState();
         const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+            !allowed.includes(origin) &&
             !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -806,10 +882,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
     if (method === "wallet_getPermissions") {
         const s = await getState();
         const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         const isConnected =
-            allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+            allowed.includes(origin) ||
             connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress];
         if (!isConnected || !activeAddress) {
             return { result: [] };
@@ -835,10 +910,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         if (!activeAddress)
             return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+            !allowed.includes(origin) &&
             !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -868,9 +942,16 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
                 "Only proceed if you fully understand what you are signing.";
         }
 
+        if (findPendingApproval(origin, "sign")) {
+            return {
+                error: {
+                    code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
+                    message: APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
+                },
+            };
+        }
         const decision = await requestSignApproval(
             origin,
-            hostname,
             signParams,
             activeAddress,
         );
@@ -884,10 +965,9 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
         if (!activeAddress)
             return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
         if (
-            !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+            !allowed.includes(origin) &&
             !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
         ) {
             return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -903,9 +983,16 @@ async function handleRpc(method, params, origin) {
                 },
             };
         }
+        if (findPendingApproval(origin, "sign")) {
+            return {
+                error: {
+                    code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
+                    message: APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
+                },
+            };
+        }
         const decision = await requestSignApproval(
             origin,
-            hostname,
             signParams,
             activeAddress,
         );
@@ -946,10 +1033,9 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
     const activeAddress = activeAddressOf(s);
     if (!activeAddress) return { error: { message: "No accounts available" } };
 
-    const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
     const allowed = s.allowedSites[activeAddress] || [];
     if (
-        !allowed.includes(hostname) &&
+        !allowed.includes(origin) &&
         !connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]
     ) {
         return { error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" } };
@@ -976,7 +1062,7 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
     if (!slot) {
         return {
             error: {
-                code: TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
+                code: APPROVAL_PENDING_CODE,
                 message: TX_APPROVAL_PENDING_MESSAGE,
             },
         };
@@ -1023,7 +1109,6 @@ async function handleSendTransaction(params, origin) {
 
         const decision = await requestTxApproval(
             origin,
-            hostname,
             approvedTx,
             activeAddress,
             slot,
@@ -1097,10 +1182,9 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
     }
     for (const tab of tabs) {
         const origin = tab.url ? new URL(tab.url).origin : "";
-        const hostname = extractHostname(origin);
         const hasPermission =
             activeAddress &&
-            (allowed.includes(hostname) ||
+            (allowed.includes(origin) ||
                 connectedSites[origin + ":" + activeAddress]);
         // Same as chainChanged above: a tab without our content script
         // rejects, and that is expected rather than a fault.
@@ -1113,7 +1197,7 @@ async function broadcastAccountsChanged() {
 }
 
 // Tell every open tab of a site Settings removed that it has no account.
-async function broadcastSiteRemoved(hostname) {
+async function broadcastSiteRemoved(origin) {
     let tabs;
     try {
         tabs = await tabsQuery({});
@@ -1121,7 +1205,7 @@ async function broadcastSiteRemoved(hostname) {
         return;
     }
     for (const tab of tabs) {
-        if (!tab.url || extractHostname(tab.url) !== hostname) continue;
+        if (!tab.url || new URL(tab.url).origin !== origin) continue;
         tabsSendMessage(tab.id, {
             type: "AUTISTMASK_EVENT",
             eventName: "accountsChanged",
@@ -1288,18 +1372,29 @@ if (windowsNs && windowsNs.onRemoved) {
 // Listen for messages from content scripts and popup
 runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_RPC") {
-        // Derive origin from trusted sender info to prevent origin spoofing.
+        // The origin is the one the browser reports for the sender, never one
-        // Chrome MV3 provides sender.origin; Firefox MV2 fallback uses sender.tab.url.
+        // the message carries. Firefox before 126 gives no sender.origin, so
-        let trustedOrigin = msg.origin; // fallback only if sender info unavailable
+        // the origin of sender.url is used: the frame that sent the message,
-        if (sender.origin) {
+        // not the tab's page, which may be another site embedding that
-            trustedOrigin = sender.origin;
+        // frame. With neither, the request is refused.
-        } else if (sender.tab && sender.tab.url) {
+        let trustedOrigin = sender.origin;
+        if (!trustedOrigin && sender.url) {
             try {
-                trustedOrigin = new URL(sender.tab.url).origin;
+                trustedOrigin = new URL(sender.url).origin;
             } catch {
-                // keep fallback
+                // an unparseable URL leaves the origin unknown
             }
         }
+        if (!trustedOrigin) {
+            sendResponse({
+                error: {
+                    code: 4100,
+                    message:
+                        "The wallet could not tell which site sent this request.",
+                },
+            });
+            return false;
+        }
         handleRpc(msg.method, msg.params, trustedOrigin)
             .then((response) => {
                 sendResponse(response);
@@ -1337,10 +1432,7 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
         const approval = pendingApprovals[msg.id];
         if (approval) {
-            const resp = {
+            const resp = { origin: approval.origin };
-                hostname: approval.hostname,
-                origin: approval.origin,
-            };
             if (approval.type === "tx") {
                 resp.type = "tx";
                 // The populated transaction, and the address it was raised
@@ -1355,7 +1447,9 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
                 resp.approvedFrom = approval.approvedFrom;
             }
             // Flag if the requesting domain is on the phishing blocklist.
-            resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(approval.hostname);
+            resp.isPhishingDomain = isPhishingDomain(
+                extractHostname(approval.origin),
+            );
             sendResponse(resp);
         } else {
             sendResponse(null);
@@ -1689,23 +1783,24 @@ runtime.onMessage.addListener((msg, sender, sendResponse) => {
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES") {
         sendResponse(
             Object.keys(connectedSites).map((key) =>
-                extractHostname(key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":"))),
+                key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":")),
             ),
         );
         return false;
     }
 
-    // Settings removed this site and has already dropped its remembered
+    // Settings removed this site (msg.origin) and has already dropped its
-    // entries. Its connections approved without "Remember" end here, under
+    // remembered entries. Its connections approved without "Remember" end
-    // every address, and its open tabs are told it has no account.
+    // here, under every address, and its open tabs are told it has no account.
     if (msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE") {
         for (const key of Object.keys(connectedSites)) {
-            const origin = key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":"));
+            if (key.slice(0, key.lastIndexOf(":")) === msg.origin) {
-            if (extractHostname(origin) === msg.hostname) {
                 delete connectedSites[key];
             }
         }
-        broadcastSiteRemoved(msg.hostname);
+        broadcastSiteRemoved(msg.origin);
         return false;
     }
 });
+
+module.exports = { PROXY_METHODS };

src/content/index.js

@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
         id,
         method,
         params,
-        origin: location.origin,
     })
         .then((response) => {
             if (response) {

src/popup/index.html

@@ -6,7 +6,10 @@
         <title>AutistMask</title>
         <link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.css" />
     </head>
-    <body class="bg-bg text-fg font-mono text-sm">
+    <!-- Chrome gives extension pages a stylesheet of its own that sets the
+         font on body, and a Tailwind class beats it only when marked
+         important: hence font-mono! rather than font-mono. -->
+    <body class="bg-bg text-fg font-mono! text-sm">
         <div id="app" class="p-2 pr-5 overflow-x-hidden">
             <!-- ============ GLOBAL TITLE BAR ============ -->
             <div
@@ -107,8 +110,7 @@
                     </div>
                     <div
                         id="add-wallet-phrase-warning"
-                        class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2"
+                        class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 invisible"
-                        style="visibility: hidden"
                     >
                         Write these words down and keep them safe. Anyone with
                         them can take your funds; if you lose them, your wallet
@@ -259,10 +261,7 @@
 
                 <!-- recent transactions across all addresses -->
                 <div>
-                    <div
+                    <div class="font-bold bg-section py-1 px-2 -mx-2">
-                        class="font-bold bg-section py-1 px-2"
-                        style="margin-left: -0.5rem; margin-right: -0.5rem"
-                    >
                         Recent Transactions
                     </div>
                     <div id="home-tx-list">
@@ -270,7 +269,7 @@
                     </div>
                 </div>
 
-                <div class="py-1" style="margin: 0 -0.5rem">&nbsp;</div>
+                <div class="py-1 -mx-2">&nbsp;</div>
 
                 <div class="text-xs text-muted">
                     <span
@@ -406,8 +405,7 @@
                 </p>
                 <div
                     id="export-privkey-flash"
-                    class="text-xs mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem] invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <div id="export-privkey-password-section" class="mb-2">
                     <label class="block mb-1">Password</label>
@@ -539,8 +537,7 @@
                     />
                     <div
                         id="send-to-error"
-                        class="text-xs"
+                        class="text-xs min-h-[1.25rem] text-[#cc0000]"
-                        style="min-height: 1.25rem; color: #cc0000"
                     ></div>
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-2">
@@ -551,12 +548,20 @@
                             class="text-xs text-muted"
                         ></span>
                     </div>
+                    <div class="flex gap-1">
                         <input
                             type="text"
                             id="send-amount"
-                        class="border border-border p-1 w-full font-mono text-sm bg-bg text-fg"
+                            class="border border-border p-1 flex-1 min-w-0 font-mono text-sm bg-bg text-fg"
                             placeholder="0.0"
                         />
+                        <button
+                            id="btn-send-max"
+                            class="border border-border px-2 py-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer"
+                        >
+                            Max
+                        </button>
+                    </div>
                 </div>
                 <button
                     id="btn-send-review"
@@ -608,7 +613,7 @@
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Your balance</div>
                     <div id="confirm-balance" class="text-xs"></div>
                 </div>
-                <div id="confirm-fee" class="mb-3" style="visibility: hidden">
+                <div id="confirm-fee" class="mb-3 invisible">
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Network fee</div>
                     <div id="confirm-fee-amount" class="text-xs"></div>
                     <!-- Holds its one line of space from the first paint, so
@@ -616,22 +621,13 @@
                     nothing. The placeholder is never seen. -->
                     <div
                         id="confirm-fee-reserve"
-                        class="text-xs text-muted"
+                        class="text-xs text-muted invisible"
-                        style="visibility: hidden"
                     >
                         reserve pending
                     </div>
                 </div>
-                <div
+                <div id="confirm-warnings" class="mb-2 invisible"></div>
-                    id="confirm-warnings"
+                <div id="confirm-recipient-warning" class="mb-2 invisible">
-                    class="mb-2"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
-                ></div>
-                <div
-                    id="confirm-recipient-warning"
-                    class="mb-2"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
-                >
                     <div
                         class="border border-red-500 border-dashed p-2 text-xs font-bold text-red-500"
                     >
@@ -640,24 +636,13 @@
                         Double-check the address before sending.
                     </div>
                 </div>
+                <!-- Its sentence names the network's native token, so show()
+                in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
                 <div
                     id="confirm-contract-warning"
-                    class="mb-2"
+                    class="mb-2 border border-red-500 border-dashed p-2 text-xs font-bold text-red-500 invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
+                ></div>
-                >
+                <div id="confirm-burn-warning" class="mb-2 invisible">
-                    <div
-                        class="border border-red-500 border-dashed p-2 text-xs font-bold text-red-500"
-                    >
-                        WARNING: The recipient is a smart contract. Sending ETH
-                        or tokens directly to a contract may result in permanent
-                        loss of funds.
-                    </div>
-                </div>
-                <div
-                    id="confirm-burn-warning"
-                    class="mb-2"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
-                >
                     <div
                         class="border border-red-500 border-dashed p-2 text-xs font-bold text-red-500"
                     >
@@ -665,11 +650,7 @@
                         here are permanently destroyed and cannot be recovered.
                     </div>
                 </div>
-                <div
+                <div id="confirm-etherscan-warning" class="mb-2 invisible">
-                    id="confirm-etherscan-warning"
-                    class="mb-2"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
-                >
                     <div
                         class="border border-red-500 border-dashed p-2 text-xs font-bold text-red-500"
                     >
@@ -679,31 +660,26 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="confirm-errors"
-                    class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2"
+                    class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 invisible min-h-[1.25rem]"
-                    style="visibility: hidden; min-height: 1.25rem"
                 ></div>
                 <div
                     id="confirm-amount-fee-error"
-                    class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 text-xs"
+                    class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 text-xs invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
                 >
                     Your balance does not cover this amount plus the network
                     fee. Please go back and send a smaller amount.
                 </div>
+                <!-- Its sentence names the network's native token, so show()
+                in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
                 <div
                     id="confirm-gas-error"
-                    class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 text-xs"
+                    class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 text-xs invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
+                ></div>
-                >
-                    You do not have enough ETH to pay the network fee for this
-                    transfer. Please add ETH to this address and try again.
-                </div>
                 <!-- Its sentence names why the fee could not be estimated,
                 so show() in confirmTx.js sets it. -->
                 <div
                     id="confirm-fee-unknown-error"
-                    class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 text-xs"
+                    class="mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-2 text-xs invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <div class="mb-2">
                     <label class="block mb-1 text-xs">Password</label>
@@ -715,8 +691,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="confirm-tx-password-error"
-                    class="text-xs mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem] invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <button
                     id="btn-confirm-send"
@@ -831,8 +806,7 @@
                 </button>
                 <div
                     id="receive-erc20-warning"
-                    class="text-xs border border-border border-dashed p-2 mt-3"
+                    class="text-xs border border-border border-dashed p-2 mt-3 invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
             </div>
 
@@ -860,8 +834,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="add-token-info"
-                    class="text-xs text-muted mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs text-muted mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem] invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <div class="mb-2">
                     <label class="block mb-1 text-xs text-muted"
@@ -1047,8 +1020,7 @@
                             type="text"
                             inputmode="numeric"
                             id="settings-dust-threshold"
-                            class="border border-border p-1 text-xs bg-bg text-fg"
+                            class="border border-border p-1 text-xs bg-bg text-fg w-[10ch]"
-                            style="width: 10ch"
                         />
                         <span class="text-xs text-muted">gwei</span>
                     </div>
@@ -1125,8 +1097,7 @@
 
                 <div
                     id="settings-debug-well"
-                    class="bg-well p-3 mx-1 mb-3"
+                    class="bg-well p-3 mx-1 mb-3 hidden"
-                    style="display: none"
                 >
                     <h3 class="font-bold mb-1">Debug</h3>
                     <label
@@ -1154,8 +1125,7 @@
                 </p>
                 <div
                     id="delete-wallet-flash"
-                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem] invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <div class="mb-2">
                     <label class="block mb-1">Password</label>
@@ -1228,8 +1198,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="delete-wallet-lost-flash"
-                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem] invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <button
                     id="btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm"
@@ -1284,8 +1253,7 @@
                 </p>
                 <div
                     id="delete-address-flash"
-                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem] invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <button
                     id="btn-delete-address-confirm"
@@ -1314,8 +1282,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="show-phrase-flash"
-                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem] invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <div id="show-phrase-password-section" class="mb-2">
                     <label class="block mb-1">Password</label>
@@ -1397,8 +1364,7 @@
                     />
                     <div
                         id="settings-addtoken-info"
-                        class="text-xs text-muted mt-1 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                        class="text-xs text-muted mt-1 min-h-[1.25rem] invisible"
-                        style="visibility: hidden"
                     ></div>
                     <button
                         id="btn-settings-addtoken-manual"
@@ -1561,7 +1527,7 @@
                     with extreme caution.
                 </div>
                 <p class="mb-2">
-                    <span id="approve-tx-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
+                    <span id="approve-tx-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
                     wants to send a transaction.
                 </p>
 
@@ -1631,8 +1597,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="approve-tx-error"
-                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.875rem]"
+                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.875rem] invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <div class="flex justify-between">
                     <button
@@ -1662,21 +1627,13 @@
                     funds. Proceed with extreme caution.
                 </div>
                 <p class="mb-2">
-                    <span id="approve-sign-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
+                    <span id="approve-sign-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
                     wants you to sign a message.
                 </p>
 
                 <div
                     id="approve-sign-danger-warning"
-                    class="mb-3 p-2 text-xs font-bold"
+                    class="mb-3 p-2 text-xs font-bold invisible min-h-[1.25rem] bg-[#fee2e2] text-[#991b1b] border-2 border-[#dc2626] rounded-[6px]"
-                    style="
-                        visibility: hidden;
-                        min-height: 1.25rem;
-                        background: #fee2e2;
-                        color: #991b1b;
-                        border: 2px solid #dc2626;
-                        border-radius: 6px;
-                    "
                 ></div>
 
                 <div class="mb-3">
@@ -1693,8 +1650,15 @@
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Message</div>
                     <div
                         id="approve-sign-message"
-                        class="text-xs break-all"
+                        class="text-xs break-all max-h-48 overflow-y-auto"
-                        style="max-height: 12rem; overflow-y: auto"
+                    ></div>
+                </div>
+
+                <div id="approve-sign-hex-section" class="mb-3 hidden">
+                    <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">Raw data</div>
+                    <div
+                        id="approve-sign-hex"
+                        class="text-xs break-all max-h-24 overflow-y-auto"
                     ></div>
                 </div>
 
@@ -1708,8 +1672,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="approve-sign-error"
-                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.875rem]"
+                    class="text-xs mb-2 border border-border border-dashed p-1 min-h-[1.875rem] invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <div class="flex justify-between">
                     <button
@@ -1740,7 +1703,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div class="mb-3">
                     <p class="mb-2">
-                        <span id="approve-hostname" class="font-bold"></span>
+                        <span id="approve-origin" class="font-bold"></span>
                         wants to connect to your wallet.
                     </p>
                     <div class="text-xs text-muted mb-1">
@@ -1833,8 +1796,7 @@
                 </div>
                 <div
                     id="state-recovery-flash"
-                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem]"
+                    class="text-xs text-red-500 mb-2 min-h-[1.25rem] invisible"
-                    style="visibility: hidden"
                 ></div>
                 <button
                     id="btn-state-recovery-reset"

src/popup/index.js

@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ function renderWalletList() {
 
 let refreshInFlight = false;
 
+// The ten-second refresh init() starts, stopped when the popup moves to the
+// recovery screen: there is no profile left to refresh.
+let refreshTimer = null;
+
 async function doRefreshAndRender() {
     if (refreshInFlight) return;
     refreshInFlight = true;
@@ -155,7 +159,28 @@ async function init() {
     // reported rather than being swallowed by the save queue
     // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362). Registered ahead of
     // the approval-window branch below too, since that window saves as well.
-    onSaveFailure(showSaveFailureBanner);
+    //
+    // Every save first reads the stored record and refuses it with the same
+    // check loadState() runs below. So a record that becomes unreadable while
+    // the popup is open is found by the next save, a navigation or the
+    // ten-second refresh, and gets the screen it would get at open
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373). Passing the recovery
+    // screen to showView() first leaves the current screen as any navigation
+    // does, so a phrase, key or password on it is wiped, and from then on
+    // showView() shows nothing else. A later save that fails the same way,
+    // such as a refresh already in flight, comes back here, where both calls
+    // see the screen already up and do nothing. Any other failed save is a
+    // read or write that failed, and gets the banner without changing the
+    // screen.
+    onSaveFailure((e) => {
+        if (e instanceof StateUnusableError) {
+            clearInterval(refreshTimer);
+            showView("state-recovery");
+            stateRecovery.show(e);
+        } else {
+            showSaveFailureBanner(e);
+        }
+    });
     try {
         await loadState();
     } catch (e) {
@@ -244,7 +269,7 @@ async function init() {
         renderWalletList();
         restoreView();
         doRefreshAndRender();
-        setInterval(doRefreshAndRender, 10000);
+        refreshTimer = setInterval(doRefreshAndRender, 10000);
     }
 }
 

src/popup/styles/main.css

@@ -64,3 +64,13 @@ body {
     white-space: nowrap;
     overflow-x: auto;
 }
+
+/* A personal message on the signature screen is laid out left to right in
+ * the order of its bytes. Without this, right-to-left characters in it move
+ * the characters around them: `5`, U+05C3, `00` would read as `500`
+ * followed by U+05C3. A paragraph separator (U+2029) ends this layout for
+ * the text after it, so src/popup/views/approval.js shows one as a mark. */
+.am-byte-order {
+    direction: ltr;
+    unicode-bidi: bidi-override;
+}

src/popup/views/addressDetail.js

@@ -11,8 +11,10 @@ const {
     attachCopyHandlers,
     goBack,
     pushCurrentView,
+    isoDate,
+    timeAgo,
 } = require("./helpers");
-const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
+const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { formatAddressTotal, getAddressValue } = require("../../shared/prices");
 const {
     fetchRecentTransactions,
@@ -31,8 +33,8 @@ const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
 
 // The defect of the wallet the selected address belongs to, or null. Both the
 // send and the private-key export path check it before asking for a password,
-// so a wallet that cannot derive its keys says so instead of failing after the
+// so a wallet whose key getSignerForAddress refuses says so instead of failing
-// user has typed one in.
+// after the user has typed one in.
 function selectedWalletDefect() {
     if (state.selectedWallet === null) return null;
     return walletDefect(state.wallets[state.selectedWallet]);
@@ -64,7 +66,7 @@ function show() {
     $("address-line").dataset.full = addr.address;
     attachCopyHandlers($("address-line"));
     const usdTotal = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));
-    $("address-usd-total").innerHTML = usdTotal || " ";
+    $("address-usd-total").innerHTML = escapeHtml(usdTotal) || " ";
     const ensEl = $("address-ens");
     // ENS is now shown inside renderAddressHtml, hide the separate element
     ensEl.classList.add("hidden");
@@ -88,62 +90,6 @@ function show() {
     loadTransactions(addr.address);
 }
 
-function isoDate(timestamp) {
-    const d = new Date(timestamp * 1000);
-    const pad = (n) => String(n).padStart(2, "0");
-    if (state.utcTimestamps) {
-        return (
-            d.getUTCFullYear() +
-            "-" +
-            pad(d.getUTCMonth() + 1) +
-            "-" +
-            pad(d.getUTCDate()) +
-            "T" +
-            pad(d.getUTCHours()) +
-            ":" +
-            pad(d.getUTCMinutes()) +
-            ":" +
-            pad(d.getUTCSeconds()) +
-            "Z"
-        );
-    }
-    const offsetMin = -d.getTimezoneOffset();
-    const sign = offsetMin >= 0 ? "+" : "-";
-    const absOff = Math.abs(offsetMin);
-    const tzStr = sign + pad(Math.floor(absOff / 60)) + ":" + pad(absOff % 60);
-    return (
-        d.getFullYear() +
-        "-" +
-        pad(d.getMonth() + 1) +
-        "-" +
-        pad(d.getDate()) +
-        "T" +
-        pad(d.getHours()) +
-        ":" +
-        pad(d.getMinutes()) +
-        ":" +
-        pad(d.getSeconds()) +
-        tzStr
-    );
-}
-
-function timeAgo(timestamp) {
-    const seconds = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000 - timestamp);
-    if (seconds < 60) return seconds + " seconds ago";
-    const minutes = Math.floor(seconds / 60);
-    if (minutes < 60)
-        return minutes + " minute" + (minutes !== 1 ? "s" : "") + " ago";
-    const hours = Math.floor(minutes / 60);
-    if (hours < 24) return hours + " hour" + (hours !== 1 ? "s" : "") + " ago";
-    const days = Math.floor(hours / 24);
-    if (days < 30) return days + " day" + (days !== 1 ? "s" : "") + " ago";
-    const months = Math.floor(days / 30);
-    if (months < 12)
-        return months + " month" + (months !== 1 ? "s" : "") + " ago";
-    const years = Math.floor(days / 365);
-    return years + " year" + (years !== 1 ? "s" : "") + " ago";
-}
-
 let loadedTxs = [];
 
 let ensNameMap = new Map();
@@ -153,6 +99,7 @@ async function loadTransactions(address) {
         const rawTxs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
             address,
             state.blockscoutUrl,
+            currentNetwork().chainId,
         );
         const result = filterTransactions(rawTxs, {
             hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
@@ -234,10 +181,10 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
         // it on the line above rather than replacing it.
         const nameStr = escapeHtml(title || ensName || "");
         const err = tx.isError ? " (failed)" : "";
-        const opacity = tx.isError ? " opacity:0.5;" : "";
+        const opacity = tx.isError ? " opacity-50" : "";
         const ago = escapeHtml(timeAgo(tx.timestamp));
         const iso = escapeHtml(isoDate(tx.timestamp));
-        html += `<div class="tx-row py-2 border-b border-border-light text-xs cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover" data-tx="${i}" style="${opacity}">`;
+        html += `<div class="tx-row py-2 border-b border-border-light text-xs cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover${opacity}" data-tx="${i}">`;
         html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="text-muted" title="${iso}">${ago}</span><span>${dirLabel}${err}</span></div>`;
         html += txCounterpartyHtml(counterparty, nameStr, amountStr);
         html += `</div>`;
@@ -312,9 +259,10 @@ function init(_ctx) {
     $("btn-export-privkey").addEventListener("click", () => {
         moreDropdown.classList.add("hidden");
         moreBtn.classList.remove("bg-fg", "text-bg");
-        // There is no private key to export for an address this wallet
+        // This address's private key can be derived from the stored key,
-        // cannot derive. Without this the export screen would take a
+        // but export goes through getSignerForAddress, which refuses a key
-        // password and then report it as wrong.
+        // that is not a master key. Without this the export screen would
+        // take a password and then report that refusal as a wrong password.
         const defect = selectedWalletDefect();
         if (defect) {
             showFlash(defect.shortMessage);

src/popup/views/addressToken.js

@@ -10,14 +10,17 @@ const {
     addressTitle,
     escapeHtml,
     displaySymbol,
+    nativeCurrency,
     balanceLine,
     unknownableAmount,
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     goBack,
     pushCurrentView,
+    isoDate,
+    timeAgo,
 } = require("./helpers");
-const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
+const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS, resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
 const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
 const {
@@ -36,62 +39,6 @@ const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
 
 let ctx;
 
-function isoDate(timestamp) {
-    const d = new Date(timestamp * 1000);
-    const pad = (n) => String(n).padStart(2, "0");
-    if (state.utcTimestamps) {
-        return (
-            d.getUTCFullYear() +
-            "-" +
-            pad(d.getUTCMonth() + 1) +
-            "-" +
-            pad(d.getUTCDate()) +
-            "T" +
-            pad(d.getUTCHours()) +
-            ":" +
-            pad(d.getUTCMinutes()) +
-            ":" +
-            pad(d.getUTCSeconds()) +
-            "Z"
-        );
-    }
-    const offsetMin = -d.getTimezoneOffset();
-    const sign = offsetMin >= 0 ? "+" : "-";
-    const absOff = Math.abs(offsetMin);
-    const tzStr = sign + pad(Math.floor(absOff / 60)) + ":" + pad(absOff % 60);
-    return (
-        d.getFullYear() +
-        "-" +
-        pad(d.getMonth() + 1) +
-        "-" +
-        pad(d.getDate()) +
-        "T" +
-        pad(d.getHours()) +
-        ":" +
-        pad(d.getMinutes()) +
-        ":" +
-        pad(d.getSeconds()) +
-        tzStr
-    );
-}
-
-function timeAgo(timestamp) {
-    const seconds = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000 - timestamp);
-    if (seconds < 60) return seconds + " seconds ago";
-    const minutes = Math.floor(seconds / 60);
-    if (minutes < 60)
-        return minutes + " minute" + (minutes !== 1 ? "s" : "") + " ago";
-    const hours = Math.floor(minutes / 60);
-    if (hours < 24) return hours + " hour" + (hours !== 1 ? "s" : "") + " ago";
-    const days = Math.floor(hours / 24);
-    if (days < 30) return days + " day" + (days !== 1 ? "s" : "") + " ago";
-    const months = Math.floor(days / 30);
-    if (months < 12)
-        return months + " month" + (months !== 1 ? "s" : "") + " ago";
-    const years = Math.floor(days / 365);
-    return years + " year" + (years !== 1 ? "s" : "") + " ago";
-}
-
 let loadedTxs = [];
 let ensNameMap = new Map();
 let currentSymbol = null;
@@ -106,7 +53,7 @@ function show() {
     let symbol, amount, price;
     const knownToken = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(tokenId.toLowerCase());
     if (tokenId === "ETH") {
-        symbol = "ETH";
+        symbol = nativeCurrency();
         amount = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0");
         price = getPrice("ETH");
     } else {
@@ -156,7 +103,7 @@ function show() {
     // USD total for this token only
     const usdVal = price && amount !== null ? amount * price : null;
     const usdStr = formatUsd(usdVal);
-    $("address-token-usd-total").innerHTML = usdStr || "&nbsp;";
+    $("address-token-usd-total").innerHTML = escapeHtml(usdStr) || "&nbsp;";
 
     // Single token balance line (no tokenId — not clickable here)
     $("address-token-balance").innerHTML = balanceLine(symbol, amount, price);
@@ -201,9 +148,9 @@ function show() {
         if (tokenSymbol)
             infoHtml += `<div class="mb-1"><span class="text-muted">Symbol:</span> ${tokenSymbol}</div>`;
         if (tokenDecimals != null)
-            infoHtml += `<div class="mb-1"><span class="text-muted">Decimals:</span> ${tokenDecimals}</div>`;
+            infoHtml += `<div class="mb-1"><span class="text-muted">Decimals:</span> ${escapeHtml(tokenDecimals)}</div>`;
         if (tokenHolders != null)
-            infoHtml += `<div class="mb-1"><span class="text-muted">Holders:</span> ${Number(tokenHolders).toLocaleString()}</div>`;
+            infoHtml += `<div class="mb-1"><span class="text-muted">Holders:</span> ${escapeHtml(Number(tokenHolders).toLocaleString())}</div>`;
         if (projectUrl)
             infoHtml += `<div class="mb-1"><span class="text-muted">Website:</span> <a href="${escapeHtml(projectUrl)}" target="_blank" rel="noopener" class="underline decoration-dashed">${escapeHtml(projectUrl)}</a></div>`;
         contractInfo.innerHTML = infoHtml;
@@ -226,6 +173,7 @@ async function loadTransactions(address, tokenId) {
         const rawTxs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
             address,
             state.blockscoutUrl,
+            currentNetwork().chainId,
         );
         const result = filterTransactions(rawTxs, {
             hideSpoofedSymbols: state.hideSpoofedSymbols,
@@ -310,10 +258,10 @@ function renderTransactions(txs) {
         // it on the line above rather than replacing it.
         const nameStr = escapeHtml(title || ensName || "");
         const err = tx.isError ? " (failed)" : "";
-        const opacity = tx.isError ? " opacity:0.5;" : "";
+        const opacity = tx.isError ? " opacity-50" : "";
         const ago = escapeHtml(timeAgo(tx.timestamp));
         const iso = escapeHtml(isoDate(tx.timestamp));
-        html += `<div class="tx-row py-2 border-b border-border-light text-xs cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover" data-tx="${i}" style="${opacity}">`;
+        html += `<div class="tx-row py-2 border-b border-border-light text-xs cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover${opacity}" data-tx="${i}">`;
         html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="text-muted" title="${iso}">${ago}</span><span>${dirLabel}${err}</span></div>`;
         html += txCounterpartyHtml(counterparty, nameStr, amountStr);
         html += `</div>`;

src/popup/views/approval.js

@@ -10,9 +10,13 @@ const {
     attachCopyHandlers,
     onViewLeave,
     formatFee,
+    tokenLabel,
 } = require("./helpers");
 const { state, saveState } = require("../../shared/state");
-const { networkByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
+const {
+    networkByChainId,
+    nativeCurrencyByChainId,
+} = require("../../shared/networks");
 const {
     formatEther,
     formatUnits,
@@ -26,6 +30,7 @@ const {
 } = require("ethers");
 const { getPrice, formatUsd } = require("../../shared/prices");
 const { ERC20_ABI } = require("../../shared/constants");
+const { INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS } = require("../../shared/symbolSpoof");
 const {
     resolveTokenDecimals,
     resolveTokenSymbol,
@@ -69,17 +74,6 @@ function tokenAmountText(rawAmount, decimals, symbol) {
     };
 }
 
-// The symbol shown for a token line, resolved from the bundled list, the
-// tokens the user tracks, and the explorer's report — the same chain the
-// amount line's scale comes from. Null when no source names one, so the token
-// lines keep saying `Unknown token` for a token nothing knows.
-function tokenLabel(address) {
-    return resolveTokenSymbol(address, {
-        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
-        wallets: state.wallets,
-    });
-}
-
 // Try to decode calldata using known ABIs.
 // Returns { name, description, details } or null.
 function decodeCalldata(data, toAddress) {
@@ -218,8 +212,12 @@ function showTxFee(approvedTx) {
     const gasLimit = BigInt(approvedTx.gasLimit);
     const feePerGas = BigInt(approvedTx.maxFeePerGas || approvedTx.gasPrice);
     // Through formatFee(), as the confirmation screen's fee is, so the same
-    // fee reads the same on both.
+    // fee reads the same on both. In the native currency of the network shown
-    $("approve-tx-fee").textContent = formatFee(gasLimit * feePerGas);
+    // above, as the value is.
+    $("approve-tx-fee").textContent = formatFee(
+        gasLimit * feePerGas,
+        nativeCurrencyByChainId(approvedTx.chainId),
+    );
 
     let detail =
         gasLimit.toString() +
@@ -263,6 +261,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
         amount: formatTxValue(ethValue),
         token: "ETH",
         tokenSymbol: null,
+        chainId: approvedTx.chainId,
     };
 
     // If this is an ERC-20 call, try to extract the real recipient and amount
@@ -306,7 +305,7 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
         };
     }
 
-    $("approve-tx-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
+    $("approve-tx-origin").textContent = details.origin;
     $("approve-tx-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(details.approvedFrom);
 
     // Show token symbol next to contract address if known
@@ -328,8 +327,15 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
     const ethUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(ethValueFormatted) * ethPrice : null;
     const usdStr = formatUsd(ethUsd);
+    // In the native currency of the network the transaction is for, which the
+    // Network line names, not the active network's: a site can switch the
+    // active network after this transaction is prepared and back before it is
+    // signed.
     $("approve-tx-value").textContent =
-        ethValueFormatted + " ETH" + (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
+        ethValueFormatted +
+        " " +
+        nativeCurrencyByChainId(approvedTx.chainId) +
+        (usdStr ? " (" + usdStr + ")" : "");
 
     showTxFee(approvedTx);
 
@@ -380,20 +386,48 @@ function showTxApproval(details) {
     );
 }
 
+// Whether a personal message is hex by the rule signing reads it with:
+// signing takes getBytes(message), which throws on anything else.
+function isHexMessage(message) {
+    try {
+        getBytes(message);
+        return true;
+    } catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+
+// The text the hex message's bytes decode to as UTF-8, or null when they are
+// not UTF-8. The caller has checked that the message is hex.
 function decodeHexMessage(hex) {
     try {
-        const bytes = Uint8Array.from(
+        return toUtf8String(getBytes(hex));
-            hex
-                .slice(2)
-                .match(/.{1,2}/g)
-                .map((b) => parseInt(b, 16)),
-        );
-        return toUtf8String(bytes);
     } catch {
         return null;
     }
 }
 
+// A character shown as a bordered U+XXXX mark.
+function codePointMark(c) {
+    const code = c.codePointAt(0).toString(16).toUpperCase();
+    return `<span class="border border-border">U+${code.padStart(4, "0")}</span>`;
+}
+
+// The text as HTML, with each character that paints nothing (zero-width and
+// bidirectional characters, variation selectors and Hangul fillers among
+// them), each control character and each line or paragraph separator
+// (U+2028, U+2029) shown as a mark. A line feed is shown as a line break.
+// Left in the text, a paragraph separator would end the byte-order layout
+// for everything after it. The marks are plain ASCII, so the second pass
+// leaves them be.
+function markInvisibleCharacters(text) {
+    return escapeHtml(text)
+        .replace(INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS, codePointMark)
+        .replace(/[\p{Cc}\p{Zl}\p{Zp}]/gu, (c) =>
+            c === "\n" ? "<br>" : codePointMark(c),
+        );
+}
+
 // The type ethers will sign typed data as. ethers does not read the page's
 // `primaryType`: it takes the one struct in `types` that no other struct
 // refers to. Throws when the types name no such single struct, which ethers
@@ -645,7 +679,7 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
     pendingSignParams = sp;
     pendingSignFrom = details.approvedFrom;
 
-    $("approve-sign-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
+    $("approve-sign-origin").textContent = details.origin;
     $("approve-sign-from").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(
         details.approvedFrom,
     );
@@ -657,15 +691,33 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
         ? "Typed data (EIP-712)"
         : "Personal message";
 
+    // A personal message is signed as the bytes its hex encodes, so the hex
+    // is shown as well as any text it decodes to, and that text is laid out
+    // left to right in the order of its bytes. Signing reads the bytes from
+    // the hex, so a message that is not hex cannot be signed: it is shown as
+    // the text it is, and refused.
+    let refusal = null;
+    $("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.add("hidden");
+    $("approve-sign-message").classList.toggle("am-byte-order", !isTyped);
     if (isTyped) {
         $("approve-sign-message").innerHTML = formatTypedDataHtml(sp.typedData);
-    } else {
+        refusal = typedDataRefusal(sp);
+    } else if (isHexMessage(sp.message)) {
         const decoded = decodeHexMessage(sp.message);
         if (decoded !== null) {
-            $("approve-sign-message").textContent = decoded;
+            $("approve-sign-message").innerHTML =
+                markInvisibleCharacters(decoded);
         } else {
-            $("approve-sign-message").textContent = sp.message;
+            $("approve-sign-message").textContent = "This message is not text.";
         }
+        $("approve-sign-hex").textContent = sp.message;
+        $("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.remove("hidden");
+    } else {
+        $("approve-sign-message").innerHTML = markInvisibleCharacters(
+            sp.message,
+        );
+        refusal =
+            "This message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed.";
     }
 
     // Display danger warning for eth_sign (raw hash signing)
@@ -687,7 +739,6 @@ function showSignApproval(details) {
 
     showView("approve-sign");
     attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-sign");
-    const refusal = typedDataRefusal(sp);
     if (refusal) {
         showError("approve-sign-error", refusal);
         $("btn-approve-sign").disabled = true;
@@ -732,7 +783,7 @@ async function show(id) {
         "approve-site-phishing-warning",
         details.isPhishingDomain,
     );
-    $("approve-hostname").textContent = details.hostname;
+    $("approve-origin").textContent = details.origin;
     $("approve-address").innerHTML = approvalAddressHtml(state.activeAddress);
     attachCopyHandlers("view-approve-site");
     $("approve-remember").checked = state.rememberSiteChoice;
@@ -771,9 +822,10 @@ function setSignButtonBusy(busy) {
 }
 
 // Say so on the approval screen itself, and disable the approve button, when
-// the address the approval was raised for belongs to a wallet whose keys
+// the address the approval was raised for belongs to a wallet whose key
-// cannot be derived. Without this the screen would take a password and fail
+// getSignerForAddress refuses. Without this the screen would take a password
-// after deriving it. Reject stays available; the wallet is not touched.
+// and fail after deriving it. Reject stays available; the wallet is not
+// touched.
 // Returns true when it gated.
 function gateOnWalletDefect(errorId, buttonId, address) {
     const owner = findWalletFor(address);

src/popup/views/confirmTx.js

@@ -11,14 +11,17 @@ const {
     addressTitle,
     escapeHtml,
     displaySymbol,
+    nativeCurrency,
     renderAddressHtml,
+    blockieHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     goBack,
     onViewLeave,
     formatFee,
 } = require("./helpers");
-const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
+const { state, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { getSignerForAddress } = require("../../shared/wallet");
+const { walletDefect } = require("../../shared/walletDefects");
 const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../../shared/vault");
 const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
 const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
@@ -42,10 +45,10 @@ const {
     FEE_UNAVAILABLE,
     feeReserveWei,
     feeEstimateWei,
+    maxEthAmount,
     validateTransfer,
 } = require("../../shared/txValidation");
 const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
-const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
 const txStatus = require("./txStatus");
 
 let pendingTx = null;
@@ -53,6 +56,10 @@ let pendingTx = null;
 // filled in by estimateGas() when the estimate resolves or fails.
 let feeStatus = FEE_PENDING;
 let feeWei = null;
+// The fee fields a max ETH send is signed with: those of the estimate its
+// amount was derived from. Null for any other send, which ethers prices from
+// the node at signing time.
+let maxSendFees = null;
 
 function restore() {
     const d = state.viewData;
@@ -61,11 +68,6 @@ function restore() {
     }
 }
 
-function blockieHtml(address) {
-    const src = makeBlockie(address);
-    return `<img src="${escapeHtml(src)}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`;
-}
-
 function confirmAddressHtml(address, ensName, title) {
     const blockie = blockieHtml(address);
     return (
@@ -81,16 +83,30 @@ function valueWithUsd(text, usdAmount) {
     return text;
 }
 
+// The Amount line, with its USD value. A max ETH send's line is drawn again
+// once its amount is re-derived from the fee estimate.
+function renderAmount(txInfo) {
+    const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH";
+    const rawSymbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : nativeCurrency();
+    const price = isErc20 ? getPrice(rawSymbol) : getPrice("ETH");
+    const amountUsd = price ? parseFloat(txInfo.amount) * price : null;
+    $("confirm-amount").textContent = valueWithUsd(
+        txInfo.amount + " " + displaySymbol(rawSymbol),
+        amountUsd,
+    );
+}
+
 function show(txInfo) {
     pendingTx = txInfo;
     feeStatus = FEE_PENDING;
     feeWei = null;
+    maxSendFees = null;
 
     const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH";
     // The raw symbol is the price-table key; the capped one is what the
     // screen says. Truncating before the lookup would silently drop the
     // price of any token whose symbol is long enough to be capped.
-    const rawSymbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : "ETH";
+    const rawSymbol = isErc20 ? txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?" : nativeCurrency();
     const symbol = displaySymbol(rawSymbol);
 
     // Transaction type
@@ -98,7 +114,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
         $("confirm-type").textContent =
             "ERC-20 token transfer (" + symbol + ")";
     } else {
-        $("confirm-type").textContent = "Native ETH transfer";
+        $("confirm-type").textContent = "Native " + symbol + " transfer";
     }
 
     // Token contract section (ERC-20 only)
@@ -131,18 +147,11 @@ function show(txInfo) {
     );
     $("confirm-to-ens").classList.add("hidden");
 
-    // Amount (with inline USD)
+    renderAmount(txInfo);
-    const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
-    const tokenPrice = getPrice(rawSymbol);
-    const amountNum = parseFloat(txInfo.amount);
-    const price = isErc20 ? tokenPrice : ethPrice;
-    const amountUsd = price ? amountNum * price : null;
-    $("confirm-amount").textContent = valueWithUsd(
-        txInfo.amount + " " + symbol,
-        amountUsd,
-    );
 
     // Balance (with inline USD)
+    const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
+    const tokenPrice = getPrice(rawSymbol);
     if (isErc20) {
         // null is a balance whose scale nothing knows, not a balance of zero
         // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/349). The send is
@@ -162,7 +171,7 @@ function show(txInfo) {
         const bal = txInfo.balance || "0";
         const balUsd = ethPrice ? parseFloat(bal) * ethPrice : null;
         $("confirm-balance").textContent = valueWithUsd(
-            truncateAmountNeverZero(bal) + " ETH",
+            truncateAmountNeverZero(bal) + " " + symbol,
             balUsd,
         );
     }
@@ -197,6 +206,19 @@ function show(txInfo) {
     // estimate landing later never moves anything.
     $("confirm-amount-fee-error").classList.toggle("hidden", isErc20);
     $("confirm-gas-error").classList.toggle("hidden", !isErc20);
+    $("confirm-gas-error").textContent =
+        "You do not have enough " +
+        nativeCurrency() +
+        " to pay the network fee for this transfer. Please add " +
+        nativeCurrency() +
+        " to this address and try again.";
+
+    // Shown later, once checkRecipientHistory() finds a contract.
+    $("confirm-contract-warning").textContent =
+        "WARNING: The recipient is a smart contract. Sending " +
+        nativeCurrency() +
+        " or tokens directly to a contract may result in permanent loss of" +
+        " funds.";
 
     // The fee-unknown message names its cause, which is also known here.
     // Without the token's scale estimateGas() cannot encode the transfer, so
@@ -245,7 +267,9 @@ function show(txInfo) {
 // touches already occupies its space, so re-running it never moves anything.
 function renderValidation(txInfo) {
     const isErc20 = txInfo.token !== "ETH";
-    const symbol = isErc20 ? displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?") : "ETH";
+    const symbol = isErc20
+        ? displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?")
+        : nativeCurrency();
 
     const { canSend, codes } = validateTransfer({
         isErc20,
@@ -258,7 +282,7 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
 
     // Messages carrying the user's own numbers are built here; the fixed
     // sentences live in the reserved elements in index.html, except the
-    // fee-unknown one, which show() sets.
+    // gas and fee-unknown ones, which show() sets.
     const messages = [];
     if (codes.includes(CODES.AMOUNT_INVALID)) {
         messages.push("Please enter a valid amount to send.");
@@ -287,9 +311,13 @@ function renderValidation(txInfo) {
         messages.push(
             "Insufficient balance. You have " +
                 truncateAmountNeverZero(txInfo.balance || "0") +
-                " ETH but are trying to send " +
+                " " +
+                symbol +
+                " but are trying to send " +
                 txInfo.amount +
-                " ETH.",
+                " " +
+                symbol +
+                ".",
         );
     }
 
@@ -360,8 +388,8 @@ async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
         }
 
         // What the node will require to be reserved, which is what the gate
-        // must be: the send pins no fee fields, so it is broadcast as a
+        // must be: the send is broadcast as a type-2 transaction priced at
-        // type-2 transaction priced at maxFeePerGas.
+        // maxFeePerGas, which only a max ETH send pins (see below).
         const gasCostWei = feeReserveWei(gasLimit, feeData);
         if (gasCostWei === null) {
             throw new Error("no usable gas price from the provider");
@@ -378,24 +406,54 @@ async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
         // The fee line goes through formatFee(), as the approval screen's
         // does, so the same fee reads the same on both.
         if (estimateWei !== null && estimateWei < gasCostWei) {
-            $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = "~" + formatFee(estimateWei);
+            $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent =
+                "~" + formatFee(estimateWei, nativeCurrency());
             $("confirm-fee-reserve").textContent =
                 "up to " +
                 truncateAmountNeverZero(formatEther(gasCostWei)) +
-                " ETH reserved";
+                " " +
+                nativeCurrency() +
+                " reserved";
             setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", true);
         } else {
             // No spread to report: either there is no estimate, or the node
             // quotes a gas price at or above maxFeePerGas, so the expected
             // cost is not below the reserve. Show the reserve alone.
-            $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = formatFee(gasCostWei);
+            $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = formatFee(
+                gasCostWei,
+                nativeCurrency(),
+            );
             setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", false);
         }
         feeStatus = FEE_KNOWN;
         feeWei = gasCostWei;
+        // A max ETH send is the balance minus this estimate's reserve, not the
+        // Send screen's, and is signed with this estimate's fee fields: fees
+        // fetched again at signing could exceed the reserve it leaves, and the
+        // node would refuse it for want of funds. Where the balance no longer
+        // covers the fee, the amount is left as it is and the balance check
+        // below says so.
+        if (txInfo.max && txInfo.token === "ETH") {
+            const amount = maxEthAmount(txInfo.balance, gasCostWei);
+            if (amount !== null) {
+                txInfo.amount = amount;
+                renderAmount(txInfo);
+                // Priced as feeReserveWei() priced the reserve: maxFeePerGas,
+                // or gasPrice on a network with no type-2 pricing.
+                if (feeData.maxFeePerGas != null) {
+                    maxSendFees = {
+                        gasLimit,
+                        maxFeePerGas: feeData.maxFeePerGas,
+                        maxPriorityFeePerGas: feeData.maxPriorityFeePerGas,
+                    };
+                } else {
+                    maxSendFees = { gasLimit, gasPrice: feeData.gasPrice };
+                }
+            }
+        }
         renderValidation(txInfo);
     } catch (e) {
-        log.errorf("gas estimation failed:", e.message);
+        log.errorf("gas estimation failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
         if (pendingTx !== txInfo) return;
         $("confirm-fee-amount").textContent = "Unable to estimate";
         setVisible("confirm-fee-reserve", false);
@@ -406,18 +464,19 @@ async function estimateGas(txInfo) {
 }
 
 // Populate the transaction this send describes, enforce the fee bound against
-// the fees that were actually filled in, then sign and broadcast it. The send
+// the fees that were actually filled in, then sign and broadcast it. Apart
-// pins no fee fields, so ethers fills maxFeePerGas and the gas limit from what
+// from a max ETH send, which passes its estimate's fee fields as `fees`, the
-// the configured RPC node answers, with nothing otherwise bounding what a
+// send pins no fee fields, so ethers fills maxFeePerGas and the gas limit from
+// what the configured RPC node answers, with nothing otherwise bounding what a
 // hostile node can set — the dApp path's ceilings never reached this one.
 // Populating before the check is what makes assertWithinCeilings() see the
 // same numbers that would be signed; it throws an ApprovalMismatchError when
 // the product gasLimit × maxFeePerGas is over the bound, which the caller
 // shows in the reserved error area rather than sending.
-async function populateVerifyAndSend(connectedSigner, tx) {
+async function populateVerifyAndSend(connectedSigner, tx, fees = null) {
     let request;
     if (tx.token === "ETH") {
-        request = { to: tx.to, value: parseEther(tx.amount) };
+        request = { to: tx.to, value: parseEther(tx.amount), ...fees };
     } else {
         const contract = new Contract(tx.token, ERC20_ABI, connectedSigner);
         // The contract's decimals() is read to be COMPARED with the scale the
@@ -479,6 +538,15 @@ function init(_ctx) {
     onViewLeave("confirm-tx", clearPassword);
 
     $("btn-confirm-send").addEventListener("click", async () => {
+        const wallet = state.wallets[state.selectedWallet];
+        // Every Send button refuses a defective wallet before this screen,
+        // but the popup also reopens onto it from a saved view.
+        const defect = walletDefect(wallet);
+        if (defect) {
+            showError("confirm-tx-password-error", defect.shortMessage);
+            return;
+        }
+
         const password = $("confirm-tx-password").value;
         if (!password) {
             showError(
@@ -488,7 +556,6 @@ function init(_ctx) {
             return;
         }
 
-        const wallet = state.wallets[state.selectedWallet];
         let decryptedSecret;
         hideError("confirm-tx-password-error");
 
@@ -508,6 +575,10 @@ function init(_ctx) {
         $("btn-confirm-send").disabled = true;
         $("btn-confirm-send").classList.add("text-muted");
 
+        // The network it is sent on. The wait, success and error screens
+        // label its amount by this, not by the network active when they draw.
+        pendingTx.chainId = currentNetwork().chainId;
+
         let tx;
         try {
             const signer = getSignerForAddress(
@@ -518,7 +589,11 @@ function init(_ctx) {
             const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
             const connectedSigner = signer.connect(provider);
 
-            tx = await populateVerifyAndSend(connectedSigner, pendingTx);
+            tx = await populateVerifyAndSend(
+                connectedSigner,
+                pendingTx,
+                maxSendFees,
+            );
 
             // Best-effort: clear decrypted secret after use.
             // Note: JS strings are immutable; this nulls the reference but

src/popup/views/deleteWallet.js

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ const {
     removeWalletFromState,
     broadcastActiveChanged,
 } = require("../../shared/walletDelete");
+const { INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS } = require("../../shared/symbolSpoof");
 
 let deleteWalletIndex = null;
 let lostPasswordIndex = null;
@@ -20,21 +21,31 @@ let ctx = null;
 // The name shown for a wallet, and on the lost-password screen the string
 // the user has to type back. One function so the two cannot disagree: a
 // confirmation that asks for a name other than the one on screen is
-// unusable.
+// unusable. A name that shows nothing at all (only spaces, or only
+// zero-width characters) is replaced by "Wallet N" for the same reason:
+// there would be nothing on screen to type back.
 function displayName(walletIdx) {
     const wallet = state.wallets[walletIdx];
-    return (wallet && wallet.name) || "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
+    const name = wallet && wallet.name;
+    if (name && confirmKey(name)) return name;
+    return "Wallet " + (walletIdx + 1);
 }
 
 // What the typed confirmation and the wallet name are compared as. HTML
 // collapses runs of whitespace when it renders the name, so a wallet named
 // "My  Wallet" with two spaces DISPLAYS as "My Wallet": the user cannot
 // see the second space and cannot type a string that matches the stored
-// name. Comparing collapsed on both sides is what keeps the confirmation
+// name. Characters that paint nothing, such as a zero-width space, are
-// satisfiable, on the one screen whose whole purpose is unwedging a user
+// invisible the same way and are removed first. Comparing this form on
-// who is already stuck. Case and surrounding space go the same way.
+// both sides is what keeps the confirmation satisfiable, on the one screen
+// whose whole purpose is unwedging a user who is already stuck. Case and
+// surrounding space go the same way.
 function confirmKey(name) {
-    return name.trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ").toLowerCase();
+    return name
+        .replace(INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS, "")
+        .trim()
+        .replace(/\s+/g, " ")
+        .toLowerCase();
 }
 
 // Drop the password from the DOM and the wallet selection from the
@@ -174,14 +185,16 @@ function init(_ctx) {
             return;
         }
 
-        // Case, surrounding spaces and repeated inner spaces are not part
+        // Case, surrounding spaces, repeated inner spaces and invisible
-        // of the confirmation; see confirmKey(). This asks whether the
+        // characters are not part of the confirmation; see confirmKey().
-        // user knows which wallet they are on; it is not a secret, and
+        // This asks whether the user knows which wallet they are on; it is
-        // refusing "wallet 2" for "Wallet 2" would only teach the user to
+        // not a secret, and refusing "wallet 2" for "Wallet 2" would only
-        // distrust the control.
+        // teach the user to distrust the control. An empty field is
-        const typed = $("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value;
+        // refused whatever the wallet is called, so no stored name can
+        // ever be confirmed by typing nothing.
+        const typed = confirmKey($("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value);
         const expected = displayName(lostPasswordIndex);
-        if (confirmKey(typed) !== confirmKey(expected)) {
+        if (typed === "" || typed !== confirmKey(expected)) {
             $("delete-wallet-lost-flash").textContent =
                 "That is not the name of this wallet. Type " +
                 expected +

src/popup/views/helpers.js

@@ -13,10 +13,12 @@
 // reasoning behind it are; it is re-exported below so views keep importing
 // it from here.
 const { formatEther } = require("ethers");
+const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
 const {
     truncateAmountNeverZero,
     isBelowOneMillionth,
 } = require("../../shared/amountDisplay");
+const { resolveTokenSymbol } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
 const { DEBUG } = require("../../shared/constants");
 const { escapeHtml } = require("../../shared/html");
 const { isDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
@@ -52,9 +54,8 @@ const VIEWS = [
     "export-privkey",
     "show-phrase",
     // Shown by src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js when the stored profile
-    // cannot be read. It is never reached through showView() — by then the
+    // cannot be read, never by showView() (see there), but listed so that
-    // state singleton this file writes on every navigation refuses to be read
+    // every view-hiding loop covers it.
-    // — but it is listed so that every view-hiding loop covers it.
     "state-recovery",
 ];
 
@@ -85,12 +86,28 @@ function hideError(id) {
     el.style.visibility = "hidden";
 }
 
+// Set when src/popup/index.js passes the recovery screen to showView(), and
+// never cleared. Kept in memory for this popup's life, never in
+// state.currentView, which is saved: a popup opened later must not inherit it.
+let stateRecoveryShown = false;
+
 function showView(name) {
+    // The recovery screen, once up, is never replaced: work still running
+    // when it went up, such as a transaction wait, must not take the user off
+    // it or clear what they exported or typed there
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373).
+    if (stateRecoveryShown) return;
     const leaving = state.currentView;
     if (leaving && leaving !== name) {
         const onLeave = viewLeaveHandlers.get(leaving);
         if (onLeave) onLeave();
     }
+    // Passed here only so the screen it replaces is left like any other;
+    // stateRecovery.show() raises it, and it is never the current view.
+    if (name === "state-recovery") {
+        stateRecoveryShown = true;
+        return;
+    }
     for (const v of VIEWS) {
         const el = document.getElementById(`view-${v}`);
         if (el) {
@@ -252,16 +269,42 @@ function unknownableAmount(balance) {
     return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
 }
 
+// The active network's native token symbol, `ETH` on mainnet and `SepoliaETH`
+// on Sepolia, as src/shared/networks.js names it. The wallet's balances and
+// the Send and confirmation screens, which send on the active network, label a
+// native amount with this; a transaction already made or requested is labelled
+// by its own chain id, through nativeCurrencyByChainId() in networks.js. The
+// "ETH" that state.selectedToken and txInfo.token hold is the native token's
+// id, not its label, and stays "ETH" on every network.
+function nativeCurrency() {
+    return currentNetwork().nativeCurrency;
+}
+
+// The symbol shown for a token line, resolved from the bundled list, the
+// tokens the user tracks, and the explorer's report — the same chain the
+// amount line's scale comes from. Null when no source names one, so the token
+// lines keep saying `Unknown token` for a token nothing knows.
+function tokenLabel(address) {
+    return resolveTokenSymbol(address, {
+        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
+        wallets: state.wallets,
+    });
+}
+
 // A network fee in wei as the confirmation and approval screens both show it:
-// the ETH figure through truncateAmountNeverZero(), then its USD value when the
+// the ETH figure through truncateAmountNeverZero() and labelled `symbol`, the
-// ETH price is known. The USD value is of the exact fee, not of the truncated
+// native currency of the network the fee is paid on, then its USD value when
-// figure.
+// the ETH price is known. The USD value is of the exact fee, not of the
-function formatFee(wei) {
+// truncated figure.
+function formatFee(wei, symbol) {
     const eth = formatEther(wei);
     const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
     const usd = ethPrice ? formatUsd(parseFloat(eth) * ethPrice) : "";
     return (
-        truncateAmountNeverZero(eth) + " ETH" + (usd ? " (" + usd + ")" : "")
+        truncateAmountNeverZero(eth) +
+        " " +
+        symbol +
+        (usd ? " (" + usd + ")" : "")
     );
 }
 
@@ -282,7 +325,7 @@ function balanceLine(symbol, amount, price, tokenId) {
     const qty = amount === null ? "quantity unknown" : amount.toFixed(4);
     const usd =
         price && amount !== null
-            ? formatUsd(amount * price) || " "
+            ? escapeHtml(formatUsd(amount * price)) || " "
             : " ";
     // tokenId is a contract address out of the same explorer JSON, and it
     // lands inside a quoted attribute.
@@ -292,7 +335,7 @@ function balanceLine(symbol, amount, price, tokenId) {
         : "";
     return (
         `<div class="flex text-xs${clickClass}"${tokenAttr}>` +
-        `<span class="flex justify-between" style="width:42ch;max-width:100%">` +
+        `<span class="flex justify-between w-[42ch] max-w-full">` +
         `<span>${escapeHtml(displaySymbol(symbol))}</span>` +
         `<span>${qty}</span>` +
         `</span>` +
@@ -303,7 +346,7 @@ function balanceLine(symbol, amount, price, tokenId) {
 
 function balanceLinesForAddress(addr, trackedTokens, showZero) {
     let html = balanceLine(
-        "ETH",
+        nativeCurrency(),
         parseFloat(addr.balance || "0"),
         getPrice("ETH"),
         "ETH",
@@ -387,23 +430,26 @@ function truncateMiddle(str, maxLen) {
 
 // 16 colors evenly spaced around the hue wheel (22.5° apart),
 // all at HSL saturation 70%, lightness 50% for uniform vibrancy.
+// Each is a whole Tailwind class: Tailwind builds only the classes it finds
+// written out in the source, so the class name cannot be put together at
+// runtime.
 const ADDRESS_COLORS = [
-    "#d92626",
+    "bg-[#d92626]",
-    "#d96926",
+    "bg-[#d96926]",
-    "#d9ac26",
+    "bg-[#d9ac26]",
-    "#c2d926",
+    "bg-[#c2d926]",
-    "#80d926",
+    "bg-[#80d926]",
-    "#3dd926",
+    "bg-[#3dd926]",
-    "#26d953",
+    "bg-[#26d953]",
-    "#26d996",
+    "bg-[#26d996]",
-    "#26d9d9",
+    "bg-[#26d9d9]",
-    "#2696d9",
+    "bg-[#2696d9]",
-    "#2653d9",
+    "bg-[#2653d9]",
-    "#3d26d9",
+    "bg-[#3d26d9]",
-    "#8026d9",
+    "bg-[#8026d9]",
-    "#c226d9",
+    "bg-[#c226d9]",
-    "#d926ac",
+    "bg-[#d926ac]",
-    "#d92669",
+    "bg-[#d92669]",
 ];
 
 function addressColor(address) {
@@ -413,7 +459,12 @@ function addressColor(address) {
 
 function addressDotHtml(address) {
     const color = addressColor(address);
-    return `<span style="width:8px;height:8px;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block;background:${color};margin-right:4px;vertical-align:middle;flex-shrink:0;"></span>`;
+    return `<span class="inline-block w-[8px] h-[8px] rounded-[50%] ${color} mr-[4px] align-middle shrink-0"></span>`;
+}
+
+function blockieHtml(address) {
+    const src = makeBlockie(address);
+    return `<img src="${escapeHtml(src)}" width="48" height="48" class="inline-block rounded-[50%] [image-rendering:pixelated]">`;
 }
 
 // Look up an address across all wallets and return its title
@@ -462,6 +513,9 @@ function formatAddressHtml(address, ensName, maxLen, title) {
     return renderAddressHtml(address, { title, ensName, maxLen });
 }
 
+// A transaction's time as every screen shows it (README, Display
+// Consistency): the ISO datetime, in UTC when the UTC Timestamps setting is
+// on, and the relative age. Views import these two; they keep no copies.
 function isoDate(timestamp) {
     const d = new Date(timestamp * 1000);
     const pad = (n) => String(n).padStart(2, "0");
@@ -520,7 +574,7 @@ function timeAgo(timestamp) {
 
 // Shared external-link icon SVG used across all views.
 const EXT_ICON =
-    `<span style="display:inline-block;width:10px;height:10px;margin-left:4px;vertical-align:middle">` +
+    `<span class="inline-block w-[10px] h-[10px] ml-[4px] align-middle">` +
     `<svg viewBox="0 0 12 12" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">` +
     `<path d="M4.5 1.5H2a.5.5 0 00-.5.5v8a.5.5 0 00.5.5h8a.5.5 0 00.5-.5V7.5"/>` +
     `<path d="M7 1.5h3.5V5M7 5.5L10.5 1.5"/>` +
@@ -660,9 +714,11 @@ module.exports = {
     balanceLinesForAddress,
     addressHoldsFunds,
     unknownableAmount,
+    nativeCurrency,
+    tokenLabel,
     formatFee,
-    addressColor,
     addressDotHtml,
+    blockieHtml,
     escapeHtml,
     displaySymbol,
     addressTitle,
@@ -672,7 +728,6 @@ module.exports = {
     renderAddressHtml,
     copyableHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
-    etherscanAddressUrl,
     etherscanLinkHtml,
     explorerUrl,
     EXT_ICON,

src/popup/views/home.js

@@ -10,11 +10,17 @@ const {
     addressTitle,
     escapeHtml,
     displaySymbol,
+    nativeCurrency,
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     pushCurrentView,
 } = require("./helpers");
-const { state, saveState, currentAddress } = require("../../shared/state");
+const {
+    state,
+    saveState,
+    currentAddress,
+    currentNetwork,
+} = require("../../shared/state");
 const { notify } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
 const {
     updateSendBalance,
@@ -57,7 +63,7 @@ function renderTotalValue() {
     const ethPrice = getPrice("ETH");
     if (priceEl) {
         priceEl.innerHTML = ethPrice
-            ? formatUsd(ethPrice) + " USD/ETH"
+            ? escapeHtml(formatUsd(ethPrice) + " USD/ETH")
             : " ";
     }
 
@@ -68,12 +74,13 @@ function renderTotalValue() {
         return;
     }
     const ethBal = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0");
-    const ethStr = ethBal.toFixed(4) + " ETH";
+    const ethStr = ethBal.toFixed(4) + " " + nativeCurrency();
     const ethUsd = ethPrice ? " (" + formatUsd(ethBal * ethPrice) + ")" : "";
     el.textContent = ethStr + ethUsd;
 
     if (subEl) {
-        subEl.innerHTML = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr)) || " ";
+        subEl.innerHTML =
+            escapeHtml(formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr))) || " ";
     }
 }
 
@@ -124,10 +131,10 @@ function renderHomeTxList(ctx) {
         const title = addressTitle(counterparty, state.wallets);
         const titleStr = title ? escapeHtml(title) : "";
         const err = tx.isError ? " (failed)" : "";
-        const opacity = tx.isError ? " opacity:0.5;" : "";
+        const opacity = tx.isError ? " opacity-50" : "";
         const ago = escapeHtml(timeAgo(tx.timestamp));
         const iso = escapeHtml(isoDate(tx.timestamp));
-        html += `<div class="home-tx-row py-2 border-b border-border-light text-xs cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover" data-tx="${i}" style="${opacity}">`;
+        html += `<div class="home-tx-row py-2 border-b border-border-light text-xs cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover${opacity}" data-tx="${i}">`;
         html += `<div class="flex justify-between"><span class="text-muted" title="${iso}">${ago}</span><span>${dirLabel}${err}</span></div>`;
         html += txCounterpartyHtml(counterparty, titleStr, amountStr);
         html += `</div>`;
@@ -182,7 +189,11 @@ async function loadHomeTxs(ctx) {
 
     try {
         const fetches = allAddresses.map((addr) =>
-            fetchRecentTransactions(addr, state.blockscoutUrl),
+            fetchRecentTransactions(
+                addr,
+                state.blockscoutUrl,
+                currentNetwork().chainId,
+            ),
         );
         const results = await Promise.all(fetches);
 
@@ -230,7 +241,7 @@ function walletListHtml() {
     state.wallets.forEach((wallet, wi) => {
         const defect = walletDefect(wallet);
         html += `<div>`;
-        html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center bg-section py-1 px-2" style="margin:0 -0.5rem">`;
+        html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center bg-section py-1 px-2 -mx-2">`;
         html += `<span class="font-bold cursor-pointer wallet-name underline decoration-dashed" data-wallet="${wi}">${escapeHtml(wallet.name)}</span>`;
         // No "+" on a defective wallet: deriving another address from that
         // xpub would only add one more address the key does not produce
@@ -244,12 +255,12 @@ function walletListHtml() {
         wallet.addresses.forEach((addr, ai) => {
             html += `<div class="address-row py-1 border-b border-border-light cursor-pointer hover:bg-hover" data-wallet="${wi}" data-address="${ai}">`;
             const isActive = state.activeAddress === addr.address;
-            const infoBtn = `<span class="btn-addr-info text-xs cursor-pointer border border-border hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg" style="padding:0" data-wallet="${wi}" data-address="${ai}">[info]</span>`;
+            const infoBtn = `<span class="btn-addr-info text-xs cursor-pointer border border-border hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg p-0" data-wallet="${wi}" data-address="${ai}">[info]</span>`;
             // Only where a wallet can spare the address: a wallet holding a
             // single address has no remove control, because its last address
             // is never removable.
             const removeBtn = canRemoveAddress(wallet)
-                ? `<span class="btn-remove-address text-xs cursor-pointer border border-border hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg ml-1" style="padding:0" data-wallet="${wi}" data-address="${ai}" title="Remove this address from the wallet">[x]</span>`
+                ? `<span class="btn-remove-address text-xs cursor-pointer border border-border hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg ml-1 p-0" data-wallet="${wi}" data-address="${ai}" title="Remove this address from the wallet">[x]</span>`
                 : "";
             const dot = addressDotHtml(addr.address);
             const titleBold = isActive ? "font-bold" : "";
@@ -270,7 +281,7 @@ function walletListHtml() {
             }
             html += `<div class="am-address text-xs">${escapeHtml(addr.address)}</div>`;
             const addrTotal = formatAddressTotal(getAddressValue(addr));
-            html += `<div class="text-xs text-muted text-right min-h-[1rem]">${addrTotal || "&nbsp;"}</div>`;
+            html += `<div class="text-xs text-muted text-right min-h-[1rem]">${escapeHtml(addrTotal) || "&nbsp;"}</div>`;
             html += balanceLinesForAddress(
                 addr,
                 state.trackedTokens,

src/popup/views/send.js

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ const {
     showFlash,
     addressTitle,
     displaySymbol,
+    escapeHtml,
+    nativeCurrency,
     renderAddressHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     goBack,
@@ -20,10 +22,25 @@ const {
     truncateAmountNeverZero,
     isBelowOneMillionth,
 } = require("../../shared/amountDisplay");
-const { getAddress } = require("ethers");
+const {
+    feeReserveWei,
+    maxEthAmount,
+    maxTokenAmount,
+} = require("../../shared/txValidation");
+const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
+const { getAddress, parseEther } = require("ethers");
 
 const ZERO_ADDRESS = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
 
+// Whether the amount field holds what Max filled in. The confirmation screen
+// re-derives a max ETH amount from its own fee estimate; typing in the field
+// makes it an ordinary amount again.
+let amountIsMax = false;
+
+// Counts the times the Send screen has opened, so a Max fee estimate started
+// before it was last opened fills nothing in.
+let sendScreenOpenings = 0;
+
 /**
  * Validate a destination address string.
  * Returns { valid: true } or { valid: false, error: "..." }.
@@ -124,7 +141,7 @@ function updateToValidation() {
 
 function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
     const sel = $("send-token");
-    sel.innerHTML = '<option value="ETH">ETH</option>';
+    sel.innerHTML = `<option value="ETH">${escapeHtml(nativeCurrency())}</option>`;
     const fraudSet = new Set(
         (state.fraudContracts || []).map((a) => a.toLowerCase()),
     );
@@ -204,7 +221,8 @@ function updateSendBalance() {
         $("send-balance").textContent =
             "Current balance: " +
             truncateAmountNeverZero(addr.balance || "0") +
-            " ETH";
+            " " +
+            nativeCurrency();
     } else {
         const symbol = resolveSymbol(
             token,
@@ -226,9 +244,102 @@ function updateSendBalance() {
     }
 }
 
+// Fill the amount field with the most the selected holding can send: a
+// token's whole balance (cut to 18 decimal places), or for ETH the exact
+// balance minus the fee reserve the confirmation screen checks against, never
+// the rounded balance the screen shows. Where there is nothing to fill in, a
+// flash message says why.
+async function fillMaxAmount() {
+    const addr = currentAddress();
+    if (!addr) return;
+    const token = state.selectedToken || $("send-token").value;
+
+    if (token !== "ETH") {
+        const bal = tokenBalanceAndDecimals(addr, token).tokenBalance;
+        if (bal == null) {
+            showFlash("This token's balance is unknown.");
+            return;
+        }
+        const amount = maxTokenAmount(bal);
+        if (!(parseFloat(amount) > 0)) {
+            showFlash("This token's balance is zero.");
+            return;
+        }
+        $("send-amount").value = amount;
+        amountIsMax = true;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    // The fee is estimated for this recipient, as the confirmation screen
+    // estimates it: sending to a contract can cost more gas.
+    const to = $("send-to").value.trim();
+    if (!validateToAddress(to).valid) {
+        showFlash("Please enter a recipient address first.");
+        return;
+    }
+    const typed = $("send-amount").value;
+    const opening = sendScreenOpenings;
+    let feeWei = null;
+    try {
+        const provider = getProvider(state.rpcUrl, state.networkId);
+        const [feeData, gasLimit] = await Promise.all([
+            provider.getFeeData(),
+            provider.estimateGas({
+                from: addr.address,
+                to,
+                value: parseEther(addr.balance || "0"),
+            }),
+        ]);
+        feeWei = feeReserveWei(gasLimit, feeData);
+    } catch (e) {
+        log.errorf(
+            "max amount fee estimate failed:",
+            e.shortMessage || e.message,
+        );
+    }
+    // While the estimate was in flight the user left the screen (and perhaps
+    // opened it again), typed an amount, or changed the address, the holding
+    // or the recipient: what they did wins.
+    if (
+        state.currentView !== "send" ||
+        sendScreenOpenings !== opening ||
+        currentAddress()?.address !== addr.address ||
+        (state.selectedToken || $("send-token").value) !== token ||
+        $("send-to").value.trim() !== to ||
+        $("send-amount").value !== typed
+    ) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if (feeWei === null) {
+        showFlash("The network fee could not be estimated.");
+        return;
+    }
+    const amount = maxEthAmount(addr.balance, feeWei);
+    if (amount === null) {
+        showFlash("Your balance does not cover the network fee.");
+        return;
+    }
+    $("send-amount").value = amount;
+    amountIsMax = true;
+}
+
 function init(_ctx) {
     ctx = _ctx;
-    $("send-token").addEventListener("change", updateSendBalance);
+    $("send-token").addEventListener("change", () => {
+        // A filled-in maximum is the maximum of the holding it was filled in
+        // for.
+        if (amountIsMax) {
+            $("send-amount").value = "";
+            amountIsMax = false;
+        }
+        updateSendBalance();
+    });
+
+    $("btn-send-max").addEventListener("click", fillMaxAmount);
+    $("send-amount").addEventListener("input", () => {
+        amountIsMax = false;
+    });
 
     // Initial state: disable review button until address is entered
     $("btn-send-review").disabled = true;
@@ -305,6 +416,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
             tokenSymbol: tokenSymbol,
             tokenBalance: tokenBalance,
             tokenDecimals: tokenDecimals,
+            max: amountIsMax,
         });
     });
 
@@ -315,7 +427,10 @@ function init(_ctx) {
     });
 }
 
+// Called each time the Send screen opens, with its fields cleared.
 function resetSendValidation() {
+    sendScreenOpenings++;
+    amountIsMax = false;
     const errorEl = $("send-to-error");
     const btn = $("btn-send-review");
     if (errorEl) errorEl.textContent = "";

src/popup/views/settings.js

@@ -16,7 +16,12 @@ const {
 } = require("../dustThreshold");
 const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
 const { onChainSwitch } = require("../../shared/chainSwitch");
-const { log, debugFetch, setRuntimeDebug } = require("../../shared/log");
+const {
+    log,
+    debugFetch,
+    urlOrigin,
+    setRuntimeDebug,
+} = require("../../shared/log");
 const deleteWallet = require("./deleteWallet");
 const showPhrase = require("./showPhrase");
 const { walletHasRecoveryPhrase } = require("../../shared/wallet");
@@ -34,35 +39,35 @@ const { notify, sendMessage } = require("../../shared/browserApi");
 let versionClickCount = 0;
 let versionClickTimer = null;
 
-// One row per hostname, however many addresses or origins it appears under,
+// One row per site origin, however many addresses it appears under, each with
-// each with an [x] that hands it to onRemove.
+// an [x] that hands it to onRemove.
-function renderSiteList(containerId, hostnames, onRemove) {
+function renderSiteList(containerId, origins, onRemove) {
     const container = $(containerId);
-    const unique = [...new Set(hostnames)];
+    const unique = [...new Set(origins)];
     if (unique.length === 0) {
         container.innerHTML = '<p class="text-xs text-muted">None</p>';
         return;
     }
     let html = "";
-    unique.forEach((hostname) => {
+    unique.forEach((origin) => {
         html += `<div class="flex justify-between items-center text-xs py-1 border-b border-border-light">`;
-        // A hostname the URL parser produced cannot carry a delimiter, so
+        // An origin the URL parser produced cannot carry a delimiter, so
         // this is escaped for the rule rather than for a known hole — the
         // rule being that nothing reaches innerHTML unescaped.
-        html += `<span>${escapeHtml(hostname)}</span>`;
+        html += `<span>${escapeHtml(origin)}</span>`;
-        html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-hostname="${escapeHtml(hostname)}">[x]</button>`;
+        html += `<button class="btn-remove-site border border-border px-1 hover:bg-fg hover:text-bg cursor-pointer" data-origin="${escapeHtml(origin)}">[x]</button>`;
         html += `</div>`;
     });
     container.innerHTML = html;
     container.querySelectorAll(".btn-remove-site").forEach((btn) => {
-        btn.addEventListener("click", () => onRemove(btn.dataset.hostname));
+        btn.addEventListener("click", () => onRemove(btn.dataset.origin));
     });
 }
 
-// Drop a hostname from a remembered site list under every address.
+// Drop a site origin from a remembered site list under every address.
-function forgetHostname(siteMap, hostname) {
+function forgetOrigin(siteMap, origin) {
     for (const addr of Object.keys(siteMap)) {
-        siteMap[addr] = siteMap[addr].filter((h) => h !== hostname);
+        siteMap[addr] = siteMap[addr].filter((o) => o !== origin);
         if (siteMap[addr].length === 0) {
             delete siteMap[addr];
         }
@@ -72,16 +77,16 @@ function forgetHostname(siteMap, hostname) {
 // Removing a site from Allowed Sites or Connected Sites disconnects it: it is
 // no longer allowed under any address, and the background ends its
 // connections approved without "Remember" and tells its open tabs.
-async function removeAllowedSite(hostname) {
+async function removeAllowedSite(origin) {
-    forgetHostname(state.allowedSites, hostname);
+    forgetOrigin(state.allowedSites, origin);
     await saveState();
-    notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", hostname });
+    notify({ type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", origin });
     await renderSiteLists();
 }
 
 // Removing a denied site only forgets the refusal; it connects nothing.
-async function removeDeniedSite(hostname) {
+async function removeDeniedSite(origin) {
-    forgetHostname(state.deniedSites, hostname);
+    forgetOrigin(state.deniedSites, origin);
     await saveState();
     await renderSiteLists();
 }
@@ -208,12 +213,7 @@ function show() {
     versionClickCount = 0;
 
     // Show debug well if debug mode is already enabled
-    const debugWell = $("settings-debug-well");
+    $("settings-debug-well").classList.toggle("hidden", !state.debugMode);
-    if (state.debugMode) {
-        debugWell.style.display = "";
-    } else {
-        debugWell.style.display = "none";
-    }
     $("settings-debug-mode").checked = state.debugMode;
 
     showView("settings");
@@ -272,8 +272,11 @@ function init(ctx) {
                 showFlash("Wrong network: expected " + net.name + ".");
                 return;
             }
-        } catch (e) {
+        } catch {
-            log.errorf("RPC validation fetch failed:", e.message);
+            // Not the error's message: fetch puts the whole URL, password and
+            // key included, in the message of the error it throws for a URL
+            // with a user name and password or one it cannot parse.
+            log.errorf("RPC validation fetch failed:", urlOrigin(url));
             showFlash("Could not reach endpoint.");
             return;
         }
@@ -295,8 +298,9 @@ function init(ctx) {
                 showFlash("Endpoint returned HTTP " + resp.status + ".");
                 return;
             }
-        } catch (e) {
+        } catch {
-            log.errorf("Blockscout validation failed:", e.message);
+            // Not the error's message, as for the RPC check above.
+            log.errorf("Blockscout validation failed:", urlOrigin(url));
             showFlash("Could not reach endpoint.");
             return;
         }
@@ -425,7 +429,7 @@ function init(ctx) {
         if (versionClickCount >= 10) {
             versionClickCount = 0;
             clearTimeout(versionClickTimer);
-            $("settings-debug-well").style.display = "";
+            $("settings-debug-well").classList.remove("hidden");
         }
     });
 

src/popup/views/settingsAddToken.js

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ function isTracked(address) {
     return state.trackedTokens.some((t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === lower);
 }
 
-function tokenLabel(t) {
+function nameAndSymbol(t) {
     return t.name ? t.name + " (" + t.symbol + ")" : t.symbol;
 }
 
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ function renderDropdown() {
     let html = '<option value="">-- select --</option>';
     for (const t of tokens) {
         const tracked = isTracked(t.address);
-        const label = tokenLabel(t) + (tracked ? " (tracked)" : "");
+        const label = nameAndSymbol(t) + (tracked ? " (tracked)" : "");
         html +=
             `<option value="${escapeHtml(t.address)}"` +
             ` data-symbol="${escapeHtml(t.symbol)}"` +

src/popup/views/stateRecovery.js

@@ -3,8 +3,10 @@
 // Everything else in the popup assumes a loaded profile: showView() reads and
 // writes the state singleton, every view renders from it, and the Settings
 // gear leads to a screen that does both. None of that is available here — by
-// the time this runs, loadState() has REFUSED, deliberately, and reading the
+// the time this runs, the stored record has been REFUSED, deliberately: at
-// singleton throws (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311).
+// open loadState() refused it and reading the singleton throws
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/311), and under an open popup
+// a save refused it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373).
 //
 // So this module talks to the DOM directly and touches no state at all. It is
 // the one screen that must work when nothing else can, which is also why it
@@ -170,6 +172,11 @@ function wire() {
  *     refused, or its sentence.
  */
 function show(problem) {
+    // Already up: a later save that trips over the same record, such as a
+    // refresh that was in flight when the screen went up, must not clear what
+    // the user has exported or typed here.
+    if (!$("view-state-recovery").classList.contains("hidden")) return;
+
     const sentence =
         (problem && (problem.problem || problem.message)) || String(problem);
 

src/popup/views/transactionDetail.js

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ const {
     isoDate,
     timeAgo,
     renderAddressHtml,
+    blockieHtml,
     attachCopyHandlers,
     copyableHtml,
     etherscanLinkHtml,
@@ -21,8 +22,8 @@ const {
     goBack,
 } = require("./helpers");
 const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
+const { nativeCurrencyByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
 const { formatEther, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
-const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
 const { log, debugFetch } = require("../../shared/log");
 const { decodeCalldata } = require("./approval");
 
@@ -41,13 +42,10 @@ function getTransactionType(tx) {
             return "Token Approval";
         return "Contract Call";
     }
-    if (tx.symbol && tx.symbol !== "ETH") return "ERC-20 Token Transfer";
+    // By the token contract, not the symbol: a token chooses its own symbol
-    return "Native ETH Transfer";
+    // and can report the native token's, but only a token transfer has one.
-}
+    if (tx.contractAddress) return "ERC-20 Token Transfer";
-
+    return "Native " + nativeCurrencyByChainId(tx.chainId) + " Transfer";
-function blockieHtml(address) {
-    const src = makeBlockie(address);
-    return `<img src="${escapeHtml(src)}" width="48" height="48" style="image-rendering:pixelated;border-radius:50%;display:inline-block">`;
 }
 
 function txAddressHtml(address, ensName, title) {
@@ -84,6 +82,11 @@ function show(tx) {
             isContractCall: tx.isContractCall || false,
             method: tx.method || null,
             contractAddress: tx.contractAddress || null,
+            // The network the history entry was read from. The type line and
+            // the fee are in its native currency, not the active network's:
+            // a site can switch the active network before a later popup
+            // shows this screen again.
+            chainId: tx.chainId,
         },
     };
     render();
@@ -179,7 +182,7 @@ function render() {
         if (el) el.classList.add("hidden");
     }
 
-    loadFullTxDetails(tx.hash, tx.to);
+    loadFullTxDetails(tx.hash, tx.to, tx.chainId);
 
     const isoStr = isoDate(tx.timestamp);
     $("tx-detail-time").innerHTML =
@@ -197,7 +200,7 @@ function showDetailField(sectionId, contentId, value) {
     section.classList.remove("hidden");
 }
 
-function populateOnChainDetails(txData) {
+function populateOnChainDetails(txData, chainId) {
     // Block number
     if (txData.block_number != null) {
         const blockLink = explorerUrl("block", String(txData.block_number));
@@ -227,7 +230,7 @@ function populateOnChainDetails(txData) {
         showDetailField(
             "tx-detail-fee-section",
             "tx-detail-fee",
-            feeEth + " ETH",
+            feeEth + " " + nativeCurrencyByChainId(chainId),
         );
     }
 
@@ -287,7 +290,7 @@ function populateOnChainDetails(txData) {
     }
 }
 
-async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress) {
+async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress, chainId) {
     const section = $("tx-detail-calldata-section");
     const actionEl = $("tx-detail-calldata-action");
     const detailsEl = $("tx-detail-calldata-details");
@@ -304,7 +307,7 @@ async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, toAddress) {
         const txData = await resp.json();
 
         // Populate on-chain detail fields (block, nonce, gas, fee)
-        populateOnChainDetails(txData);
+        populateOnChainDetails(txData, chainId);
 
         const inputData = txData.raw_input || txData.input || null;
         if (!inputData || inputData === "0x") return;

src/popup/views/txStatus.js

@@ -13,9 +13,10 @@ const {
     explorerUrl,
     displaySymbol,
     clearViewStack,
+    tokenLabel,
 } = require("./helpers");
-const { resolveTokenSymbol } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
 const { state } = require("../../shared/state");
+const { nativeCurrencyByChainId } = require("../../shared/networks");
 const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
 const { log } = require("../../shared/log");
 
@@ -86,9 +87,13 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
     endWait();
     const id = waitId;
 
+    // A native amount, here and on the success and error screens, is in the
+    // native currency of txInfo.chainId, the network the transaction was sent
+    // on, not the active network's: a site can switch the active network
+    // while this screen is open or before a later popup resumes it.
     const symbol =
         txInfo.token === "ETH"
-            ? "ETH"
+            ? nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId)
             : displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
     $("wait-tx-summary").textContent = txInfo.amount + " " + symbol;
     $("wait-tx-to").innerHTML = toAddressHtml(txInfo.to);
@@ -133,7 +138,7 @@ function startWait(txInfo, txHash, broadcastTime, pollNow) {
             // failed — which matters most on a resumed wait, where the
             // first poll is already past the deadline.
             answered = false;
-            log.errorf("poll receipt failed:", e.message);
+            log.errorf("poll receipt failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
         }
         // The lookup is async: the wait may have ended while it was in
         // flight, in which case this result must not touch the view.
@@ -193,9 +198,10 @@ function showWait(txInfo, txHash) {
 // an object merely missing one of them throws a TypeError out of
 // restoreView() — which init() does not guard, skipping the rest of popup
 // init and leaving wait-tx on screen with no back control. A non-numeric
-// broadcastTime leaves an unexitable wait counting "NaNs". txInfo.token and
+// broadcastTime leaves an unexitable wait counting "NaNs". txInfo.token,
-// txInfo.tokenSymbol are deliberately unchecked: they are compared and
+// txInfo.tokenSymbol and txInfo.chainId are deliberately unchecked: they are
-// coalesced rather than dereferenced, and tokenSymbol is null for ETH.
+// compared and coalesced rather than dereferenced, and tokenSymbol is null for
+// ETH.
 function restoreWait() {
     const d = state.viewData;
     if (!d || !d.pendingWait) return false;
@@ -223,7 +229,7 @@ function showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, blockNumber) {
 
     const symbol =
         txInfo.token === "ETH"
-            ? "ETH"
+            ? nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId)
             : displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
     state.viewData = {
         amount: txInfo.amount,
@@ -237,17 +243,6 @@ function showSuccess(txInfo, txHash, blockNumber) {
     ctx.doRefreshAndRender();
 }
 
-// The symbol shown for a decoded token line, resolved from the bundled list,
-// the tokens the user tracks, and the explorer's report — the same chain the
-// approval screen uses. Null when no source names one, so the line keeps
-// saying `Unknown token`.
-function tokenLabel(address) {
-    return resolveTokenSymbol(address, {
-        trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
-        wallets: state.wallets,
-    });
-}
-
 function decodedDetailsHtml(decoded) {
     if (!decoded || !decoded.details) return "";
     let html = `<div class="border border-border border-dashed p-2 mb-3">`;
@@ -320,7 +315,7 @@ function showError(txInfo, txHash, message) {
 
     const symbol =
         txInfo.token === "ETH"
-            ? "ETH"
+            ? nativeCurrencyByChainId(txInfo.chainId)
             : displaySymbol(txInfo.tokenSymbol || "?");
     state.viewData = {
         amount: txInfo.amount,

src/shared/addressWarnings.js

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ async function getFullWarnings(address, provider, options = {}) {
             });
         }
     } catch (e) {
-        log.errorf("contract check failed:", e.message);
+        log.errorf("contract check failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
     }
 
     // Skip tx count check for contracts — they may legitimately have
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ async function getFullWarnings(address, provider, options = {}) {
                 });
             }
         } catch (e) {
-            log.errorf("tx count check failed:", e.message);
+            log.errorf("tx count check failed:", e.shortMessage || e.message);
         }
     }
 

src/shared/approvalAmount.js

@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@
 // disputed is refused rather than guessed at.
 
 // Solidity's decimals() is a uint8, and every source here is ultimately
-// reporting that call's result. toDecimals() is that check, shared with the
+// reporting that call's result. toDecimals() is that check, stopping at the 80
-// send path rather than copied: the bundled list stores numbers, the
+// places formatUnits() accepts, and shared with the send path rather than
-// explorer's copy arrives as a string, and a token the user added by hand
+// copied: the bundled list stores numbers, the explorer's copy arrives as a
-// carries whatever lookupTokenInfo() got back, so the accepted types are
+// string, and a token the user added by hand carries whatever lookupTokenInfo()
-// enumerated rather than coerced.
+// got back, so the accepted types are enumerated rather than coerced.
 const { toDecimals } = require("./transferAmount");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
 const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");

src/shared/approvalTx.js

@@ -51,11 +51,15 @@ const POPULATE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20000;
 // passed to ethers: the object is page-controlled, and a future ethers that
 // learns to carry a new transaction field must not start picking one up out of
 // it without this module knowing.
+//
+// The nonce is not taken from the page; it is always the account's next nonce
+// from the network. A page that chose it could replace one of the user's
+// pending transactions (the same nonce at a higher fee) or leave this one stuck
+// behind a gap (a nonce above the next one).
 const REQUEST_FIELDS = [
     "to",
     "value",
     "data",
-    "nonce",
     "gasLimit",
     "gasPrice",
     "maxFeePerGas",

src/shared/approvalVerify.js

@@ -54,9 +54,11 @@ const {
     formatEther,
     getAddress,
     getBytes,
+    toQuantity,
     verifyMessage,
     verifyTypedData,
 } = require("ethers");
+const { nativeCurrencyByChainId } = require("./networks");
 
 // The only transaction types this wallet signs: legacy, EIP-2930 and
 // EIP-1559. populateTransaction() produces nothing else, so nothing else can
@@ -407,12 +409,21 @@ function assertWithinCeilings(tx) {
             price = normalizeQuantity(tx.gasPrice, "gas price");
         }
         if (price !== null && gasLimit * price > MAX_TOTAL_FEE) {
+            // The fee is paid in the native currency of the network the
+            // transaction is for. Every caller's transaction names it.
+            const nativeCurrency = nativeCurrencyByChainId(
+                present(tx.chainId) ? toQuantity(tx.chainId) : null,
+            );
             throw refuse(
                 "This transaction would allow a network fee of up to " +
                     formatEther(gasLimit * price) +
-                    " ETH, which is more than the " +
+                    " " +
+                    nativeCurrency +
+                    ", which is more than the " +
                     formatEther(MAX_TOTAL_FEE) +
-                    " ETH this wallet will sign for.",
+                    " " +
+                    nativeCurrency +
+                    " this wallet will sign for.",
             );
         }
     }

src/shared/balances.js

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ const {
 } = require("ethers");
 const { ERC20_ABI } = require("./constants");
 const { NETWORKS } = require("./networks");
-const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
+const { log, debugFetch, urlOrigin } = require("./log");
 const { deriveAddressFromXpub } = require("./wallet");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
 const { LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD, parseHoldersCount } = require("./holders");
@@ -147,20 +147,20 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(address, blockscoutUrl, trackedTokens) {
             // null is a holding of an amount that cannot be stated, which is
             // not the same as a holding of zero, and must never render as one.
             const bal = scale === null ? null : formatTokenBalance(raw, scale);
-            // null means the explorer reported no count, which is not the
+            // null means the explorer reported no readable count, which is
-            // same as a count of zero.  This gate is not the low-holder
+            // not the same as a count of zero.  This gate is not the
-            // display filter: it has no user-facing off switch and governs
+            // low-holder display filter: it has no user-facing off switch and
-            // the whole balance list, so it stays strict and admits a token
+            // governs the whole balance list, so it stays strict and admits a
-            // only on a reported count — an unreported one is no evidence.
+            // token only on a reported count — an unreported one is no
-            // A legitimate token still reaches the list through the known
+            // evidence, and `null >= LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD` is false.  A
+            // legitimate token still reaches the list through the known
             // token list or by the user tracking it, and the null is carried
             // through to the views, where the two low-holder filters treat
             // an unknown count as "do not judge" rather than as zero.
             const holders = parseHoldersCount(item.token.holders_count);
             const isKnown = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.has(tokenAddr);
             const isTracked = trackedSet.has(tokenAddr);
-            const hasEnoughHolders =
+            const hasEnoughHolders = holders >= LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD;
-                holders !== null && holders >= LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD;
 
             // Skip spam tokens the user never asked to see
             if (!isKnown && !isTracked && !hasEnoughHolders) continue;
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
     trackedTokens,
     networkId,
 ) {
-    log.debugf("refreshBalances start, rpc:", rpcUrl);
+    log.debugf("refreshBalances start, rpc:", urlOrigin(rpcUrl));
     const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     const updates = [];
 
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
                         log.errorf(
                             "ENS reverse failed",
                             addr.address,
-                            e.message,
+                            e.shortMessage || e.message,
                         );
                         // Keep existing addr.ensName if we had one
                     }),
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
 // Look up token metadata from its contract.
 // Calls symbol() and decimals() to verify it implements ERC-20.
 async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl, networkId) {
-    log.debugf("lookupTokenInfo", contractAddress, "rpc:", rpcUrl);
+    log.debugf("lookupTokenInfo", contractAddress, "rpc:", urlOrigin(rpcUrl));
     const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
     const contract = new Contract(contractAddress, ERC20_ABI, provider);
 
@@ -305,7 +305,10 @@ async function lookupTokenInfo(contractAddress, rpcUrl, networkId) {
         name = await contract.name();
         log.debugf("name() =", name);
     } catch (e) {
-        log.warnf("name() failed, using symbol as name:", e.message);
+        log.warnf(
+            "name() failed, using symbol as name:",
+            e.shortMessage || e.message,
+        );
         name = symbol;
     }
 

src/shared/constants.js

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ const DEBUG_MNEMONIC = DEBUG
     : null;
 
 const ETHEREUM_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID = "0x1";
-const ETHEREUM_SEPOLIA_CHAIN_ID = "0xaa36a7";
 
 const DEFAULT_RPC_URL = "https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com";
 
@@ -69,7 +68,6 @@ module.exports = {
     BUILD_DEBUG_MARKER,
     DEBUG_MNEMONIC,
     ETHEREUM_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID,
-    ETHEREUM_SEPOLIA_CHAIN_ID,
     DEFAULT_RPC_URL,
     DEFAULT_BLOCKSCOUT_URL,
     BIP44_ETH_PATH,

src/shared/ens.js

@@ -42,7 +42,11 @@ async function resolveEnsName(address, rpcUrl, networkId) {
         setCache(address, name);
         return name;
     } catch (e) {
-        log.errorf("ENS reverse lookup failed", address, e.message);
+        log.errorf(
+            "ENS reverse lookup failed",
+            address,
+            e.shortMessage || e.message,
+        );
         // Don't cache failures — let subsequent lookups retry
         return null;
     }

src/shared/holders.js

@@ -9,13 +9,22 @@
 
 const LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD = 1000;
 
-// Parse an explorer-supplied holders_count into a number, or null when the
+// Parse an explorer-supplied holders_count into a number, or null when it is
-// explorer did not report one.  Anything unparseable is unknown too: a count
+// not one.  Only a whole number of zero or more, or a string made of nothing
-// we cannot read is not a count of zero.
+// but the digits 0-9, is a count.  Anything else is null, never read in part:
+// "1,000", "0x10" and "1e3" are unknown, not 1, 0 and 1, because a count we
+// cannot read is not a low count.  A count above Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER is
+// null too: a number cannot hold it exactly, so it would come back rounded,
+// or as Infinity.
 function parseHoldersCount(raw) {
-    if (raw === null || raw === undefined || raw === "") return null;
+    if (typeof raw === "number") {
-    const n = parseInt(raw, 10);
+        return Number.isSafeInteger(raw) && raw >= 0 ? raw : null;
-    return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
+    }
+    if (typeof raw === "string" && /^[0-9]+$/.test(raw)) {
+        const count = Number(raw);
+        return Number.isSafeInteger(count) ? count : null;
+    }
+    return null;
 }
 
 // True only for a token the explorer reported as having fewer holders than

src/shared/log.js

@@ -42,14 +42,34 @@ const log = {
     },
 };
 
-// Fetch wrapper that debug-logs every request and response.
+// The origin (scheme, host and port) of a URL, for logging in place of the
+// URL: RPC providers put API keys in the path or the query string, and a URL
+// can carry a user name and password, which the origin leaves out. A URL that
+// does not parse gives "", so logging never stops a request.
+function urlOrigin(url) {
+    try {
+        return new URL(url).origin;
+    } catch {
+        return "";
+    }
+}
+
+// Fetch wrapper that debug-logs every request and response. It logs the
+// URL's origin and, for a JSON-RPC body, the method name: never the full URL
+// or body, which can carry an API key or a signed transaction.
 async function debugFetch(url, opts) {
     const method = (opts && opts.method) || "GET";
-    const body = opts && opts.body;
+    const origin = urlOrigin(url);
-    log.debugf("fetch →", method, url, body || "");
+    let rpcMethod = "";
+    try {
+        rpcMethod = JSON.parse(opts.body).method || "";
+    } catch {
+        // no body, or a body that is not JSON
+    }
+    log.debugf("fetch →", method, origin, rpcMethod);
     const resp = await fetch(url, opts);
-    log.debugf("fetch ←", resp.status, url);
+    log.debugf("fetch ←", resp.status, origin);
     return resp;
 }
 
-module.exports = { log, debugFetch, setRuntimeDebug, isDebug };
+module.exports = { log, debugFetch, urlOrigin, setRuntimeDebug, isDebug };

src/shared/networks.js

@@ -76,10 +76,13 @@ function networkByChainId(chainId) {
     return null;
 }
 
-// Build a block explorer link for the given path type and value.
+// The native currency of the network with this chain id. A transaction's
-// type: "address" | "tx" | "token" | "block"
+// value and fee are labelled with the one of the chain the transaction is on,
-function explorerLink(network, type, value) {
+// which need not be the active network. `ETH` when the chain id is missing or
-    return `${network.explorerUrl}/${type}/${value}`;
+// no network here has it.
+function nativeCurrencyByChainId(chainId) {
+    const network = networkByChainId(chainId);
+    return network ? network.nativeCurrency : "ETH";
 }
 
 module.exports = {
@@ -89,5 +92,5 @@ module.exports = {
     isKnownNetworkId,
     networkById,
     networkByChainId,
-    explorerLink,
+    nativeCurrencyByChainId,
 };

src/shared/persistedState.js

@@ -102,11 +102,11 @@ function tokenRefs(value) {
 
 // A list of strings, for the fields whose entries are dereferenced as text:
 // fraudContracts (`a.toLowerCase()` in src/popup/views/send.js and
-// src/shared/transactions.js) and each address's hostname list in the site maps
+// src/shared/transactions.js) and each address's origin list in the site maps
-// below (`h !== host` filters, `list.includes(hostname)` in the background).
+// below (`o !== origin` filters, `list.includes(origin)` in the background).
 //
 // Same rule as tokenRefs(), for the same reason: the container AND the entries,
-// with a malformed entry DROPPED rather than repaired. A number in a hostname
+// with a malformed entry DROPPED rather than repaired. A number in an origin
 // list names no site and a number in fraudContracts names no contract, so there
 // is nothing to repair either to, and the empty list is a legitimate value that
 // survives. The result is a fresh array of primitives, so it shares no
@@ -116,21 +116,22 @@ function textList(value) {
     return value.filter((entry) => typeof entry === "string");
 }
 
-// allowedSites / deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }.
+// allowedSites / deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }, each origin the
+// full scheme://host[:port] of a site.
 //
 // The container check these had (truthy and not an array) is not the floor:
 // `{"0xabc…": "notalist"}` IS a non-array object, and the dereference is one
-// level below it. saveState() merges these maps per key and then per hostname
+// level below it. saveState() merges these maps per key and then per origin
 // WITHIN each key, so a stored value that is not a list reaches `base.map()` in
 // mergeListByIdentity() (src/shared/state.js) and throws — after the popup has
 // rendered, which is why every save from then on failed while the UI looked
 // healthy (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/362). The Settings
 // revoke button (`list.filter()`), and the background's
-// `allowed.includes(hostname)` gate, dereference it the same way; on that last
+// `allowed.includes(origin)` gate, dereference it the same way; on that last
 // one a stored string would also answer a SUBSTRING match, so a corrupt map
 // could widen a site permission rather than merely throw.
 //
-// An address key whose value is not a list of hostnames is dropped entirely: it
+// An address key whose value is not a list of origins is dropped entirely: it
 // grants and denies nothing, and dropping it fails closed. A stored own
 // "__proto__" key — which JSON can carry — is dropped for the same reason: it
 // can never be a wallet address, so it grants nothing either, and keeping it
@@ -143,9 +144,9 @@ function siteMap(value) {
     if (!isRecord(value)) return out;
     for (const address of Object.keys(value)) {
         if (address === "__proto__") continue;
-        const hostnames = textList(value[address]);
+        const origins = textList(value[address]);
-        if (hostnames.length === 0) continue;
+        if (origins.length === 0) continue;
-        defineOwn(out, address, hostnames);
+        defineOwn(out, address, origins);
     }
     return out;
 }

src/shared/prices.js

@@ -104,27 +104,6 @@ function getAddressValue(addr) {
     return { usd, partial };
 }
 
-// The same pair for a whole wallet, and for every wallet at once. One
-// unpriced holding anywhere makes the sum a floor, so partial carries up.
-function getWalletValue(wallet) {
-    return sumValues(wallet.addresses.map(getAddressValue));
-}
-
-function getTotalValue(wallets) {
-    return sumValues(wallets.map(getWalletValue));
-}
-
-function sumValues(values) {
-    let usd = null;
-    let partial = false;
-    for (const value of values) {
-        if (value.usd === null) continue;
-        usd = (usd === null ? 0 : usd) + value.usd;
-        partial = partial || value.partial;
-    }
-    return { usd, partial };
-}
-
 // The one rendering of an address total, so no screen says it differently.
 //
 // A partial total is shown and named as partial: the figure is the ETH and
@@ -149,6 +128,4 @@ module.exports = {
     formatUsd,
     formatAddressTotal,
     getAddressValue,
-    getWalletValue,
-    getTotalValue,
 };

src/shared/state.js

@@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ function currentNetwork() {
     return networkById(state.networkId);
 }
 
-// The persisted fields as they stood at the end of this page's last
+// The persisted fields as this page held them when its last loadState()
-// loadState() or saveState(). saveState() diffs the live state against this
+// finished, or when its last successful saveState() began. saveState() diffs
-// to find only the fields THIS page actually changed.
+// the live state against this to find only the fields THIS page changed since.
 //
 // Deep-cloned, not a reference: callers mutate persisted objects and arrays
 // in place (state.wallets.push(...)), and a reference baseline would mutate
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ function mergeAddress(base, ours, theirs) {
 }
 
 // Merge a plain object keyed by string (allowedSites/deniedSites: address ->
-// hostname list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
+// origin list; networkEndpoints: networkId -> {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl}) the
 // same way mergeListByIdentity() merges an array — by key, not by whole-
 // object diff — so a key one page added or removed applies independently of
 // a key another page edited. Unlike an array's identity function, an object
@@ -353,25 +353,25 @@ function mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeLeaf) {
     return result;
 }
 
-// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. The hostname
+// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }. The origin
 // list is itself membership, not a leaf — the background appends a newly
-// approved/denied hostname to it, and the Settings "revoke" button
+// approved/denied origin to it, and the Settings "revoke" button
-// (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters a hostname out of it in place, from a
+// (src/popup/views/settings.js) filters an origin out of it in place, from a
 // different page. Merge it the same way wallets are merged: identity is the
-// hostname itself, so a merged pair is always equal and mergeItem is a no-op
+// origin itself, so a merged pair is always equal and mergeItem is a no-op
 // pick.
-function mergeHostnameList(base, ours, theirs) {
+function mergeOriginList(base, ours, theirs) {
     return mergeListByIdentity(
         base,
         ours,
         theirs,
-        (hostname) => hostname,
+        (origin) => origin,
         (b, o, t) => t,
     );
 }
 
 function mergeSiteMap(base, ours, theirs) {
-    return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeHostnameList);
+    return mergeMapByKey(base, ours, theirs, mergeOriginList);
 }
 
 // networkEndpoints: { [networkId]: {rpcUrl, blockscoutUrl} }.
@@ -422,8 +422,8 @@ function mergeNetworkEndpoints(base, ours, theirs) {
 // address) apply independently instead of colliding as the same field.
 //
 // `allowedSites` and `deniedSites` get the same treatment (mergeSiteMap(),
-// by address key and then by hostname within each address's list), for the
+// by address key and then by origin within each address's list), for the
-// identical reason: the background appends a newly approved/denied hostname
+// identical reason: the background appends a newly approved/denied origin
 // to them, and the Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js)
 // filters one out in place, from a different page. A whole-field diff here
 // doesn't just lose data, it is a security defect — a stale page's save can
@@ -464,7 +464,10 @@ function mergeNetworkEndpoints(base, ours, theirs) {
 // does not own goes on being whatever its last loadState() saw, same as
 // before this fix; only the persisted record is guaranteed current.
 async function saveStateOnce() {
-    const current = snapshotPersisted();
+    // A copy, so what this save compares and writes is the page's state as it
+    // stood when the save began. A change made while it waits on storage is
+    // left for the next save, which compares against this copy.
+    const current = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
     const result = await storageGet("autistmask");
     // The record in storage right now is about to be merged into and written
     // back, so it is validated exactly like a load validates it. Without this,
@@ -521,7 +524,11 @@ async function saveStateOnce() {
     // exactly as it stood; see the note above.
     rawState.hasWallet = rawState.wallets.length > 0;
 
-    baseline = structuredClone(snapshotPersisted());
+    // What this save compared and wrote, not the page's state now: a change
+    // made during the save must still differ from the baseline, or the save
+    // queued after it finds nothing to store
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/448).
+    baseline = current;
 }
 
 // showView() calls saveState() on every navigation without awaiting it, so

src/shared/symbolDisplay.js

@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
 // (MSYRUPUSDP), so nothing the wallet ships as a real token is ever
 // truncated. The ellipsis is what tells the user the name they are looking
 // at is not the whole name — worth knowing before they send to it.
+//
+// Characters are counted as code points, not UTF-16 units, so an emoji is
+// one character and the cut never falls between the two halves of one: a
+// half on its own renders as U+FFFD.
 
 const MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH = 12;
 
@@ -32,8 +36,9 @@ const UNKNOWN_SYMBOL = "???";
 function displaySymbol(symbol) {
     const s = symbol === null || symbol === undefined ? "" : String(symbol);
     if (s.length === 0) return UNKNOWN_SYMBOL;
-    if (s.length <= MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH) return s;
+    const chars = Array.from(s);
-    return s.slice(0, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH - 1) + "…";
+    if (chars.length <= MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH) return s;
+    return chars.slice(0, MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH - 1).join("") + "…";
 }
 
 module.exports = {

src/shared/symbolSpoof.js

@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
 // KNOWN_SYMBOLS maps a symbol to the set of lowercased contract addresses
 // that may bear it, or to null.  Null means the symbol belongs to the native
 // asset, which has no contract at all, so no contract may bear it and every
-// one that does is a spoof.  "ETH" is the only such entry today; the rule is
+// one that does is a spoof.  "ETH" is one such entry, and every network's
-// written so that a second one needs no change here or at any call site.
+// `nativeCurrency` in networks.js (`SepoliaETH`) is another, on every network.
 //
 // The value is a set because a ticker is not unique: seven symbols in the
 // bundled list belong to two real contracts each, and answering with one of
@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
     return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
 }
 
+// The characters that paint nothing; normalizeSymbol below says which they
+// are. The signature screen marks them in a personal message
+// (src/popup/views/approval.js).
+const INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS = /[\p{Cf}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}\x7F]/gu;
+
 // Fold a symbol onto what a user actually sees, and no further:
 //
 //   NFKC        collapses compatibility variants that render as the ASCII
@@ -82,7 +87,7 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
 function normalizeSymbol(symbol) {
     return String(symbol || "")
         .normalize("NFKC")
-        .replace(/[\p{Cf}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}\x7F]/gu, "")
+        .replace(INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS, "")
         .trim()
         .toUpperCase();
 }
@@ -104,5 +109,6 @@ function isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, contractAddress) {
 }
 
 module.exports = {
+    INVISIBLE_CHARACTERS,
     isSpoofedSymbol,
 };

src/shared/tokenList.js

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 // 511 tokens.
 
 const { debugFetch } = require("./log");
+const { NETWORKS } = require("./networks");
 
 const COINDESK_API = "https://data-api.coindesk.com/index/cc/v1/latest/tick";
 
@@ -3610,7 +3611,9 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
 // Build a map of symbol (uppercased) -> the set of contract addresses
 // (lowercased) that legitimately bear it.  Used for spoofed-symbol detection.
 // "ETH" maps to null: the native asset has no contract, so no contract may
-// bear its symbol.
+// bear its symbol. So does every network's `nativeCurrency` in networks.js
+// (`SepoliaETH`), on every network, since that is the label the wallet shows
+// its native asset under on that network.
 //
 // The value is a set and not a single address because tickers are not unique
 // and the list above proves it: seven of these 512 tokens share a symbol with
@@ -3624,6 +3627,9 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
 // loosen the rule, because a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
 const KNOWN_SYMBOLS = new Map();
 KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set("ETH", null);
+for (const network of Object.values(NETWORKS)) {
+    KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set(network.nativeCurrency.toUpperCase(), null);
+}
 for (const t of TOKENS) {
     const upper = t.symbol.toUpperCase();
     if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(upper)) {

src/shared/transactions.js

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
 const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
 const { parseHoldersCount, isLowHolderCount } = require("./holders");
 const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
+const { nativeCurrencyByChainId } = require("./networks");
 // The uint8 test every scale in this wallet goes through. Shared, not copied:
 // a scale is either reported or it is unknown, and "unknown" must mean the
 // same thing here as it does on the screens that refuse to format one.
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ function normalizeAddress(addr) {
     return (addr || "").toLowerCase();
 }
 
-function parseTx(tx, addrLower) {
+function parseTx(tx, addrLower, chainId) {
     const from = tx.from?.hash || "";
     const to = tx.to?.hash || "";
     const rawWei = tx.value || "0";
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ function parseTx(tx, addrLower) {
     const method = tx.method || null;
 
     // For contract calls, produce a meaningful label instead of "0.0000 ETH"
-    let symbol = "ETH";
+    let symbol = nativeCurrencyByChainId(chainId);
     let value = formatTxValue(formatEther(rawWei));
     let exactValue = formatEther(rawWei);
     let rawAmount = rawWei;
@@ -90,10 +91,11 @@ function parseTx(tx, addrLower) {
         holders: null,
         isContractCall: toIsContract,
         method: method,
+        chainId: chainId,
     };
 }
 
-function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower) {
+function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower, chainId) {
     const from = tt.from?.hash || "";
     const to = tt.to?.hash || "";
     // The explorer's own answer, or null. Never a default: a transfer of
@@ -135,10 +137,12 @@ function parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower) {
         contractAddress: normalizeAddress(
             tt.token?.address_hash || tt.token?.address || "",
         ),
-        // null when the explorer reported no count: unknown, not zero.  The
+        // null when the explorer reported no readable count: unknown, not
-        // low-holder filter declines to judge a null, so a legitimate token
+        // zero.  The low-holder filter declines to judge a null, so a
-        // is not hidden because a field went missing upstream.
+        // legitimate token is not hidden because a field went missing
+        // upstream.
         holders: parseHoldersCount(tt.token?.holders_count),
+        chainId: chainId,
     };
 }
 
@@ -221,7 +225,15 @@ function mergeTransactions(txs, tokenTransfers) {
     return merged;
 }
 
-async function fetchRecentTransactions(address, blockscoutUrl, count = 25) {
+// `chainId` is the chain id of the network `blockscoutUrl` serves. Every entry
+// carries it, and a native entry is labelled with that network's
+// `nativeCurrency` from networks.js (`ETH`, `SepoliaETH`).
+async function fetchRecentTransactions(
+    address,
+    blockscoutUrl,
+    chainId,
+    count = 25,
+) {
     log.debugf("fetchRecentTransactions", address);
     const addrLower = normalizeAddress(address);
 
@@ -254,8 +266,10 @@ async function fetchRecentTransactions(address, blockscoutUrl, count = 25) {
     const ttJson = ttResp.ok ? await ttResp.json() : {};
 
     const txs = mergeTransactions(
-        (txJson.items || []).map((tx) => parseTx(tx, addrLower)),
+        (txJson.items || []).map((tx) => parseTx(tx, addrLower, chainId)),
-        (ttJson.items || []).map((tt) => parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower)),
+        (ttJson.items || []).map((tt) =>
+            parseTokenTransfer(tt, addrLower, chainId),
+        ),
     );
 
     const result = txs.slice(0, count);

src/shared/transferAmount.js

@@ -27,9 +27,11 @@
 
 const { parseUnits } = require("ethers");
 
-// Solidity's decimals() returns a uint8, so anything outside that range is not
+// Solidity's decimals() returns a uint8, but ethers' formatUnits() and
-// an answer this wallet can use.
+// parseUnits() refuse more than 80 decimal places ("invalid FixedNumber
-const MAX_DECIMALS = 255;
+// decimals (too large)"). A scale of 81 to 255 can be neither displayed nor
+// encoded, so it is not an answer this wallet can use, the same as no answer.
+const MAX_DECIMALS = 80;
 
 const UNKNOWN_DISPLAYED_DECIMALS_MESSAGE =
     "The transfer was not sent, because the number of decimal places this" +
@@ -55,7 +57,7 @@ function mismatchMessage(displayed, onChain) {
 // A decimals value from any source as a number, or null if it is not one.
 // decimals() comes back from ethers as a bigint and the explorer's copy arrives
 // as a string, so both of those are accepted alongside a plain number; anything
-// fractional, negative, out of uint8 range, or of any other type at all is not.
+// fractional, negative, above MAX_DECIMALS, or of any other type at all is not.
 //
 // The types are enumerated rather than coerced because Number() is far too
 // willing: Number([]) is 0 and Number(true) is 1, so a coercing check would

src/shared/txValidation.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// Balance arithmetic for the transaction confirmation screen.
+// Balance arithmetic for the Send and transaction confirmation screens.
 //
 // Pure: no DOM, no network, no state. Everything is exact integer math on
 // 18-decimal fixed point (wei for ETH), so it can be unit tested directly
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 // the token balance arrive as human decimal strings, so comparing them at a
 // common scale is exact.
 
-const { parseUnits } = require("ethers");
+const { parseUnits, formatEther } = require("ethers");
 
 const SCALE_DECIMALS = 18;
 
@@ -87,6 +87,28 @@ function toFixedPoint(value) {
     }
 }
 
+// The most ETH a send can carry: the exact balance minus the fee reserve from
+// feeReserveWei(), as a decimal string, so validateTransfer() passes it with
+// exactly that reserve left behind. `ethBalance` is the exact decimal string
+// balances.js stores, never a rounded one. Null when the balance does not
+// leave anything to send once the fee is paid, or when either input is
+// unusable.
+function maxEthAmount(ethBalance, feeWei) {
+    const balanceWei = toFixedPoint(ethBalance);
+    if (balanceWei === null) return null;
+    if (typeof feeWei !== "bigint" || feeWei < 0n) return null;
+    const amountWei = balanceWei - feeWei;
+    if (amountWei <= 0n) return null;
+    return formatEther(amountWei);
+}
+
+// The most of a token a send can carry: its balance cut down, never rounded
+// up, to the 18 places (SCALE_DECIMALS) an amount may have. A token can
+// declare more than 18 decimals, and its balance is stored with all of them.
+function maxTokenAmount(tokenBalance) {
+    return tokenBalance.replace(/(\.\d{18})\d+$/, "$1");
+}
+
 // Validate a pending transfer against the balances that must cover it.
 //
 //   isErc20      — token transfer rather than a native ETH transfer
@@ -139,13 +161,12 @@ function validateTransfer({
     const feeFp = known ? feeWei : null;
 
     if (isErc20) {
-        // A token can declare more than 18 decimals, and its balance is
+        // Only the first 18 places of the balance are read: an amount with
-        // stored with all of them. Only the first 18 places (SCALE_DECIMALS)
+        // more was refused above, so the places after them cannot decide
-        // are read: an amount with more was refused above, so the places
+        // whether the amount fits.
-        // after them cannot decide whether the amount fits.
         const tokenText =
             typeof tokenBalance === "string"
-                ? tokenBalance.replace(/(\.\d{18})\d+$/, "$1")
+                ? maxTokenAmount(tokenBalance)
                 : tokenBalance;
         const tokenFp = toFixedPoint(tokenText) ?? 0n;
         if (amountFp > tokenFp) codes.push(CODES.INSUFFICIENT_TOKEN);
@@ -174,6 +195,8 @@ module.exports = {
     SCALE_DECIMALS,
     feeReserveWei,
     feeEstimateWei,
+    maxEthAmount,
+    maxTokenAmount,
     toFixedPoint,
     validateTransfer,
 };

src/shared/uniswap.js

@@ -84,17 +84,31 @@ function present(value) {
 //
 // `amountOutMinimum` gets no such mapping: V4Router compares it directly
 // (`if (amountOut < params.amountOutMinimum) revert V4TooLittleReceived`), so
-// a zero minimum is a literal zero slippage floor and is stated as one. Nor do
+// a zero minimum is a literal zero slippage floor and is stated as one. Nor
-// the V2/V3 paths have it — universal-router's `V3SwapRouter.v3SwapExactInput`
+// does the V3 path have it — universal-router's `V3SwapRouter.v3SwapExactInput`
 // special-cases only `ActionConstants.CONTRACT_BALANCE` (1<<255), never zero —
-// so a zero `amountIn` there is a literal zero and is displayed as one.
+// so a zero V3 `amountIn` is a literal zero and is displayed as one. The V2
+// exact-in path gives zero a meaning of its own: see ALREADY_PAID.
 const OPEN_DELTA = Symbol("v4-open-delta");
 
-// The two amount lines that state a fact instead of a quantity. Same register
+// The Universal Router's V2 exact-in spells "the pair already holds the input
-// as UNNAMED_CURRENCY — a sentence in the value slot, so it cannot be misread
+// tokens" as an amount of zero: universal-router
-// as a number — and deliberately not a third phrasing of "not named": these
+// `contracts/libraries/Constants.sol` declares
-// say different things.
+// `uint256 internal constant ALREADY_PAID = 0` ("Used for identifying cases
+// when a v2 pair has already received input tokens"), and
+// `V2SwapRouter.v2SwapExactInput` makes no payment of its own when `amountIn`
+// equals it. The swap then spends whatever an earlier step sent to the pair.
+// As with OPEN_DELTA, the calldata states no quantity, and "0.0000" would say
+// that nothing is swapped.
+const ALREADY_PAID = Symbol("v2-already-paid");
+
+// The amount lines that state a fact instead of a quantity. Same register as
+// UNNAMED_CURRENCY — a sentence in the value slot, so it cannot be misread as a
+// number — and deliberately not another phrasing of "not named": these say
+// different things.
 const OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT = "All available (V4 open delta)";
+const ALREADY_PAID_AMOUNT =
+    "Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)";
 const NO_MINIMUM = "None (no minimum guaranteed)";
 
 // Permit2 amounts are uint160; the maximum is Permit2's "unbounded".
@@ -185,6 +199,7 @@ function decodeBalanceCheck(input) {
 // Decode V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN (command 0x08) input bytes.
 // ABI: (address recipient, uint256 amountIn, uint256 amountOutMin,
 //        address[] path, bool payerIsUser)
+// A zero `amountIn` is read the way the router reads it, as ALREADY_PAID.
 function decodeV2SwapExactIn(input) {
     try {
         const d = coder.decode(
@@ -192,7 +207,7 @@ function decodeV2SwapExactIn(input) {
             input,
         );
         return {
-            amountIn: d[1],
+            amountIn: d[1] === 0n ? ALREADY_PAID : d[1],
             amountOutMin: d[2],
             tokenIn: d[3][0],
             tokenOut: d[3][d[3].length - 1],
@@ -502,7 +517,13 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
 
                 if (cmdId === 0x0e) {
                     const b = decodeBalanceCheck(inputs[i]);
-                    if (b) setOutput(b.token, b.minBalance);
+                    // The router passes this check whenever the owner holds at
+                    // least minBalance, so a zero one guarantees nothing and
+                    // does not replace a minimum an earlier step stated. Any
+                    // other minBalance sets the output side as a swap does.
+                    if (b && !(b.minBalance === 0n && present(minOutput))) {
+                        setOutput(b.token, b.minBalance);
+                    }
                 }
 
                 if (cmdId === 0x00) {
@@ -623,14 +644,20 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
         }
 
         if (present(inputAmount)) {
-            // Two amounts need no scale to describe and are named rather than
+            // Three amounts need no scale to describe and are named rather
-            // formatted: V4's open delta, which is not a quantity at all (see
+            // than formatted: V4's open delta and V2's already-paid zero,
-            // OPEN_DELTA), and an unbounded permit. The open-delta test comes
+            // neither of which is a quantity at all (see OPEN_DELTA and
-            // first — the sentinel is not a bigint and cannot be compared with
+            // ALREADY_PAID), and an unbounded permit. Those two tests come
-            // one.
+            // first — the sentinels are not bigints and cannot be compared
+            // with one.
             let amount;
             if (inputAmount === OPEN_DELTA) {
                 amount = { raw: OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT, display: OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT };
+            } else if (inputAmount === ALREADY_PAID) {
+                amount = {
+                    raw: ALREADY_PAID_AMOUNT,
+                    display: ALREADY_PAID_AMOUNT,
+                };
             } else if (inputAmount >= MAX_UINT160) {
                 amount = { raw: "Unlimited", display: "Unlimited" };
             } else if (hasV2ExactOut) {
@@ -697,10 +724,15 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, sources) {
 
         details.push({ label: "Steps", value: commandNames.join(" \u2192 ") });
 
+        // A JavaScript date reaches only to 275760-09-13 00:00:00 UTC. A
+        // later deadline, such as the uint256 maximum, makes an invalid date,
+        // and toISOString() throws on one, so that deadline is said in words.
         const deadlineDate = new Date(Number(deadline) * 1000);
         details.push({
             label: "Deadline",
-            value: deadlineDate.toISOString().replace("T", " ").slice(0, 19),
+            value: isNaN(deadlineDate.getTime())
+                ? "After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)"
+                : deadlineDate.toISOString().replace("T", " ").slice(0, 19),
         });
 
         return {

src/shared/walletDefects.js

@@ -13,11 +13,17 @@ const NON_MASTER_XPRV = "non-master-xprv";
 
 // An "xprv" wallet stores the neutered BIP-44 Ethereum node, four levels below
 // the key that was imported: the current import path derives the absolute
-// m/44'/60'/0'/0 from a depth-0 key, and the pre-#210 path derived the same
+// m/44'/60'/0'/0 from a depth-0 key, and the path before #210 (57959b7)
-// four levels as a relative path beneath whatever depth it was given. A master
+// derived the same four levels as a relative path beneath whatever depth it
-// import therefore stores a depth-4 xpub and a depth-d import stores depth
+// was given. A master import therefore stores a depth-4 xpub and a depth-d
-// d + 4, which makes the stored xpub an exact read on the imported key's
+// import stores depth d + 4, which makes the stored xpub an exact read on the
-// depth — and it is readable without the password, unlike the key itself.
+// imported key's depth — and it is readable without the password, unlike the
+// key itself.
+//
+// The first import path (7a7f9c5) does not fit: it stored the imported key's
+// own xpub with no derivation, so a wallet it wrote is judged wrongly here (a
+// master import as defective, a depth-4 import as sound). 57959b7 replaced it
+// in the same push, and no tag contains it.
 const BIP44_ETH_XPUB_DEPTH = 4;
 
 const DEFECTS = {

tests/addressValue.test.js

@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ const {
     prices,
     clearPrices,
     getAddressValue,
-    getWalletValue,
-    getTotalValue,
     formatAddressTotal,
 } = require("../src/shared/prices");
 const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
@@ -136,17 +134,6 @@ describe("the value of an address, and whether it is the whole value", () => {
             partial: false,
         });
     });
-
-    test("one unpriced holding makes a wallet and the grand total partial", () => {
-        const wallet = { addresses: [FULLY_PRICED, UNPRICED_ONLY] };
-        expect(getWalletValue(wallet)).toEqual({ usd: 5500, partial: true });
-        expect(getTotalValue([wallet])).toEqual({ usd: 5500, partial: true });
-    });
-
-    test("a wallet of fully priced addresses stays complete", () => {
-        const wallet = { addresses: [FULLY_PRICED, EMPTY] };
-        expect(getWalletValue(wallet)).toEqual({ usd: 5500, partial: false });
-    });
 });
 
 describe("how that value is written on screen", () => {
@@ -207,6 +194,14 @@ describe("the wallet list on Home", () => {
         clearPrices();
         expect(walletListTotal(FULLY_PRICED)).toBe(" ");
     });
+
+    // A total under a cent is written "< $0.01", and the "<" is escaped
+    // here as the removal warning escapes it.
+    test("a total under a cent is escaped, as on the removal warning", () => {
+        const tiny = { ...EMPTY, balance: "0.000001" };
+        expect(walletListTotal(tiny)).toBe("Total: &lt; $0.01");
+        expect(removalWarningTotal(tiny)).toBe("Total: &lt; $0.01");
+    });
 });
 
 describe("the balance warning on the address-removal confirmation", () => {

tests/approvalAmount.test.js

@@ -31,11 +31,15 @@ const iface = new Interface(ERC20_ABI);
 const NOVEL_TOKEN = "0xE2E0000000000000000000000000000000000E2e";
 // In the bundled list, at 6 decimals.
 const USDC = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
+// In the bundled list, at 0 decimals.
+const SLP = "0xCC8Fa225D80b9c7D42F96e9570156c65D6cAAa25";
 const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
 const SPENDER = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
 
 // 5,000 units of a 6-decimal token, the amount from the issue.
 const FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX = 5000000000n;
+// 5,000 units of a 0-decimal token, which are 5,000 tokens.
+const FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_ZERO = 5000n;
 const MAX_UINT256 = (1n << 256n) - 1n;
 
 function transferData(amount) {
@@ -113,6 +117,21 @@ describe("resolveTokenDecimals", () => {
         expect(resolveTokenDecimals(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBe(6);
     });
 
+    // Zero decimals is a real scale, not a missing one, so a source that
+    // answers 0 is used rather than fallen past like the unusable entry above.
+    test("uses a bundled scale of zero", () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [{ address: SLP, symbol: "SLP", decimals: 18 }];
+        expect(resolveTokenDecimals(SLP, state)).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    test("uses a tracked scale of zero", () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 0 },
+        ];
+        state.wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL_TOKEN, 18);
+        expect(resolveTokenDecimals(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBe(0);
+    });
+
     test("refuses a scale the explorer's own entries disagree about", () => {
         const wallets = walletsHolding(NOVEL_TOKEN, 6);
         wallets[0].addresses.push({
@@ -184,6 +203,22 @@ describe("decodeCalldata amount", () => {
         expect(line).not.toMatch(/0\.0000/);
     });
 
+    // A token added by hand carries whatever its decimals() returned, and a
+    // uint8 reaches 255, but formatUnits() throws above 80. The throw left the
+    // call undecoded rather than refused
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/350).
+    test("a token reporting more than 80 decimals shows base units", () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 81 },
+        ];
+        expect(
+            amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL_TOKEN),
+        ).toBe("5000000000 base units (decimals unknown)");
+        expect(amountLine(approveData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX), NOVEL_TOKEN)).toBe(
+            "5000000000 base units (decimals unknown)",
+        );
+    });
+
     test("an unbounded allowance is still named, with or without a scale", () => {
         expect(amountLine(approveData(MAX_UINT256), NOVEL_TOKEN)).toBe(
             "Unlimited",
@@ -197,6 +232,21 @@ describe("decodeCalldata amount", () => {
         );
     });
 
+    test("a bundled token with zero decimals shows the true quantity", () => {
+        expect(amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_ZERO), SLP)).toBe(
+            "5000.0000 SLP",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a tracked token with zero decimals shows the true quantity", () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 0 },
+        ];
+        expect(
+            amountLine(transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_ZERO), NOVEL_TOKEN),
+        ).toBe("5000.0000 NOVEL");
+    });
+
     test("the amount carried to the status screens is the same string", () => {
         const decoded = decodeCalldata(
             transferData(FIVE_THOUSAND_AT_SIX),

tests/approvalNonce.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+// A nonce the page supplies is not used
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/404). With it a page could
+// replace one of the user's pending transactions (the same nonce at a higher
+// fee) or leave the new one stuck behind a gap, so the transaction is always
+// given the account's next nonce from the network.
+//
+// Driven through the preparation the background runs on a page's
+// eth_sendTransaction (src/shared/approvalTx.js) and the real approval screen,
+// password and Confirm included, against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/approvalOrigin.test.js uses. The vault is mocked so that no password
+// has to be hashed.
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+    decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { Network, Transaction } = require("ethers");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { decryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
+const { prepareApprovalTx } = require("../src/shared/approvalTx");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+// A well-known test phrase, and its first address.
+const PHRASE = "test test test test test test test test test test test junk";
+const FROM = "0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266";
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+// The account's next nonce, as the network reports it.
+const NETWORK_NONCE = 7;
+
+const network = {
+    getNetwork: async () => Network.from(1),
+    getTransactionCount: async () => NETWORK_NONCE,
+    estimateGas: async () => 21000n,
+    getFeeData: async () => ({
+        gasPrice: 2000000000n,
+        maxFeePerGas: 2000000000n,
+        maxPriorityFeePerGas: 1000000000n,
+    }),
+};
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
+            el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
+            el.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+function click(id) {
+    return Promise.all((node(id).listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn()));
+}
+
+// Open the transaction approval screen the way the popup does: the background
+// hands over the populated transaction and show() draws it. Returns every
+// message the screen sends to the background. The background's answer to the
+// signed transaction does not matter here; a retryable refusal keeps the
+// screen where it is.
+async function openTxApproval(approvedTx) {
+    const sent = [];
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" }, close: () => {} };
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            sent.push(msg);
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") {
+                return reply({ error: "Not sent.", retryable: true });
+            }
+            reply({
+                type: "tx",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                approvedTx,
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    state.activeAddress = FROM;
+    state.wallets = [
+        {
+            type: "hd",
+            name: "Wallet 1",
+            xpub: "xpub-wallet-1",
+            encryptedSecret: "encrypted-secret-1",
+            nextIndex: 1,
+            addresses: [{ address: FROM, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] }],
+        },
+    ];
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+    return sent;
+}
+
+test("a page's nonce is replaced by the network's, on screen and in the signed transaction", async () => {
+    // What the background does with the page's request before it opens the
+    // approval window.
+    const approvedTx = await prepareApprovalTx(network, FROM, {
+        from: FROM,
+        to: RECIPIENT,
+        value: "0x0",
+        data: "0x",
+        nonce: "0x2",
+    });
+
+    const sent = await openTxApproval(approvedTx);
+    expect(node("approve-tx-nonce").textContent).toBe("7");
+
+    decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue(PHRASE);
+    node("approve-tx-password").value = "any password";
+    await click("btn-approve-tx");
+
+    const response = sent.find((msg) => msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE");
+    expect(Transaction.from(response.rawSignedTx).nonce).toBe(NETWORK_NONCE);
+});

tests/approvalOrigin.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+// The connection, transaction and signature prompts name the site by its full
+// origin, scheme and port included, not by its bare hostname
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402). A page served over http,
+// or on another port, of a host the user trusts over https must not raise a
+// prompt that reads as that trusted site.
+//
+// Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/contractCreation.test.js uses.
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+// The site asking, in cleartext and on a port, which is what the hostname
+// alone, dapp.example, used to hide.
+const ORIGIN = "http://dapp.example:8080";
+const FROM = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// Open the prompt the background describes with `details`, the way the popup
+// does: it asks for the approval and show() draws it.
+async function openApproval(details) {
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
+            reply({
+                origin: ORIGIN,
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                ...details,
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    state.wallets = [];
+    state.activeAddress = FROM;
+    state.viewData = {};
+    state.viewStack = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+});
+
+test("the connection prompt shows the origin", async () => {
+    await openApproval({});
+    expect(node("approve-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
+});
+
+test("the transaction prompt shows the origin", async () => {
+    await openApproval({
+        type: "tx",
+        approvedTx: {
+            type: 2,
+            from: FROM,
+            chainId: "0x1",
+            nonce: "0x7",
+            gasLimit: "0x5208",
+            maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
+            maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
+            to: RECIPIENT,
+            value: "0x0",
+            data: "0x",
+            accessList: [],
+        },
+    });
+    expect(node("approve-tx-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
+});
+
+test("the signature prompt shows the origin", async () => {
+    await openApproval({
+        type: "sign",
+        // "Hello" as the hex a dApp passes to personal_sign.
+        signParams: {
+            method: "personal_sign",
+            message: "0x48656c6c6f",
+            from: FROM,
+        },
+    });
+    expect(node("approve-sign-origin").textContent).toBe(ORIGIN);
+});

tests/approvalTx.test.js

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
         );
     });
 
-    test("keeps a nonce, gas limit and fee the request did fix", async () => {
+    test("keeps a gas limit and fee the request did fix, but not its nonce", async () => {
         const approved = await prepareApprovalTx(
             providerWith(),
             signer.address,
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ describe("prepareApprovalTx", () => {
                 maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
             },
         );
-        expect(approved.nonce).toBe("0x2");
+        expect(approved.nonce).toBe("0x7");
         expect(approved.gasLimit).toBe("0x30d40");
         expect(approved.maxFeePerGas).toBe("0x12a05f200");
     });

tests/approvalVerify.test.js

@@ -599,6 +599,24 @@ describe("verifySignedTx field comparison", () => {
                 expect(e.message).toContain("1.0 ETH");
             }
         });
+
+        // The fee is in the native currency of the network the transaction is
+        // for, whether its chain id is the hex string the background prepares
+        // or the number ethers parses from a signed transaction.
+        test.each([
+            ["0x1", "ETH"],
+            [1n, "ETH"],
+            ["0xaa36a7", "SepoliaETH"],
+            [11155111n, "SepoliaETH"],
+        ])("the refusal on chain %p names %s", (chainId, nativeCurrency) => {
+            expect(() => assertWithinCeilings({ ...OVER, chainId })).toThrow(
+                "up to 3000.0 " +
+                    nativeCurrency +
+                    ", which is more than the 1.0 " +
+                    nativeCurrency +
+                    " this wallet",
+            );
+        });
     });
 
     test("every field mismatch is a refusal, not a warning", async () => {

tests/backgroundApproval.test.js

@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ const other = new Wallet(OTHER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 // A page the wallet has never been connected to, whose requests are refused.
 const UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
 const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
@@ -75,6 +74,22 @@ const NONCE = 7;
 // "Hello AutistMask" as the hex string a dApp passes to personal_sign.
 const MESSAGE = "0x48656c6c6f204175746973744d61736b";
 
+// An EIP-712 document as a dApp passes it to eth_signTypedData_v4. The
+// background only carries it to the approval screen, so a small one does.
+const TYPED_DATA = JSON.stringify({
+    domain: { name: "AutistMask Test", version: "1", chainId: 1 },
+    primaryType: "Note",
+    types: {
+        EIP712Domain: [
+            { name: "name", type: "string" },
+            { name: "version", type: "string" },
+            { name: "chainId", type: "uint256" },
+        ],
+        Note: [{ name: "contents", type: "string" }],
+    },
+    message: { contents: "Hello AutistMask" },
+});
+
 // The transaction the background populates and the approval screen displays.
 // The nonce is a parameter because the duplicate case turns on two artifacts
 // differing in a field the dApp fixed nothing for.
@@ -199,7 +214,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         networkId: "mainnet",
         rpcUrl: "https://rpc.invalid",
         activeAddress: signer.address,
-        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
     };
 
@@ -230,6 +245,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
     // raised through action.openPopup() opens no window at all, so this is
     // the only place its id appears.
     const actionPopups = [];
+    const openPopup = jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve());
 
     global.chrome = {
         storage,
@@ -251,9 +267,22 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
             lastError: null,
         },
         windows: {
-            getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(null),
+            getLastFocused: (cb) => cb(opts.lastFocused || null),
             create: (options2, cb) => {
-                created.push(options2);
+                // A copy, as the browser takes it at the call: the background
+                // reuses the object when it asks a second time.
+                created.push({ ...options2 });
+                // A browser that refuses any position it is given, as Chrome
+                // does for one it judges too far off screen.
+                if (opts.refusePosition && options2.left !== undefined) {
+                    global.chrome.runtime.lastError = {
+                        message:
+                            "Invalid value for bounds. Bounds must be at least 50% within visible screen space.",
+                    };
+                    cb(undefined);
+                    global.chrome.runtime.lastError = null;
+                    return;
+                }
                 // A browser that answers with no window at all. The approval
                 // then has no window it can ever be answered in.
                 cb(opts.noWindow ? undefined : { id: created.length });
@@ -284,7 +313,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
             // popup: no window is created, so windows.onRemoved can never
             // fire for it and the port disconnect is the only close signal
             // that exists.
-            ...(opts.actionPopup ? { openPopup: () => Promise.resolve() } : {}),
+            ...(opts.actionPopup ? { openPopup } : {}),
         },
     };
 
@@ -331,7 +360,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
 
     // The same for a message-signing approval, which pins the signing address
     // at approval time in exactly the same way.
-    function requestSign(from) {
+    function requestSign(from, origin) {
         let rpcResult = null;
         messageListener(
             {
@@ -339,7 +368,7 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
                 method: "personal_sign",
                 params: [MESSAGE, from || signer.address],
             },
-            { origin: ORIGIN },
+            { origin: origin || ORIGIN },
             (r) => {
                 rpcResult = r;
             },
@@ -353,6 +382,24 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         };
     }
 
+    // The same through eth_signTypedData_v4, whose params name the address
+    // first and the typed data second.
+    function requestTypedData() {
+        let rpcResult = null;
+        messageListener(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
+                method: "eth_signTypedData_v4",
+                params: [signer.address, TYPED_DATA],
+            },
+            { origin: ORIGIN },
+            (r) => {
+                rpcResult = r;
+            },
+        );
+        return { result: () => rpcResult };
+    }
+
     // A dApp asking to connect. The origin defaults to one the persisted
     // state has never allowed, so the request really does raise a prompt
     // instead of being answered from allowedSites.
@@ -427,12 +474,15 @@ function loadBackground(options) {
         send,
         requestTx,
         requestSign,
+        requestTypedData,
         requestSite,
         connectApproval,
         closeWindow,
         broadcastTransaction,
         created,
         removed,
+        actionPopups,
+        openPopup,
         storage,
         // The user switching account in the toolbar popup, as the background
         // sees it: the persisted active address changes underneath a pending
@@ -822,6 +872,238 @@ describe("one transaction approval at a time", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// A page that asks again before the user has answered its last connection or
+// signature request is refused, instead of opening one more window per call.
+describe("one connection and one signature approval per site at a time", () => {
+    const PENDING_REFUSAL = {
+        error: {
+            code: -32002,
+            message: expect.stringMatching(/already waiting for your answer/),
+        },
+    };
+
+    test("a loop of eth_requestAccounts opens one approval and refuses the rest", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const requests = [];
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestSite());
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(requests[0].result()).toBeNull();
+        for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
+            expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        }
+
+        // Once the user has answered, the site may ask again.
+        bg.closeWindow(1);
+        await settle();
+        expect(requests[0].result()).toEqual({
+            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
+        });
+        const again = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(again.result()).toBeNull();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    test("a loop of personal_sign opens one approval and refuses the rest", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const requests = [];
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestSign());
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(requests[0].result()).toBeNull();
+        for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
+            expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a loop of eth_signTypedData_v4 opens one approval and refuses the rest", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        const requests = [];
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestTypedData());
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(requests[0].result()).toBeNull();
+        for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
+            expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        }
+    });
+
+    test("a pending personal_sign also refuses eth_signTypedData_v4", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        bg.requestSign();
+        const typed = bg.requestTypedData();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(typed.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    test("in the toolbar popup, a loop of eth_requestAccounts opens it once", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const requests = [];
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) requests.push(bg.requestSite());
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        for (const extra of requests.slice(1)) {
+            expect(extra.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        }
+    });
+
+    // A toolbar popup that closes before it connects tells the background
+    // nothing, so its prompt stays pending. Once the toolbar popup has been set
+    // to open something else, nothing shows that prompt, and the site asking
+    // again must show it again rather than be refused for good.
+    test("a toolbar prompt nothing shows any more is shown again when the site asks again", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const first = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        const id = first.id();
+
+        // Its popup closed without connecting. Another site's prompt takes the
+        // toolbar popup and is answered, which sets it back to the wallet.
+        const other = bg.requestSite(UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        const otherPort = bg.connectApproval(other.id());
+        otherPort.decide(false, false);
+        otherPort.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html",
+        );
+
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
+        );
+
+        // The user answers it, and the first request gets that answer.
+        bg.connectApproval(id).decide(true, false);
+        await settle();
+        expect(first.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+    });
+
+    // The user rejects a signature request from another site, which is
+    // connected already. Answering any approval sets the toolbar popup back to
+    // the wallet.
+    async function rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg) {
+        const sign = bg.requestSign(undefined, ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        bg.send(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
+                id: sign.id(),
+                approved: false,
+            },
+            { url: bg.fromPopup.url },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        expect(sign.result()).toEqual({
+            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
+        });
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html",
+        );
+    }
+
+    test("a toolbar prompt is shown again after another site's signature request is answered", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const first = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        const id = first.id();
+
+        // Its popup closed without connecting.
+        await rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg);
+
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html?approval=" + id,
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("a prompt in a window is not opened again when the site asks again", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        // The browser will not open the toolbar popup, so the prompt goes to a
+        // window of its own.
+        bg.openPopup.mockImplementation(() =>
+            Promise.reject(new Error("no toolbar popup")),
+        );
+        bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+
+        await rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg);
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
+
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    test("a prompt in a connected toolbar popup is not opened again when the site asks again", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const first = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        // The popup is open and showing the prompt.
+        bg.connectApproval(first.id());
+
+        await rejectSignatureFromAnotherSite(bg);
+
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(bg.openPopup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(bg.actionPopups[bg.actionPopups.length - 1]).toBe(
+            "src/popup/index.html",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("another site's connection request is not held up", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        bg.requestSite();
+        const repeat = bg.requestSite();
+        const other = bg.requestSite(UNCONNECTED_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(other.result()).toBeNull();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
+    });
+
+    test("another site's signature request is not held up", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground();
+        // Connect a second site, so that it may ask for a signature at all.
+        const connecting = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+        const port = bg.connectApproval(connecting.id());
+        port.decide(true, false);
+        port.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+        expect(connecting.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+
+        bg.requestSign();
+        const repeat = bg.requestSign();
+        const other = bg.requestSign(signer.address, FRESH_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(repeat.result()).toEqual(PENDING_REFUSAL);
+        expect(other.result()).toBeNull();
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(3);
+    });
+});
+
 // A nonce collision found before the transaction reaches the network is the
 // one send failure the wallet can speak about with certainty. The user is told
 // it did not go out and to send it again, rather than being warned it might
@@ -1966,6 +2248,27 @@ describe("a site connection decided as the popup closes", () => {
         });
     });
 
+    // The prompt is decided before the toolbar popup raised for it has
+    // loaded; that popup is torn down and openPopup() rejects only after.
+    test("a toolbar prompt already decided opens no window when openPopup() rejects", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const opening = deferred();
+        bg.openPopup.mockImplementation(() => opening.promise);
+        const pending = bg.requestSite();
+        await settle();
+
+        const port = bg.connectApproval(pending.id());
+        port.decide(true, false);
+        port.disconnect();
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+
+        opening.reject(new Error("the toolbar popup closed before it loaded"));
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
     // The port carries a decision now, so it carries the sender check the
     // one-off message used to carry. A content script that guessed an
     // approval id must not be able to connect the site it is running on.
@@ -2193,12 +2496,54 @@ describe("removing an address ends a site's connection to it", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// A remembered permission belongs to the origin it was granted to, scheme and
+// port included (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/402). The stored
+// state allows ORIGIN, https://dapp.example. A cleartext page on the same host,
+// which a network attacker can serve, and another port on it are other sites.
+describe("a remembered permission is held by the full origin", () => {
+    for (const origin of ["http://dapp.example", "https://dapp.example:8443"]) {
+        test(`an https grant does not authorise ${origin}`, async () => {
+            const bg = loadBackground();
+            expect(await siteAccounts(bg, ORIGIN)).toEqual({
+                result: [signer.address],
+            });
+
+            expect(await siteAccounts(bg, origin)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+            const send = bg.requestTx(TX_PARAMS, origin);
+            await settle();
+            expect(send.result()).toEqual({
+                error: { code: 4100, message: "Unauthorized" },
+            });
+            expect(send.id()).toBeNull();
+        });
+    }
+
+    test("Remember stores the origin, so the cleartext page on that host is asked again", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const granted = bg.requestSite(FRESH_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        const grantedId = granted.id();
+        bg.connectApproval(grantedId).decide(true, true);
+        await settle();
+        expect(granted.result()).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
+        expect(
+            bg.storage.read("autistmask").allowedSites[signer.address],
+        ).toEqual([ORIGIN, FRESH_ORIGIN]);
+
+        const cleartext = bg.requestSite("http://fresh.example");
+        await settle();
+        // Unanswered: it is waiting on a prompt of its own.
+        expect(cleartext.result()).toBeNull();
+        expect(cleartext.id()).not.toBe(grantedId);
+    });
+});
+
 // Settings lists the sites allowed without "Remember", which only the
 // background holds, and removing a site there, from either list, disconnects
 // it. These drive the real Settings view against the real background and
 // click the [x] the user clicks.
 describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
-    // FRESH_ORIGIN on another port, so its hostname is FRESH_ORIGIN's.
+    // The host of FRESH_ORIGIN on another port, which makes it another site.
     const FRESH_OTHER_PORT = "https://fresh.example:8443";
 
     // A site list's container. Its [x] buttons, data attributes and all, are
@@ -2226,9 +2571,9 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         return list;
     }
 
-    // The hostnames a site list shows.
+    // The origins a site list shows.
     function listed(list) {
-        return [...list.innerHTML.matchAll(/data-hostname="([^"]*)"/g)].map(
+        return [...list.innerHTML.matchAll(/data-origin="([^"]*)"/g)].map(
             (match) => match[1],
         );
     }
@@ -2259,10 +2604,10 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
             allowed: element("settings-allowed-sites"),
             connected: element("settings-connected-sites"),
             // Click the [x] beside a site, and let what it sends run.
-            remove: async (list, hostname) => {
+            remove: async (list, origin) => {
-                expect(listed(list)).toContain(hostname);
+                expect(listed(list)).toContain(origin);
                 const button = list.buttons.find(
-                    (b) => b.dataset.hostname === hostname,
+                    (b) => b.dataset.origin === origin,
                 );
                 await button.click();
                 await settle();
@@ -2274,14 +2619,15 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         delete global.document;
     });
 
-    test("Settings lists a site connected without Remember", async () => {
+    test("Settings lists each site by its origin", async () => {
         const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
         await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, false);
+        await connect(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT, true);
 
         const settings = await openSettings(bg);
 
-        expect(listed(settings.connected)).toEqual(["fresh.example"]);
+        expect(listed(settings.connected)).toEqual([FRESH_ORIGIN]);
-        expect(listed(settings.allowed)).toEqual([HOSTNAME]);
+        expect(listed(settings.allowed)).toEqual([ORIGIN, FRESH_OTHER_PORT]);
     });
 
     test("removing a site connected without Remember disconnects it and tells its tabs", async () => {
@@ -2293,6 +2639,7 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
                 cb([
                     { id: 1, url: FRESH_ORIGIN + "/app" },
                     { id: 2, url: ORIGIN + "/app" },
+                    { id: 3, url: FRESH_OTHER_PORT + "/app" },
                 ]),
             sendMessage: (tabId, msg, cb) => {
                 sentToTabs.push({ tabId, msg });
@@ -2301,7 +2648,7 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         };
         const settings = await openSettings(bg);
 
-        await settings.remove(settings.connected, "fresh.example");
+        await settings.remove(settings.connected, FRESH_ORIGIN);
 
         expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [] });
         expect(sentToTabs).toEqual([
@@ -2321,20 +2668,45 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         });
     });
 
-    // The same hostname can hold both kinds of connection: one origin allowed
+    // One origin can hold both kinds of connection under two addresses:
-    // without Remember, then another, on a different port, allowed with it.
+    // remembered for one, allowed without Remember for the other.
     test("removing a remembered site also ends its connection made without Remember", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
+        const stored = bg.storage.read("autistmask");
+        stored.wallets[0].addresses.push({
+            address: other.address,
+            balance: "0",
+            tokenBalances: [],
+        });
+        bg.storage.write("autistmask", stored);
+        await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, true);
+        bg.setActiveAddress(other.address);
+        const pending = bg.requestSite(FRESH_ORIGIN);
+        await settle();
+        bg.connectApproval(pending.id()).decide(true, false);
+        await settle();
+        expect(pending.result()).toEqual({ result: [other.address] });
+        const settings = await openSettings(bg);
+
+        await settings.remove(settings.allowed, FRESH_ORIGIN);
+
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+    });
+
+    test("removing a remembered site leaves the same host on another port connected", async () => {
         const bg = loadBackground({ actionPopup: true });
         await connect(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN, false);
         await connect(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT, true);
         const settings = await openSettings(bg);
 
-        await settings.remove(settings.allowed, "fresh.example");
+        await settings.remove(settings.allowed, FRESH_OTHER_PORT);
 
         expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_OTHER_PORT)).toEqual({
             result: [],
         });
-        expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({ result: [] });
+        expect(await siteAccounts(bg, FRESH_ORIGIN)).toEqual({
+            result: [signer.address],
+        });
     });
 
     test("a page can neither remove a site nor list the connected ones", async () => {
@@ -2343,7 +2715,7 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         const page = { url: FRESH_ORIGIN + "/index.html" };
 
         const remove = bg.send(
-            { type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", hostname: "fresh.example" },
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_REMOVE_SITE", origin: FRESH_ORIGIN },
             page,
         );
         const list = bg.send({ type: "AUTISTMASK_GET_CONNECTED_SITES" }, page);
@@ -2357,3 +2729,77 @@ describe("removing a site in Settings disconnects it", () => {
         expect(await siteAccounts(bg)).toEqual({ result: [signer.address] });
     });
 });
+
+// An approval window still open is often the last focused window, and headless
+// Chrome reports one as 1280x720. Centred on that, the next approval window
+// lands where the browser refuses to create it, and its request failed with no
+// window at all (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/290).
+describe("where an approval window opens", () => {
+    test("centred on the browser window the user was last in", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({
+            lastFocused: {
+                type: "normal",
+                left: 0,
+                top: 0,
+                width: 1280,
+                height: 720,
+            },
+        });
+
+        bg.requestSign();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(bg.created[0]).toMatchObject({ left: 460, top: 60 });
+    });
+
+    test("not centred on an approval window the user was last in", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({
+            lastFocused: {
+                type: "popup",
+                left: 440,
+                top: 0,
+                width: 1280,
+                height: 720,
+            },
+        });
+
+        bg.requestSign();
+        await settle();
+
+        // Centred, it would be at left 900, the position the browser refused.
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(bg.created[0].left).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(bg.created[0].top).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    test("placed by the browser when it refuses the centred position", async () => {
+        const bg = loadBackground({
+            refusePosition: true,
+            lastFocused: {
+                type: "normal",
+                left: 1500,
+                top: 900,
+                width: 400,
+                height: 300,
+            },
+        });
+
+        const sign = bg.requestSign();
+        await settle();
+
+        expect(bg.created).toHaveLength(2);
+        expect(bg.created[0]).toMatchObject({ left: 1520, top: 750 });
+        expect(bg.created[1].left).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(bg.created[1].top).toBeUndefined();
+
+        // The request waits on the second window rather than failing:
+        // closing that window is refusing the prompt.
+        expect(sign.result()).toBeNull();
+        bg.closeWindow(2);
+        await settle();
+        expect(sign.result()).toEqual({
+            error: { code: 4001, message: "User rejected the request." },
+        });
+    });
+});

tests/backgroundStateIsolation.test.js

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -81,7 +80,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
         blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
         lastBalanceRefresh: 0,

tests/balanceLineEscaping.test.js

@@ -66,4 +66,11 @@ describe("balanceLine", () => {
         expect(html).toContain("<span>1.5000</span>");
         expect(html).toContain('data-token="0xabc"');
     });
+
+    // formatUsd() writes a value under a cent as "< $0.01".
+    test("escapes the USD value along with the symbol", () => {
+        const html = balanceLine("USDC", 0.001, 1, null);
+        expect(html).toContain("&lt; $0.01");
+        expect(html).not.toContain("< $0.01");
+    });
 });

tests/chainSwitchGate.test.js

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 // The site the persisted state has connected, and one it has never heard of.
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const STRANGER_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -86,7 +85,7 @@ function loadBackground() {
         tokenHolderCache: {},
         fraudContracts: [],
         activeAddress: ADDRESS,
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
     };
     const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: persisted });

tests/coldWorkerChainId.test.js

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ const { networkById } = require("../src/shared/networks");
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const UNKNOWN_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
@@ -41,7 +40,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultRpcUrl,
         blockscoutUrl: networkById(networkId).defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
     };

tests/coldWorkerChainSwitch.test.js

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
 const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 
 const MAINNET = networkById("mainnet");
 const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
@@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: CUSTOM_RPC,
         blockscoutUrl: CUSTOM_BLOCKSCOUT,
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [{ address: TOKEN, symbol: "DAI", decimals: 18 }],
         theme: "dark",
@@ -168,7 +167,7 @@ describe("a chain switch on a worker that never loaded state", () => {
         expect(after.wallets).toEqual(walletFixture());
         expect(after.hasWallet).toBe(true);
         expect(after.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
-        expect(after.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] });
+        expect(after.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] });
         expect(after.trackedTokens).toEqual([
             { address: TOKEN, symbol: "DAI", decimals: 18 },
         ]);

tests/coldWorkerSendTransaction.test.js

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ const signer = new Wallet(SIGNER_KEY);
 const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 
 const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
-const CONNECTED_HOSTNAME = "dapp.example";
 const EXT_URL = "chrome-extension://autistmask/";
 
 const SEPOLIA = networkById("sepolia");
@@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ function storedProfile(networkId) {
         networkId,
         rpcUrl: net.defaultRpcUrl,
         blockscoutUrl: net.defaultBlockscoutUrl,
-        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_HOSTNAME] },
+        allowedSites: { [signer.address]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
     };

tests/contractCreation.test.js

@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ async function openTxApproval(to, data) {
             if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
             reply({
                 type: "tx",
-                hostname: "dapp.example",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
                 isPhishingDomain: false,
                 approvedFrom: FROM,
                 approvedTx: {
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ describe.each([
     test("a contract creation's row says so, with no colour dot and no address line", async () => {
         const html = await rowsFor(historyTx(""));
         expect(html).toContain(SENTENCE);
-        expect(html).not.toContain("background:");
+        expect(html).not.toContain("bg-[#");
         expect(html).not.toContain("am-address");
         expect(html).not.toContain("undefined");
     });
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ describe.each([
     test("a transaction with a recipient shows its colour dot and address", async () => {
         const html = await rowsFor(historyTx(RECIPIENT));
         expectAddressLine(html);
-        expect(html).toContain("background:#");
+        expect(html).toContain("bg-[#");
         expect(html).toContain(`<div class="am-address">${RECIPIENT}</div>`);
     });
 });

tests/debugFetch.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// What debugFetch writes to the console in debug mode.
+//
+// RPC providers put the API key in the URL's path or query string, and the
+// debug log used to print the whole URL and request body, so turning debug
+// mode on wrote the key to the console
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410). The log now names the
+// HTTP method, the URL's origin and the JSON-RPC method, and nothing else of
+// the request.
+
+const { debugFetch, urlOrigin, setRuntimeDebug } = require("../src/shared/log");
+
+const realFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    globalThis.fetch = realFetch;
+    setRuntimeDebug(false);
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+});
+
+test("logs the origin and JSON-RPC method, not the key in the URL", async () => {
+    setRuntimeDebug(true);
+    const consoleLog = jest.spyOn(console, "log").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    globalThis.fetch = jest.fn(async () => ({ status: 200 }));
+
+    await debugFetch(
+        "https://rpc.example.invalid/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456",
+        {
+            method: "POST",
+            headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+            body: JSON.stringify({
+                jsonrpc: "2.0",
+                id: 1,
+                method: "eth_chainId",
+                params: [],
+            }),
+        },
+    );
+
+    const logged = consoleLog.mock.calls.flat().join(" ");
+    expect(logged).not.toContain("PATHKEY123");
+    expect(logged).not.toContain("QUERYTOKEN456");
+    expect(logged).toContain("https://rpc.example.invalid");
+    expect(logged).toContain("eth_chainId");
+});
+
+test("the origin leaves out a user name and password in the URL", () => {
+    expect(
+        urlOrigin("https://user:SECRETPASS@rpc.example.invalid/v3/KEY"),
+    ).toBe("https://rpc.example.invalid");
+    expect(urlOrigin("wss://user:SECRETPASS@rpc.example.invalid:8546/")).toBe(
+        "wss://rpc.example.invalid:8546",
+    );
+});

tests/deleteWalletLostPassword.test.js

@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ const A1 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
 const B0 = "0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599";
 const C0 = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
 
+// U+200B, built from its code point so that it can be seen in this file.
+const ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE = String.fromCodePoint(0x200b);
+
 // ------------------------------------------------------------ DOM stub
 
 function makeElement(id) {
@@ -140,8 +143,14 @@ function load() {
     state.selectedWallet = 0;
     state.selectedAddress = 0;
     state.activeAddress = A0;
-    state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"], [B0]: ["b.example"] };
+    state.allowedSites = {
-    state.deniedSites = { [B0]: ["c.example"], [C0]: ["d.example"] };
+        [A0]: ["https://a.example"],
+        [B0]: ["https://b.example"],
+    };
+    state.deniedSites = {
+        [B0]: ["https://c.example"],
+        [C0]: ["https://d.example"],
+    };
     state.viewStack = ["main", "settings"];
     state.currentView = "settings";
 
@@ -336,6 +345,72 @@ describe("the typed confirmation", () => {
             "secret-three",
         ]);
     });
+
+    // A name of only spaces compares as nothing, and so does an empty
+    // field. Typing nothing must still delete nothing.
+    test.each(["", "   "])(
+        "typing %j deletes nothing when the name is only spaces",
+        async (typedValue) => {
+            const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
+            state.wallets[1].name = "   ";
+            await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+            node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = typedValue;
+            await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+            expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-flash").style.visibility).toBe(
+                "visible",
+            );
+            expect(state.wallets).toHaveLength(3);
+            expect(await persistedWallets(storage)).toHaveLength(3);
+        },
+    );
+
+    // A name that shows nothing would leave nothing on screen to type
+    // back, so the screen names the wallet by its position instead, and
+    // that is what the user types.
+    test.each([
+        ["spaces", "   "],
+        ["a zero-width space", ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE],
+    ])(
+        "a name of only %s is shown and typed back as Wallet 2",
+        async (_label, storedName) => {
+            const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
+            state.wallets[1].name = storedName;
+            await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+            expect(node("delete-wallet-lost-name").textContent).toBe(
+                "Wallet 2",
+            );
+            node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "Wallet 2";
+            await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+            const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage);
+            expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+                "secret-one",
+                "secret-three",
+            ]);
+        },
+    );
+
+    // A zero-width space paints nothing, so "My", a zero-width space and
+    // "Wallet" reads as "MyWallet", and that is all the user can type. HTML
+    // does not collapse it the way it collapses spaces, so it has to be
+    // removed explicitly.
+    test("a zero-width space inside the name is not part of it", async () => {
+        const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
+        state.wallets[1].name = "My" + ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE + "Wallet";
+        await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 1);
+
+        node("delete-wallet-lost-name-input").value = "MyWallet";
+        await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
+
+        const persisted = await persistedWallets(storage);
+        expect(persisted.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-three",
+        ]);
+    });
 });
 
 describe("deleting without the password", () => {
@@ -388,8 +463,8 @@ describe("deleting without the password", () => {
         await click("btn-delete-wallet-lost-confirm");
 
         const saved = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
-        expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] });
+        expect(saved.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["https://a.example"] });
-        expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["d.example"] });
+        expect(saved.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["https://d.example"] });
     });
 
     // The route shares finishDelete() with the password route, so the
@@ -437,7 +512,7 @@ describe("deleting without the password", () => {
     test("deleting the last wallet lands on Welcome with nothing left", async () => {
         const { deleteWallet, state, storage } = load();
         state.wallets = [wallet("Wallet 1", "secret-one", [A0])];
-        state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["a.example"] };
+        state.allowedSites = { [A0]: ["https://a.example"] };
         state.deniedSites = {};
 
         await openLostPassword(deleteWallet, 0);

tests/e2e/firefox/run.js

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
 
 const fs = require("fs");
 const path = require("path");
+const { isDeepStrictEqual } = require("util");
 
 const {
     Transaction,
@@ -62,6 +63,10 @@ const {
 const { ConsoleErrors, EXTENSION_ORIGIN, start, sleep } = require("./driver");
 const { startDappServer } = require("./dapp");
 const { STUB_COUNTERPARTY } = require("../network");
+const {
+    STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+    stateProblem,
+} = require("../../../src/shared/stateSchema");
 
 const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "..", "..");
 const POPUP_URL = EXTENSION_ORIGIN + "/src/popup/index.html";
@@ -108,6 +113,137 @@ step("popup loads and reaches the welcome view", async (env) => {
     assert(title === "AutistMask", "unexpected popup title: " + title);
 });
 
+// The same check as the Chrome suite's (#418), so both browsers are held to
+// the same font.
+step("the popup is drawn in the monospace font it declares", async (env) => {
+    const font = await env.driver.execute(
+        "return getComputedStyle(document.body).fontFamily;",
+    );
+    // --font-mono in src/popup/styles/main.css, as the browser writes it out.
+    assert(
+        font ===
+            'ui-monospace, SFMono-Regular, "SF Mono", Menlo, Consolas, "Liberation Mono", monospace',
+        "the popup is drawn in " + font + ", not in --font-mono",
+    );
+});
+
+// The recovery screen (#361): the Chrome suite's four cases, run before any
+// wallet exists for the same reason. With no wallet nothing saves on a timer,
+// so no save can write a good record over the unreadable one. The last of them
+// erases it, which leaves the popup on Welcome for wallet creation.
+
+// A profile a newer build wrote: a wallet with its encrypted secret, under a
+// schema version this build refuses to read.
+const UNREADABLE_RECORD = {
+    schemaVersion: STATE_SCHEMA_VERSION + 1,
+    wallets: [
+        {
+            type: "hd",
+            name: "Main",
+            xpub: "xpub-written-by-a-newer-build",
+            encryptedSecret: "ciphertext-written-by-a-newer-build",
+            nextIndex: 1,
+            addresses: [{ address: STUB_COUNTERPARTY }],
+        },
+    ],
+};
+
+// The whole stored record, read on the popup page.
+function storedRecord(d) {
+    return d.executeAsync(
+        `const done = arguments[arguments.length - 1];
+         browser.storage.local.get("autistmask").then((r) => done(r.autistmask));`,
+    );
+}
+
+step(
+    "an unreadable stored record opens the popup on the recovery screen",
+    async (env) => {
+        const d = env.driver;
+        // The popup the first step opened saves once, as it shows Welcome.
+        // Stored before that save lands, the record would be written over.
+        const deadline = Date.now() + 15000;
+        for (;;) {
+            const stored = await storedRecord(d);
+            if (stored && stored.currentView === "welcome") break;
+            assert(
+                Date.now() < deadline,
+                "the Welcome screen's save never landed: " +
+                    JSON.stringify(stored),
+            );
+            await sleep(100);
+        }
+        await d.executeAsync(
+            `const done = arguments[arguments.length - 1];
+             browser.storage.local.set({ autistmask: arguments[0] }).then(() => done());`,
+            [UNREADABLE_RECORD],
+        );
+
+        await d.navigate(POPUP_URL);
+        await d.waitVisible("#view-state-recovery");
+        const problem = await d.text("#state-recovery-problem");
+        assert(
+            problem === stateProblem(UNREADABLE_RECORD),
+            "the recovery screen names the problem as " +
+                JSON.stringify(problem),
+        );
+    },
+);
+
+step("Export Saved Data shows the stored record verbatim", async (env) => {
+    const d = env.driver;
+    await d.click("#btn-state-recovery-export");
+    await d.waitVisible("#state-recovery-blob");
+    const exported = await d.value("#state-recovery-blob");
+    assert(exported !== "", "Export Saved Data left the text box empty");
+    assert(
+        isDeepStrictEqual(JSON.parse(exported), UNREADABLE_RECORD),
+        "the text box does not hold the stored record: " + exported,
+    );
+});
+
+step("a near-miss confirmation phrase erases nothing", async (env) => {
+    const d = env.driver;
+    await d.fill("#state-recovery-reset-input", "ERASE MY WALLETS");
+    await d.click("#btn-state-recovery-reset");
+    await d.waitFor(
+        "the refusal on the error line",
+        `return document.getElementById("state-recovery-flash").textContent ===
+             "Type ERASE MY WALLET to confirm. Nothing was erased.";`,
+    );
+    const stored = await storedRecord(d);
+    assert(
+        isDeepStrictEqual(stored, UNREADABLE_RECORD),
+        "the stored record changed: " + JSON.stringify(stored),
+    );
+});
+
+step(
+    "the exact confirmation phrase erases the record and reloads into Welcome",
+    async (env) => {
+        const d = env.driver;
+        try {
+            await d.fill("#state-recovery-reset-input", "ERASE MY WALLET");
+            await d.click("#btn-state-recovery-reset");
+            // Welcome is the proof of the erase: the record still stored
+            // would put the recovery screen up again, and its wallet would
+            // open Home.
+            await d.waitVisible("#view-welcome");
+        } finally {
+            // Whatever failed in these four steps, wallet creation starts
+            // from Welcome. The record left stored would fail every step
+            // after this.
+            if (!(await d.isVisible("#view-welcome"))) {
+                await d.executeAsync(
+                    `const done = arguments[arguments.length - 1];
+                     browser.storage.local.remove("autistmask").then(() => done());`,
+                );
+                await d.navigate(POPUP_URL);
+            }
+        }
+    },
+);
+
 step("wallet creation through the UI reaches the main view", async (env) => {
     const d = env.driver;
     await d.click("#btn-welcome-add");
@@ -438,11 +574,10 @@ step(
         await d.switchToWindow(popup);
         await d.waitVisible("#view-approve-site");
 
-        const hostname = await d.text("#approve-hostname");
+        const origin = await d.text("#approve-origin");
         assert(
-            hostname === "127.0.0.1",
+            origin === env.server.origin,
-            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " +
+            "the site prompt names the wrong origin: " + JSON.stringify(origin),
-                JSON.stringify(hostname),
         );
         const shown = await d.text("#approve-address");
         assert(
@@ -494,16 +629,16 @@ step(
 
         const screen = await d.execute(
             `return {
-             hostname: document.getElementById("approve-sign-hostname").textContent,
+             origin: document.getElementById("approve-sign-origin").textContent,
              type: document.getElementById("approve-sign-type").textContent,
              message: document.getElementById("approve-sign-message").textContent,
              from: document.getElementById("approve-sign-from").textContent,
          };`,
         );
         assert(
-            screen.hostname === "127.0.0.1",
+            screen.origin === env.server.origin,
             "the sign prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+                JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
         );
         assert(
             screen.type === "Personal message",
@@ -571,7 +706,7 @@ step(
 
         const screen = await d.execute(
             `return {
-             hostname: document.getElementById("approve-tx-hostname").textContent,
+             origin: document.getElementById("approve-tx-origin").textContent,
              from: document.getElementById("approve-tx-from").textContent,
              to: document.getElementById("approve-tx-to").textContent,
              value: document.getElementById("approve-tx-value").textContent,
@@ -582,9 +717,9 @@ step(
          };`,
         );
         assert(
-            screen.hostname === "127.0.0.1",
+            screen.origin === env.server.origin,
             "the transaction prompt names the wrong origin: " +
-                JSON.stringify(screen.hostname),
+                JSON.stringify(screen.origin),
         );
         assert(
             screen.from.toLowerCase().includes(env.address.toLowerCase()),

tests/e2e/network.js

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 
 "use strict";
 
-const { Transaction } = require("ethers");
+const { AbiCoder, Transaction } = require("ethers");
 
 // Fictional ERC-20 used to seed the transaction-detail test. The symbol
 // must not collide with any entry in src/shared/tokenList.js, or
@@ -244,26 +244,39 @@ function latestBlock() {
     };
 }
 
-// keccak("decimals()")[0:4].
+// keccak("decimals()")[0:4], and the same for symbol() and name().
 const SELECTOR_DECIMALS = "0x313ce567";
+const SELECTOR_SYMBOL = "0x95d89b41";
+const SELECTOR_NAME = "0x06fdde03";
 
-// Every eth_call still answers with a zero word except decimals() on the
+// Every eth_call still answers with a zero word except decimals(), symbol()
-// stub token, which the wallet reads back at signing time to compare with
+// and name() on the stub token. The wallet reads decimals() back at signing
-// the scale the confirmation screen rendered (issue #305).
+// time to compare with the scale the confirmation screen rendered (issue
+// #305). Adding the token by its contract address reads all three (issue
+// #295); symbol() and name() answer what the explorer reports for it.
 //
 // opts.tokenDecimalsOverride is the lying contract: set it and decimals()
 // answers something other than the value this same fixture reports through
 // Blockscout, which is exactly the disagreement the wallet must refuse to
 // sign over. It is read at request time, so a test flips it on the options
 // object the route was registered with — after the confirmation screen has
-// been built — without re-registering anything.
+// been built — without re-registering anything. Only null or undefined means
+// no override: 0 is a token with no decimal places, and is answered as one.
 function ethCallResult(req, opts) {
     const call = Array.isArray(req.params) ? req.params[0] : null;
     if (!call || typeof call !== "object") return ZERO_WORD;
     const data = String(call.data || call.input || "").toLowerCase();
     const to = String(call.to || "").toLowerCase();
-    if (data.startsWith(SELECTOR_DECIMALS) && to === STUB_TOKEN.address) {
+    if (to !== STUB_TOKEN.address) return ZERO_WORD;
-        return word(opts.tokenDecimalsOverride || STUB_TOKEN.decimals);
+    if (data.startsWith(SELECTOR_DECIMALS)) {
+        return word(opts.tokenDecimalsOverride ?? STUB_TOKEN.decimals);
+    }
+    const abi = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder();
+    if (data.startsWith(SELECTOR_SYMBOL)) {
+        return abi.encode(["string"], [tokenObject(opts).symbol]);
+    }
+    if (data.startsWith(SELECTOR_NAME)) {
+        return abi.encode(["string"], [tokenObject(opts).name]);
     }
     return ZERO_WORD;
 }
@@ -447,6 +460,16 @@ function rpcReply(req, opts, report) {
         return Object.assign(envelope, { result: ethCallResult(req, opts) });
     }
     if (req.method === "eth_getTransactionReceipt") {
+        // A lookup that fails, which the wait screen counts differently from
+        // one that answers "not mined yet" (README.md, WaitTx).
+        if (opts.failReceiptLookup) {
+            return Object.assign(envelope, {
+                error: {
+                    code: -32000,
+                    message: "e2e fixture: receipt lookup failed",
+                },
+            });
+        }
         const hash = Array.isArray(req.params) ? req.params[0] : null;
         return Object.assign(envelope, {
             result: opts.seedReceipt && hash ? transactionReceipt(hash) : null,
@@ -597,14 +620,17 @@ function traceEnabled(raw) {
  *   eth_estimateGas until this is cleared again.
  * @param {string[]} [opts.broadcastTransactions]  every raw signed
  *   transaction handed to eth_sendRawTransaction, appended in order.
- * @param {string} [opts.tokenDecimalsOverride]  what decimals() answers for
+ * @param {number|string|null} [opts.tokenDecimalsOverride]  the scale
- *   the stub token, in place of the value Blockscout reports for it. This is
+ *   decimals() answers for the stub token, in place of the value Blockscout
- *   the token that lies about its scale; read at request time.
+ *   reports for it; null for none, while 0 is a scale like any other. This
+ *   is the token that lies about its scale; read at request time.
  * @param {string} [opts.tokenSymbolOverride]  what the explorer reports as
  *   the stub token's symbol, in place of "E2E". This is the token whose
  *   symbol is markup; read at request time.
  * @param {boolean} [opts.seedReceipt]  answer eth_getTransactionReceipt with a
  *   confirmed receipt instead of null, so a wait screen resolves.
+ * @param {boolean} [opts.failReceiptLookup]  answer eth_getTransactionReceipt
+ *   with an error, so every receipt lookup fails; read at request time.
  * @returns {Promise<{waitForServiceWorkerTraffic: (ms: number) =>
  *   Promise<string|null>}>}
  */

tests/holders.test.js

@@ -57,6 +57,39 @@ describe("parseHoldersCount", () => {
         expect(parseHoldersCount("many")).toBeNull();
         expect(parseHoldersCount(NaN)).toBeNull();
     });
+
+    // Each of these starts with a digit, so reading only the leading digits
+    // would turn it into a small reported count, and a small count is
+    // exactly what hides a token as spam (issue #251).
+    test.each(["1,000", "0x10", "1e3", "12 holders"])(
+        "%p is not read in part: it is unknown",
+        (raw) => {
+            expect(parseHoldersCount(raw)).toBeNull();
+        },
+    );
+
+    test("a negative count is unknown", () => {
+        expect(parseHoldersCount("-5")).toBeNull();
+        expect(parseHoldersCount(-5)).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    // A number holds a whole number exactly only up to 2^53 - 1.  Past that a
+    // string of digits would come back rounded, and a long enough one as
+    // Infinity, which would pass every holder-count floor.
+    test("a count too large for a number to hold exactly is unknown", () => {
+        expect(parseHoldersCount("9007199254740993")).toBeNull();
+        expect(parseHoldersCount("9".repeat(400))).toBeNull();
+        expect(parseHoldersCount(2 ** 53)).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    test("the largest count a number holds exactly still parses", () => {
+        expect(parseHoldersCount("9007199254740991")).toBe(
+            Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER,
+        );
+        expect(parseHoldersCount(Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER)).toBe(
+            Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER,
+        );
+    });
 });
 
 describe("isLowHolderCount", () => {

tests/htmlEscape.test.js

@@ -91,6 +91,17 @@ describe("displaySymbol", () => {
         expect(displaySymbol(exact)).toBe(exact);
     });
 
+    // An emoji outside the Basic Multilingual Plane is two UTF-16 units.
+    // Cutting between them leaves half of one, which renders as U+FFFD.
+    test("counts an emoji as one character and never cuts one in half", () => {
+        expect(displaySymbol("🚀".repeat(MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH))).toBe(
+            "🚀".repeat(MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH),
+        );
+        expect(displaySymbol("🚀".repeat(20))).toBe(
+            "🚀".repeat(MAX_SYMBOL_LENGTH - 1) + "…",
+        );
+    });
+
     test("substitutes a placeholder for an absent symbol", () => {
         expect(displaySymbol("")).toBe(UNKNOWN_SYMBOL);
         expect(displaySymbol(null)).toBe(UNKNOWN_SYMBOL);

tests/manifest.test.js

@@ -21,15 +21,14 @@
 // escaping in src/shared/html.js is the primary fix; default-src is what
 // stops the next escape that slips from reaching the network.
 //
-// Every directive below is pinned exactly, because each of the four
+// And for #328: style-src is 'self' alone, so the browser refuses every
+// style="..." attribute in the popup's markup, including one an escape lets
+// through. The popup styles with classes; script setting element.style is
+// not affected.
+//
+// Every directive below is pinned exactly, because each of the three
 // loosenings is load-bearing and none of them may grow:
 //
-//   style-src 'unsafe-inline'  src/popup/index.html and the view helpers
-//                              use style="..." attributes throughout, which
-//                              CSP blocks without it. Chrome enforces this
-//                              on attributes, not just <style> blocks, and
-//                              Firefox has never implemented style-src-attr,
-//                              so there is no narrower spelling available.
 //   img-src data:              blockies are data: PNGs assigned to img.src.
 //   connect-src https: http:   the RPC endpoint is user-configurable, and a
 //                              local node over http://127.0.0.1 is a
@@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ const EXPECTED_DIRECTIVES = {
     "default-src": ["'self'"],
     "script-src": ["'self'", "'wasm-unsafe-eval'"],
     "object-src": ["'self'"],
-    "style-src": ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"],
+    "style-src": ["'self'"],
     "img-src": ["'self'", "data:"],
     "connect-src": ["'self'", "http:", "https:"],
     "frame-src": ["'none'"],

tests/nativeCurrency.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+// The native token's label on the screens that show a native amount.
+//
+// src/shared/networks.js gives each network a nativeCurrency, `ETH` on mainnet
+// and `SepoliaETH` on Sepolia, and nothing read it: every screen wrote a
+// hardcoded "ETH", so on Sepolia the balance, the value and the fee all read
+// ETH (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/372). Each line is asserted
+// on both networks, through the real Send, confirmation and approval screens,
+// with only the node and the DOM stubbed. So is that a token cannot pass for
+// the native token by reporting its label, and that a transaction's figures
+// carry its own network's label when another network is active.
+
+"use strict";
+
+jest.mock("ethers", () => {
+    const actual = jest.requireActual("ethers");
+    class StubProvider {
+        async lookupAddress() {
+            return null;
+        }
+        // 10 gwei expected, 20 gwei reserved per gas.
+        async getFeeData() {
+            return { maxFeePerGas: 20000000000n, gasPrice: 10000000000n };
+        }
+        async estimateGas() {
+            return 21000n;
+        }
+        async getCode() {
+            return "0x";
+        }
+        async getTransactionCount() {
+            return 1;
+        }
+        async getTransactionReceipt() {
+            return { blockNumber: 21000000 };
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        ...actual,
+        JsonRpcProvider: StubProvider,
+        Network: { from: () => ({}) },
+    };
+});
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
+    log: {
+        debugf: () => {},
+        infof: () => {},
+        warnf: () => {},
+        errorf: () => {},
+    },
+    debugFetch: jest.fn(async () => ({
+        ok: true,
+        status: 200,
+        json: async () => ({ items: [] }),
+    })),
+    urlOrigin: () => "",
+    setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
+    isDebug: () => false,
+}));
+
+// Signing a send succeeds without a key, and sending answers with a hash.
+jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+    ...jest.requireActual("../src/shared/vault"),
+    decryptWithPassword: async () => "secret",
+}));
+jest.mock("../src/shared/wallet", () => ({
+    ...jest.requireActual("../src/shared/wallet"),
+    getSignerForAddress: () => ({
+        connect: () => ({
+            populateTransaction: async (request) => request,
+            sendTransaction: async () => ({ hash: "0x" + "3".repeat(64) }),
+        }),
+    }),
+}));
+
+global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
+    throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
+});
+
+// The approval the background hands the approval screen. Set per test.
+let approvalDetails = null;
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+global.chrome = {
+    storage: makeStorageStub(),
+    runtime: {
+        connect: () => ({
+            postMessage() {},
+            disconnect() {},
+            onDisconnect: { addListener() {} },
+        }),
+        sendMessage(message, callback) {
+            callback(
+                message.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL"
+                    ? approvalDetails
+                    : undefined,
+            );
+        },
+    },
+};
+
+// A stub DOM: every id resolves to a recording element.
+const elements = new Map();
+
+function makeEl(id) {
+    const handlers = new Map();
+    return {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        value: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add() {},
+            remove() {},
+            toggle() {},
+            contains: () => false,
+        },
+        handlers,
+        children: [],
+        addEventListener(name, fn) {
+            handlers.set(name, fn);
+        },
+        appendChild(child) {
+            this.children.push(child);
+            return child;
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        querySelector: () => null,
+        remove() {},
+        focus() {},
+        // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+        get parentElement() {
+            return global.document.getElementById(id + "-parent");
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+global.document = {
+    getElementById(id) {
+        if (!elements.has(id)) elements.set(id, makeEl(id));
+        return elements.get(id);
+    },
+    createElement: (tag) => makeEl(tag),
+    body: { prepend() {}, appendChild() {} },
+    addEventListener() {},
+};
+global.navigator = { clipboard: { writeText() {} } };
+
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const { NETWORKS } = require("../src/shared/networks");
+const { clearPrices } = require("../src/shared/prices");
+const send = require("../src/popup/views/send");
+const confirmTx = require("../src/popup/views/confirmTx");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+const transactionDetail = require("../src/popup/views/transactionDetail");
+const txStatus = require("../src/popup/views/txStatus");
+const { balanceLinesForAddress } = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+const { filterTransactions } = require("../src/shared/transactions");
+const { debugFetch } = require("../src/shared/log");
+
+const HOLDER = "0x" + "a".repeat(40);
+const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
+// A token contract that is not in the bundled token list.
+const TOKEN_CONTRACT = "0xd05339f9ea5ab9d9f03b9d57f671d2abd1f55c82";
+
+function text(id) {
+    return global.document.getElementById(id).textContent;
+}
+
+// Press Review on the Send screen for a native send of `amount`, and show the
+// confirmation screen it leads to with its fee estimate settled.
+async function confirmSend(amount) {
+    let txInfo = null;
+    send.init({ showConfirmTx: (info) => (txInfo = info) });
+    state.selectedToken = "ETH";
+    global.document.getElementById("send-to").value = RECIPIENT;
+    global.document.getElementById("send-amount").value = amount;
+    await global.document
+        .getElementById("btn-send-review")
+        .handlers.get("click")();
+    confirmTx.show(txInfo);
+    for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
+}
+
+// The approval screen for a dApp transaction sending 0.01 of the native token
+// with 21000 gas at up to 20 gwei, on the network with `chainId`.
+async function approveTx(chainId) {
+    approvalDetails = {
+        type: "tx",
+        origin: "https://dapp.example",
+        approvedFrom: HOLDER,
+        approvedTx: {
+            to: RECIPIENT,
+            value: "10000000000000000",
+            data: "0x",
+            chainId,
+            gasLimit: "21000",
+            maxFeePerGas: "20000000000",
+            nonce: 0,
+        },
+    };
+    await approval.show("1");
+}
+
+describe.each([
+    ["mainnet", "ETH"],
+    ["sepolia", "SepoliaETH"],
+])("on %s the native token reads %s", (networkId, symbol) => {
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        elements.clear();
+        clearPrices();
+        state.networkId = networkId;
+        state.wallets = [
+            {
+                name: "Wallet 1",
+                addresses: [{ address: HOLDER, balance: "1.5" }],
+            },
+        ];
+        state.selectedWallet = 0;
+        state.selectedAddress = 0;
+        state.trackedTokens = [];
+        state.fraudContracts = [];
+        state.currentView = null;
+    });
+
+    test("the balance", async () => {
+        const addr = state.wallets[0].addresses[0];
+        expect(balanceLinesForAddress(addr, [], false)).toContain(
+            `<span>${symbol}</span><span>1.5000</span>`,
+        );
+        state.selectedToken = "ETH";
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 1.5000 " + symbol);
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        expect(text("confirm-balance")).toBe("1.5000 " + symbol);
+    });
+
+    test("the value", async () => {
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        expect(text("confirm-type")).toBe("Native " + symbol + " transfer");
+        expect(text("confirm-amount")).toBe("0.1 " + symbol);
+        await approveTx(NETWORKS[networkId].chainId);
+        expect(text("approve-tx-value")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
+    });
+
+    test("the fee", async () => {
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        // 21000 gas at 10 gwei expected, at 20 gwei reserved.
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-amount")).toBe("~0.0002 " + symbol);
+        expect(text("confirm-fee-reserve")).toBe(
+            "up to 0.0004 " + symbol + " reserved",
+        );
+        expect(text("confirm-gas-error")).toContain(
+            "You do not have enough " + symbol + " to pay the network fee",
+        );
+        await approveTx(NETWORKS[networkId].chainId);
+        expect(text("approve-tx-fee")).toBe("0.0004 " + symbol);
+    });
+
+    test("the contract-recipient warning", async () => {
+        await confirmSend("0.1");
+        expect(text("confirm-contract-warning")).toContain(
+            "Sending " + symbol + " or tokens directly to a contract",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // A token reports whatever symbol it likes. One reporting the label the
+    // wallet shows its native token under, on this network or any other, is
+    // a fake, exactly as one reporting `ETH` always was.
+    test.each(["ETH", symbol])(
+        "a token claiming %s is dropped from the history and the Send selector",
+        (claim) => {
+            const result = filterTransactions(
+                [
+                    {
+                        hash: "0x" + "1".repeat(64),
+                        symbol: claim,
+                        contractAddress: TOKEN_CONTRACT,
+                        holders: 900000,
+                        valueGwei: null,
+                        isContractCall: false,
+                    },
+                ],
+                { hideSpoofedSymbols: true },
+            );
+            expect(result.transactions).toEqual([]);
+            expect(result.newFraudContracts).toEqual([TOKEN_CONTRACT]);
+
+            send.renderSendTokenSelect({
+                address: HOLDER,
+                tokenBalances: [
+                    {
+                        address: TOKEN_CONTRACT,
+                        symbol: claim,
+                        decimals: 18,
+                        balance: "5",
+                        holders: 900000,
+                    },
+                ],
+            });
+            expect(
+                global.document.getElementById("send-token").children,
+            ).toEqual([]);
+        },
+    );
+
+    // The detail screen tells the two apart by the token contract, which only
+    // a token transfer has, so a token reporting the native label still reads
+    // as a token transfer.
+    test("the transaction detail screen's type line", () => {
+        const entry = {
+            hash: "0x" + "2".repeat(64),
+            from: RECIPIENT,
+            to: HOLDER,
+            value: "1.0000",
+            exactValue: "1.0",
+            symbol,
+            timestamp: 1790000000,
+            isError: false,
+            direction: "received",
+            directionLabel: "Received",
+            chainId: NETWORKS[networkId].chainId,
+        };
+        transactionDetail.show({ ...entry, contractAddress: null });
+        expect(text("tx-detail-type")).toBe("Native " + symbol + " Transfer");
+        transactionDetail.show({ ...entry, contractAddress: TOKEN_CONTRACT });
+        expect(text("tx-detail-type")).toBe("ERC-20 Token Transfer");
+    });
+
+    test("the insufficient-balance error", async () => {
+        await confirmSend("2");
+        expect(
+            global.document.getElementById("confirm-errors").innerHTML,
+        ).toContain(
+            "You have 1.5000 " +
+                symbol +
+                " but are trying to send 2 " +
+                symbol +
+                ".",
+        );
+    });
+});
+
+// A transaction's value and fee are in the native currency of the network the
+// transaction is on, which need not be the active one. A site can switch the
+// active network after its transaction is prepared and back before it is
+// signed, and a popup opened after a switch shows a sent or listed transaction
+// again. The wallet's balances follow the active network; these do not.
+describe.each([
+    ["mainnet", "sepolia", "ETH"],
+    ["sepolia", "mainnet", "SepoliaETH"],
+])(
+    "a %s transaction shown with %s active reads %s",
+    (txNetworkId, activeNetworkId, symbol) => {
+        const chainId = NETWORKS[txNetworkId].chainId;
+        const hash = "0x" + "3".repeat(64);
+
+        beforeEach(() => {
+            elements.clear();
+            clearPrices();
+            state.networkId = activeNetworkId;
+            state.wallets = [
+                {
+                    name: "Wallet 1",
+                    addresses: [{ address: HOLDER, balance: "1.5" }],
+                },
+            ];
+            state.selectedWallet = 0;
+            state.selectedAddress = 0;
+            state.trackedTokens = [];
+            state.fraudContracts = [];
+            state.currentView = null;
+            txStatus.init({ doRefreshAndRender() {} });
+        });
+
+        afterEach(() => {
+            txStatus.endWait();
+        });
+
+        test("the approval screen's value and fee", async () => {
+            await approveTx(chainId);
+            expect(text("approve-tx-network")).toBe(NETWORKS[txNetworkId].name);
+            expect(text("approve-tx-value")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
+            expect(text("approve-tx-fee")).toBe("0.0004 " + symbol);
+        });
+
+        test("the wait, success and error screens", async () => {
+            const txInfo = {
+                from: HOLDER,
+                to: RECIPIENT,
+                amount: "0.0100",
+                token: "ETH",
+                tokenSymbol: null,
+                chainId,
+            };
+            txStatus.showWait(txInfo, hash);
+            expect(text("wait-tx-summary")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
+            txStatus.showError(txInfo, hash, "Failed.");
+            expect(text("error-tx-summary")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
+            // A later popup resumes the wait, and the receipt is there.
+            state.viewData = {
+                pendingWait: { txInfo, hash, broadcastTime: Date.now() },
+            };
+            txStatus.restoreWait();
+            for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+                await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
+            }
+            expect(text("success-tx-summary")).toBe("0.0100 " + symbol);
+        });
+
+        // Sent from the Send screen on the transaction's network, then
+        // resumed by a popup that opens after the active network changed.
+        test("the wait screen after a send", async () => {
+            state.networkId = txNetworkId;
+            await confirmSend("0.1");
+            confirmTx.init({});
+            global.document.getElementById("confirm-tx-password").value = "pw";
+            await global.document
+                .getElementById("btn-confirm-send")
+                .handlers.get("click")();
+            expect(text("wait-tx-summary")).toBe("0.1 " + symbol);
+            state.networkId = activeNetworkId;
+            txStatus.restoreWait();
+            expect(text("wait-tx-summary")).toBe("0.1 " + symbol);
+        });
+
+        test("the transaction detail screen's type line and fee", async () => {
+            debugFetch.mockImplementationOnce(async () => ({
+                ok: true,
+                status: 200,
+                json: async () => ({ fee: { value: "21000000000000" } }),
+            }));
+            transactionDetail.show({
+                hash,
+                from: RECIPIENT,
+                to: HOLDER,
+                value: "1.0000",
+                exactValue: "1.0",
+                symbol,
+                timestamp: 1790000000,
+                isError: false,
+                direction: "received",
+                directionLabel: "Received",
+                contractAddress: null,
+                chainId,
+            });
+            expect(text("tx-detail-type")).toBe(
+                "Native " + symbol + " Transfer",
+            );
+            for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+                await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
+            }
+            expect(
+                global.document.getElementById("tx-detail-fee").innerHTML,
+            ).toContain("0.000021 " + symbol);
+        });
+    },
+);

tests/persistedEntryFloors.test.js

@@ -59,24 +59,32 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
             }
         });
 
-        test(`an ${field} entry whose value is not a hostname list is dropped`, () => {
+        test(`an ${field} entry whose value is not an origin list is dropped`, () => {
-            for (const bad of ["dapp.example", 42, null, { a: 1 }, true]) {
+            for (const bad of [
+                "https://dapp.example",
+                42,
+                null,
+                { a: 1 },
+                true,
+            ]) {
                 expect(
                     normalizePersisted({ [field]: { [ADDRESS]: bad } })[field],
                 ).toEqual({});
             }
         });
 
-        test(`a hostname that is not text is dropped from an ${field} entry`, () => {
+        test(`an origin that is not text is dropped from an ${field} entry`, () => {
             expect(
                 normalizePersisted({
-                    [field]: { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, "dapp.example", {}] },
+                    [field]: {
+                        [ADDRESS]: [42, null, "https://dapp.example", {}],
+                    },
                 })[field],
-            ).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+            ).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] });
         });
 
         test(`a real ${field} map survives, copied not shared`, () => {
-            const saved = { [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] } };
+            const saved = { [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] } };
 
             const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
 
@@ -87,10 +95,13 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
 
         test(`a good ${field} entry beside a malformed one survives`, () => {
             const out = normalizePersisted({
-                [field]: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"], [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: 42 },
+                [field]: {
+                    [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
+                    [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: 42,
+                },
             });
 
-            expect(out[field]).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+            expect(out[field]).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] });
         });
 
         test(`a stored own "__proto__" key in ${field} is dropped`, () => {
@@ -100,7 +111,7 @@ describe("the floor under allowedSites and deniedSites", () => {
             // saveState()'s merge hands to the prototype setter on the next
             // write.
             const saved = JSON.parse(
-                '{"' + field + '":{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}}',
+                '{"' + field + '":{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}}',
             );
 
             const out = normalizePersisted(saved);
@@ -197,7 +208,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
     const MALFORMED = [
         { name: "a string", value: "notalist" },
         { name: "a number", value: 42 },
-        { name: "a record", value: { hostnames: ["dapp.example"] } },
+        { name: "a record", value: { origins: ["https://dapp.example"] } },
     ];
 
     for (const { name, value } of MALFORMED) {
@@ -231,7 +242,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
         const env = await bootPopup(
             unversionedValidProfile({
                 allowedSites: {
-                    [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"],
+                    [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
                     [TOKEN_ADDRESS]: "notalist",
                 },
             }),
@@ -239,7 +250,7 @@ describe("a malformed allowedSites entry", () => {
 
         expect(env.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
         expect(env.storage.read("autistmask").allowedSites).toEqual({
-            [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"],
+            [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
         });
     });
 

tests/persistedFieldContract.test.js

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ const CONTRACT = [
             [ADDRESS],
             { [ADDRESS]: 42 },
             { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
-            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
+            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}'),
         ],
         holds: siteMapHolds,
     },
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ const CONTRACT = [
             [ADDRESS],
             { [ADDRESS]: 42 },
             { [ADDRESS]: [42, null, {}] },
-            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["evil.invalid"]}'),
+            JSON.parse('{"__proto__":["https://evil.invalid"]}'),
         ],
         holds: siteMapHolds,
     },
@@ -722,6 +722,28 @@ describe("the base profile the sweep corrupts", () => {
     }
 });
 
+// Home, AddressDetail and AddressToken load their transactions inside a catch
+// that only logs, so a boot that fails there still renders the view and passes
+// the tests above while none of that code runs.
+describe("the base profile loads transactions", () => {
+    for (const view of ["main", "address", "address-token"]) {
+        test(`on ${view} without logging a failure`, async () => {
+            const consoleError = jest.spyOn(console, "error");
+            try {
+                await bootPopup(restoringOnto(view));
+                const failures = consoleError.mock.calls
+                    .map((args) => args.join(" "))
+                    .filter((line) =>
+                        /loadHomeTxs failed|loadTransactions failed/.test(line),
+                    );
+                expect(failures).toEqual([]);
+            } finally {
+                consoleError.mockRestore();
+            }
+        });
+    }
+});
+
 // A field the ROUTER itself reads — the two it gates on and the two
 // hasValidAddress() indexes with. A hostile value in one of these legitimately
 // changes which view renders, so each gets its own boot per view and is held

tests/personalSignDisplay.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+// The signature prompt shows a personal message as the bytes that are signed
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/403): the raw data in hex, the
+// text it decodes to with control characters, line and paragraph separators
+// and characters that paint nothing marked rather than obeyed, markup shown as
+// text, laid out in byte order, and a message that is not hex as plain text
+// that cannot be signed.
+//
+// Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/approvalOrigin.test.js uses. That the layout keeps right-to-left
+// characters in byte order needs a real browser: tests/e2e/run.js checks it.
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const { hexlify, toUtf8Bytes } = require("ethers");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+
+const FROM = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
+
+// Built from their code points so that this file holds none of them.
+const RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE = String.fromCodePoint(0x202e);
+const POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING = String.fromCodePoint(0x202c);
+const ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE = String.fromCodePoint(0x200b);
+const VARIATION_SELECTOR_1 = String.fromCodePoint(0xfe00);
+const VARIATION_SELECTOR_17 = String.fromCodePoint(0xe0100);
+const HANGUL_FILLER = String.fromCodePoint(0x3164);
+const LINE_SEPARATOR = String.fromCodePoint(0x2028);
+const PARAGRAPH_SEPARATOR = String.fromCodePoint(0x2029);
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    return {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// Open the signature prompt for a personal_sign of `message`, the way the
+// popup does: it asks the background for the approval and show() draws it.
+async function openPersonalSign(message) {
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
+    globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
+        connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+        sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+            if (!reply) return;
+            if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
+            reply({
+                type: "sign",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
+                isPhishingDomain: false,
+                approvedFrom: FROM,
+                signParams: { method: "personal_sign", message, from: FROM },
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    approval.init({});
+    await approval.show(1);
+}
+
+// The message box's markup as the text a reader sees: tags dropped.
+function shownMessage() {
+    return node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, "");
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    state.wallets = [];
+    state.activeAddress = FROM;
+    state.viewData = {};
+    state.viewStack = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+});
+
+test("a right-to-left override is marked, so the text reads in byte order", async () => {
+    // Obeyed, the override shows "0001" as "1000".
+    const text =
+        "Pay " +
+        RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE +
+        "0001" +
+        POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING +
+        " ETH";
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes(text)));
+    const html = node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML;
+    expect(html).not.toContain(RIGHT_TO_LEFT_OVERRIDE);
+    expect(html).not.toContain(POP_DIRECTIONAL_FORMATTING);
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Pay U+202E0001U+202C ETH");
+});
+
+test("a zero-width character is marked", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(
+        hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("pay" + ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE + "pal.com")),
+    );
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML).not.toContain(
+        ZERO_WIDTH_SPACE,
+    );
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("payU+200Bpal.com");
+});
+
+test("variation selectors and a Hangul filler are marked", async () => {
+    // Each paints nothing, so a page could hide bytes after "Sign in".
+    await openPersonalSign(
+        hexlify(
+            toUtf8Bytes(
+                "Sign in" +
+                    VARIATION_SELECTOR_1 +
+                    VARIATION_SELECTOR_17 +
+                    HANGUL_FILLER,
+            ),
+        ),
+    );
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Sign inU+FE00U+E0100U+3164");
+});
+
+test("the message is laid out in byte order", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("Hello")));
+    expect(
+        node("approve-sign-message").classList.contains("am-byte-order"),
+    ).toBe(true);
+});
+
+test("a control character other than a line feed is marked", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("a\u0000b\tc")));
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("aU+0000bU+0009c");
+});
+
+test("line and paragraph separators are marked", async () => {
+    // Left in the text, a paragraph separator would end the byte-order
+    // layout for everything after it.
+    await openPersonalSign(
+        hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("a" + LINE_SEPARATOR + "b" + PARAGRAPH_SEPARATOR)),
+    );
+    const html = node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML;
+    expect(html).not.toContain(LINE_SEPARATOR);
+    expect(html).not.toContain(PARAGRAPH_SEPARATOR);
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("aU+2028bU+2029");
+});
+
+test("a line feed is shown as a line break", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign(hexlify(toUtf8Bytes("Sign in\nNonce: 7")));
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML).toBe("Sign in<br>Nonce: 7");
+});
+
+// The message box is written as HTML, so a site's markup has to arrive there
+// escaped, as the text it is.
+const MARKUP = "<b>x</b><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>";
+
+test.each([
+    ["a hex message", hexlify(toUtf8Bytes(MARKUP))],
+    ["a message that is not hex", MARKUP],
+])("markup in %s is shown as text, not as markup", async (_, message) => {
+    await openPersonalSign(message);
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").innerHTML).toBe(
+        "&lt;b&gt;x&lt;/b&gt;&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&gt;",
+    );
+});
+
+test("the raw hex is shown alongside the text", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("0x48656c6c6f");
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Hello");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex").textContent).toBe("0x48656c6c6f");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
+        false,
+    );
+});
+
+test("hex with an uppercase 0X is read as hex, as signing reads it", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("0X48656C6C6F");
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Hello");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex").textContent).toBe("0X48656C6C6F");
+    expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(false);
+});
+
+test("bytes that are not text are shown only as hex", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("0xff00");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-message").textContent).toBe(
+        "This message is not text.",
+    );
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex").textContent).toBe("0xff00");
+});
+
+test("a message that is not hex is shown as text and cannot be signed", async () => {
+    await openPersonalSign("Hello world");
+    expect(shownMessage()).toBe("Hello world");
+    expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(
+        "This message is plain text, not hex, so it cannot be signed.",
+    );
+    expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
+    expect(node("approve-sign-hex-section").classList.contains("hidden")).toBe(
+        true,
+    );
+});

tests/proxyMethods.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+// Every method in PROXY_METHODS is sent to the RPC node.
+//
+// handleRpc answers some methods itself before it reaches its proxy branch. A
+// method listed in PROXY_METHODS but answered earlier never reaches the node,
+// so the list would name a method that is not proxied
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/326). Each method is sent from
+// a page here and must come back with what the node answered.
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete global.chrome;
+    delete global.fetch;
+});
+
+test("every method in PROXY_METHODS reaches the RPC node", async () => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+        getProvider: () => ({}),
+        refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
+        isPhishingDomain: () => false,
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
+        ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    // The node answers each method with a value naming that method.
+    global.fetch = jest.fn(async (url, opts) => ({
+        status: 200,
+        json: async () => ({
+            jsonrpc: "2.0",
+            id: 1,
+            result: "node answered " + JSON.parse(opts.body).method,
+        }),
+    }));
+
+    let messageListener = null;
+    global.chrome = {
+        storage: makeStorageStub({
+            autistmask: {
+                networkId: "mainnet",
+                wallets: [],
+                allowedSites: {},
+                deniedSites: {},
+            },
+        }),
+        runtime: {
+            getURL: (path) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + path,
+            onMessage: {
+                addListener: (fn) => {
+                    messageListener = fn;
+                },
+            },
+            onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
+            lastError: null,
+        },
+        windows: { onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} } },
+        action: { setPopup: () => {} },
+    };
+
+    const { PROXY_METHODS } = require("../src/background/index");
+
+    const answers = {};
+    const expected = {};
+    for (const method of PROXY_METHODS) {
+        messageListener(
+            { type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC", method, params: [] },
+            { origin: "https://dapp.example" },
+            (r) => {
+                answers[method] = r;
+            },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        expected[method] = { result: "node answered " + method };
+    }
+
+    expect(PROXY_METHODS.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(answers).toEqual(expected);
+});

tests/rpcErrorLog.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+// What reaches the console when the RPC endpoint answers with an HTTP error.
+//
+// RPC providers put the API key in the endpoint URL's path or query string.
+// When the endpoint answers with an HTTP error (a wrong or expired key, a rate
+// limit, a server error), the error ethers throws carries the full request URL
+// in its message, so a line logging that message printed the key
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410). Those lines log the
+// error's short message, which names the HTTP status and not the URL.
+//
+// The real ethers provider runs; only its HTTP transport is replaced, by one
+// that answers every request with 401 Unauthorized. Debug mode is on, so
+// every log level is printed.
+
+const { FetchRequest } = require("ethers");
+const {
+    getProvider,
+    lookupTokenInfo,
+    refreshBalances,
+} = require("../src/shared/balances");
+const { getFullWarnings } = require("../src/shared/addressWarnings");
+const { resolveEnsName } = require("../src/shared/ens");
+const { setRuntimeDebug } = require("../src/shared/log");
+
+const RPC_URL = "https://rpc.example.invalid/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456";
+const ADDRESS = "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
+
+const realFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+let printed;
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    setRuntimeDebug(true);
+    printed = [];
+    for (const method of ["log", "warn", "error"]) {
+        jest.spyOn(console, method).mockImplementation((...args) => {
+            printed.push(args.map(String).join(" "));
+        });
+    }
+    FetchRequest.registerGetUrl(async () => ({
+        statusCode: 401,
+        statusMessage: "Unauthorized",
+        headers: {},
+        body: new Uint8Array(),
+    }));
+    // The explorer requests the balance refresh makes go nowhere.
+    globalThis.fetch = jest.fn(async () => {
+        throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
+    });
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    FetchRequest.registerGetUrl(FetchRequest.createGetUrlFunc());
+    globalThis.fetch = realFetch;
+    setRuntimeDebug(false);
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+});
+
+// The line carrying `label` was printed and names the HTTP status, and nothing
+// printed carries the key.
+function expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey(label) {
+    const line = printed.find((text) => text.includes(label));
+    expect(line).toContain("401");
+    const all = printed.join("\n");
+    expect(all).not.toContain("PATHKEY123");
+    expect(all).not.toContain("QUERYTOKEN456");
+}
+
+test("ethers puts the URL in the error message, not in the short message", async () => {
+    const provider = getProvider(RPC_URL, "mainnet");
+    const error = await provider.getCode(ADDRESS).catch((e) => e);
+    expect(error.message).toContain("PATHKEY123");
+    expect(error.shortMessage).not.toContain("PATHKEY123");
+});
+
+test("the recipient checks before a send", async () => {
+    await getFullWarnings(ADDRESS, getProvider(RPC_URL, "mainnet"));
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("contract check failed");
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("tx count check failed");
+});
+
+test("the ENS reverse lookup", async () => {
+    expect(await resolveEnsName(ADDRESS, RPC_URL, "mainnet")).toBeNull();
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("ENS reverse lookup failed");
+});
+
+test("the balance refresh", async () => {
+    const wallets = [{ addresses: [{ address: ADDRESS }] }];
+    await refreshBalances(
+        wallets,
+        RPC_URL,
+        "https://explorer.example.invalid/api/v2",
+        [],
+        "mainnet",
+    );
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("ETH balance failed");
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("ENS reverse failed");
+});
+
+// The lookup's first line, at debug level, names the RPC endpoint; the check
+// of everything printed covers it too.
+test("the token lookup", async () => {
+    await expect(lookupTokenInfo(ADDRESS, RPC_URL, "mainnet")).rejects.toThrow(
+        "Not a valid ERC-20 token",
+    );
+    expectFailureLoggedWithoutKey("symbol() failed:");
+});

tests/rpcOrigin.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+// Which site a page's request is attributed to.
+//
+// The background takes a request's origin from what the browser says sent the
+// message: sender.origin, or on Firefox before 126, which has no
+// sender.origin, the origin of sender.url — the frame that sent it. It used to
+// fall back to the tab's page and then to an origin the message itself
+// carried, so a request from a frame was credited to the site embedding it,
+// and a request the browser said nothing about was credited to whatever the
+// page wrote (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/407).
+//
+// Every sender here lacks sender.origin, as on old Firefox. The connection
+// check on eth_accounts is what shows which site a request was credited to.
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+
+const ADDRESS = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+// The site the persisted state has connected, and one it has never heard of.
+const CONNECTED_ORIGIN = "https://dapp.example";
+const STRANGER_ORIGIN = "https://stranger.example";
+
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) await Promise.resolve();
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete global.chrome;
+});
+
+function loadBackground() {
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/balances", () => ({
+        getProvider: () => ({}),
+        refreshBalances: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/phishingDomains", () => ({
+        isPhishingDomain: () => false,
+    }));
+    jest.doMock("../src/shared/alarms", () => ({
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_ALARM: "balance",
+        BALANCE_REFRESH_PERIOD_MINUTES: 1,
+        ensureRecurringAlarms: jest.fn(async () => {}),
+        registerAlarmHandlers: jest.fn(),
+    }));
+
+    const storage = makeStorageStub({
+        autistmask: {
+            networkId: "mainnet",
+            wallets: [
+                {
+                    name: "Wallet 1",
+                    type: "hd",
+                    addresses: [
+                        { address: ADDRESS, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] },
+                    ],
+                },
+            ],
+            activeAddress: ADDRESS,
+            allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: [CONNECTED_ORIGIN] },
+            deniedSites: {},
+        },
+    });
+
+    let messageListener = null;
+    global.chrome = {
+        storage,
+        runtime: {
+            getURL: (path) => "chrome-extension://autistmask/" + path,
+            onMessage: {
+                addListener: (fn) => {
+                    messageListener = fn;
+                },
+            },
+            onConnect: { addListener: () => {} },
+            lastError: null,
+        },
+        windows: { onRemoved: { addListener: () => {} } },
+        action: { setPopup: () => {} },
+    };
+
+    require("../src/background/index");
+
+    // Ask for eth_accounts. `claimedOrigin` is an origin written into the
+    // message, as the content script used to send.
+    return async function accounts(sender, claimedOrigin) {
+        let result = null;
+        messageListener(
+            {
+                type: "AUTISTMASK_RPC",
+                method: "eth_accounts",
+                params: [],
+                origin: claimedOrigin,
+            },
+            sender,
+            (r) => {
+                result = r;
+            },
+        );
+        await settle();
+        return result;
+    };
+}
+
+describe("a request is attributed to the frame that sent it", () => {
+    test("a stranger's frame on a connected site gets no address", async () => {
+        const accounts = loadBackground();
+
+        const result = await accounts({
+            url: STRANGER_ORIGIN + "/frame.html",
+            tab: { url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/" },
+        });
+
+        expect(result).toEqual({ result: [] });
+    });
+
+    test("a connected site's frame on a stranger's page gets the address", async () => {
+        const accounts = loadBackground();
+
+        const result = await accounts({
+            url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/frame.html",
+            tab: { url: STRANGER_ORIGIN + "/" },
+        });
+
+        expect(result).toEqual({ result: [ADDRESS] });
+    });
+});
+
+describe("a request the browser does not say the sender of", () => {
+    test("is refused, whatever the tab or the message says", async () => {
+        const accounts = loadBackground();
+
+        const result = await accounts(
+            { tab: { url: CONNECTED_ORIGIN + "/" } },
+            CONNECTED_ORIGIN,
+        );
+
+        expect(result).toEqual({
+            error: {
+                code: 4100,
+                message:
+                    "The wallet could not tell which site sent this request.",
+            },
+        });
+    });
+});

tests/sendDisplayFloor.test.js

@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
         status: 200,
         json: async () => mockExplorer.items,
     })),
+    urlOrigin: () => "",
     setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
     isDebug: () => false,
 }));
@@ -232,7 +233,7 @@ async function confirmSend(amount, token = "ETH") {
 async function approveTxWithFeePerGas(maxFeePerGas) {
     approvalDetails = {
         type: "tx",
-        hostname: "dapp.example",
+        origin: "https://dapp.example",
         approvedFrom: HOLDER,
         approvedTx: {
             to: RECIPIENT,

tests/sendMax.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,530 @@
+// The Send screen's "Max" control
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/198).
+//
+// For ETH it fills in the exact balance minus the fee reserve the
+// confirmation screen's balance check gates on, never the four-decimal balance
+// the Send screen shows; the confirmation screen re-derives that amount from
+// its own estimate, and signs with that estimate's fee fields. For a token it
+// fills in the whole balance, and the check that ETH covers the fee still
+// applies.
+//
+// Driven through the real refreshBalances(), Send screen and confirmation
+// screen, Sign & Send included, with only the node, the explorer and the DOM
+// stubbed.
+
+"use strict";
+
+// What the stub node answers, and the signed transactions it was handed.
+const mockNode = {
+    balanceWei: 0n,
+    feeData: null,
+    broadcast: [],
+};
+
+// The token rows the stub explorer reports for the address.
+const mockExplorer = { items: [] };
+
+jest.mock("ethers", () => {
+    const actual = jest.requireActual("ethers");
+    class StubProvider {
+        async getBalance() {
+            return mockNode.balanceWei;
+        }
+        async lookupAddress() {
+            return null;
+        }
+        async getFeeData() {
+            return mockNode.feeData;
+        }
+        async estimateGas() {
+            return 21000n;
+        }
+        async getCode() {
+            return "0x";
+        }
+        async getTransactionCount() {
+            return 1;
+        }
+        async getNetwork() {
+            return { chainId: 1n };
+        }
+        async broadcastTransaction(signed) {
+            mockNode.broadcast.push(signed);
+            return { hash: "0x" + "ab".repeat(32) };
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        ...actual,
+        JsonRpcProvider: StubProvider,
+        Network: { from: () => ({}) },
+    };
+});
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
+    log: {
+        debugf: () => {},
+        infof: () => {},
+        warnf: () => {},
+        errorf: () => {},
+    },
+    // The explorer's token list, which refreshBalances() also fetches.
+    debugFetch: jest.fn(async () => ({
+        ok: true,
+        status: 200,
+        json: async () => mockExplorer.items,
+    })),
+    urlOrigin: () => "",
+    setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
+    isDebug: () => false,
+}));
+
+// The wait screen polls for a receipt; these tests stop at the broadcast.
+jest.mock("../src/popup/views/txStatus", () => ({
+    showWait: jest.fn(),
+    showError: jest.fn(),
+}));
+
+// The confirmation screen's Etherscan label lookup is the only fetch() these
+// screens make; it fails, as it does offline.
+global.fetch = jest.fn(() => {
+    throw new Error("tests must not perform network requests");
+});
+
+const { makeStorageStub } = require("./support/storageStub");
+global.chrome = { storage: makeStorageStub(), runtime: { sendMessage() {} } };
+
+// A stub DOM: every id resolves to a recording element.
+const elements = new Map();
+
+function makeEl(id) {
+    const handlers = new Map();
+    return {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        value: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add() {},
+            remove() {},
+            toggle() {},
+            contains: () => false,
+        },
+        handlers,
+        children: [],
+        addEventListener(name, fn) {
+            handlers.set(name, fn);
+        },
+        appendChild(child) {
+            this.children.push(child);
+            return child;
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        querySelector: () => null,
+        remove() {},
+        focus() {},
+    };
+}
+
+global.document = {
+    getElementById(id) {
+        if (!elements.has(id)) elements.set(id, makeEl(id));
+        return elements.get(id);
+    },
+    createElement: (tag) => makeEl(tag),
+    body: { prepend() {}, appendChild() {} },
+    addEventListener() {},
+};
+global.navigator = { clipboard: { writeText() {} } };
+
+const { Transaction, Wallet, formatEther } = require("ethers");
+const { refreshBalances } = require("../src/shared/balances");
+const { encryptWithPassword } = require("../src/shared/vault");
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const send = require("../src/popup/views/send");
+const confirmTx = require("../src/popup/views/confirmTx");
+
+const PRIVATE_KEY = "0x" + "11".repeat(32);
+const HOLDER = new Wallet(PRIVATE_KEY).address;
+const RECIPIENT = "0xC0FfEE0000000000000000000000000000c0fFEe";
+// A second address of the wallet, and a second recipient.
+const OTHER = "0x" + "e".repeat(40);
+const PASSWORD = "correct horse battery staple";
+
+const GWEI = 1000000000n;
+const GAS = 21000n;
+
+// The Send screen shows this balance as 1.2345 ETH.
+const BALANCE_WEI = 1234567890123456789n;
+
+// A token the bundled list does not know, with enough holders to be listed.
+const TOKEN = "0x" + "d".repeat(40);
+
+// Fee data whose reserve is 21000 gas at `maxFeePerGas`. The expected cost,
+// at gasPrice, is lower, as it is on mainnet.
+function fees(maxFeePerGas) {
+    return {
+        maxFeePerGas,
+        maxPriorityFeePerGas: GWEI,
+        gasPrice: maxFeePerGas / 2n,
+    };
+}
+
+// The balance minus a reserve of 21000 gas at `maxFeePerGas`.
+function maxAfter(maxFeePerGas) {
+    return formatEther(BALANCE_WEI - GAS * maxFeePerGas);
+}
+
+function el(id) {
+    return global.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+function text(id) {
+    return el(id).textContent;
+}
+
+// The ETH balance the node reports and the token rows the explorer reports,
+// fetched and stored exactly where the popup stores them.
+async function refreshWith(balanceWei, tokenItems = []) {
+    mockNode.balanceWei = balanceWei;
+    mockExplorer.items = tokenItems;
+    state.wallets = [
+        {
+            type: "key",
+            name: "Wallet 1",
+            encryptedSecret: await encryptWithPassword(PRIVATE_KEY, PASSWORD),
+            addresses: [{ address: HOLDER }],
+        },
+    ];
+    state.selectedWallet = 0;
+    state.selectedAddress = 0;
+    await refreshBalances(
+        state.wallets,
+        "https://rpc.example.invalid",
+        "https://blockscout.example/api/v2",
+        state.trackedTokens,
+        "mainnet",
+    );
+}
+
+function tokenRow(value, decimals = "18") {
+    return {
+        value: String(value),
+        token: {
+            type: "ERC-20",
+            address_hash: TOKEN,
+            symbol: "TOK",
+            name: "Token",
+            decimals,
+            holders_count: "50000",
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+// The confirmation screen Review leads to, once shown.
+let confirmed = null;
+
+// Open the Send screen for `token` ("ETH" or a token address), with the
+// recipient entered.
+function openSend(token = "ETH") {
+    send.init({ showConfirmTx: (info) => (confirmed = info) });
+    confirmTx.init({});
+    send.resetSendValidation();
+    state.currentView = "send";
+    state.selectedToken = token;
+    el("send-to").value = RECIPIENT;
+    el("send-amount").value = "";
+}
+
+async function pressMax() {
+    await el("btn-send-max").handlers.get("click")();
+}
+
+// Press Review and show the confirmation screen with its fee estimate settled.
+async function review() {
+    await el("btn-send-review").handlers.get("click")();
+    confirmTx.show(confirmed);
+    await settle();
+}
+
+// show() starts the fee estimate without awaiting it; this lets it settle.
+async function settle() {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
+}
+
+function canSend() {
+    return !el("btn-confirm-send").disabled;
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    elements.clear();
+    confirmed = null;
+    state.selectedToken = null;
+    state.trackedTokens = [];
+    state.fraudContracts = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+    mockNode.feeData = fees(20n * GWEI);
+    mockNode.broadcast = [];
+});
+
+describe("Max on an ETH send", () => {
+    test("fills in the exact balance minus the fee reserve", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI);
+        openSend();
+        send.updateSendBalance();
+        expect(text("send-balance")).toBe("Current balance: 1.2345 ETH");
+        await pressMax();
+        // 1.234567890123456789 - 21000 * 20 gwei.
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe("1.234147890123456789");
+    });
+
+    test("leaves exactly the fee reserve behind, and the confirmation screen enables Send", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI);
+        openSend();
+        await pressMax();
+        await review();
+        expect(text("confirm-amount")).toBe(maxAfter(20n * GWEI) + " ETH");
+        expect(el("confirm-errors").innerHTML).toBe("");
+        expect(el("confirm-amount-fee-error").style.visibility).toBe("hidden");
+        expect(canSend()).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("re-derives the amount when the fee estimate changes", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI);
+        openSend();
+        await pressMax();
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe(maxAfter(20n * GWEI));
+
+        // The fee rises between Max and the confirmation screen's estimate.
+        // Kept, the Send screen's amount would be refused for want of funds.
+        mockNode.feeData = fees(30n * GWEI);
+        await review();
+        expect(text("confirm-amount")).toBe(maxAfter(30n * GWEI) + " ETH");
+        expect(canSend()).toBe(true);
+
+        // And falls when the screen is shown again, as on reopening the popup.
+        mockNode.feeData = fees(10n * GWEI);
+        confirmTx.restore();
+        await settle();
+        expect(text("confirm-amount")).toBe(maxAfter(10n * GWEI) + " ETH");
+        expect(canSend()).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("is signed with the fee its amount leaves behind", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI);
+        openSend();
+        await pressMax();
+        await review();
+        // The fee the node quotes rises after the estimate. Fetched afresh
+        // at signing, it would make amount plus fee more than the balance.
+        mockNode.feeData = fees(25n * GWEI);
+        el("confirm-tx-password").value = PASSWORD;
+        await el("btn-confirm-send").handlers.get("click")();
+
+        expect(mockNode.broadcast).toHaveLength(1);
+        const tx = Transaction.from(mockNode.broadcast[0]);
+        expect(tx.to).toBe(RECIPIENT);
+        expect(tx.maxFeePerGas).toBe(20n * GWEI);
+        expect(tx.value + tx.gasLimit * tx.maxFeePerGas).toBe(BALANCE_WEI);
+    });
+
+    test("says so instead of filling in an amount when the balance does not cover the fee", async () => {
+        // 0.0001 ETH against a reserve of 0.00042 ETH.
+        await refreshWith(100000000000000n);
+        openSend();
+        await pressMax();
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe("");
+        expect(text("flash-msg")).toBe(
+            "Your balance does not cover the network fee.",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("asks for the recipient first, since the fee depends on it", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI);
+        openSend();
+        el("send-to").value = "";
+        await pressMax();
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe("");
+        expect(text("flash-msg")).toBe(
+            "Please enter a recipient address first.",
+        );
+    });
+
+    // Holds the node's fee answer, so Max's estimate is still running, until
+    // the returned function is called.
+    function holdFeeEstimate() {
+        let release;
+        mockNode.feeData = new Promise((resolve) => {
+            release = () => resolve(fees(20n * GWEI));
+        });
+        return release;
+    }
+
+    test.each([
+        ["the same address", 0],
+        ["another address", 1],
+    ])(
+        "fills nothing in once Send was left and opened again for %s while the fee was estimated",
+        async (_, addressIndex) => {
+            await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI);
+            state.wallets[0].addresses.push({
+                address: OTHER,
+                balance: "2.0",
+                tokenBalances: [],
+            });
+            openSend();
+            const release = holdFeeEstimate();
+            const pressed = pressMax();
+
+            // Back, then Send again as home.js opens it, with the same
+            // recipient typed in again.
+            state.selectedAddress = addressIndex;
+            el("send-to").value = "";
+            el("send-amount").value = "";
+            send.resetSendValidation();
+            el("send-to").value = RECIPIENT;
+
+            release();
+            await pressed;
+            expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe("");
+            expect(text("flash-msg")).toBe("");
+        },
+    );
+
+    test("fills nothing in and says nothing once Send was left while the fee was estimated", async () => {
+        // 0.0001 ETH, which does not cover the fee: a result that landed
+        // would say so on whichever screen is shown.
+        await refreshWith(100000000000000n);
+        openSend();
+        const release = holdFeeEstimate();
+        const pressed = pressMax();
+        state.currentView = "home";
+        release();
+        await pressed;
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe("");
+        expect(text("flash-msg")).toBe("");
+    });
+
+    test("fills nothing in when the recipient changed while the fee was estimated", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI);
+        openSend();
+        const release = holdFeeEstimate();
+        const pressed = pressMax();
+        el("send-to").value = OTHER;
+        release();
+        await pressed;
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe("");
+        expect(text("flash-msg")).toBe("");
+    });
+
+    test("fills nothing in when the holding was changed while the fee was estimated", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI, [tokenRow(10n ** 18n)]);
+        // Opened from the home screen, where the dropdown picks the holding.
+        openSend(null);
+        el("send-token").value = "ETH";
+        const release = holdFeeEstimate();
+        const pressed = pressMax();
+        el("send-token").value = TOKEN;
+        el("send-token").handlers.get("change")();
+        release();
+        await pressed;
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe("");
+        expect(text("flash-msg")).toBe("");
+    });
+
+    test("keeps an amount typed while the fee was estimated", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI);
+        openSend();
+        const release = holdFeeEstimate();
+        const pressed = pressMax();
+        el("send-amount").value = "0.5";
+        el("send-amount").handlers.get("input")();
+        release();
+        await pressed;
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe("0.5");
+        expect(text("flash-msg")).toBe("");
+    });
+
+    test("fills in once the held fee estimate arrives with nothing changed", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI);
+        openSend();
+        const release = holdFeeEstimate();
+        const pressed = pressMax();
+        release();
+        await pressed;
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe(maxAfter(20n * GWEI));
+    });
+
+    test("typed over, is an ordinary amount the confirmation screen keeps", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI);
+        openSend();
+        await pressMax();
+        el("send-amount").value = "0.5";
+        el("send-amount").handlers.get("input")();
+        mockNode.feeData = fees(30n * GWEI);
+        await review();
+        expect(text("confirm-amount")).toBe("0.5 ETH");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("Max on a token send", () => {
+    // 1234.567890123456789012 TOK; the Send screen shows 1234.5678.
+    const TOKEN_UNITS = 1234567890123456789012n;
+
+    test("fills in the whole token balance", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI, [tokenRow(TOKEN_UNITS)]);
+        openSend(TOKEN);
+        await pressMax();
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe("1234.567890123456789012");
+        await review();
+        expect(text("confirm-amount")).toBe("1234.567890123456789012 TOK");
+        expect(canSend()).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("of a token with more than 18 decimal places, fills in the balance cut down to the 18 the confirmation screen accepts", async () => {
+        // 1234.567890123456789012999999 TOK at 24 decimal places.
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI, [
+            tokenRow(1234567890123456789012999999n, "24"),
+        ]);
+        openSend(TOKEN);
+        await pressMax();
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe("1234.567890123456789012");
+        await review();
+        expect(text("confirm-amount")).toBe("1234.567890123456789012 TOK");
+        expect(canSend()).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("is still refused when ETH cannot cover the fee", async () => {
+        await refreshWith(0n, [tokenRow(TOKEN_UNITS)]);
+        openSend(TOKEN);
+        await pressMax();
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe("1234.567890123456789012");
+        await review();
+        expect(el("confirm-gas-error").style.visibility).toBe("visible");
+        expect(canSend()).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("says so when the token balance is unknown", async () => {
+        // No scale from the explorer, the bundled list or a tracked token.
+        const row = tokenRow(TOKEN_UNITS);
+        delete row.token.decimals;
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI, [row]);
+        openSend(TOKEN);
+        await pressMax();
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe("");
+        expect(text("flash-msg")).toBe("This token's balance is unknown.");
+    });
+
+    test("says so when the token balance is zero", async () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: TOKEN, symbol: "TOK", name: "Token", decimals: 18 },
+        ];
+        await refreshWith(BALANCE_WEI, [tokenRow(0n)]);
+        openSend(TOKEN);
+        await pressMax();
+        expect(el("send-amount").value).toBe("");
+        expect(text("flash-msg")).toBe("This token's balance is zero.");
+    });
+});

tests/settingsEndpointCheck.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+// What reaches the console when an endpoint check in Settings fails.
+//
+// fetch refuses a URL with a user name and password in it, or one it cannot
+// parse, with an error whose message carries the whole URL: the password, and
+// any API key in the path or query string. The checks behind the RPC and
+// Blockscout Save buttons printed that message
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/410); they now name the
+// endpoint by its origin.
+//
+// The real fetch runs; it throws before making any request. Debug mode is on,
+// so every log level is printed.
+
+const SECRETS = ["SECRETPASS789", "PATHKEY123", "QUERYTOKEN456"];
+const RPC_WITH_PASSWORD =
+    "https://user:SECRETPASS789@rpc.example.invalid/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456";
+// Port 99999 is out of range, so the URL does not parse.
+const RPC_UNPARSEABLE =
+    "https://rpc.example.invalid:99999/v3/PATHKEY123?token=QUERYTOKEN456";
+const BLOCKSCOUT_WITH_PASSWORD =
+    "https://user:SECRETPASS789@explorer.example.invalid/PATHKEY123/api/v2";
+
+const SAVED_RPC = "https://saved-rpc.example.invalid";
+const SAVED_BLOCKSCOUT = "https://saved-explorer.example.invalid/api/v2";
+
+let elements;
+let flashes;
+let printed;
+let state;
+
+// A stand-in for one DOM node: enough of an element for init() to set
+// properties on it and hang listeners off it.
+function fakeElement() {
+    return {
+        value: "",
+        checked: false,
+        textContent: "",
+        href: "",
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: { add() {}, remove() {} },
+        listeners: {},
+        addEventListener(event, handler) {
+            this.listeners[event] = handler;
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+    };
+}
+
+function element(id) {
+    return (elements[id] ||= fakeElement());
+}
+
+function loadSettingsView() {
+    elements = {};
+    flashes = [];
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+
+    jest.doMock("../src/popup/views/helpers", () => ({
+        $: element,
+        showView: () => {},
+        updateDebugBanner: () => {},
+        showFlash: (msg) => flashes.push(msg),
+        escapeHtml: (s) => s,
+        flashCopyFeedback: () => {},
+        goBack: () => {},
+        pushCurrentView: () => {},
+        onViewLeave: () => {},
+        VIEWS: [],
+    }));
+
+    state = require("../src/shared/state").state;
+    state.rpcUrl = SAVED_RPC;
+    state.blockscoutUrl = SAVED_BLOCKSCOUT;
+    require("../src/shared/log").setRuntimeDebug(true);
+
+    require("../src/popup/views/settings").init({});
+}
+
+async function save(fieldId, buttonId, typed) {
+    element(fieldId).value = typed;
+    await element(buttonId).listeners.click();
+}
+
+// The check failed, nothing was saved, and nothing printed carries the
+// password or the key.
+function expectFailedWithoutSecrets(label) {
+    expect(flashes).toContain("Could not reach endpoint.");
+    expect(state.rpcUrl).toBe(SAVED_RPC);
+    expect(state.blockscoutUrl).toBe(SAVED_BLOCKSCOUT);
+    const line = printed.find((text) => text.includes(label));
+    expect(line).toBeDefined();
+    const all = printed.join("\n");
+    for (const secret of SECRETS) {
+        expect(all).not.toContain(secret);
+    }
+    return line;
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    printed = [];
+    for (const method of ["log", "warn", "error"]) {
+        jest.spyOn(console, method).mockImplementation((...args) => {
+            printed.push(args.map(String).join(" "));
+        });
+    }
+    globalThis.chrome = {
+        runtime: { sendMessage: () => {} },
+        storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+    };
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    jest.dontMock("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+    delete globalThis.chrome;
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+});
+
+test("fetch puts the whole URL in the error it throws for such a URL", async () => {
+    for (const url of [RPC_WITH_PASSWORD, RPC_UNPARSEABLE]) {
+        const error = await fetch(url).catch((e) => e);
+        expect(error.message).toContain("PATHKEY123");
+    }
+});
+
+test("the RPC check of a URL with a user name and password", async () => {
+    loadSettingsView();
+    await save("settings-rpc", "btn-save-rpc", RPC_WITH_PASSWORD);
+    const line = expectFailedWithoutSecrets("RPC validation fetch failed");
+    expect(line).toContain("https://rpc.example.invalid");
+});
+
+test("the RPC check of a URL that does not parse", async () => {
+    loadSettingsView();
+    await save("settings-rpc", "btn-save-rpc", RPC_UNPARSEABLE);
+    expectFailedWithoutSecrets("RPC validation fetch failed");
+});
+
+test("the Blockscout check of a URL with a user name and password", async () => {
+    loadSettingsView();
+    await save(
+        "settings-blockscout",
+        "btn-save-blockscout",
+        BLOCKSCOUT_WITH_PASSWORD,
+    );
+    const line = expectFailedWithoutSecrets("Blockscout validation failed");
+    expect(line).toContain("https://explorer.example.invalid");
+});

tests/stateMerge.test.js

@@ -270,31 +270,32 @@ describe("background refresh racing a wallet deleted on another page", () => {
     });
 });
 
-// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [hostname, ...] }. Mutated in place
+// allowedSites/deniedSites: { [address]: [origin, ...] }. Mutated in place
-// from two different contexts — src/background/index.js:592-599 pushes a
+// from two different contexts — rememberSiteChoice() in
-// newly approved hostname onto state.allowedSites[activeAddress], and the
+// src/background/index.js pushes a newly approved origin onto
-// Settings "revoke" button (src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68) filters a
+// state.allowedSites[activeAddress], and the Settings "revoke" button
-// hostname out of state[key][addr] in place, deleting the address key
+// (forgetOrigin() in src/popup/views/settings.js) filters an origin out of
-// entirely once its list is empty — the exact membership-vs-whole-field
+// state[key][addr] in place, deleting the address key entirely once its list
-// pattern that made the whole-field `wallets` diff unsafe, on a
+// is empty — the exact membership-vs-whole-field pattern that made the
-// security-relevant field: a stale whole-field save here can resurrect a
+// whole-field `wallets` diff unsafe, on a security-relevant field: a stale
-// revoked permission or wipe a freshly granted one.
+// whole-field save here can resurrect a revoked permission or wipe a freshly
+// granted one.
 const ADDR1 = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
 const ADDR2 = "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7";
 
-function approveSite(pageState, address, hostname) {
+function approveSite(pageState, address, origin) {
     if (!pageState.allowedSites[address]) {
         pageState.allowedSites[address] = [];
     }
-    if (!pageState.allowedSites[address].includes(hostname)) {
+    if (!pageState.allowedSites[address].includes(origin)) {
-        pageState.allowedSites[address].push(hostname);
+        pageState.allowedSites[address].push(origin);
     }
 }
 
-function revokeSite(pageState, hostname) {
+function revokeSite(pageState, origin) {
     for (const addr of Object.keys(pageState.allowedSites)) {
         pageState.allowedSites[addr] = pageState.allowedSites[addr].filter(
-            (h) => h !== hostname,
+            (o) => o !== origin,
         );
         if (pageState.allowedSites[addr].length === 0) {
             delete pageState.allowedSites[addr];
@@ -308,7 +309,7 @@ describe("a dApp approval racing a stale Settings page's later save", () => {
         await storage.set({
             autistmask: {
                 wallets: [W1],
-                allowedSites: { [ADDR2]: ["other.example"] },
+                allowedSites: { [ADDR2]: ["https://other.example"] },
             },
         });
 
@@ -318,24 +319,24 @@ describe("a dApp approval racing a stale Settings page's later save", () => {
         await settings.state.loadState();
 
         // A dApp approval window, opened later, approves a new site for a
-        // different address and saves — the real sequence at
+        // different address and saves — the real sequence in
-        // src/background/index.js:592-599.
+        // rememberSiteChoice(), src/background/index.js.
         const approval = loadPage(storage);
         await approval.state.loadState();
-        approveSite(approval.state.state, ADDR1, "dapp.example");
+        approveSite(approval.state.state, ADDR1, "https://dapp.example");
         await approval.state.saveState();
         expect(
             (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
-        ).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
+        ).toEqual(["https://dapp.example"]);
 
-        // Settings revokes its own, unrelated site — the real sequence at
+        // Settings revokes its own, unrelated site — the real sequence in
-        // src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — and saves from state loaded
+        // forgetOrigin(), src/popup/views/settings.js — and saves from state
-        // before the dApp approval ever happened.
+        // loaded before the dApp approval ever happened.
-        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "other.example");
+        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "https://other.example");
         await settings.state.saveState();
 
         const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
-        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toEqual(["dapp.example"]);
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toEqual(["https://dapp.example"]);
         expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toBeUndefined();
     });
 });
@@ -346,7 +347,7 @@ describe("a revoked site permission against a stale page's later save", () => {
         await storage.set({
             autistmask: {
                 wallets: [W1],
-                allowedSites: { [ADDR1]: ["evil.example"] },
+                allowedSites: { [ADDR1]: ["https://evil.example"] },
             },
         });
 
@@ -354,23 +355,24 @@ describe("a revoked site permission against a stale page's later save", () => {
         const stale = loadPage(storage);
         await stale.state.loadState();
 
-        // Settings revokes it — src/popup/views/settings.js:55-68 — from a
+        // Settings revokes it — forgetOrigin(), src/popup/views/settings.js —
-        // second page.
+        // from a second page.
         const settings = loadPage(storage);
         await settings.state.loadState();
-        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "evil.example");
+        revokeSite(settings.state.state, "https://evil.example");
         await settings.state.saveState();
         expect(
             (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask.allowedSites[ADDR1],
         ).toBeUndefined();
 
         // The stale page, unaware of the revoke, approves an unrelated site
-        // for a different address and saves — src/background/index.js:592-599.
+        // for a different address and saves — rememberSiteChoice(),
-        approveSite(stale.state.state, ADDR2, "good.example");
+        // src/background/index.js.
+        approveSite(stale.state.state, ADDR2, "https://good.example");
         await stale.state.saveState();
 
         const persisted = (await storage.get("autistmask")).autistmask;
-        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toEqual(["good.example"]);
+        expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR2]).toEqual(["https://good.example"]);
         expect(persisted.allowedSites[ADDR1]).toBeUndefined();
     });
 });
@@ -421,3 +423,80 @@ describe("two wallets independently created with a colliding identity", () => {
         expect(secrets).toContain("secret-b");
     });
 });
+
+// showView() saves on every navigation without waiting, so the user can change
+// something while that save is still waiting on storage. The change is followed
+// by its own saveState(), which runs after the first save; it must be stored
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/448).
+describe("a change made while an earlier save from the same page is running", () => {
+    // Runs `change` inside the next call to `op` (the stub's get or set),
+    // before that call does its work.
+    function runInside(op, change) {
+        const real = op.getMockImplementation();
+        op.mockImplementationOnce(async (arg) => {
+            change();
+            return real(arg);
+        });
+    }
+
+    test("a network switched during the earlier save's read is stored", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub({
+            autistmask: { wallets: [W1], networkId: "sepolia" },
+        });
+        const { state, saveState, loadState } = loadPage(storage).state;
+        await loadState();
+
+        let queued;
+        runInside(storage.get, () => {
+            state.networkId = "mainnet";
+            queued = saveState();
+        });
+        state.theme = "dark";
+        await saveState();
+        await queued;
+
+        const stored = storage.read("autistmask");
+        expect(stored.theme).toBe("dark");
+        expect(stored.networkId).toBe("mainnet");
+    });
+
+    test("a wallet added during the earlier save's read is stored", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
+        const { state, saveState, loadState } = loadPage(storage).state;
+        await loadState();
+
+        let queued;
+        runInside(storage.get, () => {
+            state.wallets.push(W2);
+            queued = saveState();
+        });
+        await saveState();
+        await queued;
+
+        const stored = storage.read("autistmask");
+        expect(stored.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-two",
+        ]);
+    });
+
+    test("a wallet added during the earlier save's write is stored", async () => {
+        const storage = makeStorageStub({ autistmask: { wallets: [W1] } });
+        const { state, saveState, loadState } = loadPage(storage).state;
+        await loadState();
+
+        let queued;
+        runInside(storage.set, () => {
+            state.wallets.push(W2);
+            queued = saveState();
+        });
+        await saveState();
+        await queued;
+
+        const stored = storage.read("autistmask");
+        expect(stored.wallets.map((w) => w.encryptedSecret)).toEqual([
+            "secret-one",
+            "secret-two",
+        ]);
+    });
+});

tests/stateRecovery.test.js

@@ -148,6 +148,173 @@ describe("the destructive reset on the recovery screen", () => {
     });
 });
 
+describe("a popup already open when the stored profile becomes unreadable", () => {
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/373. The popup used to stay
+    // on the wallet list with the last good balances, and only a reopen
+    // reached the recovery screen.
+    test("moves to the recovery screen at its next refresh", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
+
+        env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+        await env.tick();
+
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
+        expect(env.text("state-recovery-problem").length).toBeGreaterThan(10);
+        expect(env.hidden("btn-settings")).toBe(true);
+        expect(env.storage.read("autistmask")).toEqual(CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+    });
+
+    test("stops the ten-second refresh", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+        env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+        await env.tick();
+        const { refreshBalances } = require("../src/shared/balances");
+        const calls = refreshBalances.mock.calls.length;
+
+        await env.tick();
+
+        expect(refreshBalances).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(calls);
+    });
+
+    test("a later save does not clear what the user exported or typed", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+        env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
+        await env.tick();
+
+        await env.click("btn-state-recovery-export");
+        env.node("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "erase my";
+        // Such as the save of a refresh already in flight when the screen
+        // went up.
+        const { saveState } = require("../src/shared/state");
+        await expect(saveState()).rejects.toThrow();
+        await env.settle();
+
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
+        expect(env.hidden("state-recovery-blob")).toBe(false);
+        expect(env.value("state-recovery-reset-input")).toBe("erase my");
+    });
+
+    // The record can become readable again under this popup, erased from the
+    // recovery screen of another window, so a save from this one can succeed.
+    test("a popup opened after the record is erased elsewhere shows a screen", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+        env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+        await env.tick();
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
+
+        await env.storage.remove("autistmask");
+        const { saveState } = require("../src/shared/state");
+        await saveState();
+
+        const reopened = await bootPopup(env.storage.read("autistmask"));
+        expect(reopened.visibleViews()).toEqual(["welcome"]);
+    });
+
+    test("a stored current view of the recovery screen does not blank the popup", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(
+            unversionedValidProfile({ currentView: "state-recovery" }),
+        );
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
+    });
+
+    test("a transaction wait that ends under it does not replace it", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(
+            unversionedValidProfile({
+                currentView: "wait-tx",
+                viewData: {
+                    pendingWait: {
+                        hash: "0x1",
+                        txInfo: { to: ADDRESS, amount: "1", token: "ETH" },
+                        broadcastTime: Date.now(),
+                    },
+                },
+            }),
+        );
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["wait-tx"]);
+        env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[2].blob);
+        await env.tick();
+        await env.click("btn-state-recovery-export");
+        env.node("state-recovery-reset-input").value = "erase my";
+
+        // The test provider answers no receipt lookup, and six that fail in
+        // a row end the wait with an error.
+        for (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) await env.tick();
+
+        expect(env.text("error-tx-message")).toMatch(/could not be reached/);
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
+        expect(env.hidden("state-recovery-blob")).toBe(false);
+        expect(env.value("state-recovery-reset-input")).toBe("erase my");
+    });
+
+    test("a storage read that fails once leaves the wallet list up", async () => {
+        const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+
+        env.storage.local.get.mockRejectedValueOnce(
+            new Error("IO error: storage busy"),
+        );
+        await env.tick();
+
+        // Reported as a failed save, not mistaken for an unreadable profile.
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
+        expect(env.node("save-failure-banner")).not.toBeNull();
+
+        await env.tick();
+        expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
+    });
+
+    // The screen it replaces is left as any navigation leaves it: the rules
+    // at the top of src/popup/views/showPhrase.js and exportPrivkey.js hold
+    // for this way off them too.
+    describe("from a screen holding a secret", () => {
+        const PHRASE =
+            "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon" +
+            " abandon abandon abandon abandon about";
+
+        afterEach(() => jest.dontMock("../src/shared/vault"));
+
+        test("a recovery phrase on screen is wiped", async () => {
+            jest.doMock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+                decryptWithPassword: async () => PHRASE,
+            }));
+            const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+            require("../src/popup/views/showPhrase").show(0);
+            env.node("show-phrase-password").value = "password";
+            await env.click("btn-show-phrase-reveal");
+            expect(env.text("show-phrase-value")).toBe(PHRASE);
+
+            env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+            await env.tick();
+
+            expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
+            expect(env.text("show-phrase-value")).toBe("");
+        });
+
+        test("a private key still being decrypted is never written", async () => {
+            let answer;
+            jest.doMock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+                decryptWithPassword: () =>
+                    new Promise((resolve) => {
+                        answer = resolve;
+                    }),
+            }));
+            const env = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
+            require("../src/popup/views/exportPrivkey").show(0, 0);
+            env.node("export-privkey-password").value = "password";
+            const revealing = env.click("btn-export-privkey-confirm");
+
+            env.storage.write("autistmask", CORRUPT_BLOBS[0].blob);
+            await env.tick();
+            expect(env.visibleViews()).toEqual(["state-recovery"]);
+            expect(env.value("export-privkey-password")).toBe("");
+
+            answer(PHRASE);
+            await revealing;
+            expect(env.text("export-privkey-value")).toBe("");
+        });
+    });
+});
+
 describe("an unversioned profile that is perfectly valid", () => {
     // The upgrade case. Every install in the field is in this state, and the
     // popup must load it, not offer to wipe it.
@@ -167,7 +334,9 @@ describe("an unversioned profile that is perfectly valid", () => {
         expect(stored.wallets[0].encryptedSecret).toBe("encrypted-secret-1");
         expect(stored.wallets[0].addresses[0].address).toBe(ADDRESS);
         expect(stored.activeAddress).toBe(ADDRESS);
-        expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({ [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] });
+        expect(stored.allowedSites).toEqual({
+            [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"],
+        });
     });
 });
 

tests/support/popupBoot.js

@@ -20,6 +20,30 @@ const path = require("path");
 
 const { makeStorageStub } = require("./storageStub");
 
+// The four libraries the popup loads from node_modules, loaded once per test
+// file and handed to every boot. jest.resetModules() in bootPopup() empties the
+// module cache but keeps what jest.doMock() registered, so these registrations
+// hold for every boot in the file and the libraries are not loaded again. None
+// of them holds popup state; everything under src/ is still loaded fresh on
+// each boot.
+//
+// A test's own mock of one of them: a jest.doMock() made inside the test
+// replaces the registration here, as it would for any module. A top-of-file
+// jest.mock() is what the require() below gets, so it is kept, but its factory
+// runs once per file and every boot shares the same mock object.
+const ethers = require("ethers");
+const sodium = require("libsodium-wrappers-sumo");
+const QRCode = require("qrcode");
+const makeBlockie = require("ethereum-blockies-base64");
+jest.doMock("ethers", () => ethers);
+jest.doMock("libsodium-wrappers-sumo", () => sodium);
+jest.doMock("qrcode", () => QRCode);
+jest.doMock("ethereum-blockies-base64", () => makeBlockie);
+
+// Taken before any boot replaces them; see bootPopup().
+const realSetInterval = globalThis.setInterval;
+const realClearInterval = globalThis.clearInterval;
+
 const POPUP_HTML = fs.readFileSync(
     path.join(__dirname, "..", "..", "src", "popup", "index.html"),
     "utf8",
@@ -51,7 +75,7 @@ function unversionedValidProfile(extra) {
         networkId: "mainnet",
         rpcUrl: "https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com",
         blockscoutUrl: "https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2",
-        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: ["dapp.example"] },
+        allowedSites: { [ADDRESS]: ["https://dapp.example"] },
         deniedSites: {},
         trackedTokens: [],
         theme: "system",
@@ -229,8 +253,6 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
         formatUsd: () => "",
         formatAddressTotal: () => "",
         getAddressValue: () => ({ usd: null, partial: false }),
-        getWalletValue: () => ({ usd: null, partial: false }),
-        getTotalValue: () => ({ usd: null, partial: false }),
     }));
     jest.doMock("../../src/shared/balances", () => ({
         fetchTokenBalances: jest.fn(async () => []),
@@ -239,9 +261,12 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
         getProvider: () => ({}),
         scanForAddresses: jest.fn(async () => []),
     }));
+    // filterTransactions() answers in the real one's shape: Home,
+    // AddressDetail and AddressToken read both fields, and a bare list makes
+    // their transaction loading throw into a catch that only logs.
     jest.doMock("../../src/shared/transactions", () => ({
         fetchRecentTransactions: jest.fn(async () => []),
-        filterTransactions: () => [],
+        filterTransactions: () => ({ transactions: [], newFraudContracts: [] }),
     }));
 
     const storage =
@@ -272,9 +297,20 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
         }),
         addEventListener: () => {},
     };
-    // The 10s refresh loop init() starts would outlive the test.
+    // The ten-second refresh init() starts, and a transaction wait's timers,
-    const realSetInterval = globalThis.setInterval;
+    // would outlive the test. So every interval is recorded rather than
-    globalThis.setInterval = () => 0;
+    // started, clearInterval() removes it as a browser would, and tick() below
+    // runs the ones still set. Put back by cleanupPopup().
+    const intervals = new Map();
+    let lastId = 0;
+    globalThis.setInterval = (fn) => {
+        lastId += 1;
+        intervals.set(lastId, fn);
+        return lastId;
+    };
+    globalThis.clearInterval = (id) => {
+        intervals.delete(id);
+    };
 
     require("../../src/popup/index");
 
@@ -296,8 +332,6 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
     }
     await settle();
 
-    globalThis.setInterval = realSetInterval;
-
     return {
         storage,
         document,
@@ -317,6 +351,12 @@ async function bootPopup(stored, options) {
             for (const fn of fns) await fn();
             await settle();
         },
+        // Every interval still set runs once: the ten-second refresh, and a
+        // transaction wait's receipt poll and elapsed counter while one runs.
+        tick: async () => {
+            for (const fn of intervals.values()) await fn();
+            await settle();
+        },
         settle,
         // The view ids whose section is not hidden, as the audit measured them.
         visibleViews: () => {
@@ -334,6 +374,8 @@ function cleanupPopup() {
     delete globalThis.chrome;
     delete globalThis.document;
     delete globalThis.window;
+    globalThis.setInterval = realSetInterval;
+    globalThis.clearInterval = realClearInterval;
 }
 
 module.exports = {

tests/symbolSpoof.test.js

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
         errorf: () => {},
     },
     debugFetch: jest.fn(),
+    urlOrigin: () => "",
     setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
     isDebug: () => false,
 }));

tests/timestampDisplay.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+// A transaction's time is written by isoDate() and timeAgo() in
+// src/popup/views/helpers.js on every screen that shows one (README, Display
+// Consistency; https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/168). AddressDetail
+// and AddressToken used to define their own copies, so a fix to the shared pair
+// would not have reached them.
+//
+// The pair is replaced before the views are loaded, because a view takes it
+// when it loads. A view that writes the time with a copy of its own shows the
+// real time instead of the replacement.
+//
+// Driven against a minimal DOM stub in the shape
+// tests/contractCreation.test.js uses.
+
+jest.mock("../src/shared/log", () => ({
+    log: {
+        debugf: () => {},
+        infof: () => {},
+        warnf: () => {},
+        errorf: () => {},
+    },
+    // The transaction detail view fetches on-chain details after drawing; an
+    // answer that is not ok leaves the drawn lines as they are.
+    debugFetch: async () => ({ ok: false }),
+    setRuntimeDebug: () => {},
+    isDebug: () => false,
+}));
+
+// The history lists ask the explorer for their transactions and resolve ENS
+// names for them; here the explorer answers with mockHistory and no name
+// resolves.
+let mockHistory = [];
+jest.mock("../src/shared/transactions", () => ({
+    ...jest.requireActual("../src/shared/transactions"),
+    fetchRecentTransactions: async () => mockHistory,
+}));
+jest.mock("../src/shared/ens", () => ({
+    ...jest.requireActual("../src/shared/ens"),
+    resolveEnsNames: async () => new Map(),
+}));
+
+globalThis.chrome = {
+    storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+};
+
+const helpers = require("../src/popup/views/helpers");
+jest.spyOn(helpers, "isoDate").mockReturnValue("SHARED-ISO-DATE");
+jest.spyOn(helpers, "timeAgo").mockReturnValue("SHARED-TIME-AGO");
+
+const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
+const addressDetail = require("../src/popup/views/addressDetail");
+const addressToken = require("../src/popup/views/addressToken");
+const transactionDetail = require("../src/popup/views/transactionDetail");
+
+const FROM = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000a11";
+const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: () => {},
+            remove: () => {},
+            contains: () => false,
+            toggle: () => false,
+        },
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+// A transaction FROM sent, as the history lists hold it.
+function historyTx() {
+    return {
+        hash: "0x85215772ed26ea8b39c2b3b18779030487efbe0b5fd7e882592b2f62b837be84",
+        from: FROM,
+        to: RECIPIENT,
+        value: "0.0000",
+        exactValue: "0.0",
+        rawAmount: "0",
+        rawUnit: "wei",
+        symbol: "ETH",
+        timestamp: 1790000000,
+        isError: false,
+        directionLabel: "Sent",
+        direction: "sent",
+        contractAddress: null,
+    };
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+    globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+    globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" } };
+    state.wallets = [
+        {
+            name: "Main",
+            type: "key",
+            addresses: [{ address: FROM, balance: "0.0000" }],
+        },
+    ];
+    state.trackedTokens = [];
+    state.viewData = {};
+    state.viewStack = [];
+    state.currentView = null;
+    state.selectedWallet = 0;
+    state.selectedAddress = 0;
+    state.selectedToken = "ETH";
+});
+
+describe.each([
+    ["AddressDetail", "tx-list", () => addressDetail.show()],
+    ["AddressToken", "address-token-tx-list", () => addressToken.show()],
+])("a transaction history row on %s", (_name, listId, open) => {
+    test("shows the time written by the shared isoDate() and timeAgo()", async () => {
+        mockHistory = [historyTx()];
+        open();
+        // The list is drawn once the history has been fetched.
+        await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0));
+        const html = node(listId).innerHTML;
+        expect(html).toContain('title="SHARED-ISO-DATE"');
+        expect(html).toContain(">SHARED-TIME-AGO<");
+    });
+});
+
+test("the transaction detail view shows the time written by the shared isoDate() and timeAgo()", () => {
+    transactionDetail.show(historyTx());
+    const html = node("tx-detail-time").innerHTML;
+    expect(html).toContain("SHARED-ISO-DATE");
+    expect(html).toContain("(SHARED-TIME-AGO)");
+});

tests/transactions.test.js

@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
 
     test("queries only the two Blockscout endpoints for the address", async () => {
         respondWith([], []);
-        await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
         expect(debugFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
         const urls = debugFetch.mock.calls.map((c) => c[0]);
         expect(urls).toContain(
@@ -1283,7 +1283,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
             ],
         );
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
         expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
         const merged = txs[0];
         // The received leg (the swap output) supplies the display amount.
@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
             ],
         );
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
         expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
         expect(txs[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
         expect(txs[0].value).toBe("1500.5000");
@@ -1346,7 +1346,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
         });
         respondWith([], [leg("1000000"), leg("2000000")]);
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
         expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
         // Keyed by hash plus contract, so the later leg wins.
         expect(txs[0].exactValue).toBe("2.0");
@@ -1386,7 +1386,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
             ],
         );
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
         expect(txs.map((t) => t.symbol).sort()).toEqual(["USDC", "WETH"]);
     });
 
@@ -1427,12 +1427,13 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
             ],
         );
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
         expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
         expect(txs[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
         expect(txs[0].exactValue).toBe("1.0");
         expect(txs[0].direction).toBe("sent");
         expect(txs[0].contractAddress).toBe(USDC_CONTRACT);
+        expect(txs[0].chainId).toBe("0x1");
         // The surviving row is the token row, and the filters keep it.
         const kept = filterTransactions(txs, filters()).transactions;
         expect(kept).toHaveLength(1);
@@ -1452,10 +1453,46 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
         });
         respondWith([item(6), item(8), item(7)], []);
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, 2);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1", 2);
         expect(txs.map((t) => t.blockNumber)).toEqual([21000008, 21000007]);
     });
 
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/372: the caller hands in
+    // the chain id of the network the explorer serves. Every entry carries
+    // it, and a native entry is labelled with that network's nativeCurrency.
+    test("a native entry is labelled by the chain id handed in", async () => {
+        respondWith(
+            [
+                {
+                    hash: "0x" + "a".repeat(64),
+                    block_number: 21000090,
+                    timestamp: TS,
+                    from: { hash: ORDINARY_PEER },
+                    to: { hash: VICTIM, is_contract: false },
+                    value: "10000000000000000",
+                    method: null,
+                    status: "ok",
+                },
+            ],
+            [],
+        );
+        const sepolia = await fetchRecentTransactions(
+            VICTIM,
+            BLOCKSCOUT,
+            "0xaa36a7",
+        );
+        expect(sepolia[0].symbol).toBe("SepoliaETH");
+        expect(sepolia[0].value).toBe("0.0100");
+        expect(sepolia[0].chainId).toBe("0xaa36a7");
+        const mainnet = await fetchRecentTransactions(
+            VICTIM,
+            BLOCKSCOUT,
+            "0x1",
+        );
+        expect(mainnet[0].symbol).toBe("ETH");
+        expect(mainnet[0].chainId).toBe("0x1");
+    });
+
     test("the fake token transfer survives fetching and is then filtered", async () => {
         respondWith(
             [],
@@ -1476,7 +1513,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
             ],
         );
 
-        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+        const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1");
         expect(txs).toHaveLength(1);
         expect(txs[0].contractAddress).toBe(FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT);
         expect(txs[0].holders).toBe(0);
@@ -1515,19 +1552,31 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
 
         test("an omitted holders_count parses to null", async () => {
             respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(OMITTED));
-            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
+                VICTIM,
+                BLOCKSCOUT,
+                "0x1",
+            );
             expect(txs[0].holders).toBeNull();
         });
 
         test("a null holders_count parses to null", async () => {
             respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(NULLED));
-            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
+                VICTIM,
+                BLOCKSCOUT,
+                "0x1",
+            );
             expect(txs[0].holders).toBeNull();
         });
 
         test("the transfer survives the low-holder filter", async () => {
             respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(OMITTED));
-            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
+                VICTIM,
+                BLOCKSCOUT,
+                "0x1",
+            );
             expect(filterTransactions(txs, filters()).transactions).toEqual(
                 txs,
             );
@@ -1539,7 +1588,11 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
         // holder count is the only rule that can catch it.
         test('a reported holders_count of "0" still parses to 0 and is filtered', async () => {
             respondWith([], spamTransferWithToken(ZERO));
-            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT);
+            const txs = await fetchRecentTransactions(
+                VICTIM,
+                BLOCKSCOUT,
+                "0x1",
+            );
             expect(txs[0].holders).toBe(0);
             expect(filterTransactions(txs, filters()).transactions).toEqual([]);
         });
@@ -1555,7 +1608,7 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
             },
         }));
         await expect(
-            fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT),
+            fetchRecentTransactions(VICTIM, BLOCKSCOUT, "0x1"),
         ).resolves.toEqual([]);
     });
 

tests/transferAmount.test.js

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 // contract at signing time, with nothing comparing the two, so a token whose
 // on-chain scale differed signed an amount that was never displayed.
 
-const { parseUnits } = require("ethers");
+const { formatUnits, parseUnits } = require("ethers");
 const {
     displayedDecimals,
     transferAmountUnits,
@@ -25,7 +25,17 @@ describe("displayedDecimals", () => {
         expect(displayedDecimals(MAX_DECIMALS)).toBe(MAX_DECIMALS);
     });
 
-    test("refuses anything that is not a uint8", () => {
+    // decimals() is a uint8, but formatUnits() and parseUnits() stop at 80
+    // places, so a larger scale cannot be shown or encoded
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/350).
+    test("accepts exactly the scales the formatter accepts", () => {
+        expect(() => formatUnits(1n, MAX_DECIMALS)).not.toThrow();
+        expect(() => parseUnits("1", MAX_DECIMALS)).not.toThrow();
+        expect(() => formatUnits(1n, MAX_DECIMALS + 1)).toThrow();
+        expect(() => parseUnits("1", MAX_DECIMALS + 1)).toThrow();
+    });
+
+    test("refuses anything that is not a uint8 the formatter accepts", () => {
         for (const bad of [
             null,
             undefined,

tests/txValidation.test.js

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ const {
     FEE_UNAVAILABLE,
     feeReserveWei,
     feeEstimateWei,
+    maxEthAmount,
+    maxTokenAmount,
     toFixedPoint,
     validateTransfer,
 } = require("../src/shared/txValidation");
@@ -306,6 +308,72 @@ describe("feeEstimateWei", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// The amount the Send screen's Max fills in for ETH: the exact balance, as
+// balances.js stores it, minus the fee reserve. Never the four-decimal balance
+// the Send screen shows.
+describe("maxEthAmount", () => {
+    // The Send screen shows this balance as 1.2345.
+    const BALANCE = "1.234567890123456789";
+
+    test("is the exact balance minus the fee, to the wei", () => {
+        expect(maxEthAmount(BALANCE, FEE)).toBe("1.234147890123456789");
+        expect(
+            parseEther(BALANCE) - parseEther(maxEthAmount(BALANCE, FEE)),
+        ).toBe(FEE);
+    });
+
+    test("passes validateTransfer with exactly the fee left behind", () => {
+        const r = validateTransfer({
+            isErc20: false,
+            amount: maxEthAmount(BALANCE, FEE),
+            ethBalance: BALANCE,
+            feeStatus: FEE_KNOWN,
+            feeWei: FEE,
+        });
+        expect(r).toEqual({ canSend: true, codes: [] });
+    });
+
+    test("is one wei when the balance is one wei more than the fee", () => {
+        expect(maxEthAmount("0.000420000000000001", FEE)).toBe(
+            "0.000000000000000001",
+        );
+    });
+
+    test("is null when the balance does not cover the fee", () => {
+        expect(maxEthAmount("0.0001", FEE)).toBe(null);
+        expect(maxEthAmount("0.0", FEE)).toBe(null);
+    });
+
+    test("is null when the balance covers the fee and nothing more", () => {
+        expect(maxEthAmount("0.00042", FEE)).toBe(null);
+    });
+
+    test("is null on a balance or fee it cannot do exact arithmetic on", () => {
+        expect(maxEthAmount(undefined, FEE)).toBe(null);
+        expect(maxEthAmount("not a number", FEE)).toBe(null);
+        expect(maxEthAmount(BALANCE, null)).toBe(null);
+        expect(maxEthAmount(BALANCE, -1n)).toBe(null);
+        expect(maxEthAmount(BALANCE, 420000000000000)).toBe(null);
+    });
+});
+
+// The amount the Send screen's Max fills in for a token.
+describe("maxTokenAmount", () => {
+    test("cuts a balance with more than 18 places down, never up", () => {
+        const amount = maxTokenAmount("1234.567890123456789012999999");
+        expect(amount).toBe("1234.567890123456789012");
+        expect(toFixedPoint(amount)).not.toBe(null);
+    });
+
+    test("leaves a balance with 18 places or fewer as it is", () => {
+        expect(maxTokenAmount("0.123456789012345678")).toBe(
+            "0.123456789012345678",
+        );
+        expect(maxTokenAmount("1.5")).toBe("1.5");
+        expect(maxTokenAmount("100")).toBe("100");
+    });
+});
+
 // Everything that is not a usable fee blocks exactly as FEE_UNAVAILABLE does.
 // Each of these previously returned { canSend: true, codes: [] } — counting no
 // fee at all, on a full-balance send, in the direction that lets money out.

tests/typedDataPermit.test.js

@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ async function openSignScreen(data) {
             if (msg.type !== "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL") return reply(null);
             reply({
                 type: "sign",
-                hostname: "dapp.example",
+                origin: "https://dapp.example",
                 isPhishingDomain: false,
                 approvedFrom: OWNER,
                 signParams: request(data),

tests/uniswap.test.js

@@ -554,6 +554,33 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
         );
     });
 
+    test("shows the deadline as a UTC date and time", () => {
+        const result = uniswap.decode(FIRST_SWAP_CALLDATA, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(detail(result, "Deadline").value).toBe("2026-02-27 08:25:51");
+    });
+
+    // A JavaScript date cannot hold this deadline. It used to make the whole
+    // swap undecoded.
+    test("a deadline of the uint256 maximum is stated in words", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            "0x08", // V2_SWAP_EXACT_IN
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 1000000n, 500000000000000n, [
+                    USDT_ADDR,
+                    WETH_ADDR,
+                ]),
+            ],
+            2n ** 256n - 1n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+        expect(result.name).toBe("Swap USDT \u2192 WETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Deadline").value).toBe(
+            "After 275760-09-13 00:00:00 (no deadline in practice)",
+        );
+    });
+
     test("formats permit amount when not unlimited", () => {
         const data = buildExecute(
             "0x0a",
@@ -831,6 +858,104 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
         expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.9900 USDC");
     });
 
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/415 — the router's V2
+    // exact-in reads an amountIn of zero as universal-router
+    // Constants.ALREADY_PAID: an earlier step sent the tokens to the pair, and
+    // the swap uses all of them. Against 375998b this read "0.0000 USDT".
+    test("a V2 exact-in already-paid amountIn is named, not printed as zero", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            "0x08",
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(
+                    USER_ADDR,
+                    0n, // Constants.ALREADY_PAID
+                    500000000000000n,
+                    [USDT_ADDR, WETH_ADDR],
+                ),
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token In").value).toContain("USDT");
+        expect(detail(result, "Amount").value).toBe(
+            "Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)",
+        );
+        expect(detail(result, "Amount").rawValue).toBe(
+            "Whatever an earlier step sent to the pair (V2 already paid)",
+        );
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.0005 WETH");
+    });
+
+    // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/415 — the router passes a
+    // BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20 whenever the balance is at least minBalance, so a
+    // zero one guarantees nothing. Against 375998b it replaced the swap's
+    // output side: Token Out = USDC, Min. received = "None (no minimum
+    // guaranteed)".
+    test("a zero balance check keeps the minimum a swap step stated", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x08, 0x0e]),
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 1000000n, 500000000000000n, [
+                    USDT_ADDR,
+                    WETH_ADDR,
+                ]),
+                encodeBalanceCheck(USER_ADDR, USDC_ADDR, 0n),
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toContain("WETH");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("0.0005 WETH");
+    });
+
+    // A nonzero balance check still replaces the output side, as before.
+    test("a nonzero balance check replaces the minimum a swap step stated", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x08, 0x0e]),
+            [
+                encodeV2SwapExactIn(USER_ADDR, 1000000n, 500000000000000n, [
+                    USDT_ADDR,
+                    WETH_ADDR,
+                ]),
+                encodeBalanceCheck(USER_ADDR, USDC_ADDR, 2000000n),
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toContain("USDC");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("2.0000 USDC");
+    });
+
+    // With no minimum stated before it, a zero balance check is what sets the
+    // output side, and it guarantees nothing.
+    test("a zero balance check with no earlier minimum states no minimum", () => {
+        const data = buildExecute(
+            solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x0b, 0x0e]),
+            [
+                encodeWrapEth(ROUTER_ADDR, 1000000000000000000n),
+                encodeBalanceCheck(USER_ADDR, USDT_ADDR, 0n),
+            ],
+            9999999999n,
+        );
+
+        const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR);
+        expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+
+        expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toContain("USDT");
+        expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe(
+            "None (no minimum guaranteed)",
+        );
+    });
+
     // Pins what https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/pulls/356 changed without
     // testing: a non-swap execute() carrying only PERMIT2_PERMIT names no
     // output currency, so it says so and titles itself "Uniswap Swap" rather

tests/uniswapUnknownDecimals.test.js

@@ -126,6 +126,19 @@ describe("a swap of a token outside the bundled list", () => {
     test("a bundled token on the other side still formats", () => {
         expect(swapDetail(data(), "Min. received").value).toBe("0.5000 WETH");
     });
+
+    // A token added by hand carries whatever its decimals() returned, and a
+    // uint8 reaches 255, but formatUnits() throws above 80. The throw left the
+    // whole swap undecoded rather than refused
+    // (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/350).
+    test("refuses to format when the token reports more than 80 decimals", () => {
+        state.trackedTokens = [
+            { address: NOVEL, symbol: "NOVEL", decimals: 81 },
+        ];
+        expect(swapDetail(data(), "Amount").value).toBe(
+            "1000000000 base units (decimals unknown)",
+        );
+    });
 });
 
 describe("the Min. received line takes the same rule", () => {

tests/walletDefects.test.js

@@ -4,8 +4,16 @@
 // already in storage: the import that created it ran before the refusal
 // existed. Such a wallet used to sign for the wrong tree and now throws on the
 // send screen instead. These tests pin down that it is named and explained in
-// the wallet list, that nothing on the way there throws, and that a wallet
+// the wallet list, that every control leading to a signature or to the private
-// imported from a real master key is untouched by any of it.
+// key refuses it before asking for a password, that nothing on the way there
+// throws, and that a wallet imported from a real master key is untouched by
+// any of it.
+
+// Mocked so that no password has to be hashed: the controls below are checked
+// for whether they decrypt at all.
+jest.mock("../src/shared/vault", () => ({
+    decryptWithPassword: jest.fn(),
+}));
 
 const { HDNodeWallet, Mnemonic } = require("ethers");
 
@@ -237,6 +245,290 @@ describe("the wallet list", () => {
     });
 });
 
+// A minimal DOM for driving the popup views: any element exists on first
+// lookup, and click() runs the listeners a view attached to it.
+function makeElement(id) {
+    const classes = new Set();
+    const el = {
+        id,
+        textContent: "",
+        title: "",
+        value: "",
+        innerHTML: "",
+        disabled: false,
+        style: {},
+        dataset: {},
+        listeners: {},
+        classList: {
+            add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
+            remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
+            contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
+            toggle: (n, force) => {
+                const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
+                if (on) classes.add(n);
+                else classes.delete(n);
+                return on;
+            },
+        },
+        addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
+            el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
+            el.listeners[name].push(fn);
+        },
+        querySelectorAll: () => [],
+        appendChild: () => {},
+    };
+    // Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
+    Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
+        get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
+    });
+    return el;
+}
+
+function makeDocument() {
+    const els = new Map();
+    return {
+        getElementById(id) {
+            // The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
+            // is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
+            if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
+            if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
+            return els.get(id);
+        },
+        createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
+        addEventListener: () => {},
+        body: { prepend: () => {} },
+    };
+}
+
+function node(id) {
+    return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
+}
+
+function click(id) {
+    return Promise.all((node(id).listeners.click || []).map((fn) => fn()));
+}
+
+// getSignerForAddress refuses this wallet's key, but only once the password
+// has been typed and spent, and the screens report that refusal as a wrong
+// password or a failed send. So every control that leads to it refuses first.
+describe("every way to a signature or the private key refuses a defective wallet first", () => {
+    const RECIPIENT = "0x66133E8ea0f5D1d612D2502a968757D1048c214a";
+
+    let state;
+    let decryptWithPassword;
+    let home;
+    let addressDetail;
+    let addressToken;
+    let approval;
+    let confirmTx;
+
+    let address;
+    let shortMessage;
+    // What the background answers when the approval window asks which
+    // approval it was opened for, and every message the popup sent it.
+    let approvalDetails;
+    let sent;
+
+    beforeAll(() => {
+        state = require("../src/shared/state").state;
+        decryptWithPassword =
+            require("../src/shared/vault").decryptWithPassword;
+        home = require("../src/popup/views/home");
+        addressDetail = require("../src/popup/views/addressDetail");
+        addressToken = require("../src/popup/views/addressToken");
+        approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
+        confirmTx = require("../src/popup/views/confirmTx");
+    });
+
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        const broken = brokenXprvWallet();
+        // A balance, so that no Send button's zero-balance refusal can stand
+        // in for the defect check.
+        broken.addresses[0].balance = "1.0000";
+        broken.addresses[0].tokenBalances = [];
+        address = broken.addresses[0].address;
+        shortMessage = walletDefect(broken).shortMessage;
+
+        approvalDetails = null;
+        sent = [];
+        globalThis.document = makeDocument();
+        globalThis.window = { close: () => {} };
+        globalThis.chrome = {
+            storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
+            runtime: {
+                connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
+                sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
+                    sent.push(msg);
+                    if (!reply) return;
+                    reply(
+                        msg.type === "AUTISTMASK_GET_APPROVAL"
+                            ? approvalDetails
+                            : null,
+                    );
+                },
+            },
+        };
+        // What the wallet's stored secret decrypts to: the account-level key
+        // it was imported from.
+        decryptWithPassword.mockReset();
+        decryptWithPassword.mockResolvedValue(accountXprv(VECTOR_PHRASE));
+
+        state.wallets = [broken];
+        state.activeAddress = address;
+        state.selectedWallet = 0;
+        state.selectedAddress = 0;
+        state.selectedToken = "ETH";
+        state.viewStack = [];
+    });
+
+    afterEach(() => {
+        state.wallets = [];
+        state.activeAddress = null;
+        state.selectedWallet = null;
+        state.selectedAddress = null;
+        state.selectedToken = null;
+    });
+
+    test("Send on the main screen", async () => {
+        state.currentView = "main";
+        home.init({});
+
+        await click("btn-main-send");
+
+        expect(node("flash-msg").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("main");
+    });
+
+    test("Send on the address screen", async () => {
+        state.currentView = "address";
+        addressDetail.init({});
+
+        await click("btn-send");
+
+        expect(node("flash-msg").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("address");
+    });
+
+    test("Export Private Key on the address screen", async () => {
+        state.currentView = "address";
+        addressDetail.init({});
+
+        await click("btn-export-privkey");
+
+        expect(node("flash-msg").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("address");
+    });
+
+    test("Send on a token's screen", async () => {
+        state.currentView = "address-token";
+        addressToken.init({});
+
+        await click("btn-address-token-send");
+
+        expect(node("flash-msg").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+        expect(state.currentView).toBe("address-token");
+    });
+
+    // The popup reopens onto this screen from a saved view, so the Send
+    // buttons above are not the only way onto it. The screen is not drawn,
+    // because drawing it starts a fee estimate against the network; with a
+    // decrypt that fails, a handler without the check stops at the password
+    // instead of going on to a transaction that was never set up.
+    test("Send on the confirmation screen", async () => {
+        decryptWithPassword.mockRejectedValue(new Error("wrong password"));
+        state.currentView = "confirm-tx";
+        confirmTx.init({});
+        node("confirm-tx-password").value = "any password";
+
+        await click("btn-confirm-send");
+
+        expect(decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(node("confirm-tx-password-error").textContent).toBe(
+            shortMessage,
+        );
+    });
+
+    async function openTxApproval() {
+        approvalDetails = {
+            type: "tx",
+            origin: "https://dapp.example",
+            isPhishingDomain: false,
+            approvedFrom: address,
+            approvedTx: {
+                from: address,
+                to: RECIPIENT,
+                value: "0x0",
+                data: "0x",
+                chainId: 1,
+                nonce: 0,
+                gasLimit: "21000",
+                maxFeePerGas: "1000000000",
+            },
+        };
+        approval.init({});
+        await approval.show(1);
+    }
+
+    async function openSignApproval() {
+        approvalDetails = {
+            type: "sign",
+            origin: "https://dapp.example",
+            isPhishingDomain: false,
+            approvedFrom: address,
+            // "Hello", as the hex a page sends.
+            signParams: {
+                method: "personal_sign",
+                message: "0x48656c6c6f",
+                from: address,
+            },
+        };
+        approval.init({});
+        await approval.show(1);
+    }
+
+    test("the transaction approval screen says so and disables Approve", async () => {
+        await openTxApproval();
+
+        expect(node("approve-tx-error").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+        expect(node("btn-approve-tx").disabled).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    // The stub runs a disabled button's listener, which a browser would not:
+    // what is asked here is whether the handler refuses on its own.
+    test("Approve on the transaction approval screen does not decrypt", async () => {
+        await openTxApproval();
+        node("approve-tx-password").value = "any password";
+
+        await click("btn-approve-tx");
+
+        expect(decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(sent.map((msg) => msg.type)).not.toContain(
+            "AUTISTMASK_TX_RESPONSE",
+        );
+        expect(node("approve-tx-error").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+    });
+
+    test("the signature approval screen says so and disables Approve", async () => {
+        await openSignApproval();
+
+        expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+        expect(node("btn-approve-sign").disabled).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("Approve on the signature approval screen does not decrypt", async () => {
+        await openSignApproval();
+        node("approve-sign-password").value = "any password";
+
+        await click("btn-approve-sign");
+
+        expect(decryptWithPassword).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(sent.map((msg) => msg.type)).not.toContain(
+            "AUTISTMASK_SIGN_RESPONSE",
+        );
+        expect(node("approve-sign-error").textContent).toBe(shortMessage);
+    });
+});
+
 describe("no path throws an unhandled error for a defective wallet", () => {
     test("address derivation from the stored xpub still works", () => {
         // The stored xpub is at a non-standard depth but is a valid extended

tests/walletDelete.test.js

@@ -28,11 +28,14 @@ function makeState(overrides = {}) {
         selectedAddress: 0,
         activeAddress: A0,
         allowedSites: {
-            [A0]: ["a.example"],
+            [A0]: ["https://a.example"],
-            [A1]: ["b.example"],
+            [A1]: ["https://b.example"],
-            [B0]: ["c.example"],
+            [B0]: ["https://c.example"],
+        },
+        deniedSites: {
+            [A1]: ["https://d.example"],
+            [C0]: ["https://e.example"],
         },
-        deniedSites: { [A1]: ["d.example"], [C0]: ["e.example"] },
         ...overrides,
     };
 }
@@ -41,7 +44,7 @@ describe("removeWalletFromState", () => {
     test("deleting the last wallet clears hasWallet", () => {
         const state = makeState({
             wallets: [wallet("A", [A0])],
-            allowedSites: { [A0]: ["a.example"] },
+            allowedSites: { [A0]: ["https://a.example"] },
             deniedSites: {},
         });
 
@@ -109,8 +112,8 @@ describe("removeWalletFromState", () => {
 
         removeWalletFromState(state, 0);
 
-        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["c.example"] });
+        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["https://c.example"] });
-        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["e.example"] });
+        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [C0]: ["https://e.example"] });
     });
 });
 
@@ -126,8 +129,14 @@ function makeAddressState(overrides = {}) {
         selectedWallet: 0,
         selectedAddress: 0,
         activeAddress: A0,
-        allowedSites: { [A0]: ["a.example"], [A1]: ["b.example"] },
+        allowedSites: {
-        deniedSites: { [A1]: ["d.example"], [B0]: ["e.example"] },
+            [A0]: ["https://a.example"],
+            [A1]: ["https://b.example"],
+        },
+        deniedSites: {
+            [A1]: ["https://d.example"],
+            [B0]: ["https://e.example"],
+        },
         ...overrides,
     };
 }
@@ -273,8 +282,8 @@ describe("removeAddressFromState", () => {
 
         removeAddressFromState(state, 0, 1);
 
-        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["a.example"] });
+        expect(state.allowedSites).toEqual({ [A0]: ["https://a.example"] });
-        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["e.example"] });
+        expect(state.deniedSites).toEqual({ [B0]: ["https://e.example"] });
     });
 
     // The derivation counter is a high-water mark, never rewound: "+" derives