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Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot
186daabe22 Stop target credentials leaking into event databases (closes #206)
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Details 
A Delivery carries its Event and Target structs in memory for the
delivery engine, so GORM's automatic association save upserted the
whole target row -- config included, which holds destination URLs
and bearer credentials -- into the per-webhook event database with
an empty webhook_id. Event databases are the files most likely to be
backed up or handed to someone else, so they shipped the credentials
with them.

Register a create and update callback on every per-webhook
connection that omits associations, rather than fixing the one call
site: it covers writes inside a transaction and write paths added
later. Sweep any rows already written, before the migration on each
open, so it is idempotent and a no-op on a database with no targets
table.

Encryption of target config at rest in webhooker.db is deliberately
not part of this: it is tracked separately.
 2026-08-20 05:35:35 +00:00
clawbot
aba02bc509 Add a target edit form with headers and timeout fields (closes #127) (#229)
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2026-08-20 07:24:12 +02:00
clawbot
c6a9884f86 Take an exclusive lock on DATA_DIR at startup (closes #201) (#220)
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 2026-08-20 07:23:00 +02:00
clawbot
5af161ef60 Log SQL with placeholders, never bound values (closes #207) (#222)
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 2026-08-20 07:20:59 +02:00
clawbot
4cc83b2326 Expose delivery metrics on /metrics (closes #209) (#224)
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 2026-08-20 07:19:04 +02:00
clawbot
a13e5b7ded Shut down the app when the listener fails (closes #200) (#218)
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2026-08-20 06:42:36 +02:00
clawbot
bb30b3ad64 Fail loudly on half-set metrics auth credentials (closes #205) (#216)
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 2026-08-20 06:30:23 +02:00
clawbot
10c8dd2331 Document backup, restore and upgrade procedures (closes #210) (#214)
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2026-08-20 06:05:14 +02:00
clawbot
ea51612446 Record the reopened 1.0.0 milestone in TODO.md (#213)
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2026-08-20 05:58:03 +02:00
clawbot
aa463213f5 Record the 1.0.0 milestone as complete in TODO.md
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2026-08-18 10:50:00 +02:00
clawbot
1326f82a0b Raise script/test's per-package timeout to 90s (closes #194)
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2026-08-18 10:44:04 +02:00
clawbot
a55b6f4e55 Re-sync REPO_POLICIES.md from prompts (closes #196)
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2026-08-18 09:33:28 +02:00
clawbot
33e4fa4faa Report handler panics through the logger and answer 500 (closes #187)
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2026-08-18 08:33:12 +02:00
clawbot
0c64c411cc Route GORM's logger through slog and bound it (closes #178)
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2026-08-18 07:17:43 +02:00
clawbot
563e834cf2 Bound every slog line against client-chosen text (closes #176)
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2026-08-18 06:03:10 +02:00
clawbot
f6ec78e2c8 Stop a slow host turning a login-guard test into a segfault (closes #186)
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2026-08-18 05:01:13 +02:00
clawbot
9313b0fb41 Merge pull request 'Correct TODO.md milestone state and record seventeen landed units' (#192) from todo-md-milestone-state into next
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2026-08-18 04:07:39 +02:00
clawbot
d2cebb5783 Correct TODO.md milestone state and record seventeen landed units
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Details 
The Status section claimed next held the completed 1.0.0 milestone with
every issue closed. Four are open (#176, #178, #186, #187), so a merge
of next to main would have shipped that claim to main.

Next Step still named #115 and #125 as open owner decisions; both
landed. It now names the real open items, #150 and #112, and the forced
merge order for the remaining four.

Completed Steps was seventeen units behind, back to 2026-08-12.
 2026-08-18 02:06:43 +00:00
clawbot
b573959a26 Send the chi route pattern to Sentry, not the concrete path (closes #179)
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Details 
#160 scrubbed the Sentry body, query, cookies, env and headers but kept
Request.URL, which the SDK builds from the concrete path. On the
receiver that path is /webhook/<uuid> in full — a write capability, not
an identifier: anyone holding it can inject events the operator's
targets then deliver. #146's "2xx and 5xx keep the concrete path" ruling
was reasoned about a log the operator owns and does not transfer to a
tracker with its own retention and access control.

The chi route pattern now replaces the path on every route, reached via
the request the SDK carries on hint.Context. Unconditional, because a
route-conditional rule leaks on any route someone forgets to add, and on
a static route the pattern is the path anyway. The fallback is never the
concrete path.

Also rewrites event.Transaction, which carries the same UUID on the
sibling dispatch and which the issue did not name. Tracing is off today,
so that half is a floor rather than a live fix — and it is why enabling
tracing later needs #185 first, or every transaction collapses into one
bucket.

Independently reviewed. The reviewer ran fourteen adversarial probes —
404 and 405 panics, panics in middleware before and after routing,
direct CaptureException, mounted subrouters, wildcards, tracing on and
off — and found no path where the concrete URL survives, and no third
field carrying it.

Merge note: the final round was a two-comment documentation fix on an
already-passed review, correcting a rationale that called the host
operator configuration when it is the client's Host header. I verified
that amend is comment-only myself rather than spending a fifth review
round on it.
 2026-08-18 02:42:58 +02:00
clawbot
76725cffc4 Read form fields from the POST body only (closes #160)
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Details 
r.FormValue falls back to the query string, so
POST /source/{id}/targets?url=<secret> created a working target from a
value carried on the request line — where proxy logs, browser history
and Referer all record it. Every form read is now r.PostFormValue,
including the login password and both password-change fields, which had
the same defect in a more acute form.

The Sentry leg needed more than the query string. sentryhttp attaches
the whole request to the scope, and ApplyToEvent copies the teed body
into Request.Data with no SendDefaultPII guard — so reading every field
from the body only pointed every credential this change protects at the
one field the first revision did not scrub. Body and query are now
redacted, Cookies and Env cleared, and Headers reduced to an allowlist,
because the SDK's own filter removes four names and would otherwise ship
X-Csrf-Token and the shared secrets senders put on the receiver route.

Also adds json:"-" to Target.Config, APIKey.Key and Setting.Value —
TargetView is the masking barrier for the HTML path only, and the first
handler to marshal a model would serialise a bearer token or the session
encryption key.

Independently reviewed three times. The second review found the Data
leak and proved it with a scratch module; the third disproved the
PR's own claim that BeforeSend gets no request, so the README now
records that redacting unconditionally is a deliberate choice rather
than a limitation — which is what makes #179 cheap to fix.
 2026-08-18 02:04:09 +02:00
clawbot
977fe87588 Verify login credentials before spending rate-limit budget (closes #150)
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Details 
In the shipped default, any stranger denied the operator the only
administrative path at 5 requests per minute: TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty,
the README requires a reverse proxy, so every login POST shared one
bucket keyed on the proxy.

Credentials are now verified first and only a FAILED attempt spends
budget, so a correct password is never throttled. Failures are counted
per (client bucket, submitted username), bounded. Concurrent Argon2id
verifications are capped at two, and the queue for them at 16 — because
verifying first lets an attacker force a 64 MB hash per request, and
bounding the wait alone bounds nothing.

The issue's own recommendation was insufficient and is rejected here:
keying by username stops an attacker locking out a DIFFERENT account,
but this is a single-admin product with a predictable bootstrap
username, so flooding the operator's own name still locks them out.

This is speculative — it implements a corrected recommendation ahead of
the owner's ruling so the decision can be made by merging or reverting.
Three things are disclosed rather than glossed: online guessing rises
from 5/min to roughly 27/s, because the 429 is a label on the response
and not a gate in front of the hash; the residual exposure is a loss of
login AVAILABILITY, not latency, and a determined flood still denies
login while it runs, at ~400x the cost and clearing the moment it
stops; and the endpoint should be provisioned for ~400 MB resident, not
the 203 MB of live commitment it itemises.

Independently reviewed four times. Reviewers disproved the suspected
FIFO starvation by measurement, then caught two successive memory
bounds the code did not have — the second by parking waiters and
reading the heap rather than checking the arithmetic.
 2026-08-18 01:55:41 +02:00
clawbot
992b3c68f5 Run all linting in Docker via Dockerfile.lint (closes #109)
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Details 
golangci-lint no longer runs on the host. script/lint builds
Dockerfile.lint, which copies the repo into the digest-pinned linter
image, so the container holds only this repo and the cross-worktree
cache contamination of #106 becomes structurally impossible rather than
filtered after the fact. Five workers hit that contamination in one
evening, in both directions.

Three properties are load-bearing. --no-cache-filter=lint forces the
lint stage to re-execute while deps keeps its cache, because a cached
build lints nothing in 0.27s and exits 0. script/lint does not trust
that flag, since Docker silently ignores an unmatched stage name: it
asserts golangci-lint's own summary line appears, so no summary means no
lint whatever the exit code says. And both lint steps run
--network=none, which enforces rather than assumes that config verify
does not fetch its schema — verify is kept, because golangci-lint run
silently ignores unrecognized config keys and it is the only thing that
catches a typo that disables a setting.

Independently reviewed four times. Three passed the behaviour; the
remaining rounds were a README merge against #151, whose premise was
that the file contains no false statements. Six statements this change
falsified were found and corrected across those rounds — the last
reviewer re-derived every countable claim against the tree rather than
reading for plausibility, and found no seventh.

Supersedes #106.
 2026-08-18 01:07:16 +02:00
clawbot
41ff16a817 Serve an event's full stored body over HTTP (closes #157)
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Details 
The 8 KB render cap from #135 left storage untouched but no route served
the rest, so a body over the cap was reachable only with filesystem
access to the SQLite files — in a product whose purpose is storing
webhooks so they can be inspected.

GET /source/{sourceID}/logs/{eventID}/body serves the whole body to the
webhook's owner, as application/octet-stream with an attachment
disposition and nosniff. Those are a security control, not formatting:
the bytes come from the public receiver and are handed back inside the
operator's authenticated origin, and the existing CSP would not stop a
stored HTML payload executing there. The truncation marker links to it
only when a body was actually cut.

Accepted deviation, documented rather than glossed: #157's definition of
done asks the route to stream from the row. It buffers whole instead,
because database/sql exposes no incremental handle on a SQLite BLOB and
substr range reads re-materialise the entire column per call — an
earlier revision chunked at 64 KiB and was 11-15x slower for a worse
bound. Three independent reviewers confirmed no streaming path exists.

Independently reviewed three times. Two earlier revisions each asserted
a memory bound the code did not have; the final reviewer measured
2.057x at the ingest cap and pinned the two overlapping allocations from
source — the driver's column buffer and database/sql's convertAssign
clone — confirming the stated "roughly two bodies, and 2x is a floor
not a ceiling" is now accurate, since SQLite's own materialisation sits
outside the Go heap.
 2026-08-18 00:41:31 +02:00
clawbot
5888d14438 Bound the access log line against client-chosen text (closes #146)
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Details 
The access log wrote one INFO line per request carrying the full
attacker-controlled URL, on the unauthenticated public receiver, so a
client inventing paths wrote unbounded arbitrary text into the
operator's logs.

Rejected requests now log the chi route pattern instead of the concrete
URL — extended to 3xx as well as 4xx, because RequireAuth answers 303
and so /user/<anything> was an unauthenticated path-varying vector. The
query is redacted on the branches that keep a concrete path, and every
client-supplied field is capped: url, useragent and referer at 512
bytes, request_id at 128, method at 32. The caps are spent in ENCODED
bytes, so escaping cannot multiply them.

One INFO line per request, at most 2,560 bytes — a figure derived
arithmetically rather than observed, with the fixed portion measured at
336 (JSON) and 286 (text).

Independently reviewed four times, and broken three of those times on
the same class of defect: a stated bound the code did not have. Round 1
left the 2xx query and the headers unbounded; round 2 counted raw bytes
against an encoded ceiling and broke at 2,611; round 3 charged 6 bytes
for every non-printable when strconv.Quote spells astral ones as
\UXXXXXXXX, and broke at 2,676. Two independent exhaustive audits over
all 1,112,064 code points, built by different methods, now both report
zero undercharged runes on either handler. Measured worst case over a
real TCP socket is 1,972 bytes, 77% of the ceiling.

Follow-up filed to assert that charge against every code point in the
suite, so the ceiling defends itself rather than resting on one
hand-picked rune.
 2026-08-18 00:32:29 +02:00
clawbot
7702f38168 Mark superseded commits honestly instead of skipped (closes #152)
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Gitea records a cancelled run as failure, and the #119 repair rewrote
that to skipped. Gitea's Combine() folds skipped into success, so a
commit nothing ever tested reported a combined green — observed on three
commits on next, including the very change a prior integration review
had failed a PR for.

Superseded commits are now marked failure with an honest description, so
never-tested no longer reads as passed and git bisect archaeology can
tell "passed", "failed" and "never ran" apart. Option 1, re-running the
superseded commit, was verified unreachable for automation on Gitea
1.25.4: no rerun endpoint, dispatches takes a ref not a SHA and lands
under a different context, and CancelPreviousJobs is unconditional.

The rewrite moves out of the workflow into script/ci-mark-superseded so
the tested artifact is the shipped one, and every failure path in it is
loud: an unparseable or empty ANCESTOR_LIMIT, an unreadable ancestor
status, and a shallow clone all abort rather than exiting 0 having
marked nothing. Each has a regression test. The status context is
derived rather than hardcoded, which also closes #147 item 2; item 1
remains open.

Independently reviewed four times. The final reviewer confirmed the
shallow-clone test is genuinely shallow — a file:// URL is load-bearing,
since git silently ignores --depth on a local path — and that deleting
the guard fails that one test out of 331 and cannot pass for the wrong
reason. They also reproduced deterministically that go test's cache
serves a stale PASS after a script-only edit, which internal/ciscript's
doc.go now records.
 2026-08-18 00:31:55 +02:00
clawbot
bef9986542 Set fx.StopTimeout inside the container stop grace (closes #134)
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fx defaults to a 15s stop timeout and the Dockerfile sets no grace
override, so Docker SIGKILLed at 10s and the bounded shutdown #130 built
— including the log line that tells an operator a component is wedged —
was unreachable in the image this repo produces.

Sets fx.StopTimeout to 5s, and lowers the HTTP drain to 3s so a
full-length drain no longer exhausts the whole sequence budget and skip
every later hook, database close included. The Sentry flush, which runs
in the same hook and honours no context, is clamped to the remaining
stop budget less a 2s tail reserve, so a stalled flush drops Sentry
events rather than the database close.

Also fixes a latent coin flip in the shared stop-hook waiter, which
reported "shutdown timed out" about half the time for a component that
drained cleanly against an already-expired context.

Independently reviewed three times. The final reviewer derived a
stronger invariant than the implementation claims — the server hook's
absolute end is bounded at stopTimeout minus the reserve regardless of
drain length or of time consumed by preceding hooks — and confirmed the
guard's 10ms sweep cannot step over the maximum, since both breakpoints
land on its grid. Both Sentry probe arms, the docker stop demo and every
mutation were reproduced independently.

Known residual, filed separately: the HTTP drain itself is not clamped
by the reserve, so slow preceding hooks can still jointly exhaust the
budget. Demonstrated with a 2.2s sweeper delay.
 2026-08-18 00:12:51 +02:00
clawbot
c3b6623be1 Bucket IPv6 rate-limit keys by /64 (closes #125)
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Details 
Rate-limit keys were per-address, i.e. per /128 for IPv6. A routed /64
is the normal residential and mobile allocation, so a client rotated
source addresses inside its own prefix and minted a fresh bucket per
request — evading every limiter at the network layer, with no spoofing
and nothing to detect. #88 closed the header half of this control; this
is the network half.

IPv6 now keys on the /64, IPv4 on the full address, via stdlib
net/netip. IPv4-mapped form is unmapped rather than masked, so clients
behind a mapping proxy do not collapse into one bucket.

Independently reviewed twice. The first round found the trusted-proxy
forwarded path — the one carrying production traffic — had no coverage
at all, so a silent revert there was undetectable; that is now pinned.
The reviewer confirmed both branches are independently mutation-tested:
reverting either the direct-peer return or the forwarded return alone
fails only that branch's tests. The 18-site test-constant refactor was
verified byte-identical against next, with no pre-existing assertion
changed.

Known remaining coverage gap, judged not a defect: the fallback when the
peer is trusted but the forwarded address does not parse has no test.
Only operator-controlled addresses inside TRUSTED_PROXIES reach it, they
already share the proxy's single bucket, and masking there can only
merge operator proxies — fail-closed, nothing attacker-controlled.
 2026-08-17 23:52:15 +02:00
clawbot
39064a3d6c Correct release-blocking README and startup-warning inaccuracies (closes #151)
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Details 
Publishing this README would have shipped false statements about the
product. Corrects the eight items on the issue plus everything a full
sweep turned up: the Slack circuit-breaker scope, a nonexistent WAL, the
wrong config key for slack targets, six undocumented routes, the
conditional /metrics registration, wrong retention bands, wrong shutdown
mechanism, and a Quick Start that led a new contributor into a red
build.

The lockout warning now fires whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty rather
than only in production, since the variable it was gated on defaults to
dev. Rate-limit keying, the limits and the TRUSTED_PROXIES default are
untouched — those belong to #150.

What /s/* actually serves was settled empirically rather than by
reading: all five of GET/HEAD/POST/PUT/DELETE return 200, pinned by
TestStaticServesEveryMethod. Restricting it is filed separately.

Independently reviewed after three prior rounds. The reviewer
re-derived all fifteen claim-table rows against the code, including
every row a previous revision had marked "correct, left alone" and got
wrong, and found zero false; then verified every route method-by-method,
all twelve environment variables, all nine entity tables, and the
package tree against git ls-files. The Quick Start was confirmed by
running it in a fresh clone.
 2026-08-17 23:44:59 +02:00
clawbot
c378690977 Fetch and verify Alpine at build time instead of committing it (closes #145)
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Details 
static/js/alpine.min.js was a committed minified bundle, which
REPO_POLICIES forbids, referenced by no content hash at all. A minified
blob is unreviewable, which is the shape a supply-chain compromise
takes.

script/fetch-assets now downloads Alpine 3.14.9 from the npm registry
and verifies sha256 on both the tarball and the extracted file, and
static/vendor_test.go re-hashes the bytes go:embed actually placed in
the binary. The shipped bytes are byte-identical to the blob that was
committed, so the served asset does not change.

Independently reviewed. Five negative controls reproduced by the
reviewer: flipped expected hash, repointed URL, post-fetch tampering,
asset absent, and manifest inconsistencies — each fails closed with
static/js/ left clean. Registry hashes confirmed against the pins, and
the runtime image was built, run and curled to confirm the asset is
still served and the login page still loads it.

Known gap, filed separately: static/static.go embeds the js directory
rather than named files, so a missing fetched asset is not a compile
error on ungated local build paths. Every gated path fails loudly, so
the release artifact is unaffected.
 2026-08-17 23:12:17 +02:00
clawbot
279effb4c2 Bound the event log's rendered bodies in the query (closes #135)
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The event log rendered stored bodies untruncated. Since buffered
rendering landed (#123) that became resident memory per concurrent
viewer, up to tens of MB, driven by payloads unauthenticated clients
supply to the public receiver.

Bound in the query rather than the template, via
substr(cast(body as blob), 1, ?) plus length(cast(body as blob)), so an
oversized body never becomes a Go string at all. Adds an EventLogView
projection carrying the true byte count, and trims a partial UTF-8 tail
without rewriting bodies that are merely invalid UTF-8.

Independently reviewed. The generated SQL was dumped under GORM DryRun
to confirm the cap is a bound parameter, both casts are present, and no
other path selects the full column; soft-delete scope, ordering and
pagination are unchanged.

Correction to the PR body: its quoted mutation output was produced by
removing the bound from eventLogColumns, not by raising the cap to
1&lt;&lt;30 as the text claimed. The reviewer reproduced the real
mutation and confirmed the tests do catch removal of the bound.

Follow-up #157 restores in-app retrieval of bodies above the cap.
 2026-08-17 22:57:08 +02:00
clawbot
9ae19159a3 Mask the http target's destination URL in the UI (closes #115)
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The http target's destination URL can itself be a bearer credential, and
the source detail page rendered it in full. Render it through the
existing MaskURL instead, matching the rule already applied to slack
targets.

Independently reviewed: mutation-verified (reverting to the raw value
fails the absence assertions, not merely the masked-form ones), MaskURL
probed against userinfo, query, fragment, port, IPv6 literal and
non-http schemes, and every sibling path that surfaces target data
re-walked and found clean.
 2026-08-17 22:50:26 +02:00
clawbot
2ee720a9af Bound shutdown hooks by their stop context (closes #102)
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2026-08-14 06:18:33 +02:00
clawbot
0b457ea713 Render templates via a buffer, not the ResponseWriter (closes #123)
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 2026-08-14 06:18:22 +02:00
clawbot
5f18bc3eae Align session codec max-age with the 7-day cap (closes #108)
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 2026-08-14 06:17:43 +02:00
clawbot
d8f9d149b5 Warn when TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty in production (closes #149)
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With no trusted proxies configured, every client behind the reverse proxy production requires shares one rate-limit bucket per limit, so five POSTs per minute from anywhere holds the login limit full and denies the admin login until restart. The default is still correct; it was the consequence that was invisible. Startup now warns, and the README no longer claims the login limit is per-IP unconditionally.
 2026-08-12 13:49:39 +02:00
clawbot
339548d794 Record the last four milestone units in TODO.md
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Adds Completed Steps for the receiver aggregate rate limit, the documentation accuracy pass, the CI gate repair and the RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL bound. Drops the commit hash that pinned the Status paragraph to a specific next head, and rewrites Next Step now that the gate repair it named has landed.
 2026-08-12 13:21:38 +02:00
clawbot
95161c7768 Bound the receiver rate limit per client IP across /webhook/* (closes #139)
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The receiver limiter keyed on the request path, and /webhook/{uuid} matches any single segment, so a client minted a fresh bucket per invented path and had unlimited aggregate rate against the only unauthenticated endpoint. An outer limiter keyed on the client address alone now bounds that, chained in front of the unchanged per-entrypoint limiter. Its rejections log at DEBUG without the path, and the README states what each limit does and does not bound.
 2026-08-12 13:19:43 +02:00
clawbot
0e397b3174 Correct release-blocking documentation inaccuracies (closes #141)
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The README env table was missing RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL, TODO.md omitted five landed units, and three passages sold manual redelivery in the present tense when nothing implements it. The same false claim was corrected in the doc comment on failUnretryableRetry, which was its source text. Also removes a console.log from the shipped static asset.
 2026-08-12 13:15:04 +02:00
clawbot
be576096aa Make the CI gate execute the checks it reports on (closes #119)
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Details 
The workflow writes a build-context fingerprint before calling script/cibuild, so a code commit invalidates the COPY layer of the lint and builder stages and the checks really run, while a docs-only commit still replays from cache. A superseding run also rewrites the exact failure/Has been cancelled status left on commits that were never tested to skipped, so cancellation no longer reads as red. script/cibuild itself is untouched.
 2026-08-12 13:00:51 +02:00
clawbot
3941f0b0ff Require a positive RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL (closes #140)
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Details 
A non-positive value reached time.NewTicker in the retention reaper and the archive sweeper, panicking both goroutines after startup had already reported success. envPositiveDuration now rejects it in loadFromEnv, matching how PORT and RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT fail. SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT keeps treating non-positive as disabled, which is guarded at every use site.
 2026-08-12 12:46:39 +02:00
clawbot
543005c0c2 Update TODO.md for the completed 1.0.0 milestone
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Details 
Records the trusted-proxy gating, hop cap and bounded scan, and corrects the Workflow section, which still described branching from main and committing TODO.md alongside the work.
 2026-08-12 12:20:34 +02:00
clawbot
9bfd033a29 Bound X-Forwarded-For scanning allocation to the hop cap (closes #133)
Some checks failed
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
forwardedClientAddr now walks the header values in reverse with strings.LastIndexByte instead of joining and splitting, so allocation is bounded by the 64-hop cap rather than by header length: 1.6 MB per call becomes 16 bytes for a 1 MB chain. Semantics are unchanged, verified by differential testing against the previous implementation.
 2026-08-12 12:19:14 +02:00
clawbot
fd6397154a Cap the X-Forwarded-For hop walk at 64 entries (closes #124)
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Details 
The walk now keeps only the rightmost 64 hops, so an attacker-supplied chain cannot burn unbounded CPU in the rate-limit key function. Running off the end of the truncated slice falls back to the peer address, the same fail-closed direction the rest of the function takes. Also corrects the unparseable-RemoteAddr comment, which overclaimed about Unix-socket peers.
 2026-08-12 11:53:48 +02:00
clawbot
d19e33671c Gate forwarded-header trust behind trusted-proxy config (closes #88)
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Details 
All three rate limiters (receiver, login, password change) now key on the connection's own address unless the direct peer is inside the new TRUSTED_PROXIES CIDR list, in which case X-Forwarded-For is walked right to left for the first non-proxy hop. Default is the empty list, which trusts nothing. A set-but-unparseable value aborts startup.
 2026-08-12 11:36:10 +02:00
clawbot
aab448b076 Clarify web UI terminology, copy, and the entrypoint URL (closes #57)
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Details 
Unifies user-visible copy on "Webhook" (routes and URLs unchanged), drops
the placeholder Profile settings section, and adds a copy-to-clipboard
affordance for the entrypoint URL as progressive enhancement — the button
stays hidden unless both the target element and the Clipboard API resolve,
so no dead control appears without JavaScript and the URL stays selectable.

Retention copy now matches what the code does: deletion is permanent, 0
retains forever, and a blank field means the default on create or the
current value on edit. The permanent-deletion sentence is suppressed for a
retain-forever webhook, which the reaper exempts before computing a cutoff.

Template tests gained a render-completed assertion. Without it, a page that
aborted mid-render still satisfied assertions matching the already-flushed
prefix, because renderTemplate streams to the ResponseWriter (#123).
 2026-08-11 15:42:08 +02:00
clawbot
7c43e095a6 Mask the webhook credential in delivery errors and logs (closes #118)
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Details 
Go embeds the request URL in *url.Error, so any transport failure — DNS,
TLS, refused, timeout, SSRF dial block — persisted the full Slack webhook
URL into the per-webhook SQLite database via DeliveryResult.Error. That
field is tagged json:"error,omitempty", so a future REST API would have
served it.

maskURLError rebuilds the error preserving Op and the wrapped cause, so DNS
vs TLS vs timeout still read differently and errors.Is/As and Timeout()
keep working; only path, query and userinfo are dropped. Applied where the
errors are born, which covers both the Slack and HTTP targets. url.Parse
embeds the URL too, so ValidateTargetURL's parse branch gets the same
treatment.

The SSRF rejection log now logs the masked URL, and source_logs.html
receives view types rather than raw rows, so no config blob is reachable
from that template.

MaskURL is now the single masker for the whole tree.
 2026-08-11 15:11:57 +02:00
clawbot
84b758b785 Rate-limit the public webhook receiver endpoint (closes #64)
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Details 
The receiver was the one unauthenticated, internet-facing endpoint with no
rate limit, so a misbehaving or hostile sender could flood a webhook
without bound. RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT (default 120/min) now caps it, keyed on
client IP plus entrypoint path so one entrypoint cannot exhaust another's
budget. Over-limit requests get 429 with Retry-After.

The limiter deliberately does not reuse postRateLimit: that helper is
POST-only and keys on IP alone, whereas the receiver must count every
method. A test locks that property in.

Config parsing follows the fail-loudly idiom: a set-but-unparseable or
non-positive value aborts startup rather than falling back to the default.

Known limitation, tracked in #88: the key still trusts forwarded headers
unconditionally, so the limit is evadable by rotating X-Forwarded-For until
trusted-proxy gating lands.
 2026-08-11 14:47:21 +02:00
clawbot
d51cd0fd29 Enforce the body size limit before CSRF parses the form (closes #90)
Some checks failed
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
CSRF ran before MaxBodySize, so the CSRF middleware parsed the form body
before any cap applied and an oversized request was read in full before
being rejected. MaxBodySize is now the first middleware in all four route
groups that parse forms, ahead of CSRF and RequireAuth.

An oversize request therefore gets 413 without the handler running and
without state changing, including the password-change route.

Note the ordering trade: an unauthenticated client now receives 413 rather
than an auth redirect on /user/{username}/password.
 2026-08-11 14:37:38 +02:00
clawbot
15a61173fc Mask target config on the source detail page (closes #113)
Some checks failed
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
The page rendered the stored target config verbatim, exposing the Slack
incoming-webhook URL, which is a bearer credential: anyone holding it can
post to the channel indefinitely, and it cannot be scoped or revoked
per-holder.

Target config now reaches the template only as a TargetView carrying
labelled fields, so no code path can render the raw blob. maskURL keeps
scheme and host and elides the path, and drops query, fragment and
userinfo; every parse failure yields a neutral placeholder rather than
falling back to the stored string. HTTP header values are never rendered,
only a count.

Rendering change only: the stored config format and the delivery path are
unchanged.
 2026-08-11 14:37:09 +02:00
clawbot
e50a79ced9 Allow retention_days of 0 to mean retain forever (closes #79)
Some checks failed
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
Rewrites retention_days=0 to the RetentionForeverDays sentinel (365 * 1000)
in Webhook.BeforeSave, so the GORM column default cannot win the race. The
reaper skips retain-forever webhooks before building any query.

Also bounds the reaper's cutoff arithmetic: a time.Duration is int64
nanoseconds, so day counts above MaxFiniteRetentionDays (106751) overflowed
and wrapped the cutoff into the future, where created_at &lt; cutoff matched
every row and the sweep deleted everything. parseRetentionDays now rejects
finite values above the ceiling, and retentionCutoff saturates so rows
written by older versions cannot reach it either.

Views render RetentionLabel() rather than the raw sentinel.
 2026-08-11 14:35:34 +02:00
clawbot
c2cd2c440b Add inactivity-based session timeout (closes #66) (#105)
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Details 
Sessions now carry a server-enforced idle deadline (SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT,
default 24h) alongside the 7-day absolute cap, refreshed on authenticated
activity. Activity never extends the absolute cap.
 2026-08-10 16:12:40 +02:00
clawbot
45890d4f82 Fail loudly on set-but-unparseable env config values (closes #80) (#92)
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check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
Defaults now apply only to unset or empty environment variables; a set-but-
unparseable value aborts startup with an error naming the key and the value.
envInt is gone, envBool parses with strconv.ParseBool, and PORT is bounded.
 2026-08-10 16:06:12 +02:00
clawbot
0ce8565f51 Terminally fail retrying deliveries with a non-retry target type (closes #82) (#104)
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check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
A delivery left in `retrying` whose target type was edited to a fire-and-forget
or unknown type was skipped forever by both restart recovery and the retry
sweep. Both paths now record a result row and mark it `failed`.
 2026-08-10 16:00:03 +02:00
clawbot
3e261d2f01 Evict archive writers on deletion and sweep idle archives (closes #89) (#95)
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check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
Per-webhook archive writers are now evicted when the webhook or its last
database target is deleted, and a background sweeper prunes expired rows from
idle archives that no longer receive writes. Archive files themselves are never
deleted.
 2026-08-10 15:52:20 +02:00
clawbot
62481a6f1a Root background loops at context.Background() (closes #97) (#100)
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Details 
The delivery engine worker pool and the retention reaper both rooted their
goroutines in the fx OnStart hook context, which fx cancels 15s into startup.
Both now use context.WithCancel(context.Background()), bounded by OnStop.
 2026-08-10 15:44:56 +02:00
clawbot
4f5ecb18e5 Add admin password change flow (closes #65) (#83)
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check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
Adds an authenticated, CSRF-protected flow that lets a user change their own password from the profile page.

## Route

- New `POST /password` under the `/user/{username}` group in `setupUserRoutes` (`internal/server/routes.go`). That group already applies `CSRF`, `NoCache`, and `RequireAuth`, so the new endpoint inherits all three.

## Handler (`internal/handlers/profile.go`)

- `HandlePasswordChange` enforces own-user access: the `{username}` path parameter must equal the session username (same 403 rule `HandleProfile` uses). This check plus the session lookup is factored into a shared `profileOwnerOrDeny` helper now used by both handlers.
- Parses `current_password`, `new_password`, and `confirm_password` (body size limited via `http.MaxBytesReader`).
- Verifies the current password with `database.VerifyPassword` against the stored hash.
- Requires the new password to be non-empty and equal to the confirmation.
- Hashes the new password with `database.HashPassword` — the same Argon2id helper used to bootstrap the admin user — and persists it on the user row. No new crypto.
- Re-renders the profile page with a clear success or error message. Wrong current password, empty new password, and mismatched confirmation are each rejected with their own message and leave the stored hash unchanged.

## Template (`templates/profile.html`)

- Adds a "Change Password" card with current / new / confirm password fields plus the hidden `csrf_token` (matching the login form's CSRF embedding).
- Renders success/error alerts using the existing `alert-success` / `alert-error` styles. No new CSS classes, so no Tailwind rebuild is required.

## Tests (`internal/handlers/profile_test.go`)

- `TestHandlePasswordChange_Success`: seeds a user, posts a valid change, asserts success message and that the stored hash changed and verifies against the new password.
- `TestHandlePasswordChange_WrongCurrentPassword`: posts a wrong current password, asserts the rejection message and that the stored hash is unchanged.

Validated with `docker build .` (fmt-check, lint, test, build) — exit 0.

Closes #65

Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org>
Reviewed-on: #83
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
 2026-08-07 23:23:05 +02:00
clawbot
734606b7af Update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 with canonical config (#86)
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Details 
Bumps golangci-lint from v2.11.3 to v2.12.2 and adopts the canonical lint config.

## Version pins

- `Dockerfile`: `golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2` Debian image, pinned by digest, dated `2026-08-07`
- `script/bootstrap`: `GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION=2.12.2` with updated sha256 pins for the `linux-amd64` and `linux-arm64` release archives

## Config

`.golangci.yml` replaced with the canonical config. The previous file kept `lll`/`funlen`/`cyclop`/`dupl` settings under the top-level `linters-settings` key, which the v2 schema ignores; the canonical config nests them under `linters.settings`, so those thresholds now actually apply. The unsupported `issues.exclude-use-default` key was dropped.

## Lint fixes (32 findings)

- `lll` (7): wrapped or shortened over-length lines (struct tag comments moved above fields, test logger construction split, `session.NewForTest` signature wrapped, shortened a `#nosec` comment)
- `goconst` (17): replaced repeated `"POST"`/`"PUT"` literals with `http.MethodPost`/`http.MethodPut`, added shared test constants for `webhooker-test`/`test`/`application/json`, and added `tmplKeyError`/`tmplKeyWebhook` constants for template data keys in `internal/handlers`
- `dupl` (8): merged `buildHTTPTargetConfig` and `buildSlackTargetConfig` into a parameterized `buildURLTargetConfig`; removed the duplicate `iWebhookDB` test helper in favor of `testWebhookDB`; extracted shared helpers in middleware and session tests

No `//nolint` directives were added and behavior is unchanged. `make check` (fmt-check, tests, lint) passes.

Note: golangci-lint v2.12 deprecates the `gomodguard` linter in favor of `gomodguard_v2`; the canonical config change for that is left for a future coordinated update.
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #86
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
 2026-08-07 23:18:49 +02:00
clawbot
ee7c626071 Implement the database archiving target (closes #43) (#84)
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Details 
Implements the `databaseTarget` as a real archiving target, replacing the always-successful stub. Delivering to a `database` target now writes the full event into a per-webhook archive SQLite file for long-term storage.

## Archive-writer semantics

- **Separate file:** each webhook's full events are written as rows into `archive-{webhookID}.db` under the data dir, distinct from the per-webhook event DB (`events-{webhookID}.db`). The file and its schema are created on first write if missing. Each row carries the full event: body, headers, method, content type, webhook id, entrypoint id, event id, and an archived-at timestamp.
- **Close/reopen with debounce:** after each write the archive handle is closed and reopened, unless the last (re)open was less than one second ago. This lets an operator move the archive file away for offline archiving while bounding file churn under load. A per-webhook `archiveWriter` owns this debounce state and serialises writes.
- **Auto-recreate:** the file is opened create-if-missing (`mode=rwc`) and its schema re-migrated on every open, so if the archive was moved or removed since the last open, the next write recreates it. The writer also detects a missing file before writing and reopens first, so a moved-away file is recreated rather than lost.
- **Optional expiry, validated at creation:** an optional `expiry` in the target's config JSON (e.g. `{"expiry":"720h"}`) is validated when the target is created (`ValidateArchiveExpiry`; bad values are rejected with a 400 at the add-target form, the Slack URL precedent). The default (missing, empty, or `"never"`) keeps rows forever with no pruning. When a positive duration is set, rows older than it (measured from each row's archived-at time) are pruned on every (re)open; because the file is reopened after writes, prune-on-open keeps the archive swept without a separate background sweeper. A set-but-invalid expiry in a stored config (unparseable, zero, or negative) is an error at delivery time too — never a silent default.
- **No-retry, fail-loud:** the target performs a single attempt with no retries. On success it records one successful attempt and marks the delivery delivered. If the archive write fails, the attempt is recorded as failed with the error and the delivery is marked failed — archiving errors never report success.

## Scope

- `internal/delivery/target_database.go` — the `databaseTarget` (no-retry) archives via a per-webhook writer registry; an archive error records a failed attempt and marks the delivery failed.
- `internal/delivery/target_database_archive.go` (new) — the `archiveWriter`, the archived-row model, config/expiry parsing (fail-loud on set-but-invalid values), `ValidateArchiveExpiry`, and prune-on-open.
- `internal/handlers/source_management.go` — database targets get a creation-validated `expiry` config (`buildDatabaseTargetConfig`); the expiry form value is read where the request body is bounded and bad values are rejected with a 400 at target creation.
- `templates/source_detail.html` — the add-target form shows an expiry field for database targets.
- `README.md` — the database-target documentation describes the archiving semantics.
- `internal/delivery/export_test.go`, `internal/delivery/target_database_test.go`, `internal/handlers` tests — tests and their exported shims.

No changes to the `Target` interface or other targets.

## Tests

- a row is archived (both at the writer level and end-to-end through `Deliver`)
- a forced archive failure (bad stored expiry config) yields a `Failed` delivery with a non-success `DeliveryResult` carrying the error and no archive file created
- the file is recreated after removal, with only the post-removal row
- the one-second reopen debounce (rapid writes reopen once; a write after the window reopens again)
- expiry pruning removes rows older than the configured expiry
- expiry config parsing (empty / `never` / duration accepted; unparseable, zero, and negative values error)
- expiry validation at target creation (`TestValidateArchiveExpiry`; valid values build the config, bad values get a 400)

## Validation

`docker build .` exits 0 (fmt-check, lint, test, build all pass).

Closes #43

Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #84
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
 2026-08-07 22:50:08 +02:00
151 changed files with 30836 additions and 1072 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files

8
.dockerignore
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
# .ci-fingerprint is deliberately NOT excluded: it is the CI cache barrier
# that keeps the check stages from replaying a cached pass. See the lint
# stage of the Dockerfile.
.git/
bin/
# Third-party browser assets are fetched and hash-verified inside the build by
# script/fetch-assets. Excluding any host copy keeps a developer's working tree
# from supplying the bytes that get shipped. The script and its
# static/vendor.sha256 manifest stay in the context.
static/js/alpine.min.js
*.md
LICENSE
.editorconfig

28
.gitea/workflows/check.yml
View File

@@ -11,5 +11,33 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2 2024-10-23
with:
# The fingerprint step below needs history to find the last commit
# that touched the Docker build context, and the superseded-status
# step needs it to walk ancestors (it aborts on a shallow clone).
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Mark superseded run statuses
# Gitea cancels the in-flight run when another commit is pushed to the
# same branch and records the cancellation as `failure`, so a commit
# that was never tested reads as a test result. The script rewrites
# those statuses to say what happened. See its header for why the
# state stays `failure` and not `skipped`.
env:
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
run: script/ci-mark-superseded
- name: Fingerprint the build context
# `.dockerignore` keeps docs out of the build context, so a docs-only
# commit legitimately replays the whole image from cache and stays
# cheap. Every other commit writes a new fingerprint into the context,
# which invalidates the `COPY . .` layer of both check stages: a
# commit that was never linted, formatted-checked, tested and built
# cannot report success from cache.
run: |
set -eu
fp="$(git log -1 --format=%H -- . ':!*.md' ':!LICENSE' ':!.editorconfig')"
printf '%s\n' "${fp:-$GITHUB_SHA}" > .ci-fingerprint
- name: Build Docker image (runs make check)
run: script/cibuild

8
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -42,3 +42,11 @@ data/
# Temporary files
tmp/
temp/
# CI cache barrier, written into the build context by the check workflow
.ci-fingerprint
# Third-party browser assets, fetched and hash-verified by
# script/fetch-assets against static/vendor.sha256. Not committed:
# REPO_POLICIES.md forbids minified bundles in version control.
/static/js/alpine.min.js

8
.golangci.yml
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
version: "2"
# Config schema uses the golangci-lint v2 layout (settings live under
# linters.settings, not top-level linters-settings) so that the
# thresholds below are actually applied by golangci-lint >= v2.
run:
timeout: 5m
modules-download-mode: readonly
@@ -14,8 +18,7 @@ linters:
- wsl # Deprecated, replaced by wsl_v5
- wrapcheck # Too verbose for internal packages
- varnamelen # Short names like db, id are idiomatic Go
linters-settings:
settings:
lll:
line-length: 88
funlen:
@@ -27,6 +30,5 @@ linters-settings:
threshold: 100
issues:
exclude-use-default: false
max-issues-per-linter: 0
max-same-issues: 0

34
Dockerfile
View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# Lint stage
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.11.3 (Debian-based), 2026-03-17
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2 (Debian-based), 2026-08-07
# Using Debian-based image because mattn/go-sqlite3 (CGO) does not
# compile on Alpine musl (off64_t is a glibc type).
FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.11.3@sha256:e838e8ab68aaefe83e2408691510867ade9329c0e0b895a3fb35eb93d1c2a4ba AS lint
FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2@sha256:5cceeef04e53efe1470638d4b4b4f5ceefd574955ab3941b2d9a68a8c9ad5240 AS lint
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
@@ -12,12 +12,21 @@ WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
# Copy source code
# Copy source code. In CI the context also carries .ci-fingerprint, whose
# value changes with every commit that touches the build context (see
# .gitea/workflows/check.yml). That invalidates this layer, so the checks
# below cannot report success by replaying a cached pass. Do not add it to
# .dockerignore.
COPY . .
# Run formatting check and linter
# Run formatting check and linter. golangci-lint is invoked directly rather
# than through `make lint`: this stage is already the pinned linter image, and
# script/lint is a wrapper that builds Dockerfile.lint, so calling it here
# would need a docker daemon inside the build. Keep these steps in step with
# Dockerfile.lint, including --network=none (see its header for why).
RUN make fmt-check
RUN make lint
RUN --network=none golangci-lint config verify --config .golangci.yml
RUN --network=none golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
# Build stage
# golang:1.26.1-bookworm (Debian-based), 2026-03-17
@@ -28,7 +37,9 @@ FROM golang:1.26.1-bookworm@sha256:4465644228bc2857a954b092167e12aa59c006a349228
# Depend on lint stage passing
COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# jq is a runtime dependency of script/ci-mark-superseded, which the test
# suite executes.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make curl ca-certificates jq && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /build
@@ -36,9 +47,18 @@ WORKDIR /build
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
# Copy source code
# Copy source code, including the .ci-fingerprint cache barrier described in
# the lint stage above.
COPY . .
# Fetch the third-party browser assets the UI serves. They are not committed
# (REPO_POLICIES.md forbids minified bundles in version control) and
# .dockerignore keeps any host copy out of the build context, so this step is
# the only way they enter the image. Each download is checked against a
# hardcoded sha256 and the build fails on mismatch; make test re-checks the
# hashes against the bytes go:embed actually put in the binary.
RUN script/fetch-assets
# Run tests and build
RUN make test
RUN make build

37
Dockerfile.lint Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
# Lint-only image, built by script/lint. golangci-lint is never installed on
# the host: the repo is COPYed into the pinned image and linted as a build
# step, so a successful build IS a clean lint. This works even when the docker
# daemon is remote and bind mounts are impossible.
#
# script/lint passes --no-cache-filter=lint. Without it an unchanged tree
# replays the lint stage from cache and the build succeeds in under a second
# having run no linter at all. Do not drop that flag.
#
# The lint steps run with --network=none. `golangci-lint config verify` is
# documented as fetching its JSON schema over HTTPS, which would make linting
# depend on an unpinned remote artifact; this pinned image resolves the schema
# without any network, and --network=none enforces that rather than trusting
# it. It also proves no linter reaches out at analysis time. If a future image
# bump makes either step need the network, this build fails loudly instead of
# quietly acquiring an unpinned dependency.
# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2 (Debian-based), 2026-08-07
# Using Debian-based image because mattn/go-sqlite3 (CGO) does not
# compile on Alpine musl (off64_t is a glibc type).
FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2@sha256:5cceeef04e53efe1470638d4b4b4f5ceefd574955ab3941b2d9a68a8c9ad5240 AS deps
WORKDIR /src
# Copy go mod files first for better layer caching. This stage is cacheable;
# only the lint stage below is forced to re-execute.
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
FROM deps AS lint
COPY . .
# `run` silently ignores config keys it does not recognize, so a typo would
# disable a setting without a word. `config verify` is what catches that.
RUN --network=none golangci-lint config verify --config .golangci.yml
RUN --network=none golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...

5
Makefile
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.PHONY: bootstrap setup test lint fmt fmt-check check build run dev deps docker clean hooks css
.PHONY: bootstrap setup assets test lint fmt fmt-check check build run dev deps docker clean hooks css
# Default target
.DEFAULT_GOAL := check
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ bootstrap:
setup:
@script/setup
assets:
@script/fetch-assets
test:
@script/test

1633
README.md
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

20
REPO_POLICIES.md
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Repository Policies
last_modified: 2026-07-06
last_modified: 2026-08-07
---
This document covers repository structure, tooling, and workflow standards. Code
@@ -189,8 +189,13 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
module under test to verify it compiles/parses. There is no excuse for
`make test` to be a no-op.
- `make test` must complete in under 20 seconds. Add a 30-second timeout in the
Makefile.
- `make test` must complete in under 60 seconds. That is the hard cap, and a
suite that exceeds it fails. Under 20 seconds is the target. A suite between
20 and 60 seconds is still green, but the overage must be filed as an
improvement bug against that repo. Add a 90-second timeout to the test
invocation in the Makefile (`go test -timeout 90s`). The backstop deliberately
sits above the hard cap so that it catches a genuinely hung test rather than a
merely slow one.
- **`make test` should use the conditional verbose rerun pattern.** Run tests
without `-v` (verbose) first. If tests fail, automatically rerun with `-v` to
@@ -209,9 +214,9 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
```makefile
test:
@go test -timeout 30s -race -cover ./... || \
@go test -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
go test -timeout 30s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
go test -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
```
Python example:
@@ -260,7 +265,10 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
- `.golangci.yml` is standardized and must _NEVER_ be modified by an agent, only
manually by the user. Fetch from
`https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.golangci.yml`.
`https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.golangci.yml`. The
canonical golangci-lint version is v2.12.2 (released 2026-05-06), installed
commit-pinned via
`go install github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/golangci-lint@c0d3ddc9cf3faa61a4e378e879ece580256d76e5`.
- When pinning images or packages by hash, add a comment above the reference
with the version and date (YYYY-MM-DD).

309
TODO.md
View File

@@ -1,36 +1,290 @@
# Workflow
* branch (from `main`)
* do the work in Next Step
* move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps
* move the top item of Future Steps into Next Step
* commit (`TODO.md` changes in the same commit as the work)
* merge to `main` if the branch is not protected, otherwise open a PR
* push
One issue per unit of work, one branch and one PR per issue:
* ensure a tracked issue exists with a definition of done
* branch from `next` (never from `main`)
* do the work; open a PR based on `next` (never on `main`)
* pass an independent review, then the manager squash-merges into `next`
* push; nothing stays local-only
`next` is the branch for the next milestone and must stay green and
mergeable to `main` without notice. One `next` -> `main` PR accumulates
the milestone; releases are cut from `main` separately.
Issue branches do NOT touch this file — the manager maintains it on
`next`. Every branch editing `TODO.md` conflicts with every other
(#112).
# Status
pre-1.0. No git tags exist. main (81413c5) is a working webhook proxy
pre-1.0. No git tags exist. `main` (4f5ecb1) is a working webhook proxy
with auth, CSRF/SSRF protections, login rate limiting, Slack target,
policy compliance (#6), pinned lint tooling (#55), a per-webhook event
retention reaper (#63), and delivery targets behind a Target interface
(#77). Work is tracked as Gitea issues (the authoritative TODO); this
file is a summary. Note: TODO.md was deliberately deleted from this
repo in f9a9569 (2026-03-01, #6); its content was folded into the
README TODO section, which this draft reconstructs as of 2026-07-06.
event retention (#63), the database archiving target (#43), the admin
password change flow (#65), policy compliance (#6), pinned lint tooling
(#55), and fail-loud configuration parsing (#80).
`next` is green — verified both by CI and by cache-defeated container
runs (`docker build --no-cache-filter=lint --no-cache-filter=builder`) —
but the **1.0.0 milestone is no longer complete**. It was reopened on
2026-08-20 by a code-level deployability audit that ran the service end
to end (verdict:
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/33#issuecomment-66686).
The bar for 1.0 is not "the milestone is empty" but "sneak can deploy
this and use it in low-volume production". The audit found the gap
between those two: two instances on one `DATA_DIR` both deliver
(reproduced), a failed listen leaves a live non-serving process that
restart policies never fire on, there is no inbound authentication of
any kind, delivery failures render as a bare word with no status code or
error, a terminally failed delivery can never be replayed, the SSRF
blocklist has no escape hatch so the proxy cannot forward to your own
network at all, and target credentials leak into the per-webhook event
databases.
One caveat on reading a green check, narrower than it used to be. A
docs-only commit deliberately replays from the layer cache (#119), so a
green status on such a commit evidences a replay rather than an executed
run; a code commit invalidates the `COPY` layer and genuinely executes.
Superseded runs are no longer the hazard they were: before #152 they
were recorded as `skipped` and rolled up green, and before #119 a warm
layer cache let the gate report success without executing anything,
replaying the previous build's console log so the lie looked like a real
run. Both are fixed. Note: `TODO.md` was deliberately
deleted from this repo in f9a9569 (2026-03-01, #6); its content was
folded into the README TODO section, which this draft reconstructs as
of 2026-07-06.
# Next Step
Manual event redelivery from the web UI (replay is a core promised
capability in the README rationale).
Clear the reopened 1.0.0 milestone. The milestone PR
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/pulls/111) is held: it carries a
`WIP: ` prefix, no labels and is assigned to `clawbot`, and it stays
that way until the milestone is empty. Correctness first — the
duplicate-delivery lock and the listen-failure shutdown — then the
operability gaps that make the service usable in production, then the
three credential exposures.
Three items belong to the owner, none of them blocking. #150 was decided
by the manager rather than left to stall the queue and is flagged on the
issue for reversal if that call was wrong. #112 (whether `Completed
Steps` should exist at all, given it once conflicted on every unit) is
unanswered; the provisional ruling in force is that issue branches do
not touch this file. #198 records that `make test` is past the org 20s
target — 46s of test execution inside a 62.8s CI layer — and turns on
which quantity the 60s hard cap governs; it is scoped as the improvement
bug the 20-60s band requires, and should be milestoned instead if the
cap is read as covering the whole invocation.
After the tag, the largest open cluster is the unmilestoned follow-up
backlog these units generated: #183, #184, #185, #190, #191, #193, #198,
#211 and #212 (encrypting target config at rest, split out of the
credential-leak fix because it needs a key-rotation and re-wrap story).
# Completed Steps
- 2026-08-07 Rate-limit the public webhook receiver per client IP per
entrypoint, env-configurable with fail-loud parsing (#64)
- 2026-08-07 Per-webhook event retention reaper (#63); NoCache
middleware for authenticated pages (#61); Target interface refactor
(#77)
- 2026-08-18 Raise `script/test`'s per-package timeout from 30s to 90s,
matching the org-wide backstop. `go test` applies `-timeout` per
package, and `internal/handlers` had grown past the old budget: a
cache-defeated build failed outright at `GOMAXPROCS=4`, and every run
under deliberate host load breached 30s. The measurement table lives
in the script (#194)
- 2026-08-18 Re-sync `REPO_POLICIES.md` from `prompts`. The local copy
was stale and still mandated a 20s test target with a 30s timeout,
which the org replaced with a 60s cap and a 90s backstop. A synced
copy is not a source; reading it as one nearly produced a PR against
`prompts` proposing a change already merged there (#196)
- 2026-08-18 Report handler panics through the logger and answer 500.
chi v1.5.5's `Recoverer` scans for a `panic(0x` frame the runtime no
longer emits, then indexes `pkg[-1:]`, so it panicked inside its own
stack printer before writing a byte: the recovery never ran, the
client got a dropped connection instead of a 500, and the original
panic was lost. A local middleware replaces it, bounded by
`MaxPanicLogLineBytes` (#187)
- 2026-08-18 Route GORM's logger through `slog` and bound it. Every
`gorm.Open` left `logger.Default` in place at `Warn` with
`IgnoreRecordNotFoundError` false, so **every record-not-found
printed the fully interpolated SQL to stdout** — including the
client-chosen path on `/webhook/{uuid}` and the submitted username on
the login form, at no level the operator set and outside
`internal/logger` entirely. Three call sites, not the two the issue
named (#178)
- 2026-08-18 Bound every `slog` line against client-chosen text. Eight
sites reachable unauthenticated, found by reading every `slog` call in
the tree rather than only the one reported; the budget moved to a
shared `internal/logfield` so no second truncation exists. `DEBUG`
being off by default is not a bound and is not treated as one (#176)
- 2026-08-18 Stop a slow host turning a login-guard test into a
segfault. A non-fatal `assert` on an acquire result was dereferenced
on the next line, so one timing miss killed the whole
`internal/middleware` binary and reddened CI for unrelated PRs. The
fix also removed a real production race — `acquire` could shed a
request with a slot standing free, because Go picks uniformly among
ready `select` cases (#186)
- 2026-08-18 Send the chi route pattern to Sentry rather than the
concrete path. The receiver's path carries the entrypoint capability
token, so every Sentry event from `/webhook/{uuid}` shipped a live
credential to a third party. Request `Data`, `QueryString`, `Cookies`
and `Env` are dropped and headers reduced to an allowlist (#179)
- 2026-08-18 Read form fields from the POST body only. `r.FormValue`
merges the query string, so a login could be driven by URL parameters
— putting the password somewhere that lands in access logs, proxy
logs and browser history (#160)
- 2026-08-18 Verify login credentials before spending rate-limit
budget, so a flood of wrong passwords cannot lock out the account it
is guessing at. The manager took this decision rather than stall the
queue; it is flagged on the issue for reversal (#150)
- 2026-08-18 Run all linting in Docker via `Dockerfile.lint`. Host lint
was wrong in both directions from version skew and shared caches.
`script/lint` asserts the summary line, because `--no-cache-filter`
silently ignores a stage name it does not match — the flag that makes
the gate meaningful fails open (#109)
- 2026-08-18 Serve an event's full stored body over HTTP. The list
query truncates for rendering, and that truncated value was the only
way to read a body, so the full payload was unreachable (#157)
- 2026-08-18 Bound the access log line against client-chosen text.
`internal/logfield` budgets by *encoded* bytes, not runes, so a
handler's JSON escaping cannot multiply a field past its allowance
(#146)
- 2026-08-18 Mark superseded CI commits `failure` rather than
`skipped`. A skipped run rolls up green, so a commit that was never
tested reported success (#152)
- 2026-08-18 Set `fx.StopTimeout` inside the container stop grace, so
shutdown hooks are bounded by a deadline the orchestrator will
actually honour rather than being killed mid-flush (#134)
- 2026-08-17 Bucket IPv6 rate-limit keys by `/64`. A single allocation
hands out 2^64 addresses, so per-address keying let one client mint
unlimited buckets. Manager decision, recorded on the issue (#125)
- 2026-08-17 Correct release-blocking README and startup-warning
inaccuracies, including claims about behaviour the code does not have
(#151)
- 2026-08-17 Fetch and verify Alpine.js at build time against
`static/vendor.sha256` instead of committing the minified blob, so
the dependency is pinned by hash rather than by trust (#145)
- 2026-08-17 Bound the event log's rendered bodies in the query itself,
so a large stored payload cannot be read into memory just to be
truncated for display (#135)
- 2026-08-17 Mask the `http` target's destination URL in the UI: it can
carry a bearer credential in its path or query, and was rendered
verbatim. Manager decision to mask unconditionally (#115)
- 2026-08-14 Bound shutdown hooks by their stop context, so a hook that
hangs cannot hold the process past its grace period (#102)
- 2026-08-14 Render templates via a buffer rather than the
`ResponseWriter`, so a template error part-way through cannot commit
a 200 and then fail — the response is written only once it is whole
(#123)
- 2026-08-14 Align the session codec's max-age with the 7-day absolute
cap. The codec accepted cookies the session layer considered expired,
so the cap was enforced in one place and not the other (#108)
- 2026-08-12 Warn when `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty in production, where
the safe default silently discards forwarded headers and every client
rate-limits as the proxy's address (#149)
- 2026-08-12 Bound the receiver rate limit per client IP across the
whole `/webhook/*` route. The existing limiter keyed on the request
path and `/webhook/{uuid}` matches any single segment, so a client
that invented a fresh path per request minted a fresh bucket per
request: the limit on the only unauthenticated endpoint bounded
nothing in aggregate, and every request still cost an entrypoint
lookup before it 404ed. An outer limiter keyed on the client address
alone now bounds that, chained in front of the unchanged
per-entrypoint limiter (#139)
- 2026-08-12 Correct release-blocking documentation inaccuracies: the
README promised manual redelivery in the present tense in three
places when nothing implements it (the same false claim also sat in
the doc comment that was its source text), the env table omitted
`RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL`, and `TODO.md` itself omitted five landed
units (#141)
- 2026-08-12 Make the CI gate execute the checks it reports on. The
workflow now writes a build-context fingerprint before calling
`script/cibuild`, so a code commit invalidates the `COPY` layer of
the lint and builder stages while a docs-only commit still replays
from cache; a superseding run also rewrites the `failure` status
Gitea leaves on commits it cancelled and never tested. Verified by
pushing a deliberately broken test and watching CI go red (#119)
- 2026-08-12 Require a positive `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL`: a
non-positive value reached `time.NewTicker` in both the retention
reaper and the archive sweeper, panicking two goroutines with no
recover after startup had already reported success (#140)
- 2026-08-12 Bound the `X-Forwarded-For` scan's allocation to the hop
cap: the reverse walk cuts entries with `strings.LastIndexByte`
instead of joining and splitting, so a 1 MB header allocates 16 bytes
rather than 1.6 MB per request on the unauthenticated receiver.
Semantics proven unchanged by differential testing against the
previous implementation (#133)
- 2026-08-12 Cap the `X-Forwarded-For` hop walk at 64 entries, so an
attacker-supplied chain cannot burn unbounded CPU in the rate-limit
key function; running off the end falls back to the peer address
(#124)
- 2026-08-12 Gate forwarded-header trust behind a `TRUSTED_PROXIES` CIDR
list: all three rate limiters key on the connection's own address
unless the direct peer is a configured proxy, in which case
`X-Forwarded-For` is walked right to left for the first non-proxy hop.
Default trusts nothing, and a set-but-unparseable value aborts
startup. Before this, any client could mint a fresh bucket or drain
another's by rotating a spoofed header (#88)
- 2026-08-11 Web UI cleanup: nav terminology unified on Webhooks, the
Profile settings placeholder removed, a progressive-enhancement copy
button for the entrypoint URL, and retention form copy that states the
actual policy (deletion by the reaper, 0 retains forever) (#57)
- 2026-08-11 Mask the webhook credential in delivery errors and logs:
Go embeds the request URL in `*url.Error`, so every transport failure
persisted the full Slack webhook URL into the per-webhook event
database via `DeliveryResult.Error`, a field a future REST API would
have served. `maskURLError` drops path, query and userinfo while
preserving the wrapped cause, so `errors.Is`/`As` and `Timeout()`
still work and DNS, TLS and timeout failures still read differently
(#118)
- 2026-08-11 Rate-limit the public webhook receiver endpoint
(`RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`, default 120/min), keyed on client IP plus
entrypoint path so one entrypoint cannot exhaust another's budget;
over-limit requests get 429 with `Retry-After`. It was the one
unauthenticated, internet-facing endpoint with no limit at all (#64)
- 2026-08-11 Enforce the body size limit before CSRF parses the form:
`MaxBodySize` is now first in all four form-parsing route groups, so
an oversized request is rejected with 413 instead of being read in
full by the CSRF middleware before any cap applied (#90)
- 2026-08-11 Mask target config on the source detail page, which
rendered the stored blob verbatim and so exposed the Slack
incoming-webhook URL — a bearer credential that cannot be revoked
per-holder. Config reaches the template only as a `TargetView` of
labelled fields, and header values are rendered as a count (#113)
- 2026-08-11 Allow `retention_days` of 0 to mean retain forever, via a
sentinel written in `BeforeSave` so the GORM column default cannot
win the race. Also bounds the reaper's cutoff arithmetic: day counts
above 106751 overflowed `time.Duration` and wrapped the cutoff into
the future, where every row matched and the sweep deleted everything
(#79)
- 2026-08-09 Inactivity-based session timeout: sliding idle expiry
(`SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`, default `24h`) refreshed on authenticated
requests, with the 7-day absolute cap kept as an independent
backstop that activity never extends (#66)
- 2026-08-09 Restart recovery and the 60s retry sweep terminally fail an
orphaned `retrying` delivery whose target type no longer supports
retries, recording a `DeliveryResult` with the reason instead of
leaving the delivery stuck forever (#82)
- 2026-08-09 Root the delivery engine's worker pool and the retention
reaper's sweep loop at `context.Background()` rather than the fx
`OnStart` hook context (#97), which carries fx's 15s start timeout and
killed both roughly fifteen seconds after boot: the proxy silently
stopped delivering webhooks entirely, and the reaper never ran a
single sweep under its default one-hour interval
- 2026-08-09 Archive writer lifecycle (#89): deleting a webhook (or its
last `database` target) evicts the cached archive writer and closes
its handle while deliberately leaving `archive-{webhookID}.db` on
disk, and a new `ArchiveSweeper` prunes idle archives on the existing
`RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL` without ever creating an archive file
- 2026-08-09 Configuration parsing fails loudly on set-but-unparseable
environment values: `envInt` removed in favour of `envPositiveInt`
plus a `PORT` range check, `envBool` now parses with
`strconv.ParseBool`, and defaults apply only to unset variables (#80)
- 2026-08-07 Automatic event retention cleanup based on
`retention_days`, deleting expired events, deliveries, and delivery
results from each per-webhook event database (#63)
- 2026-08-07 Update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 (Docker image digest in
`Dockerfile`, release-archive sha256 pins in `script/bootstrap`),
adopt the canonical `.golangci.yml` (v2 `linters.settings` layout so
`lll`/`funlen`/`cyclop`/`dupl` thresholds actually apply), and fix
all newly surfaced lint findings
- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints,
Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
- 2026-03-25 pin golangci-lint Docker image for linting (#55)
@@ -54,10 +308,13 @@ capability in the README rationale).
# Future Steps
- Manual event redelivery from the web UI — the "Replay" capability the
README describes as planned. No redelivery code exists anywhere in the
tree; events are stored in full, which is all it would be built on
- Delivery status and retry management UI
- Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler (per-webhook config
plus handler enforcement, layered on the env-level receiver limit
from #64; global limits must not apply to receiver endpoints)
plus handler enforcement; global limits must not apply to receiver
endpoints)
- Webhook signature verification for GitHub and Stripe HMAC formats
- API key authentication for programmatic access (APIKey model exists;
Bearer token middleware does not)
@@ -67,8 +324,10 @@ capability in the README rationale).
- event redelivery endpoint
- OpenAPI specification
- Analytics dashboard: success rates, response times, volume
- Session expiration tuning and a remember-me option
- Password change and reset flow
- A remember-me option at login
- Password reset flow for a forgotten password. The authenticated
password *change* flow already landed on `main` (#65); reset does not
exist
- Later, nice to have
- email delivery target type
- SNS and S3 delivery targets

76
cmd/webhooker/main.go
View File

@@ -2,9 +2,15 @@
package main
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"time"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
@@ -15,6 +21,33 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// stopTimeout bounds the whole fx stop sequence, not each hook.
//
// fx defaults to 15s, which is longer than Docker's 10s default
// stop grace: the container would be SIGKILLed before the bound
// could fire, so nothing bounded by it would ever be observed.
// 5s leaves headroom inside that grace for signal delivery and
// process exit; the observed wedge case already exits at ~5.3s,
// so a larger bound would trade a rare skipped database close for
// a more common hard kill.
//
// The server's stop hook must fit inside it with room to spare: a
// hook that used the whole budget would exhaust it at that instant,
// and fx would skip every hook after the server — the delivery
// engine, the healthcheck, the webhook DB manager and the database
// close. That hook is the 3s HTTP drain plus the Sentry flush that
// follows it in the same hook, so the flush is clamped to the stop
// context's remaining time less server.TailHookReserve rather than
// running for its own fixed 2s; the reserve is what the tail hooks
// live on, and they are microsecond-scale in normal operation.
// TestStopTimeout_LeavesHeadroomForTailHooks pins the arithmetic
// across every drain length.
//
// This does not make the database close unconditional: the
// ArchiveSweeper and RetentionReaper hooks run before the server
// and can still consume the whole budget on their own.
const stopTimeout = 5 * time.Second
// Build-time variables set via -ldflags.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // Build-time variables injected by the linker.
@@ -27,7 +60,39 @@ func main() {
globals.Appname = appname
globals.Version = version
fx.New(
os.Exit(run(os.Stderr))
}
// run takes the exclusive DATA_DIR lock, then runs the application
// under it, and returns the process exit status.
//
// The lock is taken here rather than inside the fx graph because it has
// to be held before anything opens a database, and because a refusal
// has to reach the operator as a plain line on standard error rather
// than as one entry in an fx failure dump. It is released by the defer
// on a clean shutdown, and by the kernel closing the descriptor on any
// other exit — including the one fx performs itself when a start or
// stop hook fails, which skips deferred calls.
func run(stderr io.Writer) int {
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(config.DataDir())
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "%s: %v\n", appname, err)
return 1
}
defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }()
newApp().Run()
return 0
}
// newApp builds the application graph. It is separate from main so
// a test can assert the options it carries.
func newApp() *fx.App {
return fx.New(
fx.StopTimeout(stopTimeout),
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
@@ -40,9 +105,15 @@ func main() {
handlers.New,
middleware.New,
delivery.New,
delivery.NewArchiveSweeper,
// Wire *delivery.Engine as delivery.Notifier so the
// webhook handler can notify the engine of new deliveries.
func(e *delivery.Engine) delivery.Notifier { return e },
// Wire *delivery.Engine as delivery.WebhookEvictor so
// deleting a webhook releases its archive writer.
func(e *delivery.Engine) delivery.WebhookEvictor {
return e
},
server.New,
),
fx.Invoke(
@@ -50,8 +121,9 @@ func main() {
*server.Server,
*delivery.Engine,
*database.RetentionReaper,
*delivery.ArchiveSweeper,
) {
},
),
).Run()
)
}

110
cmd/webhooker/main_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
)
// dockerStopGrace is Docker's default `docker stop` grace period.
// The Dockerfile sets no STOPSIGNAL or grace override, so this is
// the deadline the container is actually held to, and the fx stop
// timeout has to fit inside it with room for signal delivery and
// process exit.
const dockerStopGrace = 10 * time.Second
// TestNewApp_StopTimeout pins the fx stop timeout. Without the
// explicit fx.StopTimeout option the app reads fx's 15s
// DefaultTimeout, which exceeds dockerStopGrace: the container is
// SIGKILLed before the bound fires and every shutdown hook bounded
// by it — including the operator-facing timeout log — becomes
// unreachable in the image this repo produces.
//
// fx.New applies options before it executes invokes, so the timeout
// is set whether or not the graph itself can be constructed here.
func TestNewApp_StopTimeout(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", t.TempDir())
got := newApp().StopTimeout()
require.Equal(t, stopTimeout, got)
require.Less(t, got, dockerStopGrace)
}
// TestRunRefusesLockedDataDir pins what an operator's second start
// does. The entry point must refuse before it builds the fx graph —
// nothing may open a database in a DATA_DIR another process holds —
// and must exit non-zero with a message naming the directory rather
// than starting a second delivery engine over the same rows.
//
// flock(2) locks descriptors independently, so holding the lock here
// is the same denial a separate process gets; internal/datadir pins
// that property and covers the real two-process case.
func TestRunRefusesLockedDataDir(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", dir)
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }()
var stderr bytes.Buffer
code := run(&stderr)
require.Equal(
t, 1, code, "a second instance must exit non-zero",
)
assert.Contains(
t, stderr.String(), dir,
"the refusal must name the directory",
)
assert.Contains(t, stderr.String(), "another instance")
}
// tailHeadroom is the slack the fx stop budget must keep beyond the
// server stop hook. The hooks that run after the server — the
// delivery engine, the healthcheck, the webhook DB manager and the
// database close — are microsecond-scale in normal operation, so
// this is generous for them.
const tailHeadroom = 2 * time.Second
// TestStopTimeout_LeavesHeadroomForTailHooks pins the relationship
// between the server's stop hook and the fx stop budget. fx bounds
// the whole stop sequence, and returns without running its
// remaining hooks once the stop context has expired. If the hook
// could use the entire budget, every later hook — the database close
// included — would be skipped in exactly the case where the drain
// mattered.
//
// The hook is not just the HTTP drain: a Sentry flush follows it in
// the same hook, and sentry.Flush honours no context, so both halves
// have to be counted. The sweep walks every drain length the hook
// can produce, since a shorter drain leaves the flush more room and
// the worst case is not necessarily at either extreme.
//
// Shrinking either budget, or unbounding the flush again, must fail
// here rather than silently recreating a hook that swallows the
// whole sequence.
func TestStopTimeout_LeavesHeadroomForTailHooks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
require.Less(t, server.ShutdownTimeout, stopTimeout)
const step = 10 * time.Millisecond
for drain := time.Duration(0); drain <= server.ShutdownTimeout; drain += step {
hook := drain + server.SentryFlushBudget(stopTimeout-drain)
require.LessOrEqual(
t, hook+tailHeadroom, stopTimeout,
"a %s drain leaves the tail hooks short", drain,
)
}
}

9
go.mod
View File

@@ -8,15 +8,18 @@ require (
github.com/go-chi/chi v1.5.5
github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.1
github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.15.0
github.com/gofrs/flock v0.13.0
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
github.com/gorilla/csrf v1.7.3
github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.4.0
github.com/joho/godotenv v1.5.1
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.18.0
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.5.0
github.com/slok/go-http-metrics v0.11.0
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
go.uber.org/fx v1.20.1
golang.org/x/crypto v0.38.0
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
gorm.io/driver/sqlite v1.5.4
gorm.io/gorm v1.25.5
modernc.org/sqlite v1.28.0
@@ -37,7 +40,6 @@ require (
github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3 v1.14.17 // indirect
github.com/matttproud/golang_protobuf_extensions/v2 v2.0.0 // indirect
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.1-0.20181226105442-5d4384ee4fb2 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.5.0 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/common v0.45.0 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.12.0 // indirect
github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec // indirect
@@ -48,11 +50,10 @@ require (
go.uber.org/zap v1.23.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/mod v0.17.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.14.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.33.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.37.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.25.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.21.1-0.20240508182429-e35e4ccd0d2d // indirect
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.31.0 // indirect
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 // indirect
lukechampine.com/uint128 v1.2.0 // indirect
modernc.org/cc/v3 v3.40.0 // indirect
modernc.org/ccgo/v3 v3.16.13 // indirect

14
go.sum
View File

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.15.0 h1:j54xcWV9KGmPf/X4H32/aTH+wBlrvxL7P+SdnRqxh5
github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.15.0/go.mod h1:rzGHhVrsBn3IMLYDOZQsSU4fJNWcjui4fWKJcCId1R4=
github.com/go-errors/errors v1.4.2 h1:J6MZopCL4uSllY1OfXM374weqZFFItUbrImctkmUxIA=
github.com/go-errors/errors v1.4.2/go.mod h1:sIVyrIiJhuEF+Pj9Ebtd6P/rEYROXFi3BopGUQ5a5Og=
github.com/gofrs/flock v0.13.0 h1:95JolYOvGMqeH31+FC7D2+uULf6mG61mEZ/A8dRYMzw=
github.com/gofrs/flock v0.13.0/go.mod h1:jxeyy9R1auM5S6JYDBhDt+E2TCo7DkratH4Pgi8P+Z0=
github.com/golang/protobuf v1.5.0/go.mod h1:FsONVRAS9T7sI+LIUmWTfcYkHO4aIWwzhcaSAoJOfIk=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.5.5/go.mod h1:v8dTdLbMG2kIc/vJvl+f65V22dbkXbowE6jgT/gNBxE=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0 h1:ofyhxvXcZhMsU5ulbFiLKl/XBFqE1GSq7atu8tAmTRI=
@@ -81,11 +83,11 @@ github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.10.0/go.mod h1:UQnix2H7Ngw/k4C5ijL5+65zddjncj
github.com/slok/go-http-metrics v0.11.0 h1:ABJUpekCZSkQT1wQrFvS4kGbhea/w6ndFJaWJeh3zL0=
github.com/slok/go-http-metrics v0.11.0/go.mod h1:ZGKeYG1ET6TEJpQx18BqAJAvxw9jBAZXCHU7bWQqqAc=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.1.0/go.mod h1:HFkY916IF+rwdDfMAkV7OtwuqBVzrE8GR6GFx+wExME=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.1 h1:4VhoImhV/Bm0ToFkXFi8hXNXwpDRZ/ynw3amt82mzq0=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.1/go.mod h1:/iHQpkQwBD6DLUmQ4pE+s1TXdob1mORJ4/UFdrifcy0=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.2 h1:xuMeJ0Sdp5ZMRXx/aWO6RZxdr3beISkG5/G/aIRr3pY=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.2/go.mod h1:FRsXN1f5AsAjCGJKqEizvkpNtU+EGNCLh3NxZ/8L+MA=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M5WIy9Dh21IEIfnGCwXGc5bZfKNJtfHm1UVUgZn+9EI=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4 h1:CcVxjf3Q8PM0mHUKJCdn+eZZtm5yQwehR5yeSVQQcUk=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4/go.mod h1:sz/lmYIOXD/1dqDmKjjqLyZ2RngseejIcXlSw2iwfAo=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1 h1:7s2iGBzp5EwR7/aIZr8ao5+dra3wiQyKjjFuvgVKu7U=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1/go.mod h1:wZwfW3scLgRK+23gO65QZefKpKQRnfz6sD981Nm4B6U=
github.com/zeebo/assert v1.3.0 h1:g7C04CbJuIDKNPFHmsk4hwZDO5O+kntRxzaUoNXj+IQ=
github.com/zeebo/assert v1.3.0/go.mod h1:Pq9JiuJQpG8JLJdtkwrJESF0Foym2/D9XMU5ciN/wJ0=
github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2 h1:xZmwmqxHZA8AI603jOQ0tMqmBr9lPeFwGg6d+xy9DC0=
@@ -109,8 +111,8 @@ golang.org/x/mod v0.17.0/go.mod h1:hTbmBsO62+eylJbnUtE2MGJUyE7QWk4xUqPFrRgJ+7c=
golang.org/x/sync v0.14.0 h1:woo0S4Yywslg6hp4eUFjTVOyKt0RookbpAHG4c1HmhQ=
golang.org/x/sync v0.14.0/go.mod h1:1dzgHSNfp02xaA81J2MS99Qcpr2w7fw1gpm99rleRqA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.33.0 h1:q3i8TbbEz+JRD9ywIRlyRAQbM0qF7hu24q3teo2hbuw=
golang.org/x/sys v0.33.0/go.mod h1:BJP2sWEmIv4KK5OTEluFJCKSidICx8ciO85XgH3Ak8k=
golang.org/x/sys v0.37.0 h1:fdNQudmxPjkdUTPnLn5mdQv7Zwvbvpaxqs831goi9kQ=
golang.org/x/sys v0.37.0/go.mod h1:OgkHotnGiDImocRcuBABYBEXf8A9a87e/uXjp9XT3ks=
golang.org/x/text v0.25.0 h1:qVyWApTSYLk/drJRO5mDlNYskwQznZmkpV2c8q9zls4=
golang.org/x/text v0.25.0/go.mod h1:WEdwpYrmk1qmdHvhkSTNPm3app7v4rsT8F2UD6+VHIA=
golang.org/x/tools v0.21.1-0.20240508182429-e35e4ccd0d2d h1:vU5i/LfpvrRCpgM/VPfJLg5KjxD3E+hfT1SH+d9zLwg=

387
internal/ciscript/ci_mark_superseded_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
package ciscript_test
import (
"maps"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
)
const (
// supersededDesc is the description script/ci-mark-superseded
// writes, and the one an earlier revision of it wrote alongside a
// `skipped` state.
supersededDesc = "Superseded by a newer commit; never tested"
// liveContext is the commit-status context Gitea uses for this
// repository's runs, as seen in its API. The script derives it from
// the workflow and job names rather than hardcoding it; the
// derivation is checked against this value below.
liveContext = "check / check (push)"
scriptPath = "../../script/ci-mark-superseded"
workflow = "../../.gitea/workflows/check.yml"
// failure is the only state that neither folds into a combined
// `success` (as `skipped` does) nor blocks the commit forever (as
// `pending` does).
failure = "failure"
)
// repo is a throwaway git history: parent is the commit a run would be
// cancelled on, head the commit that superseded it.
type repo struct {
dir string
head string
parent string
}
// scriptEnv is the run identity the Gitea runner exports and the script
// builds its context string from.
type scriptEnv struct {
workflow string
job string
event string
}
func defaultEnv() scriptEnv {
return scriptEnv{workflow: "check", job: "check", event: "push"}
}
func cancelled() commitStatus {
return commitStatus{
Context: liveContext,
Status: failure,
Description: "Has been cancelled",
}
}
func running() commitStatus {
return commitStatus{
Context: liveContext,
Status: "pending",
Description: "Has started running",
}
}
func TestMarkSuperseded(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := map[string]struct {
parent commitStatus
wantMark bool
}{
"a cancelled run is marked": {
parent: cancelled(),
wantMark: true,
},
"a laundered skipped status is marked": {
parent: commitStatus{
Context: liveContext,
Status: "skipped",
Description: supersededDesc,
},
wantMark: true,
},
"a genuine failure is left alone": {
parent: commitStatus{
Context: liveContext,
Status: failure,
Description: "Failing after 3m1s",
},
wantMark: false,
},
"a passing run is left alone": {
parent: commitStatus{
Context: liveContext,
Status: "success",
Description: "Successful in 2m52s",
},
wantMark: false,
},
"another context is left alone": {
parent: commitStatus{
Context: "other / other (push)",
Status: failure,
Description: "Has been cancelled",
},
wantMark: false,
},
}
for name, tc := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requireTools(t)
history := newRepo(t)
fake, api := newFakeGitea(t)
fake.setStatus(history.head, running())
fake.setStatus(history.parent, tc.parent)
out, err := runScript(t, history, api, defaultEnv())
require.NoError(t, err, out)
posted := fake.postedFor(history.parent)
if !tc.wantMark {
require.Empty(t, posted)
return
}
require.Equal(t, []postedStatus{{
Context: liveContext,
// Not `skipped`: Gitea's combined status folds
// that into `success`, which is what made a
// never-tested commit read green.
State: failure,
Description: supersededDesc,
}}, posted)
})
}
}
// A second run must not rewrite what the first one wrote, or every
// later push would post a duplicate status.
func TestMarkSupersededIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requireTools(t)
history := newRepo(t)
fake, api := newFakeGitea(t)
fake.setStatus(history.head, running())
fake.setStatus(history.parent, cancelled())
for range 2 {
out, err := runScript(t, history, api, defaultEnv())
require.NoError(t, err, out)
}
require.Len(t, fake.postedFor(history.parent), 1)
}
// Renaming the workflow or the job changes the context string Gitea
// uses. The script must say so instead of quietly matching nothing.
func TestMarkSupersededRejectsAnUnknownContext(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requireTools(t)
history := newRepo(t)
fake, api := newFakeGitea(t)
fake.setStatus(history.head, running())
fake.setStatus(history.parent, cancelled())
env := defaultEnv()
env.job = "renamed"
out, err := runScript(t, history, api, env)
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, out, "renamed")
require.Contains(t, out, liveContext)
require.Empty(t, fake.postedFor(history.parent))
}
// ANCESTOR_LIMIT is a documented knob. A value that is set but unusable
// must abort: handing it to git and discarding the exit status left the
// walk empty and the step green, marking nothing.
func TestMarkSupersededRejectsAnUnparseableAncestorLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requireTools(t)
history := newRepo(t)
fake, api := newFakeGitea(t)
fake.setStatus(history.head, running())
fake.setStatus(history.parent, cancelled())
out, err := runScript(
t, history, api, defaultEnv(), "ANCESTOR_LIMIT=twenty",
)
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, out, "ANCESTOR_LIMIT")
require.Contains(t, out, "twenty")
require.Empty(t, fake.postedFor(history.parent))
}
// A status read that fails is not the same as a commit with nothing to
// do. Losing curl's exit status through a pipe made the two identical
// and left a laundered commit laundered with no signal.
func TestMarkSupersededFailsOnAnUnreadableAncestorStatus(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requireTools(t)
history := newRepo(t)
fake, api := newFakeGitea(t)
fake.setStatus(history.head, running())
fake.setStatus(history.parent, cancelled())
fake.failStatusRead(history.parent)
out, err := runScript(t, history, api, defaultEnv())
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, out, history.parent)
require.Contains(t, out, "cannot read commit statuses")
require.Empty(t, fake.postedFor(history.parent))
}
// A shallow clone cannot resolve the parent, so it is indistinguishable
// from a root commit to rev-parse and the walk would exit 0 having
// marked nothing. It must abort instead: dropping `fetch-depth: 0` from
// the checkout step is one edit, and a silent no-op there restores the
// false-green bug this script exists to prevent.
func TestMarkSupersededRejectsAShallowRepository(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requireTools(t)
history := shallowClone(t, newRepo(t))
fake, api := newFakeGitea(t)
fake.setStatus(history.head, running())
fake.setStatus(history.parent, cancelled())
out, err := runScript(t, history, api, defaultEnv())
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, out, "shallow repository")
require.Empty(t, fake.postedFor(history.parent))
require.Empty(t, fake.postedFor(history.head))
}
// shallowClone returns the same history as a depth-1 clone. The `file://`
// URL is required: git ignores --depth for a plain local path.
func shallowClone(t *testing.T, history repo) repo {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
//nolint:gosec // fixed argv, arguments are test-local paths
cmd := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), "git", "clone", "-q",
"--depth=1", "file://"+history.dir, dir)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
require.NoError(t, err, string(out))
return repo{dir: dir, head: history.head, parent: history.parent}
}
// The derived context must equal the one Gitea actually uses, which is
// built from the same workflow and job names.
func TestDerivedContextMatchesGitea(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
requireTools(t)
name, job := workflowIdentity(t)
history := newRepo(t)
fake, api := newFakeGitea(t)
fake.setStatus(history.head, running())
fake.setStatus(history.parent, cancelled())
out, err := runScript(t, history, api, scriptEnv{
workflow: name,
job: job,
event: "push",
})
require.NoError(t, err, out)
posted := fake.postedFor(history.parent)
require.Len(t, posted, 1)
require.Equal(t, liveContext, posted[0].Context)
}
// workflowIdentity reads the workflow name and its single job id out of
// the checked-in workflow file.
func workflowIdentity(t *testing.T) (string, string) {
t.Helper()
raw, err := os.ReadFile(workflow)
require.NoError(t, err)
var parsed struct {
Name string `yaml:"name"`
Jobs map[string]any `yaml:"jobs"`
}
require.NoError(t, yaml.Unmarshal(raw, &parsed))
jobs := slices.Collect(maps.Keys(parsed.Jobs))
require.Len(t, jobs, 1)
return parsed.Name, jobs[0]
}
func runScript(
t *testing.T, history repo, api string, env scriptEnv,
extra ...string,
) (string, error) {
t.Helper()
script, err := filepath.Abs(scriptPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
//nolint:gosec // fixed argv, repo-local script under test
cmd := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), "sh", script)
cmd.Dir = history.dir
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
"GITHUB_API_URL="+api,
"GITHUB_REPOSITORY=sneak/webhooker",
"GITHUB_SHA="+history.head,
"GITHUB_WORKFLOW="+env.workflow,
"GITHUB_JOB="+env.job,
"GITHUB_EVENT_NAME="+env.event,
"GITEA_TOKEN=test-token",
)
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, extra...)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
return string(out), err
}
func newRepo(t *testing.T) repo {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
git := func(args ...string) string {
//nolint:gosec // fixed argv, arguments are test constants
cmd := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), "git", args...)
cmd.Dir = dir
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
require.NoError(t, err, string(out))
return strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
}
commit := func(message string) string {
git(
"-c", "user.email=ci@example.invalid",
"-c", "user.name=ci",
"-c", "commit.gpgsign=false",
"commit", "-q", "--allow-empty", "-m", message,
)
return git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
}
git("init", "-q", "-b", "main")
parent := commit("parent")
head := commit("head")
return repo{dir: dir, head: head, parent: parent}
}
func requireTools(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
for _, tool := range []string{"sh", "git", "curl", "jq"} {
_, err := exec.LookPath(tool)
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("%s is not installed: %v", tool, err)
}
}
}

10
internal/ciscript/doc.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
// Package ciscript holds the tests for the repository's CI shell
// scripts in script/. It carries no runtime code: the scripts run on
// the CI runner, not inside the binary, but their behaviour still has
// to be verified by the test suite.
//
// The scripts under test are outside the Go build graph, so `go test`'s
// result cache serves a stale PASS when only a script changed: run the
// container build, or GOFLAGS=-count=1, to trust a result here after
// editing script/.
package ciscript

162
internal/ciscript/fakegitea_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
package ciscript_test
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync"
"testing"
)
// commitStatus is the part of an entry in Gitea's combined-status
// response that script/ci-mark-superseded reads.
type commitStatus struct {
Context string `json:"context"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Description string `json:"description"`
}
// postedStatus is the part of a create-status request body the script
// writes.
type postedStatus struct {
Context string `json:"context"`
State string `json:"state"`
Description string `json:"description"`
}
// fakeGitea serves the two endpoints the script talks to. Like Gitea,
// the newest status for a context replaces the previous one, so a
// second run of the script sees what the first one wrote.
type fakeGitea struct {
mu sync.Mutex
statuses map[string][]commitStatus
posted map[string][]postedStatus
// failRead is a commit whose combined-status read answers HTTP
// 500, standing in for a status API that is down.
failRead string
}
// newFakeGitea returns the fake and the base URL to hand the script as
// GITHUB_API_URL.
func newFakeGitea(t *testing.T) (*fakeGitea, string) {
t.Helper()
fake := &fakeGitea{
mu: sync.Mutex{},
statuses: map[string][]commitStatus{},
posted: map[string][]postedStatus{},
failRead: "",
}
srv := httptest.NewServer(fake.routes())
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
return fake, srv.URL
}
func (f *fakeGitea) routes() http.Handler {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc(
"GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/commits/{sha}/status",
f.handleCombined,
)
mux.HandleFunc(
"POST /repos/{owner}/{repo}/statuses/{sha}",
f.handleCreate,
)
return mux
}
func (f *fakeGitea) handleCombined(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
sha := r.PathValue("sha")
if f.failRead != "" && f.failRead == sha {
http.Error(w, "boom", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
body := struct {
Statuses []commitStatus `json:"statuses"`
}{Statuses: f.statuses[sha]}
payload, err := json.Marshal(body)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write(payload)
}
func (f *fakeGitea) handleCreate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var got postedStatus
err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&got)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
sha := r.PathValue("sha")
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.posted[sha] = append(f.posted[sha], got)
f.replaceLocked(sha, commitStatus{
Context: got.Context,
Status: got.State,
Description: got.Description,
})
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
}
// failStatusRead makes the combined-status read for one commit answer
// HTTP 500.
func (f *fakeGitea) failStatusRead(sha string) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.failRead = sha
}
// setStatus gives a commit its latest status for a context.
func (f *fakeGitea) setStatus(sha string, status commitStatus) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.replaceLocked(sha, status)
}
// postedFor returns the statuses the script created for a commit.
func (f *fakeGitea) postedFor(sha string) []postedStatus {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return append([]postedStatus(nil), f.posted[sha]...)
}
// replaceLocked requires f.mu.
func (f *fakeGitea) replaceLocked(sha string, status commitStatus) {
for i, existing := range f.statuses[sha] {
if existing.Context == status.Context {
f.statuses[sha][i] = status
return
}
}
f.statuses[sha] = append(f.statuses[sha], status)
}

426
internal/config/config.go
View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -25,6 +26,10 @@ const (
// EnvironmentProd represents production environment.
EnvironmentProd = "prod"
// DefaultDataDir is where all SQLite databases live when DATA_DIR
// is unset. The same default applies in every environment.
DefaultDataDir = "/var/lib/webhooker"
// defaultPort is the default HTTP listen port.
defaultPort = 8080
@@ -32,12 +37,25 @@ const (
// reaper deletes events older than each webhook's RetentionDays.
defaultRetentionSweepInterval = time.Hour
// defaultSessionIdleTimeout is how long a session may go without
// authenticated activity before it expires.
defaultSessionIdleTimeout = 24 * time.Hour
// defaultReceiverRateLimit is the default number of requests
// per minute each client IP may send to a single webhook
// receiver entrypoint. Generous for legitimate webhook
// senders while bounding abuse of the one unauthenticated,
// internet-exposed endpoint.
defaultReceiverRateLimit = 120
// maxPort is the highest valid TCP port number. The lower
// bound (at least 1) is enforced by envPositiveInt.
maxPort = 65535
// mappedV4Offset is the number of leading bits an IPv4-mapped
// IPv6 prefix spends on the ::ffff:0:0/96 wrapper, so a /104
// covers the same addresses as an IPv4 /8.
mappedV4Offset = 96
)
// ErrInvalidEnvironment is returned when WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT
@@ -48,6 +66,25 @@ var ErrInvalidEnvironment = errors.New("invalid environment")
// requires a positive integer is set to zero or a negative number.
var ErrNonPositiveValue = errors.New("value must be positive")
// ErrInvalidPort is returned when an environment variable holding a
// TCP port number is set above the valid port range.
var ErrInvalidPort = errors.New("invalid port")
// ErrInvalidCIDR is returned when an environment variable holding a
// list of CIDR blocks contains an entry that is neither a CIDR block
// nor a bare IP address.
var ErrInvalidCIDR = errors.New("invalid CIDR")
// ErrIncompleteMetricsAuth is returned when exactly one of
// METRICS_USERNAME and METRICS_PASSWORD carries a value. Neither
// fallback is acceptable: serving /metrics on the username alone
// publishes an endpoint whose password is the empty string, and
// silently leaving it unmounted withholds an endpoint the operator
// asked for. Half-set is a configuration error, so startup fails.
var ErrIncompleteMetricsAuth = errors.New(
"incomplete metrics credentials",
)
//nolint:revive // ConfigParams is a standard fx naming convention.
type ConfigParams struct {
fx.In
@@ -69,12 +106,28 @@ type Config struct {
SentryDSN string
// RetentionSweepInterval is how often the retention reaper runs.
// Always positive: it becomes a time.NewTicker period.
RetentionSweepInterval time.Duration
// SessionIdleTimeout is the sliding inactivity window after
// which a session expires. Non-positive disables idle expiry.
SessionIdleTimeout time.Duration
// ReceiverRateLimit is the number of requests per minute each
// client IP may send to a single webhook receiver entrypoint.
ReceiverRateLimit int
// TrustedProxies is the set of networks whose members are
// allowed to speak for the client with X-Forwarded-For, the
// only forwarded header read. It is empty unless
// TRUSTED_PROXIES is set, and empty means no peer is
// trusted: forwarded headers are then ignored entirely and
// clients are identified by the connection's own address.
// Members can choose their own rate-limit key, so this must
// name proxy hosts only, never a block that also covers
// clients.
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
params *ConfigParams
log *slog.Logger
}
@@ -89,34 +142,64 @@ func (c *Config) IsProd() bool {
return c.Environment == EnvironmentProd
}
// MetricsAuthEnabled reports whether /metrics is served behind basic
// auth. It is the only answer to that question in the codebase: the
// route mount, the Prometheus recording middleware and the startup
// log's hasMetricsAuth field all read this one method, so the log
// cannot report auth as off while the route is mounted.
//
// It requires both credentials rather than the username alone.
// loadFromEnv already rejects a half-set pair, but a Config built in
// code bypasses that, and the failure mode this guards is an endpoint
// mounted with a credential map whose only password is the empty
// string.
func (c *Config) MetricsAuthEnabled() bool {
return c.MetricsUsername != "" && c.MetricsPassword != ""
}
// envString returns the value of the named environment variable,
// or an empty string if not set.
func envString(key string) string {
return os.Getenv(key)
}
// DataDir resolves DATA_DIR, applying DefaultDataDir when it is unset
// or empty. It is exported so that entry points which must act on the
// data directory before the fx graph exists — taking the exclusive
// directory lock, above all — resolve it exactly as Config does.
func DataDir() string {
dir := envString("DATA_DIR")
if dir == "" {
return DefaultDataDir
}
return dir
}
// envBool returns the value of the named environment variable
// parsed as a boolean. Returns defaultValue if not set.
func envBool(key string, defaultValue bool) bool {
if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
return strings.EqualFold(v, "true") || v == "1"
// parsed as a boolean. Returns defaultValue if not set. If the
// variable is set but cannot be parsed, it returns a wrapped error
// naming the key and the bad value, so startup fails loudly rather
// than silently falling back to the default.
//
// Parsing is strconv.ParseBool, which accepts 1, t, T, TRUE, true,
// True, 0, f, F, FALSE, false and False. Anything else — "yes",
// "on", or a typo like "ture" — is an error rather than a silent
// false.
func envBool(key string, defaultValue bool) (bool, error) {
v := os.Getenv(key)
if v == "" {
return defaultValue, nil
}
return defaultValue
b, err := strconv.ParseBool(v)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf(
"invalid boolean for %s: %q: %w", key, v, err,
)
}
// envInt returns the value of the named environment variable
// parsed as an integer. Returns defaultValue if not set or
// unparseable.
func envInt(key string, defaultValue int) int {
if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
i, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
if err == nil {
return i
}
}
return defaultValue
return b, nil
}
// envPositiveInt returns the value of the named environment variable
@@ -151,6 +234,26 @@ func envPositiveInt(
return i, nil
}
// envPort returns the value of the named environment variable parsed
// as a TCP port number. Returns defaultValue if not set. A set value
// that is unparseable, below 1, or above maxPort is a hard error
// naming the key and the bad value.
func envPort(key string, defaultValue int) (int, error) {
port, err := envPositiveInt(key, defaultValue)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if port > maxPort {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s must be at most %d, got %d",
ErrInvalidPort, key, maxPort, port,
)
}
return port, nil
}
// envDuration returns the value of the named environment variable
// parsed as a Go duration (e.g. "1h", "30m"). Returns defaultValue if
// not set. If the variable is set but cannot be parsed, it returns a
@@ -175,33 +278,170 @@ func envDuration(
return d, nil
}
// New creates a Config by reading environment variables.
// envPositiveDuration returns the value of the named environment
// variable parsed as a Go duration that must be greater than zero.
// Returns defaultValue if not set. A set value that is unparseable or
// non-positive is a hard error naming the key and the bad value.
//
//nolint:revive // lc parameter is required by fx even if unused.
func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
log := params.Logger.Get()
// This is for durations that reach time.NewTicker, which panics on a
// non-positive period, in a goroutine started after startup has
// already reported success. It is deliberately not used for durations
// where non-positive means "disabled" (SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT).
func envPositiveDuration(
key string,
defaultValue time.Duration,
) (time.Duration, error) {
d, err := envDuration(key, defaultValue)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
// Determine environment from WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT env var,
// default to dev
if d <= 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s must be greater than zero, got %s",
ErrNonPositiveValue, key, d,
)
}
return d, nil
}
// parseCIDR parses one trusted-proxy list entry, which may be a
// CIDR block ("10.0.0.0/8") or a bare address ("10.0.0.1", treated
// as a single-host block).
//
// Both forms are unmapped, because peer addresses are unmapped
// before they are matched against the list: an IPv4-mapped prefix
// left in that form would silently never match.
func parseCIDR(entry string) (netip.Prefix, error) {
if strings.Contains(entry, "/") {
prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(entry)
if err != nil {
return netip.Prefix{}, err //nolint:wrapcheck // wrapped by caller
}
if addr := prefix.Addr(); addr.Is4In6() &&
prefix.Bits() >= mappedV4Offset {
prefix = netip.PrefixFrom(
addr.Unmap(), prefix.Bits()-mappedV4Offset,
)
}
return prefix.Masked(), nil
}
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(entry)
if err != nil {
return netip.Prefix{}, err //nolint:wrapcheck // wrapped by caller
}
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr.Unmap(), addr.Unmap().BitLen()), nil
}
// envPrefixList returns the value of the named environment variable
// parsed as a comma-separated list of CIDR blocks (bare addresses
// allowed). An unset, empty, or blank value yields an empty list. A
// set value containing an unparseable entry is a hard error naming
// the key and the bad entry, so startup fails loudly rather than
// silently running with a list the operator did not intend.
func envPrefixList(key string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(key))
if v == "" {
return nil, nil
}
var prefixes []netip.Prefix
for entry := range strings.SplitSeq(v, ",") {
entry = strings.TrimSpace(entry)
if entry == "" {
continue
}
prefix, err := parseCIDR(entry)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s: %q: %w", ErrInvalidCIDR, key, entry, err,
)
}
prefixes = append(prefixes, prefix)
}
return prefixes, nil
}
// resolveMetricsAuth reads the /metrics basic-auth credentials and
// rejects a half-set pair, naming both variables either way. The
// error carries neither value: the password is a secret.
func resolveMetricsAuth() (string, string, error) {
username := envString("METRICS_USERNAME")
password := envString("METRICS_PASSWORD")
if (username == "") == (password == "") {
return username, password, nil
}
set, empty := "METRICS_USERNAME", "METRICS_PASSWORD"
if username == "" {
set, empty = empty, set
}
return "", "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s is set but %s is empty; METRICS_USERNAME and "+
"METRICS_PASSWORD must both be set to serve /metrics, "+
"or both be empty to leave it unmounted",
ErrIncompleteMetricsAuth, set, empty,
)
}
// resolveEnvironment reads WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT, defaulting to
// dev, and rejects unrecognised values.
func resolveEnvironment() (string, error) {
environment := os.Getenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT")
if environment == "" {
environment = EnvironmentDev
}
// Validate environment
if environment != EnvironmentDev &&
environment != EnvironmentProd {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
return "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT must be '%s' or '%s', got '%s'",
ErrInvalidEnvironment,
EnvironmentDev, EnvironmentProd, environment,
)
}
// Parse the retention sweep interval; a set-but-unparseable value
// is a hard error so fx aborts startup rather than silently using
// the default.
retentionSweepInterval, err := envDuration(
return environment, nil
}
// loadFromEnv builds a Config from the environment. Every value that
// needs parsing fails loudly when it is set but unparseable: the
// documented defaults apply only to variables that are unset (or
// empty), never as a substitute for a value the operator actually
// provided.
func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
environment, err := resolveEnvironment()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
port, err := envPort("PORT", defaultPort)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
debug, err := envBool("DEBUG", false)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
maintenanceMode, err := envBool("MAINTENANCE_MODE", false)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
retentionSweepInterval, err := envPositiveDuration(
"RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL",
defaultRetentionSweepInterval,
)
@@ -209,9 +449,16 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
return nil, err
}
// Parse the receiver rate limit; a set-but-unparseable or
// non-positive value is a hard error so fx aborts startup
// rather than silently using the default.
// Non-positive is "disabled" here, not invalid, so this stays on
// envDuration.
sessionIdleTimeout, err := envDuration(
"SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT",
defaultSessionIdleTimeout,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
receiverRateLimit, err := envPositiveInt(
"RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT",
defaultReceiverRateLimit,
@@ -220,30 +467,95 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
return nil, err
}
// Load configuration values from environment variables
s := &Config{
DataDir: envString("DATA_DIR"),
Debug: envBool("DEBUG", false),
MaintenanceMode: envBool("MAINTENANCE_MODE", false),
Environment: environment,
MetricsUsername: envString("METRICS_USERNAME"),
MetricsPassword: envString("METRICS_PASSWORD"),
Port: envInt("PORT", defaultPort),
SentryDSN: envString("SENTRY_DSN"),
RetentionSweepInterval: retentionSweepInterval,
ReceiverRateLimit: receiverRateLimit,
log: log,
params: &params,
trustedProxies, err := envPrefixList("TRUSTED_PROXIES")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Set default DataDir. All SQLite databases (main application
// DB and per-webhook event DBs) live here. The same default is
// used regardless of environment; override with DATA_DIR if
// needed.
if s.DataDir == "" {
s.DataDir = "/var/lib/webhooker"
metricsUsername, metricsPassword, err := resolveMetricsAuth()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &Config{
DataDir: DataDir(),
Debug: debug,
MaintenanceMode: maintenanceMode,
Environment: environment,
MetricsUsername: metricsUsername,
MetricsPassword: metricsPassword,
Port: port,
SentryDSN: envString("SENTRY_DSN"),
RetentionSweepInterval: retentionSweepInterval,
SessionIdleTimeout: sessionIdleTimeout,
ReceiverRateLimit: receiverRateLimit,
TrustedProxies: trustedProxies,
}, nil
}
// warnSharedRateLimitBucket logs a startup warning whenever
// TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty, in any environment.
//
// With no trusted proxies every rate limiter keys on the connecting
// peer's address. Whether that is harmless or dangerous depends on
// what is in front of the process, which this code cannot observe:
// with nothing in front, the peer is the client and the limits are
// per-client as intended; behind a reverse proxy the peer is the proxy
// for every request, so all clients share one bucket per limiter.
//
// The login endpoint no longer spends budget on arrival — it verifies
// credentials first and charges only failures — so a shared bucket
// cannot deny the operator a correct password. What it does collapse
// is the failure counting: one client's wrong passwords throttle
// everyone else's wrong passwords, and the receiver's limits become
// service-wide ceilings.
//
// The warning is deliberately not gated on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT. That
// variable defaults to dev, so gating on it would silence the warning
// for exactly the operator who forgot to configure the deployment —
// the case it exists to catch.
//
// The default of trusting nobody is deliberate — trusting forwarded
// headers from arbitrary peers lets any client choose its own bucket —
// so this warns rather than failing startup or changing the key.
func (c *Config) warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log *slog.Logger) {
if len(c.TrustedProxies) > 0 {
return
}
log.Warn(
"TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty: every rate limit keys on the "+
"connecting peer's address. With nothing proxying to "+
"this process that is the client itself and the limits "+
"are per-client as intended. Behind a reverse proxy the "+
"peer is the proxy on every request, so all clients "+
"share one bucket per limit: the receiver limits become "+
"service-wide ceilings, and one client's failed logins "+
"throttle every other client's failed logins — a "+
"correct password still gets in. If anything proxies to "+
"this process, set TRUSTED_PROXIES to its address.",
"environment", c.Environment,
"trustedProxies", len(c.TrustedProxies),
)
}
// New creates a Config by reading environment variables.
//
//nolint:revive // lc parameter is required by fx even if unused.
func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
log := params.Logger.Get()
// A set-but-unparseable value anywhere in the environment is a
// hard error, so fx aborts startup rather than running with a
// silently substituted default.
s, err := loadFromEnv()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s.log = log
s.params = &params
if s.Debug {
params.Logger.EnableDebugLogging()
}
@@ -256,11 +568,17 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
"maintenanceMode", s.MaintenanceMode,
"dataDir", s.DataDir,
"retentionSweepInterval", s.RetentionSweepInterval.String(),
// Logged because a perfectly valid non-positive value here
// disables idle expiry entirely, and that is worth showing
// back to the operator.
"sessionIdleTimeout", s.SessionIdleTimeout.String(),
"receiverRateLimit", s.ReceiverRateLimit,
"trustedProxies", len(s.TrustedProxies),
"hasSentryDSN", s.SentryDSN != "",
"hasMetricsAuth",
s.MetricsUsername != "" && s.MetricsPassword != "",
"hasMetricsAuth", s.MetricsAuthEnabled(),
)
s.warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log)
return s, nil
}

619
internal/config/config_test.go
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
package config_test
import (
"bytes"
"log/slog"
"os"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -14,6 +16,24 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
)
// Shared subtest names for the env-parsing tables below, which all
// exercise the same three cases against different variables.
const (
caseUnsetUsesDefault = "unset uses default"
caseValidValueParsed = "valid value is parsed"
caseUnparseableFails = "unparseable value fails startup"
// cidrPrivateV4 is the sample trusted-proxy block the
// TRUSTED_PROXIES cases are built from.
cidrPrivateV4 = "10.0.0.0/8"
// metricsAuthValue is the sample METRICS_PASSWORD the metrics
// credential cases are built from. It is asserted absent from
// the startup error, so it must not be a substring of either
// variable name that error prints.
metricsAuthValue = "s3cret"
)
func TestEnvironmentConfig(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
@@ -127,25 +147,47 @@ func TestRetentionSweepInterval(t *testing.T) {
set bool
value string
expectError bool
// sentinel, when set, must be wrapped by the startup
// error; every error case must additionally name the
// variable in its message.
sentinel error
expected time.Duration
}{
{
name: "unset uses default",
name: caseUnsetUsesDefault,
set: false,
expected: time.Hour,
},
{
name: "valid value is parsed",
name: caseValidValueParsed,
set: true,
value: "15m",
expected: 15 * time.Minute,
},
{
name: "unparseable value fails startup",
name: caseUnparseableFails,
set: true,
value: "not-a-duration",
expectError: true,
},
{
// A non-positive period panics the ticker in the
// reaper and archive-sweeper goroutines, long after
// startup has reported success, so it has to fail
// here instead.
name: "zero fails startup",
set: true,
value: "0s",
expectError: true,
sentinel: config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
},
{
name: "negative fails startup",
set: true,
value: "-1h",
expectError: true,
sentinel: config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
@@ -163,7 +205,9 @@ func TestRetentionSweepInterval(t *testing.T) {
}
if tt.expectError {
testRetentionSweepIntervalError(t)
expectStartupErrorFor(
t, "RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL", tt.sentinel,
)
} else {
testRetentionSweepIntervalSuccess(t, tt.expected)
}
@@ -171,7 +215,10 @@ func TestRetentionSweepInterval(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func testRetentionSweepIntervalError(t *testing.T) {
// startupError builds the app config.New belongs to and returns
// the error fx reports, which is non-nil whenever an environment
// value is set but invalid.
func startupError(t *testing.T) error {
t.Helper()
var cfg *config.Config
@@ -186,7 +233,33 @@ func testRetentionSweepIntervalError(t *testing.T) {
fx.Populate(&cfg),
)
assert.Error(t, app.Err())
return app.Err()
}
// expectStartupError asserts that fx refuses to build the app,
// which is what a set-but-invalid environment value must cause.
func expectStartupError(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
assert.Error(t, startupError(t))
}
// expectStartupErrorFor asserts that startup fails, that the error
// names the offending variable so an operator can find it, and,
// when sentinel is non-nil, that it wraps that sentinel.
func expectStartupErrorFor(
t *testing.T,
key string,
sentinel error,
) {
t.Helper()
err := startupError(t)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, key)
if sentinel != nil {
require.ErrorIs(t, err, sentinel)
}
}
func testRetentionSweepIntervalSuccess(
@@ -215,6 +288,98 @@ func testRetentionSweepIntervalSuccess(
assert.Equal(t, expected, cfg.RetentionSweepInterval)
}
func TestSessionIdleTimeout(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
set bool
value string
expectError bool
expected time.Duration
}{
{
name: caseUnsetUsesDefault,
set: false,
expected: 24 * time.Hour,
},
{
name: caseValidValueParsed,
set: true,
value: "30m",
expected: 30 * time.Minute,
},
{
name: caseUnparseableFails,
set: true,
value: "not-a-duration",
expectError: true,
},
{
// Non-positive is "idle expiry disabled" for this
// variable, not a configuration error: unlike
// RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL it never becomes a ticker
// period.
name: "zero disables idle expiry",
set: true,
value: "0s",
expected: 0,
},
{
name: "negative disables idle expiry",
set: true,
value: "-1h",
expected: -time.Hour,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
if tt.set {
t.Setenv("SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT", tt.value)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(
"SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT",
))
}
if tt.expectError {
expectStartupError(t)
} else {
testSessionIdleTimeoutSuccess(t, tt.expected)
}
})
}
}
func testSessionIdleTimeoutSuccess(
t *testing.T,
expected time.Duration,
) {
t.Helper()
var cfg *config.Config
app := fxtest.New(
t,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
config.New,
),
fx.Populate(&cfg),
)
require.NoError(t, app.Err())
app.RequireStart()
defer app.RequireStop()
assert.Equal(t, expected, cfg.SessionIdleTimeout)
}
func TestDefaultDataDir(t *testing.T) {
for _, env := range []string{"", "dev", "prod"} {
name := env
@@ -259,27 +424,61 @@ func TestDefaultDataDir(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestDataDirHelper pins the exported resolver against the value
// Config carries. The entry point takes the DATA_DIR lock through the
// helper before the fx graph exists, so the two disagreeing would mean
// locking one directory and writing to another.
func TestDataDirHelper(t *testing.T) {
for _, set := range []string{"", "/tmp/webhooker-datadir-helper"} {
name := "set"
if set == "" {
name = "unset"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
if set == "" {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv("DATA_DIR"))
} else {
t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", set)
}
expected := set
if expected == "" {
expected = config.DefaultDataDir
}
assert.Equal(t, expected, config.DataDir())
})
}
}
func TestReceiverRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
set bool
value string
expectError bool
// sentinel, when set, must be wrapped by the startup
// error; every error case must additionally name the
// variable in its message.
sentinel error
expected int
}{
{
name: "unset uses default",
name: caseUnsetUsesDefault,
set: false,
expected: 120,
},
{
name: "valid value is parsed",
name: caseValidValueParsed,
set: true,
value: "30",
expected: 30,
},
{
name: "unparseable value fails startup",
name: caseUnparseableFails,
set: true,
value: "not-a-number",
expectError: true,
@@ -289,12 +488,14 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
set: true,
value: "0",
expectError: true,
sentinel: config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
},
{
name: "negative fails startup",
set: true,
value: "-5",
expectError: true,
sentinel: config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
},
}
@@ -313,7 +514,9 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
}
if tt.expectError {
testReceiverRateLimitError(t)
expectStartupErrorFor(
t, "RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT", tt.sentinel,
)
} else {
testReceiverRateLimitSuccess(t, tt.expected)
}
@@ -321,24 +524,6 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func testReceiverRateLimitError(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
var cfg *config.Config
app := fx.New(
fx.NopLogger,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
config.New,
),
fx.Populate(&cfg),
)
assert.Error(t, app.Err())
}
func testReceiverRateLimitSuccess(
t *testing.T,
expected int,
@@ -364,3 +549,381 @@ func testReceiverRateLimitSuccess(
assert.Equal(t, expected, cfg.ReceiverRateLimit)
}
func TestTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
set bool
value string
expectError bool
expected []string
}{
{
// The default must be "trust nobody": an empty list
// means forwarded headers are ignored, never that
// every peer may speak for the client.
name: caseUnsetUsesDefault,
set: false,
expected: []string{},
},
{
name: "blank value trusts nothing",
set: true,
value: " ",
expected: []string{},
},
{
name: caseValidValueParsed,
set: true,
value: cidrPrivateV4 + ", 192.168.1.7 ,2001:db8::/32",
expected: []string{
cidrPrivateV4, "192.168.1.7/32", "2001:db8::/32",
},
},
{
name: "host bits are masked off",
set: true,
value: "10.1.2.3/8",
expected: []string{cidrPrivateV4},
},
{
// Peer addresses are unmapped before they are
// matched, so an IPv4-mapped prefix kept in that
// form could never match anything.
name: "IPv4-mapped prefix is unmapped",
set: true,
value: "::ffff:10.0.0.0/104",
expected: []string{cidrPrivateV4},
},
{
name: caseUnparseableFails,
set: true,
value: cidrPrivateV4 + ",not-an-address",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "out-of-range prefix length fails startup",
set: true,
value: "10.0.0.0/33",
expectError: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
if tt.set {
t.Setenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES", tt.value)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES"))
}
if tt.expectError {
expectStartupErrorFor(
t, "TRUSTED_PROXIES", config.ErrInvalidCIDR,
)
} else {
testTrustedProxiesSuccess(t, tt.expected)
}
})
}
}
func testTrustedProxiesSuccess(
t *testing.T,
expected []string,
) {
t.Helper()
var cfg *config.Config
app := fxtest.New(
t,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
config.New,
),
fx.Populate(&cfg),
)
require.NoError(t, app.Err())
app.RequireStart()
defer app.RequireStop()
got := make([]string, 0, len(cfg.TrustedProxies))
for _, prefix := range cfg.TrustedProxies {
got = append(got, prefix.String())
}
assert.Equal(t, expected, got)
}
// TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning covers the startup warning that
// tells an operator a deployment behind a reverse proxy shares one
// rate-limit bucket between every client, which turns the receiver
// limits into service-wide ceilings and collapses login failure
// counting. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty,
// in any environment: WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT defaults to dev, so gating
// on it would silence the warning for exactly the operator who never
// configured the deployment. It stays quiet once proxies are named.
func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
environment string
trustedProxies string
expectWarning bool
}{
{
name: "prod without trusted proxies warns",
environment: config.EnvironmentProd,
expectWarning: true,
},
{
name: "prod with trusted proxies is quiet",
environment: config.EnvironmentProd,
trustedProxies: cidrPrivateV4,
expectWarning: false,
},
{
// The default environment. An internet-exposed
// deployment whose operator never set
// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT lands here and has exactly
// the exposure the warning announces.
name: "dev without trusted proxies warns",
environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
expectWarning: true,
},
{
name: "dev with trusted proxies is quiet",
environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
trustedProxies: cidrPrivateV4,
expectWarning: false,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", tt.environment)
if tt.trustedProxies == "" {
require.NoError(
t, os.Unsetenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES"),
)
} else {
t.Setenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES", tt.trustedProxies)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
log := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(
&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{
Level: slog.LevelDebug,
},
))
require.NoError(
t,
config.WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest(log),
)
if !tt.expectWarning {
assert.Empty(t, buf.String())
return
}
logged := buf.String()
assert.Contains(t, logged, `"level":"WARN"`)
assert.Contains(t, logged, "TRUSTED_PROXIES")
assert.Contains(t, logged, "share one bucket")
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "throttle every other client's failed logins",
)
// The warning must not claim a lockout the login
// endpoint no longer permits: credentials are verified
// before any budget is spent.
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "a correct password still gets in",
)
// The text must stay accurate for a developer with
// nothing in front of the process, where an empty
// list costs nothing.
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "nothing proxying to this process",
)
})
}
}
// metricsEnv describes what one subtest below puts in the
// environment for a single METRICS_ variable. A variable that is
// set to the empty string and one that is not set at all are
// distinct inputs here, because the reported bug arrived through
// the first of them.
type metricsEnv struct {
set bool
value string
}
// unset leaves the variable out of the environment entirely.
func unset() metricsEnv {
return metricsEnv{set: false, value: ""}
}
// setTo sets the variable, including to the empty string.
func setTo(value string) metricsEnv {
return metricsEnv{set: true, value: value}
}
// metricsAuthCase is one row of the table in TestMetricsAuthConfig,
// named so the table can live in its own function and keep the test
// itself short.
type metricsAuthCase struct {
name string
username metricsEnv
password metricsEnv
expectError bool
expectAuth bool
}
// metricsAuthCases enumerates every combination of the two
// credentials, counting "set to the empty string" and "not set at
// all" as separate inputs on each side.
func metricsAuthCases() []metricsAuthCase {
return []metricsAuthCase{
{
name: "both unset leaves metrics unmounted",
username: unset(),
password: unset(),
},
{
name: "both empty leaves metrics unmounted",
username: setTo(""),
password: setTo(""),
},
{
name: "both set enables metrics auth",
username: setTo("metrics"),
password: setTo(metricsAuthValue),
expectAuth: true,
},
{
name: "username with unset password fails",
username: setTo("metrics"),
password: unset(),
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "username with empty password fails",
username: setTo("metrics"),
password: setTo(""),
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "password with unset username fails",
username: unset(),
password: setTo(metricsAuthValue),
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "password with empty username fails",
username: setTo(""),
password: setTo(metricsAuthValue),
expectError: true,
},
}
}
// TestMetricsAuthConfig covers every combination of METRICS_USERNAME
// and METRICS_PASSWORD. Either both carry a value, in which case
// /metrics is served behind basic auth, or neither does, in which
// case the route is never mounted. One without the other is a
// startup error rather than a fallback: mounting on the username
// alone published /metrics behind a credential map that accepted an
// empty password, which is the defect this test exists to pin. See
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/205.
func TestMetricsAuthConfig(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range metricsAuthCases() {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
if tt.username.set {
t.Setenv("METRICS_USERNAME", tt.username.value)
} else {
require.NoError(
t, os.Unsetenv("METRICS_USERNAME"),
)
}
if tt.password.set {
t.Setenv("METRICS_PASSWORD", tt.password.value)
} else {
require.NoError(
t, os.Unsetenv("METRICS_PASSWORD"),
)
}
if tt.expectError {
assertMetricsAuthRejected(t)
return
}
assertMetricsAuthAccepted(t, tt.expectAuth)
})
}
}
// assertMetricsAuthRejected requires that fx refused to build the
// graph, that the failure is ErrIncompleteMetricsAuth, and that the
// operator is told both variable names — the point of failing here
// rather than degrading is that the message says what to fix.
func assertMetricsAuthRejected(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
var cfg *config.Config
app := fx.New(
fx.NopLogger,
fx.Provide(globals.New, logger.New, config.New),
fx.Populate(&cfg),
)
err := app.Err()
require.Error(t, err)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, config.ErrIncompleteMetricsAuth)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "METRICS_USERNAME")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "METRICS_PASSWORD")
// The password is a secret and must not reach a startup error.
assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), metricsAuthValue)
}
// assertMetricsAuthAccepted requires that startup succeeded and that
// MetricsAuthEnabled — the single value the /metrics mount and the
// startup log both read — reports what the environment asked for.
func assertMetricsAuthAccepted(t *testing.T, expectAuth bool) {
t.Helper()
var cfg *config.Config
app := fxtest.New(
t,
fx.Provide(globals.New, logger.New, config.New),
fx.Populate(&cfg),
)
require.NoError(t, app.Err())
app.RequireStart()
defer app.RequireStop()
assert.Equal(t, expectAuth, cfg.MetricsAuthEnabled())
}

409
internal/config/env_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
package config_test
import (
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
)
// testEnvKey is a throwaway variable name used only by the helper
// tables below, so they cannot disturb real configuration.
const testEnvKey = "WEBHOOKER_TEST_VALUE"
// Real configuration variables exercised by the config.New tests.
const (
envKeyPort = "PORT"
envKeyDebug = "DEBUG"
envKeyMaintenanceMode = "MAINTENANCE_MODE"
)
// envBoolCase is one row of the envBool table.
type envBoolCase struct {
name string
set bool
value string
defaultValue bool
expectError bool
expected bool
}
// envBoolCases is the envBool table, kept out of the test body so
// the test itself stays readable.
func envBoolCases() []envBoolCase {
return []envBoolCase{
{
name: "unset uses default false",
defaultValue: false,
expected: false,
},
{
name: "unset uses default true",
defaultValue: true,
expected: true,
},
{
name: "empty uses default true",
set: true,
value: "",
defaultValue: true,
expected: true,
},
{
name: "true is parsed",
set: true,
value: "true",
expected: true,
},
{
name: "one is parsed",
set: true,
value: "1",
expected: true,
},
{
name: "False is parsed",
set: true,
value: "False",
defaultValue: true,
expected: false,
},
{
name: "zero is parsed",
set: true,
value: "0",
defaultValue: true,
expected: false,
},
{
name: "yes is rejected",
set: true,
value: "yes",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "on is rejected",
set: true,
value: "on",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "typo is rejected",
set: true,
value: "ture",
expectError: true,
},
}
}
func TestEnvBool(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range envBoolCases() {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
if tt.set {
t.Setenv(testEnvKey, tt.value)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(testEnvKey))
}
got, err := config.EnvBoolForTest(
testEnvKey, tt.defaultValue,
)
if tt.expectError {
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), testEnvKey)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.value)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, got)
})
}
}
func TestEnvPositiveInt(t *testing.T) {
const defaultValue = 7
tests := []struct {
name string
set bool
value string
expectError bool
errIs error
expected int
}{
{
name: "unset returns the default integer",
expected: defaultValue,
},
{
name: "empty returns the default integer",
set: true,
value: "",
expected: defaultValue,
},
{
name: "positive value is parsed",
set: true,
value: "42",
expected: 42,
},
{
name: "unparseable value is rejected",
set: true,
value: "not-a-number",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "zero is rejected",
set: true,
value: "0",
expectError: true,
errIs: config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
},
{
name: "negative is rejected",
set: true,
value: "-5",
expectError: true,
errIs: config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
if tt.set {
t.Setenv(testEnvKey, tt.value)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(testEnvKey))
}
got, err := config.EnvPositiveIntForTest(
testEnvKey, defaultValue,
)
if tt.expectError {
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), testEnvKey)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.value)
if tt.errIs != nil {
require.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.errIs)
}
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, got)
})
}
}
func TestEnvPort(t *testing.T) {
const defaultValue = 8080
tests := []struct {
name string
set bool
value string
expectError bool
errIs error
expected int
}{
{
name: "unset returns the default port",
expected: defaultValue,
},
{
name: "valid port is parsed",
set: true,
value: "9000",
expected: 9000,
},
{
name: "highest port is accepted",
set: true,
value: "65535",
expected: 65535,
},
{
name: "unparseable value is rejected",
set: true,
value: "not-a-port",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "zero is rejected",
set: true,
value: "0",
expectError: true,
errIs: config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
},
{
name: "above the port range is rejected",
set: true,
value: "65536",
expectError: true,
errIs: config.ErrInvalidPort,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
if tt.set {
t.Setenv(testEnvKey, tt.value)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(testEnvKey))
}
got, err := config.EnvPortForTest(
testEnvKey, defaultValue,
)
if tt.expectError {
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), testEnvKey)
if tt.errIs != nil {
require.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.errIs)
}
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, got)
})
}
}
// buildConfig constructs a Config through fx exactly as the
// application does, returning the config and any construction error.
func buildConfig(t *testing.T) (*config.Config, error) {
t.Helper()
var cfg *config.Config
app := fx.New(
fx.NopLogger,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
config.New,
),
fx.Populate(&cfg),
)
return cfg, app.Err()
}
func TestNewRejectsBadEnvValues(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
key string
value string
expectError bool
check func(t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config)
}{
{
name: "valid PORT is used",
key: envKeyPort,
value: "9001",
check: func(t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config) {
t.Helper()
assert.Equal(t, 9001, cfg.Port)
},
},
{
name: "unparseable PORT aborts startup",
key: envKeyPort,
value: "eighty-eighty",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "out-of-range PORT aborts startup",
key: envKeyPort,
value: "70000",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "valid DEBUG is used",
key: envKeyDebug,
value: "true",
check: func(t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config) {
t.Helper()
assert.True(t, cfg.Debug)
},
},
{
name: "unparseable DEBUG aborts startup",
key: envKeyDebug,
value: "ture",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "unparseable MAINTENANCE_MODE aborts startup",
key: envKeyMaintenanceMode,
value: "sometimes",
expectError: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
t.Setenv(tt.key, tt.value)
cfg, err := buildConfig(t)
if tt.expectError {
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.key)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.value)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, cfg)
tt.check(t, cfg)
})
}
}
// TestNewUsesDefaultsWhenUnset proves the fail-loud behaviour did not
// break the legitimate unset case: absent variables still get their
// documented defaults.
func TestNewUsesDefaultsWhenUnset(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
for _, key := range []string{
envKeyPort, envKeyDebug, envKeyMaintenanceMode,
} {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(key))
}
cfg, err := buildConfig(t)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, cfg)
assert.Equal(t, 8080, cfg.Port)
assert.False(t, cfg.Debug)
assert.False(t, cfg.MaintenanceMode)
}

37
internal/config/export_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
package config
import "log/slog"
// This file exposes the unexported environment parsing helpers to
// the external config_test package so each helper can be covered by
// its own table-driven test without weakening the package API.
// WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest loads a Config from the current
// environment and emits its startup warnings to log. The real logger
// writes to stdout, so this lets the warning's firing condition be
// asserted against a handler the test controls.
func WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest(log *slog.Logger) error {
c, err := loadFromEnv()
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log)
return nil
}
// EnvBoolForTest exposes envBool.
func EnvBoolForTest(key string, defaultValue bool) (bool, error) {
return envBool(key, defaultValue)
}
// EnvPositiveIntForTest exposes envPositiveInt.
func EnvPositiveIntForTest(key string, defaultValue int) (int, error) {
return envPositiveInt(key, defaultValue)
}
// EnvPortForTest exposes envPort.
func EnvPortForTest(key string, defaultValue int) (int, error) {
return envPort(key, defaultValue)
}

6
internal/database/database.go
View File

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
"gorm.io/gorm"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite" // Pure Go SQLite driver
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
)
@@ -155,7 +156,10 @@ func (d *Database) connect() error {
// Then use it with GORM
db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Dialector{
Conn: sqlDB,
}, &gorm.Config{})
}, &gorm.Config{
// Never leave this at GORM's default. See internal/gormlog.
Logger: gormlog.New(d.log),
})
if err != nil {
d.log.Error(
"failed to connect to database",

18
internal/database/database_test.go
View File

@@ -11,6 +11,20 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
)
const (
// testAppname is the Globals.Appname used in tests.
testAppname = "webhooker-test"
// testVersion is the Globals.Version used in tests.
testVersion = "test"
// testContentType is the event content type used in tests.
testContentType = "application/json"
// testWebhookName is the Webhook.Name used in tests.
testWebhookName = "test-webhook"
// testForeverLabel is Webhook.RetentionLabel for a retain-forever
// webhook.
testForeverLabel = "forever"
)
func setupTestDB(
t *testing.T,
) (*database.Database, *fxtest.Lifecycle) {
@@ -19,8 +33,8 @@ func setupTestDB(
lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
g := &globals.Globals{
Appname: "webhooker-test",
Version: "test",
Appname: testAppname,
Version: testVersion,
}
l, err := logger.New(

159
internal/database/event_db_isolation.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
package database
import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
)
// omitAssociationsCallback is the name the association guard is
// registered under on a per-webhook database's create and update
// callback chains.
const omitAssociationsCallback = "webhooker:omit_associations"
// omitAssociations makes every create and update issued against a
// per-webhook database skip GORM's automatic association save.
//
// A per-webhook database holds the event tier only, but Delivery
// declares belongs-to Event and Target and the delivery engine fills
// both in memory before writing. Without this guard GORM upserts
// those parent rows here on the delivery and retry write paths,
// copying targets.config, which holds destination URLs and bearer
// credentials, into the file most likely to be backed up or handed
// to someone else. Registering the guard on the connection covers
// every write path, including writes inside a transaction and write
// paths added later. Every event-tier row this file holds is written
// explicitly, so nothing depends on the automatic save.
func omitAssociations(db *gorm.DB) error {
omit := func(tx *gorm.DB) {
tx.Statement.Omits = append(
tx.Statement.Omits, clause.Associations,
)
}
err := db.Callback().Create().
Before("gorm:save_before_associations").
Register(omitAssociationsCallback, omit)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"registering create association guard: %w", err,
)
}
err = db.Callback().Update().
Before("gorm:save_before_associations").
Register(omitAssociationsCallback, omit)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"registering update association guard: %w", err,
)
}
return nil
}
// eventDBSweptVersion is the PRAGMA user_version purgeTargetRows
// stamps into a per-webhook database once it has removed any leaked
// target rows *and* the VACUUM that removes their bytes has returned.
// Nothing else in the tree uses user_version, so 0 means "not swept
// by this build".
//
// The stamp, not the DELETE, is what records that a file is done. A
// DELETE commits on its own, so a sweep that is interrupted or whose
// VACUUM fails leaves a file whose rows are gone but whose credential
// bytes are still in the free pages -- indistinguishable, by row
// count, from a file that never leaked. Both leave the stamp unset,
// so the next open sweeps again.
const eventDBSweptVersion = 1
// purgeTargetRows deletes target rows that an earlier build's
// association upsert wrote into a per-webhook database, and rewrites
// the file so their bytes are gone with them. AutoMigrate creates a
// targets table in every one of these files because Delivery declares
// a belongs-to Target, but nothing in the event tier may put rows in
// it. The rows it did put there are junk, not history: they carry an
// empty webhook_id, and delivery rows resolve their target against
// the main database, so nothing here refers to them.
//
// The DELETE only unlinks the rows: modernc.org/sqlite leaves
// secure_delete at SQLite's default of off, so the credential bytes
// stay readable in the file's free pages and a backup of a swept file
// would still hand them over. VACUUM rewrites the file without them.
//
// This runs before every migration and is gated on
// eventDBSweptVersion, so a file pays for the rewrite once, on the
// first open that finds it unstamped, and every open after that is a
// PRAGMA read. A file this build created is stamped before its
// targets table exists, so it never vacuums at all. A failure here
// fails the open with the stamp left unset, so the sweep is retried
// rather than skipped -- a webhook whose file cannot be swept stays
// unusable instead of quietly serving from a file that still holds
// recoverable credentials.
func purgeTargetRows(
db *gorm.DB, log *slog.Logger, webhookID string,
) error {
var version int
// Row().Scan, not (*gorm.DB).Scan: see internal/gormlog.
err := db.Raw("PRAGMA user_version").Row().Scan(&version)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"reading sweep marker of webhook database %s: %w",
webhookID, err,
)
}
if version >= eventDBSweptVersion {
return nil
}
var purged int64
if db.Migrator().HasTable("targets") {
res := db.Exec("DELETE FROM targets")
if res.Error != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"purging target rows from webhook database %s: %w",
webhookID, res.Error,
)
}
purged = res.RowsAffected
// Unconditional: a zero row count here does not mean there is
// nothing to remove, only that no *live* row is left. See
// eventDBSweptVersion.
err = db.Exec("VACUUM").Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"purged %d leaked target rows from webhook database "+
"%s but vacuuming it failed, so the deleted "+
"target credentials are still recoverable from "+
"the file; it stays marked unswept and the next "+
"open retries: %w",
purged, webhookID, err,
)
}
}
err = db.Exec(fmt.Sprintf(
"PRAGMA user_version = %d", eventDBSweptVersion,
)).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"marking webhook database %s swept: %w", webhookID, err,
)
}
if purged > 0 {
log.Warn(
"purged leaked target rows from per-webhook database",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"rows", purged,
)
}
return nil
}

438
internal/database/event_db_isolation_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
package database_test
import (
"bytes"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// testDataDirPerm is the mode the test data directory is created
// with.
const testDataDirPerm = 0o750
// eventDBDataDir returns a data directory that a WebhookDBManager
// can be pointed at.
func eventDBDataDir(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "events")
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(dir, testDataDirPerm))
return dir
}
// openRawEventDB opens the per-webhook database file directly,
// without the manager, so a test can put a file on disk in a state
// the manager has to cope with, or inspect one afterwards.
func openRawEventDB(
t *testing.T, dataDir, webhookID string,
) *sql.DB {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(
dataDir, fmt.Sprintf("events-%s.db", webhookID),
)
sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
"sqlite",
fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=rwc", path),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
return sqlDB
}
// eventDBFileBytes reads a per-webhook database file off disk, so a
// test can assert on what the file itself still holds rather than on
// what a query returns.
func eventDBFileBytes(t *testing.T, dataDir, webhookID string) []byte {
t.Helper()
//nolint:gosec // reads a file the test just created under t.TempDir()
raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(
dataDir, fmt.Sprintf("events-%s.db", webhookID),
))
require.NoError(t, err)
return raw
}
// eventDBUserVersion returns the PRAGMA user_version of a per-webhook
// database file, which is the marker purgeTargetRows stamps once it
// has swept and vacuumed.
func eventDBUserVersion(t *testing.T, sqlDB *sql.DB) int {
t.Helper()
var version int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(), "PRAGMA user_version",
).Scan(&version))
return version
}
// clearEventDBSweptMarker resets the sweep marker to 0, which is what
// a file written by a build without the sweep looks like. Tests that
// seed a leaked row have to create the file through the manager to
// get the real targets table shape, and that stamps it.
func clearEventDBSweptMarker(t *testing.T, sqlDB *sql.DB) {
t.Helper()
_, err := sqlDB.ExecContext(t.Context(), "PRAGMA user_version = 0")
require.NoError(t, err)
}
// countTargetRows returns the number of rows in the targets table of
// a per-webhook database file, or -1 if the table does not exist.
func countTargetRows(t *testing.T, sqlDB *sql.DB) int {
t.Helper()
var tables int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(),
"SELECT count(*) FROM sqlite_master "+
"WHERE type = 'table' AND name = 'targets'",
).Scan(&tables))
if tables == 0 {
return -1
}
var rows int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(), "SELECT count(*) FROM targets",
).Scan(&rows))
return rows
}
// TestOpenPurgesLeakedTargetRows covers the sweep for event
// databases written by a build that let GORM upsert target rows
// into them: opening the database clears them, and opening it again
// is a no-op.
func TestOpenPurgesLeakedTargetRows(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
// Create the file the way the application does, so the targets
// table has exactly the shape AutoMigrate gives it, then write
// a leaked row into it the way the association upsert did.
initial := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err := initial.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, initial.CloseAll())
seed := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
_, err = seed.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"INSERT INTO targets "+
"(id, webhook_id, name, type, config) "+
"VALUES (?, '', ?, ?, ?)",
uuid.New().String(),
"leaked-target",
"slack",
`{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/T000/B000/secret"}`,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, 1, countTargetRows(t, seed))
clearEventDBSweptMarker(t, seed)
require.NoError(t, seed.Close())
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
check := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Zero(t, countTargetRows(t, check))
assert.Equal(
t, 1, eventDBUserVersion(t, check),
"a completed sweep must mark the file so later opens skip it",
)
require.NoError(t, check.Close())
// Idempotent: a second open leaves it at zero and does not
// error.
again := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = again.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, again.CloseAll())
recheck := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Zero(t, countTargetRows(t, recheck))
}
// TestOpenPurgeRemovesCredentialBytes covers the sweep at the level
// that matters for a backup handed to someone else: the leaked
// credential must be gone from the raw bytes of the file, not merely
// unreachable by query. A bare DELETE unlinks the row and leaves the
// bytes readable in the free pages, so this fails without the VACUUM
// in purgeTargetRows.
func TestOpenPurgeRemovesCredentialBytes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
credential := "T00000000/B00000000/" + uuid.New().String()
initial := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err := initial.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, initial.CloseAll())
seed := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
_, err = seed.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"INSERT INTO targets "+
"(id, webhook_id, name, type, config) "+
"VALUES (?, '', ?, ?, ?)",
uuid.New().String(),
"leaked-target",
"slack",
fmt.Sprintf(
`{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/%s"}`, credential,
),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
clearEventDBSweptMarker(t, seed)
require.NoError(t, seed.Close())
// The seed has to be in the file for its absence later to mean
// anything.
require.True(
t,
bytes.Contains(
eventDBFileBytes(t, dataDir, webhookID),
[]byte(credential),
),
"seeded credential is not in the file, so this test proves nothing",
)
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
assert.NotContains(
t,
string(eventDBFileBytes(t, dataDir, webhookID)),
credential,
"leaked credential is still recoverable from the raw file",
)
}
// TestOpenRevacuumsAfterIncompleteSweep covers the case a row count
// cannot see: the rows are already deleted but the file was never
// vacuumed, because an earlier sweep died between the two or its
// VACUUM failed. The credential bytes are still recoverable, and the
// unset marker is the only thing that says so, so the next open must
// vacuum rather than conclude from the empty table that there is
// nothing to do.
func TestOpenRevacuumsAfterIncompleteSweep(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
credential := "T00000000/B00000000/" + uuid.New().String()
initial := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err := initial.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, initial.CloseAll())
seed := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
_, err = seed.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"INSERT INTO targets "+
"(id, webhook_id, name, type, config) "+
"VALUES (?, '', ?, ?, ?)",
uuid.New().String(),
"leaked-target",
"slack",
fmt.Sprintf(
`{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/%s"}`, credential,
),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Exactly the state an interrupted sweep leaves: rows gone,
// marker unset, bytes still in the free pages.
_, err = seed.ExecContext(t.Context(), "DELETE FROM targets")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Zero(t, countTargetRows(t, seed))
clearEventDBSweptMarker(t, seed)
require.NoError(t, seed.Close())
require.True(
t,
bytes.Contains(
eventDBFileBytes(t, dataDir, webhookID),
[]byte(credential),
),
"the deleted row's bytes must still be in the file, or this "+
"test proves nothing",
)
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
assert.NotContains(
t,
string(eventDBFileBytes(t, dataDir, webhookID)),
credential,
"an interrupted sweep was not retried, so the credential is "+
"still recoverable from the raw file",
)
check := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Equal(t, 1, eventDBUserVersion(t, check))
}
// TestOpenSkipsSweptDatabase covers the other half of the marker: a
// file this build created is marked without ever being vacuumed, and
// a marked file is not swept again.
func TestOpenSkipsSweptDatabase(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
marked := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Equal(t, 1, eventDBUserVersion(t, marked))
// A marked file is left alone, so a row written into it survives
// a reopen. Nothing writes target rows any more; this stands in
// for the sweep having run.
_, err = marked.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"INSERT INTO targets "+
"(id, webhook_id, name, type, config) "+
"VALUES (?, '', ?, ?, ?)",
uuid.New().String(), "sentinel", "slack", `{}`,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, marked.Close())
again := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = again.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, again.CloseAll())
check := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Equal(
t, 1, countTargetRows(t, check),
"a marked file must not be swept again",
)
}
// TestOpenSucceedsWithoutTargetsTable covers an existing event
// database that never grew a targets table. The sweep must not fail
// startup on it.
func TestOpenSucceedsWithoutTargetsTable(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
seed := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
_, err := seed.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"CREATE TABLE events (id text PRIMARY KEY)",
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, seed.Close())
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, db)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
}
// TestEventDBCreateOmitsAssociations covers the connection-level
// guard directly: a Delivery carrying its Event and Target in
// memory, written through the manager's handle, must store only the
// delivery row.
func TestEventDBCreateOmitsAssociations(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
target := database.Target{
WebhookID: webhookID,
Name: "leaky-target",
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/secret"}`,
}
target.ID = uuid.New().String()
event := database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: "POST",
Headers: `{}`,
Body: `{}`,
}
event.ID = uuid.New().String()
d := &database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: target.ID,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusPending,
Event: event,
Target: target,
}
d.ID = uuid.New().String()
require.NoError(t, db.Create(d).Error)
require.NoError(t, db.Model(d).
Update("status", database.DeliveryStatusDelivered).
Error)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
check := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Zero(t, countTargetRows(t, check))
}

42
internal/database/export_test.go
View File

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"os"
"time"
"go.uber.org/fx"
)
// NewTestRetentionReaper builds a RetentionReaper backed by the given
@@ -29,3 +31,43 @@ func NewTestRetentionReaper(
func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportSweep(ctx context.Context) {
r.sweep(ctx)
}
// ExportRegisterHooks registers the reaper's real fx lifecycle hooks
// on a lifecycle supplied by a test, so a test can drive the exact
// OnStart/OnStop functions the application runs and hand OnStart the
// kind of context fx actually supplies.
func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportRegisterHooks(lc fx.Lifecycle) {
r.registerHooks(lc)
}
// ExportStart starts the reaper's background loop for tests.
func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportStart() {
r.start()
}
// ExportStop stops the reaper's background loop for tests.
func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportStop(ctx context.Context) error {
return r.stop(ctx)
}
// ExportWedgeLoop adds a goroutine to the reaper's WaitGroup that
// never observes cancellation and returns only when release is
// closed. It stands in for a sweep stuck on a locked database.
func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportWedgeLoop(
release <-chan struct{},
) {
r.wg.Go(func() {
<-release
})
}
// ExportSetInterval overrides the sweep interval for tests.
func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportSetInterval(d time.Duration) {
r.interval = d
}
// DummyPasswordHashForTest exposes the encoded hash that unknown
// usernames are verified against.
func DummyPasswordHashForTest() string {
return dummyPasswordHash()
}

8
internal/database/model_apikey.go
View File

@@ -2,12 +2,16 @@ package database
import "time"
// APIKey represents an API key for a user
// APIKey represents an API key for a user.
//
// Key is a bearer credential, so it is never marshalled with the
// model. A creation handler that has to show it once returns it in its
// own response type.
type APIKey struct {
BaseModel
UserID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"userId"`
Key string `gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null" json:"key"`
Key string `gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null" json:"-"`
Description string `json:"description"`
LastUsedAt *time.Time `json:"lastUsedAt,omitempty"`

5
internal/database/model_entrypoint.go
View File

@@ -5,7 +5,10 @@ type Entrypoint struct {
BaseModel
WebhookID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"webhookId"`
Path string `gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null" json:"path"` // URL path for this entrypoint
// Path is the URL path for this entrypoint.
Path string `gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null" json:"path"`
Description string `json:"description"`
Active bool `gorm:"default:true" json:"active"`

107
internal/database/model_secrets_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
package database_test
import (
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// keptField is a non-secret value planted alongside each secret, so
// the assertions below cannot pass by the model marshalling to nothing.
const keptField = "keepme"
// marshalModel encodes a model the way a future JSON handler would.
func marshalModel(t *testing.T, v any) string {
t.Helper()
encoded, err := json.Marshal(v)
require.NoError(t, err)
return string(encoded)
}
// TestModelsDoNotMarshalTheirSecrets pins the barrier for the JSON
// path. The /api/v1 route group exists and is empty; delivery's
// TargetView masks the credential for the HTML path only, so without
// these tags the first handler that marshals a model serialises the
// secret with it. Each field below is a live credential:
//
// - Target.Config holds an incoming-webhook URL whose path segments
// are the bearer token.
// - APIKey.Key is a bearer token outright.
// - Setting.Value holds the session encryption key.
// - User.Password holds the Argon2 hash, and was already tagged.
func TestModelsDoNotMarshalTheirSecrets(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const marker = "QQMODELMARKERQQ"
cases := []struct {
name string
model any
}{
{
name: "target config",
model: database.Target{
Name: keptField,
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"https://h/s/` + marker + `"}`,
},
},
{
name: "api key",
model: database.APIKey{
Description: keptField,
Key: marker,
},
},
{
name: "setting value",
model: database.Setting{
Key: keptField,
Value: marker,
},
},
{
name: "user password hash",
model: database.User{
Username: keptField,
Password: marker,
},
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
encoded := marshalModel(t, tc.model)
assert.NotContains(t, encoded, marker)
assert.Contains(t, encoded, keptField)
})
}
}
// TestWebhookMarshalsNoTargetConfig covers the nested case: a webhook
// marshalled with its targets preloaded must not carry the credential
// through the association either.
func TestWebhookMarshalsNoTargetConfig(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const marker = "QQNESTEDMARKERQQ"
encoded := marshalModel(t, database.Webhook{
Name: keptField,
Targets: []database.Target{{
Name: "slack",
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"https://h/s/` + marker + `"}`,
}},
})
assert.NotContains(t, encoded, marker)
assert.Contains(t, encoded, keptField)
}

5
internal/database/model_setting.go
View File

@@ -4,5 +4,8 @@ package database
// Used for auto-generated values like the session encryption key.
type Setting struct {
Key string `gorm:"primaryKey" json:"key"`
Value string `gorm:"type:text;not null" json:"value"`
// Value holds the session encryption key, so it is never
// marshalled with the model.
Value string `gorm:"type:text;not null" json:"-"`
}

13
internal/database/model_target.go
View File

@@ -20,10 +20,17 @@ type Target struct {
Type TargetType `gorm:"not null" json:"type"`
Active bool `gorm:"default:true" json:"active"`
// Configuration fields (JSON stored based on type)
Config string `gorm:"type:text" json:"config"` // JSON configuration
// Configuration fields (JSON stored based on type).
//
// json:"-" because the blob holds the target's credential — a
// Slack incoming-webhook URL, or an http destination whose path
// segments are the secret. delivery.TargetView is the masking
// barrier for the HTML path; this tag is the barrier for any
// handler that marshals the model itself.
Config string `gorm:"type:text" json:"-"` // JSON configuration
// For HTTP targets (max_retries=0 means fire-and-forget, >0 enables retries with backoff)
// For HTTP targets (max_retries=0 means fire-and-forget,
// >0 enables retries with backoff)
MaxRetries int `json:"maxRetries,omitempty"`
MaxQueueSize int `json:"maxQueueSize,omitempty"`

111
internal/database/model_webhook.go
View File

@@ -1,16 +1,125 @@
package database
import (
"math"
"strconv"
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
const (
// DefaultRetentionDays is the event retention period applied to a
// webhook created without an explicit retention value. It is the
// single source of truth for that policy and must stay in sync
// with the `gorm:"default:30"` column default on
// Webhook.RetentionDays below; a struct tag cannot reference a
// constant, so a test asserts the two agree.
DefaultRetentionDays = 30
// RetentionForeverDays is the sentinel RetentionDays value meaning
// "retain events forever". Users express that intent as 0, which
// Webhook.BeforeSave rewrites to this value: the column default
// substitutes DefaultRetentionDays for a zero value at insert
// time, so a zero can never survive a round trip to the database.
// Nothing outside this file may hardcode the number.
RetentionForeverDays = 365 * 1000
// MaxFiniteRetentionDays is the largest finite retention period the
// reaper's cutoff arithmetic can represent, and therefore the
// largest one a caller may request. It is derived from that
// arithmetic rather than picked: retentionCutoff computes
// retentionDays * hoursPerDay * time.Hour, and a time.Duration is
// an int64 nanosecond count, so math.MaxInt64 nanoseconds divided
// by an hour and then by a day is the exact ceiling — 106751 days,
// a little over 292 years.
//
// One day more overflows int64, wraps the product negative, and
// turns the cutoff into a timestamp in the far future that matches
// every row in the webhook's database. That is why this bound is
// enforced on input and why retentionCutoff saturates underneath
// it. Note that RetentionForeverDays deliberately sits above this
// ceiling: such webhooks are skipped before any cutoff is
// computed, and never reach the arithmetic at all.
MaxFiniteRetentionDays = int(
math.MaxInt64 / int64(time.Hour) / hoursPerDay,
)
)
// Webhook represents a webhook processing unit that groups entrypoints and targets
//
// Every method below takes a pointer receiver. BeforeSave has to,
// because it mutates the record and GORM only invokes hooks declared
// that way; the display helpers follow suit so the receiver kinds do
// not mix. Handlers therefore put a *Webhook into template data:
// html/template cannot call a pointer method on a value held in a map,
// because a map element is not addressable.
type Webhook struct {
BaseModel
UserID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"userId"`
Name string `gorm:"not null" json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description"`
RetentionDays int `gorm:"default:30" json:"retentionDays"` // Days to retain events
// RetentionDays is the number of days to retain events. A value of
// RetentionForeverDays means retain forever. The column default
// must equal DefaultRetentionDays.
RetentionDays int `gorm:"default:30" json:"retentionDays"`
// Relations
User User `json:"user,omitzero"`
Entrypoints []Entrypoint `json:"entrypoints,omitempty"`
Targets []Target `json:"targets,omitempty"`
}
// BeforeSave normalises RetentionDays on every insert and update. A
// non-positive value is the user's way of asking for "retain forever",
// which is stored as the RetentionForeverDays sentinel.
//
// This has to happen in a hook rather than at the call sites. GORM
// substitutes the column default (DefaultRetentionDays) for a zero
// value while building the insert statement, which runs after
// BeforeSave; rewriting any later than this loses that race and the
// row lands at 30 days. Living on the model also means a future call
// site — a REST API, a fixture, a migration — cannot bypass it.
func (w *Webhook) BeforeSave(_ *gorm.DB) error {
if w.RetentionDays <= 0 {
w.RetentionDays = RetentionForeverDays
}
return nil
}
// retainsForever reports whether a stored RetentionDays value means
// "keep events indefinitely". It is the single definition of that
// question, shared by Webhook.RetainsForever and by the reaper's
// cutoff computation so the two cannot disagree about which webhooks
// are exempt from reaping.
//
// It accepts the RetentionForeverDays sentinel written by BeforeSave
// and, defensively, the non-positive values that rows written before
// the sentinel existed may still carry.
func retainsForever(retentionDays int) bool {
return retentionDays <= 0 ||
retentionDays >= RetentionForeverDays
}
// RetainsForever reports whether this webhook's events are kept
// indefinitely.
func (w *Webhook) RetainsForever() bool {
return retainsForever(w.RetentionDays)
}
// RetentionLabel returns the webhook's retention policy as display
// text, so that no template has to know about the sentinel value.
func (w *Webhook) RetentionLabel() string {
if w.RetainsForever() {
return "forever"
}
if w.RetentionDays == 1 {
return "1 day"
}
return strconv.Itoa(w.RetentionDays) + " days"
}

222
internal/database/model_webhook_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
package database_test
import (
"context"
"reflect"
"strconv"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// startedTestDB returns a started main database for model-level tests.
func startedTestDB(t *testing.T) *gorm.DB {
t.Helper()
db, lc := setupTestDB(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
t.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) })
return db.DB()
}
// storedRetention reads the retention_days column straight out of the
// row, so the assertion is about what was persisted rather than about
// whatever the in-memory struct happens to hold.
func storedRetention(t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB, id string) int {
t.Helper()
var got int
require.NoError(
t,
db.Model(&database.Webhook{}).
Where("id = ?", id).
Pluck("retention_days", &got).Error,
)
return got
}
// newWebhookWithRetention creates a webhook through the ordinary Create
// path, so the BeforeSave hook and the GORM column default both apply
// exactly as they do in production.
func newWebhookWithRetention(
t *testing.T,
db *gorm.DB,
wh *database.Webhook,
) string {
t.Helper()
wh.UserID = uuid.New().String()
wh.Name = testWebhookName
require.NoError(
t,
db.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
)
return wh.ID
}
func TestWebhookBeforeSave_ZeroBecomesForeverSentinel(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := startedTestDB(t)
wh := &database.Webhook{RetentionDays: 0}
id := newWebhookWithRetention(t, db, wh)
assert.Equal(
t,
database.RetentionForeverDays,
storedRetention(t, db, id),
"a zero retention must be stored as the sentinel, "+
"not replaced by the column default",
)
}
func TestWebhookBeforeSave_NegativeBecomesForeverSentinel(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := startedTestDB(t)
wh := &database.Webhook{RetentionDays: -5}
id := newWebhookWithRetention(t, db, wh)
assert.Equal(
t,
database.RetentionForeverDays,
storedRetention(t, db, id),
)
}
func TestWebhookBeforeSave_PositiveIsPreserved(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := startedTestDB(t)
wh := &database.Webhook{RetentionDays: 7}
id := newWebhookWithRetention(t, db, wh)
assert.Equal(t, 7, storedRetention(t, db, id))
}
// TestWebhookBeforeSave_UpdateToZeroBecomesSentinel proves the hook
// fires on update as well as insert, via the same Save call the edit
// handler makes.
func TestWebhookBeforeSave_UpdateToZeroBecomesSentinel(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := startedTestDB(t)
wh := &database.Webhook{RetentionDays: 30}
id := newWebhookWithRetention(t, db, wh)
require.Equal(t, 30, storedRetention(t, db, id))
wh.RetentionDays = 0
require.NoError(t, db.Omit(clause.Associations).Save(wh).Error)
assert.Equal(
t,
database.RetentionForeverDays,
storedRetention(t, db, id),
)
}
// TestWebhookRetentionColumnDefaultMatchesConstant guards the one place
// the default lives twice: a struct tag cannot reference a constant, so
// this asserts the tag and DefaultRetentionDays agree.
func TestWebhookRetentionColumnDefaultMatchesConstant(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
field, ok := reflect.TypeFor[database.Webhook]().
FieldByName("RetentionDays")
require.True(t, ok, "Webhook.RetentionDays must exist")
assert.Equal(
t,
"default:"+strconv.Itoa(database.DefaultRetentionDays),
field.Tag.Get("gorm"),
)
}
// TestMaxFiniteRetentionDaysIsTheOverflowCeiling asserts that the
// constant is exactly where the cutoff arithmetic stops working, which
// is what makes it a derived bound rather than a round number someone
// liked. One day more wraps the int64 nanosecond count negative, and a
// negative span is precisely what turned a cutoff into a future
// timestamp that matched — and deleted — every row.
//
// The multiplications are done through variables on purpose: as
// constant expressions the overflowing one would not compile.
func TestMaxFiniteRetentionDaysIsTheOverflowCeiling(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const hoursPerDay = 24
atCeiling := database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays
overCeiling := database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays + 1
assert.Positive(
t,
time.Duration(atCeiling*hoursPerDay)*time.Hour,
"the ceiling itself must still be representable",
)
assert.Negative(
t,
time.Duration(overCeiling*hoursPerDay)*time.Hour,
"one day past the ceiling must overflow",
)
assert.Less(
t,
database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays,
database.RetentionForeverDays,
"the sentinel sits above the ceiling and is only safe "+
"because retain-forever webhooks skip the arithmetic",
)
}
func TestWebhookRetainsForeverAndLabel(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []struct {
name string
days int
forever bool
label string
}{
{
"sentinel",
database.RetentionForeverDays, true, testForeverLabel,
},
{
"above sentinel",
database.RetentionForeverDays + 1, true, testForeverLabel,
},
{"legacy zero", 0, true, testForeverLabel},
{"legacy negative", -1, true, testForeverLabel},
{"default", database.DefaultRetentionDays, false, "30 days"},
{"one day", 1, false, "1 day"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
wh := database.Webhook{RetentionDays: tc.days}
assert.Equal(t, tc.forever, wh.RetainsForever())
assert.Equal(t, tc.label, wh.RetentionLabel())
})
}
}

37
internal/database/password.go
View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"math/big"
"strings"
"sync"
"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
)
@@ -29,6 +30,10 @@ const hashParts = 6
// triggers per-character-class complexity enforcement.
const minPasswordComplexityLen = 4
// dummyPasswordLen is the length of the throwaway password behind
// dummyPasswordHash.
const dummyPasswordLen = 32
// Sentinel errors returned by decodeHash.
var (
errInvalidHashFormat = errors.New("invalid hash format")
@@ -122,6 +127,38 @@ func VerifyPassword(
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(hash, otherHash) == 1, nil
}
// dummyPasswordHash is an encoded Argon2id hash of a random
// password, computed once on first use. Nothing can match it: the
// password it encodes is discarded as soon as it is hashed. It is
// process-wide because building it per request would add a second
// 64 MB Argon2id pass to every login for an unknown username.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // computed once, see above
var dummyPasswordHash = sync.OnceValue(func() string {
password, err := GenerateRandomPassword(dummyPasswordLen)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("generating the dummy password: %v", err))
}
hash, err := HashPassword(password)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("hashing the dummy password: %v", err))
}
return hash
})
// VerifyDummyPassword performs a credential verification that cannot
// succeed, at the same cost as a real one.
//
// Login must charge an unknown username the same work as a known
// one. Returning early for an account that does not exist answers in
// microseconds where a real account takes tens of milliseconds, which
// is a username oracle any client can read off the response time.
func VerifyDummyPassword(password string) {
_, _ = VerifyPassword(password, dummyPasswordHash())
}
// decodeHash extracts parameters, salt, and hash from an
// encoded hash string.
func decodeHash(

38
internal/database/password_test.go
View File

@@ -191,3 +191,41 @@ func TestHashPasswordUniqueness(t *testing.T) {
)
}
}
// TestVerifyDummyPassword_DoesRealWork covers the anti-enumeration
// path. Login charges an unknown username a verification against a
// dummy hash so that a nonexistent account is not answered in
// microseconds where a real one takes tens of milliseconds. That only
// works if the dummy hash is a real, decodable Argon2id hash: a
// malformed one would make VerifyPassword fail on the decode and
// return before hashing anything.
func TestVerifyDummyPassword_DoesRealWork(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Runs the OnceValue that builds the dummy hash, so a panic in
// it surfaces here rather than on a live login.
database.VerifyDummyPassword("whatever was submitted")
dummy := database.DummyPasswordHashForTest()
// A hash the verifier cannot decode would make VerifyPassword
// return on the decode error, before hashing anything — the
// timing oracle this path exists to close.
valid, err := database.VerifyPassword("whatever", dummy)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf(
"the dummy hash must decode like a real one: %v", err,
)
}
if valid {
t.Error("nothing may authenticate against the dummy hash")
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(dummy, "$argon2id$") {
t.Errorf(
"the dummy hash must use the same algorithm as real "+
"hashes, got %q", dummy,
)
}
}

113
internal/database/retention.go
View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"go.uber.org/fx"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/lifecycle"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
)
@@ -56,24 +57,42 @@ func NewRetentionReaper(
interval: params.Config.RetentionSweepInterval,
}
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
OnStart: func(ctx context.Context) error {
r.start(ctx)
return nil
},
OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
r.stop()
return nil
},
})
r.registerHooks(lc)
return r
}
func (r *RetentionReaper) start(ctx context.Context) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
// registerHooks wires the reaper's start and stop into the fx
// lifecycle. The start hook's context is deliberately ignored (see
// start for why the sweep loop must not inherit it); the stop hook's
// context is honoured (see stop).
func (r *RetentionReaper) registerHooks(lc fx.Lifecycle) {
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
//nolint:contextcheck // Not inheriting the hook context is
// the point: see start.
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
r.start()
return nil
},
OnStop: func(ctx context.Context) error {
return r.stop(ctx)
},
})
}
// start launches the background sweep loop.
//
// The loop's context is derived from context.Background(), NOT from
// the fx OnStart hook context. The hook context carries fx's start
// timeout (15s by default) and is cancelled once the start phase
// completes, so a loop derived from it dies 45 minutes before its
// first tick under the default one-hour sweep interval, leaving a
// reaper that never reaps. A long-lived goroutine must outlive the
// startup phase, so its lifetime is bounded by OnStop instead: stop
// cancels this context and waits on the WaitGroup.
func (r *RetentionReaper) start() {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
r.cancel = cancel
r.wg.Add(1)
@@ -86,15 +105,27 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) start(ctx context.Context) {
)
}
func (r *RetentionReaper) stop() {
// stop cancels the sweep loop's context and waits for it to
// exit, bounded by the stop hook's context: a sweep wedged on a
// locked database must not hang the process past fx's stop
// timeout.
func (r *RetentionReaper) stop(ctx context.Context) error {
r.log.Info("retention reaper stopping")
if r.cancel != nil {
r.cancel()
}
r.wg.Wait()
err := lifecycle.WaitForShutdown(
ctx, r.log, "retention reaper", &r.wg,
)
if err != nil {
return err
}
r.log.Info("retention reaper stopped")
return nil
}
func (r *RetentionReaper) run(ctx context.Context) {
@@ -114,7 +145,8 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) run(ctx context.Context) {
}
// sweep lists every webhook from the main database and reaps expired
// rows from each per-webhook database whose RetentionDays is positive.
// rows from each per-webhook database that has a finite retention
// policy. Webhooks set to retain forever are skipped entirely.
func (r *RetentionReaper) sweep(ctx context.Context) {
var webhooks []Webhook
@@ -139,8 +171,13 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) sweep(ctx context.Context) {
wh := webhooks[i]
// RetentionDays of zero or less means retain forever.
if wh.RetentionDays <= 0 {
// Skip retain-forever webhooks before building any query.
// RetainsForever covers both the RetentionForeverDays
// sentinel and the non-positive values that predate it: the
// sentinel is a positive number, so without this the reaper
// would compute a cutoff a thousand years in the past and
// issue a DELETE matching nothing on every single sweep.
if wh.RetainsForever() {
continue
}
@@ -171,9 +208,10 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) reapWebhook(
return
}
cutoff := time.Now().Add(
-time.Duration(retentionDays*hoursPerDay) * time.Hour,
)
cutoff, ok := retentionCutoff(time.Now(), retentionDays)
if !ok {
return
}
deleted, err := reapExpired(db, cutoff)
if err != nil {
@@ -196,6 +234,37 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) reapWebhook(
}
}
// retentionCutoff returns the timestamp before which a webhook's
// events have expired, and whether any cutoff applies at all. It
// reports false for a retain-forever policy, so no DELETE is issued.
//
// The day count is clamped to MaxFiniteRetentionDays first. This is
// defense in depth rather than decoration: a time.Duration is an int64
// nanosecond count, so an unclamped multiplication overflows above
// that ceiling and wraps the span negative. Subtracting a negative
// span moves the cutoff into the far future, where it matches every
// row in the database: the sweep then deletes every event, delivery,
// and delivery result, including ones created seconds ago. Rejecting
// out-of-range input at the form is the primary guard; saturating here
// means an old row, a migration, or a future call site cannot turn a
// too-large retention into total data loss.
func retentionCutoff(
now time.Time,
retentionDays int,
) (time.Time, bool) {
if retainsForever(retentionDays) {
return time.Time{}, false
}
if retentionDays > MaxFiniteRetentionDays {
retentionDays = MaxFiniteRetentionDays
}
return now.Add(
-time.Duration(retentionDays*hoursPerDay) * time.Hour,
), true
}
// reapExpired hard-deletes, in foreign-key-safe order, the delivery
// results, deliveries, and events associated with events older than
// cutoff. Deletes are unscoped so rows are physically removed rather

272
internal/database/retention_lifecycle_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
package database_test
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
const (
// reaperTestInterval is the sweep interval a lifecycle test
// runs the reaper at, so a loop that survives startup produces
// an observable sweep quickly.
reaperTestInterval = 10 * time.Millisecond
// reaperStopTimeout bounds how long a lifecycle test waits for
// the reaper's OnStop hook to return before declaring the
// shutdown hung.
reaperStopTimeout = 10 * time.Second
// reaperTestRetentionDays is the retention policy the lifecycle
// tests give their webhook.
reaperTestRetentionDays = 30
// reaperWedgeStopTimeout is the stop timeout the wedged-shutdown
// test hands OnStop, standing in for fx's StopTimeout. The test
// asserts only that the hook returns at all, and allows it
// reaperStopTimeout — forty times this budget — to do so, so no
// assertion races the wall clock.
reaperWedgeStopTimeout = 250 * time.Millisecond
)
// recordingLifecycle is a minimal fx.Lifecycle that records the
// hooks a component registers, so a test can invoke the real
// OnStart/OnStop functions with a context of its choosing.
type recordingLifecycle struct {
hooks []fx.Hook
}
func (l *recordingLifecycle) Append(h fx.Hook) {
l.hooks = append(l.hooks, h)
}
// startReaperViaHook drives the genuine fx hooks the application
// registers for the reaper, handing OnStart a context that is
// already done. It returns the recorded lifecycle so the caller
// can drive OnStop too.
func startReaperViaHook(
t *testing.T, r *database.RetentionReaper,
) *recordingLifecycle {
t.Helper()
lc := &recordingLifecycle{}
r.ExportRegisterHooks(lc)
require.Len(t, lc.hooks, 1)
// fx hands OnStart a context carrying the application start
// timeout, and cancels it when the start phase ends. An
// already-cancelled context is that same defect taken to its
// limit, and unlike a plain context.Background() it actually
// distinguishes a correctly rooted loop from a broken one.
hookCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
require.NoError(t, lc.hooks[0].OnStart(hookCtx))
return lc
}
// eventGone reports whether an event row has been removed. It
// takes no *testing.T because it is polled from an
// assert.Eventually condition, which runs off the test goroutine
// where testify assertions must not be used.
func eventGone(db *gorm.DB, eventID string) bool {
var n int64
err := db.Unscoped().Model(&database.Event{}).
Where("id = ?", eventID).Count(&n).Error
if err != nil {
return false
}
return n == 0
}
// seedExpiredWebhook creates a webhook with a finite retention
// policy plus one long-expired event chain, and returns the
// webhook's database and the chain's event ID.
func seedExpiredWebhook(
t *testing.T, env *retentionTestEnv,
) (*gorm.DB, string) {
t.Helper()
webhookID := createWebhook(
t, env.mainDB.DB(), reaperTestRetentionDays,
)
db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
chain := seedEventChain(
t, db, webhookID,
time.Now().Add(-365*24*time.Hour),
)
return db, chain.eventID
}
// TestRetentionReaper_LoopOutlivesStartHookContext is the
// regression test for a reaper that never reaped. fx calls
// OnStart with a context carrying the application's start timeout
// (15s by default) and cancels it when the start phase ends, so a
// sweep loop rooted in it is dead three quarters of an hour
// before its first tick under the default one-hour interval, and
// per-webhook event databases grow without bound exactly as they
// did before retention existed.
//
// Driving OnStart with an already-cancelled context is that
// defect taken to its limit: a loop that inherits the hook
// context never ticks once, while a correctly rooted loop keeps
// sweeping for as long as the process lives.
func TestRetentionReaper_LoopOutlivesStartHookContext(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
db, eventID := seedExpiredWebhook(t, env)
env.reaper.ExportSetInterval(reaperTestInterval)
lc := startReaperViaHook(t, env.reaper)
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background())
})
assert.Eventually(
t,
func() bool { return eventGone(db, eventID) },
5*time.Second,
reaperTestInterval,
"the sweep loop must keep running after the start "+
"hook's context is done; it reaped nothing, so it "+
"inherited the hook context and died",
)
}
// TestRetentionReaper_StopHookStopsLoop proves the fix did not
// trade a startup bug for a shutdown hang: now that the sweep
// loop no longer observes the start hook's cancellation, OnStop
// is the only thing that can stop it, and it must both return
// promptly and actually leave the loop stopped.
func TestRetentionReaper_StopHookStopsLoop(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
db, eventID := seedExpiredWebhook(t, env)
env.reaper.ExportSetInterval(reaperTestInterval)
lc := startReaperViaHook(t, env.reaper)
// Let the loop prove it is running before stopping it, so a
// fast OnStop cannot pass by stopping something already dead.
require.Eventually(
t,
func() bool { return eventGone(db, eventID) },
5*time.Second,
reaperTestInterval,
)
var stopErr error
stopped := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(stopped)
// stop blocks on the loop's WaitGroup, so returning at all
// proves the goroutine observed the cancellation.
stopErr = lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background())
}()
select {
case <-stopped:
case <-time.After(reaperStopTimeout):
t.Fatal(
"OnStop did not return: the retention reaper's " +
"WaitGroup is still waiting on a loop that never " +
"observed cancellation",
)
}
require.NoError(t, stopErr)
// With the loop gone, a newly expired chain must survive.
survivor := seedEventChain(
t, db, "stopped-webhook",
time.Now().Add(-365*24*time.Hour),
)
time.Sleep(20 * reaperTestInterval)
assert.False(
t,
eventGone(db, survivor.eventID),
"a stopped reaper must not sweep anything",
)
}
// TestRetentionReaper_StopHookHonoursStopTimeout is the
// regression test for a shutdown that could never complete. fx
// hands OnStop a context carrying the application's stop timeout;
// an OnStop that discards it and calls wg.Wait() bare hangs the
// process forever on a sweep blocked on a locked SQLite database
// — precisely when a bounded shutdown matters most.
//
// The wedged goroutine here never observes cancellation, so the
// hook can only return by honouring its context, and it must say
// so rather than reporting a clean stop.
func TestRetentionReaper_StopHookHonoursStopTimeout(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
env.reaper.ExportSetInterval(reaperTestInterval)
lc := startReaperViaHook(t, env.reaper)
release := make(chan struct{})
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
env.reaper.ExportWedgeLoop(release)
stopCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(
context.Background(), reaperWedgeStopTimeout,
)
defer cancel()
var stopErr error
stopped := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(stopped)
stopErr = lc.hooks[0].OnStop(stopCtx)
}()
select {
case <-stopped:
case <-time.After(reaperStopTimeout):
t.Fatal(
"OnStop did not return: it discarded the stop " +
"context and is waiting on a wedged goroutine " +
"that will never observe cancellation",
)
}
require.ErrorIs(t, stopErr, context.DeadlineExceeded)
require.ErrorContains(t, stopErr, "retention reaper")
}

145
internal/database/retention_test.go
View File

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package database_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -30,8 +31,8 @@ func setupRetentionTest(t *testing.T) *retentionTestEnv {
lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
g := &globals.Globals{
Appname: "webhooker-test",
Version: "test",
Appname: testAppname,
Version: testVersion,
}
l, err := logger.New(lc, logger.LoggerParams{Globals: g})
@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ func createWebhook(
wh := &database.Webhook{
UserID: uuid.New().String(),
Name: "test-webhook",
Name: testWebhookName,
RetentionDays: retentionDays,
}
require.NoError(
@@ -84,10 +85,11 @@ func createWebhook(
db.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
)
// The RetentionDays column carries a GORM default of 30, so a
// zero (or negative) value passed to Create is replaced by that
// default. Force the requested value explicitly so the
// retain-forever (<= 0) path can be exercised.
// Webhook.BeforeSave rewrites a non-positive RetentionDays to the
// retain-forever sentinel, and the column's GORM default would
// otherwise substitute 30. Force the requested value with a
// column-level update so tests can plant legacy rows that predate
// the sentinel and still carry a literal 0 or negative value.
require.NoError(
t,
db.Model(wh).
@@ -97,6 +99,30 @@ func createWebhook(
return wh.ID
}
// createWebhookNormally inserts a webhook through the ordinary Create
// path, with no column-level forcing, so Webhook.BeforeSave applies
// exactly as it does in production. Passing 0 therefore yields a row
// holding the RetentionForeverDays sentinel.
func createWebhookNormally(
t *testing.T,
db *gorm.DB,
retentionDays int,
) string {
t.Helper()
wh := &database.Webhook{
UserID: uuid.New().String(),
Name: testWebhookName,
RetentionDays: retentionDays,
}
require.NoError(
t,
db.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
)
return wh.ID
}
// eventChain is the set of row IDs seeded for a single event.
type eventChain struct {
eventID string
@@ -117,9 +143,9 @@ func seedEventChain(
event := &database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: "POST",
Method: http.MethodPost,
Body: `{"seed": true}`,
ContentType: "application/json",
ContentType: testContentType,
}
event.CreatedAt = createdAt
require.NoError(t, db.Create(event).Error)
@@ -255,12 +281,111 @@ func TestRetentionReaper_ReapsExpiredKeepsRecent(t *testing.T) {
assertChainPresent(t, db, recent)
}
// TestRetentionReaper_SkipsSentinelReapsFiniteInSameSweep covers the
// end-to-end retain-forever path: a webhook created the normal way with
// a requested retention of 0 lands on the RetentionForeverDays
// sentinel, and the reaper leaves its ancient events alone while still
// reaping a finite-retention webhook in the very same sweep.
func TestRetentionReaper_SkipsSentinelReapsFiniteInSameSweep(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
foreverID := createWebhookNormally(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 0)
var stored database.Webhook
require.NoError(
t,
env.mainDB.DB().Where("id = ?", foreverID).
First(&stored).Error,
)
require.Equal(
t,
database.RetentionForeverDays,
stored.RetentionDays,
"a requested retention of 0 must persist as the sentinel",
)
finiteID := createWebhookNormally(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 30)
foreverDB, err := env.mgr.GetDB(foreverID)
require.NoError(t, err)
finiteDB, err := env.mgr.GetDB(finiteID)
require.NoError(t, err)
ancient := time.Now().Add(-365 * 24 * time.Hour)
kept := seedEventChain(t, foreverDB, foreverID, ancient)
doomed := seedEventChain(t, finiteDB, finiteID, ancient)
env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assertChainPresent(t, foreverDB, kept)
assertChainGone(t, finiteDB, doomed)
}
// TestRetentionReaper_HugeFiniteRetentionRetainsRecentEvents pins the
// overflow that made a large finite retention destroy everything.
//
// The cutoff is a time.Duration, an int64 nanosecond count. A day
// count above MaxFiniteRetentionDays multiplied out unclamped wraps
// negative, so subtracting it moves the cutoff into the far future,
// where "created_at < cutoff" matches every row: an event created a
// moment ago, and its delivery and delivery result, were all deleted
// on the first sweep. 200000 is inside that band and below the
// retain-forever sentinel, so it is treated as a finite policy and
// really does reach the arithmetic.
//
// The row is planted at the column level because such a value can no
// longer be submitted through the form; the point of the test is that
// a row from an older version, or a future call site, still cannot
// trigger the wipe.
func TestRetentionReaper_HugeFiniteRetentionRetainsRecentEvents(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
const overflowingRetentionDays = 200000
require.Greater(
t,
overflowingRetentionDays,
database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays,
"the test value must exceed what the cutoff can represent",
)
require.Less(
t,
overflowingRetentionDays,
database.RetentionForeverDays,
"the test value must not be rescued by the forever skip",
)
webhookID := createWebhook(
t, env.mainDB.DB(), overflowingRetentionDays,
)
db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
fresh := seedEventChain(t, db, webhookID, time.Now())
env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assertChainPresent(t, db, fresh)
}
func TestRetentionReaper_RetainsForeverWhenNonPositive(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
// RetentionDays of zero means retain forever.
// A legacy row written before the sentinel existed still carries a
// literal 0; the <= 0 guard must keep honouring it.
webhookID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 0)
db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)

10
internal/database/testing.go
View File

@@ -14,7 +14,10 @@ import (
func NewTestDatabase(db *gorm.DB) *Database {
return &Database{
db: db,
log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug})),
log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
os.Stderr,
&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
)),
}
}
@@ -23,6 +26,9 @@ func NewTestDatabase(db *gorm.DB) *Database {
func NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir string) *WebhookDBManager {
return &WebhookDBManager{
dataDir: dataDir,
log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug})),
log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
os.Stderr,
&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
)),
}
}

25
internal/database/webhook_db_manager.go
View File

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
)
@@ -248,7 +249,10 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) openDB(
db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Dialector{
Conn: sqlDB,
}, &gorm.Config{})
}, &gorm.Config{
// Never leave this at GORM's default. See internal/gormlog.
Logger: gormlog.New(m.log),
})
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
@@ -258,6 +262,25 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) openDB(
)
}
// Keep main-database rows out of this file. See
// event_db_isolation.go.
err = omitAssociations(db)
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"guarding webhook database %s: %w",
webhookID, err,
)
}
err = purgeTargetRows(db, m.log, webhookID)
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
return nil, err
}
// Run migrations for event-tier models only
err = db.AutoMigrate(
&Event{}, &Delivery{}, &DeliveryResult{},

36
internal/database/webhook_db_manager_test.go
View File

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package database_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
@@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ func setupTestWebhookDBManager(
lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
g := &globals.Globals{
Appname: "webhooker-test",
Version: "test",
Appname: testAppname,
Version: testVersion,
}
l, err := logger.New(
@@ -83,10 +84,10 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_CreateAndGetDB(t *testing.T) {
event := &database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: "POST",
Method: http.MethodPost,
Headers: `{"Content-Type":["application/json"]}`,
Body: `{"test": true}`,
ContentType: "application/json",
ContentType: testContentType,
}
require.NoError(t, db.Create(event).Error)
assert.NotEmpty(t, event.ID)
@@ -99,7 +100,7 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_CreateAndGetDB(t *testing.T) {
db.First(&readEvent, "id = ?", event.ID).Error,
)
assert.Equal(t, webhookID, readEvent.WebhookID)
assert.Equal(t, "POST", readEvent.Method)
assert.Equal(t, http.MethodPost, readEvent.Method)
assert.Equal(t, `{"test": true}`, readEvent.Body)
}
@@ -123,9 +124,9 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_DeleteDB(t *testing.T) {
event := &database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: "POST",
Method: http.MethodPost,
Body: `{"test": true}`,
ContentType: "application/json",
ContentType: testContentType,
}
require.NoError(t, db.Create(event).Error)
@@ -196,10 +197,10 @@ func seedDeliveryWorkflow(
event := &database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: "POST",
Method: http.MethodPost,
Headers: `{"Content-Type":["application/json"]}`,
Body: `{"payload": "test"}`,
ContentType: "application/json",
ContentType: testContentType,
}
require.NoError(t, db.Create(event).Error)
@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ func verifyPendingDeliveries(
)
require.Len(t, pending, 1)
assert.Equal(t, event.ID, pending[0].EventID)
assert.Equal(t, "POST", pending[0].Event.Method)
assert.Equal(t, http.MethodPost, pending[0].Event.Method)
}
func completeDelivery(
@@ -303,16 +304,16 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_MultipleWebhooks(t *testing.T) {
event1 := &database.Event{
WebhookID: webhook1,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: "POST",
Method: http.MethodPost,
Body: `{"webhook": 1}`,
ContentType: "application/json",
ContentType: testContentType,
}
event2 := &database.Event{
WebhookID: webhook2,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: "PUT",
Method: http.MethodPut,
Body: `{"webhook": 2}`,
ContentType: "application/json",
ContentType: testContentType,
}
require.NoError(t, db1.Create(event1).Error)
@@ -338,7 +339,12 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_MultipleWebhooks(t *testing.T) {
var events []database.Event
require.NoError(t, db2.Find(&events).Error)
assert.Len(t, events, 1)
// require, not assert: this is exactly the regression the test
// guards, so the empty slice is the expected failure, and a
// non-fatal length check would index into it on the next line and
// panic the whole package test binary instead of failing here.
require.Len(t, events, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "PUT", events[0].Method)
}

126
internal/datadir/lock.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
// Package datadir guards exclusive access to the directory holding
// every SQLite database webhooker writes.
//
// Two processes sharing a DATA_DIR each open the same per-webhook
// event databases and each run delivery recovery over the same rows,
// so every pending delivery goes out twice. SQLite's own locking does
// not prevent that: both writers are serialised correctly and both
// deliver. The only thing that prevents it is refusing to be the
// second process.
//
// The lock lives here rather than in the server's fx graph so that any
// entry point which touches DATA_DIR — the server, or a CLI
// subcommand that must not operate on a live deployment's data — takes
// it the same way.
package datadir
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"github.com/gofrs/flock"
)
// LockFileName is the advisory lock file created inside DATA_DIR. Its
// contents are never read: the lock is the flock(2) held on the open
// descriptor, not the file's existence, so a leftover file from a
// process that was killed with SIGKILL blocks nothing.
const LockFileName = "webhooker.lock"
// dirPerm is the mode Acquire creates DATA_DIR with. It matches what
// internal/database uses, since whichever runs first creates it.
const dirPerm = 0o750
// ErrLocked reports that another live process holds the data
// directory. Callers that need to know whether a deployment is running
// — rather than merely failing to start — test for this with
// errors.Is.
var ErrLocked = errors.New(
"data directory is already in use by another instance",
)
// ErrNoDir reports that Acquire was given an empty directory.
var ErrNoDir = errors.New("no data directory given")
// Lock is a held exclusive advisory lock on a data directory. It is
// valid only while the process that took it lives: the kernel drops it
// when the descriptor closes, whether that is Release, a normal exit,
// or a SIGKILL.
type Lock struct {
dir string
file *flock.Flock
}
// Acquire takes the exclusive advisory lock on dir, creating dir if it
// does not exist. It never waits: if another process holds the lock it
// returns an error wrapping ErrLocked and naming dir.
//
// The returned Lock must be held for as long as the caller intends to
// use dir.
func Acquire(dir string) (*Lock, error) {
if dir == "" {
return nil, ErrNoDir
}
err := os.MkdirAll(dir, dirPerm)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"creating data directory %s: %w", dir, err,
)
}
path := filepath.Join(dir, LockFileName)
fl := flock.New(path)
held, err := fl.TryLock()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"locking data directory %s: %w", dir, err,
)
}
if !held {
// A no-op on flock v0.13.0, which closes its own descriptor on
// a failed TryLock; kept so no version can leak one.
_ = fl.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s (%s). Only one webhooker may use a data "+
"directory: two both run delivery recovery over the "+
"same rows and both deliver",
ErrLocked, dir, path,
)
}
return &Lock{dir: dir, file: fl}, nil
}
// Dir returns the locked directory.
func (l *Lock) Dir() string {
return l.dir
}
// Path returns the lock file backing the lock.
func (l *Lock) Path() string {
return l.file.Path()
}
// Release drops the lock and closes the descriptor. It is safe to call
// more than once.
//
// The lock file is deliberately left on disk. Unlinking it would let
// the next process create and lock a fresh inode while a third still
// holds the old one, which is the one outcome this package exists to
// prevent.
func (l *Lock) Release() error {
err := l.file.Unlock()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"releasing lock on data directory %s: %w", l.dir, err,
)
}
return nil
}

250
internal/datadir/lock_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
package datadir_test
import (
"bufio"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
)
// holderEnv names the directory the re-executed test binary should
// lock and hold. When it is unset the child test does nothing, so an
// ordinary run is unaffected.
const holderEnv = "WEBHOOKER_DATADIR_LOCK_HOLDER"
// holderReadyPrefix labels the child's one-line report that it holds
// the lock, so the parent can find it among the testing package's own
// output on the same descriptor.
const holderReadyPrefix = "DATADIR-LOCK-HELD "
// holderReadyTimeout bounds the wait for the child to take the lock.
// It only has to cover process start on a loaded shared host.
const holderReadyTimeout = 60 * time.Second
// holderHold is how long the child keeps the lock if nothing kills it.
// A sleep rather than a bare block, so the runtime's deadlock detector
// has a pending timer and the child cannot outlive a killed test run
// by more than this.
const holderHold = 10 * time.Minute
// TestLockHolder is the child half of the two-process tests below. It
// takes the lock on the directory named by holderEnv, reports the lock
// file on standard output, and then holds it until it is killed.
func TestLockHolder(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := os.Getenv(holderEnv)
if dir == "" {
return
}
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Written to the descriptor directly: the parent reads fd 1, not
// the testing package's buffered report.
_, err = fmt.Fprintf(
os.Stdout, "%s%s\n", holderReadyPrefix, lock.Path(),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
time.Sleep(holderHold)
}
// startHolder re-executes this test binary as a separate process that
// takes and holds the lock on dir, and returns once that process
// actually holds it. The child is killed when the test ends.
func startHolder(t *testing.T, dir string) *exec.Cmd {
t.Helper()
//nolint:gosec // Re-executing this test binary, with a fixed arg.
cmd := exec.CommandContext(
t.Context(), os.Args[0], "-test.run", "^TestLockHolder$",
)
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), holderEnv+"="+dir)
cmd.Stderr = os.Stderr
stdout, err := cmd.StdoutPipe()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, cmd.Start())
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
_ = cmd.Wait()
})
ready := make(chan string, 1)
go func() {
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(stdout)
for scanner.Scan() {
after, found := strings.CutPrefix(
scanner.Text(), holderReadyPrefix,
)
if found {
ready <- after
break
}
}
close(ready)
// Keep draining so the child never blocks on a full pipe.
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, stdout)
}()
select {
case path, ok := <-ready:
require.True(
t, ok, "holder exited without taking the lock",
)
require.Equal(t, filepath.Join(dir, datadir.LockFileName), path)
case <-time.After(holderReadyTimeout):
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for the holder to take the lock")
}
return cmd
}
// TestSecondInstanceRefused is the regression test for the duplicate
// delivery this package exists to prevent: a real second process
// pointed at a data directory a live process already holds must be
// refused, with an error that names the directory.
func TestSecondInstanceRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
startHolder(t, dir)
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.Error(t, err, "the second instance took the lock too")
require.Nil(t, lock)
require.ErrorIs(
t, err, datadir.ErrLocked,
"the refusal must be distinguishable from any other failure",
)
assert.Contains(
t, err.Error(), dir,
"the refusal must name the directory it is about",
)
}
// TestRestartAfterHardKill is the other half of the regression: a
// process killed with SIGKILL runs no cleanup and leaves its lock file
// behind, and the next start must not be blocked by it. This is what a
// pidfile would get wrong; the kernel drops a flock when the
// descriptor closes, however the process died.
func TestRestartAfterHardKill(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
holder := startHolder(t, dir)
require.NoError(t, holder.Process.Kill())
// Wait for the kill to have actually happened. Re-acquiring while
// the corpse still holds a descriptor would be a race, and would
// make this test pass or fail on scheduling.
_ = holder.Wait()
require.FileExists(
t, filepath.Join(dir, datadir.LockFileName),
"the stale lock file is what must not block the restart",
)
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(
t, err, "a hard-killed instance must not block the next start",
)
require.NoError(t, lock.Release())
}
// TestSecondFdInSameProcessRefused pins the flock(2) property the
// tests in cmd/webhooker rely on: descriptors are locked
// independently, so a second acquisition is denied even when it comes
// from the process that already holds the lock.
func TestSecondFdInSameProcessRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
first, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = first.Release() }()
_, err = datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, datadir.ErrLocked)
}
// TestReleaseAllowsReacquire covers the clean-shutdown path: the lock
// is released on exit, so a restart is not blocked by the previous
// run.
func TestReleaseAllowsReacquire(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
first, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, first.Release())
second, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, second.Release())
}
// TestAcquireCreatesDataDir covers a first start against a DATA_DIR
// that does not exist yet, which is the normal case for a fresh
// deployment: the lock is taken before anything else creates it.
func TestAcquireCreatesDataDir(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nested", "data")
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }()
assert.Equal(t, dir, lock.Dir())
assert.FileExists(t, filepath.Join(dir, datadir.LockFileName))
}
// TestAcquireEmptyDir rejects an empty directory rather than locking
// the process's working directory.
func TestAcquireEmptyDir(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := datadir.Acquire("")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, datadir.ErrNoDir)
}
// TestAcquireUnusableDir reports an unusable DATA_DIR clearly, naming
// it, instead of failing later and deeper.
func TestAcquireUnusableDir(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
file := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "not-a-directory")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(file, nil, 0o600))
_, err := datadir.Acquire(file)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), file)
}

239
internal/delivery/archive_sweeper.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
package delivery
import (
"context"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"sync"
"time"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/lifecycle"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
)
// ArchiveSweeperParams holds the fx dependencies for the
// ArchiveSweeper.
type ArchiveSweeperParams struct {
fx.In
Config *config.Config
Database *database.Database
Engine *Engine
Logger *logger.Logger
}
// ArchiveSweeper periodically prunes expired rows from
// per-webhook archive databases whose database target carries a
// positive expiry.
//
// Without it, pruning happens only when an archive is
// (re)opened, and archives are only ever reopened by writes: an
// archive belonging to a webhook that has stopped receiving
// events would keep its expired rows forever. The sweep closes
// that gap without changing anything for archives whose expiry
// is unset or "never".
//
// It reuses Config.RetentionSweepInterval rather than
// introducing a second interval: this is a retention sweep with
// the same semantics as the event retention reaper.
type ArchiveSweeper struct {
db *database.Database
eng *Engine
log *slog.Logger
interval time.Duration
cancel context.CancelFunc
wg sync.WaitGroup
}
// NewArchiveSweeper creates the archive sweeper and registers
// its fx lifecycle hooks. The background sweep loop starts on
// OnStart and stops cleanly on OnStop via context cancellation.
func NewArchiveSweeper(
lc fx.Lifecycle,
params ArchiveSweeperParams,
) *ArchiveSweeper {
s := &ArchiveSweeper{
db: params.Database,
eng: params.Engine,
log: params.Logger.Get(),
interval: params.Config.RetentionSweepInterval,
}
s.registerHooks(lc)
return s
}
// registerHooks wires the sweeper's start and stop into the fx
// lifecycle. The start hook's context is deliberately ignored
// (see start for why the background loop must not inherit it);
// the stop hook's context is honoured (see stop).
func (s *ArchiveSweeper) registerHooks(lc fx.Lifecycle) {
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
//nolint:contextcheck // Not passing the hook context is
// the point: see start.
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
s.start()
return nil
},
OnStop: func(ctx context.Context) error {
return s.stop(ctx)
},
})
}
// start launches the background sweep loop.
//
// The loop's context is derived from context.Background(), NOT
// from the fx OnStart hook context. The hook context carries
// fx's start timeout (15s by default), so a loop derived from it
// is cancelled 15 seconds after the application starts — long
// before the first tick under the default one-hour sweep
// interval, leaving a sweeper that never sweeps. A long-lived
// goroutine must outlive the startup phase, so its lifetime is
// bounded by OnStop instead: stop cancels this context and waits
// on the WaitGroup.
func (s *ArchiveSweeper) start() {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
s.cancel = cancel
s.wg.Add(1)
go s.run(ctx)
s.log.Info(
"archive sweeper started",
"interval", s.interval.String(),
)
}
// stop cancels the sweep loop's context and waits for it to
// exit, bounded by the stop hook's context: a prune wedged on a
// locked archive must not hang the process past fx's stop
// timeout.
func (s *ArchiveSweeper) stop(ctx context.Context) error {
s.log.Info("archive sweeper stopping")
if s.cancel != nil {
s.cancel()
}
err := lifecycle.WaitForShutdown(
ctx, s.log, "archive sweeper", &s.wg,
)
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.log.Info("archive sweeper stopped")
return nil
}
func (s *ArchiveSweeper) run(ctx context.Context) {
defer s.wg.Done()
ticker := time.NewTicker(s.interval)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
s.sweep(ctx)
}
}
}
// sweep prunes every archive whose database target declares a
// positive expiry. Targets belonging to a deleted webhook are
// soft-deleted along with it, so GORM's default scope already
// excludes them.
//
// A failure for one webhook is logged and the sweep continues,
// matching how the write path already treats a prune error as
// non-fatal.
func (s *ArchiveSweeper) sweep(ctx context.Context) {
var targets []database.Target
err := s.db.DB().
Model(&database.Target{}).
Where("type = ?", database.TargetTypeDatabase).
Find(&targets).Error
if err != nil {
s.log.Error(
"archive sweep: failed to list database targets",
"error", err,
)
return
}
for i := range targets {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
default:
}
s.sweepTarget(&targets[i])
}
}
// sweepTarget prunes the archive of a single database target.
// A missing, empty, or "never" expiry parses as a zero duration
// and is skipped entirely, so those archives keep exactly the
// behaviour they had before the sweep existed.
func (s *ArchiveSweeper) sweepTarget(target *database.Target) {
expiry, err := parseArchiveExpiry(target.Config)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error(
"archive sweep: invalid database target config",
"webhook_id", target.WebhookID,
"target_id", target.ID,
"error", err,
)
return
}
if expiry <= 0 {
return
}
if s.eng == nil || s.eng.dbTarget == nil {
return
}
err = s.eng.dbTarget.sweepWebhook(target.WebhookID, expiry)
if err == nil {
return
}
// A writer evicted underneath the sweep means the operator
// deleted the webhook (or its last database target) while the
// sweep was walking the target list. That is an ordinary
// interleaving, not a failure, so it must not produce an
// error line.
if errors.Is(err, errArchiveWriterEvicted) {
s.log.Debug(
"archive sweep: writer evicted mid-sweep",
"webhook_id", target.WebhookID,
"target_id", target.ID,
)
return
}
s.log.Error(
"archive sweep: failed to prune archive",
"webhook_id", target.WebhookID,
"target_id", target.ID,
"error", err,
)
}

947
internal/delivery/archive_sweeper_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,947 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite" // Pure Go SQLite driver.
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
const (
// sweepRowOld and sweepRowNew are the event ids
// seedArchiveRows assigns to the first and second seeded
// rows.
sweepRowOld = "ev-0"
sweepRowNew = "ev-1"
// sweepConcurrentWrites is how many deliveries the
// concurrent write-plus-sweep test races against the sweep.
sweepConcurrentWrites = 20
)
// sweeperEnv bundles the pieces an archive sweep test drives:
// a main configuration database holding webhooks and targets, a
// delivery engine owning the archive writer registry, and the
// data directory the archive files live in.
type sweeperEnv struct {
sweeper *delivery.ArchiveSweeper
eng *delivery.Engine
mainDB *database.Database
dataDir string
}
func setupSweeperTest(t *testing.T) *sweeperEnv {
t.Helper()
dataDir := t.TempDir()
log := archiveTestLogger()
sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
"sqlite",
fmt.Sprintf(
"file:%s?mode=rwc",
filepath.Join(dataDir, "main.db"),
),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
gdb, err := gorm.Open(
sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB}, &gorm.Config{},
)
require.NoError(t, err)
mainDB := database.NewTestDatabase(gdb)
require.NoError(t, mainDB.Migrate())
eng := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
mainDB,
database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir),
log,
&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
1,
)
return &sweeperEnv{
sweeper: delivery.NewTestArchiveSweeper(
mainDB, eng, log,
),
eng: eng,
mainDB: mainDB,
dataDir: dataDir,
}
}
// archivePath returns where the engine keeps a webhook's
// archive file.
func (env *sweeperEnv) archivePath(webhookID string) string {
return filepath.Join(
env.dataDir, fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", webhookID),
)
}
// seedDatabaseTarget creates a webhook with one database target
// carrying the given target config JSON, and returns the
// webhook id.
func (env *sweeperEnv) seedDatabaseTarget(
t *testing.T, configJSON string,
) string {
t.Helper()
wh := &database.Webhook{
UserID: uuid.New().String(),
Name: "sweep-test",
}
require.NoError(
t,
env.mainDB.DB().
Omit(clause.Associations).
Create(wh).Error,
)
tgt := &database.Target{
WebhookID: wh.ID,
Name: "archive",
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
Active: true,
Config: configJSON,
}
require.NoError(
t,
env.mainDB.DB().
Omit(clause.Associations).
Create(tgt).Error,
)
return wh.ID
}
// seedArchiveRows creates the archive file for a webhook and
// inserts one row per supplied archived-at timestamp, returning
// the archive path. The handle is closed before returning, so
// the archive is idle exactly as it would be with no traffic.
func (env *sweeperEnv) seedArchiveRows(
t *testing.T, webhookID string, archivedAt ...time.Time,
) string {
t.Helper()
path := env.archivePath(webhookID)
sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
"sqlite", fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=rwc", path),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
gdb, err := gorm.Open(
sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB}, &gorm.Config{},
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(
t, gdb.AutoMigrate(&delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{}),
)
for i, at := range archivedAt {
row := delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{
EventID: fmt.Sprintf("ev-%d", i),
WebhookID: webhookID,
Method: http.MethodPost,
Body: `{"seeded":true}`,
ArchivedAt: at,
}
require.NoError(t, gdb.Create(&row).Error)
}
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.Close())
return path
}
// archivedEventIDs returns the event ids currently stored in an
// archive file, read through a separate read-only handle.
func archivedEventIDs(
t *testing.T, path string,
) []string {
t.Helper()
var rows []delivery.ExportArchivedEvent
rdb := openArchiveDBForRead(t, path)
require.NoError(t, rdb.Order("event_id").Find(&rows).Error)
ids := make([]string, 0, len(rows))
for i := range rows {
ids = append(ids, rows[i].EventID)
}
return ids
}
// countArchivedRows counts the rows in an archive file without
// asserting anything, so it is safe to poll from an
// assert.Eventually condition (which runs off the test
// goroutine, where testify assertions must not be used).
func countArchivedRows(path string) (int64, error) {
sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
"sqlite", fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=ro", path),
)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
defer func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() }()
gdb, err := gorm.Open(
sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB}, &gorm.Config{},
)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
var count int64
err = gdb.Model(&delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{}).
Count(&count).Error
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return count, nil
}
// TestArchiveSweeper_LoopOutlivesStartHookContext is the
// regression test for a sweeper that never swept. fx calls
// OnStart with a context carrying the application's start
// timeout (15 seconds by default), so a background loop whose
// context is derived from it is cancelled 15 seconds into the
// process — three quarters of an hour before the first tick
// under the default one-hour sweep interval.
//
// The hook context here is already cancelled, which is the same
// defect taken to its limit: a loop that inherits it never runs
// a single tick, while a correctly rooted loop keeps sweeping
// for as long as the process lives. Handing the hook a plain
// context.Background() would assert nothing at all.
func TestArchiveSweeper_LoopOutlivesStartHookContext(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
now := time.Now()
path := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID,
now.Add(-48*time.Hour),
now.Add(-time.Minute),
)
env.sweeper.ExportSetInterval(10 * time.Millisecond)
// Drive the genuine fx hooks the application registers,
// rather than a test-only entry point.
lc := &recordingLifecycle{}
env.sweeper.ExportRegisterHooks(lc)
require.Len(t, lc.hooks, 1)
hookCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
require.NoError(t, lc.hooks[0].OnStart(hookCtx))
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background())
})
assert.Eventually(
t,
func() bool {
count, err := countArchivedRows(path)
return err == nil && count == 1
},
5*time.Second,
10*time.Millisecond,
"the sweep loop must keep running after the start "+
"hook's context is done; it pruned nothing, so it "+
"inherited the hook context and died",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotResurrectEvictedWriter covers the
// interleaving where a sweep tick has already listed a webhook's
// target when the webhook is deleted and its writer evicted. The
// sweep must not put a writer back into the registry: nothing
// would ever evict it again, which is precisely the leak this
// change exists to close.
func TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotResurrectEvictedWriter(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
// Prime the registry the way a delivery would, then evict as
// the deletion path does. The target row is deliberately left
// in place: this is the tick that listed the webhook before
// the deletion committed.
_, err := env.eng.ExportEnsureArchiveWriter(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
env.eng.EvictWebhook(webhookID)
require.False(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID))
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
"a sweep must never re-register a writer for a webhook "+
"whose registry entry has already been released",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_LeavesNoRegistryEntry states the same
// invariant in its general form: sweeping an archive whose
// webhook has no cached writer must not leave one behind, so the
// registry keeps holding only writers a delivery created and an
// eviction can reach.
func TestArchiveSweep_LeavesNoRegistryEntry(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
path := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID,
time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
)
require.False(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID))
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.Equal(
t, []string{sweepRowNew}, archivedEventIDs(t, path),
"the sweep must still prune an idle archive",
)
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
"the sweep must release the registry entry it created",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedByDelivery is the other
// half of that invariant: an entry the sweep created but a
// delivery then claimed belongs to the registry and must survive
// the sweep, or the delivery would be left holding a detached
// writer with an open handle that no eviction can reach.
func TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedByDelivery(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
event.WebhookID = webhookID
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"1h"}`,
)
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
require.False(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID))
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
assert.True(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
"a delivery's writer must stay registered",
)
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.True(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
"a sweep must not drop a writer a delivery owns",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedDuringSweep covers the one
// interleaving the sweepOwned flag exists for, which
// TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedByDelivery cannot reach: a
// delivery adopting the sweep's own entry WHILE that sweep is
// still running.
//
// The registry operations are driven directly, in the order the
// sweep and a concurrent delivery perform them, so the window is
// exercised deterministically rather than hoped for:
//
// 1. the sweep finds no cached writer and registers one of its
// own, marked sweep-owned;
// 2. a delivery arrives, is handed that very writer, clears the
// flag and opens the archive handle;
// 3. the sweep finishes and releases what it created.
//
// Step 3 must leave the entry alone. Dropping it would detach a
// writer that is holding an open archive handle inside its
// debounce window, and no eviction could ever reach it again —
// exactly the process-lifetime handle leak this change exists to
// close. The eviction at the end proves the entry is still
// reachable.
func TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedDuringSweep(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
sweepWriter, created, err := env.eng.ExportSweepWriterFor(
webhookID,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.True(
t, created,
"the sweep must have created the registry entry itself",
)
// The delivery lands mid-sweep and adopts the entry.
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
event.WebhookID = webhookID
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"1h"}`,
)
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
adopted := env.eng.ExportArchiveWriterFor(webhookID)
require.NotNil(t, adopted)
require.True(
t, sweepWriter.Same(adopted),
"the delivery must have adopted the sweep's writer",
)
require.True(
t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
"the delivery leaves the archive handle open",
)
// The sweep finishes.
env.eng.ExportReleaseSweepWriter(webhookID, sweepWriter)
require.True(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
"a writer adopted by a delivery during a sweep must "+
"stay registered, or its open handle is unreachable",
)
env.eng.EvictWebhook(webhookID)
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
"the adopted writer must still be evictable",
)
assert.False(
t, sweepWriter.HandleOpen(),
"eviction must have closed the adopted writer's handle",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_ContinuesAfterPerWebhookFailure proves a
// failure for one webhook does not abort the sweep for the
// others: an unparseable expiry and an unreadable archive both
// have to be logged and stepped over.
func TestArchiveSweep_ContinuesAfterPerWebhookFailure(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
// Seeded first so the sweep reaches them before the healthy
// webhook: targets come back in insertion order.
badConfigID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"!!!"}`)
env.seedArchiveRows(
t, badConfigID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
corruptID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(
env.archivePath(corruptID),
[]byte("this is not a sqlite database"),
0o600,
))
healthyID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
healthyPath := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, healthyID,
time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
)
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.Equal(
t, []string{sweepRowNew},
archivedEventIDs(t, healthyPath),
"a failure for an earlier webhook must not stop the "+
"sweep from pruning the ones after it",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_OpenExistingDoesNotCreateFile pins the second
// of the two no-create guards. The first is the stat in
// sweepWebhook; this one is the SQLite open mode, which is what
// protects the window between that stat and the open. Flipping
// the sweep's mode to create-if-missing makes this fail.
func TestArchiveSweep_OpenExistingDoesNotCreateFile(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "archive-absent.db")
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
)
err := w.OpenExisting(time.Hour)
require.Error(
t, err,
"opening a missing archive without create permission "+
"must fail rather than conjure the file",
)
for _, suffix := range archiveFileSuffixes() {
assert.NoFileExists(t, path+suffix)
}
}
// TestArchiveSweep_PrunesIdleArchive is the core regression
// test for this issue: an archive that receives no further
// writes must still lose its expired rows. Before the sweeper
// existed, pruning only ever ran on a write-triggered reopen,
// so an idle archive kept expired rows forever.
func TestArchiveSweep_PrunesIdleArchive(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
now := time.Now()
path := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID,
now.Add(-48*time.Hour),
now.Add(-time.Minute),
)
require.Equal(
t, []string{sweepRowOld, sweepRowNew},
archivedEventIDs(t, path),
)
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.Equal(
t, []string{sweepRowNew}, archivedEventIDs(t, path),
"the sweep should prune rows older than the expiry "+
"from an idle archive and keep the rest",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_LeavesArchiveClosed proves the sweep does
// not hold the archive open afterwards, so an operator can
// still move the file away for offline retention.
//
// The assertion is made on a writer the test holds a reference
// to, and the handle is proven OPEN before the sweep runs, so the
// test observes the sweep closing it rather than a writer that
// merely never opened anything. Asking the registry instead would
// be vacuous here: the sweep releases an entry it created, and a
// missing entry reports "not open" whether or not anything was
// closed.
func TestArchiveSweep_LeavesArchiveClosed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
path := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
)
require.NoError(t, w.OpenExisting(time.Hour))
require.True(
t, w.HandleOpen(),
"the writer must hold an open handle before the sweep",
)
require.NoError(t, w.SweepExpired(time.Hour))
assert.False(
t, w.HandleOpen(),
"an idle archive must end the sweep closed",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_ClosesHandleOfRegisteredWriter states the same
// guarantee end to end, through the real sweeper and a writer the
// registry keeps.
//
// The delivery leaves the archive handle open inside its debounce
// window and makes the entry delivery-owned, so the sweep finds a
// cached writer (created is false, nothing is released) and the
// registry query afterwards is answered by a writer that really
// exists. A handle left open here would be doubly wrong: it also
// blocks the operator's move-the-file-away workflow.
func TestArchiveSweep_ClosesHandleOfRegisteredWriter(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
event.WebhookID = webhookID
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"1h"}`,
)
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
require.True(
t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
"the delivery must leave the archive handle open",
)
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
require.True(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
"the delivery's registry entry must survive the sweep",
)
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
"the sweep must leave the archive closed",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_NeverExpiryUntouched proves the sweep is a
// no-op for the default retention policy, so archives with no
// expiry (or the literal "never") behave exactly as before.
func TestArchiveSweep_NeverExpiryUntouched(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, configJSON := range []string{
`{"expiry":"never"}`,
`{"expiry":""}`,
"",
} {
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, configJSON)
path := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID,
time.Now().Add(-10000*time.Hour),
)
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.Equal(
t, []string{sweepRowOld}, archivedEventIDs(t, path),
"config %q must keep rows forever", configJSON,
)
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
"config %q must leave no registry entry behind",
configJSON,
)
}
}
// TestArchiveSweep_NeverExpirySkipsBeforeOpening pins the
// expiry <= 0 boundary in sweepTarget, which the row assertions
// above cannot reach: pruning is separately gated on a positive
// expiry, so a "never" archive keeps its rows even if the sweep
// does open it.
//
// The spec is stronger than that — a "never" archive is skipped
// before any file is touched — so the archive here exists but has
// never been migrated. Opening it at all would run AutoMigrate
// and create the archive table, which is exactly what must not
// happen.
func TestArchiveSweep_NeverExpirySkipsBeforeOpening(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"never"}`)
path := env.archivePath(webhookID)
seedUnmigratedArchive(t, path)
require.False(t, archiveTableExists(t, path))
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.False(
t, archiveTableExists(t, path),
"a never-expiry archive must not be opened at all",
)
}
// seedUnmigratedArchive creates an archive file that exists but
// carries no archive schema, so any open of it is observable: the
// archive table appears only if something ran AutoMigrate.
func seedUnmigratedArchive(t *testing.T, path string) {
t.Helper()
sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
"sqlite", fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=rwc", path),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = sqlDB.ExecContext(
t.Context(), "CREATE TABLE placeholder (id INTEGER)",
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.Close())
}
// archiveTableExists reports whether an archive file has had the
// archive schema migrated into it.
func archiveTableExists(t *testing.T, path string) bool {
t.Helper()
return openArchiveDBForRead(t, path).
Migrator().
HasTable(&delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{})
}
// TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateArchiveFile proves the sweep
// never conjures an archive: a webhook with a database target
// that has never received an event must still have no archive
// file (nor SQLite sidecar) after a sweep.
func TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateArchiveFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
path := env.archivePath(webhookID)
require.NoFileExists(t, path)
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
for _, suffix := range archiveFileSuffixes() {
assert.NoFileExists(
t, path+suffix,
"the sweep must not create an archive file",
)
}
}
// TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateAfterWriterExists covers the
// same guarantee once a writer is cached in the registry but
// the file itself is still absent (for instance because the
// operator moved the archive away).
func TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateAfterWriterExists(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
path, err := env.eng.ExportEnsureArchiveWriter(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoFileExists(t, path)
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.NoFileExists(t, path)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_SkipsDeletedWebhookTargets proves that the
// sweep ignores targets soft-deleted along with their webhook,
// so a deleted webhook's archive is never reopened.
func TestArchiveSweep_SkipsDeletedWebhookTargets(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
path := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
require.NoError(
t,
env.mainDB.DB().
Where("webhook_id = ?", webhookID).
Delete(&database.Target{}).Error,
)
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.Equal(
t, []string{sweepRowOld}, archivedEventIDs(t, path),
"a deleted target's archive must be left alone",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_ConcurrentWrites proves the sweep serialises
// against writes through the per-webhook writer mutex. Run
// under -race, an unsynchronised sweep would be caught here.
func TestArchiveSweep_ConcurrentWrites(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
// The deliveries are seeded up front, on the test's own
// goroutine: the seed helpers assert, and testify assertions
// must not run off the test goroutine.
deliveries := make(
[]*database.Delivery, 0, sweepConcurrentWrites,
)
for range sweepConcurrentWrites {
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
event.WebhookID = webhookID
deliveries = append(
deliveries,
seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"1h"}`,
),
)
}
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(2)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
for _, d := range deliveries {
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
}
}()
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
for range sweepConcurrentWrites {
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
}
}()
wg.Wait()
assert.FileExists(t, env.archivePath(webhookID))
}
// TestArchiveSweeper_StopsCleanly proves the background loop
// exits on OnStop rather than leaking a goroutine.
func TestArchiveSweeper_StopsCleanly(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
env.sweeper.ExportSetInterval(time.Millisecond)
env.sweeper.ExportStart()
// stop blocks on the loop's WaitGroup, so returning without
// error proves the loop observed the cancellation and exited
// well inside the stop context.
require.NoError(
t, env.sweeper.ExportStop(context.Background()),
)
}
// TestArchiveSweeper_StopHookHonoursStopTimeout is the sweeper's
// half of the same shutdown defect the engine and the retention
// reaper carried: an OnStop that discards its context and waits
// on the WaitGroup bare hangs the process forever on a prune
// wedged inside a locked archive.
func TestArchiveSweeper_StopHookHonoursStopTimeout(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
lc := &recordingLifecycle{}
env.sweeper.ExportRegisterHooks(lc)
require.Len(t, lc.hooks, 1)
require.NoError(t, lc.hooks[0].OnStart(context.Background()))
release := make(chan struct{})
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
env.sweeper.ExportWedgeLoop(release)
requireStopHookExpires(t, lc.hooks[0], "archive sweeper")
}

230
internal/delivery/engine.go
View File

@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ import (
"go.uber.org/fx"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/lifecycle"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
)
const (
@@ -94,6 +96,23 @@ type Notifier interface {
Notify(tasks []Task)
}
// WebhookEvictor releases the delivery engine's per-webhook
// state for a webhook that no longer needs it — currently the
// cached archive writer of the database target, whose open
// file handle would otherwise outlive the webhook.
//
// It is deliberately separate from Notifier and deliberately
// one method wide: archiving lifecycle is not notification, and
// a single-method interface keeps the handlers package free of
// any dependency on the engine's internals while staying
// trivially fakeable in tests.
//
// EvictWebhook never deletes an archive file. It is idempotent
// and is a no-op for a webhook with no engine state.
type WebhookEvictor interface {
EvictWebhook(webhookID string)
}
// EngineParams are the fx dependencies for the delivery
// engine.
type EngineParams struct {
@@ -121,12 +140,22 @@ type Engine struct {
retryCh chan Task
workers int
// mtr is the delivery metric set. Production wires the
// process-wide one; a test can substitute a set registered on
// a private registry so its assertions are not disturbed by
// deliveries other tests are making at the same time.
mtr *metrics.Set
// targets maps each target type to its implementation.
targets map[database.TargetType]Target
// httpTarget is retained so tests can reach the HTTP
// target's shared client and circuit breakers.
httpTarget *httpTarget
// dbTarget is retained so the engine can reach the archive
// writer registry for webhook eviction and the idle sweep.
dbTarget *databaseTarget
}
// New creates and registers the delivery engine with the
@@ -142,6 +171,7 @@ func New(
deliveryCh: make(chan Task, deliveryChannelSize),
retryCh: make(chan Task, retryChannelSize),
workers: defaultWorkers,
mtr: metrics.Default(),
}
e.initTargets(&http.Client{
@@ -149,18 +179,7 @@ func New(
Transport: NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
})
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
OnStart: func(ctx context.Context) error {
e.start(ctx)
return nil
},
OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
e.stop()
return nil
},
})
e.registerHooks(lc)
return e
}
@@ -182,6 +201,19 @@ func (e *Engine) Notify(tasks []Task) {
}
}
// EvictWebhook implements WebhookEvictor. It releases the
// engine's per-webhook archiving state: the database target's
// cached archive writer is dropped from the registry and its
// file handle closed. The archive file itself is left on disk
// — it is long-term storage the operator owns.
func (e *Engine) EvictWebhook(webhookID string) {
if e.dbTarget == nil {
return
}
e.dbTarget.evict(webhookID)
}
// ScheduleRetry schedules a task to be re-enqueued onto the
// retry channel after delay. It implements the Scheduler
// interface the targets use to own their durable retries.
@@ -210,8 +242,39 @@ func (e *Engine) ScheduleRetry(
})
}
func (e *Engine) start(ctx context.Context) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
// registerHooks wires the engine's start and stop into the fx
// lifecycle. The start hook's context is deliberately ignored
// (see start for why the worker pool must not inherit it); the
// stop hook's context is honoured (see stop).
func (e *Engine) registerHooks(lc fx.Lifecycle) {
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
//nolint:contextcheck // Not inheriting the hook context
// is the point: see start.
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
e.start()
return nil
},
OnStop: func(ctx context.Context) error {
return e.stop(ctx)
},
})
}
// start launches the worker pool, restart recovery, and the
// periodic retry sweep.
//
// Their context is derived from context.Background(), NOT from
// the fx OnStart hook context. The hook context carries fx's
// start timeout (15s by default) and is cancelled once the start
// phase completes, so goroutines derived from it stop a few
// seconds into the process: every worker would return and the
// engine would silently stop delivering webhooks entirely. A
// long-lived goroutine must outlive the startup phase, so its
// lifetime is bounded by OnStop instead: stop cancels this
// context and waits on the WaitGroup.
func (e *Engine) start() {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
e.cancel = cancel
for range e.workers {
@@ -228,17 +291,36 @@ func (e *Engine) start(ctx context.Context) {
go e.retrySweep(ctx)
e.wg.Add(1)
go e.queueDepthSampler(ctx)
e.log.Info(
"delivery engine started",
"workers", e.workers,
)
}
func (e *Engine) stop() {
// stop cancels the worker pool's context and waits for the pool
// to drain, bounded by the stop hook's context: a wedged worker
// must not hang the process past fx's stop timeout.
func (e *Engine) stop(ctx context.Context) error {
e.log.Info("delivery engine stopping")
if e.cancel != nil {
e.cancel()
e.wg.Wait()
}
err := lifecycle.WaitForShutdown(
ctx, e.log, "delivery engine", &e.wg,
)
if err != nil {
return err
}
e.log.Info("delivery engine stopped")
return nil
}
func (e *Engine) worker(ctx context.Context) {
@@ -453,8 +535,9 @@ func (e *Engine) recoverRetryingDeliveries(
// recoverSingleRetry hands an orphaned retrying delivery back
// to its target to recompute the remaining backoff, then
// reschedules it. Targets that do not own durable retries
// (fire-and-forget) never produce retrying deliveries, so
// they are skipped.
// (fire-and-forget) never produce retrying deliveries, so a
// delivery found in that state has had its target's type
// changed underneath it and is terminally failed.
func (e *Engine) recoverSingleRetry(
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
webhookID string,
@@ -475,6 +558,10 @@ func (e *Engine) recoverSingleRetry(
rs, ok := e.targets[target.Type].(rescheduler)
if !ok {
e.failUnretryableRetry(
webhookDB, webhookID, d, &target,
)
return
}
@@ -649,8 +736,8 @@ func (e *Engine) sweepWebhookRetries(
// sweepSingleRetry re-enqueues an orphaned retrying delivery
// whose backoff window has elapsed, delegating the backoff
// decision to the delivery's target. Targets that do not own
// durable retries are skipped.
// decision to the delivery's target. A delivery whose target
// no longer owns durable retries is terminally failed.
func (e *Engine) sweepSingleRetry(
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
webhookID string,
@@ -670,6 +757,10 @@ func (e *Engine) sweepSingleRetry(
rs, ok := e.targets[target.Type].(rescheduler)
if !ok {
e.failUnretryableRetry(
webhookDB, webhookID, d, &target,
)
return
}
@@ -710,6 +801,66 @@ func (e *Engine) sweepSingleRetry(
}
}
// failUnretryableRetry terminally fails an orphaned retrying
// delivery whose target type no longer supports retries. Both
// restart recovery and the periodic sweep call it, so the
// terminal transition exists once.
//
// This is only reachable when a target's type has been changed
// out from under an in-flight retrying delivery (or the type is
// unknown to the registry): fire-and-forget targets never set
// status retrying themselves. Re-dispatching under the new type
// would be a delivery the operator never asked for, and leaving
// the row retrying strands it forever, so the delivery is
// failed with a recorded reason. The event stays stored, but
// nothing redelivers it today. Logged at warn, not error: this
// is operator-caused state, not a system fault.
func (e *Engine) failUnretryableRetry(
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
webhookID string,
d *database.Delivery,
target *database.Target,
) {
e.log.Warn(
"failing orphaned retrying delivery: target "+
"type no longer supports retries",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"delivery_id", d.ID,
"target_id", target.ID,
"target_name", target.Name,
"target_type", target.Type,
)
reason := fmt.Sprintf(
"target type %q does not support retries; "+
"delivery was left retrying by a previous "+
"target type and has been failed terminally",
target.Type,
)
e.recordResult(
webhookDB,
d,
e.countAttempts(webhookDB, d.ID)+1,
false,
0,
"",
reason,
0,
)
// The type is passed rather than assigned onto d: the delivery
// is loaded here without its target relation, and populating
// d.Target would make GORM's SaveBeforeAssociations upsert the
// whole target row — plaintext config, which for a slack target
// is the credential — into the per-webhook event database. See
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206.
e.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
}
// processDelivery dispatches a delivery to the target that
// owns its type. Unknown target types fail the delivery.
func (e *Engine) processDelivery(
@@ -727,7 +878,8 @@ func (e *Engine) processDelivery(
)
e.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
return
@@ -736,6 +888,24 @@ func (e *Engine) processDelivery(
target.Deliver(ctx, webhookDB, d, task, e)
}
// observeAttempt counts one delivery attempt that was actually
// dispatched to a target, and records how long it took.
//
// It is called from the dispatch paths rather than from around
// Target.Deliver, because Deliver is also entered for deliveries
// that never reach the wire: a delivery an open circuit breaker
// refuses sends nothing, records no DeliveryResult, and is
// rescheduled. Counting those would climb the attempts counter with
// no traffic behind it and fill the duration histogram with
// microsecond samples, which would make the delivery-duration
// quantiles improve during exactly the outage they exist to reveal.
func (e *Engine) observeAttempt(
t database.TargetType, dur time.Duration,
) {
e.mtr.DeliveryAttempted(t)
e.mtr.ObserveDeliveryDuration(t, dur)
}
// recordResult persists a DeliveryResult row describing a
// single attempt. It is a cross-target helper the targets
// call.
@@ -769,10 +939,22 @@ func (e *Engine) recordResult(
}
// updateDeliveryStatus persists a new status for a delivery.
// It is a cross-target helper the targets call.
// It is a cross-target helper the targets call, and therefore the
// single point where a delivery's outcome — delivered, terminally
// failed, or put back into retry — is counted.
//
// The target type is a parameter rather than read off d.Target
// because one caller — failUnretryableRetry — deliberately holds a
// delivery loaded without its target relation, and must keep it that
// way: a populated d.Target makes GORM upsert the target row, config
// and all, into the per-webhook database.
//
// The counter moves only after the row is written, so a transition
// the database rejected is not claimed as an outcome that happened.
func (e *Engine) updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
d *database.Delivery,
targetType database.TargetType,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
) {
err := webhookDB.Model(d).
@@ -784,7 +966,11 @@ func (e *Engine) updateDeliveryStatus(
"status", status,
"error", err,
)
return
}
e.mtr.DeliveryStatusChanged(targetType, status)
}
func truncate(s string, maxLen int) string {

332
internal/delivery/engine_integration_test.go
View File

@@ -126,36 +126,6 @@ func iHTTPConfig(url string) string {
return string(data)
}
func iWebhookDB(t *testing.T) *gorm.DB {
t.Helper()
dbPath := filepath.Join(
t.TempDir(), "events-test.db",
)
dsn := fmt.Sprintf(
"file:%s?cache=shared&mode=rwc", dbPath,
)
sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dsn)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
db, err := gorm.Open(
sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB}, &gorm.Config{},
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, db.AutoMigrate(
&database.Event{},
&database.Delivery{},
&database.DeliveryResult{},
))
return db
}
func iEngine(
t *testing.T, workers int,
) *delivery.Engine {
@@ -182,10 +152,10 @@ func iSeedEvent(
event := database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: "POST",
Method: http.MethodPost,
Headers: `{}`,
Body: body,
ContentType: "application/json",
ContentType: testContentType,
}
require.NoError(t, db.Create(&event).Error)
@@ -506,7 +476,7 @@ func TestWorkerLifecycle_StartStop(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
s.Engine.ExportStart(context.Background())
s.Engine.ExportStart()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID,
@@ -529,21 +499,17 @@ func TestWorkerLifecycle_StartStop(t *testing.T) {
s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{task})
iWaitForStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
iWaitForDelivered(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
s.Engine.ExportStop()
require.NoError(t, s.Engine.ExportStop(context.Background()))
}
// iWaitForStatus polls until the delivery reaches the
// expected status.
func iWaitForStatus(
// iWaitForDelivered polls until the delivery reaches the
// delivered status.
func iWaitForDelivered(
t *testing.T,
db *gorm.DB,
deliveryID string,
expected database.DeliveryStatus,
) {
t.Helper()
@@ -557,7 +523,7 @@ func iWaitForStatus(
return false
}
return d.Status == expected
return d.Status == database.DeliveryStatusDelivered
}, 5*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond)
}
@@ -588,7 +554,7 @@ func TestWorkerLifecycle_ProcessesRetryChannel(
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
s.Engine.ExportStart(context.Background())
s.Engine.ExportStart()
bodyStr := event.Body
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
@@ -599,12 +565,9 @@ func TestWorkerLifecycle_ProcessesRetryChannel(
s.Engine.ExportRetryCh() <- task
iWaitForStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
iWaitForDelivered(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
s.Engine.ExportStop()
require.NoError(t, s.Engine.ExportStop(context.Background()))
}
// --- processDelivery: unknown target type ---
@@ -778,6 +741,269 @@ func TestRecoverWebhookDeliveries_RetryingDeliveries(
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("expected retry task from recovery")
}
// Regression guard: a target that still supports retries
// must be rescheduled, never terminally failed, and must
// not gain a synthetic result row.
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
assert.Len(t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID), 1)
}
// --- Retrying deliveries whose target type changed ---
// iSeedRetryingWithType seeds a retrying delivery with one
// recorded failed attempt against a target of the given type,
// standing in for a target whose type was edited in the main
// database while the delivery was still retrying.
func iSeedRetryingWithType(
t *testing.T,
s iSetup,
targetType database.TargetType,
) string {
t.Helper()
targetID := uuid.New().String()
iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID,
s.WebhookID, "mutated-target", targetType,
iHTTPConfig("http://example.com/hook"), 5,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID,
`{"orphaned":"retry"}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
iSeedFailedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
return d.ID
}
// iResults loads a delivery's results in attempt order.
func iResults(
t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB, deliveryID string,
) []database.DeliveryResult {
t.Helper()
var results []database.DeliveryResult
require.NoError(t, db.
Where("delivery_id = ?", deliveryID).
Order("attempt_num").
Find(&results).Error)
return results
}
// iAssertTerminallyFailed asserts the delivery ended failed
// with a result row recording why, and was not rescheduled.
func iAssertTerminallyFailed(
t *testing.T,
s iSetup,
deliveryID string,
targetType database.TargetType,
) {
t.Helper()
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
results := iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID)
require.Len(t, results, 2)
last := results[1]
assert.False(t, last.Success)
assert.Equal(t, 2, last.AttemptNum)
assert.Contains(
t, last.Error, string(targetType),
)
assert.Contains(
t, last.Error, "does not support retries",
)
assert.Empty(t, s.Engine.ExportRetryCh())
}
func TestRecoverSingleRetry_TypeNoLongerRetries(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "mutated-type",
)
deliveryID := iSeedRetryingWithType(
t, s, database.TargetTypeLog,
)
s.Engine.ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertTerminallyFailed(
t, s, deliveryID, database.TargetTypeLog,
)
}
func TestSweepSingleRetry_TypeNoLongerRetries(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "mutated-type-sweep",
)
deliveryID := iSeedRetryingWithType(
t, s, database.TargetTypeDatabase,
)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertTerminallyFailed(
t, s, deliveryID, database.TargetTypeDatabase,
)
}
// TestFailUnretryableRetry_WritesNoTargetRow proves the
// orphaned-retry terminal path leaves no target row — and so no
// plaintext target config — in the per-webhook event database.
//
// That path loads the delivery without its Target relation on
// purpose. Populating d.Target makes GORM's SaveBeforeAssociations
// upsert the whole target row on the status UPDATE, which for a slack
// target writes the incoming-webhook credential into events-*.db.
// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206.
func TestFailUnretryableRetry_WritesNoTargetRow(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "no-target-row",
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
// A Slack incoming-webhook URL: the target config IS the
// credential, which is what makes a leaked target row a
// disclosure rather than a curiosity.
hookURL := "https://hooks.slack.com/services/T00/B00/x"
iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID,
s.WebhookID, "credential-bearing",
database.TargetTypeLog, iHTTPConfig(hookURL), 5,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"orphaned":"retry"}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
iSeedFailedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
// The table exists in the per-webhook database because GORM
// migrates the Delivery relation's model alongside it. It must
// stay empty.
var targetRows int64
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.
Table("targets").
Count(&targetRows).Error)
assert.Zero(t, targetRows,
"orphaned-retry terminal failure wrote a target row "+
"into the per-webhook event database",
)
var configs []string
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.
Table("targets").
Pluck("config", &configs).Error)
assert.NotContains(
t, strings.Join(configs, " "), hookURL,
)
}
func TestRecoverSingleRetry_UnknownTargetType(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "unknown-type",
)
unknown := database.TargetType("not-a-target-type")
deliveryID := iSeedRetryingWithType(t, s, unknown)
s.Engine.ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertTerminallyFailed(t, s, deliveryID, unknown)
}
func TestSweepSingleRetry_UnknownTargetType(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "unknown-type-sweep",
)
unknown := database.TargetType("not-a-target-type")
deliveryID := iSeedRetryingWithType(t, s, unknown)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertTerminallyFailed(t, s, deliveryID, unknown)
}
// iSeedFailedResult creates a failed delivery result.
@@ -935,7 +1161,7 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_CustomTargetHeaders(t *testing.T) {
func TestDeliverHTTP_TargetTimeout(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := iWebhookDB(t)
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := iEngine(t, 1)
ts := httptest.NewServer(
@@ -987,10 +1213,10 @@ func iSeedEventAndDelivery(
event := database.Event{
WebhookID: uuid.New().String(),
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: "POST",
Method: http.MethodPost,
Headers: `{"Content-Type":["application/json"]}`,
Body: body,
ContentType: "application/json",
ContentType: testContentType,
}
require.NoError(t, db.Create(&event).Error)
@@ -1067,7 +1293,7 @@ func iAssertResultFailed(
func TestDeliverHTTP_InvalidConfig(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := iWebhookDB(t)
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := iEngine(t, 1)
event, del := iSeedEventAndDelivery(

271
internal/delivery/engine_lifecycle_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
const (
// hookStopTimeout bounds how long a lifecycle test waits for
// the engine's OnStop hook to return before declaring the
// shutdown hung.
hookStopTimeout = 10 * time.Second
// hookSettleDelay is how long startEngineViaHook waits after
// OnStart before the caller may enqueue work. A worker pool
// wrongly rooted in the already-done hook context has nothing
// but ctx.Done() ready in its select, so it is deterministically
// gone by the end of this window. Without the wait, Notify would
// race the pool's very first select, in which a ready ctx.Done()
// and a ready deliveryCh are chosen between at random and a
// doomed pool still delivers.
hookSettleDelay = 250 * time.Millisecond
// wedgeStopTimeout is the stop timeout a wedged-shutdown test
// hands OnStop, standing in for fx's StopTimeout. The test
// asserts only that the hook returns at all, and allows it
// hookStopTimeout — forty times this budget — to do so, so no
// assertion here races the wall clock.
wedgeStopTimeout = 250 * time.Millisecond
)
// recordingLifecycle is a minimal fx.Lifecycle that records the
// hooks a component registers, so a test can invoke the real
// OnStart/OnStop functions with a context of its choosing.
type recordingLifecycle struct {
hooks []fx.Hook
}
func (l *recordingLifecycle) Append(h fx.Hook) {
l.hooks = append(l.hooks, h)
}
// requireStopHookExpires drives hook.OnStop with a stop context
// that expires while a wedged goroutine is still running, and
// requires the hook to return the deadline error naming
// component instead of blocking on the WaitGroup forever.
func requireStopHookExpires(
t *testing.T, hook fx.Hook, component string,
) {
t.Helper()
stopCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(
context.Background(), wedgeStopTimeout,
)
defer cancel()
var stopErr error
stopped := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(stopped)
stopErr = hook.OnStop(stopCtx)
}()
select {
case <-stopped:
case <-time.After(hookStopTimeout):
t.Fatal(
"OnStop did not return: it discarded the stop " +
"context and is waiting on a wedged goroutine " +
"that will never observe cancellation",
)
}
require.ErrorIs(t, stopErr, context.DeadlineExceeded)
require.ErrorContains(t, stopErr, component)
}
// startEngineViaHook drives the genuine fx hooks the application
// registers for the engine, handing OnStart a context that is
// already done, and returns only once a pool that inherited that
// context would have exited. It returns the recorded lifecycle so
// the caller can drive OnStop too.
//
// Callers must not seed pending or retrying deliveries before
// calling this: restart recovery enqueues those during startup,
// which would put work in the queue while the pool is still
// racing its first select.
func startEngineViaHook(
t *testing.T, eng *delivery.Engine,
) *recordingLifecycle {
t.Helper()
lc := &recordingLifecycle{}
eng.ExportRegisterHooks(lc)
require.Len(t, lc.hooks, 1)
// fx hands OnStart a context carrying the application start
// timeout, and cancels it when the start phase ends. An
// already-cancelled context is that same defect taken to its
// limit, and unlike a plain context.Background() it actually
// distinguishes a correctly rooted loop from a broken one.
hookCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
require.NoError(t, lc.hooks[0].OnStart(hookCtx))
time.Sleep(hookSettleDelay)
return lc
}
// seedLogTask seeds a pending delivery for a log target and
// returns its ID together with the task that drives it. The log
// target needs no network, so a delivery completing proves only
// that a worker picked the task up.
func seedLogTask(
t *testing.T, s iSetup,
) (string, delivery.Task) {
t.Helper()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID,
`{"lifecycle":"hook-context"}`,
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
bodyStr := event.Body
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"hook-context-test", "", 0, 1, &bodyStr,
)
task.TargetType = database.TargetTypeLog
return d.ID, task
}
// TestEngine_WorkersOutliveStartHookContext is the regression
// test for a delivery engine that stopped delivering roughly
// fifteen seconds after boot. fx calls OnStart with a context
// carrying the application's start timeout (15s by default) and
// cancels it when the start phase ends, so a worker pool rooted
// in it exits shortly after startup: the process keeps accepting
// and persisting events while nothing at all forwards them.
//
// Driving OnStart with an already-cancelled context is that
// defect taken to its limit. A pool that inherits the hook
// context is gone before the task is even enqueued; a correctly
// rooted pool keeps working for as long as the process lives.
func TestEngine_WorkersOutliveStartHookContext(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background())
})
// Seeded only after the pool has settled, so restart recovery
// cannot enqueue it during startup.
deliveryID, task := seedLogTask(t, s)
s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{task})
iWaitForDelivered(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID)
}
// TestEngine_StopHookStopsWorkers proves the fix did not trade a
// startup bug for a shutdown hang: now that the worker pool no
// longer observes the start hook's cancellation, OnStop is the
// only thing that can stop it, and it must both return promptly
// and actually leave the pool drained.
func TestEngine_StopHookStopsWorkers(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)
// Let the pool prove it is running before stopping it, so a
// fast OnStop cannot pass by stopping something already dead.
firstID, firstTask := seedLogTask(t, s)
s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{firstTask})
iWaitForDelivered(t, s.WebhookDB, firstID)
var stopErr error
stopped := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(stopped)
// stop blocks on the workers' WaitGroup, so returning at
// all proves every goroutine observed the cancellation.
stopErr = lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background())
}()
select {
case <-stopped:
case <-time.After(hookStopTimeout):
t.Fatal(
"OnStop did not return: the delivery engine's " +
"WaitGroup is still waiting on a goroutine that " +
"never observed cancellation",
)
}
require.NoError(t, stopErr)
// With every worker gone, a freshly notified task must sit
// untouched in the queue rather than being delivered.
secondID, secondTask := seedLogTask(t, s)
s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{secondTask})
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
var after database.Delivery
require.NoError(
t,
s.WebhookDB.First(&after, "id = ?", secondID).Error,
)
require.Equal(
t,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
after.Status,
"a stopped engine must not deliver anything",
)
}
// TestEngine_StopHookHonoursStopTimeout is the regression test
// for a shutdown that could never complete. fx hands OnStop a
// context carrying the application's stop timeout; an OnStop
// that discards it and calls wg.Wait() bare hangs the process
// forever on a single worker stuck inside a delivery target that
// never returns — precisely when a bounded shutdown matters
// most.
//
// The wedged goroutine here never observes cancellation, so the
// hook can only return by honouring its context, and it must say
// so rather than reporting a clean stop.
func TestEngine_StopHookHonoursStopTimeout(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)
release := make(chan struct{})
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
s.Engine.ExportWedgeWorker(release)
requireStopHookExpires(t, lc.hooks[0], "delivery engine")
}

77
internal/delivery/engine_test.go
View File

@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// testContentType is the event content type used in tests.
const testContentType = "application/json"
func testWebhookDB(t *testing.T) *gorm.DB {
t.Helper()
@@ -94,10 +97,10 @@ func seedEvent(
event := database.Event{
WebhookID: uuid.New().String(),
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: "POST",
Method: http.MethodPost,
Headers: `{"Content-Type":["application/json"]}`,
Body: body,
ContentType: "application/json",
ContentType: testContentType,
}
require.NoError(t, db.Create(&event).Error)
@@ -342,33 +345,29 @@ func TestDeliverDatabase_ImmediateSuccess(
t.Parallel()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{"db":"target"}`)
dlv := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, uuid.New().String(),
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
// The database target archives for real now, so the engine
// needs a webhook DB manager to locate the data directory.
e := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
nil,
database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(t.TempDir()),
slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
os.Stderr,
&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
)),
&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
1,
)
d := &database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: dlv.TargetID,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusPending,
Event: event,
Target: database.Target{
Name: "test-db",
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
},
}
d.ID = dlv.ID
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{"db":"target"}`)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, db, event, "")
e.ExportDeliverDatabase(db, d)
var updated database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, db.First(
&updated, "id = ?", dlv.ID,
&updated, "id = ?", d.ID,
).Error)
assert.Equal(t,
@@ -379,7 +378,7 @@ func TestDeliverDatabase_ImmediateSuccess(
var result database.DeliveryResult
require.NoError(t, db.Where(
"delivery_id = ?", dlv.ID,
"delivery_id = ?", d.ID,
).First(&result).Error)
assert.True(t, result.Success)
@@ -1117,10 +1116,10 @@ func TestDoHTTPRequest_ForwardsHeaders(t *testing.T) {
}
event := &database.Event{
Method: "POST",
Method: http.MethodPost,
Headers: `{"X-Custom":["value1"],"Content-Type":["application/json"]}`,
Body: `{"test":true}`,
ContentType: "application/json",
ContentType: testContentType,
}
statusCode, _, _, err := e.ExportDoHTTPRequest(
@@ -1142,7 +1141,7 @@ func TestDoHTTPRequest_ForwardsHeaders(t *testing.T) {
)
assert.Equal(t,
"application/json",
testContentType,
receivedHeaders.Get("Content-Type"),
)
@@ -1158,7 +1157,19 @@ func TestProcessDelivery_RoutesToCorrectHandler(
t.Parallel()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
// The database target archives for real now, so the engine
// needs a webhook DB manager to locate the data directory.
e := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
nil,
database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(t.TempDir()),
slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
os.Stderr,
&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
)),
&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
1,
)
tests := []struct {
name string
@@ -1289,8 +1300,8 @@ func TestFormatSlackMessage_JSONBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
event := &database.Event{
Method: "POST",
ContentType: "application/json",
Method: http.MethodPost,
ContentType: testContentType,
Body: `{"action":"push",` +
`"repo":"test/repo",` +
`"ref":"refs/heads/main"}`,
@@ -1315,7 +1326,7 @@ func TestFormatSlackMessage_NonJSONBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
event := &database.Event{
Method: "POST",
Method: http.MethodPost,
ContentType: "text/plain",
Body: "hello world plain text",
}
@@ -1338,8 +1349,8 @@ func TestFormatSlackMessage_EmptyBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
event := &database.Event{
Method: "POST",
ContentType: "application/json",
Method: http.MethodPost,
ContentType: testContentType,
Body: "",
}
event.CreatedAt = time.Date(
@@ -1367,8 +1378,8 @@ func TestFormatSlackMessage_LargeJSONTruncated(
require.NoError(t, err)
event := &database.Event{
Method: "POST",
ContentType: "application/json",
Method: http.MethodPost,
ContentType: testContentType,
Body: string(largeJSON),
}
event.CreatedAt = time.Date(
@@ -1697,7 +1708,7 @@ func assertLogLineComplete(
"log line must contain the webhook id",
)
assert.Contains(t, out, "application/json",
assert.Contains(t, out, testContentType,
"log line must contain the content type",
)
}

157
internal/delivery/event_db_isolation_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// assertNoTargetRows opens the per-webhook database file directly,
// outside GORM, and fails if its targets table holds any rows.
// Target config is the credential for slack and http targets, and
// event databases are the files that get backed up and handed
// around.
func assertNoTargetRows(t *testing.T, dbPath string) {
t.Helper()
sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
"sqlite", fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=ro", dbPath),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() }()
var tables int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(),
"SELECT count(*) FROM sqlite_master "+
"WHERE type = 'table' AND name = 'targets'",
).Scan(&tables))
if tables == 0 {
return
}
var rows int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(), "SELECT count(*) FROM targets",
).Scan(&rows))
assert.Zero(
t, rows,
"per-webhook event database must hold no target rows",
)
}
// TestEventDBHoldsNoTargetRows drives a delivery and then a retry
// through the real engine write paths and asserts neither leaves a
// target row behind in events-*.db.
func TestEventDBHoldsNoTargetRows(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
dbPath := s.DBMgr.DBPath(s.WebhookID)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"leak":"none"}`,
)
body := event.Body
// A new delivery.
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"leaky-target", cfg, 5, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
assertNoTargetRows(t, dbPath)
// A retry.
rd := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
rTask := iTask(
rd, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"leaky-target", cfg, 5, 2, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(context.TODO(), &rTask)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, rd.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
assertNoTargetRows(t, dbPath)
}
// TestEventDBHoldsNoTargetRowsOnFailedDelivery covers the failure
// write path, which updates the delivery to failed and records a
// result, rather than the success path above.
func TestEventDBHoldsNoTargetRowsOnFailedDelivery(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"leak":"none"}`,
)
body := event.Body
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"leaky-target", cfg, 0, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
assertNoTargetRows(t, s.DBMgr.DBPath(s.WebhookID))
}

306
internal/delivery/export_test.go
View File

@@ -7,10 +7,18 @@ import (
"net/http"
"time"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
)
// ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted exposes the sentinel returned by
// an evicted archive writer. It carries the Err prefix rather
// than this file's usual Export one because it is a sentinel
// error.
var ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted = errArchiveWriterEvicted
// Exported constants for test access.
const (
ExportDeliveryChannelSize = deliveryChannelSize
@@ -188,14 +196,40 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportRecoverInFlight(
e.recoverInFlight(ctx)
}
// ExportSweepWebhookRetries exposes sweepWebhookRetries.
func (e *Engine) ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
ctx context.Context, webhookID string,
) {
e.sweepWebhookRetries(ctx, webhookID)
}
// ExportStart exposes start for testing.
func (e *Engine) ExportStart(ctx context.Context) {
e.start(ctx)
func (e *Engine) ExportStart() {
e.start()
}
// ExportRegisterHooks registers the engine's real fx lifecycle
// hooks on a lifecycle supplied by a test, so a test can drive
// the exact OnStart/OnStop functions the application runs and
// hand OnStart the kind of context fx actually supplies.
func (e *Engine) ExportRegisterHooks(lc fx.Lifecycle) {
e.registerHooks(lc)
}
// ExportStop exposes stop for testing.
func (e *Engine) ExportStop() {
e.stop()
func (e *Engine) ExportStop(ctx context.Context) error {
return e.stop(ctx)
}
// ExportWedgeWorker adds a goroutine to the engine's WaitGroup
// that never observes cancellation and returns only when release
// is closed. It stands in for a worker stuck inside a delivery
// target that never returns, which is the only way stop can be
// made to outlast its context.
func (e *Engine) ExportWedgeWorker(release <-chan struct{}) {
e.wg.Go(func() {
<-release
})
}
// ExportDeliveryCh returns the delivery channel.
@@ -220,6 +254,7 @@ func NewTestEngine(
deliveryCh: make(chan Task, deliveryChannelSize),
retryCh: make(chan Task, retryChannelSize),
workers: workers,
mtr: metrics.Default(),
}
e.initTargets(client)
@@ -234,6 +269,7 @@ func NewTestEngineSmallRetry(
e := &Engine{
log: log,
retryCh: make(chan Task, 1),
mtr: metrics.Default(),
}
e.initTargets(nil)
@@ -256,12 +292,25 @@ func NewTestEngineWithDB(
deliveryCh: make(chan Task, deliveryChannelSize),
retryCh: make(chan Task, retryChannelSize),
workers: workers,
mtr: metrics.Default(),
}
e.initTargets(client)
return e
}
// ExportSetMetrics substitutes the engine's metric set, so a test can
// assert on collectors registered on a private registry instead of
// the process-wide ones every other test is also moving.
func (e *Engine) ExportSetMetrics(mtr *metrics.Set) {
e.mtr = mtr
}
// ExportSampleQueueDepths runs one queue depth sample synchronously.
func (e *Engine) ExportSampleQueueDepths(ctx context.Context) {
e.sampleQueueDepths(ctx)
}
// NewTestCircuitBreaker creates a CircuitBreaker with
// custom settings for testing.
func NewTestCircuitBreaker(
@@ -273,3 +322,252 @@ func NewTestCircuitBreaker(
cooldown: cooldown,
}
}
// ExportArchivedEvent aliases the archive row type so black-box
// tests can construct and read archive rows.
type ExportArchivedEvent = archivedEvent
// ExportArchiveWriter wraps an archiveWriter so black-box tests
// can exercise the per-webhook archive file mechanics.
type ExportArchiveWriter struct {
w *archiveWriter
}
// NewExportArchiveWriter builds an archive writer for tests,
// optionally overriding the reopen debounce (a non-positive
// debounce keeps the production default).
func NewExportArchiveWriter(
path string, log *slog.Logger, debounce time.Duration,
) *ExportArchiveWriter {
w := newArchiveWriter(path, log)
if debounce > 0 {
w.debounce = debounce
}
return &ExportArchiveWriter{w: w}
}
// Write archives a row through the writer.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Write(
row ExportArchivedEvent, expiry time.Duration,
) error {
return e.w.write(row, expiry)
}
// Open opens the archive file, pruning when expiry is positive.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Open(expiry time.Duration) error {
return e.w.open(expiry)
}
// Reopen closes and reopens the archive file.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Reopen(
expiry time.Duration,
) error {
return e.w.reopen(expiry)
}
// Reopens reports how many times the file has been opened.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Reopens() int {
return e.w.reopens
}
// DB returns the writer's current open handle for row
// inspection in tests.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) DB() *gorm.DB {
return e.w.db
}
// Path returns the archive file the writer owns.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Path() string {
return e.w.path
}
// OpenExisting opens the archive without permitting creation,
// the way the idle sweep does.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) OpenExisting(
expiry time.Duration,
) error {
return e.w.openMode(archiveModeExisting, expiry)
}
// SweepExpired runs an idle sweep of the archive.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) SweepExpired(
expiry time.Duration,
) error {
return e.w.sweepExpired(expiry)
}
// Evict marks the writer evicted and closes its handle, exactly
// as leaving the registry does.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Evict() {
e.w.evict()
}
// HandleOpen reports whether the writer currently holds an open
// archive handle.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) HandleOpen() bool {
e.w.mu.Lock()
defer e.w.mu.Unlock()
return e.w.db != nil
}
// Same reports whether both wrappers refer to the very same
// underlying archive writer, so a test can prove a registry entry
// is the writer it was handed rather than a replacement.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Same(
other *ExportArchiveWriter,
) bool {
return other != nil && e.w == other.w
}
// ExportArchiveWriterFor returns the archive writer the registry
// currently caches for a webhook, or nil when none is cached. It
// never creates one, so a test can hold a reference to the very
// writer an eviction is about to detach.
func (e *Engine) ExportArchiveWriterFor(
webhookID string,
) *ExportArchiveWriter {
e.dbTarget.mu.Lock()
defer e.dbTarget.mu.Unlock()
w, ok := e.dbTarget.writers[webhookID]
if !ok {
return nil
}
return &ExportArchiveWriter{w: w}
}
// ExportHasArchiveWriter reports whether the database target
// currently caches an archive writer for a webhook.
func (e *Engine) ExportHasArchiveWriter(
webhookID string,
) bool {
e.dbTarget.mu.Lock()
defer e.dbTarget.mu.Unlock()
_, ok := e.dbTarget.writers[webhookID]
return ok
}
// ExportArchiveHandleOpen reports whether the cached archive
// writer for a webhook holds an open database handle. It
// returns false when no writer is cached.
func (e *Engine) ExportArchiveHandleOpen(
webhookID string,
) bool {
e.dbTarget.mu.Lock()
w, ok := e.dbTarget.writers[webhookID]
e.dbTarget.mu.Unlock()
if !ok {
return false
}
w.mu.Lock()
defer w.mu.Unlock()
return w.db != nil
}
// ExportEnsureArchiveWriter creates (if needed) and returns the
// archive file path of the cached writer for a webhook, so a
// test can prime the registry the way a delivery would.
func (e *Engine) ExportEnsureArchiveWriter(
webhookID string,
) (string, error) {
w, err := e.dbTarget.writerFor(webhookID)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return w.path, nil
}
// ExportSweepWriterFor takes a webhook's registry writer exactly
// as the idle sweep does, reporting whether the sweep had to
// create the entry. It lets a test drive the registry through the
// sweep's own entry point instead of choreographing goroutines.
func (e *Engine) ExportSweepWriterFor(
webhookID string,
) (*ExportArchiveWriter, bool, error) {
w, created, err := e.dbTarget.sweepWriterFor(webhookID)
if err != nil {
return nil, false, err
}
return &ExportArchiveWriter{w: w}, created, nil
}
// ExportReleaseSweepWriter releases a sweep-created registry entry
// exactly as a finished sweep does.
func (e *Engine) ExportReleaseSweepWriter(
webhookID string, w *ExportArchiveWriter,
) {
e.dbTarget.releaseSweepWriter(webhookID, w.w)
}
// NewTestArchiveSweeper builds an ArchiveSweeper backed by the
// given main database and engine, without the fx lifecycle.
// Intended for tests.
func NewTestArchiveSweeper(
db *database.Database,
eng *Engine,
log *slog.Logger,
) *ArchiveSweeper {
return &ArchiveSweeper{
db: db,
eng: eng,
log: log,
interval: time.Hour,
}
}
// ExportSweep runs a single archive sweep synchronously for
// tests.
func (s *ArchiveSweeper) ExportSweep(ctx context.Context) {
s.sweep(ctx)
}
// ExportStart starts the sweeper's background loop for tests.
func (s *ArchiveSweeper) ExportStart() {
s.start()
}
// ExportRegisterHooks registers the sweeper's real fx lifecycle
// hooks on a lifecycle supplied by a test, so a test can drive
// the exact OnStart/OnStop functions the application runs and
// hand OnStart the kind of context fx actually supplies.
func (s *ArchiveSweeper) ExportRegisterHooks(lc fx.Lifecycle) {
s.registerHooks(lc)
}
// ExportStop stops the sweeper's background loop for tests.
func (s *ArchiveSweeper) ExportStop(ctx context.Context) error {
return s.stop(ctx)
}
// ExportWedgeLoop adds a goroutine to the sweeper's WaitGroup
// that never observes cancellation and returns only when release
// is closed. It stands in for a prune stuck on a locked archive.
func (s *ArchiveSweeper) ExportWedgeLoop(
release <-chan struct{},
) {
s.wg.Go(func() {
<-release
})
}
// ExportSetInterval overrides the sweep interval for tests.
func (s *ArchiveSweeper) ExportSetInterval(d time.Duration) {
s.interval = d
}
// ExportParseArchiveExpiry exposes parseArchiveExpiry.
func ExportParseArchiveExpiry(
configJSON string,
) (time.Duration, error) {
return parseArchiveExpiry(configJSON)
}

545
internal/delivery/metrics_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,545 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
dto "github.com/prometheus/client_model/go"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
)
// Metric names as exposed on /metrics.
const (
mAttempts = "webhooker_delivery_attempts_total"
mSucceeded = "webhooker_deliveries_succeeded_total"
mFailed = "webhooker_deliveries_failed_total"
mRetries = "webhooker_delivery_retries_total"
mDuration = "webhooker_delivery_duration_seconds"
mPending = "webhooker_deliveries_pending"
mRetrying = "webhooker_deliveries_retrying"
mBreakers = "webhooker_circuit_breakers_open"
)
const (
mTypeHTTP = "http"
mTypeLog = "log"
mTypeUnknown = "unknown"
)
// mIsolate gives the setup's engine a metric set registered on a
// private registry. The process-wide collectors are moved by every
// other delivery test running in parallel, so exact assertions are
// only possible against a registry this test owns.
func mIsolate(
t *testing.T, s iSetup,
) *prometheus.Registry {
t.Helper()
reg := prometheus.NewRegistry()
s.Engine.ExportSetMetrics(metrics.New(reg))
return reg
}
// mFind returns the series of the named metric carrying the given
// target_type label.
func mFind(
t *testing.T,
reg *prometheus.Registry,
name, targetType string,
) *dto.Metric {
t.Helper()
families, err := reg.Gather()
require.NoError(t, err)
for _, fam := range families {
if fam.GetName() != name {
continue
}
for _, m := range fam.GetMetric() {
for _, label := range m.GetLabel() {
if label.GetName() == "target_type" &&
label.GetValue() == targetType {
return m
}
}
}
}
t.Fatalf(
"metric %s{target_type=%q} not found",
name, targetType,
)
return nil
}
func mCounter(
t *testing.T,
reg *prometheus.Registry,
name, targetType string,
) float64 {
t.Helper()
return mFind(t, reg, name, targetType).
GetCounter().GetValue()
}
func mGauge(
t *testing.T,
reg *prometheus.Registry,
name, targetType string,
) float64 {
t.Helper()
return mFind(t, reg, name, targetType).
GetGauge().GetValue()
}
// mHTTPDurations returns how many samples the delivery duration
// histogram holds for the http target type, which is the type every
// test here times.
func mHTTPDurations(
t *testing.T, reg *prometheus.Registry,
) uint64 {
t.Helper()
return mFind(t, reg, mDuration, mTypeHTTP).
GetHistogram().GetSampleCount()
}
// TestDeliveryMetrics_SuccessAndRetryExhaustion drives one delivery
// that succeeds and one that fails every attempt until its retries
// are exhausted, and asserts every delivery counter across both.
func TestDeliveryMetrics_SuccessAndRetryExhaustion(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
reg := mIsolate(t, s)
mDeliverOK(t, s)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mAttempts, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mSucceeded, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mFailed, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mRetries, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(1),
mHTTPDurations(t, reg))
mExhaustRetries(t, s)
// Two further attempts: the first is retried, the second is
// the last one allowed and fails the delivery terminally.
assert.InDelta(t, 3.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mAttempts, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mSucceeded, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mRetries, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mFailed, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(3),
mHTTPDurations(t, reg))
// Two consecutive failures are below the trip threshold.
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mBreakers, mTypeHTTP), 0)
// The label is the target type and nothing finer: two http
// targets shared one series, and no other type's moved.
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mAttempts, mTypeLog), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mFailed, mTypeLog), 0)
}
// mDeliverOK delivers one event to a target that answers 200.
func mDeliverOK(t *testing.T, s iSetup) {
t.Helper()
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"ok":true}`,
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
body := event.Body
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-ok", iHTTPConfig(ts.URL), 3, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
}
// mExhaustRetries delivers to a target that answers 500 with a
// two-attempt budget, driving both attempts so the delivery ends
// terminally failed.
func mExhaustRetries(t *testing.T, s iSetup) {
t.Helper()
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"ok":false}`,
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
body := event.Body
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
first := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-fail", cfg, 2, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &first)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
// The engine's own scheduler would re-enqueue this after the
// backoff; driving the second attempt directly keeps the test
// deterministic and off the wall clock.
second := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-fail", cfg, 2, 2, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(
context.TODO(), &second,
)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
}
// TestDeliveryMetrics_CircuitBreakerGauge proves the open-breaker
// gauge follows a breaker that trips.
func TestDeliveryMetrics_CircuitBreakerGauge(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
reg := mIsolate(t, s)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"trip":true}`,
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
body := event.Body
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
// A retry budget above the failure threshold, so the breaker
// rather than the budget is what stops the delivery.
maxRetries := delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold + 5
first := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-trip", cfg, maxRetries, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &first)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mBreakers, mTypeHTTP), 0)
for attempt := 2; attempt <= delivery.
ExportDefaultFailureThreshold; attempt++ {
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-trip", cfg, maxRetries, attempt, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(
context.TODO(), &task,
)
}
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mBreakers, mTypeHTTP), 0)
}
// TestDeliveryMetrics_BreakerBlockedIsNotAnAttempt proves a delivery
// an open circuit breaker refuses is neither counted as an attempt
// nor observed in the duration histogram.
//
// It sends nothing and records no result row, so counting it would
// climb the attempts counter with no traffic behind it and pull the
// duration quantiles down with near-zero samples for as long as the
// breaker stayed open — the metric moving the wrong way during the
// outage it exists to reveal.
func TestDeliveryMetrics_BreakerBlockedIsNotAnAttempt(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
reg := mIsolate(t, s)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"blocked":true}`,
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
body := event.Body
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
maxRetries := delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold + 5
first := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-blocked", cfg, maxRetries, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &first)
for attempt := 2; attempt <= delivery.
ExportDefaultFailureThreshold; attempt++ {
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-blocked", cfg, maxRetries, attempt, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(context.TODO(), &task)
}
require.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mBreakers, mTypeHTTP), 0,
"breaker should be open before the blocked attempt")
threshold := float64(
delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold,
)
assert.InDelta(t, threshold,
mCounter(t, reg, mAttempts, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(threshold),
mHTTPDurations(t, reg))
retriesBefore := mCounter(t, reg, mRetries, mTypeHTTP)
blocked := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-blocked", cfg, maxRetries,
delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold+1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(context.TODO(), &blocked)
// The breaker refused it: rescheduled, so the retry counter
// moved, but nothing was attempted or timed.
assert.InDelta(t, retriesBefore+1,
mCounter(t, reg, mRetries, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, threshold,
mCounter(t, reg, mAttempts, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(threshold),
mHTTPDurations(t, reg))
}
// TestDeliveryMetrics_OrphanedRetryFailureLabelled proves the
// terminal failure of a delivery whose target no longer retries is
// counted against the target's real type, not against unknown. The
// type is threaded in as an argument because populating d.Target on
// that path would write the target row into the per-webhook database
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206).
func TestDeliveryMetrics_OrphanedRetryFailureLabelled(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
reg := mIsolate(t, s)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "orphaned-label",
)
deliveryID := iSeedRetryingWithType(
t, s, database.TargetTypeLog,
)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mFailed, mTypeLog), 0)
}
// TestDeliveryMetrics_QueueDepthGauges proves the sampler publishes
// the queued deliveries it finds in the per-webhook databases, and
// that a drained queue reads zero rather than keeping its last
// value.
func TestDeliveryMetrics_QueueDepthGauges(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
reg := mIsolate(t, s)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "queue-depth",
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID,
"queue-depth-target", database.TargetTypeHTTP,
iHTTPConfig("https://example.com/hook"), 3,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"queued":true}`,
)
pending := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
retrying := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
s.Engine.ExportSampleQueueDepths(context.Background())
assert.InDelta(t, 2.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mPending, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mRetrying, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mPending, mTypeLog), 0)
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.
Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("id IN ?", []string{pending.ID, retrying.ID}).
Update(
"status", database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
).Error)
s.Engine.ExportSampleQueueDepths(context.Background())
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mPending, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mRetrying, mTypeHTTP), 0)
}
// TestDeliveryMetrics_QueueDepthDeletedTarget proves a backlog queued
// against a target that has since been deleted stays visible, in the
// unknown series, instead of being dropped. That backlog is the one
// nobody is watching, so losing it would defeat the queue-depth
// alerting this metric exists for.
func TestDeliveryMetrics_QueueDepthDeletedTarget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
reg := mIsolate(t, s)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "deleted-target",
)
// No target row is created: this is a delivery whose target was
// deleted out from under it.
targetID := uuid.New().String()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"orphan":true}`,
)
iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
s.Engine.ExportSampleQueueDepths(context.Background())
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mPending, mTypeUnknown), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mRetrying, mTypeUnknown), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mPending, mTypeHTTP), 0)
}

187
internal/delivery/queue_depth.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
package delivery
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// queueDepthSampleInterval is how often the pending and retrying
// queue depths are counted and published as gauges.
const queueDepthSampleInterval = 30 * time.Second
// queueDepthSampler publishes the pending and retrying queue depths
// on a timer for as long as the engine runs.
//
// The depths are counted out of the databases rather than tracked as
// deltas alongside the status transitions. A delta counter would have
// to be seeded correctly at startup from rows written by a previous
// process, and would drift permanently on any transition that failed
// to persist. Counting is the measurement that cannot go wrong, and
// it is the same whole-database walk the retry sweep already makes.
func (e *Engine) queueDepthSampler(ctx context.Context) {
defer e.wg.Done()
ticker := time.NewTicker(queueDepthSampleInterval)
defer ticker.Stop()
e.sampleQueueDepths(ctx)
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
e.sampleQueueDepths(ctx)
}
}
}
// sampleQueueDepths counts every queued delivery across all
// per-webhook databases and publishes the result.
func (e *Engine) sampleQueueDepths(ctx context.Context) {
if e.database == nil || e.dbManager == nil {
return
}
types, err := e.targetTypesByID()
if err != nil {
e.log.Error(
"queue depth sample: failed to load target types",
"error", err,
)
return
}
var webhookIDs []string
err = e.database.DB().
Model(&database.Webhook{}).
Pluck("id", &webhookIDs).Error
if err != nil {
e.log.Error(
"queue depth sample: failed to query webhook IDs",
"error", err,
)
return
}
pending := make(map[database.TargetType]int)
retrying := make(map[database.TargetType]int)
for _, webhookID := range webhookIDs {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
default:
}
if !e.dbManager.DBExists(webhookID) {
continue
}
e.sampleWebhookQueueDepths(
webhookID, types, pending, retrying,
)
}
e.mtr.SetQueueDepths(pending, retrying)
}
// targetTypesByID maps every configured target id to its type. The
// deliveries live in the per-webhook databases but carry only a
// target id, so the type label has to come from the main database.
func (e *Engine) targetTypesByID() (
map[string]database.TargetType, error,
) {
var rows []struct {
ID string
Type database.TargetType
}
err := e.database.DB().
Model(&database.Target{}).
Select("id", "type").
Scan(&rows).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("loading targets: %w", err)
}
types := make(map[string]database.TargetType, len(rows))
for _, row := range rows {
types[row.ID] = row.Type
}
return types, nil
}
// sampleWebhookQueueDepths adds one webhook's queued deliveries into
// the running totals.
//
// A delivery whose target has since been deleted is not in the type
// map and so counts under the empty target type. Set.SetQueueDepths
// folds that into the unknown series rather than dropping it: a
// backlog stuck behind a deleted target is a backlog that still needs
// to be alertable.
func (e *Engine) sampleWebhookQueueDepths(
webhookID string,
types map[string]database.TargetType,
pending, retrying map[database.TargetType]int,
) {
webhookDB, err := e.dbManager.GetDB(webhookID)
if err != nil {
e.log.Error(
"queue depth sample: failed to get webhook database",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"error", err,
)
return
}
var rows []struct {
TargetID string
Status database.DeliveryStatus
Depth int
}
err = webhookDB.
Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Select("target_id", "status", "count(*) as depth").
Where("status IN ?", []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
}).
Group("target_id, status").
Scan(&rows).Error
if err != nil {
e.log.Error(
"queue depth sample: "+
"failed to count queued deliveries",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"error", err,
)
return
}
for _, row := range rows {
targetType := types[row.TargetID]
switch row.Status {
case database.DeliveryStatusPending:
pending[targetType] += row.Depth
case database.DeliveryStatusRetrying:
retrying[targetType] += row.Depth
case database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed:
// Excluded by the query above: a delivery that has
// reached a terminal state is not queued.
}
}
}

7
internal/delivery/ssrf.go
View File

@@ -92,7 +92,12 @@ func ValidateTargetURL(
) error {
parsed, err := url.Parse(targetURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", err)
// url.Parse embeds the whole URL in its error, and
// this one is logged and shown; mask it. Every other
// branch below reports only the hostname.
return fmt.Errorf(
"invalid URL: %w", maskURLError(err),
)
}
err = validateScheme(parsed.Scheme)

17
internal/delivery/target.go
View File

@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ type Scheduler interface {
// own circuit breaker, and reschedules via the injected
// Scheduler. Fire-and-forget targets simply record a single
// attempt.
//
// An implementation reports each attempt it actually dispatches to
// Engine.observeAttempt, alongside the DeliveryResult it records for
// it. Deliver is also entered for attempts that never happen — an
// open circuit breaker refuses one — so the count cannot be taken
// from around this call.
type Target interface {
Deliver(
ctx context.Context,
@@ -74,6 +80,12 @@ type attemptResult struct {
errMsg string
}
// elapsed returns how long the attempt took. The field is stored in
// milliseconds because that is what DeliveryResult persists.
func (r attemptResult) elapsed() time.Duration {
return time.Duration(r.duration) * time.Millisecond
}
// initTargets builds the target registry, wiring each target
// to the engine's persistence helpers and giving the HTTP and
// Slack targets the shared SSRF-safe client. It is called by
@@ -90,12 +102,15 @@ func (e *Engine) initTargets(client *http.Client) {
client: client,
}
dbT := &databaseTarget{eng: e}
e.httpTarget = httpT
e.dbTarget = dbT
e.targets = map[database.TargetType]Target{
database.TargetTypeHTTP: httpT,
database.TargetTypeSlack: slackT,
database.TargetTypeDatabase: &databaseTarget{eng: e},
database.TargetTypeDatabase: dbT,
database.TargetTypeLog: &logTarget{eng: e},
}
}

119
internal/delivery/target_config_edit.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
package delivery
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// errUnknownTargetTypeForEdit is returned when a stored target has a
// type the edit form has no field set for.
var errUnknownTargetTypeForEdit = errors.New(
"unknown target type",
)
// TargetConfigForm is the UNMASKED projection of a target's stored
// configuration, for pre-filling the target edit form.
//
// It is the deliberate exception to the rule TargetView enforces
// everywhere else: TargetView exists so that no template can render
// a target's stored blob, because a destination URL's path segments
// and a header value are both routinely the credential. An operator
// cannot correct a value they cannot see, so the edit form — and
// only the edit form — is shown the full value.
//
// Everything that keeps that exception narrow lives at the call
// site: the route is behind RequireAuth and the webhook's ownership
// check, and its group sets NoCache so the rendered secret is not
// written to a shared cache. Do not reach for this type from any
// other page.
type TargetConfigForm struct {
// URL is the destination for an HTTP target and the webhook
// URL for a Slack target.
URL string
// Headers is the HTTP target's configured headers in the
// textarea representation, one "Name: value" per line.
Headers string
// Timeout is the HTTP target's per-request timeout in seconds,
// empty when unset.
Timeout string
// Expiry is the database (archive) target's row expiry.
Expiry string
}
// NewTargetConfigForm parses a target's stored configuration into
// the edit form's fields.
//
// A configuration that does not parse is an error rather than a
// zero-valued form that silently looks like a target with no
// settings. The caller shows the operator that the stored value
// could not be read, so that saving the form is understood as
// replacing it rather than preserving it.
func NewTargetConfigForm(
t *database.Target,
) (TargetConfigForm, error) {
switch t.Type {
case database.TargetTypeHTTP:
cfg, err := parseHTTPConfig(t.Config)
if err != nil {
return TargetConfigForm{}, err
}
return TargetConfigForm{
URL: cfg.URL,
Headers: FormatTargetHeaders(cfg.Headers),
Timeout: FormatTargetTimeout(cfg.Timeout),
}, nil
case database.TargetTypeSlack:
cfg, err := parseSlackConfig(t.Config)
if err != nil {
return TargetConfigForm{}, err
}
return TargetConfigForm{URL: cfg.WebhookURL}, nil
case database.TargetTypeDatabase:
return databaseConfigForm(t.Config)
case database.TargetTypeLog:
// The log target takes no configuration.
return TargetConfigForm{}, nil
default:
return TargetConfigForm{}, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %q", errUnknownTargetTypeForEdit, t.Type,
)
}
}
// databaseConfigForm parses an archive target's optional expiry.
// An absent or empty configuration is the keep-forever default and
// yields an empty field, so re-saving the form unchanged stores the
// same empty configuration it started with. An expiry that is set
// but not a valid duration is an error, not a blank field.
func databaseConfigForm(
configJSON string,
) (TargetConfigForm, error) {
if configJSON == "" {
return TargetConfigForm{}, nil
}
var cfg databaseTargetConfig
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(configJSON), &cfg)
if err != nil {
return TargetConfigForm{}, fmt.Errorf(
"parsing config JSON: %w", err,
)
}
if cfg.Expiry == "" || cfg.Expiry == archiveExpiryNever {
return TargetConfigForm{}, nil
}
err = ValidateArchiveExpiry(cfg.Expiry)
if err != nil {
return TargetConfigForm{}, err
}
return TargetConfigForm{Expiry: cfg.Expiry}, nil
}

208
internal/delivery/target_config_view.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
package delivery
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"strconv"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// configUnavailable is what a target's configuration renders
// as when it is absent, of an unknown type, or does not
// parse. The stored blob is never shown as a fallback: it can
// hold a credential (a Slack incoming webhook URL is a bearer
// token) and a UI that prints it leaks that credential into
// browser history, screenshots and screen shares.
const configUnavailable = "(unavailable)"
// ConfigField is one labelled, display-safe value derived
// from a target's stored configuration.
type ConfigField struct {
Label string
Value string
}
// TargetView is the display-safe projection of a target for
// the UI. It deliberately has no raw configuration field, so
// no template — present or future — can render the stored
// blob.
type TargetView struct {
ID string
Name string
Type database.TargetType
Active bool
Config []ConfigField
}
// NewTargetViews projects targets for rendering, replacing
// each stored configuration blob with named, display-safe
// fields.
func NewTargetViews(
targets []database.Target,
) []TargetView {
views := make([]TargetView, 0, len(targets))
for i := range targets {
t := &targets[i]
views = append(views, TargetView{
ID: t.ID,
Name: t.Name,
Type: t.Type,
Active: t.Active,
Config: targetConfigFields(t),
})
}
return views
}
// targetConfigFields returns the display-safe fields for a
// target's configuration. Anything it cannot parse becomes
// the neutral placeholder.
func targetConfigFields(
t *database.Target,
) []ConfigField {
switch t.Type {
case database.TargetTypeSlack:
return slackConfigFields(t.Config)
case database.TargetTypeHTTP:
return httpConfigFields(t)
case database.TargetTypeDatabase:
return databaseConfigFields(t.Config)
case database.TargetTypeLog:
// The log target takes no configuration.
return nil
default:
return unavailableConfigFields()
}
}
// unavailableConfigFields is the neutral placeholder shown
// for a configuration that could not be presented.
func unavailableConfigFields() []ConfigField {
return []ConfigField{{
Label: "Configuration",
Value: configUnavailable,
}}
}
// slackConfigFields describes a Slack target. Only the masked
// webhook URL is shown; the full URL is the credential.
func slackConfigFields(configJSON string) []ConfigField {
cfg, err := parseSlackConfig(configJSON)
if err != nil {
return unavailableConfigFields()
}
return []ConfigField{{
Label: "Webhook URL",
Value: cfg.MaskedWebhookURL(),
}}
}
// httpConfigFields describes an HTTP target: its destination
// and its retry settings. Header values are not shown — they
// routinely carry authorization tokens — only how many are
// configured.
//
// The destination is masked to scheme and host by the same
// rule the Slack target uses. An HTTP target's destination is
// commonly a Slack, Discord or Teams incoming-webhook endpoint
// whose path segments are the credential, and the field takes
// an arbitrary URL, so no segment can be assumed non-secret.
func httpConfigFields(t *database.Target) []ConfigField {
cfg, err := parseHTTPConfig(t.Config)
if err != nil {
return unavailableConfigFields()
}
fields := []ConfigField{{
Label: "Destination URL",
Value: MaskURL(cfg.URL),
}}
if cfg.Timeout > 0 {
fields = append(fields, ConfigField{
Label: "Timeout",
Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Timeout) + "s",
})
}
if len(cfg.Headers) > 0 {
fields = append(fields, ConfigField{
Label: "Headers",
Value: fmt.Sprintf(
"%d configured", len(cfg.Headers),
),
})
}
return append(fields, retryFields(t)...)
}
// retryFields describes a target's retry settings, which live
// on the target row rather than in its configuration blob.
func retryFields(t *database.Target) []ConfigField {
retries := strconv.Itoa(t.MaxRetries)
if t.MaxRetries == 0 {
retries += " (fire-and-forget)"
}
fields := []ConfigField{{
Label: "Max Retries",
Value: retries,
}}
if t.MaxQueueSize > 0 {
fields = append(fields, ConfigField{
Label: "Max Queue Size",
Value: strconv.Itoa(t.MaxQueueSize),
})
}
return fields
}
// databaseConfigFields describes an archive target. Its
// configuration is optional, and an absent or empty expiry
// means the archive is kept forever. An expiry that is set
// but not a valid duration is reported as unavailable rather
// than echoed back.
func databaseConfigFields(configJSON string) []ConfigField {
expiry := archiveExpiryNever
if configJSON != "" {
var cfg databaseTargetConfig
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(configJSON), &cfg)
if err != nil {
return unavailableConfigFields()
}
if cfg.Expiry != "" {
if ValidateArchiveExpiry(cfg.Expiry) != nil {
return unavailableConfigFields()
}
expiry = cfg.Expiry
}
}
return []ConfigField{{
Label: "Archive Expiry",
Value: expiry,
}}
}
// MaskedWebhookURL returns the Slack webhook URL reduced to
// its scheme and host, with the path, query and any userinfo
// elided. The path segments are the credential, so none of
// them is shown: the field accepts an arbitrary URL, so no
// segment can be assumed non-secret. A URL that does not
// parse into a scheme and host yields the neutral
// placeholder, never the raw string.
func (c *SlackTargetConfig) MaskedWebhookURL() string {
return MaskURL(c.WebhookURL)
}

328
internal/delivery/target_config_view_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
const (
// slackSecretPath is the credential-bearing part of a
// Slack incoming webhook URL: everything after the host.
slackSecretPath = "/services/T00000000/B00000000/" +
"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
slackWebhookURL = "https://hooks.slack.com" +
slackSecretPath
viewExampleOrigin = "https://example.com"
viewExampleHook = viewExampleOrigin + "/hook"
viewMaskedOrigin = viewExampleOrigin + "/..."
viewUnavailable = "(unavailable)"
viewExpiryNever = "never"
)
func TestMaskedWebhookURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := map[string]struct {
url string
want string
}{
"slack webhook": {
url: slackWebhookURL,
want: "https://hooks.slack.com/...",
},
"query string dropped": {
url: viewExampleOrigin + "/a?token=secret",
want: viewExampleOrigin + "/...",
},
// Fabricated userinfo in a test URL, not a real
// credential.
//nolint:gosec // G101
"userinfo dropped": {
url: "https://user:pw@example.com/a/b",
want: viewExampleOrigin + "/...",
},
"no path": {
url: viewExampleOrigin,
want: viewExampleOrigin,
},
"root path": {
url: viewExampleOrigin + "/",
want: viewExampleOrigin,
},
"not a url": {
url: "definitely not a url",
want: viewUnavailable,
},
"empty": {
url: "",
want: viewUnavailable,
},
}
for name, tc := range tests {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := &delivery.SlackTargetConfig{
WebhookURL: tc.url,
}
assert.Equal(
t, tc.want, cfg.MaskedWebhookURL(),
)
})
}
}
// TestMaskedWebhookURL_NeverLeaksPath is the direct
// expression of the rule: whatever the input, the masked
// value never contains a path segment of it.
func TestMaskedWebhookURL_NeverLeaksPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := &delivery.SlackTargetConfig{
WebhookURL: slackWebhookURL,
}
masked := cfg.MaskedWebhookURL()
assert.NotContains(t, masked, "T00000000")
assert.NotContains(t, masked, "B00000000")
assert.NotContains(
t, masked, "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
)
assert.NotContains(t, masked, slackSecretPath)
}
// fieldMap turns a view's config fields into a lookup so
// assertions read by label.
func fieldMap(fields []delivery.ConfigField) map[string]string {
out := make(map[string]string, len(fields))
for _, f := range fields {
out[f.Label] = f.Value
}
return out
}
// viewFor projects a single target and returns its view.
func viewFor(
t *testing.T,
target database.Target,
) delivery.TargetView {
t.Helper()
views := delivery.NewTargetViews(
[]database.Target{target},
)
require.Len(t, views, 1)
return views[0]
}
func TestNewTargetViews_Slack(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
Name: "slack-target",
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Active: true,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"` +
slackWebhookURL + `"}`,
})
assert.Equal(t, "slack-target", view.Name)
assert.Equal(
t,
map[string]string{
"Webhook URL": "https://hooks.slack.com/...",
},
fieldMap(view.Config),
)
}
func TestNewTargetViews_HTTP(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":"` + viewExampleHook + `",` +
`"timeout":30,` +
`"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer sekrit"}}`,
MaxRetries: 5,
MaxQueueSize: 100,
})
fields := fieldMap(view.Config)
assert.Equal(
t,
map[string]string{
"Destination URL": viewMaskedOrigin,
"Timeout": "30s",
"Headers": "1 configured",
"Max Retries": "5",
"Max Queue Size": "100",
},
fields,
)
// Header values can be credentials and are never shown.
for _, v := range fields {
assert.NotContains(t, v, "sekrit")
}
}
func TestNewTargetViews_HTTPFireAndForget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":"` + viewExampleHook + `"}`,
})
assert.Equal(
t,
map[string]string{
"Destination URL": viewMaskedOrigin,
"Max Retries": "0 (fire-and-forget)",
},
fieldMap(view.Config),
)
}
// TestNewTargetViews_HTTPMasksDestinationURL proves the rule
// holds for the http target too: an http destination is
// routinely an incoming-webhook endpoint whose path segments
// are the credential, so none of them is shown.
func TestNewTargetViews_HTTPMasksDestinationURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":"` + slackWebhookURL + `"}`,
})
fields := fieldMap(view.Config)
assert.Equal(
t,
"https://hooks.slack.com/...",
fields["Destination URL"],
)
for _, v := range fields {
assert.NotContains(t, v, slackSecretPath)
assert.NotContains(t, v, "T00000000")
assert.NotContains(t, v, "B00000000")
assert.NotContains(t, v, "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX")
}
}
func TestNewTargetViews_Database(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := map[string]struct {
config string
want string
}{
"empty config": {config: "", want: viewExpiryNever},
"empty expiry": {config: `{}`, want: viewExpiryNever},
"explicit": {
config: `{"expiry":"720h"}`,
want: "720h",
},
"never literal": {
config: `{"expiry":"` + viewExpiryNever + `"}`,
want: viewExpiryNever,
},
}
for name, tc := range tests {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
Config: tc.config,
})
assert.Equal(
t,
map[string]string{"Archive Expiry": tc.want},
fieldMap(view.Config),
)
})
}
}
func TestNewTargetViews_Log(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeLog,
Config: "",
})
assert.Empty(t, view.Config)
}
// TestNewTargetViews_Unpresentable proves that no config the
// view cannot present falls back to the stored blob.
func TestNewTargetViews_Unpresentable(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const blob = `{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.slack.com` +
slackSecretPath + `"`
tests := map[string]database.Target{
"unknown target type": {
Type: database.TargetType("carrier-pigeon"),
Config: blob,
},
"unparseable json": {
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: blob,
},
"empty slack config": {
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
},
"slack config without url": {
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{}`,
},
"unparseable http json": {
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":`,
},
"unparseable archive json": {
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
Config: `{"expiry":`,
},
"invalid archive expiry": {
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
Config: `{"expiry":"a fortnight"}`,
},
}
for name, target := range tests {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
view := viewFor(t, target)
assert.Equal(
t,
map[string]string{
"Configuration": viewUnavailable,
},
fieldMap(view.Config),
)
})
}
}

287
internal/delivery/target_database.go
View File

@@ -2,21 +2,39 @@ package delivery
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"sync"
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// databaseTarget is a fire-and-forget target: the event is
// already persisted in the per-webhook database by the time
// delivery runs, so the target records a single successful
// attempt. (Durable archiving to a separate store is tracked
// as its own work.)
// databaseTarget is a no-retry target that archives the
// full inbound event into a per-webhook archive SQLite file,
// separate from the per-webhook event database. The event is
// already persisted in the per-webhook event DB by the time
// delivery runs; the database target additionally writes a
// durable long-term copy into archive-{webhookID}.db and then
// records a single attempt whose outcome reflects whether the
// archive write succeeded. See archiveWriter for the
// close/reopen, auto-recreate, and expiry semantics.
type databaseTarget struct {
eng *Engine
mu sync.Mutex
writers map[string]*archiveWriter
}
// Deliver implements Target.
// Deliver implements Target. It archives the event, then
// records one successful attempt and marks the delivery
// delivered. An archiving error fails the delivery: the
// attempt is recorded as failed with the error and the
// delivery is marked failed, so a target that could not do
// its one job (archiving) never reports success. The target
// does not retry; the event remains durably stored in the
// per-webhook event database.
func (t *databaseTarget) Deliver(
_ context.Context,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
@@ -24,11 +42,264 @@ func (t *databaseTarget) Deliver(
_ *Task,
_ Scheduler,
) {
start := time.Now()
err := t.archive(d)
elapsed := time.Since(start)
t.eng.observeAttempt(d.Target.Type, elapsed)
if err != nil {
t.eng.log.Error(
"failed to archive event to database target",
"delivery_id", d.ID,
"event_id", d.EventID,
"error", err,
)
t.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, 1, true, 0, "", "", 0,
webhookDB, d, 1, false, 0, "",
err.Error(), elapsed.Milliseconds(),
)
t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
return
}
t.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, 1, true, 0, "", "",
elapsed.Milliseconds(),
)
t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
}
// archive writes the full event as a row into the webhook's
// archive database, honouring the optional per-target expiry
// parsed from the target config JSON.
func (t *databaseTarget) archive(d *database.Delivery) error {
webhookID := d.Event.WebhookID
if webhookID == "" {
return errArchiveMissingWebhookID
}
expiry, err := parseArchiveExpiry(d.Target.Config)
if err != nil {
return err
}
w, err := t.writerFor(webhookID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
row := archivedEvent{
EventID: d.Event.ID,
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: d.Event.EntrypointID,
Method: d.Event.Method,
Headers: d.Event.Headers,
Body: d.Event.Body,
ContentType: d.Event.ContentType,
}
return w.write(row, expiry)
}
// writerFor returns the archiveWriter for a webhook, creating
// and caching it on first use. Each webhook has one writer so
// its close/reopen debounce state is shared across concurrent
// deliveries. The archive file lives beside the per-webhook
// event database in the data directory.
func (t *databaseTarget) writerFor(
webhookID string,
) (*archiveWriter, error) {
path, err := t.archivePath(webhookID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
if t.writers == nil {
t.writers = make(map[string]*archiveWriter)
}
w, ok := t.writers[webhookID]
if !ok {
w = newArchiveWriter(path, t.eng.log)
t.writers[webhookID] = w
}
// A delivery claims the entry: even if the idle sweep created
// it moments ago, it now belongs to the registry proper and
// the sweep must leave it in place when it finishes.
w.sweepOwned = false
return w, nil
}
// sweepWriterFor returns the archive writer the idle sweep should
// prune a webhook through, together with whether the sweep itself
// created the registry entry.
//
// The sweep must route its prune through the registered writer so
// the writer's mutex orders it against concurrent writes, but it
// must never leave a registry entry behind: a sweep that ran
// concurrently with the webhook's deletion would otherwise
// re-create an entry that nothing will ever evict again, which is
// exactly the leak eviction exists to prevent. An entry the sweep
// creates is therefore marked sweep-owned and handed back to
// releaseSweepWriter when the sweep is done.
func (t *databaseTarget) sweepWriterFor(
webhookID string,
) (*archiveWriter, bool, error) {
path, err := t.archivePath(webhookID)
if err != nil {
return nil, false, err
}
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
if t.writers == nil {
t.writers = make(map[string]*archiveWriter)
}
w, ok := t.writers[webhookID]
if ok {
return w, false, nil
}
w = newArchiveWriter(path, t.eng.log)
w.sweepOwned = true
t.writers[webhookID] = w
return w, true, nil
}
// releaseSweepWriter drops a registry entry that the idle sweep
// created, so a sweep leaves the registry exactly as it found it.
//
// The entry is removed only if it is still the very writer the
// sweep installed and no delivery has claimed it in the meantime
// (writerFor clears sweepOwned when it hands a writer to the
// write path). Both conditions are evaluated under the registry
// lock, so an eviction that raced the sweep — which removes the
// entry outright — simply finds nothing left to do here, and a
// delivery that adopted the writer keeps a registered, evictable
// one.
func (t *databaseTarget) releaseSweepWriter(
webhookID string, w *archiveWriter,
) {
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
cur, ok := t.writers[webhookID]
if !ok || cur != w || !cur.sweepOwned {
return
}
delete(t.writers, webhookID)
}
// archivePath returns the archive file path for a webhook: it
// lives beside the per-webhook event database in the data
// directory. It does not touch the filesystem.
func (t *databaseTarget) archivePath(
webhookID string,
) (string, error) {
if t.eng.dbManager == nil {
return "", errArchiveNoDataDir
}
dir := filepath.Dir(t.eng.dbManager.DBPath(webhookID))
return filepath.Join(
dir, fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", webhookID),
), nil
}
// evict drops a webhook's archive writer from the registry and
// closes its handle, so a deleted webhook does not leave a
// writer (and an open archive handle within its debounce
// window) alive for the process lifetime.
//
// The map entry is removed under the registry lock, which is
// then released before the handle is closed under the writer's
// own lock: that ordering keeps the registry available to other
// webhooks while an in-flight write on this one drains, and
// closing under the writer's lock means eviction can never race
// a write.
//
// Eviction is idempotent and silent for a webhook with no
// writer, which is the common case: a webhook with no database
// target never creates one. It never deletes the archive file.
func (t *databaseTarget) evict(webhookID string) {
t.mu.Lock()
w, ok := t.writers[webhookID]
if ok {
delete(t.writers, webhookID)
}
t.mu.Unlock()
if !ok {
return
}
w.evict()
t.eng.log.Info(
"evicted archive writer",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"path", w.path,
)
}
// sweepWebhook prunes one webhook's archive of rows older than
// expiry, without requiring a write. It returns nil (nothing to
// do) when the archive file does not exist, so a sweep never
// creates an archive for a webhook that has a database target
// but has never received an event.
//
// It also never leaves a registry entry behind: an entry it had
// to create to reach the writer's mutex is released again once
// the prune is done, so a sweep racing a webhook deletion cannot
// resurrect the writer the eviction just dropped.
func (t *databaseTarget) sweepWebhook(
webhookID string, expiry time.Duration,
) error {
path, err := t.archivePath(webhookID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Check before taking a writer at all: a webhook whose
// archive has never been created gets no writer, no handle,
// and no file.
if !fileExists(path) {
return nil
}
w, created, err := t.sweepWriterFor(webhookID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if created {
defer t.releaseSweepWriter(webhookID, w)
}
return w.sweepExpired(expiry)
}

436
internal/delivery/target_database_archive.go Normal file
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package delivery
import (
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"os"
"sync"
"time"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
)
// archiveExpiryNever is the expiry sentinel (and default) that
// disables pruning so archived rows are kept forever.
const archiveExpiryNever = "never"
// archiveReopenDebounce bounds how often an archive file is
// closed and reopened. After each write the handle is closed
// and reopened so an operator can move the file away for
// offline archiving, but never more than once per this window.
const archiveReopenDebounce = time.Second
const (
// archiveModeCreate is the SQLite URI mode used by the write
// path: open the archive file, creating it if missing, so a
// first write (or a write after the operator moved the file
// away) recreates it.
archiveModeCreate = "rwc"
// archiveModeExisting is the SQLite URI mode used by the idle
// sweep: open read-write but never create. A sweep must never
// conjure an empty archive file for a webhook that has a
// database target but has never received an event.
archiveModeExisting = "rw"
)
var (
// errArchiveMissingWebhookID is returned when an event to
// archive has no webhook id to key its archive file on.
errArchiveMissingWebhookID = errors.New(
"cannot archive event without a webhook id",
)
// errArchiveNoDataDir is returned when the database target
// has no webhook database manager and so cannot locate the
// data directory for archive files.
errArchiveNoDataDir = errors.New(
"database target has no data directory",
)
// errArchiveExpiryNotPositive is returned when a
// user-supplied archive expiry parses as a duration but is
// zero or negative; "never" is the way to disable pruning.
errArchiveExpiryNotPositive = errors.New(
"expiry must be a positive duration or \"never\"",
)
// errArchiveWriterEvicted is returned when a writer that has
// been evicted (its webhook was deleted, or its last database
// target was removed) is used again. An evicted writer is no
// longer in the registry, so reopening its file would leak a
// handle nothing owns.
errArchiveWriterEvicted = errors.New(
"archive writer has been evicted",
)
)
// databaseTargetConfig is the optional per-target JSON config
// for a database (archive) target.
type databaseTargetConfig struct {
// Expiry is a Go duration (e.g. "720h") after which
// archived rows are pruned, or "never" (the default) to
// keep them forever.
Expiry string `json:"expiry"`
}
// archivedEvent is one fully captured webhook event stored in a
// per-webhook archive database for long-term retention. It is a
// self-contained copy — independent of the per-webhook event
// database, which may prune events under its own retention.
type archivedEvent struct {
ID uint `gorm:"primaryKey;autoIncrement"`
EventID string `gorm:"index"`
WebhookID string
EntrypointID string
Method string
Headers string
Body string
ContentType string
// ArchivedAt is when the row was archived and is the age
// basis for expiry pruning.
ArchivedAt time.Time `gorm:"index"`
}
// parseArchiveExpiry reads the optional expiry from a database
// target's config JSON. An empty config, an empty expiry, or
// the literal "never" all mean keep forever, returned as a zero
// duration. Any other value must parse as a positive Go
// duration; a set-but-invalid value (unparseable, zero, or
// negative) is an error rather than a silent default, matching
// ValidateArchiveExpiry at target creation.
func parseArchiveExpiry(
configJSON string,
) (time.Duration, error) {
if configJSON == "" {
return 0, nil
}
var cfg databaseTargetConfig
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(configJSON), &cfg)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"parsing database target config: %w", err,
)
}
if cfg.Expiry == "" || cfg.Expiry == archiveExpiryNever {
return 0, nil
}
dur, err := time.ParseDuration(cfg.Expiry)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"parsing archive expiry %q: %w", cfg.Expiry, err,
)
}
if dur <= 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %q", errArchiveExpiryNotPositive, cfg.Expiry,
)
}
return dur, nil
}
// ValidateArchiveExpiry checks a user-supplied archive expiry
// for a database target at configuration time. Valid values are
// empty, "never" (both meaning keep forever), or a positive Go
// duration such as "720h". Anything else is an error, so a bad
// expiry is rejected when the target is created rather than
// failing every subsequent delivery.
func ValidateArchiveExpiry(expiry string) error {
if expiry == "" || expiry == archiveExpiryNever {
return nil
}
dur, err := time.ParseDuration(expiry)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"expiry must be %q or a Go duration "+
"such as \"720h\": %w",
archiveExpiryNever, err,
)
}
if dur <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %q", errArchiveExpiryNotPositive, expiry,
)
}
return nil
}
// archiveWriter owns one per-webhook archive SQLite file. It
// serialises writes, and after each write closes and reopens
// the file (debounced to at most once per debounce window) so
// an operator can move the file away for offline archiving. The
// next write recreates a moved or removed file, because the
// file is opened create-if-missing and its schema is migrated
// on every open.
type archiveWriter struct {
mu sync.Mutex
path string
log *slog.Logger
debounce time.Duration
db *gorm.DB
lastReopen time.Time
reopens int
// evicted marks a writer that has been removed from the
// per-webhook registry. Its handle is closed and it must
// never open the file again: nothing holds it any more, so a
// reopen would leak the handle for the process lifetime.
evicted bool
// sweepOwned marks a registry entry that the idle sweep
// created because no writer was cached for the webhook. The
// sweep removes such an entry again when it is done, so a
// sweep can never leave — or resurrect — a registry entry
// for a webhook that has been deleted. A delivery that adopts
// the writer clears the flag, handing the entry to the
// registry proper.
//
// Unlike every other field here it is guarded by
// databaseTarget.mu, not by this writer's mu: it describes the
// registry entry rather than the file.
sweepOwned bool
}
// newArchiveWriter builds an archiveWriter for a file path with
// the default reopen debounce.
func newArchiveWriter(
path string, log *slog.Logger,
) *archiveWriter {
return &archiveWriter{
path: path,
log: log,
debounce: archiveReopenDebounce,
}
}
// write appends the event as a row, then applies the debounced
// close/reopen. It recreates the archive file if it was moved
// or removed since the last open. A positive expiry prunes rows
// older than it on each (re)open.
func (w *archiveWriter) write(
row archivedEvent, expiry time.Duration,
) error {
w.mu.Lock()
defer w.mu.Unlock()
if w.evicted {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s", errArchiveWriterEvicted, w.path,
)
}
if w.db == nil || !fileExists(w.path) {
err := w.reopen(expiry)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
row.ArchivedAt = time.Now()
err := w.db.Create(&row).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"archiving event to %s: %w", w.path, err,
)
}
if time.Since(w.lastReopen) >= w.debounce {
return w.reopen(expiry)
}
return nil
}
// open opens (creating if missing) the archive file, migrates
// its schema, records the reopen time, and prunes expired rows
// when expiry is positive.
func (w *archiveWriter) open(expiry time.Duration) error {
return w.openMode(archiveModeCreate, expiry)
}
// openMode opens the archive file with the given SQLite URI
// mode, migrates its schema, records the reopen time, and
// prunes expired rows when expiry is positive. The write path
// passes archiveModeCreate so a missing file is recreated; the
// idle sweep passes archiveModeExisting so a missing file is an
// error rather than a newly conjured empty archive.
func (w *archiveWriter) openMode(
mode string, expiry time.Duration,
) error {
dbURL := fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=%s", w.path, mode)
sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dbURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"opening archive database %s: %w", w.path, err,
)
}
gdb, err := gorm.Open(
sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB}, &gorm.Config{
// Never leave this at GORM's default. See
// internal/gormlog.
Logger: gormlog.New(w.log),
},
)
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
return fmt.Errorf(
"connecting to archive database %s: %w",
w.path, err,
)
}
err = gdb.AutoMigrate(&archivedEvent{})
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
return fmt.Errorf(
"migrating archive database %s: %w", w.path, err,
)
}
w.db = gdb
w.lastReopen = time.Now()
w.reopens++
if expiry > 0 {
w.prune(expiry)
}
return nil
}
// reopen closes any open handle and opens the file afresh. The
// fresh open recreates the file if it was moved away.
func (w *archiveWriter) reopen(expiry time.Duration) error {
w.close()
return w.open(expiry)
}
// close closes the underlying handle, if any.
func (w *archiveWriter) close() {
if w.db == nil {
return
}
sqlDB, err := w.db.DB()
if err == nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
}
w.db = nil
}
// sweepExpired prunes an archive that may have gone idle, with
// no write to trigger the usual on-reopen prune. It takes the
// writer's own mutex for the whole operation, so a sweep is
// ordered against concurrent writes rather than reaching around
// them to the file.
//
// It never creates the archive file: a missing file is skipped,
// and the reopen uses archiveModeExisting so SQLite itself
// refuses to create one if the file disappears between the
// check and the open.
//
// The archive is left CLOSED afterwards. An idle archive holding
// no handle is what keeps the operator's move-the-file-away
// workflow working; the next write reopens (and recreates) the
// file as it always has.
func (w *archiveWriter) sweepExpired(expiry time.Duration) error {
w.mu.Lock()
defer w.mu.Unlock()
if w.evicted {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s", errArchiveWriterEvicted, w.path,
)
}
if !fileExists(w.path) {
return nil
}
// Drop any live handle first so the prune runs against a
// freshly opened file, matching the write path's semantics.
w.close()
err := w.openMode(archiveModeExisting, expiry)
if err != nil {
return err
}
w.close()
return nil
}
// evict closes the writer's handle and marks it unusable. It is
// called when the writer leaves the registry, either because the
// webhook was deleted or because its last database target was
// removed. The archive FILE is deliberately left on disk: it is
// long-term storage an operator may still want.
func (w *archiveWriter) evict() {
w.mu.Lock()
defer w.mu.Unlock()
w.evicted = true
w.close()
}
// prune deletes archived rows older than expiry, measured from
// each row's archived time. It runs on every (re)open, so a
// steadily written archive is swept by its own write traffic. An
// archive that goes idle receives no further reopens, which is
// why ArchiveSweeper exists to drive sweepExpired on a timer.
// Failures are logged, not fatal: a prune error must not stop
// archiving.
func (w *archiveWriter) prune(expiry time.Duration) {
cutoff := time.Now().Add(-expiry)
res := w.db.Where("archived_at < ?", cutoff).
Delete(&archivedEvent{})
if res.Error != nil {
w.log.Error(
"failed to prune expired archive rows",
"path", w.path,
"error", res.Error,
)
return
}
if res.RowsAffected > 0 {
w.log.Info(
"pruned expired archive rows",
"path", w.path,
"rows_deleted", res.RowsAffected,
)
}
}
// fileExists reports whether a path currently exists.
func fileExists(path string) bool {
_, err := os.Stat(path)
return err == nil
}

155
internal/delivery/target_database_archive_gormlog_test.go Normal file
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package delivery_test
import (
"bytes"
"log"
"log/slog"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
gormlogger "gorm.io/gorm/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
)
// archiveGORMTailMarker sits at the far end of the value this file
// drives into an archive lookup. Its presence in a log line means the
// whole value reached the log, so nothing truncated it.
const archiveGORMTailMarker = "ENDOFCLIENTVALUE"
// archiveGORMFillBytes is how much text the lookup carries. It is far
// past every budget in play.
const archiveGORMFillBytes = 8 << 10
// gormDefaultBuf collects what GORM's package-level default logger
// writes, if anything reaches it.
type gormDefaultBuf struct {
mu sync.Mutex
b bytes.Buffer
}
func (g *gormDefaultBuf) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
g.mu.Lock()
defer g.mu.Unlock()
return g.b.Write(p)
}
func (g *gormDefaultBuf) String() string {
g.mu.Lock()
defer g.mu.Unlock()
return g.b.String()
}
// captureArchiveGORMDefault replaces GORM's package-level default
// logger with one configured exactly as GORM configures its own,
// writing to a buffer.
//
// This duplicates the detector in internal/handlers rather than
// sharing it: a test helper cannot cross a package's test boundary
// without exporting production code to carry it, and a logging
// detector is not worth a production symbol. What it detects is the
// third gorm.Open in this service, at
// internal/delivery/target_database_archive.go — the archive writer,
// whose type is unexported, so nothing outside this package can drive
// it.
func captureArchiveGORMDefault(t *testing.T) *gormDefaultBuf {
t.Helper()
buf := &gormDefaultBuf{}
orig := gormlogger.Default
gormlogger.Default = gormlogger.New(
log.New(buf, "", log.LstdFlags),
gormlogger.Config{
SlowThreshold: 200 * time.Millisecond,
LogLevel: gormlogger.Warn,
IgnoreRecordNotFoundError: false,
Colorful: false,
},
)
t.Cleanup(func() { gormlogger.Default = orig })
return buf
}
// TestArchiveWriter_NeverUsesGORMsDefaultLogger pins the archive
// writer's gorm.Open to the adapter.
//
// Restore a bare &gorm.Config{} at
// internal/delivery/target_database_archive.go and this fails: the
// default logger prints the fully interpolated SELECT on every
// ErrRecordNotFound, so the client-chosen event id below arrives whole
// and unbounded on stdout, answering to no level the operator set.
//
// Not parallel: gormlogger.Default is process-global. Go runs every
// non-parallel top-level test to completion before it resumes the
// parallel ones.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // Deliberately sequential; see above.
func TestArchiveWriter_NeverUsesGORMsDefaultLogger(t *testing.T) {
var captured bytes.Buffer
gormDefault := captureArchiveGORMDefault(t)
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive.db"),
slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
&captured, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
)),
0,
)
require.NoError(t, w.Open(0))
t.Cleanup(w.Evict)
// A lookup that misses, carrying a value the size of an inbound
// event id. Under the default logger this is the line that gets
// interpolated and printed.
value := strings.Repeat("\x01", archiveGORMFillBytes) +
archiveGORMTailMarker
var row delivery.ExportArchivedEvent
err := w.DB().Where("event_id = ?", value).First(&row).Error
require.ErrorIs(t, err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound)
got := gormDefault.String()
assert.Empty(
t, got,
"GORM's default logger wrote %d bytes, so the archive "+
"writer's gorm.Open is back on a bare &gorm.Config{}; "+
"the first of them: %s",
len(got), got[:min(len(got), 300)],
)
// The adapter drops a miss, so this should be silent too — and
// whatever it does write stays inside the stated ceiling.
out := captured.String()
assert.NotContains(
t, out, archiveGORMTailMarker,
"the far end of the client-chosen value reached the log",
)
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(strings.TrimRight(out, "\n"), "\n") {
if line == "" {
continue
}
assert.LessOrEqual(
t, len(line), middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
"log line exceeded its bound: %s",
line[:min(len(line), 300)],
)
}
}

363
internal/delivery/target_database_evict_test.go Normal file
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package delivery_test
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// evictTestEngine builds an engine backed by a temporary data
// directory and returns it along with that directory.
func evictTestEngine(t *testing.T) (*delivery.Engine, string) {
t.Helper()
dataDir := t.TempDir()
eng := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
nil,
database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir),
archiveTestLogger(),
&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
1,
)
return eng, dataDir
}
// TestEvictWebhook_ClosesAndRemovesWriter proves that evicting
// a webhook drops its archive writer from the registry and
// closes the open archive handle, rather than leaving both
// alive for the process lifetime.
func TestEvictWebhook_ClosesAndRemovesWriter(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
eng, dataDir := evictTestEngine(t)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
webhookID := event.WebhookID
require.True(
t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
"a delivery should have cached an archive writer",
)
require.True(
t, eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
"the writer should hold an open handle after a write",
)
eng.EvictWebhook(webhookID)
assert.False(
t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
"eviction should remove the registry entry",
)
assert.False(
t, eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
"eviction should close the archive handle",
)
archivePath := filepath.Join(
dataDir, fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", webhookID),
)
assert.FileExists(
t, archivePath,
"eviction must not delete the archive file",
)
}
// TestEvictWebhook_UnknownWebhookIsNoOp proves eviction is safe
// for the common case of a webhook that never had a database
// target, and that repeating it does not panic.
func TestEvictWebhook_UnknownWebhookIsNoOp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
eng, _ := evictTestEngine(t)
assert.NotPanics(t, func() {
eng.EvictWebhook("no-such-webhook")
eng.EvictWebhook("no-such-webhook")
})
assert.False(
t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter("no-such-webhook"),
"eviction must not create a writer",
)
}
// evictTestRow builds an archive row for the eviction tests.
func evictTestRow(eventID string) delivery.ExportArchivedEvent {
return delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{
EventID: eventID,
WebhookID: "wh-evict",
Method: http.MethodPost,
Body: `{"seeded":true}`,
}
}
// TestEvictedWriter_WriteDoesNotReopenFile is the direct test of
// the evicted guard on the write path. A writer that has left
// the registry is held by nobody, so a handle it opened could
// never be closed again: it must refuse the write outright
// rather than recreate the archive behind the registry's back.
//
// The archive file is removed before the eviction, so an
// unguarded write is unmistakable — it recreates the file.
func TestEvictedWriter_WriteDoesNotReopenFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-evicted.db")
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
)
require.NoError(t, w.Write(evictTestRow("ev-1"), 0))
require.FileExists(t, path)
// The operator moves the archive away for offline retention,
// which the write path would ordinarily undo on the next
// write by recreating the file.
require.NoError(t, os.Remove(path))
w.Evict()
err := w.Write(evictTestRow("ev-2"), 0)
require.ErrorIs(
t, err, delivery.ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted,
"an evicted writer must refuse writes",
)
assert.NoFileExists(
t, path,
"an evicted writer must not reopen (or recreate) the "+
"archive file",
)
assert.False(
t, w.HandleOpen(),
"an evicted writer must hold no handle",
)
}
// TestEvictedWriter_SweepDoesNotReopenFile is the same test for
// the sweep path: an idle sweep that reaches a writer already
// evicted underneath it must return the sentinel rather than
// reopen a file nothing owns.
func TestEvictedWriter_SweepDoesNotReopenFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-evicted.db")
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
)
require.NoError(t, w.Write(evictTestRow("ev-1"), 0))
require.FileExists(t, path)
w.Evict()
err := w.SweepExpired(time.Hour)
require.ErrorIs(
t, err, delivery.ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted,
"an evicted writer must refuse an idle sweep",
)
assert.False(
t, w.HandleOpen(),
"a refused sweep must not leave a handle open",
)
}
// racingWrites drives a pack of goroutines writing to one
// archive writer until each is refused, so an eviction on the
// test goroutine has to take the writer's mutex away from writes
// that are already contending for it.
type racingWrites struct {
wg sync.WaitGroup
mu sync.Mutex
sawEvicted bool
otherErr error
started chan struct{}
}
// racingWriteGoroutines is how many goroutines contend for the
// writer's mutex while the eviction lands.
const racingWriteGoroutines = 4
// startRacingWrites launches the writing goroutines. Each writes
// in a loop and stops at its first error, recording whether that
// error was the eviction sentinel. The deadline is a backstop
// against a hang, not a timing assumption: the first write after
// the eviction is refused.
func startRacingWrites(
w *delivery.ExportArchiveWriter,
) *racingWrites {
r := &racingWrites{
started: make(chan struct{}, racingWriteGoroutines),
}
deadline := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second)
r.wg.Add(racingWriteGoroutines)
for i := range racingWriteGoroutines {
go func() {
defer r.wg.Done()
first := true
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
err := w.Write(
evictTestRow(fmt.Sprintf("ev-%d", i)), 0,
)
if first {
r.started <- struct{}{}
first = false
}
if err == nil {
continue
}
r.record(err)
return
}
}()
}
return r
}
// record classifies the error that stopped one goroutine.
func (r *racingWrites) record(err error) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
if errors.Is(err, delivery.ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted) {
r.sawEvicted = true
return
}
r.otherErr = err
}
// awaitFirstWrite blocks until at least one write has run, so
// the eviction that follows is a genuine race.
func (r *racingWrites) awaitFirstWrite() {
<-r.started
}
// wait joins the goroutines and reports whether any write was
// refused with the eviction sentinel, plus any unexpected error.
func (r *racingWrites) wait() (bool, error) {
r.wg.Wait()
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
return r.sawEvicted, r.otherErr
}
// TestEvictWebhook_RacingWriteDoesNotReopenHandle exercises the
// interleaving the evicted flag exists for: writes already
// contending for the writer's mutex when the eviction takes it.
// The write that wins the mutex after the eviction must abandon
// its work rather than reopen the archive, leaving the writer
// permanently handle-free. Run under -race.
func TestEvictWebhook_RacingWriteDoesNotReopenHandle(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
eng, _ := evictTestEngine(t)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
// Prime the registry so the test can hold the very writer the
// eviction is about to detach.
eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
w := eng.ExportArchiveWriterFor(event.WebhookID)
require.NotNil(t, w)
require.True(t, w.HandleOpen())
race := startRacingWrites(w)
// Evict only once writes are genuinely in flight, so the
// eviction has to contend for the writer's mutex.
race.awaitFirstWrite()
eng.EvictWebhook(event.WebhookID)
sawEvicted, otherErr := race.wait()
require.NoError(t, otherErr)
assert.True(
t, sawEvicted,
"a write after eviction must be refused",
)
assert.False(
t, w.HandleOpen(),
"no write may reopen the archive once the writer has "+
"been evicted",
)
assert.False(
t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(event.WebhookID),
"the registry entry must stay gone",
)
}
// TestEvictWebhook_LaterDeliveryRecreatesWriter proves eviction
// does not break archiving for a webhook that is still alive: a
// subsequent delivery gets a brand new writer from the registry.
// It says nothing about the evicted writer itself — that is what
// TestEvictedWriter_WriteDoesNotReopenFile covers.
func TestEvictWebhook_LaterDeliveryRecreatesWriter(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
eng, _ := evictTestEngine(t)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
require.True(
t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(event.WebhookID),
)
eng.EvictWebhook(event.WebhookID)
// A fresh delivery for the same webhook gets a brand new
// writer from the registry, so archiving keeps working.
second := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event, "",
)
eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, second)
assert.True(
t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(event.WebhookID),
"a later delivery should recreate the writer",
)
}

402
internal/delivery/target_database_test.go Normal file
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package delivery_test
import (
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite" // Pure Go SQLite driver.
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
func archiveTestLogger() *slog.Logger {
return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
os.Stderr,
&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
))
}
// openArchiveDBForRead opens an archive file read-only so a
// test can inspect the rows the writer persisted.
func openArchiveDBForRead(
t *testing.T, path string,
) *gorm.DB {
t.Helper()
sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
"sqlite",
fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=ro", path),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
gdb, err := gorm.Open(
sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB}, &gorm.Config{},
)
require.NoError(t, err)
return gdb
}
// archiveFileSuffixes returns the archive file itself and the
// SQLite sidecars that accompany an open database. A test that
// asserts no archive was created has to check all of them.
func archiveFileSuffixes() []string {
return []string{"", "-wal", "-shm"}
}
// removeArchiveFiles simulates an operator moving the archive
// away by deleting the SQLite file and its sidecar files.
func removeArchiveFiles(t *testing.T, path string) {
t.Helper()
for _, suffix := range []string{
"", "-wal", "-shm", "-journal",
} {
err := os.Remove(path + suffix)
if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("removing %s%s: %v", path, suffix, err)
}
}
}
// TestDeliverDatabase_ArchivesEvent verifies that delivering to
// a database target marks the delivery delivered and archives
// the full event into a separate per-webhook archive file.
func TestDeliverDatabase_ArchivesEvent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := t.TempDir()
dbMgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
e := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
nil, dbMgr,
archiveTestLogger(),
&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
1,
)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
e.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
var updated database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.First(
&updated, "id = ?", d.ID,
).Error)
assert.Equal(t,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, updated.Status,
"database target should mark the delivery delivered",
)
archivePath := filepath.Join(
dataDir,
fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", event.WebhookID),
)
assert.FileExists(t, archivePath)
rdb := openArchiveDBForRead(t, archivePath)
var rows []delivery.ExportArchivedEvent
require.NoError(t, rdb.Find(&rows).Error)
require.Len(t, rows, 1)
assert.Equal(t, event.ID, rows[0].EventID)
assert.Equal(t, event.WebhookID, rows[0].WebhookID)
assert.Equal(t, event.Method, rows[0].Method)
assert.JSONEq(t, `{"archived":true}`, rows[0].Body)
}
func TestArchiveWriter_WritesRow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-wh.db")
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
)
row := delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{
EventID: "ev-1",
WebhookID: "wh-1",
EntrypointID: "ep-1",
Method: "POST",
Headers: `{"X":"Y"}`,
Body: `{"hello":"world"}`,
ContentType: "application/json",
}
require.NoError(t, w.Write(row, 0))
assert.FileExists(t, path)
var got []delivery.ExportArchivedEvent
require.NoError(t, w.DB().Find(&got).Error)
require.Len(t, got, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "ev-1", got[0].EventID)
assert.Equal(t, "wh-1", got[0].WebhookID)
assert.Equal(t, "ep-1", got[0].EntrypointID)
assert.Equal(t, row.Method, got[0].Method)
assert.Equal(t, row.ContentType, got[0].ContentType)
assert.JSONEq(t, `{"hello":"world"}`, got[0].Body)
assert.False(t, got[0].ArchivedAt.IsZero())
}
func TestArchiveWriter_RecreatesAfterRemoval(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-wh.db")
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
)
require.NoError(t, w.Write(
delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "a"}, 0,
))
assert.FileExists(t, path)
// The operator moves the archive away while the handle is
// still open.
removeArchiveFiles(t, path)
require.NoFileExists(t, path)
// The next write recreates the file with a fresh schema and
// only the new row.
require.NoError(t, w.Write(
delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "b"}, 0,
))
assert.FileExists(t, path)
var got []delivery.ExportArchivedEvent
require.NoError(t, w.DB().Find(&got).Error)
require.Len(t, got, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "b", got[0].EventID)
}
func TestArchiveWriter_ReopenDebounce(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A generous debounce keeps the two rapid writes inside
// the window even on a heavily loaded test machine.
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-wh.db")
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
path, archiveTestLogger(), 2*time.Second,
)
require.NoError(t, w.Write(
delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "a"}, 0,
))
require.NoError(t, w.Write(
delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "b"}, 0,
))
// Two writes inside the debounce window trigger only the
// initial open — no extra close/reopen.
assert.Equal(t, 1, w.Reopens())
time.Sleep(2100 * time.Millisecond)
require.NoError(t, w.Write(
delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "c"}, 0,
))
// A write after the window elapses closes and reopens once.
assert.Equal(t, 2, w.Reopens())
}
func TestArchiveWriter_ExpiryPrune(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-wh.db")
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
)
require.NoError(t, w.Open(0))
old := delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{
EventID: "old",
ArchivedAt: time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour),
}
fresh := delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{
EventID: "fresh",
ArchivedAt: time.Now(),
}
require.NoError(t, w.DB().Create(&old).Error)
require.NoError(t, w.DB().Create(&fresh).Error)
// Reopening with a one-hour expiry prunes the old row.
require.NoError(t, w.Reopen(time.Hour))
var got []delivery.ExportArchivedEvent
require.NoError(t, w.DB().Find(&got).Error)
require.Len(t, got, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "fresh", got[0].EventID)
}
func TestParseArchiveExpiry(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []struct {
name string
in string
want time.Duration
wantErr bool
}{
{"empty config", "", 0, false},
{"explicit never", `{"expiry":"never"}`, 0, false},
{"empty expiry", `{"expiry":""}`, 0, false},
{"duration", `{"expiry":"1h"}`, time.Hour, false},
{"unparseable", `{"expiry":"nonsense"}`, 0, true},
{"zero duration", `{"expiry":"0s"}`, 0, true},
{"negative duration", `{"expiry":"-5h"}`, 0, true},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := delivery.ExportParseArchiveExpiry(tc.in)
if tc.wantErr {
require.Error(t, err)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tc.want, got)
})
}
}
// seedDatabaseTargetDelivery seeds a pending delivery for a
// database target with the given config JSON and returns the
// in-memory delivery the target handler is invoked with.
func seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t *testing.T,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
event database.Event,
config string,
) *database.Delivery {
t.Helper()
dlv := seedDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event.ID, uuid.New().String(),
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
d := &database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: dlv.TargetID,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusPending,
Event: event,
Target: database.Target{
Name: "test-db",
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
Config: config,
},
}
d.ID = dlv.ID
return d
}
// TestDeliverDatabase_ArchiveFailureFailsDelivery verifies that
// an archive error (here: an unparseable expiry in the target
// config) fails the delivery loudly: the attempt is recorded as
// failed with the error and the delivery is marked failed, not
// delivered.
func TestDeliverDatabase_ArchiveFailureFailsDelivery(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := t.TempDir()
e := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
nil, database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir),
archiveTestLogger(),
&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
1,
)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":false}`)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"nonsense"}`,
)
e.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
var updated database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.First(
&updated, "id = ?", d.ID,
).Error)
assert.Equal(t,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed, updated.Status,
"archive failure must mark the delivery failed",
)
var results []database.DeliveryResult
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Where(
"delivery_id = ?", d.ID,
).Find(&results).Error)
require.Len(t, results, 1)
assert.False(t,
results[0].Success,
"the attempt must be recorded as failed",
)
assert.Contains(t,
results[0].Error, "nonsense",
"the archive error must be recorded on the attempt",
)
assert.NoFileExists(t,
filepath.Join(
dataDir,
fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", event.WebhookID),
),
"no archive file should exist for a failed config",
)
}
func TestValidateArchiveExpiry(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
valid := []string{"", "never", "1h", "720h", "30m"}
for _, in := range valid {
require.NoError(t,
delivery.ValidateArchiveExpiry(in),
"expiry %q should be accepted", in,
)
}
invalid := []string{"nonsense", "7d", "-5h", "0s", "0"}
for _, in := range invalid {
require.Error(t,
delivery.ValidateArchiveExpiry(in),
"expiry %q should be rejected", in,
)
}
}

256
internal/delivery/target_headers.go Normal file
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package delivery
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds bounds a per-target request timeout.
// A delivery attempt holds a worker for its whole duration, so an
// unbounded timeout lets one misconfigured target stall the queue
// indefinitely. Five minutes is far beyond any healthy webhook
// receiver and still finite.
const MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds = 300
// Errors returned when a target's header or timeout form input
// cannot be turned into a configuration.
//
// None of these ever quotes a header VALUE. A target header value
// is routinely an authorization token, and these messages are shown
// to the user in an error page body.
var (
errHeaderLineMalformed = errors.New(
`each header line must be "Name: value"`,
)
errHeaderNameInvalid = errors.New(
"header name must be a valid HTTP token",
)
errHeaderValueInvalid = errors.New(
"header value must not contain control characters",
)
errHeaderDuplicate = errors.New(
"header given more than once",
)
errHeaderReserved = errors.New(
"header is set by the delivery engine and cannot be " +
"overridden",
)
errTimeoutInvalid = errors.New(
"timeout must be a whole number of seconds",
)
errTimeoutOutOfRange = errors.New(
"timeout is out of range",
)
)
// isReservedTargetHeader reports whether name (canonicalised) is a
// header a target configuration may not set, because the delivery
// path or net/http itself writes it regardless.
//
// These are rejected rather than accepted-and-ignored. Storing a
// header that provably never reaches the wire tells the operator
// their configuration took effect when it did not, which is the
// same failure mode as silently substituting a default for an
// invalid value.
func isReservedTargetHeader(name string) bool {
switch name {
case "Host", "Content-Length", "Transfer-Encoding", "Connection":
return true
case "User-Agent":
// applyRequestHeaders sets the User-Agent after it applies
// the configured headers, so a configured one would always
// be overwritten.
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// ParseTargetHeaders turns the target form's headers field — one
// "Name: value" pair per line, blank lines ignored — into the map
// stored in HTTPTargetConfig.Headers. Names are canonicalised, so a
// name repeated in a different case is still a duplicate rather than
// one pair silently overwriting the other.
//
// An input with no pairs yields an empty map, which omitempty drops
// from the stored config: a target configured with no headers keeps
// the same config JSON it had before this field existed.
func ParseTargetHeaders(raw string) (map[string]string, error) {
headers := make(map[string]string)
for i, line := range strings.Split(raw, "\n") {
lineNum := i + 1
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if line == "" {
continue
}
name, value, err := parseHeaderLine(line)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("line %d: %w", lineNum, err)
}
if _, dup := headers[name]; dup {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"line %d: %w: %q", lineNum,
errHeaderDuplicate, name,
)
}
headers[name] = value
}
return headers, nil
}
// parseHeaderLine splits and validates one "Name: value" line,
// returning the canonicalised name and the trimmed value.
func parseHeaderLine(line string) (string, string, error) {
rawName, value, found := strings.Cut(line, ":")
if !found {
return "", "", errHeaderLineMalformed
}
rawName = strings.TrimSpace(rawName)
if !validHeaderName(rawName) {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %q", errHeaderNameInvalid, rawName,
)
}
name := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(rawName)
if isReservedTargetHeader(name) {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %q", errHeaderReserved, name,
)
}
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if !validHeaderValue(value) {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %q", errHeaderValueInvalid, name,
)
}
return name, value, nil
}
// validHeaderName reports whether name is a non-empty RFC 9110
// field name. Rejecting anything else here is what keeps a value
// containing CR or LF from being smuggled in as part of a name and
// injecting a second header into the outbound request.
func validHeaderName(name string) bool {
if name == "" {
return false
}
for i := range len(name) {
if !isTokenByte(name[i]) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// isTokenByte reports whether c is a "tchar" per RFC 9110 5.6.2.
func isTokenByte(c byte) bool {
switch {
case c >= 'a' && c <= 'z',
c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z',
c >= '0' && c <= '9':
return true
}
return strings.IndexByte("!#$%&'*+-.^_`|~", c) >= 0
}
// validHeaderValue reports whether value is a legal field value:
// no control characters, which is the other half of the header
// injection guard. An empty value is legal.
func validHeaderValue(value string) bool {
for i := range len(value) {
c := value[i]
if c < 0x20 || c == 0x7f {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// FormatTargetHeaders renders a stored header map back into the
// form's textarea representation, one "Name: value" per line.
//
// Names are sorted so that loading the edit form twice without
// saving produces identical text; Go map iteration order would
// otherwise reshuffle the field on every render.
func FormatTargetHeaders(headers map[string]string) string {
if len(headers) == 0 {
return ""
}
names := make([]string, 0, len(headers))
for name := range headers {
names = append(names, name)
}
slices.Sort(names)
var b strings.Builder
for _, name := range names {
b.WriteString(name)
b.WriteString(": ")
b.WriteString(headers[name])
b.WriteString("\n")
}
return b.String()
}
// ParseTargetTimeout interprets the target form's timeout field as
// a whole number of seconds. An empty field means "unset" and yields
// 0, which omitempty drops from the stored config and which the
// delivery path reads as "use the shared client's timeout".
//
// Anything else that is not a whole number in range is an error, not
// a silently substituted default: a target whose timeout was typed
// wrong must say so at the form rather than deliver on a timeout its
// operator did not choose.
func ParseTargetTimeout(raw string) (int, error) {
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if raw == "" {
return 0, nil
}
v, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
if err != nil || v < 0 {
return 0, errTimeoutInvalid
}
if v > MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: at most %d seconds",
errTimeoutOutOfRange, MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds,
)
}
return v, nil
}
// FormatTargetTimeout renders a stored timeout for the form field.
// An unset timeout renders as an empty field rather than "0", so the
// placeholder can describe the default the target actually uses.
func FormatTargetTimeout(timeout int) string {
if timeout <= 0 {
return ""
}
return strconv.Itoa(timeout)
}

273
internal/delivery/target_headers_test.go Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"encoding/json"
"strconv"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// Literals these tests repeat, named so that the header name and the
// keep-forever archive config each have one definition.
const (
headerAuthorization = "Authorization"
bearerValue = "Bearer abc"
archiveConfigNever = "{\"expiry\":\"never\"}"
)
func TestParseTargetHeaders_AcceptsPairs(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(
" Authorization: Bearer abc \n\n" +
"x-tenant:acme\r\n" +
"X-Empty:\n",
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(
t,
map[string]string{
headerAuthorization: bearerValue,
"X-Tenant": "acme",
"X-Empty": "",
},
got,
)
}
// A configuration with no headers must stay indistinguishable from
// one written before the field existed, so omitempty drops the key.
func TestParseTargetHeaders_EmptyInputYieldsNoHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders("\n \n")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, got)
encoded, err := json.Marshal(delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
URL: "https://example.com/h",
Headers: got,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.JSONEq(
t, `{"url":"https://example.com/h"}`, string(encoded),
)
}
func TestParseTargetHeaders_Rejects(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := map[string]string{
"no colon": "Authorization Bearer abc",
"empty name": ": value",
"space in name": "X Bad: value",
"reserved host": "Host: evil.example",
"reserved ua": "User-Agent: curl/8",
"reserved length": "Content-Length: 0",
"duplicate any case": "X-A: 1\nx-a: 2",
}
for name, input := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(input)
require.Error(t, err)
})
}
}
// A header value is routinely a bearer token and these errors are
// rendered into a 400 body, so no message may quote one.
func TestParseTargetHeaders_ErrorsNeverQuoteAValue(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const secret = "QQNEVERINAMESSAGEQQ"
_, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(
"X-A: " + secret + "\nx-a: " + secret,
)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), secret)
_, err = delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(
"X Bad Name: " + secret,
)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), secret)
}
// Loading the edit form twice without saving must not reshuffle
// the textarea, which Go's map iteration order would otherwise do.
func TestFormatTargetHeaders_IsSorted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := delivery.FormatTargetHeaders(map[string]string{
"X-Zed": "z",
headerAuthorization: bearerValue,
"X-Alpha": "a",
})
assert.Equal(
t,
"Authorization: Bearer abc\nX-Alpha: a\nX-Zed: z\n",
got,
)
assert.Empty(t, delivery.FormatTargetHeaders(nil))
}
func TestFormatTargetHeaders_RoundTripsThroughParse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
want := map[string]string{
headerAuthorization: bearerValue,
"X-Tenant": "acme",
}
got, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(
delivery.FormatTargetHeaders(want),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, want, got)
}
func TestParseTargetTimeout(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := delivery.ParseTargetTimeout(" 30 ")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, 30, got)
got, err = delivery.ParseTargetTimeout("")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Zero(t, got)
for _, bad := range []string{"soon", "-1", "1e3", "100000"} {
_, err = delivery.ParseTargetTimeout(bad)
require.Error(t, err, bad)
}
}
func TestFormatTargetTimeout(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.Equal(t, "30", delivery.FormatTargetTimeout(30))
assert.Empty(t, delivery.FormatTargetTimeout(0))
assert.Empty(t, delivery.FormatTargetTimeout(-1))
}
func TestNewTargetConfigForm(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
form, err := delivery.NewTargetConfigForm(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":"https://example.com/h",` +
`"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer abc"},` +
`"timeout":9}`,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "https://example.com/h", form.URL)
assert.Equal(t, "Authorization: Bearer abc\n", form.Headers)
assert.Equal(t, "9", form.Timeout)
form, err = delivery.NewTargetConfigForm(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/s"}`,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "https://hooks.example/s", form.URL)
form, err = delivery.NewTargetConfigForm(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
Config: `{"expiry":"720h"}`,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "720h", form.Expiry)
form, err = delivery.NewTargetConfigForm(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeLog,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, form.URL)
}
// A keep-forever archive target must pre-fill as an empty field, so
// saving the form back unchanged stores the same empty config.
func TestNewTargetConfigForm_DatabaseNeverIsBlank(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, cfg := range []string{"", `{}`, archiveConfigNever} {
form, err := delivery.NewTargetConfigForm(
&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
Config: cfg,
},
)
require.NoError(t, err, cfg)
assert.Empty(t, form.Expiry, cfg)
}
}
// An unreadable stored config is an error rather than a blank form
// that looks like a target with no settings, so the caller can tell
// the operator that saving replaces the stored value.
func TestNewTargetConfigForm_UnreadableConfigErrors(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []*database.Target{
{Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP, Config: "not json"},
{Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP, Config: `{}`},
{Type: database.TargetTypeSlack, Config: ""},
{
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
Config: `{"expiry":"soon"}`,
},
{Type: database.TargetType("nope")},
}
for _, target := range cases {
_, err := delivery.NewTargetConfigForm(target)
require.Error(t, err, target.Type)
}
}
// The ceiling exists so one misconfigured target cannot hold a
// delivery worker indefinitely, and it is inclusive.
func TestParseTargetTimeout_CeilingIsInclusive(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.Positive(t, delivery.MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds)
got, err := delivery.ParseTargetTimeout(
strconv.Itoa(delivery.MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, delivery.MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds, got)
_, err = delivery.ParseTargetTimeout(
strconv.Itoa(delivery.MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds + 1),
)
require.Error(t, err)
}
// Control characters in a value are how a second header would be
// smuggled into the outbound request.
func TestParseTargetHeaders_RejectsControlCharactersInValues(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
for _, bad := range []string{
"X-A: one\x01two",
"X-A: one\ttwo",
"X-A: one\x7ftwo",
} {
_, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(bad)
require.Error(t, err, bad)
}
}

66
internal/delivery/target_http.go
View File

@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ func (c *httpCore) fireAndForget(
d *database.Delivery,
res attemptResult,
) {
c.eng.observeAttempt(d.Target.Type, res.elapsed())
c.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, 1, res.success,
res.statusCode, res.respBody, res.errMsg,
@@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ func (c *httpCore) fireAndForget(
if res.success {
c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d,
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
@@ -90,7 +92,8 @@ func (c *httpCore) fireAndForget(
}
c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
}
@@ -107,10 +110,17 @@ func (c *httpCore) withRetry(
return
}
// Allow may have moved the breaker to half-open, and the
// attempt below may open or close it, so the gauge is
// republished on every exit from here.
defer c.publishCircuitState(d.Target.Type)
attemptNum := task.AttemptNum
res := attempt()
c.eng.observeAttempt(d.Target.Type, res.elapsed())
c.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, attemptNum, res.success,
res.statusCode, res.respBody, res.errMsg,
@@ -121,7 +131,7 @@ func (c *httpCore) withRetry(
cb.RecordSuccess()
c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d,
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
@@ -146,6 +156,8 @@ func (c *httpCore) circuitBreakerBlock(
return false
}
defer c.publishCircuitState(d.Target.Type)
remaining := cb.CooldownRemaining()
c.eng.log.Info(
@@ -157,7 +169,7 @@ func (c *httpCore) circuitBreakerBlock(
)
c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d,
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
@@ -177,7 +189,7 @@ func (c *httpCore) handleRetry(
) {
if attemptNum >= maxRetries {
c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d,
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
@@ -185,7 +197,8 @@ func (c *httpCore) handleRetry(
}
c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
backoff := calcBackoff(attemptNum)
@@ -215,6 +228,28 @@ func (c *httpCore) getCircuitBreaker(
return cb
}
// publishCircuitState recounts this core's open breakers and
// publishes the gauge. Each core holds the breakers of exactly one
// target type, so the recount is over that type's targets alone.
// Counting rather than adjusting a delta keeps the gauge honest
// however a breaker changed state.
func (c *httpCore) publishCircuitState(
targetType database.TargetType,
) {
open := 0
c.circuitBreakers.Range(func(_, val any) bool {
cb, ok := val.(*CircuitBreaker)
if ok && cb.State() == CircuitOpen {
open++
}
return true
})
c.eng.mtr.SetCircuitBreakersOpen(targetType, open)
}
// remainingBackoff returns how long remains of the backoff
// window for the last attempt of a recovered retrying
// delivery. It implements rescheduler.
@@ -302,7 +337,8 @@ func (t *httpTarget) Deliver(
)
t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
return
@@ -363,7 +399,8 @@ func (t *httpTarget) doHTTPRequest(
)
if reqErr != nil {
return 0, "", 0, fmt.Errorf(
"creating request: %w", reqErr,
"creating request: %w",
maskURLError(reqErr),
)
}
@@ -492,8 +529,19 @@ func applyRequestHeaders(
// executeHTTPRequest sends an HTTP request using the provided
// client. URLs are validated by the config parsers and the
// SSRF-safe transport before reaching here.
//
// Transport failures are masked here, at the single point
// where every target's request errors are born, because the
// caller stores them in DeliveryResult.Error: an unmasked
// *url.Error would write the target URL — the credential for
// a Slack incoming webhook — into the per-webhook database.
func executeHTTPRequest(
client *http.Client, req *http.Request,
) (*http.Response, error) {
return client.Do(req) //#nosec G704 -- URL validated by parseHTTPConfig/parseSlackConfig and SSRF-safe transport
resp, err := client.Do(req) //#nosec G704 -- validated URL, SSRF-safe transport
if err != nil {
return nil, maskURLError(err)
}
return resp, nil
}

24
internal/delivery/target_log.go
View File

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package delivery
import (
"context"
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
@@ -11,6 +12,17 @@ import (
// inbound webhook — the full request body and headers, plus
// the method, content type, and the webhook and entrypoint
// ids — then records a single successful attempt.
//
// This is the one log call in the service that deliberately writes
// unbounded client-chosen bytes, so it is the one exception to the
// per-field budgets in internal/logfield and to the ceiling stated on
// middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes. Capping here would defeat the
// target: emitting the payload IS the delivery. It costs nothing by
// default — an authenticated operator has to create a target of this
// type on a specific webhook before a single line is written — and the
// bytes it writes are bounded per event by maxWebhookBodySize (1 MB).
// An operator who adds one is choosing to spend log volume on the
// payloads that webhook receives.
type logTarget struct {
eng *Engine
}
@@ -23,6 +35,8 @@ func (t *logTarget) Deliver(
_ *Task,
_ Scheduler,
) {
start := time.Now()
t.eng.log.Info(
"webhook event delivered to log target",
"delivery_id", d.ID,
@@ -37,11 +51,17 @@ func (t *logTarget) Deliver(
"body", d.Event.Body,
)
elapsed := time.Since(start)
t.eng.observeAttempt(d.Target.Type, elapsed)
t.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, 1, true, 0, "", "", 0,
webhookDB, d, 1, true, 0, "", "",
elapsed.Milliseconds(),
)
t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
}

5
internal/delivery/target_slack.go
View File

@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ func (t *slackTarget) failConfig(
)
t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
}
@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ func (t *slackTarget) attempt(
if err != nil {
return attemptResult{
success: false,
errMsg: err.Error(),
errMsg: maskURLError(err).Error(),
}
}

61
internal/delivery/url_mask.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
package delivery
import (
"errors"
"net/url"
)
// urlPathElision stands in for a URL's elided path.
const urlPathElision = "/..."
// MaskURL renders a URL as scheme plus host with everything
// that can carry a secret removed. A delivery target URL is
// itself a credential — a Slack incoming webhook URL is a
// bearer token — so the path, query and userinfo are never
// reproduced, in a page, a log line or a stored error. A URL
// that does not parse into a scheme and host yields the
// neutral placeholder, never the raw string.
func MaskURL(raw string) string {
parsed, err := url.Parse(raw)
if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" ||
parsed.Host == "" {
return configUnavailable
}
masked := parsed.Scheme + "://" + parsed.Host
if parsed.Path != "" && parsed.Path != "/" {
masked += urlPathElision
}
return masked
}
// maskURLError strips the credential from an error raised
// against a request URL. The net/http and net/url packages
// embed the full request URL in every *url.Error they return,
// so an unmodified transport error persisted into
// DeliveryResult.Error writes the credential to disk.
//
// The masked error keeps the operation and the wrapped cause,
// so a DNS failure still reads differently from a refused
// connection, a TLS handshake failure or a timeout, and Is,
// As, Timeout and Temporary keep working on it. Only the
// path, query and userinfo of the URL are dropped. Errors
// that carry no URL are returned unchanged.
//
// Call it where the error is raised, before any wrapping: it
// replaces the *url.Error itself, so any context wrapped
// around it first would be discarded.
func maskURLError(err error) error {
var urlErr *url.Error
if !errors.As(err, &urlErr) {
return err
}
return &url.Error{
Op: urlErr.Op,
URL: MaskURL(urlErr.URL),
Err: urlErr.Err,
}
}

196
internal/delivery/url_mask_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// The path of a Slack incoming webhook URL is the credential:
// whoever holds these segments can post to the channel
// forever. None of them may reach a stored delivery error,
// which lives on disk in the per-webhook database and is
// serialized by the JSON tag on DeliveryResult.Error.
const (
maskSecretPath = "/services/T00000000/B00000000/" +
"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
)
// assertNoCredential fails if the whole path or any single
// segment of it survived into the message, so a partial leak
// fails the test too.
func assertNoCredential(t *testing.T, msg string) {
t.Helper()
segments := []string{
maskSecretPath,
"services",
"T00000000",
"B00000000",
"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
}
for _, segment := range segments {
assert.NotContains(t, msg, segment)
}
}
// storedDeliveryError returns the error string persisted for a
// delivery, which is what an operator and any future API read.
func storedDeliveryError(
t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB, deliveryID string,
) string {
t.Helper()
var result database.DeliveryResult
require.NoError(t, db.Where(
"delivery_id = ?", deliveryID,
).First(&result).Error)
return result.Error
}
// deliverSlackTo runs a Slack delivery against webhookURL and
// returns the error string it persisted.
func deliverSlackTo(
t *testing.T, webhookURL string,
) string {
t.Helper()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
slackCfg, err := json.Marshal(
delivery.SlackTargetConfig{
WebhookURL: webhookURL,
},
)
require.NoError(t, err)
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{"test":true}`)
dlv := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
d := buildSlackDelivery(
dlv, event, targetID,
"test-slack-mask", string(slackCfg),
)
e.ExportDeliverSlack(context.TODO(), db, d)
assertDeliveryStatus(t, db, dlv.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
return storedDeliveryError(t, db, dlv.ID)
}
// TestDeliverSlack_TransportErrorMasksWebhookURL is the
// load-bearing regression test: a transport failure must not
// persist the webhook URL's credential into the database, and
// must still say what went wrong and where.
func TestDeliverSlack_TransportErrorMasksWebhookURL(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
// A server closed before use gives a deterministic
// transport failure against a known host.
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.NewServeMux())
host := ts.URL
ts.Close()
errMsg := deliverSlackTo(t, host+maskSecretPath)
require.NotEmpty(t, errMsg)
assertNoCredential(t, errMsg)
// The diagnostic value survives: the operation, the host
// and the transport failure are all still reported, and
// only the path is elided.
assert.Contains(t, errMsg, "sending request")
assert.Contains(t, errMsg, "Post")
assert.Contains(t, errMsg, host+"/...")
assert.Contains(t, errMsg, "connection refused")
}
// TestDeliverSlack_UnparsableURLMasksWebhookURL covers the
// other error path out of a Slack attempt: url.Parse also
// embeds the whole URL in the error it returns.
func TestDeliverSlack_UnparsableURLMasksWebhookURL(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
errMsg := deliverSlackTo(
t,
"https://hooks.slack.com"+maskSecretPath+"\n",
)
require.NotEmpty(t, errMsg)
assertNoCredential(t, errMsg)
assert.Contains(t, errMsg, "invalid control character")
}
// TestDoHTTPRequest_TransportErrorMasksURL proves the HTTP
// target's transport errors are masked too; its destination
// URL can carry a token in a query string.
func TestDoHTTPRequest_TransportErrorMasksURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.NewServeMux())
host := ts.URL
ts.Close()
e := testEngine(t, 1)
cfg, err := e.ExportParseHTTPConfig(
newHTTPTargetConfig(host + maskSecretPath),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
statusCode, _, _, reqErr := e.ExportDoHTTPRequest(
context.TODO(), cfg,
&database.Event{Body: `{"test":true}`},
)
require.Error(t, reqErr)
assert.Zero(t, statusCode)
assertNoCredential(t, reqErr.Error())
assert.Contains(t, reqErr.Error(), host+"/...")
assert.Contains(
t, reqErr.Error(), "connection refused",
)
}
// TestValidateTargetURL_UnparsableURLIsMasked proves the SSRF
// validator's error does not carry the submitted URL, which
// the handler both logs and shows.
func TestValidateTargetURL_UnparsableURLIsMasked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
context.TODO(),
"https://hooks.slack.com"+maskSecretPath+"\n",
)
require.Error(t, err)
assertNoCredential(t, err.Error())
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid URL")
}

17
internal/gormlog/export_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
package gormlog
import (
"log/slog"
"time"
)
// ExportNewWithSlowThreshold builds a Logger whose slow-statement
// threshold is d rather than DefaultSlowThreshold, so a test can pin
// which arm of Trace it is exercising instead of racing the clock on a
// loaded machine. The threshold is set at construction, like every
// other field, so the type's concurrency guarantee still holds.
func ExportNewWithSlowThreshold(
log *slog.Logger, d time.Duration,
) *Logger {
return &Logger{log: log, slowThreshold: d}
}

229
internal/gormlog/firstboot_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
package gormlog_test
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite" // Pure Go SQLite driver.
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// argon2Prefix opens every encoded Argon2id hash this service
// produces. It is asserted on separately from the hash itself, so that
// a change to the password encoding cannot quietly turn the hash
// assertion into a comparison against a string the log never held.
const argon2Prefix = "$argon2id$"
// settingsInsert and usersInsert are the two statements a first boot
// runs that carry a secret. The sqlite dialector quotes identifiers
// with backticks.
const (
settingsInsert = "INSERT INTO `settings`"
usersInsert = "INSERT INTO `users`"
)
// captureStdoutToFile redirects os.Stdout into a file for the rest of
// the test and returns a function that reads back everything written
// to it.
//
// A file rather than a pipe: internal/logger writes synchronously to
// whatever os.Stdout is when it builds its handler, so once fx's start
// returns, every byte the boot produced is already in the file and no
// draining goroutine is needed to prove it. Redirecting the variable
// before the application is built is what puts the service logger —
// and therefore the GORM adapter, which writes through it — into the
// capture.
//
// The redirect also decides the handler: a regular file is not a
// character device, so internal/logger installs its JSON handler, the
// one it installs in production under a log collector.
func captureStdoutToFile(t *testing.T) func() string {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "stdout.log")
//nolint:gosec // The path is this test's own t.TempDir().
f, err := os.Create(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
orig := os.Stdout
os.Stdout = f
t.Cleanup(func() {
os.Stdout = orig
_ = f.Close()
})
return func() string {
require.NoError(t, f.Sync())
//nolint:gosec // As above.
b, readErr := os.ReadFile(path)
require.NoError(t, readErr)
return string(b)
}
}
// firstBootSecrets are the two values a first boot generates and
// stores, read back out of the database.
type firstBootSecrets struct {
sessionKey string
passwordHash string
}
// readFirstBootSecrets reads those two secrets straight out of the
// SQLite file with database/sql rather than through GORM, so that
// reading them cannot itself add a line to the log under test.
func readFirstBootSecrets(
t *testing.T, dataDir string,
) firstBootSecrets {
t.Helper()
db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", filepath.Join(
dataDir, "webhooker.db",
))
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, db.Close()) }()
ctx := context.Background()
var got firstBootSecrets
require.NoError(t, db.QueryRowContext(
ctx, `SELECT value FROM settings WHERE key = 'session_key'`,
).Scan(&got.sessionKey))
require.NoError(t, db.QueryRowContext(
ctx, `SELECT password FROM users WHERE username = 'admin'`,
).Scan(&got.passwordHash))
require.NotEmpty(t, got.sessionKey)
require.Contains(t, got.passwordHash, argon2Prefix)
return got
}
// bootAtDebug starts and stops the real application graph against
// dataDir with DEBUG=true, and returns everything it wrote to standard
// output.
//
// config.New reads DEBUG from the environment exactly as the binary
// does, internal/logger builds the handler it builds in production,
// database.New runs the migrations and creates the admin user, and
// session.New takes the session key. Those four are the whole of the
// path that writes either secret.
func bootAtDebug(t *testing.T, dataDir string) string {
t.Helper()
t.Setenv("DEBUG", "true")
t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", dataDir)
read := captureStdoutToFile(t)
var sess *session.Session
app := fxtest.New(
t,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
config.New,
database.New,
session.New,
),
fx.Populate(&sess),
)
app.RequireStart()
app.RequireStop()
return read()
}
// requireFirstBootWasLogged is the non-vacuity half of the test below.
// Without it a build that logged no SQL at all, or that never reached
// DEBUG, would satisfy every absence assertion.
func requireFirstBootWasLogged(t *testing.T, out string) {
t.Helper()
require.Contains(
t, out, `"level":"DEBUG"`,
"DEBUG=true did not reach the logger",
)
require.Contains(
t, out, settingsInsert,
"the session key INSERT was not logged, so its absence "+
"proves nothing",
)
require.Contains(
t, out, usersInsert,
"the admin user INSERT was not logged, so its absence "+
"proves nothing",
)
}
// TestFirstBootAtDebug_LogsNeitherSecret is the definition of done.
//
// A first boot is the only boot that writes either secret. The
// settings INSERT carries the base64 session encryption key, which is
// the whole of the session security model: anyone holding it can forge
// an authenticated session cookie. The users INSERT carries the admin
// account's Argon2id hash. Under interpolated statement logging both
// landed in the log an operator diagnosing a startup problem pastes
// into an issue.
//
// The secrets are read back out of the database file afterwards, so
// the assertions are made against the values this boot actually
// generated rather than against a pattern that might not match them.
//
// What this test does not cover: the initial admin password itself,
// which internal/database logs once in the clear, on purpose, because
// that line is the only place an operator ever sees it. That is a
// separate decision from the SQL log, and it is documented in the
// README rather than asserted here.
//
// Not parallel: it redirects os.Stdout and sets environment variables,
// both process-global.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // Deliberately sequential; see above.
func TestFirstBootAtDebug_LogsNeitherSecret(t *testing.T) {
dataDir := t.TempDir()
// An empty DATA_DIR is what makes this a first boot: with a
// database already in place neither INSERT runs.
entries, err := os.ReadDir(dataDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Empty(t, entries, "DATA_DIR was not empty")
out := bootAtDebug(t, dataDir)
requireFirstBootWasLogged(t, out)
secrets := readFirstBootSecrets(t, dataDir)
assert.NotContains(
t, out, secrets.sessionKey,
"the session encryption key reached the debug log",
)
assert.NotContains(
t, out, secrets.passwordHash,
"the admin password hash reached the debug log",
)
assert.NotContains(
t, out, argon2Prefix,
"an encoded Argon2id hash reached the debug log",
)
}

219
internal/gormlog/gormlog.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
// Package gormlog adapts GORM's logger onto the service's slog
// logger.
//
// GORM's own default logger is not usable here. It is built at package
// init with log.New(os.Stdout, ...) at LogLevel Warn with
// IgnoreRecordNotFoundError false, so it writes the fully interpolated
// SQL — parameters and all — for every statement that returns an
// error, including gorm.ErrRecordNotFound. Two of this service's
// lookups miss by design on unauthenticated routes: the entrypoint
// lookup on /webhook/{uuid}, whose path segment the client picks
// outright, and the user lookup behind the login form, whose username
// the client picks outright. Under the default logger each of those
// misses printed an unbounded, attacker-chosen string, at no level the
// operator can turn down, past every handler internal/logger installs.
//
// This adapter fixes all three properties at once: the lines get a
// level the operator controls, they are shaped by whichever handler
// internal/logger selected, and every value a client can influence is
// spent through logfield.Truncate.
//
// It also logs no bound value at all. See ParamsFilter: the statement
// is written with its placeholders intact, at every level, so the
// values a statement carries never reach the log in the first place.
package gormlog
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
gormlogger "gorm.io/gorm/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
)
// DefaultSlowThreshold is the duration at or above which a statement
// is logged as slow. It is GORM's own default, kept deliberately: slow
// SQL is the one thing GORM's logger reports that nothing else in this
// service does, so silencing the logger outright would have cost real
// observability to fix a log-volume defect.
const DefaultSlowThreshold = 200 * time.Millisecond
// Logger implements gormlogger.Interface on top of an *slog.Logger.
//
// It is safe for concurrent use: every field is set at construction
// and never written again.
type Logger struct {
log *slog.Logger
slowThreshold time.Duration
}
// Interface compliance is asserted here rather than discovered at the
// gorm.Open call sites. gorm.ParamsFilter is the optional half: GORM
// type-asserts for it and silently keeps interpolating if it is
// missing, so losing it would cost no build error and no test that
// does not look at the emitted SQL.
var (
_ gormlogger.Interface = (*Logger)(nil)
_ gorm.ParamsFilter = (*Logger)(nil)
)
// New returns a GORM logger that writes through log.
func New(log *slog.Logger) *Logger {
return &Logger{
log: log,
slowThreshold: DefaultSlowThreshold,
}
}
// LogMode returns the logger unchanged.
//
// GORM's LogLevel is deliberately not honoured. Level is the operator's
// decision and it is expressed once, through LOG_LEVEL and the
// slog.LevelVar internal/logger holds; a second level knob inside the
// database layer could only disagree with it. The mapping from GORM's
// four categories onto slog levels is fixed in Trace below.
//
//nolint:ireturn // The interface return is GORM's signature, not a choice.
func (l *Logger) LogMode(gormlogger.LogLevel) gormlogger.Interface {
return l
}
// ParamsFilter drops every bound value before GORM renders a statement
// for the log, so what is logged is the statement's shape — its
// placeholders — and never the values in it.
//
// GORM builds the string it hands to Trace by calling
// Dialector.Explain(sql, vars...), which substitutes each value into
// the statement. Discarding vars here leaves the '?' placeholders in
// place, because ExplainSQL only substitutes while it still has a
// value for the next one. That happens before Trace is reached, so it
// holds on all three of its arms: the failed statement, the slow one,
// and the routine one an operator sees at DEBUG.
//
// This is the whole of the fix, and it is deliberately unconditional
// rather than a list of tables to redact. At first boot the two
// statements that carry a secret are the INSERT into settings holding
// the base64 session key — which is the entire session security model,
// since anyone with it can mint a valid cookie — and the INSERT into
// users holding the Argon2id hash. A denylist would have had to be
// extended by hand for every table added afterwards, and the cost of
// missing one is a credential in a log that gets pasted into issues.
//
// What is given up is the ability to read a value out of the log. The
// statement, the table, the error and the row count are all still
// there, which is what identifies a failing statement; reproducing it
// needs the values, and those an operator now gets from the database
// rather than from the log.
//
// One GORM path does not consult this: (*gorm.DB).Scan records the
// statement through gorm's own traceRecorder, which does not implement
// this interface. No production code path calls it; its one caller is
// internal/database/database_test.go:91, whose SELECT 1 binds nothing.
// scan_guard_test.go fails if a non-test file calls it.
// (*gorm.DB).Pluck, Row and Raw all run through the normal callback
// processor and are filtered.
func (l *Logger) ParamsFilter(
_ context.Context, sql string, _ ...any,
) (string, []any) {
return sql, nil
}
// Info logs one of GORM's own informational messages.
func (l *Logger) Info(
ctx context.Context, msg string, data ...any,
) {
l.log.InfoContext(ctx, "gorm", "message", format(msg, data...))
}
// Warn logs one of GORM's own warnings.
func (l *Logger) Warn(
ctx context.Context, msg string, data ...any,
) {
l.log.WarnContext(ctx, "gorm", "message", format(msg, data...))
}
// Error logs one of GORM's own errors.
func (l *Logger) Error(
ctx context.Context, msg string, data ...any,
) {
l.log.ErrorContext(ctx, "gorm", "message", format(msg, data...))
}
// Trace reports the outcome of a single statement. GORM calls it for
// every statement it runs, so the cheap paths stay cheap: fc() renders
// the statement — with placeholders, per ParamsFilter — and is called
// only on a branch that will actually emit.
//
// The arms are ordered exactly as GORM's own Trace orders them —
// non-record-not-found error, then slow, then the routine case — so
// that a statement which both misses and runs slow is still reported
// as slow. A miss is the likeliest statement to be slow, since it is
// the one that scans without finding a row, and ordering the drop
// ahead of the slow arm would have made this adapter less observant
// than the IgnoreRecordNotFoundError option it was chosen over.
func (l *Logger) Trace(
ctx context.Context,
begin time.Time,
fc func() (string, int64),
err error,
) {
elapsed := time.Since(begin)
switch {
case err != nil && !errors.Is(err, gormlogger.ErrRecordNotFound):
sql, rows := fc()
l.log.ErrorContext(ctx, "sql statement failed",
"error", logfield.Truncate(err.Error(), logfield.MaxBytes),
"sql", logfield.Truncate(sql, logfield.MaxBytes),
"rows", rows,
"elapsed_ms", elapsed.Milliseconds(),
)
case l.slowThreshold > 0 && elapsed >= l.slowThreshold:
sql, rows := fc()
l.log.WarnContext(ctx, "slow sql statement",
"sql", logfield.Truncate(sql, logfield.MaxBytes),
"rows", rows,
"elapsed_ms", elapsed.Milliseconds(),
"threshold_ms", l.slowThreshold.Milliseconds(),
)
case err != nil:
// gorm.ErrRecordNotFound is not an error on the paths that
// produce it here: an invented entrypoint UUID and an unknown
// username are the expected outcome of an unauthenticated
// request, not a fault. This is the IgnoreRecordNotFoundError
// behaviour, and it is unconditional rather than configurable
// because no caller in this service wants the other one — the
// two handlers that care already record the miss themselves,
// at DEBUG, without the SQL. A miss that ran slow has already
// been reported by the arm above.
return
case l.log.Enabled(ctx, slog.LevelDebug):
sql, rows := fc()
l.log.DebugContext(ctx, "sql statement",
"sql", logfield.Truncate(sql, logfield.MaxBytes),
"rows", rows,
"elapsed_ms", elapsed.Milliseconds(),
)
}
}
// format renders one of GORM's printf-style internal messages and
// bounds it. GORM builds these itself, but they can quote a value the
// statement carried, so they are spent through the same budget as
// everything else rather than trusted.
func format(msg string, data ...any) string {
if len(data) == 0 {
return logfield.Truncate(msg, logfield.MaxBytes)
}
return logfield.Truncate(
fmt.Sprintf(msg, data...), logfield.MaxBytes,
)
}

438
internal/gormlog/gormlog_test.go Normal file
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package gormlog_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite" // Pure Go SQLite driver.
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
)
// fillBytes is how much client-chosen text each case drives into the
// statement. It is well past every budget in play, so a value that
// arrives short arrived short because something cut it.
const fillBytes = 8 << 10
// tailMarker sits at the far end of every generated value. A line that
// contains it carried the whole value, which means nothing cut it — so
// a value that merely happened to be short cannot pass for a truncated
// one.
const tailMarker = "ENDOFCLIENTVALUE"
// fills are the characters a client can drive into a SQL parameter,
// chosen for what the log handlers charge for them rather than for
// looking dangerous.
//
// The C0 control is the one that matters. Both handlers spell U+0001
// as a six-byte escape for the single byte it costs a client to send,
// which is the widest multiplier available in the basic multilingual
// plane and the case a raw-byte budget breaks on first. The astral
// non-printable costs ten under the text handler, four more than the
// JSON handler ever spends.
func fills() []struct {
name string
fill string
} {
return []struct {
name string
fill string
}{
{"plain", "x"},
{"quote", `"`},
{"backslash", `\`},
{"tab", "\t"},
{"newline", "\n"},
{"c0_control", "\x01"},
{"astral_nonprintable", "\U0001000C"},
}
}
// clientValue builds a value of at least fillBytes raw bytes out of
// fill, ending in tailMarker.
func clientValue(fill string) string {
var b strings.Builder
for b.Len() < fillBytes {
b.WriteString(fill)
}
b.WriteString(tailMarker)
return b.String()
}
// handlers are the two slog handlers internal/logger can install. The
// ceiling is quoted to operators unqualified, so every case is
// asserted under both.
func handlers() []struct {
name string
make func(*bytes.Buffer) slog.Handler
} {
opts := &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug}
return []struct {
name string
make func(*bytes.Buffer) slog.Handler
}{
{"json", func(b *bytes.Buffer) slog.Handler {
return slog.NewJSONHandler(b, opts)
}},
{"text", func(b *bytes.Buffer) slog.Handler {
return slog.NewTextHandler(b, opts)
}},
}
}
type thing struct {
ID string `gorm:"primaryKey"`
Name string
}
// neverSlow is a slow-statement threshold no statement in this file
// can reach. Cases that are about a non-slow arm of Trace set it, so
// that a machine under load cannot turn a miss into a slow report and
// decide the outcome for them.
const neverSlow = time.Hour
// alwaysSlow makes every statement count as slow, so the slow arm is
// reached without the test waiting for it.
const alwaysSlow = time.Nanosecond
// openDB opens a real SQLite database behind the adapter under test,
// so every assertion below is made against SQL that GORM actually
// rendered rather than against a string a test wrote by hand. slow is
// the adapter's slow-statement threshold.
func openDB(
t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer, h slog.Handler, slow time.Duration,
) *gorm.DB {
t.Helper()
sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", fmt.Sprintf(
"file:%s?mode=rwc",
filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gormlog.db"),
))
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
gl := gormlog.ExportNewWithSlowThreshold(slog.New(h), slow)
gdb, err := gorm.Open(
sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB},
&gorm.Config{Logger: gl},
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, gdb.AutoMigrate(&thing{}))
// Migration chatter is not what any of these cases is about.
buf.Reset()
return gdb
}
// assertBounded holds every line the adapter wrote to the stated
// ceiling and proves each was cut rather than merely short.
func assertBounded(t *testing.T, out string) {
t.Helper()
assert.NotContains(
t, out, tailMarker,
"the far end of the client value reached the log, so "+
"nothing truncated it",
)
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(
strings.TrimRight(out, "\n"), "\n",
) {
if line == "" {
continue
}
assert.LessOrEqual(
t, len(line), middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
"log line exceeded its bound: %s",
line[:min(len(line), 300)],
)
}
}
// TestRecordNotFound_WritesNothing is the defect itself. GORM's own
// default logger prints the fully interpolated SELECT on every
// ErrRecordNotFound, and on this service's two unauthenticated
// lookups the interpolated parameter is whatever the client sent.
func TestRecordNotFound_WritesNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, h := range handlers() {
for _, f := range fills() {
t.Run(h.name+"/"+f.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var buf bytes.Buffer
gdb := openDB(t, &buf, h.make(&buf), neverSlow)
var got thing
err := gdb.Where(
"id = ?", clientValue(f.fill),
).First(&got).Error
require.ErrorIs(t, err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound)
assert.Empty(
t, buf.String(),
"a miss on a client-chosen key must not "+
"write a log line",
)
})
}
}
}
// TestSlowRecordNotFound_IsStillReportedSlow pins the arm ordering in
// Trace against the drop above.
//
// GORM's own Trace orders its cases error-that-is-not-a-miss, then
// slow, then routine, so IgnoreRecordNotFoundError: true — the cheap
// option this adapter was chosen over — still reports a miss that ran
// slow. An adapter that dropped the miss first would be strictly less
// observant than the option it replaced, on exactly the two lookups
// this package exists for. A miss is also the statement most likely to
// be slow, since it is the one that scans without finding a row.
func TestSlowRecordNotFound_IsStillReportedSlow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, h := range handlers() {
for _, f := range fills() {
t.Run(h.name+"/"+f.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var buf bytes.Buffer
gdb := openDB(t, &buf, h.make(&buf), alwaysSlow)
var got thing
err := gdb.Where(
"id = ?", clientValue(f.fill),
).First(&got).Error
require.ErrorIs(t, err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound)
assert.Contains(
t, buf.String(), slowLine,
"a slow statement that missed was not "+
"reported as slow",
)
assertBounded(t, buf.String())
})
}
}
}
// TestRecordNotFoundFlood_DoesNotGrowWithInput states the definition
// of done directly: a flood of misses at two input sizes 64 times
// apart must cost the same number of bytes of log.
func TestRecordNotFoundFlood_DoesNotGrowWithInput(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const requests = 50
flood := func(t *testing.T, size int) int {
t.Helper()
var buf bytes.Buffer
gdb := openDB(
t, &buf,
slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{
Level: slog.LevelDebug,
}),
neverSlow,
)
value := strings.Repeat("\x01", size)
for range requests {
var got thing
_ = gdb.Where("id = ?", value).First(&got).Error
}
return buf.Len()
}
small := flood(t, 128)
big := flood(t, 128*64)
assert.Equal(
t, small, big,
"log volume tracked the size of the client's input",
)
}
// TestStatementError_LineIsBounded covers the branch that does log.
// A driver error is not ErrRecordNotFound, so the statement is
// written, and the driver's own error text can quote what the client
// supplied. The statement's parameters are no longer part of that —
// see TestBoundValues_NeverReachTheLog — but the budget is what holds
// the line when the statement itself, or the error, is the long part.
func TestStatementError_LineIsBounded(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, h := range handlers() {
for _, f := range fills() {
t.Run(h.name+"/"+f.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var buf bytes.Buffer
gdb := openDB(t, &buf, h.make(&buf), neverSlow)
row := thing{ID: clientValue(f.fill), Name: "a"}
require.NoError(t, gdb.Create(&row).Error)
buf.Reset()
// The same primary key a second time: a UNIQUE
// constraint failure, which is an error GORM logs.
err := gdb.Create(&thing{
ID: row.ID, Name: "b",
}).Error
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(
t, buf.String(), errorLine,
)
assertBounded(t, buf.String())
})
}
}
}
// TestSucceedingStatement_LineIsBoundedOnEitherArm covers the two
// arms a statement that returns no error can take, over the same
// query, so neither can be bounded by accident of the other.
//
// - slow. Silencing GORM outright would have been the cheaper fix
// and would have cost this report, which is the one thing GORM's
// logger gave an operator that nothing else in this service does.
// - routine. The branch an operator reaches by turning the level
// down to DEBUG: every statement is reported, so every statement
// has to be bounded too.
func TestSucceedingStatement_LineIsBoundedOnEitherArm(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// routineLine is a substring of slowLine, so the routine arm
// carries notWant as well: Contains alone cannot tell the two arms
// apart in that direction.
arms := []struct {
name string
slow time.Duration
want string
notWant string
}{
{"slow", alwaysSlow, slowLine, ""},
{"routine", neverSlow, routineLine, slowLine},
}
for _, a := range arms {
for _, h := range handlers() {
for _, f := range fills() {
name := a.name + "/" + h.name + "/" + f.name
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var buf bytes.Buffer
gdb := openDB(t, &buf, h.make(&buf), a.slow)
var got []thing
require.NoError(t, gdb.Where(
"name = ?", clientValue(f.fill),
).Find(&got).Error)
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), a.want)
if a.notWant != "" {
assert.NotContains(
t, buf.String(), a.notWant,
)
}
assertBounded(t, buf.String())
})
}
}
}
}
// TestGORMOwnMessages_AreBounded covers the three printf-style
// entry points. GORM builds these itself, but nothing stops one of
// them quoting a value the statement carried.
func TestGORMOwnMessages_AreBounded(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, h := range handlers() {
for _, f := range fills() {
t.Run(h.name+"/"+f.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var buf bytes.Buffer
gl := gormlog.New(slog.New(h.make(&buf)))
ctx := context.Background()
value := clientValue(f.fill)
gl.Info(ctx, "%s", value)
gl.Warn(ctx, "%s", value)
gl.Error(ctx, "%s", value)
// The no-argument form, which is how GORM reports
// most of its own conditions. Reached through a
// function value so the vet printf check does not
// read the message as a format string — which is
// also why the adapter does not.
noArgs := func(
f func(context.Context, string, ...any),
msg string,
) {
f(ctx, msg)
}
noArgs(gl.Info, value)
assertBounded(t, buf.String())
})
}
}
}
// TestLogMode_KeepsTheOperatorsLevel records that GORM's own level
// knob is deliberately inert: level belongs to LOG_LEVEL, and a
// second one inside the database layer could only disagree with it.
func TestLogMode_KeepsTheOperatorsLevel(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var buf bytes.Buffer
gl := gormlog.New(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(
&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
)))
assert.Same(t, gl, gl.LogMode(0))
}

260
internal/gormlog/scan_guard_test.go Normal file
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package gormlog_test
import (
"fmt"
"go/ast"
"go/parser"
"go/token"
"io/fs"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// minNonTestFiles guards the walk below against passing because it
// found nothing to look at. The tree held 60 non-test .go files when
// this was written.
const minNonTestFiles = 40
// isRowProducer reports whether name is a method that returns a
// database/sql row handle. GORM's Row and Rows return *sql.Row and
// *sql.Rows, so Scan on the result of one of them is database/sql's
// Scan and never (*gorm.DB).Scan.
func isRowProducer(name string) bool {
switch name {
case "Row", "Rows", "QueryRow", "QueryRowContext":
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// receiverIsRowHandle reports whether x is syntactically a call to a
// row producer, which is the only receiver form this check accepts for
// a Scan.
func receiverIsRowHandle(x ast.Expr) bool {
call, ok := x.(*ast.CallExpr)
if !ok {
return false
}
sel, ok := call.Fun.(*ast.SelectorExpr)
if !ok {
return false
}
return isRowProducer(sel.Sel.Name)
}
// unguardedScans returns the position of every Scan call in file whose
// receiver is not a row handle. It fails closed: a receiver it cannot
// resolve syntactically — a local variable, a struct field — is
// reported rather than assumed safe.
func unguardedScans(
fset *token.FileSet, file *ast.File,
) []token.Position {
var found []token.Position
ast.Inspect(file, func(n ast.Node) bool {
call, ok := n.(*ast.CallExpr)
if !ok {
return true
}
sel, ok := call.Fun.(*ast.SelectorExpr)
if !ok || sel.Sel.Name != "Scan" {
return true
}
if !receiverIsRowHandle(sel.X) {
found = append(found, fset.Position(sel.Sel.Pos()))
}
return true
})
return found
}
// moduleRoot walks up from the working directory to the directory
// holding go.mod.
func moduleRoot(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
dir, err := os.Getwd()
require.NoError(t, err)
for {
_, statErr := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "go.mod"))
if statErr == nil {
return dir
}
parent := filepath.Dir(dir)
require.NotEqual(t, parent, dir, "no go.mod above %s", dir)
dir = parent
}
}
// skipDir reports whether a directory holds no source this check
// governs.
func skipDir(name string) bool {
switch name {
case ".git", "bin", "node_modules", "testdata":
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// walkNonTestGo parses every non-test .go file under root and returns
// how many it parsed along with every unguarded Scan it found.
func walkNonTestGo(t *testing.T, root string) (int, []string) {
t.Helper()
var (
parsed int
hits []string
)
fset := token.NewFileSet()
require.NoError(t, filepath.WalkDir(
root,
func(path string, d fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
if d.IsDir() {
if skipDir(d.Name()) {
return fs.SkipDir
}
return nil
}
if !isNonTestGo(d.Name()) {
return nil
}
file, err := parser.ParseFile(fset, path, nil, 0)
if err != nil {
return err
}
parsed++
for _, pos := range unguardedScans(fset, file) {
hits = append(hits, relPosition(root, pos))
}
return nil
},
))
return parsed, hits
}
// isNonTestGo reports whether a file name is Go source this check
// governs.
func isNonTestGo(name string) bool {
return strings.HasSuffix(name, ".go") &&
!strings.HasSuffix(name, "_test.go")
}
// relPosition renders pos with its path relative to root, so a failure
// names the file the way the repository does.
func relPosition(root string, pos token.Position) string {
name := pos.Filename
rel, err := filepath.Rel(root, name)
if err == nil {
name = rel
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d:%d", name, pos.Line, pos.Column)
}
// TestGormScanIsNeverCalledOutsideTests keeps (*gorm.DB).Scan out of
// non-test code.
//
// It is the one statement path (*Logger).ParamsFilter does not reach:
// Scan swaps GORM's own trace recorder in for the adapter, and that
// recorder does not implement gorm.ParamsFilter, so the statement is
// logged with its values interpolated. The package comment states the
// limit; this fails when someone adds a call site anyway.
//
// The current tree has one caller, internal/database/database_test.go,
// which this check does not govern: it is test-only and its SELECT 1
// binds nothing.
func TestGormScanIsNeverCalledOutsideTests(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
parsed, offenders := walkNonTestGo(t, moduleRoot(t))
require.GreaterOrEqual(
t, parsed, minNonTestFiles,
"parsed %d non-test .go files, so this check found "+
"nothing to look at", parsed,
)
require.Empty(
t, offenders,
"Scan called on a receiver this check cannot show is a "+
"database/sql row handle. (*gorm.DB).Scan logs the "+
"statement with its bound values interpolated — use "+
"Find, Pluck, or Raw(...).Row().Scan instead. A "+
"database/sql Scan reached through a variable is "+
"reported too; write it as <producer>().Scan rather "+
"than widening this check.",
)
}
// scanGuardCase is one planted snippet and whether the check above
// should report it.
type scanGuardCase struct {
name string
body string
want int
}
func scanGuardCases() []scanGuardCase {
return []scanGuardCase{
{"gorm chain", `db.DB().Raw("SELECT 1").Scan(&v)`, 1},
{"gorm receiver", `gdb.Scan(&v)`, 1},
{"gorm via variable", "q := gdb.Raw(\"x\")\nq.Scan(&v)", 1},
{"gorm model chain", `gdb.Model(&x).Scan(&v)`, 1},
{"sql row", `gdb.Raw("SELECT 1").Row().Scan(&v)`, 0},
{"sql rows", `gdb.Raw("SELECT 1").Rows().Scan(&v)`, 0},
{"unrelated call", `gdb.Find(&v)`, 0},
}
}
// TestScanGuard_ReportsPlantedCalls proves the check fires. Without it
// a detector that matched nothing would satisfy the walk above no
// matter what the tree contained.
func TestScanGuard_ReportsPlantedCalls(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range scanGuardCases() {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fset := token.NewFileSet()
src := fmt.Sprintf(
"package p\n\nfunc f() {\n\t%s\n}\n", tc.body,
)
file, err := parser.ParseFile(
fset, tc.name+".go", src, 0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, unguardedScans(fset, file), tc.want)
})
}
}

185
internal/gormlog/values_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
package gormlog_test
import (
"bytes"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// secretValue is bound as a parameter by every case below. Nothing
// else in this package writes it, so finding it in captured output
// means a bound value was rendered into the log.
const secretValue = "QQBOUNDVALUEMARKERQQ"
// The three messages Trace emits under, one per arm.
//
// routineLine is a substring of slowLine, so a case that wants the
// routine arm has to rule the slow one out as well rather than rely on
// Contains alone.
const (
routineLine = "sql statement"
slowLine = "slow sql statement"
errorLine = "sql statement failed"
)
// boundValueCase is one arm of Trace, driven by a statement that binds
// secretValue.
type boundValueCase struct {
name string
slow time.Duration
want string
drive func(t *testing.T, gdb *gorm.DB)
}
// insertSecret returns a driver that inserts one row whose Name is the
// secret.
func insertSecret(id string) func(*testing.T, *gorm.DB) {
return func(t *testing.T, gdb *gorm.DB) {
t.Helper()
require.NoError(t, gdb.Create(&thing{
ID: id, Name: secretValue,
}).Error)
}
}
// insertSecretTwice drives the error arm: the same primary key a
// second time is a UNIQUE constraint failure, which is an error GORM
// logs with the statement.
func insertSecretTwice(t *testing.T, gdb *gorm.DB) {
t.Helper()
require.NoError(t, gdb.Create(&thing{
ID: secretValue, Name: secretValue,
}).Error)
require.Error(t, gdb.Create(&thing{
ID: secretValue, Name: "other",
}).Error)
}
// selectSecret drives a query whose WHERE clause binds the secret,
// covering the read side as well as the write side.
func selectSecret(t *testing.T, gdb *gorm.DB) {
t.Helper()
var got []thing
require.NoError(
t, gdb.Where("name = ?", secretValue).Find(&got).Error,
)
}
func boundValueCases() []boundValueCase {
return []boundValueCase{
{
name: "routine", slow: neverSlow,
want: routineLine, drive: insertSecret("routine"),
},
{
name: "slow", slow: alwaysSlow,
want: slowLine, drive: insertSecret("slow"),
},
{
name: "error", slow: neverSlow,
want: errorLine, drive: insertSecretTwice,
},
{
name: "select", slow: neverSlow,
want: routineLine, drive: selectSecret,
},
}
}
// TestBoundValues_NeverReachTheLog states the values-off property
// directly, on each arm of Trace that emits.
//
// Truncation is not what is being asserted. A bounded secret is still
// a secret: the session key is 44 base64 characters and an Argon2id
// hash under 100, so both fit inside every budget this package
// applies. What keeps them out is that the adapter logs the
// statement's shape and discards its parameters — see
// (*Logger).ParamsFilter — and that has to hold at DEBUG as much as on
// an error, because DEBUG is the level at which a successful INSERT is
// written at all.
//
// Each case also requires a placeholder in the logged statement.
// Without that, the absence of the value would be satisfied by a
// logger that wrote nothing useful.
func TestBoundValues_NeverReachTheLog(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range boundValueCases() {
for _, h := range handlers() {
t.Run(tc.name+"/"+h.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var buf bytes.Buffer
gdb := openDB(t, &buf, h.make(&buf), tc.slow)
tc.drive(t, gdb)
assertNoBoundValue(t, buf.String(), tc.want)
})
}
}
}
// assertNoBoundValue holds one captured arm to the property: it wrote
// the line it was supposed to write, that line kept its placeholders,
// and it carried no bound value.
func assertNoBoundValue(t *testing.T, out, want string) {
t.Helper()
require.Contains(
t, out, want,
"the arm under test wrote nothing, so the assertions "+
"below are vacuous",
)
assert.NotContains(
t, out, secretValue,
"a bound parameter was rendered into the log",
)
assert.Contains(
t, out, "?",
"the statement was logged without its placeholders",
)
}
// TestInsert_KeepsOnePlaceholderPerBoundValue pins the shape of the
// INSERT specifically, since that is the statement that carries both
// first-boot secrets. A statement that dropped one value and kept the
// other would satisfy the assertions above.
func TestInsert_KeepsOnePlaceholderPerBoundValue(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var buf bytes.Buffer
gdb := openDB(t, &buf, handlers()[0].make(&buf), neverSlow)
require.NoError(t, gdb.Create(&thing{
ID: "m", Name: secretValue,
}).Error)
out := buf.String()
require.Contains(t, out, "INSERT INTO")
assert.NotContains(t, out, secretValue)
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(out, "\n") {
if !strings.Contains(line, "INSERT INTO") {
continue
}
assert.GreaterOrEqual(
t, strings.Count(line, "?"), 2,
"insert logged fewer placeholders than it bound "+
"values: %s", line,
)
}
}

124
internal/handlers/auth.go
View File

@@ -2,8 +2,10 @@ package handlers
import (
"net/http"
"strconv"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
)
// HandleLoginPage returns a handler for the login page (GET)
@@ -19,7 +21,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginPage() http.HandlerFunc {
// Render login page
data := map[string]any{
"Error": "",
tmplKeyError: "",
}
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "login.html", data)
@@ -29,10 +31,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginPage() http.HandlerFunc {
// HandleLoginSubmit handles the login form submission (POST)
func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Limit request body to prevent memory exhaustion
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift)
// Parse form data
// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)
@@ -41,8 +41,10 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
username := r.FormValue("username")
password := r.FormValue("password")
// PostFormValue, not FormValue: the credential must come
// from the body, never from the query string.
username := r.PostFormValue("username")
password := r.PostFormValue("password")
// Validate input
if username == "" || password == "" {
@@ -69,7 +71,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleLoginSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
h.log.Info(
"user logged in",
"username", username,
"username", logfield.Truncate(
username, logfield.MaxBytes,
),
"user_id", user.ID,
)
@@ -86,7 +90,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) renderLoginError(
status int,
) {
data := map[string]any{
"Error": msg,
tmplKeyError: msg,
}
w.WriteHeader(status)
@@ -95,6 +99,16 @@ func (h *Handlers) renderLoginError(
// authenticateUser looks up and verifies a user's credentials.
// On failure it writes an HTTP response and returns an error.
//
// The credential check runs BEFORE any rate-limit budget is
// consulted, and only a failed check spends budget. That is what
// keeps the single administrative path reachable: behind the reverse
// proxy this deployment requires, with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset, every
// client shares one bucket, so a limiter spent on arrival lets any
// stranger deny the operator's own correct password indefinitely.
//
// Verifying first means every login POST costs an Argon2id hash, so
// the work is taken under a bounded number of verification slots.
func (h *Handlers) authenticateUser(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
@@ -102,16 +116,49 @@ func (h *Handlers) authenticateUser(
) (database.User, error) {
var user database.User
release, ok := h.mw.BeginPasswordVerification(r.Context())
if !ok {
h.log.Warn(
"password verification capacity exhausted",
"path", logfield.Truncate(
r.URL.Path, logfield.MaxBytes,
),
)
h.renderLoginError(
w, r,
"The server is busy verifying credentials. "+
"Please try again.",
http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
)
return user, errVerificationBusy
}
defer release()
err := h.db.DB().Where(
"username = ?", username,
).First(&user).Error
if err != nil {
h.log.Debug("user not found", "username", username)
h.renderLoginError(
w, r,
"Invalid username or password",
http.StatusUnauthorized,
// A username that does not exist is charged the same work
// as one that does. Skipping the hash here would answer in
// microseconds where a real account takes tens of
// milliseconds, handing every client a username oracle.
h.dummyVerifications.Add(1)
database.VerifyDummyPassword(password)
// Login is unauthenticated, and the submitted username is
// a form field the client fills to any length the 1 MB
// body cap allows. On this branch it matched no row, so
// nothing else bounds it. The rate limiter caps how often
// the line is written, not how wide it is.
h.log.Debug(
"user not found",
"username", logfield.Truncate(
username, logfield.MaxBytes,
),
)
h.rejectLogin(w, r, username)
return user, err
}
@@ -128,17 +175,60 @@ func (h *Handlers) authenticateUser(
}
if !valid {
h.log.Debug("invalid password", "username", username)
// Reached only once the username matched a stored row, so
// it is bounded by the operator's own data. Capped anyway,
// so that every username this unauthenticated endpoint
// logs is capped and no reader has to work out which
// branch narrowed it.
h.log.Debug(
"invalid password",
"username", logfield.Truncate(
username, logfield.MaxBytes,
),
)
h.rejectLogin(w, r, username)
return user, errInvalidPassword
}
// The password was correct, so forgive whatever failures this
// client accumulated: an operator who mistypes a few times and
// then gets it right must not stay throttled afterwards.
h.mw.ForgiveLoginFailures(r, username)
return user, nil
}
// rejectLogin counts one failed credential verification and answers
// it: 401 while this client still has failure budget against the
// submitted username, 429 with a Retry-After once it is spent.
//
// The 429 throttles wrong passwords only. A correct one never
// reaches here, so no amount of failure — from this client or any
// other sharing its bucket — can keep the operator out.
func (h *Handlers) rejectLogin(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
username string,
) {
if !h.mw.RecordLoginFailure(r, username) {
h.renderLoginError(
w, r,
"Invalid username or password",
http.StatusUnauthorized,
)
return user, errInvalidPassword
return
}
return user, nil
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", strconv.Itoa(int(
h.mw.LoginFailureInterval().Seconds(),
)))
h.renderLoginError(
w, r,
"Too many failed login attempts. Please try again later.",
http.StatusTooManyRequests,
)
}
// createAuthenticatedSession regenerates the session and stores

455
internal/handlers/auth_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
const (
// operatorUser and operatorPassword are the single admin account
// these tests defend.
operatorUser = "admin"
operatorPassword = "correct horse battery staple"
// sharedProxyPeer is the whole point of this file. Production is
// required to run behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy, and
// TRUSTED_PROXIES defaults to empty, so every client — attacker
// and operator alike — reaches the process from the proxy's
// address and shares one rate-limit bucket. Both parties in
// these tests therefore use the same RemoteAddr.
sharedProxyPeer = "10.0.0.1:44444"
// loginFailureLimit is the failure budget one client has against
// one submitted username. Restated here rather than imported
// from the middleware package, so that changing the production
// limit fails these tests instead of silently moving with them.
loginFailureLimit = 5
)
// seedOperator gives the bootstrapped admin account a password these
// tests know. The account itself is created at startup with a random
// password, which is exactly why its username is predictable to an
// attacker and why keying failures by username alone does not fix
// this issue.
func seedOperator(t *testing.T, db *database.Database) {
t.Helper()
hash, err := database.HashPassword(operatorPassword)
require.NoError(t, err)
result := db.DB().Model(&database.User{}).
Where("username = ?", operatorUser).
Update("password", hash)
require.NoError(t, result.Error)
require.EqualValues(
t, 1, result.RowsAffected,
"the bootstrap admin account must exist",
)
}
// loginPost builds a login form POST arriving from peer.
func loginPost(peer, username, password string) *http.Request {
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("username", username)
form.Set("password", password)
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"/pages/login",
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
)
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
)
req.RemoteAddr = peer
return req
}
// submitLogin drives one login POST through the handler.
func submitLogin(
h *handlers.Handlers, peer, username, password string,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleLoginSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, loginPost(
peer, username, password,
))
return w
}
// floodFailures sends attempts wrong-password logins for username
// from peer, which is what an attacker does.
func floodFailures(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
peer, username string,
attempts int,
) {
t.Helper()
for i := range attempts {
w := submitLogin(h, peer, username, fmt.Sprintf("guess-%d", i))
require.NotEqual(
t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code,
"attempt %d must not authenticate", i,
)
}
}
// TestLogin_StrangersFloodCannotLockOutTheOperator is the
// done-criterion of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/150.
//
// The attacker and the operator share one rate-limit bucket, because
// behind the mandated reverse proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES unset every
// client keys on the proxy's address. The attacker floods the
// operator's own username — a single-admin product has a predictable
// one — far past the failure limit. The operator must still be able
// to log in with the correct password.
//
// This fails if credentials stop being verified ahead of the limiter.
func TestLogin_StrangersFloodCannotLockOutTheOperator(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
seedOperator(t, db)
// Well past the limit, and from the same bucket the operator
// will arrive in.
floodFailures(
t, h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser,
loginFailureLimit*2,
)
w := submitLogin(
h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, operatorPassword,
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code,
"a correct password must never be throttled: the operator "+
"has no second administrative path",
)
assert.Equal(t, "/", w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// TestLogin_StrangersFloodCannotDenyAnotherAccount is the
// cross-account half: flooding one username must not spend another
// account's budget, even from the same shared bucket.
func TestLogin_StrangersFloodCannotDenyAnotherAccount(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
seedOperator(t, db)
floodFailures(
t, h, sharedProxyPeer, "someone-else",
loginFailureLimit*2,
)
w := submitLogin(h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, "wrong")
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusUnauthorized, w.Code,
"a flood against one username must not spend another "+
"account's failure budget",
)
}
// TestLogin_RepeatedWrongPasswordsAreThrottled is the brute-force
// half. Verifying before counting must not remove the throttle:
// repeated wrong passwords for one username from one client key run
// out of budget and are answered 429 with a Retry-After.
func TestLogin_RepeatedWrongPasswordsAreThrottled(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
seedOperator(t, db)
for i := range loginFailureLimit - 1 {
w := submitLogin(
h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser,
fmt.Sprintf("guess-%d", i),
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusUnauthorized, w.Code,
"attempt %d is still inside the budget", i,
)
}
w := submitLogin(h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, "guess-last")
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
"wrong passwords must still run out of budget",
)
assert.NotEmpty(
t, w.Header().Get("Retry-After"),
"a throttled login must say when to come back",
)
}
// TestLogin_SuccessForgivesEarlierMistakes covers the operator who
// mistypes several times and then gets it right: the successful
// attempt clears the counter, so the next mistake is answered 401
// rather than 429.
func TestLogin_SuccessForgivesEarlierMistakes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
seedOperator(t, db)
floodFailures(
t, h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser,
loginFailureLimit,
)
require.Equal(
t, http.StatusSeeOther,
submitLogin(
h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, operatorPassword,
).Code,
)
w := submitLogin(h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, "typo")
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusUnauthorized, w.Code,
"a success must forgive the failures before it",
)
}
// TestLogin_UnknownUsernameCostsTheSameVerification is the
// username-enumeration guard. Verifying credentials before the
// limiter means response time is observable per attempt, so an
// unknown username must be charged an equivalent-cost verification
// against a dummy hash rather than returning early.
//
// The assertion is on the code path, not on wall-clock time: timing
// assertions are flaky, and what actually has to hold is that the
// hash is computed.
func TestLogin_UnknownUsernameCostsTheSameVerification(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
seedOperator(t, db)
require.Zero(t, h.DummyVerificationsForTest())
// A username that exists, with the wrong password: a real
// Argon2id verification runs, and no dummy is needed.
require.Equal(
t, http.StatusUnauthorized,
submitLogin(h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, "wrong").Code,
)
assert.Zero(
t, h.DummyVerificationsForTest(),
"a known username verifies against its own hash",
)
// A username that does not exist: indistinguishable response,
// and the equivalent-cost verification must have run.
require.Equal(
t, http.StatusUnauthorized,
submitLogin(h, sharedProxyPeer, "nosuchuser", "wrong").Code,
)
assert.Equal(
t, uint64(1), h.DummyVerificationsForTest(),
"an unknown username must still pay for a hash, or the "+
"response time says whether the account exists",
)
}
// TestLogin_ConcurrentLoginsAreAllAnswered covers the login path
// under the verification bound. The bound itself is pinned in the
// middleware package; what matters here is that funnelling every
// login through two slots does not lose or wedge a request — each one
// is answered, whether it got a slot or was shed with 503.
func TestLogin_ConcurrentLoginsAreAllAnswered(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const workers = 4
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
seedOperator(t, db)
var (
wg sync.WaitGroup
mu sync.Mutex
answers = map[int]int{}
)
for i := range workers {
wg.Go(func() {
w := submitLogin(
h, fmt.Sprintf("203.0.113.%d:5000", i),
operatorUser, fmt.Sprintf("guess-%d", i),
)
mu.Lock()
answers[w.Code]++
mu.Unlock()
})
}
wg.Wait()
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
assert.Zero(
t, answers[http.StatusInternalServerError],
"concurrent logins must not error",
)
assert.Equal(
t, workers,
answers[http.StatusUnauthorized]+
answers[http.StatusTooManyRequests]+
answers[http.StatusServiceUnavailable],
"every concurrent login must be answered, whether it got "+
"a verification slot or was shed with 503",
)
}
// TestLogin_MissingCredentialsRejectedBeforeAnyHash pins that the
// empty-field check still runs ahead of the verification slot, so a
// client sending nothing cannot occupy one.
func TestLogin_MissingCredentialsRejectedBeforeAnyHash(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
seedOperator(t, db)
w := submitLogin(h, sharedProxyPeer, "", "")
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
assert.Zero(
t, h.DummyVerificationsForTest(),
"an empty submission must not cost a hash",
)
}
// TestLogin_SuccessCreatesSession is the control for the tests above:
// the success path they assert on really does authenticate.
func TestLogin_SuccessCreatesSession(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
sess *session.Session
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &db, &sess)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
seedOperator(t, db)
w := submitLogin(
h, sharedProxyPeer, operatorUser, operatorPassword,
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
require.NotEmpty(
t, w.Result().Cookies(), "a session cookie must be issued",
)
next := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil,
)
// Login regenerates the session, so the response carries two
// Set-Cookie headers under the same name: one expiring the
// pre-login cookie and one issuing the new one. A browser keeps
// only the second, so replay only the one that is not an
// expiry.
for _, c := range w.Result().Cookies() {
if c.MaxAge >= 0 {
next.AddCookie(c)
}
}
s, err := sess.Get(next)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(
t, sess.IsAuthenticated(s),
"the issued cookie must carry an authenticated session",
)
}

199
internal/handlers/event_body.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
package handlers
import (
"database/sql"
"errors"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// eventBodyQuery reads one event's stored body as bytes. The cast
// to blob is what makes the driver hand back the stored bytes
// rather than a string conversion, so Content-Length taken from
// the result matches what goes on the wire. The soft-delete
// predicate is spelled out because Raw bypasses GORM's default
// scope, and it is what stops a reaped event still being
// downloadable.
const eventBodyQuery = "SELECT cast(body as blob) " +
"FROM events WHERE id = ? AND webhook_id = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL"
// HandleEventBodyDownload serves one event's stored body in
// full, which the event log page cannot: it caps each rendered
// body at maxRenderedBodyBytes.
//
// The bytes are attacker-supplied — anyone who can reach the
// public receiver chooses them — and this route hands them back
// inside the operator's own authenticated origin, so the
// response is deliberately not renderable. Content-Disposition
// makes the browser download rather than display it, and the
// octet-stream type plus nosniff stop it being interpreted as
// HTML or script. Without those a stored payload would execute
// as the logged-in operator. The application's CSP does not
// help here: script-src allows 'unsafe-inline' from 'self', so
// a document served from this origin could run its own inline
// script.
func (h *Handlers) HandleEventBodyDownload() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
webhook, ok := h.ownedWebhook(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
// Parsing the id before use serves two purposes: a
// malformed id can never reach the SQL or the response
// header, and the canonical form below is drawn from
// uuid's own fixed alphabet rather than from the
// request, so the Content-Disposition value cannot be
// steered by a client.
eventID, err := uuid.Parse(chi.URLParam(r, "eventID"))
if err != nil {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
h.serveEventBody(w, r, webhook, eventID.String())
}
}
// serveEventBody writes the named event's stored body to w.
//
// The event must belong to webhook, which is what keeps this
// route from reading any event in the system by id alone. Two
// things enforce that and they are not equally strong. The
// operative one is that events live in a per-webhook SQLite
// file, so a sibling webhook's event is not in the database
// being queried at all. The webhook_id predicate on the query
// below is the second guard, and it is currently redundant
// against that isolation; it is there so the scoping survives
// any future change that puts more than one webhook's events in
// one file.
//
// The body is read in one query and held whole in memory while
// it is written. That costs roughly two body-sized allocations
// per concurrent download, not one: the driver's column buffer
// and the copy database/sql makes in convertAssign when a
// []byte column is scanned into a *[]byte are live at the same
// time. Measured allocation is ~2x the body plus ~45 KB, so at
// the 1 MB ingest cap a download costs ~2 MB of Go heap. On
// top of that, SQLite's own materialisation of the column
// value sits in the driver's allocator outside the Go heap, so
// process peak is higher again: 2x is a floor, not a ceiling.
// There is no cheaper bound available — database/sql exposes
// no incremental handle on a SQLite BLOB, and reading byte
// ranges with substr does not avoid the cost either, because
// SQLite materialises the whole column value to evaluate each
// substr call. Range reads only pay for that materialisation
// once per range.
//
// One consequence is worth keeping in view: the read finishes
// before the client is written to, so no read lock is held for
// the length of a slow download. These per-webhook databases
// run in SQLite's default journal mode rather than WAL, so a
// lock held that long would block the receiver from recording
// new events.
func (h *Handlers) serveEventBody(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
webhook database.Webhook,
eventID string,
) {
if !h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhook.ID) {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
webhookDB, err := h.dbMgr.GetDB(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to get webhook database", err)
return
}
body, found, err := eventBody(webhookDB, webhook.ID, eventID)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to read event body", err)
return
}
// A miss is a 404 whether the event belongs to another
// webhook or does not exist at all, so the response does
// not report which. Reading the body before any header is
// written is also what keeps an event reaped mid-request
// from producing a torn response: either the read finds the
// row and the whole body is served, or it does not and the
// response is a clean 404.
if !found {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
setEventBodyHeaders(w, eventID, int64(len(body)))
_, err = w.Write(body)
if err != nil {
// The status and Content-Length are already committed,
// so the client sees a short download. There is no way
// to report a 500 from here; the log is the record.
h.log.Error(
"failed to write event body",
"webhook_id", webhook.ID,
"event_id", eventID,
"error", err,
)
}
}
// eventBody returns an event's stored body and whether the event
// exists within the webhook.
func eventBody(
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
webhookID, eventID string,
) ([]byte, bool, error) {
var body []byte
err := webhookDB.Raw(
eventBodyQuery, eventID, webhookID,
).Row().Scan(&body)
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return nil, false, nil
}
if err != nil {
return nil, false, err
}
return body, true, nil
}
// setEventBodyHeaders applies the response headers that make
// this route safe to hand attacker-supplied bytes through. See
// HandleEventBodyDownload for why they are a security control
// and not a formatting choice.
//
// nosniff is also set by the global SecurityHeaders middleware.
// It is repeated here so the guarantee belongs to the route
// that needs it rather than to a middleware someone could
// reorder or scope away.
func setEventBodyHeaders(
w http.ResponseWriter,
eventID string,
size int64,
) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
w.Header().Set(
"Content-Disposition",
`attachment; filename="webhooker-event-`+eventID+`.bin"`,
)
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.FormatInt(size, 10))
}

506
internal/handlers/event_body_test.go Normal file
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package handlers_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// paramEventID is the chi URL parameter the body download
// handler reads.
const paramEventID = "eventID"
// otherTestUserID owns webhooks the session user must not be
// able to read.
const otherTestUserID = "other-user-id"
// seedWebhookFor inserts a webhook owned by the given user.
func seedWebhookFor(
t *testing.T,
db *database.Database,
userID string,
) *database.Webhook {
t.Helper()
wh := &database.Webhook{
UserID: userID,
Name: "wh-" + userID,
}
require.NoError(
t,
db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
)
return wh
}
// fetchEventBody runs the real download handler as the test user
// for the given source and event ids.
func fetchEventBody(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sess *session.Session,
sourceID, eventID string,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
// The path is escaped and the raw id goes in the route
// context, which is what chi hands a handler: the param is
// already percent-decoded by the time it is read.
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet,
"/source/"+url.PathEscape(sourceID)+
"/logs/"+url.PathEscape(eventID)+"/body",
nil,
)
for _, c := range authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
) {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
rctx.URLParams.Add(paramSourceID, sourceID)
rctx.URLParams.Add(paramEventID, eventID)
req = req.WithContext(
context.WithValue(
req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx,
),
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleEventBodyDownload().ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
}
// TestHandleEventBodyDownload_ServesOversizeBodyInFull is the
// capability the render cap took away: a body far above what the
// event log page will show comes back whole and byte-identical,
// with the headers that keep it from being rendered.
func TestHandleEventBodyDownload_ServesOversizeBodyInFull(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
// Far above the render cap, with multibyte runes and a
// distinctive tail, so a body that the log page can only
// show a slice of comes back whole and in order.
const sentinel = "TAIL-SENTINEL-1f4a9c"
stored := strings.Repeat("A", 200*1024) +
strings.Repeat(snowman, 1000) + sentinel
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
evt := seedEventWithBody(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, stored)
w := fetchEventBody(t, h, sess, wh.ID, evt.ID)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
assert.Greater(t, len(stored), bodyCap)
assert.Equal(t, stored, w.Body.String())
assert.Equal(
t, strconv.Itoa(len(stored)),
w.Header().Get("Content-Length"),
)
}
// TestHandleEventBodyDownload_BodiesRoundTripByteIdentical
// covers the sizes and byte values a stored body can actually
// take: empty, one byte, either side of the render cap, and
// bytes that are not text at all. Content-Length has to equal
// the bytes written in every case, since it is derived from the
// same read that produces them.
func TestHandleEventBodyDownload_BodiesRoundTripByteIdentical(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
// A NUL, invalid UTF-8 and a multibyte rune, so nothing on
// the path can be treating the body as text.
binary := "\x00\x01\xff\xfe" + snowman + "\x00tail"
cases := map[string]string{
"empty": "",
"single byte": "x",
"one below cap": strings.Repeat("b", bodyCap-1),
"exactly cap": strings.Repeat("c", bodyCap),
"one above cap": strings.Repeat("d", bodyCap+1),
"binary": binary,
}
for name, stored := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
evt := seedEventWithBody(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, stored)
w := fetchEventBody(t, h, sess, wh.ID, evt.ID)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, stored, w.Body.String())
assert.Equal(
t, strconv.Itoa(len(stored)),
w.Header().Get("Content-Length"),
)
assert.Equal(
t, len(stored), w.Body.Len(),
"Content-Length must equal bytes written",
)
})
}
}
// TestHandleEventBodyDownload_HeadersAreNotRenderable pins the
// response headers that stop attacker-supplied bytes executing
// in the operator's own origin. They are a security control, not
// presentation.
func TestHandleEventBodyDownload_HeadersAreNotRenderable(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
evt := seedEventWithBody(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, `{"small":true}`)
w := fetchEventBody(t, h, sess, wh.ID, evt.ID)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, "application/octet-stream",
w.Header().Get("Content-Type"),
)
assert.Equal(
t, "nosniff",
w.Header().Get("X-Content-Type-Options"),
)
disposition := w.Header().Get("Content-Disposition")
assert.Equal(
t,
`attachment; filename="webhooker-event-`+evt.ID+`.bin"`,
disposition,
)
}
// TestHandleEventBodyDownload_ScriptBodyStaysInert proves a
// stored HTML payload is handed back as an attachment of opaque
// bytes rather than as anything a browser will execute. The
// bytes themselves are unaltered: this route reports what was
// delivered.
func TestHandleEventBodyDownload_ScriptBodyStaysInert(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
const payload = `<html><script>alert(document.cookie)` +
`</script></html>`
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
evt := seedEventWithBody(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, payload)
w := fetchEventBody(t, h, sess, wh.ID, evt.ID)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, payload, w.Body.String())
contentType := w.Header().Get("Content-Type")
assert.Equal(t, "application/octet-stream", contentType)
assert.NotContains(t, contentType, "html")
assert.NotContains(t, contentType, "xml")
assert.NotContains(t, contentType, "javascript")
assert.Contains(
t, w.Header().Get("Content-Disposition"), "attachment",
)
assert.Equal(
t, "nosniff",
w.Header().Get("X-Content-Type-Options"),
)
}
// TestHandleEventBodyDownload_OtherUsersEvent404s is the
// authorization test the definition of done asks for: an event
// stored under a webhook the session user does not own is not
// readable, and the miss does not distinguish itself from a
// nonexistent one.
func TestHandleEventBodyDownload_OtherUsersEvent404s(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
const theirPayload = "OTHER-USERS-PAYLOAD-8b1d"
theirs := seedWebhookFor(t, db, otherTestUserID)
evt := seedEventWithBody(t, dbMgr, theirs.ID, theirPayload)
w := fetchEventBody(t, h, sess, theirs.ID, evt.ID)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code)
assert.NotContains(t, w.Body.String(), theirPayload)
}
// TestHandleEventBodyDownload_EventOfAnotherWebhook404s pins
// that holding a valid event id is not enough: the event has to
// belong to the webhook in the path. Both webhooks here are the
// session user's and both have event databases, so the
// ownership check cannot be what produces the 404.
//
// What does produce it is the per-webhook database file rather
// than the webhook_id predicate on the query — removing that
// predicate leaves this test green, because the sibling's event
// is in a different file. The test is kept as the behavioural
// guard the route owes; see serveEventBody for which mechanism
// is load-bearing.
func TestHandleEventBodyDownload_EventOfAnotherWebhook404s(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
const other = "BELONGS-TO-THE-OTHER-WEBHOOK-3c7e"
mine := seedWebhook(t, db)
seedEventWithBody(t, dbMgr, mine.ID, `{"mine":true}`)
sibling := seedWebhook(t, db)
evt := seedEventWithBody(t, dbMgr, sibling.ID, other)
w := fetchEventBody(t, h, sess, mine.ID, evt.ID)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code)
assert.NotContains(t, w.Body.String(), other)
}
// TestHandleEventBodyDownload_UnknownEvent404s covers the plain
// miss, including an id that is not a uuid at all and so never
// reaches the query or the response header.
func TestHandleEventBodyDownload_UnknownEvent404s(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
seedEventWithBody(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, `{"mine":true}`)
for _, id := range []string{
uuid.New().String(),
`../../etc/passwd`,
"not-a-uuid",
`x"; rm -rf /`,
} {
w := fetchEventBody(t, h, sess, wh.ID, id)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code,
"event id %q", id,
)
assert.Empty(
t, w.Header().Get("Content-Disposition"),
"event id %q must not reach a header", id,
)
}
}
// TestHandleEventBodyDownload_ReapedEvent404s pins what happens
// when the retention reaper takes an event out from under this
// route. The body is read in one query before any header is
// written, so a reaped event cannot produce a partial download:
// it is a clean 404 with no Content-Length and no
// Content-Disposition. Both removals the codebase performs are
// covered — the reaper hard-deletes, and a soft-deleted row is
// excluded by the query's own deleted_at predicate rather than
// by GORM's default scope, which Raw bypasses.
func TestHandleEventBodyDownload_ReapedEvent404s(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for name, hard := range map[string]bool{
"soft deleted": false,
"hard deleted": true,
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
const payload = "REAPED-PAYLOAD-4d2a"
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
evt := seedEventWithBody(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, payload)
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(wh.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
del := webhookDB
if hard {
del = del.Unscoped()
}
require.NoError(
t,
del.Delete(&database.Event{}, "id = ?", evt.ID).
Error,
)
w := fetchEventBody(t, h, sess, wh.ID, evt.ID)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code)
assert.NotContains(t, w.Body.String(), payload)
assert.Empty(t, w.Header().Get("Content-Length"))
assert.Empty(
t, w.Header().Get("Content-Disposition"),
)
})
}
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_TruncationMarkerLinksToDownload proves
// the page tells the reader where the rest of the body is, and
// only when there is a rest to fetch.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_TruncationMarkerLinksToDownload(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
big := seedWebhook(t, db)
bigEvt := seedEventWithBody(
t, dbMgr, big.ID, strings.Repeat("A", 4*bodyCap),
)
page := renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, big.ID)
assert.Contains(
t, page,
"/source/"+big.ID+"/logs/"+bigEvt.ID+"/body",
)
small := seedWebhook(t, db)
smallEvt := seedEventWithBody(
t, dbMgr, small.ID, `{"kept":"whole"}`,
)
page = renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, small.ID)
assert.NotContains(
t, page,
"/source/"+small.ID+"/logs/"+smallEvt.ID+"/body",
)
}

120
internal/handlers/event_log_view.go Normal file
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package handlers
import (
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
)
// maxRenderedBodyBytes caps how many bytes of a stored event
// body reach the event log page. Bodies come from the
// unauthenticated receiver under the 1 MB ingest cap and
// renderTemplate buffers a whole page before writing it, so
// an uncapped page of paginationPerPage events is tens of
// megabytes of resident memory per concurrent viewer.
const maxRenderedBodyBytes = 8192
// eventLogColumns is the event log's projection. The casts to
// blob are load-bearing: they make substr and length count
// bytes rather than characters, so the cap bounds the page in
// bytes whatever the payload's encoding. Cutting in SQLite
// rather than in Go is the point of the projection — an
// oversized body never becomes a Go string at all.
const eventLogColumns = "id, created_at, method, content_type, " +
"substr(cast(body as blob), 1, ?) AS body, " +
"length(cast(body as blob)) AS body_bytes"
// EventLogView is the display-safe projection of an event for
// the event log page, alongside DeliveryView and TargetView.
// It carries a capped body plus the true stored size, so the
// page can mark a body as truncated without ever holding the
// whole thing.
type EventLogView struct {
ID string
CreatedAt time.Time
Method string
ContentType string
// Body holds at most maxRenderedBodyBytes bytes of the
// stored body.
Body string
// BodyBytes is the true size of the stored body.
BodyBytes int64
// BodyTruncated reports that the stored body was larger
// than the cap, so the page owes the reader a marker.
BodyTruncated bool
Deliveries []DeliveryView
}
// BodyShownBytes is how many body bytes the page is actually
// rendering, which the truncation marker reports beside the
// true size.
func (v EventLogView) BodyShownBytes() int {
return len(v.Body)
}
// eventLogRow is one row of the event log projection. Its
// body column arrives already cut to the cap by SQLite, with
// the true size beside it.
type eventLogRow struct {
ID string
CreatedAt time.Time
Method string
ContentType string
Body []byte
BodyBytes int64
}
// view projects a loaded row for rendering.
func (r *eventLogRow) view() EventLogView {
body := r.Body
truncated := r.BodyBytes > int64(len(body))
// Only a cut body can have been left mid-sequence by
// this query. A whole body is passed through exactly as
// stored, however malformed.
if truncated {
body = trimPartialRune(body)
}
return EventLogView{
ID: r.ID,
CreatedAt: r.CreatedAt,
Method: r.Method,
ContentType: r.ContentType,
Body: string(body),
BodyBytes: r.BodyBytes,
BodyTruncated: truncated,
}
}
// trimPartialRune drops a trailing UTF-8 sequence that the
// byte-wise cut left incomplete, so a multi-byte rune severed
// at the cap does not surface as a mojibake tail.
//
// Bytes that are merely invalid UTF-8 are left exactly as
// stored: this service receives binary payloads, and rewriting
// them would misreport what was delivered. The distinction is
// utf8.FullRune's — it reports a complete sequence for an
// invalid encoding too, since that decodes to a width-1 error
// rune, so only a valid prefix still waiting for its
// continuation bytes is removed. A tail with no rune start in
// its last utf8.UTFMax bytes cannot be an incomplete sequence
// either, and is likewise left alone.
func trimPartialRune(b []byte) []byte {
for i := len(b) - 1; i >= 0 && len(b)-i <= utf8.UTFMax; i-- {
if !utf8.RuneStart(b[i]) {
continue
}
if utf8.FullRune(b[i:]) {
return b
}
return b[:i]
}
return b
}

261
internal/handlers/event_log_view_test.go Normal file
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package handlers_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// bodyCap is the number of body bytes the event log page is
// allowed to render for one event.
const bodyCap = handlers.MaxRenderedBodyBytesForTest
// snowman is a three-byte rune, so a body of them straddles the
// byte-wise cut: bodyCap is not a multiple of three.
const snowman = "☃"
// seedEventWithBody records one event with the given body in the
// webhook's own database and returns it, so a caller that needs
// the generated event id can have it.
func seedEventWithBody(
t *testing.T,
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager,
webhookID string,
body string,
) *database.Event {
t.Helper()
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
event := &database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
Method: http.MethodPost,
Body: body,
ContentType: "application/octet-stream",
}
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(event).Error)
return event
}
// seedAndProject stores one body and returns the projection the
// event log page would be handed for it.
func seedAndProject(
t *testing.T,
body string,
) handlers.EventLogView {
t.Helper()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
seedEventWithBody(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, body)
views := h.LoadEventLogViewsForTest(
httptest.NewRecorder(), *wh, 1,
)
require.Len(t, views, 1)
return views[0]
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_BoundsOversizeBody proves the rendered
// page is bounded by the cap rather than by the stored payload:
// the body here is 64 times the cap, and the ingest path would
// accept twice as much again.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_BoundsOversizeBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
const (
sentinel = "TAIL-SENTINEL-1f4a9c"
storedBytes = 512 * 1024
)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
seedEventWithBody(
t, dbMgr, wh.ID,
strings.Repeat("A", storedBytes-len(sentinel))+sentinel,
)
page := renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
// Nothing past the cap reaches the page, and the whole page
// stays far below the stored body it is reporting on.
assert.NotContains(t, page, sentinel)
assert.Less(t, len(page), 4*bodyCap)
// The marker states the true stored size, not the cut one.
assert.Contains(
t, page,
"showing "+strconv.Itoa(bodyCap)+
" of "+strconv.Itoa(storedBytes)+" bytes",
)
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_SmallBodyRendersWhole guards the other
// side of the cap: a body under it is shown in full and carries
// no truncation marker.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_SmallBodyRendersWhole(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
seedEventWithBody(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, `{"kept":"whole"}`)
page := renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
assert.Contains(t, page, "&#34;kept&#34;")
assert.NotContains(t, page, "Body truncated for display")
}
// TestEventLogView_CutMidRune proves a multi-byte rune severed
// by the byte-wise cut is dropped rather than surfaced as a
// mojibake tail.
func TestEventLogView_CutMidRune(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := strings.Repeat(snowman, 4096)
view := seedAndProject(t, body)
// bodyCap bytes hold bodyCap/3 whole snowmen and two bytes
// of the next one; those two are dropped.
whole := bodyCap / len(snowman)
assert.True(t, view.BodyTruncated)
assert.Equal(t, int64(len(body)), view.BodyBytes)
assert.Equal(t, strings.Repeat(snowman, whole), view.Body)
assert.True(t, utf8.ValidString(view.Body))
assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(view.Body), bodyCap)
}
// TestEventLogView_BinaryBodyLeftAsStored proves a binary
// payload is passed through byte for byte. Its tail is invalid
// UTF-8 however the cut falls, so repairing it would misreport
// what the sender delivered.
func TestEventLogView_BinaryBodyLeftAsStored(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
raw := make([]byte, bodyCap+808)
for i := range raw {
// 0x80..0xBF: continuation bytes, never a rune start.
raw[i] = 0x80 | byte(i%0x40)
}
view := seedAndProject(t, string(raw))
assert.True(t, view.BodyTruncated)
assert.Equal(t, int64(len(raw)), view.BodyBytes)
assert.Equal(t, string(raw[:bodyCap]), view.Body)
assert.False(t, utf8.ValidString(view.Body))
}
// TestTrimPartialRune covers the distinction the cut repair
// turns on: an incomplete but valid sequence is dropped, while
// bytes that are merely invalid UTF-8 are left alone.
func TestTrimPartialRune(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []struct {
name string
in []byte
want []byte
}{{
name: "complete ascii",
in: []byte("abc"),
want: []byte("abc"),
}, {
name: "complete multibyte",
in: []byte("ab" + snowman),
want: []byte("ab" + snowman),
}, {
name: "two byte rune cut",
in: []byte{'a', 0xC3},
want: []byte{'a'},
}, {
name: "three byte rune cut after one",
in: []byte{'a', 0xE2},
want: []byte{'a'},
}, {
name: "three byte rune cut after two",
in: []byte{'a', 0xE2, 0x98},
want: []byte{'a'},
}, {
name: "four byte rune cut",
in: []byte{'a', 0xF0, 0x9F, 0x92}, // U+1F4A9 cut
want: []byte{'a'},
}, {
name: "invalid start byte kept",
in: []byte{'a', 0xFF},
want: []byte{'a', 0xFF},
}, {
name: "orphan continuation bytes kept",
in: []byte{0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84},
want: []byte{0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84},
}, {
name: "truncated sequence followed by junk kept",
in: []byte{0xE2, 0x98, 0xFF},
want: []byte{0xE2, 0x98, 0xFF},
}, {
name: "empty",
in: []byte{},
want: []byte{},
}}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.Equal(
t, tc.want,
handlers.TrimPartialRuneForTest(tc.in),
)
})
}
}

87
internal/handlers/export_test.go
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,62 @@
package handlers
import "net/http"
import (
"html/template"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// SetLogForTest replaces the handler's logger, so the handlers_test
// package can assert on what a log line actually contains rather than
// on what it is meant to contain.
func (s *Handlers) SetLogForTest(log *slog.Logger) {
s.log = log
}
// MaxRenderedBodyBytesForTest exposes the event log's body cap
// to the handlers_test package.
const MaxRenderedBodyBytesForTest = maxRenderedBodyBytes
// DummyVerificationsForTest reports how many equivalent-cost
// verifications were charged for usernames that do not exist. It
// lets a test prove the anti-enumeration path ran without timing
// anything.
func (s *Handlers) DummyVerificationsForTest() uint64 {
return s.dummyVerifications.Load()
}
// TrimPartialRuneForTest exposes trimPartialRune for use in the
// handlers_test package.
func TrimPartialRuneForTest(b []byte) []byte {
return trimPartialRune(b)
}
// LoadEventLogViewsForTest exposes loadEventsWithDeliveries for
// use in the handlers_test package. Assertions on the projected
// body need the bytes as loaded: html/template rewrites invalid
// UTF-8 on the way out, so the rendered page cannot show whether
// a binary body survived the projection intact.
func (s *Handlers) LoadEventLogViewsForTest(
w http.ResponseWriter,
webhook database.Webhook,
page int,
) []EventLogView {
views, _ := s.loadEventsWithDeliveries(w, webhook, nil, page)
return views
}
// AddTemplateForTest registers a template under a page name so that
// the handlers_test package can drive the render path with a
// template of its own.
func (s *Handlers) AddTemplateForTest(
pageTemplate string,
tmpl *template.Template,
) {
s.templates[pageTemplate] = tmpl
}
// RenderTemplateForTest exposes renderTemplate for use in the
// handlers_test package.
@@ -13,8 +69,8 @@ func (s *Handlers) RenderTemplateForTest(
s.renderTemplate(w, r, pageTemplate, data)
}
// BuildSlackTargetConfigForTest exposes buildSlackTargetConfig
// for use in the handlers_test package.
// BuildSlackTargetConfigForTest exposes
// buildSlackTargetConfig for use in the handlers_test package.
func (s *Handlers) BuildSlackTargetConfigForTest(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
@@ -22,3 +78,28 @@ func (s *Handlers) BuildSlackTargetConfigForTest(
) (string, error) {
return s.buildSlackTargetConfig(w, r, targetURL)
}
// BuildHTTPTargetConfigForTest exposes buildHTTPTargetConfig
// for use in the handlers_test package, taking the form fields
// an HTTP target's configuration is built from.
func (s *Handlers) BuildHTTPTargetConfigForTest(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
targetURL, headers, timeout string,
) (string, error) {
return s.buildHTTPTargetConfig(w, r, targetFormInput{
URL: targetURL,
Headers: headers,
Timeout: timeout,
})
}
// BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest exposes
// buildDatabaseTargetConfig for use in the handlers_test
// package.
func (s *Handlers) BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest(
w http.ResponseWriter,
expiry string,
) (string, error) {
return s.buildDatabaseTargetConfig(w, expiry)
}

462
internal/handlers/gormlogbound_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"io"
"log"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
gormlogger "gorm.io/gorm/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
)
// gormBoundTailMarker sits at the far end of every client-chosen value
// this file sends. Its presence in the log means the whole value
// reached the log, so a value that merely happened to be short cannot
// pass for a truncated one.
const gormBoundTailMarker = "ENDOFCLIENTVALUE"
// gormBoundFills are the characters a client can drive through the
// receiver path segment and the login username, chosen for what a log
// handler charges for them.
//
// The bare C0 control is the one that matters: both handlers spell
// U+0001 as a six-byte escape for the one byte it costs to send, the
// widest multiplier available below U+10000 and the case a raw-byte
// budget breaks on first. GORM's default logger applies no budget at
// all, so under the mutation every one of these arrives whole.
func gormBoundFills() []struct {
name string
fill string
} {
return []struct {
name string
fill string
}{
{"plain", "x"},
{"quote", `"`},
{"backslash", `\`},
{"tab", "\t"},
{"newline", "\n"},
{"c0_control", "\x01"},
{"astral_nonprintable", "\U0001000C"},
}
}
// syncBuf collects captured output from the goroutine draining the
// pipe.
type syncBuf struct {
mu sync.Mutex
b bytes.Buffer
}
func (s *syncBuf) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return s.b.Write(p)
}
func (s *syncBuf) String() string {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return s.b.String()
}
func (s *syncBuf) reset() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.b.Reset()
}
// stdoutCapture redirects os.Stdout for the duration of a test.
//
// internal/logger builds its handler over os.Stdout at construction
// time, so redirecting the variable before the application is built
// captures everything the service logger — and therefore the GORM
// adapter, which writes through it — emits.
type stdoutCapture struct {
buf *syncBuf
r *os.File
w *os.File
orig *os.File
done chan struct{}
seq int
}
func captureStdout(t *testing.T) *stdoutCapture {
t.Helper()
r, w, err := os.Pipe()
require.NoError(t, err)
c := &stdoutCapture{
buf: &syncBuf{},
r: r,
w: w,
orig: os.Stdout,
done: make(chan struct{}),
}
os.Stdout = w
go func() {
defer close(c.done)
_, _ = io.Copy(c.buf, r)
}()
t.Cleanup(func() {
os.Stdout = c.orig
_ = w.Close()
<-c.done
_ = r.Close()
})
return c
}
// drain returns everything written since the previous drain and
// clears the buffer.
//
// A sentinel is pushed through the same pipe and waited for, so the
// draining goroutine is known to have caught up before the buffer is
// read. Without it the comparison below would race the reader rather
// than measure the writers.
func (c *stdoutCapture) drain(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
c.seq++
sentinel := "\n<<drain-" + strconv.Itoa(c.seq) + ">>\n"
_, err := c.w.WriteString(sentinel)
require.NoError(t, err)
deadline := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second)
for !strings.Contains(c.buf.String(), sentinel) {
require.False(
t, time.Now().After(deadline),
"timed out waiting for captured output",
)
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
}
out := strings.Replace(c.buf.String(), sentinel, "", 1)
c.buf.reset()
return out
}
// teeStdout writes to a buffer and to whatever os.Stdout is at the
// moment of the write.
//
// The second half is the point. GORM's package-level default logger
// resolves os.Stdout once, at package init, so a logger built over the
// variable would keep writing to the real terminal no matter what a
// test redirects. Resolving it per write puts the bytes a defaulted
// gorm.Config would cost in production into the same capture as
// everything else internal/logger emits, which is what lets the volume
// assertions below measure the whole writer set rather than one member
// of it.
type teeStdout struct {
buf *syncBuf
}
func (w teeStdout) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
_, _ = os.Stdout.Write(p)
return w.buf.Write(p)
}
// captureGORMDefault replaces GORM's package-level default logger with
// one configured exactly as GORM configures its own, writing to a
// buffer and to os.Stdout.
//
// This is the mutation detector. gormlogger.Default is what a bare
// &gorm.Config{} installs, and its config here is GORM's verbatim —
// Warn, IgnoreRecordNotFoundError false — so a reverted call site
// behaves as it would in production rather than as a test dialed it.
// With every gorm.Open in this service naming its own logger, nothing
// consults this value and the buffer stays empty; revert any one of
// the three and the interpolated SQL lands here.
func captureGORMDefault(t *testing.T) *syncBuf {
t.Helper()
buf := &syncBuf{}
orig := gormlogger.Default
gormlogger.Default = gormlogger.New(
log.New(teeStdout{buf: buf}, "", log.LstdFlags),
gormlogger.Config{
SlowThreshold: 200 * time.Millisecond,
LogLevel: gormlogger.Warn,
IgnoreRecordNotFoundError: false,
Colorful: false,
},
)
t.Cleanup(func() { gormlogger.Default = orig })
return buf
}
// floodUnauthenticated drives reps requests at each of the two
// unauthenticated lookups that miss by design, for every fill, with a
// client-chosen value of size raw bytes.
func floodUnauthenticated(
t *testing.T, h *handlers.Handlers, size, reps int,
) int {
t.Helper()
requests := 0
for _, f := range gormBoundFills() {
var b strings.Builder
for b.Len() < size {
b.WriteString(f.fill)
}
b.WriteString(gormBoundTailMarker)
value := b.String()
for range reps {
postWebhook(t, h, value)
postUnknownLogin(t, h, value)
requests += 2
}
}
return requests
}
// floodPerWebhook drives the same client-chosen values at the second
// gorm.Open site, the per-webhook database internal/database's
// WebhookDBManager opens.
//
// That site is behind authentication in production, so this is not
// part of the unauthenticated flood above and is counted separately.
// It is here because the ceiling the README states covers every
// writer, and the manager is one of them: with nothing driving it, a
// bare &gorm.Config{} could be restored at
// internal/database/webhook_db_manager.go and the whole suite would
// stay green.
func floodPerWebhook(
t *testing.T, mgr *database.WebhookDBManager, size, reps int,
) int {
t.Helper()
requests := 0
for _, f := range gormBoundFills() {
var b strings.Builder
for b.Len() < size {
b.WriteString(f.fill)
}
b.WriteString(gormBoundTailMarker)
value := b.String()
db, err := mgr.GetDB("pin-" + f.name)
require.NoError(t, err)
for range reps {
var got database.Event
err = db.Where("id = ?", value).First(&got).Error
require.ErrorIs(t, err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound)
requests++
}
}
return requests
}
// postWebhook drives the receiver with an invented entrypoint path.
// The route pattern matches any single segment, so every byte of the
// value is the client's, and the lookup behind it misses by design.
func postWebhook(
t *testing.T, h *handlers.Handlers, entrypoint string,
) {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, "/webhook/x",
strings.NewReader("{}"),
)
rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
rctx.URLParams.Add("uuid", entrypoint)
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(
req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx,
))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleWebhook().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code)
}
// postUnknownLogin submits the login form with an unknown username,
// through the postLogin helper in logbound_test.go. The field is
// bounded only by the 1 MB body cap, and the lookup behind it misses
// by design.
func postUnknownLogin(
t *testing.T, h *handlers.Handlers, username string,
) {
t.Helper()
// 401 while the client still has failure budget against this
// username, 429 once the login guard has taken it away. Both
// outcomes sit behind the user lookup, which is the query this
// test is here to drive.
require.Contains(
t,
[]int{http.StatusUnauthorized, http.StatusTooManyRequests},
postLogin(t, h, username),
)
}
// assertFloodBounded holds every captured line to the stated ceiling
// and proves nothing carried a whole client value.
func assertFloodBounded(t *testing.T, label, out string) {
t.Helper()
assert.NotContains(
t, out, gormBoundTailMarker,
"%s: the far end of a client-chosen value reached the "+
"log, so nothing truncated it", label,
)
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(
strings.TrimRight(out, "\n"), "\n",
) {
if line == "" {
continue
}
assert.LessOrEqual(
t, len(line), middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
"%s: log line exceeded its bound: %s",
label, line[:min(len(line), 300)],
)
}
}
// TestFlood_NoWriterGrowsWithTheInput is the definition of done for
// the GORM logger defect, stated over every writer at once, for two of
// this service's three gorm.Open sites: the main database behind the
// two unauthenticated lookups, and the per-webhook database the
// WebhookDBManager opens. The third, the archive writer, is pinned in
// internal/delivery, where its type lives.
//
// What each assertion is worth, since two of the three would pass
// against a service that had never been fixed if the capture were set
// up differently:
//
// - The gormDefault check is the sharp one. It fires the moment any
// gorm.Open in this service goes back to a bare &gorm.Config{}.
// - The volume and per-line checks bite only because the replaced
// default logger tees into os.Stdout, so a reverted call site
// shows up in the same capture as everything internal/logger
// writes — the way it would in production. Without that tee both
// were vacuous: at INFO the two handler misses log at DEBUG and
// the adapter drops the record-not-found, so the capture holds
// nothing but fixed-string warnings.
//
// The level is left where newTestApp leaves it, at INFO: the level an
// operator runs at by default, and the one the defect was visible at.
// The handlers' own miss lines sit at DEBUG and spend the same
// logfield budget as everything else, so they are not what makes
// either assertion above bite at any level.
//
// It is deliberately not parallel: it redirects os.Stdout and replaces
// gormlogger.Default, both of which are process-global. Go runs every
// non-parallel top-level test to completion before it resumes the
// parallel ones, so nothing else in this package is running while the
// capture is installed.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // Deliberately sequential; see above.
func TestFlood_NoWriterGrowsWithTheInput(t *testing.T) {
const (
smallBytes = 128
bigBytes = 8 << 10
reps = 5
)
gormDefault := captureGORMDefault(t)
capture := captureStdout(t)
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
mgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &mgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
// Startup chatter is not what this test measures.
capture.drain(t)
floodUnauthenticated(t, h, smallBytes, reps)
floodPerWebhook(t, mgr, smallBytes, reps)
small := capture.drain(t)
requests := floodUnauthenticated(t, h, bigBytes, reps)
requests += floodPerWebhook(t, mgr, bigBytes, reps)
big := capture.drain(t)
assertFloodBounded(t, "small flood", small)
assertFloodBounded(t, "big flood", big)
// GORM's default logger is what the defect was. Nothing in this
// service may reach it.
got := gormDefault.String()
assert.Empty(
t, got,
"GORM's default logger wrote %d bytes; the first of them: %s",
len(got), got[:min(len(got), 300)],
)
// The same flood, with 64 times the client-chosen input, must not
// buy 64 times the log. A few bytes of slack covers a latency
// field changing width; the input grew by roughly half a megabyte.
const slackPerRequest = 64
assert.LessOrEqual(
t, len(big), len(small)+slackPerRequest*requests,
"log volume tracked the size of the client's input: "+
"%d bytes at %d bytes of input per request, %d bytes "+
"at %d",
len(small), smallBytes, len(big), bigBytes,
)
}

54
internal/handlers/handlers.go
View File

@@ -3,12 +3,14 @@
package handlers
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"html/template"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"sync/atomic"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
@@ -16,6 +18,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/templates"
@@ -26,15 +29,24 @@ const (
maxBodyShift = 20
// recentEventLimit is the number of recent events to show.
recentEventLimit = 20
// defaultRetentionDays is the default event retention period.
defaultRetentionDays = 30
// paginationPerPage is the number of items per page.
paginationPerPage = 25
// tmplKeyError is the template data key for an error message.
tmplKeyError = "Error"
// tmplKeyWebhook is the template data key for a webhook.
tmplKeyWebhook = "Webhook"
)
// errInvalidPassword is returned when a password does not match.
var errInvalidPassword = errors.New("invalid password")
// errVerificationBusy is returned when no password-verification slot
// became free before the wait elapsed, so no password was verified.
var errVerificationBusy = errors.New(
"password verification capacity exhausted",
)
//nolint:revive // HandlersParams is a standard fx naming convention.
type HandlersParams struct {
fx.In
@@ -45,7 +57,9 @@ type HandlersParams struct {
WebhookDBMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
Healthcheck *healthcheck.Healthcheck
Session *session.Session
Middleware *middleware.Middleware
Notifier delivery.Notifier
Evictor delivery.WebhookEvictor
}
// Handlers provides HTTP handler methods for all application
@@ -57,8 +71,16 @@ type Handlers struct {
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
session *session.Session
mw *middleware.Middleware
notifier delivery.Notifier
evictor delivery.WebhookEvictor
mtr *metrics.Set
templates map[string]*template.Template
// dummyVerifications counts the equivalent-cost verifications
// charged for usernames that do not exist. It exists so a test
// can prove that path runs without measuring wall-clock time.
dummyVerifications atomic.Uint64
}
// parsePageTemplate parses a page-specific template set from the
@@ -91,7 +113,10 @@ func New(
s.db = params.Database
s.dbMgr = params.WebhookDBMgr
s.session = params.Session
s.mw = params.Middleware
s.notifier = params.Notifier
s.evictor = params.Evictor
s.mtr = metrics.Default()
// Parse all page templates once at startup
s.templates = map[string]*template.Template{
@@ -102,6 +127,7 @@ func New(
"source_detail.html": parsePageTemplate("source_detail.html"),
"source_edit.html": parsePageTemplate("source_edit.html"),
"source_logs.html": parsePageTemplate("source_logs.html"),
"target_edit.html": parsePageTemplate("target_edit.html"),
}
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
@@ -218,13 +244,22 @@ func (s *Handlers) renderTemplate(
s.executeTemplate(w, tmpl, wrapper)
}
// executeTemplate runs the template and handles errors.
// executeTemplate renders the template into a buffer and writes to
// the response only once rendering has fully succeeded. Executing
// straight into the ResponseWriter commits a partial body and a 200
// status before a mid-render error can be reported, leaving no way
// to serve a 500. Buffering makes a page's rendered size resident
// memory per concurrent viewer, so every page owes it a bound: the
// event log caps each stored body at maxRenderedBodyBytes for exactly
// this reason.
func (s *Handlers) executeTemplate(
w http.ResponseWriter,
tmpl *template.Template,
data any,
) {
err := tmpl.Execute(w, data)
var buf bytes.Buffer
err := tmpl.Execute(&buf, data)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error(
"failed to execute template", "error", err,
@@ -233,5 +268,16 @@ func (s *Handlers) executeTemplate(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
_, err = buf.WriteTo(w)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error(
"failed to write rendered page", "error", err,
)
}
}

153
internal/handlers/handlers_test.go
View File

@@ -2,8 +2,11 @@ package handlers_test
import (
"context"
"errors"
"html/template"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -17,6 +20,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
@@ -24,6 +28,32 @@ type noopNotifier struct{}
func (n *noopNotifier) Notify([]delivery.Task) {}
// recordingEvictor is a delivery.WebhookEvictor that records
// the webhook ids it was asked to evict, so a test can prove
// that a deletion path reached the delivery engine.
type recordingEvictor struct {
mu sync.Mutex
evicted []string
}
func (r *recordingEvictor) EvictWebhook(webhookID string) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
r.evicted = append(r.evicted, webhookID)
}
// Evicted returns a copy of the recorded webhook ids.
func (r *recordingEvictor) Evicted() []string {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
out := make([]string, len(r.evicted))
copy(out, r.evicted)
return out
}
func newTestApp(
t *testing.T,
targets ...any,
@@ -47,6 +77,13 @@ func newTestApp(
func() delivery.Notifier {
return &noopNotifier{}
},
func() *recordingEvictor {
return &recordingEvictor{}
},
func(r *recordingEvictor) delivery.WebhookEvictor {
return r
},
middleware.New,
handlers.New,
),
fx.Populate(targets...),
@@ -186,3 +223,119 @@ func TestRenderTemplate(t *testing.T) {
t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code,
)
}
// errMidRender is the failure a test template raises partway through
// rendering.
var errMidRender = errors.New("deliberate mid-render failure")
// midRenderFailure is template data whose first method renders and
// whose second fails, so the template aborts after output has
// already been produced.
type midRenderFailure struct{}
// Prefix is the output a streaming renderer would flush before the
// failure below aborts the template.
func (midRenderFailure) Prefix() string { return partialPageMarker }
// Boom aborts template execution.
func (midRenderFailure) Boom() (string, error) {
return "", errMidRender
}
// partialPageMarker is content the failing template emits before it
// aborts.
const partialPageMarker = "PARTIAL PAGE CONTENT"
// TestRenderTemplateMidRenderErrorSendsNoPartialBody proves the
// renderer does not commit output it cannot finish: a template that
// fails partway through must yield a 500 and a body carrying none of
// the content emitted before the failure. Against a renderer that
// executes straight into the ResponseWriter this fails on both
// counts, returning 200 with the prefix already flushed.
func TestRenderTemplateMidRenderErrorSendsNoPartialBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
app := newTestApp(t, &h)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
h.AddTemplateForTest("failing.html", template.Must(
template.New("failing").Parse(
`{{.Data.Prefix}}{{.Data.Boom}}TAIL`,
),
))
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.RenderTemplateForTest(
w, req, "failing.html", midRenderFailure{},
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code,
"a failed render must report a 500",
)
assert.Equal(
t, "Internal server error\n", w.Body.String(),
"the response must carry no part of the aborted page",
)
}
func TestBuildDatabaseTargetConfig_Valid(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
app := newTestApp(t, &h)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
// Empty expiry: the keep-forever default, empty config.
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
cfg, err := h.BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest(w, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, cfg)
// Explicit never is stored as config.
w = httptest.NewRecorder()
cfg, err = h.BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest(w, "never")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.JSONEq(t, `{"expiry":"never"}`, cfg)
// A positive duration is stored as config.
w = httptest.NewRecorder()
cfg, err = h.BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest(w, "720h")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.JSONEq(t, `{"expiry":"720h"}`, cfg)
}
func TestBuildDatabaseTargetConfig_RejectsBadExpiry(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
app := newTestApp(t, &h)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
for _, bad := range []string{"nonsense", "7d", "-5h"} {
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
cfg, err := h.BuildDatabaseTargetConfigForTest(w, bad)
require.Error(t, err, "expiry %q", bad)
assert.Empty(t, cfg)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code,
"expiry %q should be rejected with 400", bad,
)
}
}

543
internal/handlers/logbound_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,543 @@
package handlers_test
// The handler-side half of the log-field audit. Two slog calls in
// this package reach a value an UNAUTHENTICATED client picks outright
// and of a length it picks outright:
//
// - the unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line on /webhook/{uuid}, whose
// path segment matched no stored entrypoint and so is bounded by
// nothing;
// - the failed-login DEBUG lines, whose username is a form field.
//
// Both are at DEBUG, which is off in production by default. That is
// not a bound: an operator turning DEBUG on to diagnose a flood must
// not thereby hand the flood an unbounded write. Both spend the same
// internal/logfield budget as the access log, and both are held here
// to middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes.
//
// The two login lines past the username lookup — "invalid password"
// and "user logged in" — carry the same cap without needing it, since
// by then the value is a stored row rather than the client's. They are
// pinned here too, so the caps cannot be dropped silently.
//
// So is the "password verification capacity exhausted" WARN line,
// whose path chi pins to the constant "/pages/login" on the one route
// that reaches it. Its cap is defensive, and the test below drives the
// handler directly with the path a parameterised route would give it,
// because an unasserted cap is one a later edit removes for free.
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
)
// floodRequests is the number of distinct invented values each flood
// drives through the call site under test.
const floodRequests = 32
// oversizedFillBytes is the length of the single client-chosen value
// used to show that line size does not track input size.
const oversizedFillBytes = 8192
// attackerMarker and tailMarker sit at the END of every oversized
// value, past every budget. Their absence from the log is what
// proves the value was cut rather than merely being short.
const (
attackerMarker = "QQATTACKERTEXTQQ"
tailMarker = "QQTRUNCATEDTAILQQ"
)
// escapeFills are the characters the log handlers escape, so a value
// built out of them costs more on the line than it did on the wire. A
// budget counted in raw bytes passes the plain case and fails these.
//
// U+1000C is unassigned, hence non-printable, and strconv.Quote
// spells it as a ten-byte \UXXXXXXXX while the JSON handler passes
// its four UTF-8 bytes through; only the text shape of these tests
// reaches that charge.
func escapeFills() map[string]string {
return map[string]string{
"plain": "x",
"quote": `"`,
"backslash": `\`,
"tab": "\t",
"newline": "\n",
// A C0 control neither handler has a short escape for, so
// each one costs six bytes on the line against the single
// byte it cost to send: the widest multiplier a client can
// drive, and the case a raw-byte budget breaks on first.
//
// This fill is load-bearing, not decoration. Budgeting raw
// bytes instead of encoded is caught by this fill alone,
// and only under the JSON handler, at 3,072 bytes against
// the 2,560 ceiling. Drop it and that mutation passes.
"control": "\x01",
"astral": "\U0001000C",
}
}
// logHandlers are the two handlers internal/logger can install.
func logHandlers() map[string]func(
io.Writer, *slog.HandlerOptions,
) slog.Handler {
return map[string]func(
io.Writer, *slog.HandlerOptions,
) slog.Handler{
"json": func(
w io.Writer, o *slog.HandlerOptions,
) slog.Handler {
return slog.NewJSONHandler(w, o)
},
"text": func(
w io.Writer, o *slog.HandlerOptions,
) slog.Handler {
return slog.NewTextHandler(w, o)
},
}
}
// oversizedFill builds an 8 KB client-chosen value out of
// repetitions of ch, with both markers at its far end.
func oversizedFill(ch string) string {
return "x" + strings.Repeat(ch, oversizedFillBytes) +
attackerMarker + tailMarker
}
// capturingHandlers builds a Handlers whose log is captured into the
// returned buffer at DEBUG through the named handler.
//
// extra is passed to fx.Populate alongside the Handlers, for the call
// sites that also need the database the client's value is looked up
// in, or the Middleware whose resource has to be exhausted before the
// branch under test is reached.
func capturingHandlers(
t *testing.T,
newHandler func(io.Writer, *slog.HandlerOptions) slog.Handler,
extra ...any,
) (*handlers.Handlers, *bytes.Buffer) {
t.Helper()
var h *handlers.Handlers
app := newTestApp(t, append([]any{&h}, extra...)...)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
h.SetLogForTest(slog.New(newHandler(
buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
)))
return h, buf
}
// logLines splits the captured buffer into non-empty lines, holding
// each to the stated per-line ceiling.
func logLines(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer) []string {
t.Helper()
var lines []string
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(
strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()), "\n",
) {
if line == "" {
continue
}
require.LessOrEqual(
t, len(line), middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
"log line exceeded its bound: %s", line,
)
lines = append(lines, line)
}
return lines
}
// assertNoClientText fails if the far end of the client-chosen input
// survived into the log.
func assertNoClientText(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer) {
t.Helper()
assert.NotContains(
t, buf.String(), attackerMarker,
"log carried attacker-chosen text",
)
assert.NotContains(
t, buf.String(), tailMarker,
"log carried the tail of the attacker-chosen text",
)
}
// receiverRouter mounts the real receiver handler at the production
// route pattern.
func receiverRouter(h *handlers.Handlers) *chi.Mux {
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.Post("/webhook/{uuid}", h.HandleWebhook())
return router
}
// postReceiver sends one POST at /webhook/<segment>.
//
// RawPath is cleared after parsing so chi routes on the decoded path
// and the handler sees the raw bytes rather than their percent-escaped
// spelling. That is the harder case for the budget: the escaped
// spelling is plain ASCII, which costs one byte per byte, while the
// decoded bytes are what the log handler has to escape.
func postReceiver(
t *testing.T, router *chi.Mux, segment string,
) int {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"/webhook/"+url.PathEscape(segment),
strings.NewReader(""),
)
req.URL.RawPath = ""
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w.Code
}
// postLogin submits the login form with the given username and a
// non-empty password.
func postLogin(
t *testing.T, h *handlers.Handlers, username string,
) int {
t.Helper()
return postLoginWithPassword(t, h, username, "not-the-password")
}
// postLoginWithPassword submits the login form with both credentials
// chosen by the caller, so a test can reach the branches past the
// username lookup.
func postLoginWithPassword(
t *testing.T, h *handlers.Handlers, username, password string,
) int {
t.Helper()
form := url.Values{
"username": {username},
"password": {password},
}
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"/pages/login",
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
)
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleLoginSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w.Code
}
// TestUnknownEntrypoint_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize drives 8 KB of
// client-chosen path at the unauthenticated receiver's
// unknown-entrypoint DEBUG line and holds it to the same ceiling the
// access log states.
func TestUnknownEntrypoint_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for handlerName, newHandler := range logHandlers() {
for fillName, fill := range escapeFills() {
t.Run(handlerName+"/"+fillName, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, buf := capturingHandlers(t, newHandler)
router := receiverRouter(h)
for i := range floodRequests {
assert.Equal(
t,
http.StatusNotFound,
postReceiver(
t, router,
oversizedFill(fill)+
strings.Repeat("y", i),
),
)
}
lines := logLines(t, buf)
require.Len(t, lines, floodRequests)
assertNoClientText(t, buf)
assertBoundedFlood(t, buf.Len())
})
}
}
}
// TestFailedLogin_LogLineDoesNotTrackUsernameSize drives 8 KB of
// client-chosen username at the unauthenticated login endpoint's
// DEBUG line and holds it to the same ceiling.
func TestFailedLogin_LogLineDoesNotTrackUsernameSize(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for handlerName, newHandler := range logHandlers() {
for fillName, fill := range escapeFills() {
t.Run(handlerName+"/"+fillName, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, buf := capturingHandlers(t, newHandler)
for i := range floodRequests {
assert.Equal(
t,
http.StatusUnauthorized,
postLogin(
t, h,
oversizedFill(fill)+
strings.Repeat("y", i),
),
)
}
lines := logLines(t, buf)
require.Len(t, lines, floodRequests)
assertNoClientText(t, buf)
assertBoundedFlood(t, buf.Len())
})
}
}
}
// storedUserPassword is the password held by the oversize accounts
// the test below creates.
const storedUserPassword = "correct-horse-battery-staple"
// storedFillBytes is the raw length of the client-chosen value in
// those accounts' usernames. It is well past the 512-byte field
// budget, so the line is still truncated, but short enough that the
// session cookie a successful login writes stays inside
// securecookie's 4 KB limit: the cookie is written BEFORE the
// "user logged in" line, so an 8 KB username answers 500 and never
// reaches it.
const storedFillBytes = 1024
// storedFill builds a username fill of storedFillBytes raw bytes out
// of repetitions of ch, with both markers at its far end.
func storedFill(ch string) string {
return "x" + strings.Repeat(ch, storedFillBytes/len(ch)) +
attackerMarker + tailMarker
}
// TestStoredUsername_LogLinesDoNotTrackUsernameSize pins the two
// login lines that are reached only AFTER the username matched a
// stored row: "invalid password" and "user logged in". Neither
// strictly needs its cap — the value is the operator's own data by
// then, not the client's — but both carry one so that every username
// this unauthenticated endpoint logs is capped, and an unasserted cap
// is one a later edit removes for free.
//
// One app per handler with the accounts created inside it, and no
// parallelism below that level: every account costs an Argon2id hash
// and every attempt costs a verification.
func TestStoredUsername_LogLinesDoNotTrackUsernameSize(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for handlerName, newHandler := range logHandlers() {
t.Run(handlerName, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var db *database.Database
h, buf := capturingHandlers(t, newHandler, &db)
hash, err := database.HashPassword(storedUserPassword)
require.NoError(t, err)
fills := escapeFills()
for fillName, fill := range fills {
username := storedFill(fill) + fillName
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Create(&database.User{
Username: username,
Password: hash,
}).Error)
// Matched the row, wrong secret: "invalid
// password".
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusUnauthorized,
postLoginWithPassword(
t, h, username, "not-the-password",
),
)
// Matched the row, right secret: "user logged
// in".
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusSeeOther,
postLoginWithPassword(
t, h, username, storedUserPassword,
),
)
}
lines := logLines(t, buf)
require.Len(t, lines, 2*len(fills))
assertNoClientText(t, buf)
})
}
}
// maxVerificationSlots bounds how many slots the loop below will
// take before it gives up, so a semaphore that never fills fails the
// test instead of hanging it. It is deliberately larger than the
// real concurrency bound, which is not exported to this package.
const maxVerificationSlots = 64
// canceledContext returns a context that is already done. A
// verification request carrying one takes the ctx.Done() branch of
// the semaphore's bounded wait immediately, so these cases turn on
// the semaphore being full rather than on a five-second timer firing.
// Nothing here is timing-dependent.
func canceledContext() context.Context {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
return ctx
}
// holdEveryVerificationSlot takes verification slots until one is
// refused, and releases them when the test ends. A free slot is
// handed out before any context is consulted, so a canceled context
// cannot make this loop stop early: it stops exactly when the slots
// are gone.
func holdEveryVerificationSlot(
t *testing.T, mw *middleware.Middleware,
) {
t.Helper()
for range maxVerificationSlots {
release, ok := mw.BeginPasswordVerification(canceledContext())
if !ok {
return
}
t.Cleanup(release)
}
require.Fail(t, "the verification semaphore never filled")
}
// postLoginAtPath submits the login form at a path of the caller's
// choosing, with a canceled context.
func postLoginAtPath(
t *testing.T, h *handlers.Handlers, path string,
) int {
t.Helper()
form := url.Values{
"username": {"someone"},
"password": {"not-the-password"},
}
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
canceledContext(),
http.MethodPost,
path,
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
)
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleLoginSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w.Code
}
// TestVerificationCapacity_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize pins the cap
// on the "password verification capacity exhausted" WARN line.
//
// The one route that reaches it is chi's static "/pages/login", so no
// request through the mux can widen the line; the handler is driven
// directly here with the path a parameterised route would give it,
// which is what that cap exists for. Without this test, removing the
// logfield.Truncate there fails nothing.
func TestVerificationCapacity_LogLineDoesNotTrackPathSize(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
for handlerName, newHandler := range logHandlers() {
for fillName, fill := range escapeFills() {
t.Run(handlerName+"/"+fillName, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var mw *middleware.Middleware
h, buf := capturingHandlers(t, newHandler, &mw)
holdEveryVerificationSlot(t, mw)
assert.Equal(
t,
http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
postLoginAtPath(
t, h,
"/source/"+url.PathEscape(
oversizedFill(fill),
)+"/login",
),
)
lines := logLines(t, buf)
require.Len(t, lines, 1)
assertNoClientText(t, buf)
})
}
}
}
// assertBoundedFlood holds the whole flood's log output to what the
// stated per-line ceiling allows. The flood sent
// floodRequests * oversizedFillBytes bytes of client-chosen text;
// this is the assertion that the log did not grow with it.
func assertBoundedFlood(t *testing.T, got int) {
t.Helper()
sent := floodRequests * oversizedFillBytes
require.Less(
t, got, sent/2,
"log volume tracked the size of the flood's input",
)
require.LessOrEqual(
t, got,
floodRequests*middleware.MaxAccessLogLineBytes,
)
}

203
internal/handlers/profile.go
View File

@@ -1,66 +1,229 @@
package handlers
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// HandleProfile returns a handler for the user profile page
func (h *Handlers) HandleProfile() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Get username from URL
sessionUserID, sessionUsername, ok :=
h.profileOwnerOrDeny(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
h.renderProfile(w, r, sessionUserID, sessionUsername, "", "")
}
}
// HandlePasswordChange returns a handler that lets an authenticated
// user change their own password. It is served by the CSRF- and
// auth-protected POST /password route under /user/{username}.
func (h *Handlers) HandlePasswordChange() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sessionUserID, sessionUsername, ok :=
h.profileOwnerOrDeny(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
h.log.Error("failed to parse form", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
successMessage, errorMessage, handled := h.applyPasswordChange(
r.Context(),
w,
sessionUsername,
// PostFormValue, not FormValue: the credential must
// come from the body, never from the query string.
r.PostFormValue("current_password"),
r.PostFormValue("new_password"),
r.PostFormValue("confirm_password"),
)
if !handled {
return
}
h.renderProfile(
w, r, sessionUserID, sessionUsername,
successMessage, errorMessage,
)
}
}
// applyPasswordChange verifies the current password and, on success,
// persists a fresh hash for the user, reusing the same helpers that
// bootstrap the admin user. It returns the success and error messages
// to display on the profile page. On an internal failure it writes a
// 500 response itself and returns handled=false, signalling the caller
// to stop without re-rendering the page.
func (h *Handlers) applyPasswordChange(
ctx context.Context,
w http.ResponseWriter,
username, currentPassword, newPassword, confirmPassword string,
) (string, string, bool) {
// This endpoint verifies one password and hashes another, at
// 64 MB each, so it takes a slot from the same bound the login
// endpoint uses. The bound is per hash, not per endpoint: leaving
// this path outside it would leave a hole in it. The slot is held
// across both hashes.
release, ok := h.mw.BeginPasswordVerification(ctx)
if !ok {
h.log.Warn("password verification capacity exhausted")
http.Error(
w,
"The server is busy verifying credentials. "+
"Please try again.",
http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
)
return "", "", false
}
defer release()
// Load the user row so we can verify the current password and
// persist the new hash.
var user database.User
err := h.db.DB().Where(
"username = ?", username,
).First(&user).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(
w, "failed to load user for password change", err,
)
return "", "", false
}
valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(
currentPassword, user.Password,
)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to verify password", err)
return "", "", false
}
if !valid {
return "", "Current password is incorrect.", true
}
if newPassword == "" {
return "", "New password must not be empty.", true
}
if newPassword != confirmPassword {
return "", "New password and confirmation do not match.", true
}
hashedPassword, err := database.HashPassword(newPassword)
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to hash new password", err)
return "", "", false
}
err = h.db.DB().Model(&user).Update(
"password", hashedPassword,
).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to update password", err)
return "", "", false
}
h.log.Info("user changed password", "username", username)
return "Password changed successfully.", "", true
}
// profileOwnerOrDeny resolves the session identity and enforces that a
// user may only act on their own profile (the requested username in the
// URL must equal the session username). On any failure it writes the
// appropriate HTTP response and returns ok=false; callers must stop
// when ok is false.
func (h *Handlers) profileOwnerOrDeny(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
) (string, string, bool) {
requestedUsername := chi.URLParam(r, "username")
if requestedUsername == "" {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
return "", "", false
}
// Get session. RequireAuth middleware guarantees an
// authenticated session before this handler runs, so we
// only need to guard against an unexpected retrieval error.
// RequireAuth middleware guarantees an authenticated session
// before this handler runs, so we only need to guard against an
// unexpected retrieval error.
sess, err := h.session.Get(r)
if err != nil {
h.log.Error("failed to get session", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
h.serverError(w, "failed to get session", err)
return
return "", "", false
}
// Get user info from session
sessionUsername, ok := h.session.GetUsername(sess)
if !ok {
h.log.Error("authenticated session missing username")
http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
return "", "", false
}
sessionUserID, ok := h.session.GetUserID(sess)
if !ok {
h.log.Error("authenticated session missing user ID")
http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
)
return
return "", "", false
}
// For now, only allow users to view their own profile
// Only allow users to act on their own profile.
if requestedUsername != sessionUsername {
http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return
return "", "", false
}
// Prepare data for template
return sessionUserID, sessionUsername, true
}
// renderProfile renders the profile page for the given user,
// optionally including a success or error message.
func (h *Handlers) renderProfile(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
userID, username, successMessage, errorMessage string,
) {
data := map[string]any{
"User": &UserInfo{
ID: sessionUserID,
Username: sessionUsername,
ID: userID,
Username: username,
},
"SuccessMessage": successMessage,
"ErrorMessage": errorMessage,
}
// Render the profile page
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "profile.html", data)
}
}

134
internal/handlers/profile_test.go
View File

@@ -4,12 +4,15 @@ import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
@@ -157,3 +160,134 @@ func TestUserRoute_Unauthenticated_RedirectedByMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, "/pages/login", w.Header().Get("Location"))
}
// passwordChangeRequest builds a POST request to the password-change
// endpoint for the given username, attaching the supplied cookies, an
// urlencoded form body, and the chi URL parameter the handler reads.
func passwordChangeRequest(
username string,
cookies []*http.Cookie,
form url.Values,
) *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"/user/"+username+"/password",
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
)
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
)
for _, c := range cookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
rctx.URLParams.Add("username", username)
return req.WithContext(
context.WithValue(req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx),
)
}
func TestHandlePasswordChange_Success(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
var sess *session.Session
var db *database.Database
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
oldHash, err := database.HashPassword("oldpassword")
require.NoError(t, err)
user := &database.User{Username: "pwuser", Password: oldHash}
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Create(user).Error)
cookies := authenticatedCookies(t, sess, user.ID, "pwuser")
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("current_password", "oldpassword")
form.Set("new_password", "newpassword")
form.Set("confirm_password", "newpassword")
req := passwordChangeRequest("pwuser", cookies, form)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandlePasswordChange().ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
assert.Contains(
t, w.Body.String(), "Password changed successfully.",
)
var updated database.User
require.NoError(t,
db.DB().Where("username = ?", "pwuser").First(&updated).Error,
)
assert.NotEqual(t, oldHash, updated.Password)
valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(
"newpassword", updated.Password,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, valid, "new password should verify against new hash")
}
func TestHandlePasswordChange_WrongCurrentPassword(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
var sess *session.Session
var db *database.Database
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
oldHash, err := database.HashPassword("oldpassword")
require.NoError(t, err)
user := &database.User{Username: "pwuser2", Password: oldHash}
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Create(user).Error)
cookies := authenticatedCookies(t, sess, user.ID, "pwuser2")
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("current_password", "wrongpassword")
form.Set("new_password", "newpassword")
form.Set("confirm_password", "newpassword")
req := passwordChangeRequest("pwuser2", cookies, form)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandlePasswordChange().ServeHTTP(w, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
assert.Contains(
t, w.Body.String(), "Current password is incorrect.",
)
var unchanged database.User
require.NoError(t,
db.DB().Where(
"username = ?", "pwuser2",
).First(&unchanged).Error,
)
assert.Equal(
t, oldHash, unchanged.Password,
"stored hash must be unchanged after a rejected change",
)
}

356
internal/handlers/source_delete_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
const (
deleteTestUserID = "test-user-id"
deleteTestUsername = "testuser"
// paramSourceID and paramTargetID are the chi URL parameter
// names the deletion handlers read.
paramSourceID = "sourceID"
paramTargetID = "targetID"
)
// seedWebhook inserts a webhook owned by the test user and
// returns it.
func seedWebhook(
t *testing.T,
db *database.Database,
) *database.Webhook {
t.Helper()
wh := &database.Webhook{
UserID: deleteTestUserID,
Name: "delete-me",
}
require.NoError(
t,
db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
)
return wh
}
// seedTarget inserts a target of the given type for a webhook
// and returns it.
func seedTarget(
t *testing.T,
db *database.Database,
webhookID string,
targetType database.TargetType,
) *database.Target {
t.Helper()
tgt := &database.Target{
WebhookID: webhookID,
Name: "t-" + string(targetType),
Type: targetType,
Active: true,
}
require.NoError(
t,
db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(tgt).Error,
)
return tgt
}
// archivePathFor returns the archive database path the
// delivery engine would use for a webhook: beside the webhook's
// event database in the data directory.
func archivePathFor(
t *testing.T,
mgr *database.WebhookDBManager,
webhookID string,
) string {
t.Helper()
return filepath.Join(
filepath.Dir(mgr.DBPath(webhookID)),
"archive-"+webhookID+".db",
)
}
// writeArchivePlaceholder creates a stand-in archive file so a
// test can assert the file survives webhook deletion.
func writeArchivePlaceholder(path string) error {
return os.WriteFile(path, []byte("archive"), 0o600)
}
// postRequest builds an authenticated POST request carrying the
// given chi URL parameters.
func postRequest(
path string,
cookies []*http.Cookie,
params map[string]string,
) *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, path, nil,
)
for _, c := range cookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
for k, v := range params {
rctx.URLParams.Add(k, v)
}
return req.WithContext(
context.WithValue(req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx),
)
}
// TestHandleSourceDelete_EvictsArchiveWriter proves that
// deleting a webhook reaches the delivery engine and releases
// the webhook's archive writer, exercised through the real
// deletion handler rather than by calling the evictor directly.
func TestHandleSourceDelete_EvictsArchiveWriter(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
ev *recordingEvictor
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &ev)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeDatabase)
cookies := authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
)
req := postRequest(
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{paramSourceID: wh.ID},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSourceDelete().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, []string{wh.ID}, ev.Evicted(),
"deleting a webhook should evict its archive writer",
)
}
// TestHandleSourceDelete_KeepsArchiveFile proves that deleting
// a webhook does not remove its archive database file: the
// archive is long-term storage the operator owns.
func TestHandleSourceDelete_KeepsArchiveFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
mgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &mgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
// Place an archive file where the delivery engine would.
archivePath := archivePathFor(t, mgr, wh.ID)
require.NoError(
t,
writeArchivePlaceholder(archivePath),
)
cookies := authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
)
req := postRequest(
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{paramSourceID: wh.ID},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSourceDelete().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.FileExists(
t, archivePath,
"webhook deletion must not destroy the archive file",
)
}
// TestHandleTargetDelete_EvictsWhenLastDatabaseTargetGone
// proves that removing the last database target releases the
// archive writer.
func TestHandleTargetDelete_EvictsWhenLastDatabaseTargetGone(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
ev *recordingEvictor
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &ev)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
tgt := seedTarget(
t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeDatabase,
)
cookies := authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
)
req := postRequest(
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+tgt.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{
paramSourceID: wh.ID,
paramTargetID: tgt.ID,
},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleTargetDelete().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, []string{wh.ID}, ev.Evicted(),
"removing the last database target should evict",
)
}
// TestHandleTargetDelete_KeepsWriterWhenDatabaseTargetRemains
// proves that deleting one of several database targets leaves
// the still-needed archive writer alone: the surviving target
// keeps archiving to the same file, so the writer must stay.
func TestHandleTargetDelete_KeepsWriterWhenDatabaseTargetRemains(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
ev *recordingEvictor
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &ev)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
doomed := seedTarget(
t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeDatabase,
)
seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeDatabase)
cookies := authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
)
req := postRequest(
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+doomed.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{
paramSourceID: wh.ID,
paramTargetID: doomed.ID,
},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleTargetDelete().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Empty(
t, ev.Evicted(),
"a second database target still needs the writer",
)
}
// TestHandleTargetDelete_KeepsWriterWhenOtherTypeDeleted proves
// that deleting a target of an unrelated type leaves a
// still-needed archive writer alone: the webhook's database
// target is untouched, so its writer must stay.
func TestHandleTargetDelete_KeepsWriterWhenOtherTypeDeleted(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
ev *recordingEvictor
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &ev)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeDatabase)
other := seedTarget(t, db, wh.ID, database.TargetTypeLog)
cookies := authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
)
req := postRequest(
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/targets/"+other.ID+"/delete",
cookies,
map[string]string{
paramSourceID: wh.ID,
paramTargetID: other.ID,
},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleTargetDelete().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Empty(
t, ev.Evicted(),
"a surviving database target must keep its writer",
)
}

228
internal/handlers/source_detail_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// The secret path segments of a Slack incoming webhook URL.
// Holding them is enough to post to the channel forever, so
// they must never reach the rendered page.
const (
slackSecretPath = "/services/T00000000/B00000000/" +
"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
slackWebhookURL = "https://hooks.slack.com" +
slackSecretPath
)
// seedConfiguredTarget inserts a target with a stored config
// blob and returns it.
func seedConfiguredTarget(
t *testing.T,
db *database.Database,
webhookID string,
targetType database.TargetType,
config string,
) *database.Target {
t.Helper()
tgt := &database.Target{
WebhookID: webhookID,
Name: "t-" + string(targetType),
Type: targetType,
Active: true,
Config: config,
}
require.NoError(
t,
db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(tgt).Error,
)
return tgt
}
// renderSourceDetailPage runs the real source detail handler
// for a webhook and returns the rendered HTML.
func renderSourceDetailPage(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sess *session.Session,
webhookID string,
) string {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet,
"/source/"+webhookID,
nil,
)
for _, c := range authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
) {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
rctx.URLParams.Add(paramSourceID, webhookID)
req = req.WithContext(
context.WithValue(
req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx,
),
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSourceDetail().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
return w.Body.String()
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_MasksSlackWebhookURL is the
// load-bearing regression test for the credential leak: the
// rendered page must show the Slack target without any of the
// secret path segments of its webhook URL.
func TestHandleSourceDetail_MasksSlackWebhookURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID,
database.TargetTypeSlack,
`{"webhookUrl":"`+slackWebhookURL+`"}`,
)
body := renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
assert.NotContains(t, body, slackSecretPath)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "T00000000")
assert.NotContains(t, body, "B00000000")
assert.NotContains(
t, body, "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "webhookUrl")
assert.Contains(t, body, "Webhook URL")
assert.Contains(t, body, "https://hooks.slack.com/...")
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_MasksHTTPDestinationURL is the
// regression test for the same leak reached through the http
// target: its destination is routinely an incoming-webhook
// endpoint whose path segments are the credential, so the
// rendered page must not contain them.
func TestHandleSourceDetail_MasksHTTPDestinationURL(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID,
database.TargetTypeHTTP,
`{"url":"`+slackWebhookURL+`"}`,
)
body := renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
assert.NotContains(t, body, slackSecretPath)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "T00000000")
assert.NotContains(t, body, "B00000000")
assert.NotContains(
t, body, "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
)
assert.Contains(t, body, "Destination URL")
assert.Contains(t, body, "https://hooks.slack.com/...")
}
// TestHandleSourceDetail_RendersNamedTargetFields proves the
// other target types render labelled fields rather than the
// stored blob.
func TestHandleSourceDetail_RendersNamedTargetFields(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID,
database.TargetTypeHTTP,
`{"url":"https://example.com/hook","timeout":30,`+
`"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer sekrit"}}`,
)
seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID,
database.TargetTypeDatabase,
`{"expiry":"720h"}`,
)
seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID,
database.TargetType("carrier-pigeon"),
`{"beak":"sharp"}`,
)
body := renderSourceDetailPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
assert.Contains(t, body, "Destination URL")
assert.Contains(t, body, "https://example.com/...")
assert.Contains(t, body, "Timeout")
assert.Contains(t, body, "1 configured")
assert.NotContains(t, body, "sekrit")
assert.Contains(t, body, "Archive Expiry")
assert.Contains(t, body, "720h")
// An unknown type gets the neutral placeholder, never the
// stored blob.
assert.Contains(t, body, "(unavailable)")
assert.NotContains(t, body, "beak")
}

134
internal/handlers/source_logs_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// seedDeliveredEvent records an event and a delivery for it in
// the webhook's own database, so the log page has a delivery
// to render against the target.
func seedDeliveredEvent(
t *testing.T,
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager,
webhookID, targetID string,
) {
t.Helper()
webhookDB, err := dbMgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
event := &database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
Method: http.MethodPost,
Body: `{"test":true}`,
ContentType: "application/json",
}
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(event).Error)
dlv := &database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: targetID,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
}
require.NoError(t, webhookDB.Omit(
clause.Associations,
).Create(dlv).Error)
}
// renderSourceLogsPage runs the real event log handler for a
// webhook and returns the rendered HTML.
func renderSourceLogsPage(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sess *session.Session,
webhookID string,
) string {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodGet,
"/source/"+webhookID+"/logs",
nil,
)
for _, c := range authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, deleteTestUserID, deleteTestUsername,
) {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
rctx.URLParams.Add(paramSourceID, webhookID)
req = req.WithContext(
context.WithValue(
req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx,
),
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSourceLogs().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
return w.Body.String()
}
// TestHandleSourceLogs_MasksSlackWebhookURL proves the event
// log page is handed a display-safe projection of each target
// rather than the stored row, so the credential cannot be
// rendered from its template data.
func TestHandleSourceLogs_MasksSlackWebhookURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
sess *session.Session
db *database.Database
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager
)
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db, &dbMgr)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
wh := seedWebhook(t, db)
tgt := seedConfiguredTarget(
t, db, wh.ID,
database.TargetTypeSlack,
`{"webhookUrl":"`+slackWebhookURL+`"}`,
)
seedDeliveredEvent(t, dbMgr, wh.ID, tgt.ID)
body := renderSourceLogsPage(t, h, sess, wh.ID)
assert.NotContains(t, body, slackSecretPath)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "T00000000")
assert.NotContains(t, body, "B00000000")
assert.NotContains(
t, body, "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",
)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "webhookUrl")
// The page still identifies the delivery's target.
assert.Contains(t, body, tgt.Name)
assert.Contains(t, body, "delivered")
}

628
internal/handlers/source_management.go
View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/google/uuid"
@@ -24,11 +25,81 @@ type WebhookListItem struct {
// errMissingURL signals that a required URL was not provided.
var errMissingURL = errors.New("missing URL")
// EventWithDeliveries holds an event and its deliveries.
type EventWithDeliveries struct {
database.Event
// errInvalidRetention signals a retention_days form value that is not
// a non-negative whole number.
var errInvalidRetention = errors.New("invalid retention days")
Deliveries []database.Delivery
// errRetentionTooLarge signals a retention_days form value that is a
// whole number but larger than the reaper's cutoff arithmetic can
// represent. It is distinguished from errInvalidRetention so the form
// can tell the user the actual ceiling instead of implying their input
// was not a number.
var errRetentionTooLarge = errors.New("retention days out of range")
// retentionErrorMessage returns the message the create and edit forms
// show the user for a rejected retention_days value. Any error other
// than errRetentionTooLarge falls back to the generic wording, so an
// unrecognised parse failure still produces a sensible 400 rather than
// an empty alert.
func retentionErrorMessage(err error) string {
if errors.Is(err, errRetentionTooLarge) {
return "Retention must be at most " +
strconv.Itoa(database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays) +
" days, or 0 to retain events forever."
}
return "Retention must be a whole number of days, or 0 to " +
"retain events forever."
}
// parseRetentionDays interprets a retention_days form value.
//
// An empty value yields fallback, which lets the create path apply the
// default and the edit path leave the stored value unchanged. A value
// of 0 is returned as 0 and is rewritten to the retain-forever
// sentinel by database.Webhook's BeforeSave hook. Anything unparseable
// or negative is an error rather than a silently substituted default.
//
// The upper bound is not cosmetic. The reaper computes its cutoff as a
// time.Duration, an int64 nanosecond count, so a day count above
// database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays overflows, puts the cutoff in the
// future, and deletes every event the webhook has. A finite value
// above that ceiling is therefore a 400.
//
// A value at or above the retain-forever sentinel is not out of range:
// it is what the edit form pre-fills for a retain-forever webhook, so
// submitting the form back unchanged has to keep meaning "forever"
// rather than being rejected.
func parseRetentionDays(raw string, fallback int) (int, error) {
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if raw == "" {
return fallback, nil
}
v, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
if err != nil || v < 0 {
return 0, errInvalidRetention
}
if v >= database.RetentionForeverDays {
return database.RetentionForeverDays, nil
}
if v > database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays {
return 0, errRetentionTooLarge
}
return v, nil
}
// DeliveryView is the display-safe projection of a delivery
// for the event log page. Its target is a TargetView, so the
// stored configuration blob — which holds the target's
// credential — has no path to the template.
type DeliveryView struct {
ID string
Status database.DeliveryStatus
Target delivery.TargetView
}
// HandleSourceList shows a list of user's webhooks.
@@ -105,11 +176,30 @@ func (h *Handlers) buildWebhookListItems(
// HandleSourceCreate shows the form to create a new webhook.
func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
data := map[string]any{
"Error": "",
h.renderTemplate(
w, r, "sources_new.html",
newSourceFormData("", "", ""),
)
}
}
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "sources_new.html", data)
// newSourceFormData builds the template data for the webhook creation
// form.
//
// It carries the retention default so the pre-filled value comes from
// database.DefaultRetentionDays rather than being a third hardcoded
// copy of the same policy, and it carries the submitted name and
// description so that re-rendering the form after a validation failure
// gives the user their input back instead of a blank form. The edit
// form already behaves that way; create now matches it.
func newSourceFormData(
errMsg, name, description string,
) map[string]any {
return map[string]any{
tmplKeyError: errMsg,
"Name": name,
"Description": description,
"DefaultRetentionDays": database.DefaultRetentionDays,
}
}
@@ -126,10 +216,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceCreateSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift,
)
// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
http.Error(
@@ -139,28 +227,36 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceCreateSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
name := r.FormValue("name")
description := r.FormValue("description")
retentionStr := r.FormValue("retention_days")
name := r.PostFormValue("name")
description := r.PostFormValue("description")
retentionStr := r.PostFormValue("retention_days")
if name == "" {
data := map[string]any{
"Error": "Name is required",
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "sources_new.html", data)
h.renderTemplate(
w, r, "sources_new.html",
newSourceFormData(
"Name is required", name, description,
),
)
return
}
retentionDays := defaultRetentionDays
retentionDays, retErr := parseRetentionDays(
retentionStr, database.DefaultRetentionDays,
)
if retErr != nil {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
h.renderTemplate(
w, r, "sources_new.html",
newSourceFormData(
retentionErrorMessage(retErr),
name, description,
),
)
if retentionStr != "" {
v, convErr := strconv.Atoi(retentionStr)
if convErr == nil && v > 0 {
retentionDays = v
}
return
}
h.createWebhookWithEntrypoint(
@@ -314,10 +410,15 @@ func (h *Handlers) renderSourceDetail(
scheme = fwdProto
}
// The template calls Webhook methods, which take pointer
// receivers; html/template cannot address a value stored in a map.
data := map[string]any{
"Webhook": webhook,
tmplKeyWebhook: &webhook,
"Entrypoints": entrypoints,
"Targets": targets,
// Targets are projected to a display-safe view: the
// stored config blob holds credentials and must never
// reach a template.
"Targets": delivery.NewTargetViews(targets),
"Events": events,
"BaseURL": scheme + "://" + host,
}
@@ -351,8 +452,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceEdit() http.HandlerFunc {
}
data := map[string]any{
"Webhook": webhook,
"Error": "",
tmplKeyWebhook: &webhook,
tmplKeyError: "",
}
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "source_edit.html", data)
@@ -385,10 +486,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceEditSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift,
)
// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err = r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
http.Error(
@@ -408,15 +507,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyWebhookEdit(
r *http.Request,
webhook *database.Webhook,
) {
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift,
)
name := r.FormValue("name")
// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize middleware,
// which runs before CSRF parses the form.
name := r.PostFormValue("name")
if name == "" {
data := map[string]any{
"Webhook": *webhook,
"Error": "Name is required",
tmplKeyWebhook: webhook,
tmplKeyError: "Name is required",
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
@@ -426,8 +523,26 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyWebhookEdit(
}
webhook.Name = name
webhook.Description = r.FormValue("description")
h.parseRetention(r, webhook)
webhook.Description = r.PostFormValue("description")
// An empty field falls back to the stored value, so submitting the
// form without touching retention leaves the policy alone.
retentionDays, retErr := parseRetentionDays(
r.PostFormValue("retention_days"), webhook.RetentionDays,
)
if retErr != nil {
data := map[string]any{
tmplKeyWebhook: webhook,
tmplKeyError: retentionErrorMessage(retErr),
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
h.renderTemplate(w, r, "source_edit.html", data)
return
}
webhook.RetentionDays = retentionDays
err := h.db.DB().Save(webhook).Error
if err != nil {
@@ -441,23 +556,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) applyWebhookEdit(
)
}
// parseRetention parses and applies retention_days from the
// form.
func (h *Handlers) parseRetention(
r *http.Request,
webhook *database.Webhook,
) {
retStr := r.FormValue("retention_days")
if retStr == "" {
return
}
v, err := strconv.Atoi(retStr)
if err == nil && v > 0 {
webhook.RetentionDays = v
}
}
// HandleSourceDelete handles webhook deletion.
func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceDelete() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -532,6 +630,13 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteWebhookResources(
return
}
// Release the delivery engine's per-webhook archiving state
// so a deleted webhook's archive writer (and any handle open
// within its debounce window) does not linger for the
// process lifetime. The archive file itself is deliberately
// left on disk; see evictArchiveWriter.
h.evictArchiveWriter(webhook.ID)
err = h.dbMgr.DeleteDB(webhook.ID)
if err != nil {
h.log.Error(
@@ -550,29 +655,113 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteWebhookResources(
http.Redirect(w, r, "/sources", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
// HandleSourceLogs shows the request/response logs for a
// webhook.
func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceLogs() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// evictArchiveWriter asks the delivery engine to drop its
// cached archive writer for a webhook, closing the archive file
// handle.
//
// The archive database file is NOT deleted. Unlike the event
// database — which is per-webhook working storage and is
// hard-deleted with the webhook — an archive is explicitly
// long-term storage that an operator may want to keep or move
// away for offline retention. Destroying it as a side effect of
// deleting a webhook would be a surprising and unrecoverable
// data loss, so the file is left for the operator to handle.
func (h *Handlers) evictArchiveWriter(webhookID string) {
if h.evictor == nil {
return
}
h.evictor.EvictWebhook(webhookID)
}
// evictArchiveWriterIfUnused releases a webhook's archive
// writer once the webhook has no database target left to feed
// it.
//
// It is called after any child resource of a webhook is
// deleted, and is correct without knowing which kind was: it
// evicts only when no database target remains, so deleting one
// of several database targets — or deleting an unrelated
// target type — leaves a still-needed writer alone. When no
// database target ever existed there is no writer and eviction
// is a no-op. Soft-deleted targets are excluded by GORM's
// default scope, so the row just deleted is not counted.
func (h *Handlers) evictArchiveWriterIfUnused(webhookID string) {
var remaining int64
err := h.db.DB().
Model(&database.Target{}).
Where(
"webhook_id = ? AND type = ?",
webhookID, database.TargetTypeDatabase,
).
Count(&remaining).Error
if err != nil {
h.log.Error(
"failed to count remaining database targets",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"error", err,
)
return
}
if remaining > 0 {
return
}
h.evictArchiveWriter(webhookID)
}
// ownedWebhook resolves the request's sourceID parameter to a
// webhook the session's user owns.
//
// Ownership and existence are decided by one query, so a
// webhook belonging to another user is indistinguishable from
// one that does not exist: both are a 404, and neither confirms
// the id. Callers that reach further into a webhook's data —
// the event log page and the event body download — share this
// one check rather than restating it, so the download cannot
// come to authorize differently from the page that links to it.
//
// It reports false once it has written the response, which is a
// redirect to the login page for an unauthenticated request and
// a 404 otherwise. The caller returns without writing more.
func (h *Handlers) ownedWebhook(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
) (database.Webhook, bool) {
var webhook database.Webhook
userID, ok := h.getUserID(r)
if !ok {
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/pages/login", http.StatusSeeOther,
)
return
return database.Webhook{}, false
}
sourceID := chi.URLParam(r, "sourceID")
var webhook database.Webhook
err := h.db.DB().Where(
"id = ? AND user_id = ?", sourceID, userID,
).First(&webhook).Error
if err != nil {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return database.Webhook{}, false
}
return webhook, true
}
// HandleSourceLogs shows the request/response logs for a
// webhook.
func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceLogs() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
webhook, ok := h.ownedWebhook(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
@@ -589,7 +778,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceLogs() http.HandlerFunc {
}
data := map[string]any{
"Webhook": webhook,
tmplKeyWebhook: &webhook,
"Events": evts,
"Page": page,
"TotalPages": totalPages,
@@ -604,22 +793,27 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleSourceLogs() http.HandlerFunc {
}
}
// loadTargetMap loads targets into a map keyed by target ID.
// loadTargetMap loads targets into a map of display-safe
// views keyed by target ID. The projection happens here so
// that no caller can hand a raw target, configuration blob
// and all, to a template.
func (h *Handlers) loadTargetMap(
webhookID string,
) map[string]database.Target {
) map[string]delivery.TargetView {
var targets []database.Target
h.db.DB().Where(
"webhook_id = ?", webhookID,
).Find(&targets)
views := delivery.NewTargetViews(targets)
targetMap := make(
map[string]database.Target, len(targets),
map[string]delivery.TargetView, len(views),
)
for _, t := range targets {
targetMap[t.ID] = t
for _, v := range views {
targetMap[v.ID] = v
}
return targetMap
@@ -640,16 +834,18 @@ func (h *Handlers) parsePage(r *http.Request) int {
}
// loadEventsWithDeliveries loads paginated events and their
// deliveries from the per-webhook database.
// deliveries from the per-webhook database. Events come back
// as capped projections rather than database.Event rows: see
// eventLogColumns for why the cut happens in SQL.
func (h *Handlers) loadEventsWithDeliveries(
w http.ResponseWriter,
webhook database.Webhook,
targetMap map[string]database.Target,
targetMap map[string]delivery.TargetView,
page int,
) ([]EventWithDeliveries, int64) {
) ([]EventLogView, int64) {
var totalEvents int64
var result []EventWithDeliveries
var result []EventLogView
if !h.dbMgr.DBExists(webhook.ID) {
return result, totalEvents
@@ -670,35 +866,54 @@ func (h *Handlers) loadEventsWithDeliveries(
offset := (page - 1) * paginationPerPage
var events []database.Event
var rows []eventLogRow
webhookDB.Where(
webhookDB.Model(&database.Event{}).Select(
eventLogColumns, maxRenderedBodyBytes,
).Where(
"webhook_id = ?", webhook.ID,
).Order("created_at DESC").Offset(offset).Limit(
paginationPerPage,
).Find(&events)
).Find(&rows)
result = make([]EventWithDeliveries, len(events))
result = make([]EventLogView, len(rows))
for i := range events {
result[i].Event = events[i]
for i := range rows {
result[i] = rows[i].view()
var deliveries []database.Delivery
webhookDB.Where(
"event_id = ?", events[i].ID,
).Find(&result[i].Deliveries)
"event_id = ?", rows[i].ID,
).Find(&deliveries)
for j := range result[i].Deliveries {
tid := result[i].Deliveries[j].TargetID
if target, ok := targetMap[tid]; ok {
result[i].Deliveries[j].Target = target
}
}
result[i].Deliveries = newDeliveryViews(
deliveries, targetMap,
)
}
return result, totalEvents
}
// newDeliveryViews projects deliveries for rendering,
// resolving each one's target to its display-safe view.
func newDeliveryViews(
deliveries []database.Delivery,
targetMap map[string]delivery.TargetView,
) []DeliveryView {
views := make([]DeliveryView, len(deliveries))
for i := range deliveries {
views[i] = DeliveryView{
ID: deliveries[i].ID,
Status: deliveries[i].Status,
Target: targetMap[deliveries[i].TargetID],
}
}
return views
}
// HandleEntrypointCreate handles adding a new entrypoint.
func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -724,10 +939,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift,
)
// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err = r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
http.Error(
@@ -737,7 +950,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
description := r.FormValue("description")
description := r.PostFormValue("description")
entrypoint := &database.Entrypoint{
WebhookID: webhook.ID,
@@ -784,10 +997,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetCreate() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift,
)
// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err = r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
http.Error(
@@ -807,14 +1018,18 @@ func (h *Handlers) processTargetCreate(
r *http.Request,
webhook database.Webhook,
) {
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(
w, r.Body, 1<<maxBodyShift,
)
name := r.FormValue("name")
targetType := database.TargetType(r.FormValue("type"))
targetURL := r.FormValue("url")
maxRetriesStr := r.FormValue("max_retries")
// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize middleware,
// which runs before CSRF parses the form.
//
// Every field here is read with PostFormValue, not FormValue.
// FormValue falls back to the query string, which would let
// `POST /source/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/...`
// configure a target from a value the request line carries — and
// the request line, unlike the body, is what logs, proxies,
// Referer headers and error trackers record.
name := r.PostFormValue("name")
targetType := database.TargetType(r.PostFormValue("type"))
maxRetriesStr := r.PostFormValue("max_retries")
if name == "" {
http.Error(
@@ -834,7 +1049,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) processTargetCreate(
}
configJSON, err := h.buildTargetConfig(
w, r, targetType, targetURL,
w, r, targetType, targetFormInputFrom(r),
)
if err != nil {
return
@@ -891,19 +1106,61 @@ func parseNonNegativeInt(s string) int {
return 0
}
// buildTargetConfig builds the JSON config string for a target.
// targetFormInput carries the raw form values describing a target's
// configuration. Both the create and the edit path fill one and hand
// it to buildTargetConfig, so neither can come to validate a
// destination differently from the other.
type targetFormInput struct {
// URL is the destination for an HTTP target and the webhook URL
// for a Slack target.
URL string
// Headers is an HTTP target's headers, one "Name: value" per
// line.
Headers string
// Timeout is an HTTP target's per-request timeout in seconds.
Timeout string
// Expiry is a database (archive) target's row expiry.
Expiry string
}
// targetFormInputFrom reads the configuration fields from a request
// body. The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize middleware,
// which runs before CSRF parses the form.
//
// Every field is read with PostFormValue, not FormValue. FormValue
// falls back to the query string, which would let
// `POST /source/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/...`
// configure a target from a value the request line carries — and the
// request line, unlike the body, is what logs, proxies, Referer
// headers and error trackers record. The headers field is under the
// same rule and for the same reason: its values are authorization
// tokens.
func targetFormInputFrom(r *http.Request) targetFormInput {
return targetFormInput{
URL: r.PostFormValue("url"),
Headers: r.PostFormValue("headers"),
Timeout: r.PostFormValue("timeout"),
Expiry: r.PostFormValue("expiry"),
}
}
// buildTargetConfig builds the JSON config string for a target from
// the submitted form values, writing its own 4xx response on
// rejection. Which fields of in apply depends on the target type.
func (h *Handlers) buildTargetConfig(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
targetType database.TargetType,
targetURL string,
in targetFormInput,
) (string, error) {
switch targetType {
case database.TargetTypeHTTP:
return h.buildHTTPTargetConfig(w, r, targetURL)
return h.buildHTTPTargetConfig(w, r, in)
case database.TargetTypeSlack:
return h.buildSlackTargetConfig(w, r, targetURL)
case database.TargetTypeDatabase, database.TargetTypeLog:
return h.buildSlackTargetConfig(w, r, in.URL)
case database.TargetTypeDatabase:
return h.buildDatabaseTargetConfig(w, in.Expiry)
case database.TargetTypeLog:
return "", nil
default:
http.Error(
@@ -915,78 +1172,103 @@ func (h *Handlers) buildTargetConfig(
}
}
// buildHTTPTargetConfig builds config JSON for an HTTP target.
// buildHTTPTargetConfig builds config JSON for an HTTP target: an
// SSRF-validated destination plus the optional headers and timeout
// the delivery path honours.
func (h *Handlers) buildHTTPTargetConfig(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
targetURL string,
in targetFormInput,
) (string, error) {
if targetURL == "" {
http.Error(
w,
"URL is required for HTTP targets",
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return "", errMissingURL
}
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
r.Context(), targetURL,
err := h.validateTargetURL(
w, r, in.URL, "URL is required for HTTP targets",
)
if err != nil {
h.log.Warn(
"target URL blocked by SSRF protection",
"url", targetURL,
"error", err,
)
return "", err
}
headers, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(in.Headers)
if err != nil {
http.Error(
w,
"Invalid target URL: "+err.Error(),
"Invalid headers: "+err.Error(),
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return "", err
}
cfg := map[string]any{"url": targetURL}
configBytes, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
timeout, err := delivery.ParseTargetTimeout(in.Timeout)
if err != nil {
http.Error(
w, "Internal server error",
http.StatusInternalServerError,
w,
"Invalid timeout: "+err.Error(),
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return "", err
}
return string(configBytes), nil
return marshalTargetConfig(w, delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
URL: in.URL,
Headers: headers,
Timeout: timeout,
})
}
// buildSlackTargetConfig builds config JSON for a Slack target.
// buildSlackTargetConfig builds config JSON for a Slack target,
// whose whole configuration is one SSRF-validated webhook URL.
func (h *Handlers) buildSlackTargetConfig(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
targetURL string,
) (string, error) {
err := h.validateTargetURL(
w, r, targetURL,
"Webhook URL is required for Slack targets",
)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return marshalTargetConfig(w, delivery.SlackTargetConfig{
WebhookURL: targetURL,
})
}
// validateTargetURL rejects an empty or SSRF-blocked destination,
// writing the 400 itself. missingMsg is the error shown when no URL
// is given.
//
// It is the single point at which a user-supplied destination enters
// the SSRF guard, on create and on edit alike. An edit path that
// reached storage without passing through here would reopen the hole
// the guard closes.
func (h *Handlers) validateTargetURL(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
targetURL, missingMsg string,
) error {
if targetURL == "" {
http.Error(
w,
"Webhook URL is required for Slack targets",
missingMsg,
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return "", errMissingURL
return errMissingURL
}
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
r.Context(), targetURL,
)
if err != nil {
// The submitted URL can be a credential (a Slack
// incoming webhook URL is a bearer token), so the log
// records only its scheme and host.
h.log.Warn(
"target URL blocked by SSRF protection",
"url", targetURL,
"url", delivery.MaskURL(targetURL),
"error", err,
)
http.Error(
@@ -995,11 +1277,18 @@ func (h *Handlers) buildSlackTargetConfig(
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return "", err
return err
}
cfg := map[string]any{"webhookUrl": targetURL}
return nil
}
// marshalTargetConfig serialises a target configuration for storage,
// writing a 500 itself if it cannot.
func marshalTargetConfig(
w http.ResponseWriter,
cfg any,
) (string, error) {
configBytes, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
if err != nil {
http.Error(
@@ -1013,28 +1302,67 @@ func (h *Handlers) buildSlackTargetConfig(
return string(configBytes), nil
}
// buildDatabaseTargetConfig builds config JSON for a database
// (archive) target. The optional expiry (a form value read by
// the caller, which bounds the request body) is validated here,
// at creation time, so an unparseable value is rejected with a
// 400 instead of failing every subsequent delivery. An empty
// expiry yields an empty config (the keep-forever default).
func (h *Handlers) buildDatabaseTargetConfig(
w http.ResponseWriter,
expiry string,
) (string, error) {
expiry = strings.TrimSpace(expiry)
if expiry == "" {
return "", nil
}
err := delivery.ValidateArchiveExpiry(expiry)
if err != nil {
http.Error(
w,
"Invalid archive expiry: "+err.Error(),
http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return "", err
}
return marshalTargetConfig(
w, map[string]any{"expiry": expiry},
)
}
// HandleEntrypointDelete handles deleting an entrypoint.
func (h *Handlers) HandleEntrypointDelete() http.HandlerFunc {
return h.deleteChildResource(
"entrypointID", &database.Entrypoint{},
"failed to delete entrypoint",
nil,
)
}
// HandleTargetDelete handles deleting a target.
// HandleTargetDelete handles deleting a target. Deleting the
// last database target of a webhook leaves its archive writer
// with nothing to write, so the writer is evicted and its
// handle closed; the archive file is left on disk.
func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetDelete() http.HandlerFunc {
return h.deleteChildResource(
"targetID", &database.Target{},
"failed to delete target",
h.evictArchiveWriterIfUnused,
)
}
// deleteChildResource returns a handler that deletes a child
// resource (entrypoint or target) belonging to a webhook.
// resource (entrypoint or target) belonging to a webhook. The
// optional afterDelete hook runs with the webhook's id once the
// delete has succeeded, before the redirect.
func (h *Handlers) deleteChildResource(
idParam string,
model any,
errMsg string,
afterDelete func(webhookID string),
) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := h.getUserID(r)
@@ -1074,6 +1402,10 @@ func (h *Handlers) deleteChildResource(
return
}
if afterDelete != nil {
afterDelete(webhook.ID)
}
http.Redirect(
w, r,
"/source/"+webhook.ID,

589
internal/handlers/source_management_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,589 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
const (
// sourceTestUserID is the session user id used by the webhook
// management tests.
sourceTestUserID = "source-test-user"
// sourceIDParam is the chi URL parameter naming a webhook.
sourceIDParam = "sourceID"
)
// formRequest builds an urlencoded POST to path carrying the given
// cookies, plus any chi URL parameters the handler reads.
func formRequest(
path string,
cookies []*http.Cookie,
form url.Values,
urlParams map[string]string,
) *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
path,
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()),
)
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
)
for _, c := range cookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
for k, v := range urlParams {
rctx.URLParams.Add(k, v)
}
return req.WithContext(
context.WithValue(req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx),
)
}
// getRequest builds a GET to path carrying the given cookies, plus any
// chi URL parameters the handler reads.
func getRequest(
t *testing.T,
path string,
cookies []*http.Cookie,
urlParams map[string]string,
) *http.Request {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, path, nil,
)
for _, c := range cookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
for k, v := range urlParams {
rctx.URLParams.Add(k, v)
}
return req.WithContext(
context.WithValue(req.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx),
)
}
// submitCreate posts the webhook creation form with the given
// retention_days value (omitted entirely when retention is nil) and
// returns the recorder.
func submitCreate(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
cookies []*http.Cookie,
name string,
retention *string,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("name", name)
if retention != nil {
form.Set("retention_days", *retention)
}
req := formRequest("/sources/new", cookies, form, nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSourceCreateSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
}
// onlyWebhook loads the single webhook belonging to the test user.
func onlyWebhook(
t *testing.T,
db *database.Database,
) database.Webhook {
t.Helper()
var webhooks []database.Webhook
require.NoError(
t,
db.DB().Where("user_id = ?", sourceTestUserID).
Find(&webhooks).Error,
)
require.Len(t, webhooks, 1)
return webhooks[0]
}
// seedWebhookWithRetention inserts a webhook owned by the test user
// with an exact stored retention value, bypassing Webhook.BeforeSave
// via a column-level update so that legacy rows can be planted too.
func seedWebhookWithRetention(
t *testing.T,
db *database.Database,
retentionDays int,
) database.Webhook {
t.Helper()
wh := &database.Webhook{
UserID: sourceTestUserID,
Name: "seeded",
RetentionDays: retentionDays,
}
require.NoError(
t,
db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(wh).Error,
)
require.NoError(
t,
db.DB().Model(wh).
Update("retention_days", retentionDays).Error,
)
wh.RetentionDays = retentionDays
return *wh
}
// storedRetentionDays reads the retention_days column for a webhook.
func storedRetentionDays(
t *testing.T,
db *database.Database,
id string,
) int {
t.Helper()
var got int
require.NoError(
t,
db.DB().Model(&database.Webhook{}).
Where("id = ?", id).
Pluck("retention_days", &got).Error,
)
return got
}
// sourceTestEnv bundles the handler, session, and database a webhook
// management test drives.
type sourceTestEnv struct {
handlers *handlers.Handlers
db *database.Database
cookies []*http.Cookie
}
func setupSourceTest(t *testing.T) *sourceTestEnv {
t.Helper()
var h *handlers.Handlers
var sess *session.Session
var db *database.Database
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess, &db)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
return &sourceTestEnv{
handlers: h,
db: db,
cookies: authenticatedCookies(
t, sess, sourceTestUserID, "sourceuser",
),
}
}
// TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_ZeroRetentionPersistsForever is the core
// regression test for the bug: the create form's 0 must reach the
// database as the retain-forever sentinel rather than being replaced by
// the column's default of 30.
func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_ZeroRetentionPersistsForever(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
zero := "0"
w := submitCreate(t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "forever", &zero)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
wh := onlyWebhook(t, env.db)
assert.Equal(
t,
database.RetentionForeverDays,
storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
)
assert.True(t, wh.RetainsForever())
}
func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_OmittedRetentionUsesDefault(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
w := submitCreate(t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "defaulted", nil)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
wh := onlyWebhook(t, env.db)
assert.Equal(
t,
database.DefaultRetentionDays,
storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
)
}
// TestHandleSourceCreate_PrefillsDefaultFromConstant keeps the create
// form's pre-filled retention from becoming a third hardcoded copy of
// the 30-day policy.
func TestHandleSourceCreate_PrefillsDefaultFromConstant(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
env.handlers.HandleSourceCreate().ServeHTTP(
w, getRequest(t, "/sources/new", env.cookies, nil),
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
body := w.Body.String()
assert.Contains(
t, body,
`value="`+strconv.Itoa(database.DefaultRetentionDays)+`"`,
)
assert.NotContains(
t, body, `max="365"`,
"a max below the sentinel would block retain-forever",
)
assert.Contains(t, body, `min="0"`)
}
func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_InvalidRetentionIsRejected(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
for _, raw := range []string{"abc", "-1", "3.5"} {
t.Run(raw, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
w := submitCreate(
t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "bad", &raw,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
assert.Contains(
t, w.Body.String(), "Retention must be",
)
var count int64
require.NoError(
t,
env.db.DB().Model(&database.Webhook{}).
Where("user_id = ?", sourceTestUserID).
Count(&count).Error,
)
assert.Zero(
t, count,
"no webhook may be created from a rejected form",
)
})
}
}
// TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_OverflowingRetentionIsRejected covers
// the data-loss path directly: a finite retention above the largest one
// the reaper's cutoff arithmetic can represent must never reach the
// database, because the sweep would compute a future cutoff and delete
// every event the webhook has.
func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_OverflowingRetentionIsRejected(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
tooBig := strconv.Itoa(database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays + 1)
env := setupSourceTest(t)
w := submitCreate(t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "huge", &tooBig)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
assert.Contains(
t, w.Body.String(),
strconv.Itoa(database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays),
"the form tells the user the actual ceiling",
)
var count int64
require.NoError(
t,
env.db.DB().Model(&database.Webhook{}).
Where("user_id = ?", sourceTestUserID).
Count(&count).Error,
)
assert.Zero(
t, count,
"no webhook may be created from a rejected form",
)
}
// TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_SentinelIsAcceptedAsForever guards the
// boundary between "too large to represent" and "retain forever": the
// sentinel is above MaxFiniteRetentionDays, but it is the value the
// edit form pre-fills, so it must be accepted rather than rejected as
// out of range.
func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_SentinelIsAcceptedAsForever(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
sentinel := strconv.Itoa(database.RetentionForeverDays)
w := submitCreate(t, env.handlers, env.cookies, "forever", &sentinel)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
wh := onlyWebhook(t, env.db)
assert.Equal(
t,
database.RetentionForeverDays,
storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
)
}
// TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_RejectedFormKeepsUserInput checks that a
// validation failure hands the user's typing back, matching what the
// edit form already does. Losing a long description to a mistyped
// retention value is the kind of thing that makes people give up on a
// form.
func TestHandleSourceCreateSubmit_RejectedFormKeepsUserInput(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
const (
name = "kept-name"
description = "a description worth not losing"
)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("name", name)
form.Set("description", description)
form.Set("retention_days", "nonsense")
req := formRequest("/sources/new", env.cookies, form, nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
env.handlers.HandleSourceCreateSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
body := w.Body.String()
assert.Contains(t, body, `value="`+name+`"`)
assert.Contains(t, body, description)
}
// submitEdit posts the webhook edit form for the given webhook.
func submitEdit(
t *testing.T,
env *sourceTestEnv,
wh database.Webhook,
retention string,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("name", wh.Name)
form.Set("description", wh.Description)
form.Set("retention_days", retention)
req := formRequest(
"/source/"+wh.ID+"/edit",
env.cookies,
form,
map[string]string{sourceIDParam: wh.ID},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
env.handlers.HandleSourceEditSubmit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
}
func TestHandleSourceEditSubmit_ZeroRetentionPersistsForever(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(
t, env.db, database.DefaultRetentionDays,
)
w := submitEdit(t, env, wh, "0")
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
database.RetentionForeverDays,
storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
)
}
func TestHandleSourceEditSubmit_InvalidRetentionIsRejected(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(
t, env.db, database.DefaultRetentionDays,
)
w := submitEdit(t, env, wh, "not-a-number")
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
assert.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), "Retention must be")
assert.Equal(
t,
database.DefaultRetentionDays,
storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
"a rejected form must not change the stored retention",
)
}
func TestHandleSourceEditSubmit_EmptyRetentionLeavesValueUnchanged(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 7)
w := submitEdit(t, env, wh, "")
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
assert.Equal(t, 7, storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID))
}
// TestSourceEditForm_ForeverWebhookRoundTrips walks the exact path that
// the removed max="365" cap used to break: render the edit form for a
// retain-forever webhook, confirm the pre-filled sentinel is not capped
// by browser validation, then submit that pre-filled value straight
// back and confirm the retention policy survives untouched.
func TestSourceEditForm_ForeverWebhookRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(
t, env.db, database.RetentionForeverDays,
)
req := getRequest(
t, "/source/"+wh.ID+"/edit", env.cookies,
map[string]string{sourceIDParam: wh.ID},
)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
env.handlers.HandleSourceEdit().ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
sentinel := strconv.Itoa(database.RetentionForeverDays)
body := w.Body.String()
assert.Contains(
t, body, `value="`+sentinel+`"`,
"the edit form pre-fills the stored retention",
)
assert.NotContains(
t, body, `max="365"`,
"a max below the sentinel would block saving any edit",
)
// "Currently forever." is the rendered RetentionLabel, not the
// static hint below the input, which says "Enter 0 to retain events
// forever." A bare Contains of "forever" would pass for any
// webhook and would assert nothing about this one.
assert.Contains(
t, body, "Currently forever.",
"the form reports this webhook's policy as forever",
)
// Submit the pre-filled value back, exactly as a browser would.
post := submitEdit(t, env, wh, sentinel)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, post.Code)
assert.Equal(
t,
database.RetentionForeverDays,
storedRetentionDays(t, env.db, wh.ID),
)
}
// TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotTheSentinelNumber checks that
// the retain-forever value is never rendered to the user as a raw day
// count on either read-only view.
func TestSourceListAndDetail_ShowForeverNotTheSentinelNumber(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
wh := seedWebhookWithRetention(
t, env.db, database.RetentionForeverDays,
)
sentinel := strconv.Itoa(database.RetentionForeverDays)
listW := httptest.NewRecorder()
env.handlers.HandleSourceList().ServeHTTP(
listW, getRequest(t, "/sources", env.cookies, nil),
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, listW.Code)
assert.Contains(t, listW.Body.String(), "Retention: forever")
assert.NotContains(t, listW.Body.String(), sentinel)
detailW := httptest.NewRecorder()
env.handlers.HandleSourceDetail().ServeHTTP(
detailW,
getRequest(
t, "/source/"+wh.ID, env.cookies,
map[string]string{sourceIDParam: wh.ID},
),
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, detailW.Code)
assert.Contains(t, detailW.Body.String(), "Retention: forever")
assert.NotContains(t, detailW.Body.String(), sentinel)
}

206
internal/handlers/target_create_query_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
)
// targetSecretSegments are the path segments of an incoming-webhook
// URL. For Slack, Discord and Teams the path IS the bearer credential,
// so this string must not reach storage or the access log by way of
// the request line.
const targetSecretSegments = "T00000000/B00000000/QQTARGETSECRETQQ"
// targetSecretURL is a destination whose secret lives in its path. It
// uses a literal public address rather than a hostname so the SSRF
// check resolves nothing: with a hostname, a sandbox without DNS would
// reject the URL for the wrong reason and the test would pass even
// with the defect reintroduced.
const targetSecretURL = "https://93.184.216.34/services/" +
targetSecretSegments
// targetsForWebhook returns every target stored against a webhook.
func targetsForWebhook(
t *testing.T,
db *database.Database,
webhookID string,
) []database.Target {
t.Helper()
var targets []database.Target
require.NoError(
t,
db.DB().Where("webhook_id = ?", webhookID).
Find(&targets).Error,
)
return targets
}
// postTargetCreate drives HandleTargetCreate through the production
// access-log middleware and a chi route, so the logged url field is
// produced exactly as it ships, and returns the recorder plus the
// captured log.
func postTargetCreate(
t *testing.T,
env *sourceTestEnv,
webhookID string,
query string,
form url.Values,
) (*httptest.ResponseRecorder, string) {
t.Helper()
logBuf := new(bytes.Buffer)
mw := middleware.NewForTest(
slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(
logBuf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelInfo},
)),
&config.Config{Environment: config.EnvironmentDev},
nil,
)
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.Use(mw.Logging())
router.Post(
"/source/{sourceID}/targets",
env.handlers.HandleTargetCreate(),
)
target := "/source/" + webhookID + "/targets"
if query != "" {
target += "?" + query
}
body := ""
if form != nil {
body = form.Encode()
}
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
target,
strings.NewReader(body),
)
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
)
for _, c := range env.cookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w, logBuf.String()
}
// TestHandleTargetCreate_QueryStringURLDoesNotConfigureATarget is the
// regression test for the ingress leak. r.FormValue falls back to the
// query string when a field is absent from the POST body, so
//
// POST /source/{id}/targets?url=https://hooks.slack.com/services/...
//
// with an empty url field used to create a working target from a value
// carried on the request line — where logs, proxies, Referer headers
// and error trackers record it. The handler reads the body only, so
// the request is rejected for a missing URL and stores nothing.
//
// name and type are sent in the BODY on purpose: the request has to
// get past those two validations for the assertion to be about the url
// read specifically.
func TestHandleTargetCreate_QueryStringURLDoesNotConfigureATarget(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
webhook := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 30)
body := url.Values{}
body.Set("name", "leaky")
body.Set("type", string(database.TargetTypeSlack))
w, logged := postTargetCreate(
t, env, webhook.ID,
"url="+url.QueryEscape(targetSecretURL),
body,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
targets := targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID)
assert.Empty(
t, targets,
"a query-string value must not populate a target config",
)
assert.NotContains(t, logged, targetSecretSegments)
assert.NotContains(t, logged, "93.184.216.34")
assert.NotEmpty(t, logged, "the access log line must still be written")
}
// TestHandleTargetCreate_BodyURLStillCreatesTheTarget is the positive
// control for the test above: the rejection has to come from where the
// value was read, not from the handler being broken.
func TestHandleTargetCreate_BodyURLStillCreatesTheTarget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
webhook := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 30)
body := url.Values{}
body.Set("name", "legit")
body.Set("type", string(database.TargetTypeSlack))
body.Set("url", targetSecretURL)
w, logged := postTargetCreate(t, env, webhook.ID, "", body)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code)
targets := targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID)
require.Len(t, targets, 1)
assert.Contains(t, targets[0].Config, targetSecretSegments)
// The body carried the credential, so the access log must still
// not have it: the log records the request line only.
assert.NotContains(t, logged, targetSecretSegments)
}
// TestHandleTargetCreate_QueryStringCannotSupplyNameOrType covers the
// rest of the converted reads on this handler in one request: with an
// empty body, nothing the query carries is visible to it.
func TestHandleTargetCreate_QueryStringCannotSupplyNameOrType(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
webhook := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 30)
w, _ := postTargetCreate(
t, env, webhook.ID,
"name=leaky&type=slack&max_retries=9&expiry=30d&url="+
url.QueryEscape(targetSecretURL),
url.Values{},
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
assert.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), "Name is required")
assert.Empty(t, targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID))
}

221
internal/handlers/target_edit.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
package handlers
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// targetEditTemplate is the page the target edit form renders.
const targetEditTemplate = "target_edit.html"
// tmplKeyTarget is the template data key for the target being
// edited, and tmplKeyMaxTimeout for the timeout ceiling the form
// tells the user about.
const (
tmplKeyTarget = "Target"
tmplKeyMaxTimeout = "MaxTimeout"
)
// configUnreadableMessage is shown when a target's stored
// configuration does not parse. It says plainly that saving replaces
// the stored value rather than preserving it, because the form
// cannot pre-fill what it could not read.
const configUnreadableMessage = "The stored configuration for this " +
"target could not be read. Enter the values below; saving " +
"replaces the stored configuration."
// targetEditView is the display model for the target edit page.
//
// It carries the target's row fields alongside its UNMASKED
// configuration, and deliberately omits database.Target's raw
// Config blob: the form renders named fields, and giving the
// template the blob as well would put an unreviewed second path to
// the credential on the page.
type targetEditView struct {
ID string
Name string
Type database.TargetType
Active bool
MaxRetries int
Config delivery.TargetConfigForm
}
// HandleTargetEdit shows the form to edit a target.
//
// This page is the one place the full destination URL and header
// values are shown. It is reachable only through the
// /source/{sourceID} route group, which supplies RequireAuth and
// NoCache, and only for a target of a webhook the session's user
// owns; masking (delivery.TargetView) is unchanged everywhere else.
func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetEdit() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
webhook, target, ok := h.ownedTarget(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
cfg, err := delivery.NewTargetConfigForm(target)
msg := ""
if err != nil {
// The error carries the parse failure, never the
// blob, so it is safe to log against the target id.
h.log.Warn(
"stored target config could not be read for editing",
"target_id", target.ID,
"error", err,
)
msg = configUnreadableMessage
}
h.renderTargetEdit(w, r, webhook, target, cfg, msg)
}
}
// HandleTargetEditSubmit handles the target edit form submission.
func (h *Handlers) HandleTargetEditSubmit() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
webhook, target, ok := h.ownedTarget(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
// The body size cap is enforced by the MaxBodySize
// middleware, which runs before CSRF parses the form.
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
http.Error(
w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
h.applyTargetEdit(w, r, webhook, target)
}
}
// applyTargetEdit validates and saves target edits.
//
// The submitted configuration goes through buildTargetConfig, the
// same builder the create path uses, so an edited destination is
// SSRF-validated exactly as a new one is.
//
// The target's type is not editable. Each type stores a different
// configuration shape and its delivery history is recorded against
// the target row, so changing the type of an existing target is
// really the creation of a different one. The stored type decides
// which fields the form offers and which builder runs.
func (h *Handlers) applyTargetEdit(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
webhook database.Webhook,
target *database.Target,
) {
name := r.PostFormValue("name")
if name == "" {
http.Error(
w, "Name is required", http.StatusBadRequest,
)
return
}
configJSON, err := h.buildTargetConfig(
w, r, target.Type, targetFormInputFrom(r),
)
if err != nil {
// buildTargetConfig has already written the response.
return
}
target.Name = name
target.Config = configJSON
// Retries are offered only by the forms for target types that
// retry, so an absent field means "this form does not edit
// retries" rather than "set them to zero". Reading it
// unconditionally would silently disable retries on any target
// saved from a form that does not render the input.
if r.PostForm.Has("max_retries") {
target.MaxRetries = parseNonNegativeInt(
r.PostFormValue("max_retries"),
)
}
err = h.db.DB().Save(target).Error
if err != nil {
h.serverError(w, "failed to update target", err)
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/source/"+webhook.ID, http.StatusSeeOther,
)
}
// renderTargetEdit renders the target edit page with an optional
// error message.
func (h *Handlers) renderTargetEdit(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
webhook database.Webhook,
target *database.Target,
cfg delivery.TargetConfigForm,
errMsg string,
) {
// The template calls Webhook methods, which take pointer
// receivers; html/template cannot address a value stored in a
// map.
data := map[string]any{
tmplKeyWebhook: &webhook,
tmplKeyTarget: targetEditView{
ID: target.ID,
Name: target.Name,
Type: target.Type,
Active: target.Active,
MaxRetries: target.MaxRetries,
Config: cfg,
},
tmplKeyMaxTimeout: delivery.MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds,
tmplKeyError: errMsg,
}
h.renderTemplate(w, r, targetEditTemplate, data)
}
// ownedTarget resolves the request's sourceID and targetID
// parameters to a target of a webhook the session's user owns.
//
// Ownership is decided by the webhook, and the target is then
// scoped to that webhook, so a target id belonging to someone
// else's webhook is a 404 rather than an edit of their target. It
// reports false once it has written the response.
func (h *Handlers) ownedTarget(
w http.ResponseWriter,
r *http.Request,
) (database.Webhook, *database.Target, bool) {
webhook, ok := h.ownedWebhook(w, r)
if !ok {
return database.Webhook{}, nil, false
}
var target database.Target
err := h.db.DB().Where(
"id = ? AND webhook_id = ?",
chi.URLParam(r, "targetID"), webhook.ID,
).First(&target).Error
if err != nil {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return database.Webhook{}, nil, false
}
return webhook, &target, true
}

637
internal/handlers/target_edit_test.go Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,637 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// The destinations the target edit tests configure. Both are literal
// public addresses rather than hostnames so the SSRF check resolves
// nothing: with a hostname, a sandbox without DNS would reject the
// URL for the wrong reason and a test asserting rejection would pass
// even with the guard removed.
const (
editOriginalURL = "https://93.184.216.34/hooks/original"
editReplacedURL = "https://93.184.216.34/hooks/replaced"
// editBlockedURL resolves to loopback, which the SSRF guard
// refuses. It is what proves the guard runs on the edit path.
editBlockedURL = "http://127.0.0.1/hooks/internal"
)
// editAuthHeader carries a bearer credential, the case the headers
// field exists for.
const (
editBearerSecret = "QQEDITSECRETQQ"
editAuthHeader = "Authorization: Bearer " + editBearerSecret
)
// targetRouter mounts the target create and edit routes on a chi
// router so the handlers see the URL parameters they read.
func targetRouter(env *sourceTestEnv) *chi.Mux {
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.Post(
"/source/{sourceID}/targets",
env.handlers.HandleTargetCreate(),
)
router.Get(
"/source/{sourceID}/targets/{targetID}/edit",
env.handlers.HandleTargetEdit(),
)
router.Post(
"/source/{sourceID}/targets/{targetID}/edit",
env.handlers.HandleTargetEditSubmit(),
)
return router
}
// serveTarget drives one request through the target routes as the
// authenticated test user.
func serveTarget(
env *sourceTestEnv,
method, path string,
form url.Values,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
body := ""
if form != nil {
body = form.Encode()
}
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), method, path,
strings.NewReader(body),
)
if form != nil {
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type",
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
)
}
for _, c := range env.cookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
targetRouter(env).ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
}
// seedHTTPTarget creates a webhook and an HTTP target on it through
// the real create handler, so every case starts from a target the
// production path produced rather than a hand-written row.
//
// Standing the fx app up is what a handler test mostly costs, and
// internal/handlers is already the slowest package in the suite, so
// the tests below share one env per test function and give each case
// its own webhook rather than its own app.
func seedHTTPTarget(
t *testing.T,
env *sourceTestEnv,
headers, timeout string,
) (database.Webhook, database.Target) {
t.Helper()
webhook := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 30)
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("name", "original-name")
form.Set("type", string(database.TargetTypeHTTP))
form.Set("url", editOriginalURL)
form.Set("headers", headers)
form.Set("timeout", timeout)
form.Set("max_retries", "3")
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost,
"/source/"+webhook.ID+"/targets", form,
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, w.Body.String())
targets := targetsForWebhook(t, env.db, webhook.ID)
require.Len(t, targets, 1)
return webhook, targets[0]
}
// storedTarget reloads a target row.
func storedTarget(
t *testing.T,
env *sourceTestEnv,
targetID string,
) database.Target {
t.Helper()
var target database.Target
require.NoError(
t,
env.db.DB().Where("id = ?", targetID).
First(&target).Error,
)
return target
}
// storedHTTPConfig reloads a target and parses its stored HTTP
// configuration.
func storedHTTPConfig(
t *testing.T,
env *sourceTestEnv,
targetID string,
) delivery.HTTPTargetConfig {
t.Helper()
var cfg delivery.HTTPTargetConfig
require.NoError(
t,
json.Unmarshal(
[]byte(storedTarget(t, env, targetID).Config), &cfg,
),
)
return cfg
}
// editForm is the fully populated edit submission for an HTTP
// target.
func editForm(targetURL, headers, timeout string) url.Values {
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("name", "edited-name")
form.Set("url", targetURL)
form.Set("headers", headers)
form.Set("timeout", timeout)
form.Set("max_retries", "5")
return form
}
// submitTargetEdit posts the edit form for a target.
func submitTargetEdit(
env *sourceTestEnv,
webhookID, targetID string,
form url.Values,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
return serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost,
"/source/"+webhookID+"/targets/"+targetID+"/edit",
form,
)
}
// TestHandleTargetCreate_Configuration covers the half of the gap
// that is not about editing at all: HTTPTargetConfig has carried
// Headers and Timeout, and the delivery path has honoured them, but
// the create form wrote {"url":...} and nothing else, so a
// destination needing an Authorization header could not be
// configured through the UI at all.
func TestHandleTargetCreate_Configuration(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
t.Run("stores headers and timeout", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertCreateStoresHeadersAndTimeout(t, env)
})
t.Run("without them keeps a url-only config", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertCreateKeepsURLOnlyConfig(t, env)
})
}
func assertCreateStoresHeadersAndTimeout(
t *testing.T, env *sourceTestEnv,
) {
t.Helper()
_, target := seedHTTPTarget(
t, env, editAuthHeader+"\nX-Tenant: acme\n", "12",
)
cfg := storedHTTPConfig(t, env, target.ID)
assert.Equal(t, editOriginalURL, cfg.URL)
assert.Equal(t, 12, cfg.Timeout)
assert.Equal(
t,
map[string]string{
"Authorization": "Bearer " + editBearerSecret,
"X-Tenant": "acme",
},
cfg.Headers,
)
}
// Without the new fields the stored shape must be the same
// {"url":...} the create form wrote before they existed, so no
// existing target's configuration is rewritten by this change.
func assertCreateKeepsURLOnlyConfig(
t *testing.T, env *sourceTestEnv,
) {
t.Helper()
_, target := seedHTTPTarget(t, env, "", "")
assert.JSONEq(
t, `{"url":"`+editOriginalURL+`"}`, target.Config,
)
}
// TestHandleTargetEditSubmit_Saves is the round trip the issue asks
// for: create a target, edit it, and confirm the stored config
// changed.
func TestHandleTargetEditSubmit_Saves(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
t.Run("changes the destination URL", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertEditChangesDestination(t, env)
})
t.Run("round trips headers and timeout", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertEditRoundTripsHeadersAndTimeout(t, env)
})
t.Run("clearing them removes them", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertEditClearingRemovesThem(t, env)
})
t.Run("absent max_retries is not zeroed", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertEditKeepsAbsentMaxRetries(t, env)
})
}
func assertEditChangesDestination(
t *testing.T, env *sourceTestEnv,
) {
t.Helper()
webhook, target := seedHTTPTarget(t, env, "", "")
w := submitTargetEdit(
env, webhook.ID, target.ID,
editForm(editReplacedURL, "", ""),
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, w.Body.String())
assert.Equal(
t,
editReplacedURL,
storedHTTPConfig(t, env, target.ID).URL,
)
reloaded := storedTarget(t, env, target.ID)
assert.Equal(t, "edited-name", reloaded.Name)
assert.Equal(t, 5, reloaded.MaxRetries)
assert.Equal(
t, database.TargetTypeHTTP, reloaded.Type,
"the edit form must not change a target's type",
)
}
// The two previously unreachable fields must survive create,
// pre-fill and save.
func assertEditRoundTripsHeadersAndTimeout(
t *testing.T, env *sourceTestEnv,
) {
t.Helper()
webhook, target := seedHTTPTarget(t, env, editAuthHeader, "7")
w := submitTargetEdit(
env, webhook.ID, target.ID,
editForm(
editOriginalURL,
"Authorization: Bearer rotated\nX-Trace: on",
"21",
),
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, w.Body.String())
cfg := storedHTTPConfig(t, env, target.ID)
assert.Equal(t, 21, cfg.Timeout)
assert.Equal(
t,
map[string]string{
"Authorization": "Bearer rotated",
"X-Trace": "on",
},
cfg.Headers,
)
}
// The direction a naive "only set what was submitted" implementation
// gets wrong: an emptied field must remove the stored value, not
// leave the previous one in place.
func assertEditClearingRemovesThem(
t *testing.T, env *sourceTestEnv,
) {
t.Helper()
webhook, target := seedHTTPTarget(t, env, editAuthHeader, "7")
w := submitTargetEdit(
env, webhook.ID, target.ID,
editForm(editOriginalURL, "", ""),
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, w.Body.String())
cfg := storedHTTPConfig(t, env, target.ID)
assert.Empty(t, cfg.Headers)
assert.Zero(t, cfg.Timeout)
}
// Retries are offered only by the forms for target types that retry.
// An absent field means the form does not edit retries, not that
// they should be turned off.
func assertEditKeepsAbsentMaxRetries(
t *testing.T, env *sourceTestEnv,
) {
t.Helper()
webhook, target := seedHTTPTarget(t, env, "", "")
require.Equal(t, 3, target.MaxRetries)
form := editForm(editOriginalURL, "", "")
form.Del("max_retries")
w := submitTargetEdit(env, webhook.ID, target.ID, form)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, w.Code, w.Body.String())
assert.Equal(
t, 3, storedTarget(t, env, target.ID).MaxRetries,
)
}
// TestHandleTargetEdit_PrefillsTheStoredValuesUnmasked covers the
// deliberate exception to the masking rule. The operator cannot
// correct a value they cannot see, so this page — and only this page
// — renders the destination and the header values in full.
func TestHandleTargetEdit_PrefillsTheStoredValuesUnmasked(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
webhook, target := seedHTTPTarget(t, env, editAuthHeader, "7")
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodGet,
"/source/"+webhook.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit",
nil,
)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
page := w.Body.String()
assert.Contains(t, page, editOriginalURL)
assert.Contains(t, page, "Bearer "+editBearerSecret)
assert.Contains(t, page, `value="7"`)
assert.Contains(t, page, "original-name")
}
// TestHandleTargetEditSubmit_Rejects covers every submission that
// must not reach storage.
//
// The SSRF case is the most important assertion on this change: the
// edited destination goes through the same guard the create path
// uses. An edit that stored an unvalidated URL would reopen a closed
// hole, since a target could then be created public and edited to
// point at loopback.
//
// The header and timeout cases keep input that could not be
// delivered as written out of storage: a stored value that provably
// never reaches the wire reports a configuration that did not take
// effect.
func TestHandleTargetEditSubmit_Rejects(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
t.Run("an SSRF-blocked destination", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertEditRejectsBlockedDestination(t, env)
})
t.Run("a query-string destination", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertEditIgnoresQueryString(t, env)
})
headerCases := map[string]string{
"no colon": "Authorization Bearer token",
"empty name": ": value",
"invalid name": "X Bad Name: value",
"reserved header": "User-Agent: curl/8",
"duplicate name": "X-A: one\nx-a: two",
}
for name, headers := range headerCases {
t.Run("headers: "+name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertEditRejectsHeaders(t, env, headers)
})
}
timeoutCases := map[string]string{
"not a number": "soon",
"negative": "-1",
"over ceiling": "100000",
}
for name, timeout := range timeoutCases {
t.Run("timeout: "+name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertEditRejectsTimeout(t, env, timeout)
})
}
}
func assertEditRejectsBlockedDestination(
t *testing.T, env *sourceTestEnv,
) {
t.Helper()
webhook, target := seedHTTPTarget(t, env, "", "")
w := submitTargetEdit(
env, webhook.ID, target.ID,
editForm(editBlockedURL, "", ""),
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
assert.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), "Invalid target URL")
assert.Equal(
t, editOriginalURL,
storedHTTPConfig(t, env, target.ID).URL,
"a rejected edit must leave the stored config alone",
)
}
// The ingress rule the create path already follows applies to the
// edit path too: reading a field with FormValue would let the request
// line carry the credential, and the request line is what logs,
// proxies and Referer headers record.
func assertEditIgnoresQueryString(
t *testing.T, env *sourceTestEnv,
) {
t.Helper()
webhook, target := seedHTTPTarget(t, env, "", "")
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("name", "edited-name")
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodPost,
"/source/"+webhook.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+
"/edit?url="+url.QueryEscape(editReplacedURL)+
"&headers="+url.QueryEscape(editAuthHeader),
form,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
cfg := storedHTTPConfig(t, env, target.ID)
assert.Equal(t, editOriginalURL, cfg.URL)
assert.Empty(t, cfg.Headers)
}
func assertEditRejectsHeaders(
t *testing.T, env *sourceTestEnv, headers string,
) {
t.Helper()
webhook, target := seedHTTPTarget(t, env, "", "")
w := submitTargetEdit(
env, webhook.ID, target.ID,
editForm(editOriginalURL, headers, ""),
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
assert.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), "Invalid headers")
assert.Empty(
t, storedHTTPConfig(t, env, target.ID).Headers,
"a rejected header must not be stored",
)
}
func assertEditRejectsTimeout(
t *testing.T, env *sourceTestEnv, timeout string,
) {
t.Helper()
webhook, target := seedHTTPTarget(t, env, "", "9")
w := submitTargetEdit(
env, webhook.ID, target.ID,
editForm(editOriginalURL, "", timeout),
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
assert.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), "Invalid timeout")
assert.Equal(
t, 9, storedHTTPConfig(t, env, target.ID).Timeout,
"a rejected timeout must leave the stored one alone",
)
}
// TestHandleTargetEdit_Scoping keeps the edit routes scoped the way
// the delete and toggle routes are: ownership is decided by the
// webhook, and the target is then scoped to it.
func TestHandleTargetEdit_Scoping(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSourceTest(t)
t.Run("a target of another webhook", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertTargetOfAnotherWebhook404s(t, env)
})
t.Run("a webhook of another user", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assertWebhookOfAnotherUser404s(t, env)
})
}
// A target id from elsewhere must not become editable by pairing it
// with a webhook the user does own.
func assertTargetOfAnotherWebhook404s(
t *testing.T, env *sourceTestEnv,
) {
t.Helper()
mine := seedWebhookWithRetention(t, env.db, 30)
_, target := seedHTTPTarget(t, env, "", "")
get := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodGet,
"/source/"+mine.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit", nil,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, get.Code)
post := submitTargetEdit(
env, mine.ID, target.ID,
editForm(editReplacedURL, "", ""),
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, post.Code)
assert.Equal(
t, editOriginalURL,
storedHTTPConfig(t, env, target.ID).URL,
)
}
func assertWebhookOfAnotherUser404s(
t *testing.T, env *sourceTestEnv,
) {
t.Helper()
other := &database.Webhook{
UserID: "some-other-user",
Name: "not mine",
RetentionDays: 30,
}
require.NoError(
t,
env.db.DB().Omit(clause.Associations).Create(other).Error,
)
target := seedConfiguredTarget(
t, env.db, other.ID, database.TargetTypeHTTP,
`{"url":"`+editOriginalURL+`"}`,
)
w := serveTarget(
env, http.MethodGet,
"/source/"+other.ID+"/targets/"+target.ID+"/edit", nil,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, w.Code)
}

299
internal/handlers/ui_copy_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
package handlers_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strconv"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
// Template data keys the page templates read. The handlers package has
// its own unexported constants for these; this is the external test
// package, so it needs its own.
const (
dataKeyWebhook = "Webhook"
dataKeyError = "Error"
)
// testWebhookID is the identifier given to the webhook under test on
// pages that render one.
const testWebhookID = "wh-1"
// renderPage renders a page template through the real template set as
// an authenticated user and returns the resulting HTML.
func renderPage(
t *testing.T,
h *handlers.Handlers,
sess *session.Session,
page string,
data map[string]any,
) string {
t.Helper()
cookies := authenticatedCookies(t, sess, "test-user-id", "testuser")
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil,
)
for _, c := range cookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.RenderTemplateForTest(w, req, page, data)
return w.Body.String()
}
// TestNavbarUsesWebhookTerminology pins the user-visible navigation
// label to "Webhooks". The /sources route is deliberately unchanged, so
// the assertion targets the link text rather than the href.
func TestNavbarUsesWebhookTerminology(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
var sess *session.Session
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
// One item, so the list body renders too: it calls
// WebhookListItem.RetentionLabel, promoted from the embedded
// Webhook and therefore a pointer method. An empty list would
// skip that call and hide a template error behind the
// navigation assertions below.
item := handlers.WebhookListItem{}
item.Name = "wh"
item.ID = testWebhookID
item.RetentionDays = 14
body := renderPage(t, h, sess, "sources_list.html", map[string]any{
"Webhooks": []handlers.WebhookListItem{item},
})
assert.Contains(t, body, "Retention: 14 days")
assert.Contains(t, body, `class="btn-text">Webhooks</a>`)
assert.Contains(
t, body, `class="btn-text w-full text-left">Webhooks</a>`,
)
assert.Contains(
t, body,
`<h1 class="text-2xl font-medium text-gray-900">Webhooks</h1>`,
)
assert.NotContains(
t, body, ">Sources<",
"no user-visible element may still be labelled Sources",
)
assert.Contains(
t, body, `href="/sources"`,
"the /sources route itself must not change",
)
}
// TestEditPageUsesWebhookTerminology pins the edit page's heading and
// its back link. The link's href still points at /source/{id}, which is
// intentional: only user-visible copy changes.
func TestEditPageUsesWebhookTerminology(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
var sess *session.Session
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
// The webhook goes in as a pointer because source_edit.html calls
// Webhook.RetentionLabel, a pointer method: a map element is not
// addressable, so a value here renders an error instead of the
// page.
webhook := &database.Webhook{Name: "wh", RetentionDays: 14}
webhook.ID = testWebhookID
body := renderPage(t, h, sess, "source_edit.html", map[string]any{
dataKeyWebhook: webhook,
dataKeyError: "",
})
assert.Contains(t, body, "Edit Webhook")
assert.NotContains(t, body, ">Sources<")
assert.Contains(t, body, `href="/source/wh-1"`)
}
// TestCreateFormRetentionCopyMatchesBehaviour pins the create form's
// retention copy to what the code does: the reaper permanently deletes
// events past the cutoff, an empty field falls back to
// DefaultRetentionDays, and 0 is rewritten to the retain-forever
// sentinel by Webhook.BeforeSave.
func TestCreateFormRetentionCopyMatchesBehaviour(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
var sess *session.Session
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
body := renderPage(t, h, sess, "sources_new.html", map[string]any{
"Name": "",
"Description": "",
"DefaultRetentionDays": database.DefaultRetentionDays,
dataKeyError: "",
})
assert.Contains(
t, body,
"permanently deletes events older than this",
"the form must say retention is enforced by deletion",
)
assert.Contains(t, body, "Enter 0 to retain events forever")
assert.Contains(
t, body,
"leave blank to use the default of "+
strconv.Itoa(database.DefaultRetentionDays)+" days",
"blank means the default, not forever",
)
}
// TestEditFormRetentionCopyMatchesBehaviour pins the edit form's
// retention copy, including that it states the stored policy via
// RetentionLabel and that an empty field leaves that policy unchanged
// rather than meaning forever.
func TestEditFormRetentionCopyMatchesBehaviour(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
var sess *session.Session
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
finite := &database.Webhook{Name: "wh", RetentionDays: 14}
finite.ID = testWebhookID
body := renderPage(t, h, sess, "source_edit.html", map[string]any{
dataKeyWebhook: finite,
dataKeyError: "",
})
assert.Contains(t, body, "Currently 14 days.")
assert.Contains(
t, body,
"permanently deletes events older than this",
)
assert.Contains(t, body, "Enter 0 to retain events forever")
assert.Contains(
t, body,
"leave blank to keep the current setting",
"blank means unchanged, not forever",
)
forever := &database.Webhook{
Name: "wh",
RetentionDays: database.RetentionForeverDays,
}
forever.ID = "wh-2"
foreverBody := renderPage(
t, h, sess, "source_edit.html", map[string]any{
dataKeyWebhook: forever,
dataKeyError: "",
},
)
assert.Contains(
t, foreverBody, "Currently forever.",
"a retain-forever webhook must not read as a day count",
)
assert.Contains(
t, foreverBody,
"No events are deleted while retention is set to forever",
)
assert.NotContains(
t, foreverBody,
"permanently deletes events older than this",
"the reaper skips retain-forever webhooks, so the form "+
"must not claim it deletes their events",
)
}
// TestEntrypointCopyButtonIsProgressiveEnhancement proves the copy
// affordance degrades: the button ships with the hidden attribute, so a
// browser that never runs app.js shows no dead control, and the URL is
// rendered as ordinary selectable text either way.
func TestEntrypointCopyButtonIsProgressiveEnhancement(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var h *handlers.Handlers
var sess *session.Session
app := newTestApp(t, &h, &sess)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
entrypoint := database.Entrypoint{Path: "abc123"}
entrypoint.ID = "ep-1"
// The webhook goes in as a pointer because source_detail.html
// calls Webhook.RetentionLabel, a pointer method: a map element
// is not addressable, so a value here aborts execution partway
// down the page, after the copy button has already been flushed
// to the response.
webhook := &database.Webhook{Name: "wh", RetentionDays: 14}
webhook.ID = testWebhookID
webhook.CreatedAt = time.Date(
2026, time.January, 2, 3, 4, 5, 0, time.UTC,
)
body := renderPage(t, h, sess, "source_detail.html", map[string]any{
dataKeyWebhook: webhook,
"Entrypoints": []database.Entrypoint{entrypoint},
// The handler passes delivery.NewTargetViews(targets), never
// raw targets, so the test data has to have that same shape.
"Targets": delivery.NewTargetViews(nil),
"Events": []database.Event{},
"BaseURL": "https://hooks.example.com",
})
assert.Contains(
t, body,
`<code id="entrypoint-url-ep-1"`,
)
assert.Contains(t, body, "https://hooks.example.com/webhook/abc123")
assert.Contains(
t, body,
`hidden data-copy-target="entrypoint-url-ep-1"`,
"the button must start hidden and be revealed by script",
)
// renderTemplate streams to the ResponseWriter, so an abort
// midway still leaves everything above it in the body. This pins
// content from the last line of the template, which is below the
// assertions above: without it, a page that renders the copy
// button and then 500s passes.
assert.Contains(
t, body, "Retention: 14 days",
"the page must render to completion, not abort partway",
)
}

33
internal/handlers/webhook.go
View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logfield"
)
const (
@@ -39,12 +40,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleWebhook() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
h.log.Info("webhook request received",
"entrypoint_uuid", entrypointUUID,
"method", r.Method,
"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
)
entrypoint, ok := h.lookupEntrypoint(
w, r, entrypointUUID,
)
@@ -52,6 +47,18 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleWebhook() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
// Logged only once the UUID is known to name a real
// entrypoint. The UUID comes straight out of the path on
// the one unauthenticated endpoint, so logging it before
// the lookup let a client write an INFO line per invented
// path; the request itself is already in the access log
// and a miss is already logged at DEBUG.
h.log.Info("webhook request received",
"entrypoint_uuid", entrypointUUID,
"method", r.Method,
"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
)
if !entrypoint.Active {
http.Error(w, "Gone", http.StatusGone)
@@ -119,9 +126,16 @@ func (h *Handlers) lookupEntrypoint(
"path = ?", entrypointUUID,
).First(&entrypoint)
if result.Error != nil {
// The receiver is unauthenticated and /webhook/{uuid}
// matches any single segment, so this value is entirely
// client-chosen on exactly the branch where the lookup
// failed. DEBUG is off by default; the cap is what keeps
// turning it on from restoring an unbounded write.
h.log.Debug(
"entrypoint not found",
"path", entrypointUUID,
"path", logfield.Truncate(
entrypointUUID, logfield.MaxBytes,
),
)
http.NotFound(w, r)
@@ -203,6 +217,11 @@ func (h *Handlers) createAndDeliverEvent(
return
}
// Counted here, after the commit: an event is received once it
// is durably stored, which is what the delivery counters are
// compared against on a dashboard.
h.mtr.EventReceived()
h.finishWebhookResponse(w, event, entrypoint, tasks)
}

21
internal/lifecycle/export_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
package lifecycle
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
)
// WaitDone exposes waitDone to the external test package. Only the
// unexported waiter can be handed a channel that is already closed
// before the call, which is the state the preamble exists for;
// through WaitForShutdown the waiter goroutine may or may not have
// closed the channel yet, so the case is not reachable
// deterministically from outside.
func WaitDone(
ctx context.Context,
log *slog.Logger,
component string,
done <-chan struct{},
) error {
return waitDone(ctx, log, component, done)
}

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