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sneak/webhooker:main sneak/webhooker:issue-290-file-config-audit sneak/webhooker:issue-462-test-gorm-logger sneak/webhooker:issue-170-clamp-drain-by-reserve sneak/webhooker:next sneak/webhooker:issue-166-embed-named-assets sneak/webhooker:issue-369-event-page sneak/webhooker:issue-392-edit-entrypoint sneak/webhooker:issue-370-targets-add-by-type sneak/webhooker:issue-374-database-target-download sneak/webhooker:issue-414-main sneak/webhooker:prod sneak/webhooker:issue-70-log-target
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compare: sneak/webhooker:issue-374-database-target-download
Branches Tags
sneak/webhooker:issue-290-file-config-audit sneak/webhooker:issue-462-test-gorm-logger sneak/webhooker:issue-170-clamp-drain-by-reserve sneak/webhooker:next sneak/webhooker:issue-166-embed-named-assets sneak/webhooker:issue-369-event-page sneak/webhooker:issue-392-edit-entrypoint sneak/webhooker:issue-370-targets-add-by-type sneak/webhooker:issue-374-database-target-download sneak/webhooker:issue-414-main sneak/webhooker:prod sneak/webhooker:main sneak/webhooker:issue-70-log-target
110 Commits
b8c8b75e04 ... issue-374-database-target-download
Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot 61802bfcf4 Add a Download button that exports a database target's archive as gzipped JSON (closes #374)
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Details 
Each database target on the webhook page links to
/hook/ID/targets/TARGETID/download, which streams the target's archive
as archive-WEBHOOK-TARGET-YYYYMMDDTHHMMSSZ.json.gz: the webhook, the
target, exported_at, and archived_events, one object per row keyed by
column, a body that is not valid UTF-8 in base64 with body_encoding.
The export reads through one cursor inside a read-only transaction:
one snapshot, no write lock. A download runs for as long as the client
keeps reading, and one that fails after it has started aborts the
connection. The request limit answers 504 only when the handler has
not started its response, so a long download is logged as its 200.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 16:54:15 +00:00
clawbot 40f59ec4d2 Try every event database file on delete and say which was left (closes #275)
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Details 
DeleteDB returned on the first event database file it failed to remove, so with WAL sidecars present a failure could be reported as "the file was left behind" after the events themselves were already gone. It now tries the database file and both sidecars, and its error says which case happened and names each file left: the database file is still on disk, or it is gone (the events are lost) and only a -wal or -shm sidecar remains. The webhook delete handler logs a different message for each and never says the events survive when they do not. Tests cover a normal delete with both sidecars, and a failed removal of the database file or a sidecar, through DeleteDB and the handler.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 18:42:29 +02:00
clawbot 806c95e305 Make every clickable control look clickable, in two shared styles (closes #375)
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Details 
Many controls were plain coloured text with no sign they could be clicked: Edit, Activate, Deactivate, Delete, Replay, Resubmit, both Add controls and the copy control beside each entrypoint URL. Every clickable control is now a real button or link in one of two shared styles: the buttons in input.css, now with a pointer cursor, and btn-small, a small bordered secondary action in style.css, which the layout now loads. The site name, the footer links and each webhook list card show at rest that they open something, with focus states. The copy control shows "Copied" after a click. Rows on the webhook page and in the event log wrap at phone width. The browser test covers the copy control.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 18:32:19 +02:00
clawbot 45bd7e9b94 Pin the close before the reopen in the archive sweep (closes #103)
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Details 
The archive sweep closes a target's archive connection before it reopens the file, and no test noticed if that close was removed, which would leak one SQLite connection per target per sweep. A test now keeps the connection from before a sweep that reopens the archive and requires it closed afterwards. The sweeper's query for database targets takes the sweep's context; a sweep whose context is done returns without an error line, so stopping is not logged as a failure, and a test pins that. The comment on the sweeper's cancel function gives the true reason it needs no lock: fx calls the stop hook only after the start hook has returned.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 18:16:31 +02:00
clawbot bf3df0312b Clear the environment in the cmd/webhooker tests that build a Config (closes #452)
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Details 
The two cmd/webhooker tests that build the app graph, TestNewApp_StopTimeout and TestNewApp_SendsFxEventsToTheLogger, built a Config without clearing the environment, so a variable exported in the developer's shell changed their result: a METRICS_USERNAME without METRICS_PASSWORD failed the second. Both now call config.ClearEnvForTest before setting their own variables, as the config tests and the first-boot test already do. No other test outside internal/config builds a Config through config.New. Test change only.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 18:03:31 +02:00
clawbot 503c57efd9 Assert the body a retry delivers, not only its status (closes #294)
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Details 
TestProcessRetryTask_LargeBody_FetchFromDB and TestProcessRetryTask_SuccessfulRetry checked only that the delivery ended delivered, so deleting the event-body fetch on the retry path, the behaviour the first is named for, left both green while a retry could deliver an empty or truncated body. Both now compare the body the target received with the stored event body byte for byte, and both fail when that fetch is deleted. The other retry-path tests are not about the body and are unchanged. Test change only.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 18:03:20 +02:00
clawbot d084f4f912 Pin the body cap's order in every page route group (closes #93)
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Details 
Follow-ups from an August review of the body cap, each checked against the current tree. One route test now requires an oversized POST, with no session and no CSRF token, to be refused with 413 before CSRF runs, in every page route group with a POST route and in /settings/, so moving a group's body cap after CSRF fails it. The three test router helpers build the server through New with a lifecycle that is never started, so no field is set by hand. The middleware test comment names runMaxBodySize, and the MaxBodySize doc comment says methods other than POST, PUT and PATCH pass uncapped on purpose. The README item was already settled.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 17:53:21 +02:00
clawbot e67fffb05d Check the log charge against every code point (closes #172)
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Details 
The access log's 2,560-byte line ceiling holds only if logfield.EncodedBytes charges each code point at least what the log handlers write for it, and the test checked that on a sample. TestEncodedBytes_ChargesAtLeastWhatTheHandlersEmit now covers every code point, surrogates aside, for both handlers. Below U+1000, where the handlers' escaping varies, each code point is measured alone, both in a bare value and in a quoted one, so undercharging any of them, DEL included, fails and names it. From U+1000 up it compares batch sums, which the doc comment says can hide one JSON-only overcharge. Reverting the astral charge to 6 fails the test. It adds under 2 seconds under -race.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 17:53:10 +02:00
clawbot 4958a6f2e4 Isolate config tests from the shell; any out-of-range PORT is ErrInvalidPort (closes #94)
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Details 
The config tests unset variables without restoring them and read whatever the developer's shell exported, so results could differ from one machine to the next. config.ClearEnvForTest, in internal/config/testing.go, unsets every variable in the process environment and, when the test ends, leaves it exactly as it found it; every config test and the first-boot test call it before setting their own. TestEnvPositiveInt and TestEnvPort share one table runner, and the port errors name the bad value. A PORT of zero, below zero, or too large to parse now matches ErrInvalidPort, as one above 65535 already did. The README and the Settings page say an unparseable or non-positive RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL stops startup.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 17:44:30 +02:00
clawbot 385fbc1a6a Send fx's own events through the service's logger (closes #183)
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Details 
fx printed its dependency graph and lifecycle hooks through its own console logger on standard error, so an operator shipping the JSON log to a collector got a second shape on a second stream for every start. The production app now passes fx.WithLogger with a small FxLogger in internal/logger that writes fx's events through the service's logger: graph events at debug, lifecycle at info, failures at error. Its constructor takes the configuration, so DEBUG=true applies before fx replays the events it held back. go.uber.org/fx moves from v1.20.1 to v1.24.0. Tests keep fx.NopLogger. The README says a failure before the logger exists, and the Go runtime's own output, still go to standard error as plain text.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 17:22:05 +02:00
clawbot c22ca6218e Pin the rate-limit key for an empty RemoteAddr (closes #168)
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Details 
A request whose RemoteAddr is empty has no peer identity, so the rate limiters' key falls back to the raw empty string and every such request shares one bucket: it fails closed rather than giving each its own. net/http always fills RemoteAddr for a TCP listener, so normal serving never reaches this. The behaviour is unchanged and now deliberate: a test pins the shared key, and a one-sentence comment at the fallback tells the empty case apart from a Unix-socket listener, where every peer legitimately carries the same address.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 17:09:23 +02:00
clawbot 0ccb01cada Close the retention follow-ups from the August review (closes #99)
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Details 
Follow-ups from an August review of the retention bounds, each checked against the current tree. A test now pins that a retention value above the keep-forever sentinel is stored as the sentinel. The form's retention parser returns its message directly, so the two error values that were never compared, and the function that mapped them to messages, are gone. The sweep's own keep-forever skip, which duplicated the check in retentionCutoff, is removed; the cutoff is now asked before the webhook's database is opened. The create-form refill test uses HTML-special characters and checks they come back escaped. The README item was already settled; handling for rows made by hand is declined.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 16:50:34 +02:00
clawbot 1f22b30de3 Log the client address next to the peer address (closes #270)
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Details 
Behind a trusted proxy every log line named only the proxy, so abuse could not be traced from webhooker's own logs although the rate limiters already knew the client. The access log, the rate-limit rejection lines, the CSRF warning and the receiver's request line now carry clientIP next to remoteIP. remoteIP still means the connecting peer; clientIP is the address the rate limiters key on, the forwarded client when the peer is inside TRUSTED_PROXIES, worked out once per request by the same code. The README says the field is only as trustworthy as TRUSTED_PROXIES. The access log's 2,560-byte line ceiling holds with the field charged, and a size case with an oversized X-Forwarded-For pins it.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 16:50:22 +02:00
clawbot debe588bba Seed the retention tests 50 rows per insert, not 500 (closes #198)
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Details 
Three retention tests made internal/database the slowest test package, mostly by seeding thousands of rows 500 per insert: the SQLite driver finds each parameter's value by scanning the statement's arguments from the first until it reaches that parameter's, so binding grows with the square of the parameter count. They now seed the same rows 50 per insert, about three times faster; no test case or assertion changes. The package drops from 13 to 22s to about 7s. What keeps make test above the 20s target is now mostly the cold -race compile of the tree, which moves with host load. The 90s per-package timeout stays; script/test's header records the new figures.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 16:27:00 +02:00
clawbot e8379272ae Load Alpine's CSP build so the UI's directives run (closes #371)
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Details 
Every page's Content-Security-Policy forbids eval, which the standard Alpine.js build needs, so no directive ran in a browser: both add forms on the webhook page showed open, and events in the event log could not be collapsed. The UI now loads Alpine's CSP build (@alpinejs/csp 3.14.9 in 3p/); the policy is unchanged. Each directive names a property or method of a component registered in static/js/app.js (collapsible, targetForm), and each card holds its own x-data. A browser test, built only with the browser tag, loads the webhook page and the event log under the real headers; make test-browser runs it in Docker. New test-only dependency chromedp, which raises golang.org/x/sys to 0.47.0.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 16:09:03 +02:00
clawbot 3e209bfe4e Drive the archive reopen debounce test from a clock (closes #190)
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Details 
The archive writer's reopen debounce test made two writes that had to land inside the real 2-second window, then slept 2.1 seconds to cross it, so a slow host could turn correct code red. The archive writer now reads the time for its reopen debounce from a clock field, time.Now in production, and the test moves that clock instead of sleeping: two writes at one instant open the file once, and a write one debounce later closes and reopens it once. Removing the debounce check fails the test. This was the last test whose result depended on real elapsed time.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 16:03:01 +02:00
clawbot 88b961c115 Keep each model's parent out of its JSON (closes #177)
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Details 
Every reference from a model to the record it belongs to (a target's or entrypoint's webhook, a webhook's or API key's user, an event's webhook and entrypoint, a delivery's event and target, a delivery result's delivery) is now tagged json:"-", so a preloaded model can be marshalled without the encoder recursing between parent and child. References to child records stay. Tests marshal each of the nine references set, preloaded where it matters, and check the parent's id is absent, so deleting or restoring any one tag fails a test; preloading still fills each reference.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 15:43:06 +02:00
clawbot dc9deda173 Write a form-error page's status only after it renders (closes #128)
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Details 
Six form-error paths (the login error and the webhook form's validation and name-taken branches) called WriteHeader before rendering, so if the form page's own template failed, the answer kept its 400 or 409 status with an error body instead of a 500. The new renderTemplateStatus renders into the buffer and writes the status only after the page has rendered; renderTemplate sends 200 through it, and those handlers pass their status to it. No handler calls WriteHeader before a render. Login-form tests show the 400 page still renders in full and a failing template answers 500.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 15:34:01 +02:00
clawbot c706199389 Name the CI build step after what the image runs (closes #175)
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Details 
The workflow's build step was named "Build Docker image (runs make check)", but the image has never run make check. It is now named for what the image runs: make fmt-check, golangci-lint, make test and make build. No other step name or comment in the workflow names something it does not run. In the README, the Prerequisites bullet now says Docker is needed for make lint and so for make check, and the sentence about what runs on the host is limited to the steps make check runs.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 15:15:08 +02:00
clawbot d52cac1ec6 Toggle only a target's active state, so it cannot undo an edit (closes #431)
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Details 
The target toggle loaded the target, flipped its active flag and saved the whole row, so an edit of the same target's name or settings saved in between was written back over and lost, although it reported success. The toggle now updates only the active column, so it can no longer undo an edit. A test saves an edit just after the toggle has read the target and shows the edit survives and the state flips. The entrypoint toggle is unchanged, since an entrypoint has no edit form.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 14:43:00 +02:00
clawbot 0f9b68a0e8 Build the middleware test cookie stores with the production constructor (closes #154)
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Details 
The middleware tests built their cookie stores by setting store.Options by hand, which left the securecookie codecs at the library's 30-day default instead of the 7-day cap production sets, an invisible divergence that would outlive the next change to store construction. The test store constructor moves from internal/session/export_test.go into internal/session/testing.go so other packages can reach it, and the two middleware test helpers build their stores through it. No test in the repo builds a cookie store by hand any more, and no assertion changes.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 14:30:51 +02:00
clawbot 8cf5acaf1d Justify the handlers tests' start limit with a measurement (closes #225)
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Details 
The internal/handlers tests were load-fragile because every test app hashed the admin password at 64 MB; that went with the cheaper test hashing already on next, and measuring under the host's real load found nothing left to fix in how the tests run. The comment on newTestApp now says its start limit, fx's default, is there to catch a start that hangs, and that the slowest measured start is far inside it. The header of script/test gives current figures in place of ones from before that change. Neither limit changes, and no test changes.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 14:08:54 +02:00
clawbot 9ade217222 Show each webhook's activity in the webhook list (closes #394)
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Details 
Each entry in the webhook list at /hooks now shows when its last event arrived (or "No events yet"), how many of its deliveries failed in the last 24 hours, in red when not zero, and how many entrypoints and targets are inactive, as in "4 targets, 1 inactive". The figures come from the event totals row and the statistics pane's own query, so the list no longer counts every stored event and its event count matches the pane's. A webhook whose event database cannot be read says so in its entry; the rest of the list still shows. A failed read of entrypoints or targets from the main database now returns an error page instead of showing zero.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 13:57:43 +02:00
clawbot 5551f75251 Say at the receiver route where its 1 MB body cap lives (closes #173)
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Details 
The receiver route /h/{uuid} has no MaxBodySize middleware, unlike the page route groups; its 1 MB cap is enforced in the handler, which owns the response senders see. Nothing at the route said so, so a reader could take the receiver for uncapped or remove the only bound on the one unauthenticated endpoint. The route registration and the handler's body-reading function now say where the cap lives and why. A routing test sends a body of exactly 1 MB and one a byte over through the production router and pins that only the second is refused, with the handler's 413 and message.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 13:40:00 +02:00
clawbot fd036774f9 Name each database target's archive for its webhook and target (closes #376)
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Details 
Each database target now writes its own archive file, archive-WEBHOOKNAME-TARGETNAME-TARGETID.db, named by delivery.ArchiveFileName, in place of one archive per webhook keyed on its UUID. Renaming a webhook or a target renames its archive files (with any -wal and -shm) before the new name is saved, never over an existing file, and moves every one back if a rename or the save fails. The webhook edit, the target edit and target creation share one lock so no two interleave. Deleting a webhook or target leaves its files on disk. Nothing looks for the old archive-WEBHOOKID.db files. The README gives the naming and the recovery steps.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 13:28:49 +02:00
clawbot 21aafbf928 Remove the no-op MAINTENANCE_MODE setting (closes #317)
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Details 
MAINTENANCE_MODE did nothing but make the healthcheck JSON report maintenanceMode: true; no request was ever served differently, so an operator who set it expecting requests to be refused got nothing. It is removed from the configuration, the startup configuration log line, the healthcheck JSON, the README and the Settings page, together with the uncalled Server.MaintenanceMode method and the healthcheck's dependency on the configuration. A leftover value in an environment is ignored like any other unknown variable.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 13:27:43 +02:00
clawbot c87b469dcd Let a handler flush or set a write deadline through the access log and metrics (closes #191)
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Details 
The access log's response writer and the metrics middleware's writer hid the writer beneath them, so a handler's flush, hijack or write deadline set through http.ResponseController failed with "not supported" behind them. The access log's writer now has Unwrap. The metrics middleware calls the library's public Measure with a writer of our own that has Unwrap, in place of std.Handler's writer, so the middleware order and what metrics record are unchanged. A test over a real connection sets a write deadline and flushes, metrics on and off, on a global route and in an admin page group, and fails without either Unwrap.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 13:08:54 +02:00
clawbot b14b27b78b Serve the delivery duration histogram from boot (closes #267)
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Details 
The delivery duration histogram was registered only when a delivery first ran, so until then /metrics had no series for it and a dashboard or alert on it saw nothing at all rather than zero. Each of the four target types now has its series registered at boot with zero counts, so the histogram is served from the first scrape. Tests pin that all four series are present before any delivery, on the metrics registry and through the production router.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 12:45:05 +02:00
clawbot 287e47df7f Add a read-only Settings page for the loaded configuration (closes #402)
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Details 
A new page at /settings, linked from the navigation bar and behind the login, lists every configuration field the server loaded at startup: its environment variable, the README table's description, and the value in effect. METRICS_PASSWORD and SENTRY_DSN show only as set or not set; their values are replaced before rendering and never reach the template. The route is GET only and its group is built like the other admin page groups. Tests set the credentials one at a time so each value shown is checked against its own field and a set secret never appears in the page.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 12:30:21 +02:00
clawbot 8b5541734e Run script/test quietly with coverage, rerun failed tests verbosely (closes #315)
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Details 
script/test now runs the suite once with -race -cover and no -v. On a failure it reruns only the failed top-level tests, with -v, in the packages that failed, then exits non-zero whatever the rerun shows. A green run stays quiet, and a red one ends with the failing tests' verbose output, which the Docker build's 2 MiB log limit can hold; a verbose rerun of every package would pass that limit again. A failure that names no test (a build error, a timeout) skips the rerun, since the quiet run already prints that package's output. The timeout and parallelism are unchanged.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 11:58:43 +02:00
clawbot c513816a55 Refuse [::], 0.0.0.0, IPv6 multicast and documentation space (closes #341)
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Details 
On the build host a connection to [::] reaches a listener on ::1, and one to 0.0.0.0 reaches 127.0.0.1, so a delivery target at either reached this host's loopback past the guard. 0.0.0.0/32 and ::/128 are now in alwaysBlockedNetworks, which no allowlist opens; an allowlist reaches loopback only through an entry covering a loopback address. IPv6 multicast (ff00::/8) and documentation space (2001:db8::/32) are refused by default and reopen when listed.

Every default blocklist entry has a one-line comment, each list is pinned on its own, and tests refuse each address at target creation and at delivery. The README and the rules above each list match.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 11:22:30 +02:00
clawbot 2bb4683512 Discard fx's own log in tests that build an fx app (closes #230)
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Details 
Every test that builds an fx app with fxtest.New (handlers, server, resetpw, gormlog, config) now passes fx.NopLogger, so fx's own log no longer goes to t.Logf. A hook still running after a start or stop timeout can then no longer write to a test that has already returned, which the race detector reported as a data race. What the tests assert is unchanged, and nothing about the race detector is suppressed.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 11:08:38 +02:00
clawbot 5b1d283d06 Say what each action did in a one-line notice (closes #383)
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Details 
Saving, deleting, activating or deactivating a webhook, entrypoint or target, and signing out, now land on their page with a one-line notice such as "Webhook deleted." or "Signed out.". The redirect carries a fixed code that maps to fixed text; an unknown code shows nothing, so nothing from the URL is ever echoed. One partial in the page layout shows the notice on every page, and replay and resubmit now use the same codes and partial. Error pages show no notice.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 10:30:31 +02:00
clawbot b78abdc9da Drop TODO.md's stale docs-only cache caveat (closes #421)
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Details 
Since the build context carries .git and the CI fingerprint is the hash of the commit being checked, every commit's check runs the build, docs-only commits included. TODO.md's caveat that a docs-only commit replays from the layer cache was no longer true, and the README's "CI gate honesty" section already says how a check runs, so the paragraph is removed.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 10:14:40 +02:00
clawbot c23ffbac65 Widen the webhook page by half so an entrypoint URL fits on one line (closes #350)
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Details 
The webhook page's maximum width goes from 72rem (1152 px) to 108rem (1728 px), half again as wide, so an entrypoint URL stays on one line in 1920- and 1440-pixel windows; the statistics pane and both columns widen with it. The title row now wraps, so a phone-width window no longer scrolls sideways.

The width is an inline style: static/css/style.css is linked by no page, and the committed Tailwind stylesheet has no class that wide. The webhook list, the event log, the navbar and the footer stay at 72rem.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 09:49:33 +02:00
clawbot 2ac4d4d793 Send the build version in the outbound User-Agent (closes #313)
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Details 
The http and slack targets sent the constant User-Agent webhooker/1.0. They now send webhooker/ followed by the version the build stamped, the same value the footer shows, built in one place on the delivery engine. User-Agent stays a reserved header and is still set after the target's configured headers, so a configured one cannot override it. Tests check the header each target sends against a known version, and that a configured User-Agent is replaced.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 09:48:34 +02:00
clawbot eb4c4cc849 Serve /metrics from a registry of its own (closes #227)
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Details 
A second metrics-enabled router in one process panicked on a duplicate collector registration, because every collector registered on Prometheus's global default registry. metrics.NewRegistry now builds one registry with the Go runtime and process collectors; fx provides it and the delivery metric set built on it. The middleware builds its HTTP recorder once on that registry (NewForTest on a fresh one), the engine and handlers take the metric set from fx, and nothing registers on the global default any more.

/metrics is served from the new registry with the same series names, labels and auth. A test builds two metrics-enabled routers in one process.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 09:06:20 +02:00
clawbot cb7bafab17 Derive the image's version from the .git in the build context (closes #366)
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Details 
upaas uploads its clone as a tar context, which .dockerignore does not filter, so its builds already carried .git; the unknown default of the VERSION build arg is what stamped them. The image now derives its version itself: ARG VERSION has no default, so make build falls back to script/version, which runs git describe on the copied .git; a VERSION build arg still wins.

.dockerignore sends .git without its config in a directory context and no longer leaves out tracked files, which would mark the tree -dirty. The builder installs git, trusts /build as a safe.directory, and fails when .git is present but the version comes out unknown. A shallow single-branch clone stamps its short commit.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 08:41:20 +02:00
clawbot 2416528b77 Render admin page errors in the normal layout (closes #382)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m12s
Details 
Every 400, 403, 404 and 500 on an admin page now answers with an error page in the normal layout: the status, one fixed line explaining it, and a link back to the webhook list, or to sign-in when nobody is signed in. Unknown paths reach it through the router's not-found handler, a refused form token through the CSRF middleware, and a panic through a recoverer each admin page route group installs first. Status codes are unchanged, and the page always sends Cache-Control: no-store.

If the error page fails to render, the answer is the same status in plain text; if it panics, the answer is a 500. The receiver, the healthcheck and /metrics keep their plain answers.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 08:15:12 +02:00
clawbot 38157d8936 Say how to allow a refused private target address (closes #398)
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Details 
Refusing an http or slack target whose address is private or reserved, on add or edit, now adds one sentence: such addresses are refused by default, and the server's ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS setting allows named networks, with a pointer to the README section. It suggests no value, so it never points at allowing everything.

Metadata refusals get no such sentence. To tell them apart, the default blocklist's public addresses now have their own list, blockedPublicNetworks, still checked after the allowlist; a test pins which addresses each list refuses and how listing opens them, unchanged from before.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 07:52:50 +02:00
clawbot 7d360babed Logging in returns to the page that was asked for (closes #384)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m44s
Details 
A logged-out GET of an admin page now redirects to /pages/login with its path and query in a next parameter, when they fit in 2048 bytes. The login form carries next as a hidden field; a successful login redirects there, and a failed one shows the page again with the same next. A POST still redirects to plain /pages/login.

The value is client-chosen, so every read of it goes through one check: after percent-decoding it must start with exactly one / and contain no backslash or control character; anything else becomes /. gosec's open-redirect rule is suppressed on the two redirects that follow it. The login page's navigation bar no longer links to itself.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 06:57:51 +02:00
clawbot 803a94be37 Add a statistics pane to the webhook page (closes #368)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m56s
Details 
The webhook page opens with a statistics pane: entrypoints and targets, deliveries in progress, the last arrival, the retention period; events, deliveries and failures, lifetime and within retention; and events, failures and failure percentage over 10 minutes and 24 hours.

Running totals, one row per target plus one for events, sit in each webhook's event database and are written in the same transaction as the rows they count; retention prunes in paused, stoppable batches and subtracts what it removes. Window figures are index-range counts on a new finished_at column. An existing event database must be recreated.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 06:41:00 +02:00
clawbot 43ed8d4834 Move webhook pages to /hook/ID and inbound URLs to /h/UUID (closes #367)
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Details 
The webhook page and everything under it move from /source/ID to /hook/ID; the list and new-webhook form from /sources to /hooks and /hooks/new; the event log from .../logs to /hook/ID/events; entrypoint URLs, the ones senders post to, from /webhook/UUID to /h/UUID. The old paths are simply gone, per the owner's ruling. Every link, redirect, form action, test, comment and README mention follows; every link to the event log, and its title and heading, read "Full Event Log".

Keeping the UUID out of logs, metrics labels and error reports, and the receiver rate limits, key on the route itself, so they cover /h/ unchanged. Routed tests follow every link and form the pages render to a moved page.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 06:32:14 +02:00
clawbot 1c721ede41 Run the test suite without -v so a failure shows in the build log (next side of #414)
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Details 
script/test now runs go test without -v. The Docker build cuts each step's log at 2 MiB, and the verbose output of the whole suite passed that limit before any failure was printed, so a red script/cibuild showed only passing packages. Without -v, go test prints one result line per package and, for a package that fails, everything its tests wrote, the application's log lines included. -race, -p 4 -parallel 8 and the 90-second per-package timeout are unchanged.

The cause of the red builds was fixed by the cheaper test hashing already on next; the same two changes go to main separately.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 06:31:53 +02:00
clawbot bfdbc937c6 Keep make test under 2 GB of memory (closes #344)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m41s
Details 
Every test that starts a database seeds the admin account, hashing its password with Argon2id at 64 MB, about 150 MB under -race, and internal/handlers and internal/database ran dozens of those at once. That was the memory, and most of internal/handlers' run time; the product code does not leak.

HashPassword now hashes at a 1 MB cost only when testing.Testing() reports a test binary, so every test package gets it with nothing to add and a binary built by go build always hashes at the shipped parameters. TestHashPassword_ShippedParameters still hashes and verifies through HashPassword at the shipped cost. script/test adds -p 4 -parallel 8.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 03:02:28 +02:00
clawbot 1cafaeb953 Reword the build-architecture history line in TODO.md (closes #412)
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Details 
The architecture is read at run time, so nothing passes it in at build time. The dated history entry for issue 31 in TODO.md now says a build-architecture global was removed, without naming it, so the word no longer appears in the tree.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 01:08:22 +02:00
clawbot 515c359e56 Trust the RFC 1918 ranges as proxies when TRUSTED_PROXIES is unset (closes #333)
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Details 
Unset or empty, TRUSTED_PROXIES now defaults to 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12 and 192.168.0.0/16, so a reverse proxy reaching webhooker from one of those ranges gets per-client rate-limit buckets with nothing set. A set value replaces the default entirely; an unparseable one still fails startup. The startup warning for an empty list is gone.

The README gives the default, one rule (if any client can reach webhooker, or the proxy in front of it, from an RFC 1918 source address, set the list to the proxy's address alone), and where to find that address: the remoteIP field of the http request log line. Loopback is not in the default.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 00:41:36 +02:00
clawbot 30e65dce53 State what the default blocklist covers (closes #244)
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Details 
The README's egress section and the comment above blockedNetworks now state what the default blocklist covers: the IPv4 private and reserved ranges, IPv6 loopback, unique local and link-local addresses, and certain public addresses, each added only because it hands credentials, user data or bootstrap material to whatever can reach it without the caller presenting anything. That is the same material as the rule above alwaysBlockedNetworks, so a future candidate can be accepted or refused against one rule.

A provider's other public addresses, such as 161.26.0.0/16 and 166.8.0.0/14, are not refused. Docs and a comment only; the lists are unchanged.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-02 00:21:35 +02:00
clawbot 1ac4fe0be4 Show 50 recent events with size, processing time and status (closes #347)
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Details 
The webhook page's list, now headed "50 Most Recent Events", shows the 50 newest events, limited in the query. Each row adds the time received (relative, UTC on hover), the body size, the processing time (slowest delivery, queued to final outcome, retries included, "in progress" while pending), and, when the webhook has exactly one HTTP target, that target's latest HTTP status, coloured by class.

Each event now records its body size in a new body_bytes column when it is stored, so the list never reads bodies; the list loads only the delivery and attempt columns it shows, and a failed load is an error, not an empty list.

An existing event database must be recreated: the column is added in place, with no migration.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-01 23:50:00 +02:00
clawbot a56f1fe0c8 Remove the fixed Account Type row from the profile page (closes #401)
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Details 
The profile page no longer shows the fixed "Account Type: Standard User" row. webhooker has one account, the administrator it creates, and no account types, so the row was untrue. The Account Information section now lists the username alone, and a test checks the row stays gone.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-01 23:24:41 +02:00
clawbot 9d29baaa2d Commit the Alpine.js tarball in 3p/ and extract it at build time (closes #345)
check / check (push) Successful in 6m21s
Details 
The build no longer downloads Alpine.js. Its npm package tarball is committed as 3p/alpinejs-3.14.9.tgz, byte for byte the file script/fetch-assets downloaded, with the sha256 that script pinned. script/assets (make assets) extracts package/dist/cdn.min.js to the ignored static/js/alpine.min.js; script/test runs it, so make test, make check, the pre-commit hook and the Dockerfile get the file with no network access, and make build, run and dev run it too.

Removed: script/fetch-assets, its Dockerfile step, static/vendor.sha256 and static/vendor_test.go. The README describes the new flow.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-01 22:44:41 +02:00
clawbot 507980a347 Bound username length at creation (closes #184)
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Details 
Usernames are limited to 1024 bytes, so no account can exist that is unable to log in. The username rides in the session cookie, which browsers and securecookie refuse past about 4 KB, leaving room for roughly 2000 bytes of username; the limit is about half that.

User.BeforeSave returns ErrUsernameTooLong when a whole User is created or saved. A byte-counting check constraint on users.username catches every other write, including a column update. The limit appears in the constant and in the struct tag; a test fails if they disagree.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-01 21:38:48 +02:00
clawbot b79e4649a1 Container sets its data directory's owner and mode itself (#353)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
Details 
Closes #340.

The image no longer sets `USER`. Its new `ENTRYPOINT`, `deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh`, starts as root, creates `DATA_DIR` if missing, gives the directory and anything in it owned by another user to `webhooker` (UID 1000), sets the directory to `0750`, and runs the command as `webhooker` through `su-exec`. An empty root-owned bind mount, or data left by another UID, now works as mounted; the app never runs as root and is still PID 1. `CMD` is still `/app/webhooker`, so the `resetpw` commands are unchanged. Started with `--user`, the script only runs the command. It is in `/usr/local/bin`, not `/app`, which belongs to `webhooker`.

README: the UID 1000 ownership block, the upaas pre-deploy commands and the restore ownership step are gone; the upaas volume bullet names only the path.

- Judgement call: `su-exec` over `setpriv`: Alpine's small tool for this, needing only musl; busybox's `setpriv` cannot change user, and util-linux's adds `libcap-ng`.
- Deviation: `su-exec` is pinned by version (`0.2-r3`), not by hash; `ca-certificates` beside it is unpinned.
- Judgement call: each start reads every entry's owner but changes only entries owned by someone else.
- `docker exec` and the health check now run as root, since the image sets no `USER`.
- No automated test covers the script: the suite runs inside `docker build`, which cannot start a container.
- A missing host directory under upaas is sneak/upaas#235.

Model: opus-5-5
Reviewed-on: #353
Co-authored-by: clawbot <35+clawbot@noreply.example.org>
 2026-09-29 13:05:16 +02:00
clawbot 1428154bbd Let a browser with cookies from an earlier database log in (closes #359)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
Details 
A new database brings a new session key. A browser still holding the
old session cookie got a 500 on a correct login: Session.Get returned
the cookie's decode error and the login handler answered it with a
500. Get now treats a cookie that does not decode as absent, and
logging in replaces it. gorilla/csrf already did the same for the
CSRF cookie.

A start that creates webhooker.db now logs "created a new, empty
database" at WARN with its path, shortly before the first-boot banner,
so an unexpectedly empty DATA_DIR is noticed.

The codec tests now decode through the store, since Get no longer
reports the codec's reason.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-09-29 12:58:44 +02:00
sneak 8ad2a86e4b Sneak/testdeploy (#356)
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Details 
Reviewed-on: #356
 2026-09-29 12:01:33 +02:00
sneak a891b726e5 Milestone: next into main (#342)
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Details 
Reviewed-on: #342
 2026-09-29 11:53:19 +02:00
clawbot ab63b5f777 Restrict /s/* to GET and HEAD (closes #169)
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Details 
The static file server was attached with Mount, which registers every
method, so POST, PUT and DELETE on an asset were answered 200 with the
file. It is now registered for GET and HEAD only, inside a /s group
whose method-not-allowed handler answers 405 with Allow: GET, HEAD.
A method chi does not route at all, such as PROPFIND, still gets 405
from the top-level router, without Allow. The inverted test and the
README route table say the same.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-09-29 11:10:27 +02:00
sneak 9cf9cdd8eb 1.0.0 milestone: next into main (#321)
check / check (push) Successful in 8s
Details 
Reviewed-on: #321
 2026-09-29 11:04:58 +02:00
clawbot f0adeafde3 Drop Set-Cookie from the recovered 500 (closes #193)
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Details 
When a handler sets a cookie and then panics before sending
anything, the recover middleware now deletes Set-Cookie before
writing its 500, so a request that failed never hands the client
a credential. Every other header, Location included, is left as
http.Error leaves it, matching chi's Recoverer. A response that
was already sent is untouched.

Tests cover the uncommitted case (no cookie, Location kept) and
assert the cookie still reaches the client when the response was
committed before the panic.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-09-29 10:30:26 +02:00
clawbot f755c03110 Default-block Azure WireServer's public address (closes #245)
check / check (push) Successful in 4m34s
Details 
Add 168.63.129.16 (Azure WireServer) to blockedNetworks, the default
blocklist, not alwaysBlockedNetworks: it is public unicast, so an
operator who lists it in ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS can reach it again. The
refusal message, the allowlist startup warning, the README and the
comments no longer call every blocked address private/reserved, and
no longer claim the allowlist cannot open any metadata endpoint.

Sources:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/what-is-ip-address-168-63-129-16
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/metadata-security-protocol/overview

Deviation: 147.75.207.243 (Equinix Metal) is not added; Equinix
documents only a hostname, and the service was sunset on 2026-06-30.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-09-29 10:22:07 +02:00
clawbot 4a724130ca Close archive writers when the delivery engine stops (closes #280)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m45s
Details 
The engine cached archive writers and never closed them at shutdown,
so after a clean stop an archive's rows could sit in its -wal while
the .db held no table. The engine's stop hook now evicts every cached
writer once its workers have returned, the same way deleting a webhook
does, so a clean stop leaves each archive as one file and a late write
is refused. If the workers do not return within the stop budget, the
writers are left open as a kill would leave them: closing would wait
on a write in progress, and a still-running worker would open new
ones.

The README no longer says archives keep their sidecars across a clean
stop.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-09-29 08:30:22 +02:00
clawbot d4f4ddf51f Send Content-Type once on a delivery (closes #246)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m20s
Details 
A delivery set Content-Type from the event's ContentType and then
added the inbound Content-Type from the event's stored headers, so a
target could receive two values. The inbound Content-Type is no
longer forwarded from the stored headers; the receiver already saves
it as the event's ContentType.

Which value is sent is now stated at applyRequestHeaders: a
Content-Type configured on the target, otherwise the event's
ContentType, otherwise none. A configured one still survives a
cross-origin 307/308 with its body.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-09-29 07:11:55 +02:00
clawbot 51580a2bc6 Fail a pending delivery whose target was deleted (closes #293)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m38s
Details 
Restart recovery and the pending sweep skipped a pending delivery
whose target was missing from the batch's target map, every minute,
for the life of the database. A miss now asks loadTarget: no row
fails the delivery terminally with a recorded reason; any other error
leaves it pending, since the map is also empty when its query failed;
a target found there is used.

The failure goes through the ownership-gated function the retrying
paths already used, now failMissingTarget. Once it owns the delivery
it re-reads the row and fails it only if the status is unchanged, so
a delivery sent and settled in between is left alone.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-09-29 06:48:19 +02:00
clawbot e0b211f960 Make deliveries refused while half-open wait a cooldown (closes #306)
check / check (push) Successful in 5m0s
Details 
While the breaker was half-open, Allow refused every delivery but the
probe and CooldownRemaining returned zero, so each queued task for the
target went straight back onto the retry channel and rewrote its status
on every pass until the probe finished.

CooldownRemaining now returns the whole cooldown while half-open, so a
refused delivery waits that long. A refused delivery already at
retrying is not written again, so the retry counter now moves only
when a refusal moves a delivery into retrying.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-09-29 05:48:20 +02:00
clawbot 978eb01b29 Open each event database once when callers race (closes #291)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m48s
Details 
GetDB opened the database on a cache miss and then tried to cache it,
so callers racing on a webhook's first use could each open the file,
and the losers closed their copies. On a new file the parallel opens
also create its tables at the same time, and one caller can fail with
"table already exists".

A mutex now covers the open: GetDB looks in the cache again under it,
then opens and caches. DeleteDB and CloseAll take the same mutex, so
neither runs while an open is under way. Reading an already cached
database takes no lock.

The new test starts many callers on one webhook at once and checks
that exactly one open happened.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-09-29 04:37:30 +02:00
clawbot 3cdab97930 Say make check needs make bootstrap on a fresh clone (closes #282)
check / check (push) Successful in 11s
Details 
The third-party browser assets are not committed, so on a fresh clone
make check fails in the tests until make bootstrap (or make assets) has
fetched them. The Entrypoints section now says so up front, and why the
check does not fetch them itself: it must not change files in the repo.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-09-29 04:30:14 +02:00
clawbot 83740b1de1 Do not resend a delivery that restart recovery already sent (closes #299)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m35s
Details 
Restart recovery could find a just-written delivery pending, send it
and release it before the receiver's Notify queued the same delivery.
Notify's claim then succeeded on the released id, and the worker sent
it again because the new-task path never read the delivery's row.

Before sending a new task the worker now reads the delivery's status
by primary key and skips the task unless the row still says pending,
as the retry path already does for retrying. Nothing else can change
the row while the worker owns the delivery. A row left pending by a
failed bookkeeping write is still sent again.

loadRetryDelivery is renamed loadDelivery now that both paths use it.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-09-29 04:12:14 +02:00
sneak aeeeca5ea1 Merge branch 'main' into next
check / check (push) Successful in 9s
Details
2026-09-29 03:13:57 +02:00
clawbot 6ebac4fa71 Index the event-tier columns the sweeps, event log and retention scan (closes #314)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m4s
Details 
The per-webhook event databases had no secondary indexes, so startup
recovery, the retry and pending sweeps, the queue-depth sampler, the
event log and retention each read whole tables. Indexes declared in
the GORM model tags now serve them, and AutoMigrate adds them to new
and existing databases alike.

Each index also covers deleted_at: GORM adds deleted_at IS NULL to
these queries, and SQLite, with no table statistics, otherwise
prefers the existing deleted_at index. A test checks SQLite's plan
for each statement as GORM builds it.

Rule suppressed: lll on the three event-tier model structs, whose
struct tags cannot wrap.
The resubmitted_from_id scan is left to
#325.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation); opus-5-5 (rework)
 2026-09-28 14:13:22 +02:00
clawbot 237f131367 Default WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT to prod (closes #307)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m14s
Details 
An unset WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT now means prod, not dev. The only
thing dev still changes is CORS, which then answers every origin with
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, so an operator who forgets the
variable is no longer silently permissive; dev must be set
explicitly. Cookie Secure and CSRF strictness follow each request's
transport and are unaffected.

The README, comments and tests no longer describe dev as the default:
the deployment checklist asks only that the environment is not dev,
the Docker and nginx examples drop the now-redundant setting, and the
TRUSTED_PROXIES warning gives its real reason for firing in every
environment.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation); opus-5-5 (rework)
 2026-09-28 12:47:31 +02:00
clawbot 7ed1588443 Document running webhooker under upaas (closes #323)
check / check (push) Successful in 8s
Details 
Adds a "Running under upaas" section to the README: add no port
mapping, since upaas publishes mapped ports on every host interface,
and put the app on the reverse proxy's Docker network instead; one
data volume at /var/lib/webhooker, created owned by UID 1000 before
the first deploy; WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT and TRUSTED_PROXIES; the
health check upaas reads 60 seconds after a deploy; and where the
first-run admin password appears and how to reset it.

upaas bind-mounts a host directory it never creates, and one made by
root stops the container at its data directory lock. The documented
creation step removes that; the image is unchanged.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-09-28 12:30:32 +02:00
clawbot b051821370 Say max_retries is the total attempt count, not a retry count (closes #316)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m54s
Details 
The help text under the field on both target forms and the max_retries rows in the README now say the number is the total number of delivery attempts: 0 is a single attempt with no retries and no circuit breaker, and N is N attempts in total. The delivery code already worked this way; only the wording was wrong, so an operator wanting one try plus two retries would have entered 2 instead of 3. A UI copy test renders both forms and pins the wording. Delivery behaviour is unchanged.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation); fable-5-1 (merge)
 2026-09-21 18:33:09 +02:00
clawbot 39afa69bfc Consolidate the data directory mode into one owner (closes #288)
check / check (push) Successful in 6m34s
Details 
Two packages each declared the 0o750 mode for DATA_DIR and both created the directory. internal/datadir now exports DirPerm as the single definition, and internal/database uses it in both places it creates the directory. The value is unchanged, so existing deployments see no permission change. datadir owns it because guarding and creating DATA_DIR is that package's whole purpose and it imports nothing that would form a cycle.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation and review); fable-5-1 (merge)
 2026-09-21 10:01:51 +02:00
clawbotandsneak 888eaf526b State the UUID-is-the-credential rule as a rule (closes #301) (#302)
check / check (push) Successful in 4m28s
Details 
Closes #301. Docs-only apart from one test comment; no behaviour change.

The receiver has authenticated on the entrypoint UUID alone since inbound signature verification was removed in #279. The README described that as the current state. It did not say it is the decision, which leaves a future contributor free to propose HMAC as an improvement rather than as a reversal.

What changed:

- `## The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret` now states the rule: the v4 UUID at `/webhook/{uuid}` is the credential and the only one; no shared secret, HMAC signature, bearer token or second factor will be added, including as defence in depth. It names the removal that settled it, and it says explicitly that signature headers a sender sends anyway are stored and forwarded but never checked — the previous text left that ambiguous.
- The same section carries the two consequences an operator has to act on: the URL is a capability, so keep it out of logs, tickets and screenshots; and rotation means minting a new entrypoint, not changing a key.
- It also handles the case the rule will next be argued from: a sender that only supports signed payloads to a well-known URL is a constraint on that integration, to be raised on its own terms, not grounds to reintroduce shared secrets.
- The rule is reachable without scrolling 1,100 lines: a pointer in the intro, a new first bullet under Authentication (which previously listed the web UI, the API and `/metrics` and said nothing about the receiver at all), and a sharpened bullet under Security.

Stale language found and corrected: one, in `internal/delivery/redirect_test.go`. Its comment justified same-origin header retention partly by "the inbound signature the receiver verifies" — in this repo's vocabulary "the receiver" is `/webhook/{uuid}`, which verifies nothing. The endpoint that verifies it is the delivery target's, and the comment now says so.

Two places that read like stale signing language were checked and left alone as accurate: `internal/delivery/redirect.go` and `internal/server/sentry.go` describe signature headers senders put on the receiver route, which do arrive and are forwarded — neither claims webhooker checks them.

`REPO_POLICIES.md` was deliberately not touched. It is the cross-project policy document synced from `sneak/prompts` and carries `last_modified` front matter for that purpose, so a webhooker-specific carve-out does not belong in it. Worth knowing: its hardening section ends "if a standard security hardening measure exists for HTTP services and is not listed here, it is still expected. When in doubt, harden" — that is the sentence a future HMAC proposal will cite, and only the README now answers it.

`TODO.md` is untouched per its own Workflow section (issue branches do not touch it).

Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #302
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
 2026-08-30 04:05:38 +02:00
sneak 251cb3d3d3 1.0.0b1 - testing remains
check / check (push) Successful in 8s
Details 
Reviewed-on: #111
 2026-08-30 04:04:59 +02:00
clawbot d61d9dc1c1 Drop the stale open-work claim from the TODO status section
check / check (push) Successful in 2m56s
Details 
The milestone is the authoritative count and the section already says
so; the lead-in asserted work remaining independently of it.
 2026-08-24 15:52:44 +00:00
clawbot b0a011f6b4 Render unknown for a zero CreatedAt in Slack/Mattermost messages (closes #298)
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
2026-08-24 17:52:25 +02:00
clawbot 5976a4a98f Carry the event's receipt time into every delivery (closes #257)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m4s
Details
2026-08-24 06:44:24 +02:00
clawbot b2c9acdaa6 Correct four documentation claims ahead of the 1.0.0 tag
check / check (push) Successful in 7s
Details
2026-08-24 06:25:08 +02:00
clawbot af3703d748 Close the two remaining delivery terminal-state gaps (closes #107)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m16s
Details
2026-08-24 05:12:02 +02:00
clawbot 322d9a6d6b Create every SQLite file 0600 (closes #255)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m17s
Details
2026-08-24 04:33:40 +02:00
clawbot b9f7db6901 Fail loudly on an unparseable SENTRY_DSN and a malformed .env (closes #283)
check / check (push) Successful in 2m54s
Details
2026-08-24 04:25:29 +02:00
clawbot 48cf93ec7e Derive the entrypoint URL scheme from the shared TLS predicate (closes #272)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m44s
Details
2026-08-24 04:04:04 +02:00
clawbot 8d64259283 Open SQLite with WAL and bound delivery re-dispatch by ownership (closes #256)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m1s
Details
2026-08-24 03:49:17 +02:00
clawbot bde32d3ee6 Record landed 1.0.0 work and drop the removed signing roadmap in TODO.md
check / check (push) Successful in 8s
Details
2026-08-24 03:43:16 +02:00
clawbot 62576f6fc6 Bind the app port deliberately and document the proxy deployment (closes #268) (closes #226)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m4s
Details
2026-08-24 03:38:44 +02:00
clawbot 37b59f8822 Remove inbound request signature verification (closes #279)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m14s
Details
2026-08-24 03:25:09 +02:00
clawbot ee2276a912 Stamp the build version into the binary (closes #253)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m12s
Details
2026-08-24 03:15:20 +02:00
clawbot 032f265d69 Derive cookie Secure and CSRF strictness from the request transport (closes #269)
check / check (push) Successful in 2m56s
Details
2026-08-24 03:01:37 +02:00
clawbot 65ace2d856 Roll back a failed webhook deletion instead of committing it (closes #262)
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
2026-08-24 03:01:33 +02:00
clawbot 5fda446c71 Name a deleted target on its historical deliveries (closes #211)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m13s
Details
2026-08-24 02:03:23 +02:00
clawbot 763d8f8058 Bound the /metrics method label (closes #261)
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
2026-08-24 02:03:18 +02:00
clawbot fd5966f807 Validate max_retries on both target forms (closes #221)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m36s
Details
2026-08-24 01:32:48 +02:00
clawbot 0082f216fa Label HTTP metrics with the chi route pattern (closes #254)
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
2026-08-24 01:32:44 +02:00
clawbot 89f3b984d2 Resubmit a stored event as a new undelivered event (closes #250)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m1s
Details
2026-08-24 00:53:37 +02:00
clawbot a83e8fe654 Record the completed 1.0.0 milestone in TODO.md (#249)
check / check (push) Successful in 7s
Details
2026-08-20 11:16:51 +02:00
clawbot 687405993e Harden operator-set target headers (closes #233) (#242)
check / check (push) Successful in 2m58s
Details
2026-08-20 10:54:43 +02:00
clawbot 03cd1859d7 Add an egress CIDR allowlist to the SSRF guard (closes #204) (#217)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m1s
Details
2026-08-20 10:34:42 +02:00
clawbot f0512f1c3c Render delivery attempt detail in the event log (closes #202) (#219)
check / check (push) Successful in 2m55s
Details 
delivery_results stored status_code, response_body, error, duration and
attempt_num, and no template rendered any of it, so a failure read as
"target: failed" and diagnosing it meant opening the per-webhook SQLite
file by hand.

An expanded delivery now lists its attempts with attempt number, status
code, duration, error and response body. The body is bounded in the query
rather than read whole and truncated in Go (#135), and a body the engine
itself cut is no longer presented as complete.

The response body and error are untrusted remote content, so target
credentials are removed before rendering. Two cases needed care: a secret
severed by the 4096-byte cut matches nothing as a whole string, and the
engine's io.LimitReader cuts at the same constant the renderer uses, so
the guard keys on the body reaching the cap rather than on the stored size
exceeding it. Empty secrets are filtered where the secret list is built,
because an empty string passed to strings.ReplaceAll inserts the marker at
every byte boundary.

loadTargetMap builds the redactor half unscoped, so a soft-deleted
target's historical deliveries still render redacted.

Also regenerates static/css/tailwind.css, which had drifted from the
templates: hover:text-red-700, text-red-500, underline and w-28 were in
use but absent from the served stylesheet (#236).
 2026-08-20 08:36:25 +02:00
clawbot 3b0ed826bc Add per-delivery replay to the event log (closes #203) (#240)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m21s
Details 
There was no redelivery path anywhere: once a delivery exhausted
max_retries it was failed permanently, even though the event body is
durably stored. Storing an event and being unable to re-send it defeats
the reason it is stored, and the ordinary case is a destination that was
down longer than the backoff ladder.

Adds POST /source/{sourceID}/deliveries/{deliveryID}/replay, inside the
authenticated group so it inherits MaxBodySize, CSRF, NoCache and
RequireAuth. Replay creates a NEW pending delivery against the target's
CURRENT config and hands it to the engine through the same notifier the
receiver uses, so it runs the normal path with the retry ladder, the
SSRF-guarded transport and the circuit breaker. The original delivery's
rows are never touched, and the stored event body is re-sent, never the
recorded response.

Replay is refused, with a distinct message, for a non-terminal delivery, a
deleted target, a deactivated target, and when an earlier replay of the
same event and target is still in flight. Bounded by a per-client rate
limit and by that in-flight check.

The new delivery row is written with Omit(clause.Associations) and with
neither Event nor Target populated, so it cannot upsert a targets row into
the per-webhook event database (#206).

Counted by webhooker_delivery_replays_total on the existing target_type
label. A replay also moves the ordinary attempt, outcome and duration
series, because it is a real delivery.
 2026-08-20 08:11:35 +02:00
clawbot 9969694a47 Add a webhooker resetpw subcommand and a bootstrap banner (closes #208) (#239)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m25s
Details 
The admin bootstrap password was printed once, as one line among roughly
45 fx lines, and under docker run -d went to container logs subject to
rotation. There was no reset path at all -- no subcommand, no forgot-password
flow, no env override -- so recovery meant hand-deleting the users row from
webhooker.db, which was documented nowhere.

Adds webhooker resetpw [-generate] &lt;username&gt;. The password is read from
stdin or generated with the existing crypto/rand helper, never taken from
argv where /proc would publish it. It reuses the existing Argon2id hashing
rather than reimplementing the parameters, and writes a single UPDATE only
after the hash is complete, so no failure can leave an account with no
usable password. An unknown username is a hard error and never creates an
account.

It refuses to run against a DATA_DIR held by a live instance, via the
exclusive lock from #201. DATA_DIR and webhooker.db are checked to exist
before the lock is acquired, so a mistyped path creates nothing -- neither
a directory tree nor a stray lock file.

The bootstrap password now appears exactly once, in a distinct banner
written straight to a caller-named writer rather than as an fx log line.
 2026-08-20 08:01:42 +02:00
clawbot fcead5d401 Add optional inbound webhook signature verification (closes #67) (#228)
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested 
The receiver had no inbound authentication of any kind: /webhook/{uuid}
was mounted behind a rate limiter alone, so the only thing protecting an
entrypoint was the secrecy of a v4 UUID in a URL path. Inbound headers are
forwarded almost verbatim to the target, so anyone who learned the URL
also chose the headers the downstream service received.

Adds an optional per-entrypoint secret with two schemes: github
(X-Hub-Signature-256, HMAC-SHA256 hex over the raw body) and gitlab
(X-Gitlab-Token, a plain shared token). Comparison is constant-time, the
HMAC is computed over the raw body before any parsing, and rejection
happens before persistence -- an unauthenticated request creates no event
row. An entrypoint with no secret behaves exactly as before, including
every row that predates this change.

The scheme's credential header is stripped from the header map before it
is marshalled into Event.Headers, so the GitLab token reaches neither the
event store nor any delivery target. SchemeInfo.HeaderIsDigest defaults to
false meaning strip, so a scheme added later is protected unless its
header is positively declared a digest.
 2026-08-20 08:01:32 +02:00
clawbot ac782f4c5a Stop target credentials leaking into event databases (closes #206) (#223)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m34s
Details 
GORM's association upsert copied whole targets rows -- plaintext
credential-bearing config -- into the per-webhook event databases with an
empty webhook_id. The leak was in updateDeliveryStatus, not the create
path: Update leaves Statement.Model pointing at a Delivery whose Target
the engine populated, so save_before_associations upserts it.

A connection-level callback now appends clause.Associations to
Statement.Omits on the create and update chains of every per-webhook
connection, so every write path is covered rather than one call site.

Existing files are swept on first open: the leaked rows are deleted and
the file is VACUUMed, because DELETE alone only unlinks the pages and
leaves the credential recoverable in the file's free space. The sweep is
recorded in PRAGMA user_version only after the VACUUM returns, so a sweep
that fails or is interrupted fails the open and is retried on the next
one, rather than being marked done.

Encryption of target config at rest is deliberately out of scope and
deferred to #212.
 2026-08-20 07:55:34 +02:00
clawbot 89b2dadd48 Read queue depths with Find, not Scan (closes #234) (#237)
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested 
Both queue-depth reads used (*gorm.DB).Scan, which swaps GORM's own trace
recorder in for the logging adapter. That recorder does not implement
gorm.ParamsFilter, so those statements logged their bound values
interpolated, bypassing the suppression added for #207.

The scan guard from #222 and the queue-depth sampler from #224 each gated
green against a next that lacked the other; both landed and next went red.

Converted to Find. The emitted SQL is identical apart from placeholders,
and both paths parse the anonymous dest schema the same way, so the
queue-depth gauges are unchanged.
 2026-08-20 07:55:20 +02:00
clawbot aba02bc509 Add a target edit form with headers and timeout fields (closes #127) (#229)
check / check (push) Failing after 2m59s
Details
2026-08-20 07:24:12 +02:00
clawbot c6a9884f86 Take an exclusive lock on DATA_DIR at startup (closes #201) (#220)
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
2026-08-20 07:23:00 +02:00
clawbot 5af161ef60 Log SQL with placeholders, never bound values (closes #207) (#222)
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
2026-08-20 07:20:59 +02:00
clawbot 4cc83b2326 Expose delivery metrics on /metrics (closes #209) (#224)
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
2026-08-20 07:19:04 +02:00
clawbot a13e5b7ded Shut down the app when the listener fails (closes #200) (#218)
check / check (push) Successful in 3m48s
Details
2026-08-20 06:42:36 +02:00
clawbot bb30b3ad64 Fail loudly on half-set metrics auth credentials (closes #205) (#216)
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
2026-08-20 06:30:23 +02:00
238 changed files with 37971 additions and 3264 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files
.dockerignore
+12 -8
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,20 @@
# .git is sent so the build can derive the version it stamps into the binary
# (script/version). Its config, which can hold a remote URL carrying a
# credential and which `git describe` does not need, is left out of a
# directory context. A context sent as a tar is not filtered by this file, so
# it carries .git/config unless its sender leaves it out.
.git/config
# No tracked file may be listed here: git in the build would see it as
# deleted and mark the version -dirty.
#
# .ci-fingerprint is deliberately NOT excluded: it is the CI cache barrier
# that keeps the check stages from replaying a cached pass. See the lint
# stage of the Dockerfile.
.git/
bin/
# Third-party browser assets are fetched and hash-verified inside the build by
# script/fetch-assets. Excluding any host copy keeps a developer's working tree
# from supplying the bytes that get shipped. The script and its
# static/vendor.sha256 manifest stay in the context.
# Extracted from 3p/ by `make assets` inside the build; a host copy is not
# needed. The tarball in 3p/ must stay in the context.
static/js/alpine.min.js
*.md
LICENSE
.editorconfig
.env
.env.*
*.db
.gitea/workflows/check.yml
+8 -14
View File
@@ -12,9 +12,8 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2 2024-10-23
with:
# The fingerprint step below needs history to find the last commit
# that touched the Docker build context, and the superseded-status
# step needs it to walk ancestors (it aborts on a shallow clone).
# The superseded-status step needs history to walk ancestors (it
# aborts on a shallow clone).
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Mark superseded run statuses
@@ -28,16 +27,11 @@ jobs:
run: script/ci-mark-superseded
- name: Fingerprint the build context
# `.dockerignore` keeps docs out of the build context, so a docs-only
# commit legitimately replays the whole image from cache and stays
# cheap. Every other commit writes a new fingerprint into the context,
# which invalidates the `COPY . .` layer of both check stages: a
# commit that was never linted, formatted-checked, tested and built
# cannot report success from cache.
run: |
set -eu
fp="$(git log -1 --format=%H -- . ':!*.md' ':!LICENSE' ':!.editorconfig')"
printf '%s\n' "${fp:-$GITHUB_SHA}" > .ci-fingerprint
# Writes the hash of the commit being checked into the context, which
# invalidates the `COPY . .` layer of both check stages: a commit
# that was never linted, format-checked, tested and built cannot
# report success from cache.
run: git rev-parse HEAD > .ci-fingerprint
- name: Build Docker image (runs make check)
- name: Build Docker image (runs make fmt-check, golangci-lint, make test, make build)
run: script/cibuild
.gitignore
+3 -4
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ temp/
# CI cache barrier, written into the build context by the check workflow
.ci-fingerprint
# Third-party browser assets, fetched and hash-verified by
# script/fetch-assets against static/vendor.sha256. Not committed:
# REPO_POLICIES.md forbids minified bundles in version control.
/static/js/alpine.min.js
# Alpine.js, extracted by `make assets` from its tarball in 3p/, which is
# what is committed.
/static/js/alpine.min.js
3p/alpinejs-csp-3.14.9.tgz
BIN
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Binary file not shown.
Dockerfile
+57 -18
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
# Copy source code. In CI the context also carries .ci-fingerprint, whose
# value changes with every commit that touches the build context (see
# Copy source code. In CI the context also carries .ci-fingerprint, which
# holds the hash of the commit being checked (see
# .gitea/workflows/check.yml). That invalidates this layer, so the checks
# below cannot report success by replaying a cached pass. Do not add it to
# .dockerignore.
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ COPY . .
# Dockerfile.lint, including --network=none (see its header for why).
RUN make fmt-check
RUN --network=none golangci-lint config verify --config .golangci.yml
RUN --network=none golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
RUN --network=none golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml --build-tags browser ./...
# Build stage
# golang:1.26.1-bookworm (Debian-based), 2026-03-17
@@ -38,8 +38,13 @@ FROM golang:1.26.1-bookworm@sha256:4465644228bc2857a954b092167e12aa59c006a349228
COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
# jq is a runtime dependency of script/ci-mark-superseded, which the test
# suite executes.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make curl ca-certificates jq && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# suite executes. git is what script/version derives the version with.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends make curl ca-certificates jq git && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# A build context sent as a tar archive keeps its files' owners, and git
# refuses to read a checkout owned by another user. Trust this one
# whoever owns it.
RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /build
WORKDIR /build
@@ -51,30 +56,47 @@ RUN go mod download
# the lint stage above.
COPY . .
# Fetch the third-party browser assets the UI serves. They are not committed
# (REPO_POLICIES.md forbids minified bundles in version control) and
# .dockerignore keeps any host copy out of the build context, so this step is
# the only way they enter the image. Each download is checked against a
# hardcoded sha256 and the build fails on mismatch; make test re-checks the
# hashes against the bytes go:embed actually put in the binary.
RUN script/fetch-assets
# Run tests and build
# Run tests and build. Both first run script/assets, which extracts Alpine.js
# from its tarball in 3p/.
RUN make test
RUN make build
# Version stamped into the binary: the VERSION build arg when one is
# given, otherwise what script/version derives from the .git the build
# context carries, so any `docker build .` of a clone stamps its commit.
# With neither, as from a source tarball, it is "unknown".
#
# Declared here, below the test step, so a changed version does not
# invalidate its cached layer.
ARG VERSION
# A context that carries .git must not stamp "unknown": that means git is
# missing here or could not read the checkout, and the image could not be
# traced back to its commit.
RUN if [ -d .git ] && [ "$(make version VERSION="$VERSION")" = unknown ]; then \
echo "version is unknown although the build context carries .git" >&2; \
exit 1; \
fi
RUN make build VERSION="$VERSION"
# Rebuild with static linking for Alpine runtime.
# make build already verified compilation.
# The CGO binary from `make build` is dynamically linked against glibc,
# which doesn't exist on Alpine (musl). Rebuild with static linking so
# the binary runs on Alpine without glibc.
RUN CGO_ENABLED=1 go build -ldflags '-extldflags "-static"' -o bin/webhooker ./cmd/webhooker
#
# The static flags go in through GO_LDFLAGS rather than a -ldflags of
# their own: the build target composes them with the -X that stamps the
# version, so this relink cannot silently drop the stamp.
RUN CGO_ENABLED=1 make build VERSION="$VERSION" GO_LDFLAGS='-extldflags "-static"'
# Runtime stage
# alpine:3.21, 2026-03-17
FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:c3f8e73fdb79deaebaa2037150150191b9dcbfba68b4a46d70103204c53f4709
RUN apk --no-cache add ca-certificates
# su-exec 0.2-r3 (Alpine 3.21), 2026-09-29: the entrypoint runs the app
# as webhooker with it.
RUN apk --no-cache add ca-certificates su-exec=0.2-r3
# Create non-root user
RUN addgroup -g 1000 -S webhooker && \
@@ -85,17 +107,34 @@ WORKDIR /app
# Copy binary from builder
COPY --from=builder /build/bin/webhooker /app/webhooker
# Not under /app, which belongs to webhooker: this script runs as root.
COPY deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
# Create data directory for all SQLite databases (main app DB +
# per-webhook event DBs). DATA_DIR defaults to /var/lib/webhooker.
RUN mkdir -p /var/lib/webhooker
RUN chown -R webhooker:webhooker /app /var/lib/webhooker
USER webhooker
# No USER: the entrypoint starts as root to make the data directory
# webhooker's, then runs the app as webhooker.
EXPOSE 8080
# The binary defaults BIND_ADDRESS to 127.0.0.1, which is right for a
# bare host: the cleartext listener serves the admin UI and the
# unauthenticated receiver, so it must not appear on every interface
# of a machine that configured nothing. A container is the other case.
# Its network namespace is already the isolation boundary, so binding
# every address inside it exposes nothing; what decides exposure is
# the publish flag, and `-p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080` is the operator's
# control there. Shipping the image on loopback would buy no security
# and would make the process unreachable through its own published
# port.
ENV BIND_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
CMD wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider http://localhost:8080/.well-known/healthcheck || exit 1
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh"]
CMD ["/app/webhooker"]
Dockerfile.browser
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
# Browser test image, built by script/test-browser (make test-browser). It
# runs the test in internal/server that loads the pages in a headless
# browser under the real Content-Security-Policy. That test is built only
# with the browser build tag, so make test leaves it out. Here the browser
# comes from a digest-pinned image, and if it is missing the test fails.
# golang:1.26.1-bookworm, 2026-03-17: the builder stage's image in Dockerfile.
FROM golang:1.26.1-bookworm@sha256:4465644228bc2857a954b092167e12aa59c006a3492282a6c820bf4755fd64a4 AS build
WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
# The test binary embeds the templates and static files, so the browser
# stage needs nothing else. -p 4 keeps the compile's memory down, as in
# script/test.
RUN make assets && go test -c -p 4 -tags browser -o /browser.test ./internal/server
# chromedp/headless-shell:151.0.7922.109 (Debian trixie), 2026-08-11. The
# browser is on PATH as headless-shell, where the test's browser library
# looks for it.
FROM chromedp/headless-shell:151.0.7922.109@sha256:2d349b544a1ea6b5b5fd7c0fe99215ff662339c57407ee2e8c0a11af93516b04 AS browser
COPY --from=build /browser.test /browser.test
RUN /browser.test -test.v -test.timeout 90s -test.run '^TestAlpineRunsUnderTheSecurityPolicy$'
Dockerfile.lint
+3 -1
View File
@@ -34,4 +34,6 @@ COPY . .
# `run` silently ignores config keys it does not recognize, so a typo would
# disable a setting without a word. `config verify` is what catches that.
RUN --network=none golangci-lint config verify --config .golangci.yml
RUN --network=none golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
# --build-tags browser also lints the browser test, which is built only with
# that tag (make test-browser).
RUN --network=none golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml --build-tags browser ./...
Makefile
+29 -5
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,26 @@
.PHONY: bootstrap setup assets test lint fmt fmt-check check build run dev deps docker clean hooks css
.PHONY: bootstrap setup assets test test-browser lint fmt fmt-check check build run dev deps docker clean hooks css version
# Default target
.DEFAULT_GOAL := check
# Version stamped into the binary. Derived from git by script/version;
# override it (`make build VERSION=v1.2.3`) to stamp a given value, which is
# how the Dockerfile passes its build arg in.
VERSION ?= $(shell script/version)
# An empty override (`make build VERSION=`, or the Dockerfile's `make build
# VERSION="$VERSION"` when no VERSION build arg was given) means unset,
# exactly as it does in script/version -- stamping "" would leave the binary
# reporting no version and the footer back on its "dev" fallback. `override`
# is required: a plain assignment loses to the command-line definition it
# exists to correct.
override VERSION := $(or $(strip $(VERSION)),$(shell script/version))
# Extra linker flags for the build target. The static relink in the
# Dockerfile adds -extldflags here rather than passing its own -ldflags,
# so composing flags cannot drop the version stamp.
GO_LDFLAGS ?=
bootstrap:
@script/bootstrap
@@ -10,11 +28,14 @@ setup:
@script/setup
assets:
@script/fetch-assets
@script/assets
test:
@script/test
test-browser:
@script/test-browser
lint:
@script/lint
@@ -27,19 +48,22 @@ fmt-check:
check:
@script/check
build:
go build -o bin/webhooker ./cmd/webhooker
build: assets
go build -ldflags '$(strip -X main.version=$(VERSION) $(GO_LDFLAGS))' -o bin/webhooker ./cmd/webhooker
run: build
./bin/webhooker
dev:
dev: assets
go run ./cmd/webhooker
deps:
go mod download
go mod tidy
version:
@echo $(VERSION)
docker:
@script/docker
README.md
+1713 -396
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
TODO.md
+148 -66
View File
@@ -18,71 +18,153 @@ Issue branches do NOT touch this file — the manager maintains it on
# Status
pre-1.0. No git tags exist. `main` (4f5ecb1) is a working webhook proxy
with auth, CSRF/SSRF protections, login rate limiting, Slack target,
event retention (#63), the database archiving target (#43), the admin
password change flow (#65), policy compliance (#6), pinned lint tooling
(#55), and fail-loud configuration parsing (#80).
The milestone (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/milestone/9) is the
authoritative list, and the only place to read a count or a state of
play from. This file records where the project is, not what is in
flight: a sentence whose truth depends on a branch being unmerged is
wrong the moment it merges, and this file has been wrong that way
before.
`next` is green — verified both by CI and by cache-defeated container
runs (`docker build --no-cache-filter=lint --no-cache-filter=builder`) —
but the **1.0.0 milestone is no longer complete**. It was reopened on
2026-08-20 by a code-level deployability audit that ran the service end
to end (verdict:
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/33#issuecomment-66686).
The durability defect that held the tag has landed
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/256, commit `8d64259`).
Every SQLite handle opens with WAL journaling and a busy timeout, a
bookkeeping write that fails leaves its delivery in a recoverable
state rather than a lying one, and recovery skips a delivery that
already has a successful result row. Final pre-tag verification
exercised it and confirmed it holds. Whatever the milestone still
shows open is what remains before `v1.0.0`.
The bar for 1.0 is not "the milestone is empty" but "sneak can deploy
this and use it in low-volume production". The audit found the gap
between those two: two instances on one `DATA_DIR` both deliver
(reproduced), a failed listen leaves a live non-serving process that
restart policies never fire on, there is no inbound authentication of
any kind, delivery failures render as a bare word with no status code or
error, a terminally failed delivery can never be replayed, the SSRF
blocklist has no escape hatch so the proxy cannot forward to your own
network at all, and target credentials leak into the per-webhook event
databases.
One caveat on reading a green check, narrower than it used to be. A
docs-only commit deliberately replays from the layer cache (#119), so a
green status on such a commit evidences a replay rather than an executed
run; a code commit invalidates the `COPY` layer and genuinely executes.
Superseded runs are no longer the hazard they were: before #152 they
were recorded as `skipped` and rolled up green, and before #119 a warm
layer cache let the gate report success without executing anything,
replaying the previous build's console log so the lie looked like a real
run. Both are fixed. Note: `TODO.md` was deliberately
deleted from this repo in f9a9569 (2026-03-01, #6); its content was
folded into the README TODO section, which this draft reconstructs as
of 2026-07-06.
Delivery is at-least-once by design, not by accident: a send whose
result row does not land is attempted again, so a receiver can see a
duplicate. That is deliberate — the alternative is a silent lost
delivery — and the README says so under Rationale. It is not a defect
to re-file.
# Next Step
Clear the reopened 1.0.0 milestone. The milestone PR
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/pulls/111) is held: it carries a
`WIP: ` prefix, no labels and is assigned to `clawbot`, and it stays
that way until the milestone is empty. Correctness first — the
duplicate-delivery lock and the listen-failure shutdown — then the
operability gaps that make the service usable in production, then the
three credential exposures.
Three items belong to the owner, none of them blocking. #150 was decided
by the manager rather than left to stall the queue and is flagged on the
issue for reversal if that call was wrong. #112 (whether `Completed
Steps` should exist at all, given it once conflicted on every unit) is
unanswered; the provisional ruling in force is that issue branches do
not touch this file. #198 records that `make test` is past the org 20s
target — 46s of test execution inside a 62.8s CI layer — and turns on
which quantity the 60s hard cap governs; it is scoped as the improvement
bug the 20-60s band requires, and should be milestoned instead if the
cap is read as covering the whole invocation.
After the tag, the largest open cluster is the unmilestoned follow-up
backlog these units generated: #183, #184, #185, #190, #191, #193, #198,
#211 and #212 (encrypting target config at rest, split out of the
credential-leak fix because it needs a key-rotation and re-wrap story).
Clear the rest of the open 1.0.0 milestone
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/milestone/9) and tag `v1.0.0`.
Merging `next` into `main` is a separate act from tagging and waits on
neither of those: `next` is kept mergeable at all times, which is the
point of the branch.
# Completed Steps
- 2026-08-24 Bind the plaintext HTTP listener deliberately, via
`BIND_ADDRESS` defaulting to `127.0.0.1`, and document the
reverse-proxy deployment. A hostname, an empty value or a value
carrying a port is a startup error, and the `Dockerfile` sets
`0.0.0.0` because a loopback bind inside a container is unreachable
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/268). The same commit
removed the shutdown race: `httpServer` is built in the constructor
rather than assigned from the serving goroutine, which orders the
write before every fx hook and rules out the nil dereference a
SIGTERM arriving first would have caused, and `sentryEnabled` is an
`atomic.Bool` (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/226)
- 2026-08-24 Remove inbound request signature verification. The
entrypoint UUID is the authentication secret, so the per-entrypoint
shared secret, the `internal/signature` package, the receiver check,
the model fields and the forms are all gone. This reverses the
feature that landed earlier in the same milestone
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/67,
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/279)
- 2026-08-24 Stamp the build version into the binary and render it in
the UI footer. `script/version` is the single source — `$VERSION`,
else `git describe --tags --always --dirty`, else `unknown` — so a
`make build` binary and a `make docker` image from one checkout
report the same thing, and nothing in it varies between two builds
of the same commit, which the release gate's byte-identical
assertion would catch
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/253)
- 2026-08-24 Derive cookie `Secure` and CSRF strictness from the
request transport rather than from `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT`. Behind a
real TLS proxy with the environment left at its `dev` default, the
session cookie silently lost `Secure` while the CSRF cookie on the
same response kept it. `X-Forwarded-Proto` is now matched
case-insensitively on its first comma-separated element, so `HTTPS`
and `https, http` no longer fall to the relaxed CSRF path
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/269)
- 2026-08-24 Roll back a failed webhook deletion instead of committing
it. A failing delete committed whatever had already succeeded,
hard-deleted the per-webhook event database anyway, and redirected as
though it had worked — orphaned config plus permanently destroyed
history, reported as success. All three delete positions now roll
back with the event database intact
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/262)
- 2026-08-24 Name a deleted target on its historical deliveries, marked
`(deleted)`, rather than leaving the event log unable to say where a
delivery went. A deleted target's credentials stay masked exactly as
a live one's, and it cannot become deliverable again through the
receiver, resubmit, replay, the edit form or the toggle
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/211)
- 2026-08-24 Bound both request-controlled `/metrics` label dimensions,
so the unauthenticated receiver is no longer a memory-exhaustion
vector: `handler` carries the chi route pattern, and `method` folds
anything chi cannot route onto a single `(unmatched)` sentinel. Both
were reproduced before the fix — 300 random method tokens took the
series count from 106 to 7,631, and path flooding reached 62,532 —
and a label audit across a live scrape found no third unbounded
dimension (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/254,
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/261)
- 2026-08-24 Validate `max_retries` on both target forms. `abc`, `2.7`
and `-5` silently became 0 — fire-and-forget — including on the edit
path, where it destroyed a working value, and `999999999` stored
verbatim. The ceiling of 20 is the `max` both templates already
declared (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/221)
- 2026-08-24 Resubmit a stored event as a new undelivered event, so a
backend under development can be tested against real captured
traffic. Per-delivery replay cannot serve that: it re-sends one
finished delivery to its own original target, and a target created
for a dev backend has no prior delivery to replay. Resubmit
re-injects the stored event at the top of the receiver path and fans
it out to whatever targets are active now
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/250)
- 2026-08-20 Take an exclusive lock on `DATA_DIR` at startup, so two
instances on one directory cannot both deliver
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/201)
- 2026-08-20 Shut down the app when the HTTP listener fails. The
`OnStart` hook returned as soon as the serving goroutine was
spawned, so a failed listen left fx reporting RUNNING and a live
process with nothing bound — invisible to systemd and Docker restart
policies (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/200)
- 2026-08-20 Stop target credentials leaking into the per-webhook event
databases (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206), log SQL
with placeholders rather than bound values
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/207), and fail loudly on
half-set metrics auth credentials
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/205)
- 2026-08-20 Read queue depths with `Find`, not `Scan`. `Scan` swaps
GORM's own trace recorder in for the logging adapter, and that
recorder does not implement `gorm.ParamsFilter`, so those statements
logged their bound values interpolated and bypassed the suppression
above. The two units gated green against a `next` that lacked the
other, and `next` went red when both landed
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/234)
- 2026-08-20 Render per-attempt delivery detail in the event log
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/202) and add replay of a
terminally failed delivery
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/203)
- 2026-08-20 Expose delivery metrics on `/metrics`
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/209) and document the
backup, restore and upgrade procedures
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/210)
- 2026-08-20 Add a `webhooker resetpw` subcommand and a bootstrap
banner. The admin bootstrap password was printed once among roughly
45 fx lines, and under `docker run -d` went to container logs subject
to rotation; there was no reset path at all, so recovery meant
hand-deleting the users row, documented nowhere. The password is read
from stdin or generated, never from argv where `/proc` would publish
it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/208)
- 2026-08-20 Add `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS`, an allowlist-only escape hatch
for the SSRF guard, so a self-hosted proxy can forward into the
operator's own network. The guard's always-blocked set cannot be
reopened by configuration
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/204)
- 2026-08-20 Harden operator-set target headers, which were carried
unsafely across a redirect
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/233)
- 2026-08-20 Add a target edit form with headers and timeout fields
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/127)
- 2026-08-18 Raise `script/test`'s per-package timeout from 30s to 90s,
matching the org-wide backstop. `go test` applies `-timeout` per
package, and `internal/handlers` had grown past the old budget: a
@@ -299,7 +381,7 @@ credential-leak fix because it needs a key-rotation and re-wrap story).
- 2026-03-05 security headers middleware, session regeneration on
login, request body size limits (#41)
- 2026-03-04 tests for delivery, middleware, and session packages
(#32); removed globals.Buildarch (#31)
(#32); removed the build-architecture global (#31)
- 2026-03-04 1.0 MVP merge: Webhook/Entrypoint/Target rename, core
delivery engine with bounded worker pool and circuit breaker,
parallel fan-out, per-webhook event databases, management UI (#16)
@@ -308,14 +390,13 @@ credential-leak fix because it needs a key-rotation and re-wrap story).
# Future Steps
- Manual event redelivery from the web UI — the "Replay" capability the
README describes as planned. No redelivery code exists anywhere in the
tree; events are stored in full, which is all it would be built on
- Delivery status and retry management UI
- Delivery status and retry management UI. Replay of a terminally
failed delivery and per-attempt detail already landed
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/203,
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/202)
- Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler (per-webhook config
plus handler enforcement; global limits must not apply to receiver
endpoints)
- Webhook signature verification for GitHub and Stripe HMAC formats
- API key authentication for programmatic access (APIKey model exists;
Bearer token middleware does not)
- REST API v1
@@ -325,9 +406,10 @@ credential-leak fix because it needs a key-rotation and re-wrap story).
- OpenAPI specification
- Analytics dashboard: success rates, response times, volume
- A remember-me option at login
- Password reset flow for a forgotten password. The authenticated
password *change* flow already landed on `main` (#65); reset does not
exist
- Password reset flow for a forgotten password over the web. The
authenticated password *change* flow already landed, and a lost
password is recoverable from the console with `webhooker resetpw`
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/208)
- Later, nice to have
- email delivery target type
- SNS and S3 delivery targets
cmd/webhooker/dotenv_test.go
+107
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
)
// dotEnvKey is a throwaway variable name these tests write and read,
// so they cannot disturb real configuration.
const dotEnvKey = "WEBHOOKER_TEST_DISPATCH_VALUE"
// writeDotEnvInWorkingDir puts contents in a .env file in a fresh
// temporary directory and moves the process there.
//
// The callers are deliberately not parallel and must stay that way:
// t.Chdir moves the whole process. Go releases parallel tests only
// after every sequential test in the package has finished, so nothing
// else runs while these do.
func writeDotEnvInWorkingDir(t *testing.T, contents string) {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(
filepath.Join(dir, config.DotEnvPath),
[]byte(contents), 0o600,
))
t.Chdir(dir)
}
// TestDispatch_MalformedDotEnvRefuses pins the second half of the
// defect. godotenv applies nothing at all when a file will not parse,
// so one mistyped line used to revert every variable in it to its
// default and start the server anyway, with no log line naming the
// file. The refusal has to arrive before any subcommand runs, which
// is why `help` — the one subcommand that touches nothing — is still
// refused here.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // t.Chdir moves the whole process.
func TestDispatch_MalformedDotEnvRefuses(t *testing.T) {
writeDotEnvInWorkingDir(t, "PORT 19615\n")
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := dispatch(
[]string{helpCommand}, strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr,
)
require.Equal(t, 1, code, "a broken .env must exit non-zero")
assert.Contains(
t, stderr.String(), config.DotEnvPath,
"the refusal must name the file",
)
assert.Empty(
t, stdout.String(),
"the subcommand must not have run",
)
}
// TestDispatch_LoadsDotEnvBeforeSubcommands pins the ordering the
// godotenv/autoload import used to provide for free. It ran in an
// init(), so .env was in the environment before anything read it —
// including config.DataDir, which both the DATA_DIR lock and resetpw
// call outside the fx graph. Loading any later would let a .env that
// sets DATA_DIR lock one directory while the config opened databases
// in another.
func TestDispatch_LoadsDotEnvBeforeSubcommands(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(dotEnvKey, "placeholder")
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(dotEnvKey))
writeDotEnvInWorkingDir(t, dotEnvKey+"=from-dot-env\n")
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := dispatch(
[]string{helpCommand}, strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr,
)
require.Equal(t, 0, code)
assert.Equal(
t, "from-dot-env", os.Getenv(dotEnvKey),
"the file must be applied before the subcommand runs",
)
}
// TestDispatch_MissingDotEnvIsFine pins the case most deployments are
// in: no .env at all, which must stay a normal start.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // t.Chdir moves the whole process.
func TestDispatch_MissingDotEnvIsFine(t *testing.T) {
t.Chdir(t.TempDir())
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := dispatch(
[]string{helpCommand}, strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr,
)
require.Equal(t, 0, code)
assert.Empty(t, stderr.String())
}
cmd/webhooker/main.go
+130 -5
View File
@@ -2,17 +2,24 @@
package main
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"time"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"go.uber.org/fx/fxevent"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/handlers"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/resetpw"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
)
@@ -44,6 +51,16 @@ import (
// and can still consume the whole budget on their own.
const stopTimeout = 5 * time.Second
// exitUsage is the status for a command line this binary cannot make
// sense of, kept distinct from the 1 a refusal exits with so that a
// caller can tell "called wrong" from "declined".
const exitUsage = 2
// helpCommand is the subcommand that prints usage. The flag spellings
// beside it in the switch are aliases; this is the name the usage text
// documents and the one tests invoke.
const helpCommand = "help"
// Build-time variables set via -ldflags.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // Build-time variables injected by the linker.
@@ -56,7 +73,95 @@ func main() {
globals.Appname = appname
globals.Version = version
os.Exit(dispatch(os.Args[1:], os.Stdin, os.Stdout, os.Stderr))
}
// dispatch routes the command line to a subcommand.
//
// No arguments runs the server, which is what the image's CMD and
// every existing deployment invoke; that path is unchanged, including
// where the DATA_DIR lock is taken relative to building the fx graph
// and how fx propagates a non-zero exit itself.
//
// The optional .env file is read here, before any subcommand and so
// before anything reads the environment — config.DataDir, which both
// the DATA_DIR lock and resetpw call outside the fx graph, above all.
// It used to be read from an init() in internal/config, which put it
// earlier still but threw the error away: a single malformed line
// applied none of the file and said nothing about it. A file that is
// not there stays fine, since .env is optional and most deployments
// do not have one.
func dispatch(
args []string,
stdin io.Reader,
stdout, stderr io.Writer,
) int {
err := config.LoadDotEnv()
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "%s: %v\n", appname, err)
return 1
}
if len(args) == 0 {
return run(stderr)
}
switch args[0] {
case resetpw.Name:
return resetpw.Run(args[1:], stdin, stdout, stderr)
case helpCommand, "-h", "-help", "--help":
usage(stdout)
return 0
default:
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(
stderr, "%s: unknown subcommand %q\n", appname, args[0],
)
usage(stderr)
return exitUsage
}
}
// usage lists what the binary can be asked to do.
func usage(w io.Writer) {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `usage: %s [subcommand]
With no subcommand, runs the webhooker server.
Subcommands:
%s [-generate] <username>
Set an existing account's password on a stopped deployment.
Recovers an admin account whose bootstrap password was lost.
help
Print this message.
`, appname, resetpw.Name)
}
// run takes the exclusive DATA_DIR lock, then runs the application
// under it, and returns the process exit status.
//
// The lock is taken here rather than inside the fx graph because it has
// to be held before anything opens a database, and because a refusal
// has to reach the operator as a plain line on standard error rather
// than as one entry in an fx failure dump. It is released by the defer
// on a clean shutdown, and by the kernel closing the descriptor on any
// other exit — including the one fx performs itself when a start or
// stop hook fails, which skips deferred calls.
func run(stderr io.Writer) int {
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(config.DataDir())
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "%s: %v\n", appname, err)
return 1
}
defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }()
newApp().Run()
return 0
}
// newApp builds the application graph. It is separate from main so
@@ -64,6 +169,19 @@ func main() {
func newApp() *fx.App {
return fx.New(
fx.StopTimeout(stopTimeout),
// fx's own events go through the service's logger, not fx's
// console logger on standard error. The exception is a failure
// before this logger is built, such as an invalid configuration
// value, which fx's console logger still prints there. fx holds
// its events back until this logger is built and then replays
// them, so it takes the configuration, which sets the level
// DEBUG=true asks for: without it the replay would run at INFO
// and drop every record of how the graph was built.
fx.WithLogger(
func(l *logger.Logger, _ *config.Config) fxevent.Logger {
return logger.NewFxLogger(l.Get())
},
),
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
@@ -74,17 +192,24 @@ func newApp() *fx.App {
healthcheck.New,
session.New,
handlers.New,
// The registry /metrics serves, and the delivery
// collectors registered on it.
metrics.NewRegistry,
metrics.New,
middleware.New,
// The one SSRF guard both target-creation validation
// and the delivery dialer consult, so they cannot
// disagree about a destination.
delivery.NewGuard,
delivery.New,
delivery.NewArchiveSweeper,
// Wire *delivery.Engine as delivery.Notifier so the
// webhook handler can notify the engine of new deliveries.
func(e *delivery.Engine) delivery.Notifier { return e },
// Wire *delivery.Engine as delivery.WebhookEvictor so
// deleting a webhook releases its archive writer.
func(e *delivery.Engine) delivery.WebhookEvictor {
return e
},
// Wire *delivery.Engine as delivery.Archives so deleting
// or renaming a webhook or target reaches its archive
// files.
func(e *delivery.Engine) delivery.Archives { return e },
server.New,
),
fx.Invoke(
cmd/webhooker/main_test.go
+198
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,22 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/resetpw"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
)
@@ -25,6 +37,7 @@ const dockerStopGrace = 10 * time.Second
// fx.New applies options before it executes invokes, so the timeout
// is set whether or not the graph itself can be constructed here.
func TestNewApp_StopTimeout(t *testing.T) {
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", t.TempDir())
got := newApp().StopTimeout()
@@ -33,6 +46,191 @@ func TestNewApp_StopTimeout(t *testing.T) {
require.Less(t, got, dockerStopGrace)
}
// freePort returns a loopback TCP port that was free a moment ago, by
// taking one and releasing it.
func freePort(t *testing.T) int {
t.Helper()
var listenCfg net.ListenConfig
l, err := listenCfg.Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
require.NoError(t, err)
addr, ok := l.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr)
require.True(t, ok, "listener is not TCP")
require.NoError(t, l.Close())
return addr.Port
}
// TestNewApp_SendsFxEventsToTheLogger starts and stops the app main
// runs, with DEBUG=true, and reads back what reached the service's
// logger. fx's own events must arrive there as structured records:
// the start at INFO, and at DEBUG the records of how the graph was
// built.
//
// fx holds its events back until its logger is built and then replays
// them all at once, so the earliest of them arriving shows the replay
// ran at DEBUG: that globals.New was provided, which fx records before
// anything is built, and the run of logger.New, which happens before
// the configuration sets the level.
func TestNewApp_SendsFxEventsToTheLogger(t *testing.T) {
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", t.TempDir())
t.Setenv("PORT", strconv.Itoa(freePort(t)))
t.Setenv("DEBUG", "true")
// internal/logger writes to whatever os.Stdout is when it builds
// its handler. A file is not a terminal, so that handler is the
// JSON one the service uses in production.
out, err := os.CreateTemp(t.TempDir(), "stdout")
require.NoError(t, err)
stdout := os.Stdout
os.Stdout = out
t.Cleanup(func() {
os.Stdout = stdout
_ = out.Close()
})
app := newApp()
require.NoError(t, app.Start(t.Context()))
require.NoError(t, app.Stop(t.Context()))
_, err = out.Seek(0, io.SeekStart)
require.NoError(t, err)
written, err := io.ReadAll(out)
require.NoError(t, err)
type record struct {
Level string `json:"level"`
Msg string `json:"msg"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Constructor string `json:"constructor"`
}
var records []record
for line := range strings.Lines(string(written)) {
var r record
// The first-boot banner is plain text, not a record.
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &r) == nil {
records = append(records, r)
}
}
const pkg = "sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/"
info := slog.LevelInfo.String()
debug := slog.LevelDebug.String()
assert.Contains(t, records, record{Level: info, Msg: "started"})
assert.Contains(t, records, record{
Level: debug, Msg: "provided", Constructor: pkg + "globals.New()",
})
assert.Contains(t, records, record{
Level: debug, Msg: "run", Name: pkg + "logger.New()",
})
assert.Contains(t, records, record{Level: debug, Msg: "invoking"})
assert.Contains(t, records, record{
Level: debug, Msg: "initialized custom fxevent.Logger",
})
}
// TestRunRefusesLockedDataDir pins what an operator's second start
// does. The entry point must refuse before it builds the fx graph —
// nothing may open a database in a DATA_DIR another process holds —
// and must exit non-zero with a message naming the directory rather
// than starting a second delivery engine over the same rows.
//
// flock(2) locks descriptors independently, so holding the lock here
// is the same denial a separate process gets; internal/datadir pins
// that property and covers the real two-process case.
func TestRunRefusesLockedDataDir(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", dir)
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }()
var stderr bytes.Buffer
code := run(&stderr)
require.Equal(
t, 1, code, "a second instance must exit non-zero",
)
assert.Contains(
t, stderr.String(), dir,
"the refusal must name the directory",
)
assert.Contains(t, stderr.String(), "another instance")
}
// TestDispatch_NoArgumentsRunsTheServer pins the routing of a bare
// invocation, which is what the image's CMD and every deployment use.
// Adding subcommands must not move the server off the empty argument
// list, and must not move the DATA_DIR lock: this asserts the refusal
// arrives with no fx graph built, exactly as run does on its own.
func TestDispatch_NoArgumentsRunsTheServer(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", dir)
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }()
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := dispatch(nil, strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr)
require.Equal(t, 1, code)
assert.Contains(t, stderr.String(), "another instance")
}
// TestDispatch_UnknownSubcommand keeps a mistyped subcommand from
// starting a server. Anything else would have `webhooker resetpww`
// silently take the DATA_DIR lock and serve.
func TestDispatch_UnknownSubcommand(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := dispatch(
[]string{"resetpww", "admin"},
strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr,
)
require.Equal(t, 2, code)
assert.Contains(t, stderr.String(), "unknown subcommand")
assert.Contains(
t, stderr.String(), resetpw.Name,
"the usage must name the subcommand that does exist",
)
}
// TestDispatch_Help answers on standard output with a zero status, so
// `webhooker help` is usable in a pipe.
func TestDispatch_Help(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := dispatch(
[]string{helpCommand}, strings.NewReader(""), &stdout, &stderr,
)
require.Equal(t, 0, code)
assert.Empty(t, stderr.String())
assert.Contains(t, stdout.String(), resetpw.Name)
}
// tailHeadroom is the slack the fx stop budget must keep beyond the
// server stop hook. The hooks that run after the server — the
// delivery engine, the healthcheck, the webhook DB manager and the
deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh
Executable
+22
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
#!/bin/sh
# deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh: the image's ENTRYPOINT. A bind-mounted
# data directory keeps its owner from the host, often root, and the app
# could not write to it. Started as root, this creates DATA_DIR if
# needed, gives it and everything in it to webhooker, sets its mode, and
# runs the command as webhooker, so the app never runs as root. Started
# as another user, it only runs the command.
set -eu
main() {
if [ "$(id -u)" != 0 ]; then
exec "$@"
fi
dir="${DATA_DIR:-/var/lib/webhooker}"
mkdir -p "$dir"
find "$dir" ! -user webhooker -exec chown -h webhooker:webhooker {} +
chmod 750 "$dir"
exec su-exec webhooker "$@"
}
main "$@"
go.mod
+16 -10
View File
@@ -4,18 +4,23 @@ go 1.26.1
require (
github.com/99designs/basicauth-go v0.0.0-20230316000542-bf6f9cbbf0f8
github.com/chromedp/cdproto v0.0.0-20260922220944-a19bff23514f
github.com/chromedp/chromedp v0.16.0
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1
github.com/getsentry/sentry-go v0.25.0
github.com/go-chi/chi v1.5.5
github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.1
github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.15.0
github.com/gofrs/flock v0.13.0
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
github.com/gorilla/csrf v1.7.3
github.com/gorilla/sessions v1.4.0
github.com/joho/godotenv v1.5.1
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.18.0
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.5.0
github.com/slok/go-http-metrics v0.11.0
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4
go.uber.org/fx v1.20.1
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
go.uber.org/fx v1.24.0
golang.org/x/crypto v0.38.0
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
gorm.io/driver/sqlite v1.5.4
@@ -26,30 +31,31 @@ require (
require (
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.2.0 // indirect
github.com/chromedp/sysutil v1.1.0 // indirect
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.2-0.20180830191138-d8f796af33cc // indirect
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/go-json-experiment/json v0.0.0-20260820222146-c27c302e5fc3 // indirect
github.com/gobwas/httphead v0.1.0 // indirect
github.com/gobwas/pool v0.2.1 // indirect
github.com/gobwas/ws v1.4.0 // indirect
github.com/gorilla/securecookie v1.1.2 // indirect
github.com/jinzhu/inflection v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/jinzhu/now v1.1.5 // indirect
github.com/kballard/go-shellquote v0.0.0-20180428030007-95032a82bc51 // indirect
github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.2.10 // indirect
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3 v1.14.17 // indirect
github.com/matttproud/golang_protobuf_extensions/v2 v2.0.0 // indirect
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.1-0.20181226105442-5d4384ee4fb2 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.5.0 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/common v0.45.0 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.12.0 // indirect
github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec // indirect
github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2 // indirect
go.uber.org/atomic v1.9.0 // indirect
go.uber.org/dig v1.17.0 // indirect
go.uber.org/multierr v1.9.0 // indirect
go.uber.org/zap v1.23.0 // indirect
go.uber.org/dig v1.19.0 // indirect
go.uber.org/multierr v1.10.0 // indirect
go.uber.org/zap v1.26.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/mod v0.17.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.14.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.33.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.25.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.21.1-0.20240508182429-e35e4ccd0d2d // indirect
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.31.0 // indirect
go.sum
+36 -26
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
github.com/99designs/basicauth-go v0.0.0-20230316000542-bf6f9cbbf0f8 h1:nMpu1t4amK3vJWBibQ5X/Nv0aXL+b69TQf2uK5PH7Go=
github.com/99designs/basicauth-go v0.0.0-20230316000542-bf6f9cbbf0f8/go.mod h1:3cARGAK9CfW3HoxCy1a0G4TKrdiKke8ftOMEOHyySYs=
github.com/benbjohnson/clock v1.3.0 h1:ip6w0uFQkncKQ979AypyG0ER7mqUSBdKLOgAle/AT8A=
github.com/benbjohnson/clock v1.3.0/go.mod h1:J11/hYXuz8f4ySSvYwY0FKfm+ezbsZBKZxNJlLklBHA=
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 h1:VlbKKnNfV8bJzeqoa4cOKqO6bYr3WgKZxO8Z16+hsOM=
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1/go.mod h1:G2ZrVWU2WbWT9wwq4/hrbKbnv/1ERSJQ0ibhJ6rlkpw=
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.2.0 h1:DC2CZ1Ep5Y4k3ZQ899DldepgrayRUGE6BBZ/cd9Cj44=
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.2.0/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs=
github.com/creack/pty v1.1.9/go.mod h1:oKZEueFk5CKHvIhNR5MUki03XCEU+Q6VDXinZuGJ33E=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/chromedp/cdproto v0.0.0-20260922220944-a19bff23514f h1:8PK9FM4bE0C8GMoWBW5lVsef3U7sPICjDg6JqngyYhk=
github.com/chromedp/cdproto v0.0.0-20260922220944-a19bff23514f/go.mod h1:3v4FIp5njIUyPDvqXsxEOxnB34lijG0up98/5kM1KaE=
github.com/chromedp/chromedp v0.16.0 h1:rOO4deOm4CbZgBCa8mD9g2rDyIoNs0BkgvNrlbp5ouk=
github.com/chromedp/chromedp v0.16.0/go.mod h1:rbuGKFT1vMcFcFqKfPIO1GpX/N+2s8onm2qMxZLbU5U=
github.com/chromedp/sysutil v1.1.0 h1:PUFNv5EcprjqXZD9nJb9b/c9ibAbxiYo4exNWZyipwM=
github.com/chromedp/sysutil v1.1.0/go.mod h1:WiThHUdltqCNKGc4gaU50XgYjwjYIhKWoHGPTUfWTJ8=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.2-0.20180830191138-d8f796af33cc h1:U9qPSI2PIWSS1VwoXQT9A3Wy9MM3WgvqSxFWenqJduM=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.2-0.20180830191138-d8f796af33cc/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 h1:GzkhY7T5VNhEkwH0PVJgjz+fX1rhBrR7pRT3mDkpeCY=
@@ -23,6 +24,16 @@ github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.15.0 h1:j54xcWV9KGmPf/X4H32/aTH+wBlrvxL7P+SdnRqxh5
github.com/go-chi/httprate v0.15.0/go.mod h1:rzGHhVrsBn3IMLYDOZQsSU4fJNWcjui4fWKJcCId1R4=
github.com/go-errors/errors v1.4.2 h1:J6MZopCL4uSllY1OfXM374weqZFFItUbrImctkmUxIA=
github.com/go-errors/errors v1.4.2/go.mod h1:sIVyrIiJhuEF+Pj9Ebtd6P/rEYROXFi3BopGUQ5a5Og=
github.com/go-json-experiment/json v0.0.0-20260820222146-c27c302e5fc3 h1:UADEEmDKgfXbtnGJZ97beY5XLo9ZechG1nlU4KnRrkE=
github.com/go-json-experiment/json v0.0.0-20260820222146-c27c302e5fc3/go.mod h1:tphK2c80bpPhMOI4v6bIc2xWywPfbqi1Z06+RcrMkDg=
github.com/gobwas/httphead v0.1.0 h1:exrUm0f4YX0L7EBwZHuCF4GDp8aJfVeBrlLQrs6NqWU=
github.com/gobwas/httphead v0.1.0/go.mod h1:O/RXo79gxV8G+RqlR/otEwx4Q36zl9rqC5u12GKvMCM=
github.com/gobwas/pool v0.2.1 h1:xfeeEhW7pwmX8nuLVlqbzVc7udMDrwetjEv+TZIz1og=
github.com/gobwas/pool v0.2.1/go.mod h1:q8bcK0KcYlCgd9e7WYLm9LpyS+YeLd8JVDW6WezmKEw=
github.com/gobwas/ws v1.4.0 h1:CTaoG1tojrh4ucGPcoJFiAQUAsEWekEWvLy7GsVNqGs=
github.com/gobwas/ws v1.4.0/go.mod h1:G3gNqMNtPppf5XUz7O4shetPpcZ1VJ7zt18dlUeakrc=
github.com/gofrs/flock v0.13.0 h1:95JolYOvGMqeH31+FC7D2+uULf6mG61mEZ/A8dRYMzw=
github.com/gofrs/flock v0.13.0/go.mod h1:jxeyy9R1auM5S6JYDBhDt+E2TCo7DkratH4Pgi8P+Z0=
github.com/golang/protobuf v1.5.0/go.mod h1:FsONVRAS9T7sI+LIUmWTfcYkHO4aIWwzhcaSAoJOfIk=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.5.5/go.mod h1:v8dTdLbMG2kIc/vJvl+f65V22dbkXbowE6jgT/gNBxE=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0 h1:ofyhxvXcZhMsU5ulbFiLKl/XBFqE1GSq7atu8tAmTRI=
@@ -53,17 +64,20 @@ github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1 h1:flRD4NNwYAUpkphVc1HcthR4KEIFJ65n8Mw5qdRn3LE=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1/go.mod h1:hoEshYVHaxMs3cyo3Yncou5ZscifuDolrwPKZanG3xk=
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 h1:5Nx0Ya0ZqY2ygV366QzturHI13Jq95ApcVaJBhpS+AY=
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0/go.mod h1:eLer722TekiGuMkidMxC/pM04lWEeraHUUmBw8l2grE=
github.com/ledongthuc/pdf v0.0.0-20220302134840-0c2507a12d80 h1:6Yzfa6GP0rIo/kULo2bwGEkFvCePZ3qHDDTC3/J9Swo=
github.com/ledongthuc/pdf v0.0.0-20220302134840-0c2507a12d80/go.mod h1:imJHygn/1yfhB7XSJJKlFZKl/J+dCPAknuiaGOshXAs=
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 h1:xfD0iDuEKnDkl03q4limB+vH+GxLEtL/jb4xVJSWWEY=
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20/go.mod h1:W+V8PltTTMOvKvAeJH7IuucS94S2C6jfK/D7dTCTo3Y=
github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3 v1.14.17 h1:mCRHCLDUBXgpKAqIKsaAaAsrAlbkeomtRFKXh2L6YIM=
github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3 v1.14.17/go.mod h1:2eHXhiwb8IkHr+BDWZGa96P6+rkvnG63S2DGjv9HUNg=
github.com/matttproud/golang_protobuf_extensions/v2 v2.0.0 h1:jWpvCLoY8Z/e3VKvlsiIGKtc+UG6U5vzxaoagmhXfyg=
github.com/matttproud/golang_protobuf_extensions/v2 v2.0.0/go.mod h1:QUyp042oQthUoa9bqDv0ER0wrtXnBruoNd7aNjkbP+k=
github.com/orisano/pixelmatch v0.0.0-20220722002657-fb0b55479cde h1:x0TT0RDC7UhAVbbWWBzr41ElhJx5tXPWkIHA2HWPRuw=
github.com/orisano/pixelmatch v0.0.0-20220722002657-fb0b55479cde/go.mod h1:nZgzbfBr3hhjoZnS66nKrHmduYNpc34ny7RK4z5/HM0=
github.com/pingcap/errors v0.11.4 h1:lFuQV/oaUMGcD2tqt+01ROSmJs75VG1ToEOkZIZ4nE4=
github.com/pingcap/errors v0.11.4/go.mod h1:Oi8TUi2kEtXXLMJk9l1cGmz20kV3TaQ0usTwv5KuLY8=
github.com/pkg/errors v0.9.1 h1:FEBLx1zS214owpjy7qsBeixbURkuhQAwrK5UwLGTwt4=
github.com/pkg/errors v0.9.1/go.mod h1:bwawxfHBFNV+L2hUp1rHADufV3IMtnDRdf1r5NINEl0=
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0/go.mod h1:iKH77koFhYxTK1pcRnkKkqfTogsbg7gZNVY4sRDYZ/4=
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.1-0.20181226105442-5d4384ee4fb2 h1:Jamvg5psRIccs7FGNTlIRMkT8wgtp5eCXdBlqhYGL6U=
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.1-0.20181226105442-5d4384ee4fb2/go.mod h1:iKH77koFhYxTK1pcRnkKkqfTogsbg7gZNVY4sRDYZ/4=
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.18.0 h1:HzFfmkOzH5Q8L8G+kSJKUx5dtG87sewO+FoDDqP5Tbk=
@@ -80,28 +94,24 @@ github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.10.0 h1:TMyTOH3F/DB16zRVcYyreMH6GnZZrwQVAoYjR
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.10.0/go.mod h1:UQnix2H7Ngw/k4C5ijL5+65zddjncjaFoBhdsK/akog=
github.com/slok/go-http-metrics v0.11.0 h1:ABJUpekCZSkQT1wQrFvS4kGbhea/w6ndFJaWJeh3zL0=
github.com/slok/go-http-metrics v0.11.0/go.mod h1:ZGKeYG1ET6TEJpQx18BqAJAvxw9jBAZXCHU7bWQqqAc=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.1.0/go.mod h1:HFkY916IF+rwdDfMAkV7OtwuqBVzrE8GR6GFx+wExME=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.1 h1:4VhoImhV/Bm0ToFkXFi8hXNXwpDRZ/ynw3amt82mzq0=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.1/go.mod h1:/iHQpkQwBD6DLUmQ4pE+s1TXdob1mORJ4/UFdrifcy0=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M5WIy9Dh21IEIfnGCwXGc5bZfKNJtfHm1UVUgZn+9EI=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4 h1:CcVxjf3Q8PM0mHUKJCdn+eZZtm5yQwehR5yeSVQQcUk=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4/go.mod h1:sz/lmYIOXD/1dqDmKjjqLyZ2RngseejIcXlSw2iwfAo=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.2 h1:xuMeJ0Sdp5ZMRXx/aWO6RZxdr3beISkG5/G/aIRr3pY=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.2/go.mod h1:FRsXN1f5AsAjCGJKqEizvkpNtU+EGNCLh3NxZ/8L+MA=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1 h1:7s2iGBzp5EwR7/aIZr8ao5+dra3wiQyKjjFuvgVKu7U=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1/go.mod h1:wZwfW3scLgRK+23gO65QZefKpKQRnfz6sD981Nm4B6U=
github.com/zeebo/assert v1.3.0 h1:g7C04CbJuIDKNPFHmsk4hwZDO5O+kntRxzaUoNXj+IQ=
github.com/zeebo/assert v1.3.0/go.mod h1:Pq9JiuJQpG8JLJdtkwrJESF0Foym2/D9XMU5ciN/wJ0=
github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2 h1:xZmwmqxHZA8AI603jOQ0tMqmBr9lPeFwGg6d+xy9DC0=
github.com/zeebo/xxh3 v1.0.2/go.mod h1:5NWz9Sef7zIDm2JHfFlcQvNekmcEl9ekUZQQKCYaDcA=
go.uber.org/atomic v1.9.0 h1:ECmE8Bn/WFTYwEW/bpKD3M8VtR/zQVbavAoalC1PYyE=
go.uber.org/atomic v1.9.0/go.mod h1:fEN4uk6kAWBTFdckzkM89CLk9XfWZrxpCo0nPH17wJc=
go.uber.org/dig v1.17.0 h1:5Chju+tUvcC+N7N6EV08BJz41UZuO3BmHcN4A287ZLI=
go.uber.org/dig v1.17.0/go.mod h1:rTxpf7l5I0eBTlE6/9RL+lDybC7WFwY2QH55ZSjy1mU=
go.uber.org/fx v1.20.1 h1:zVwVQGS8zYvhh9Xxcu4w1M6ESyeMzebzj2NbSayZ4Mk=
go.uber.org/fx v1.20.1/go.mod h1:iSYNbHf2y55acNCwCXKx7LbWb5WG1Bnue5RDXz1OREg=
go.uber.org/goleak v1.1.11 h1:wy28qYRKZgnJTxGxvye5/wgWr1EKjmUDGYox5mGlRlI=
go.uber.org/goleak v1.1.11/go.mod h1:cwTWslyiVhfpKIDGSZEM2HlOvcqm+tG4zioyIeLoqMQ=
go.uber.org/multierr v1.9.0 h1:7fIwc/ZtS0q++VgcfqFDxSBZVv/Xo49/SYnDFupUwlI=
go.uber.org/multierr v1.9.0/go.mod h1:X2jQV1h+kxSjClGpnseKVIxpmcjrj7MNnI0bnlfKTVQ=
go.uber.org/zap v1.23.0 h1:OjGQ5KQDEUawVHxNwQgPpiypGHOxo2mNZsOqTak4fFY=
go.uber.org/zap v1.23.0/go.mod h1:D+nX8jyLsMHMYrln8A0rJjFt/T/9/bGgIhAqxv5URuY=
go.uber.org/dig v1.19.0 h1:BACLhebsYdpQ7IROQ1AGPjrXcP5dF80U3gKoFzbaq/4=
go.uber.org/dig v1.19.0/go.mod h1:Us0rSJiThwCv2GteUN0Q7OKvU7n5J4dxZ9JKUXozFdE=
go.uber.org/fx v1.24.0 h1:wE8mruvpg2kiiL1Vqd0CC+tr0/24XIB10Iwp2lLWzkg=
go.uber.org/fx v1.24.0/go.mod h1:AmDeGyS+ZARGKM4tlH4FY2Jr63VjbEDJHtqXTGP5hbo=
go.uber.org/goleak v1.2.0 h1:xqgm/S+aQvhWFTtR0XK3Jvg7z8kGV8P4X14IzwN3Eqk=
go.uber.org/goleak v1.2.0/go.mod h1:XJYK+MuIchqpmGmUSAzotztawfKvYLUIgg7guXrwVUo=
go.uber.org/multierr v1.10.0 h1:S0h4aNzvfcFsC3dRF1jLoaov7oRaKqRGC/pUEJ2yvPQ=
go.uber.org/multierr v1.10.0/go.mod h1:20+QtiLqy0Nd6FdQB9TLXag12DsQkrbs3htMFfDN80Y=
go.uber.org/zap v1.26.0 h1:sI7k6L95XOKS281NhVKOFCUNIvv9e0w4BF8N3u+tCRo=
go.uber.org/zap v1.26.0/go.mod h1:dtElttAiwGvoJ/vj4IwHBS/gXsEu/pZ50mUIRWuG0so=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.38.0 h1:jt+WWG8IZlBnVbomuhg2Mdq0+BBQaHbtqHEFEigjUV8=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.38.0/go.mod h1:MvrbAqul58NNYPKnOra203SB9vpuZW0e+RRZV+Ggqjw=
golang.org/x/mod v0.17.0 h1:zY54UmvipHiNd+pm+m0x9KhZ9hl1/7QNMyxXbc6ICqA=
@@ -109,8 +119,8 @@ golang.org/x/mod v0.17.0/go.mod h1:hTbmBsO62+eylJbnUtE2MGJUyE7QWk4xUqPFrRgJ+7c=
golang.org/x/sync v0.14.0 h1:woo0S4Yywslg6hp4eUFjTVOyKt0RookbpAHG4c1HmhQ=
golang.org/x/sync v0.14.0/go.mod h1:1dzgHSNfp02xaA81J2MS99Qcpr2w7fw1gpm99rleRqA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.33.0 h1:q3i8TbbEz+JRD9ywIRlyRAQbM0qF7hu24q3teo2hbuw=
golang.org/x/sys v0.33.0/go.mod h1:BJP2sWEmIv4KK5OTEluFJCKSidICx8ciO85XgH3Ak8k=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
golang.org/x/text v0.25.0 h1:qVyWApTSYLk/drJRO5mDlNYskwQznZmkpV2c8q9zls4=
golang.org/x/text v0.25.0/go.mod h1:WEdwpYrmk1qmdHvhkSTNPm3app7v4rsT8F2UD6+VHIA=
golang.org/x/tools v0.21.1-0.20240508182429-e35e4ccd0d2d h1:vU5i/LfpvrRCpgM/VPfJLg5KjxD3E+hfT1SH+d9zLwg=
internal/banner/banner.go
+47
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
// Package banner renders the operator-facing blocks that carry a
// plaintext credential.
//
// A generated password printed as one more structured log line is lost:
// a boot writes roughly 45 fx PROVIDE/RUN/HOOK lines around it, and
// under `docker run -d` it is one line in a log subject to rotation. A
// credential that is shown exactly once has to be findable by eye when
// an operator scrolls back, so it is written as a ruled block rather
// than as a log record.
//
// It is deliberately not a log line: it goes straight to the writer the
// caller names — standard output for both the first-boot account and
// the `resetpw` subcommand — so it is neither levelled, filtered, nor
// rendered as JSON by whichever handler internal/logger installed.
package banner
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
)
// ruleWidth is the length of the horizontal rules, chosen to fit an
// 80-column terminal without wrapping.
const ruleWidth = 72
// Credentials writes a ruled block naming an account and its plaintext
// password. headline says which event produced it, and note says what
// the operator must do about it; both are written verbatim, so a
// multi-line note must already be wrapped.
func Credentials(
w io.Writer,
headline, username, password, note string,
) error {
rule := strings.Repeat("=", ruleWidth)
_, err := fmt.Fprintf(
w,
"\n%s\n%s\n\n username: %s\n password: %s\n\n%s\n%s\n\n",
rule, headline, username, password, note, rule,
)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing credentials banner: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
internal/banner/banner_test.go
+59
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
package banner_test
import (
"bytes"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/banner"
)
// TestCredentials_IsFindableByEye pins the properties that make the
// block worth having: rules above and below it, the two fields on
// their own lines, and blank lines separating it from whatever the
// surrounding log wrote.
func TestCredentials_IsFindableByEye(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var out bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, banner.Credentials(
&out, "HEADLINE", "admin", "s3cret", "NOTE",
))
got := out.String()
lines := strings.Split(strings.Trim(got, "\n"), "\n")
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(lines), 3)
assert.Equal(t, lines[0], lines[len(lines)-1], "rules must match")
assert.Greater(
t, len(lines[0]), 40, "the rule must be visible at a glance",
)
assert.Equal(t, strings.Repeat("=", len(lines[0])), lines[0])
assert.Contains(t, got, "\n username: admin\n")
assert.Contains(t, got, "\n password: s3cret\n")
assert.Contains(t, got, "HEADLINE")
assert.Contains(t, got, "NOTE")
assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(got, "\n"))
}
// failingWriter reports the write error a banner must not swallow: it
// is the one copy of a password that will never be shown again.
type failingWriter struct{}
func (failingWriter) Write([]byte) (int, error) {
return 0, assert.AnError
}
func TestCredentials_ReportsAWriteFailure(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := banner.Credentials(
failingWriter{}, "HEADLINE", "admin", "s3cret", "NOTE",
)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, assert.AnError)
}
internal/config/config.go
+392 -94
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ package config
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"os"
@@ -11,13 +12,11 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/getsentry/sentry-go"
"github.com/joho/godotenv"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
// Populates the environment from a ./.env file automatically for
// development configuration. Kept in one place only (here).
_ "github.com/joho/godotenv/autoload"
)
const (
@@ -26,9 +25,41 @@ const (
// EnvironmentProd represents production environment.
EnvironmentProd = "prod"
// DefaultDataDir is where all SQLite databases live when DATA_DIR
// is unset. The same default applies in every environment.
DefaultDataDir = "/var/lib/webhooker"
// defaultPort is the default HTTP listen port.
defaultPort = 8080
// defaultBindAddress is the interface the plaintext HTTP
// listener claims when BIND_ADDRESS is unset.
//
// Loopback, because the listener speaks cleartext and serves
// both the admin UI and the unauthenticated receiver: a
// wildcard default publishes them on every interface of every
// host that never configured anything, which is the failure
// this default exists to prevent. Reaching webhooker from off
// the host is then a deliberate act — a reverse proxy in front
// of it, or an explicit BIND_ADDRESS.
//
// This is the binary's default only. The Dockerfile ships
// ENV BIND_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0, so a container deployment needs
// nothing set and is unaffected by this constant. The two
// differ because they answer different questions: a container's
// network namespace is already the boundary this default is
// reaching for, so binding every address inside it exposes
// nothing, and what decides exposure there is the publish flag
// (-p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080). A loopback bind inside a container
// buys no security and makes the process unreachable through
// its own published port.
//
// The split is expressed as two explicit defaults rather than
// container auto-detection, because a heuristic that guesses
// wrong opens the cleartext port exactly where nobody is
// looking.
defaultBindAddress = "127.0.0.1"
// defaultRetentionSweepInterval is how often the retention
// reaper deletes events older than each webhook's RetentionDays.
defaultRetentionSweepInterval = time.Hour
@@ -44,14 +75,24 @@ const (
// internet-exposed endpoint.
defaultReceiverRateLimit = 120
// maxPort is the highest valid TCP port number. The lower
// bound (at least 1) is enforced by envPositiveInt.
// defaultTrustedProxies is TRUSTED_PROXIES when it is unset: the
// RFC 1918 private ranges, which a reverse proxy reaching the
// process over a Docker network or a private LAN connects from.
defaultTrustedProxies = "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
// maxPort is the highest valid TCP port number.
maxPort = 65535
// mappedV4Offset is the number of leading bits an IPv4-mapped
// IPv6 prefix spends on the ::ffff:0:0/96 wrapper, so a /104
// covers the same addresses as an IPv4 /8.
mappedV4Offset = 96
// DotEnvPath is the optional file of KEY=value lines read into the
// environment at startup, relative to the process working
// directory. Exported so that documentation and tests name the
// same path the loader opens.
DotEnvPath = ".env"
)
// ErrInvalidEnvironment is returned when WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT
@@ -63,7 +104,7 @@ var ErrInvalidEnvironment = errors.New("invalid environment")
var ErrNonPositiveValue = errors.New("value must be positive")
// ErrInvalidPort is returned when an environment variable holding a
// TCP port number is set above the valid port range.
// TCP port number is set to a number outside 1 to 65535.
var ErrInvalidPort = errors.New("invalid port")
// ErrInvalidCIDR is returned when an environment variable holding a
@@ -71,6 +112,29 @@ var ErrInvalidPort = errors.New("invalid port")
// nor a bare IP address.
var ErrInvalidCIDR = errors.New("invalid CIDR")
// ErrInvalidBindAddress is returned when BIND_ADDRESS is set to
// something that is not an IP address literal.
var ErrInvalidBindAddress = errors.New("invalid bind address")
// ErrInvalidSentryDSN is returned when SENTRY_DSN is set to something
// the Sentry SDK cannot parse as a DSN.
var ErrInvalidSentryDSN = errors.New("invalid Sentry DSN")
// ErrDotEnvUnreadable is returned when the optional .env file exists
// but cannot be read or parsed. A file that is not there is not an
// error; a file that is there and broken is.
var ErrDotEnvUnreadable = errors.New("unreadable .env file")
// ErrIncompleteMetricsAuth is returned when exactly one of
// METRICS_USERNAME and METRICS_PASSWORD carries a value. Neither
// fallback is acceptable: serving /metrics on the username alone
// publishes an endpoint whose password is the empty string, and
// silently leaving it unmounted withholds an endpoint the operator
// asked for. Half-set is a configuration error, so startup fails.
var ErrIncompleteMetricsAuth = errors.New(
"incomplete metrics credentials",
)
//nolint:revive // ConfigParams is a standard fx naming convention.
type ConfigParams struct {
fx.In
@@ -84,13 +148,19 @@ type ConfigParams struct {
type Config struct {
DataDir string
Debug bool
MaintenanceMode bool
Environment string
MetricsPassword string
MetricsUsername string
Port int
SentryDSN string
// BindAddress is the IP address the plaintext HTTP listener
// binds, as an address literal. It defaults to
// defaultBindAddress and is never empty: an empty string would
// mean the wildcard to net.Listen, which is the opposite of the
// default this ships.
BindAddress string
// RetentionSweepInterval is how often the retention reaper runs.
// Always positive: it becomes a time.NewTicker period.
RetentionSweepInterval time.Duration
@@ -105,15 +175,34 @@ type Config struct {
// TrustedProxies is the set of networks whose members are
// allowed to speak for the client with X-Forwarded-For, the
// only forwarded header read. It is empty unless
// TRUSTED_PROXIES is set, and empty means no peer is
// trusted: forwarded headers are then ignored entirely and
// clients are identified by the connection's own address.
// Members can choose their own rate-limit key, so this must
// name proxy hosts only, never a block that also covers
// clients.
// only forwarded header read. Unless TRUSTED_PROXIES is set it
// is the RFC 1918 private ranges (defaultTrustedProxies); a set
// value replaces them. If any client can reach the process, or
// the proxy in front of it, from an RFC 1918 source address
// (directly, or through anything that can rewrite source
// addresses, such as NAT or a published container port), it
// must be set to the proxy's address alone, or every rate limit
// can be bypassed by those clients.
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// AllowedEgressCIDRs is the set of networks a delivery target
// may reach even though the SSRF guard's default blocklist
// covers them. It is empty unless ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS is set,
// and empty means every private/reserved range stays refused.
//
// This only ever adds destinations to what the guard would
// otherwise refuse. The guard itself is always on: there is no
// setting that disables SSRF protection, and delivery's
// alwaysBlockedNetworks stays blocked no matter what is listed
// here. That set is link-local, the unspecified addresses
// 0.0.0.0 and ::, and the cloud metadata endpoints outside
// link-local that disclose credentials or user data at a
// provider-fixed, non-public address; it is not exhaustive of
// every cloud's metadata address. See
// alwaysBlockedNetworks for the authoritative list and why
// each entry is on it.
AllowedEgressCIDRs []netip.Prefix
params *ConfigParams
log *slog.Logger
}
@@ -128,12 +217,90 @@ func (c *Config) IsProd() bool {
return c.Environment == EnvironmentProd
}
// MetricsAuthEnabled reports whether /metrics is served behind basic
// auth. It is the only answer to that question in the codebase: the
// route mount, the Prometheus recording middleware and the startup
// log's hasMetricsAuth field all read this one method, so the log
// cannot report auth as off while the route is mounted.
//
// It requires both credentials rather than the username alone.
// loadFromEnv already rejects a half-set pair, but a Config built in
// code bypasses that, and the failure mode this guards is an endpoint
// mounted with a credential map whose only password is the empty
// string.
func (c *Config) MetricsAuthEnabled() bool {
return c.MetricsUsername != "" && c.MetricsPassword != ""
}
// SentryEnabled reports whether error reporting is shipped to Sentry.
// It is the only answer to that question in the codebase: the SDK
// initialisation, the sentryhttp middleware registration and the
// startup log's sentryEnabled field all read this one method, so the
// log cannot report reporting as on while nothing is sending.
//
// A non-empty DSN is enough because loadFromEnv already parsed it with
// the SDK's own parser and refused to build a Config around one the
// SDK would reject, and because initialising the SDK with a DSN that
// parsed and failed anyway aborts the process rather than leaving this
// true and the client absent.
func (c *Config) SentryEnabled() bool {
return c.SentryDSN != ""
}
// envString returns the value of the named environment variable,
// or an empty string if not set.
func envString(key string) string {
return os.Getenv(key)
}
// LoadDotEnv reads DotEnvPath into the environment when that file is
// present, and reports a file that is present but broken.
//
// It has to run before anything reads the environment, so that every
// reader agrees on what the environment holds — the DATA_DIR lock
// taken before the fx graph exists as much as loadFromEnv itself. A
// variable already set in the real environment wins: godotenv never
// overwrites one.
//
// A missing file is not an error. It is a development convenience and
// most deployments set the environment directly.
//
// Any other failure is. godotenv parses the whole file before setting
// anything, so a single malformed line applies none of it: every
// variable in the file silently reverts to its default, which defeats
// the fail-loud guarantee for all of them at once.
func LoadDotEnv() error {
return loadDotEnvFile(DotEnvPath)
}
// loadDotEnvFile is LoadDotEnv over a named file, so tests can point
// at a temporary one instead of the process working directory.
func loadDotEnvFile(path string) error {
err := godotenv.Load(path)
if err == nil || errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s: %w; nothing in it was applied, so fix the file or "+
"remove it",
ErrDotEnvUnreadable, path, err,
)
}
// DataDir resolves DATA_DIR, applying DefaultDataDir when it is unset
// or empty. It is exported so that entry points which must act on the
// data directory before the fx graph exists — taking the exclusive
// directory lock, above all — resolve it exactly as Config does.
func DataDir() string {
dir := envString("DATA_DIR")
if dir == "" {
return DefaultDataDir
}
return dir
}
// envBool returns the value of the named environment variable
// parsed as a boolean. Returns defaultValue if not set. If the
// variable is set but cannot be parsed, it returns a wrapped error
@@ -195,17 +362,27 @@ func envPositiveInt(
// envPort returns the value of the named environment variable parsed
// as a TCP port number. Returns defaultValue if not set. A set value
// that is unparseable, below 1, or above maxPort is a hard error
// naming the key and the bad value.
// naming the key and the bad value; every out-of-range value wraps
// ErrInvalidPort, including one too large or too small for an int.
func envPort(key string, defaultValue int) (int, error) {
port, err := envPositiveInt(key, defaultValue)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
v := os.Getenv(key)
if v == "" {
return defaultValue, nil
}
if port > maxPort {
// strconv.ErrRange means a number too large or too small for an
// int, which is outside the port range as well.
port, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, strconv.ErrRange) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s must be at most %d, got %d",
ErrInvalidPort, key, maxPort, port,
"invalid integer for %s: %q: %w", key, v, err,
)
}
if err != nil || port < 1 || port > maxPort {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s must be from 1 to %d, got %q",
ErrInvalidPort, key, maxPort, v,
)
}
@@ -298,14 +475,15 @@ func parseCIDR(entry string) (netip.Prefix, error) {
// envPrefixList returns the value of the named environment variable
// parsed as a comma-separated list of CIDR blocks (bare addresses
// allowed). An unset, empty, or blank value yields an empty list. A
// set value containing an unparseable entry is a hard error naming
// the key and the bad entry, so startup fails loudly rather than
// silently running with a list the operator did not intend.
func envPrefixList(key string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
// allowed). An unset, empty, or blank value is read as defaultValue
// instead. A set value containing an unparseable entry is a hard
// error naming the key and the bad entry, so startup fails loudly
// rather than silently running with a list the operator did not
// intend.
func envPrefixList(key, defaultValue string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(key))
if v == "" {
return nil, nil
v = defaultValue
}
var prefixes []netip.Prefix
@@ -329,12 +507,109 @@ func envPrefixList(key string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
return prefixes, nil
}
// resolveEnvironment reads WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT, defaulting to
// dev, and rejects unrecognised values.
// envBindAddress returns the value of the named environment variable
// parsed as an IP address literal. An unset (or empty, or
// whitespace-only) value yields defaultValue.
//
// Only literals are accepted: no hostname is resolved, so `localhost`
// is an error rather than a DNS lookup at startup whose answer could
// be either loopback family, could change under the process, and
// could return several addresses of which only one would be bound. A
// value with a port in it (`127.0.0.1:8080`) is likewise an error —
// the port is PORT's business, and silently accepting it would bind
// something other than what was asked for.
//
// A set value that is not a literal is a hard error naming the key
// and the bad value, so startup fails loudly rather than falling back
// to a default the operator plainly did not want. A literal that is
// not an address of this host parses here and fails at listen time
// instead, which ends the process non-zero.
func envBindAddress(key, defaultValue string) (string, error) {
v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(key))
if v == "" {
return defaultValue, nil
}
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(v)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s: %q must be an IP address literal such as "+
"127.0.0.1, 0.0.0.0 or ::, not a hostname and not "+
"host:port: %w",
ErrInvalidBindAddress, key, v, err,
)
}
return addr.String(), nil
}
// envSentryDSN returns the value of the named environment variable
// checked as a Sentry DSN. An unset (or empty, or whitespace-only)
// value yields "", which means error reporting stays off — the common
// case, and a normal start.
//
// A set value is parsed with sentry.NewDsn, which is the call
// sentry.Init makes on the DSN it is handed, so what passes here is
// exactly what the SDK will accept later and the two cannot disagree.
// Reproducing the check by hand instead would cost this package its
// dependency on the SDK — already a module dependency, already linked
// into the binary — in exchange for a second definition of "valid DSN"
// free to drift from the one that decides.
//
// A set value that does not parse is a hard error naming the key, so
// startup fails loudly. Losing error reporting is the failure this
// variable exists to prevent, and a typo in a DSN is silent forever:
// nothing later in the process can notice that reports are going
// nowhere. The bad value is quoted because it is a URL to a public
// endpoint carrying a public key, not a secret.
func envSentryDSN(key string) (string, error) {
v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(key))
if v == "" {
return "", nil
}
_, err := sentry.NewDsn(v)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s: %q: %w", ErrInvalidSentryDSN, key, v, err,
)
}
return v, nil
}
// resolveMetricsAuth reads the /metrics basic-auth credentials and
// rejects a half-set pair, naming both variables either way. The
// error carries neither value: the password is a secret.
func resolveMetricsAuth() (string, string, error) {
username := envString("METRICS_USERNAME")
password := envString("METRICS_PASSWORD")
if (username == "") == (password == "") {
return username, password, nil
}
set, empty := "METRICS_USERNAME", "METRICS_PASSWORD"
if username == "" {
set, empty = empty, set
}
return "", "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s is set but %s is empty; METRICS_USERNAME and "+
"METRICS_PASSWORD must both be set to serve /metrics, "+
"or both be empty to leave it unmounted",
ErrIncompleteMetricsAuth, set, empty,
)
}
// resolveEnvironment reads WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT, defaulting to prod
// when it is unset so a deployment that forgets the variable is not
// silently permissive; dev must be set explicitly. It rejects
// unrecognised values.
func resolveEnvironment() (string, error) {
environment := os.Getenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT")
if environment == "" {
environment = EnvironmentDev
environment = EnvironmentProd
}
if environment != EnvironmentDev &&
@@ -349,6 +624,27 @@ func resolveEnvironment() (string, error) {
return environment, nil
}
// resolveListener reads the two variables that describe the HTTP
// listener: which port it claims and which address it claims it on.
// They are read together because neither is meaningful alone, and
// because a validation failure in either has to abort startup before
// anything binds.
func resolveListener() (int, string, error) {
port, err := envPort("PORT", defaultPort)
if err != nil {
return 0, "", err
}
bindAddress, err := envBindAddress(
"BIND_ADDRESS", defaultBindAddress,
)
if err != nil {
return 0, "", err
}
return port, bindAddress, nil
}
// loadFromEnv builds a Config from the environment. Every value that
// needs parsing fails loudly when it is set but unparseable: the
// documented defaults apply only to variables that are unset (or
@@ -360,7 +656,7 @@ func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
return nil, err
}
port, err := envPort("PORT", defaultPort)
port, bindAddress, err := resolveListener()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -370,11 +666,6 @@ func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
return nil, err
}
maintenanceMode, err := envBool("MAINTENANCE_MODE", false)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
retentionSweepInterval, err := envPositiveDuration(
"RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL",
defaultRetentionSweepInterval,
@@ -401,70 +692,81 @@ func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
return nil, err
}
trustedProxies, err := envPrefixList("TRUSTED_PROXIES")
trustedProxies, err := envPrefixList("TRUSTED_PROXIES", defaultTrustedProxies)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
allowedEgressCIDRs, err := envPrefixList("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS", "")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
metricsUsername, metricsPassword, err := resolveMetricsAuth()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sentryDSN, err := envSentryDSN("SENTRY_DSN")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &Config{
DataDir: envString("DATA_DIR"),
DataDir: DataDir(),
Debug: debug,
MaintenanceMode: maintenanceMode,
Environment: environment,
MetricsUsername: envString("METRICS_USERNAME"),
MetricsPassword: envString("METRICS_PASSWORD"),
MetricsUsername: metricsUsername,
MetricsPassword: metricsPassword,
Port: port,
SentryDSN: envString("SENTRY_DSN"),
BindAddress: bindAddress,
SentryDSN: sentryDSN,
RetentionSweepInterval: retentionSweepInterval,
SessionIdleTimeout: sessionIdleTimeout,
ReceiverRateLimit: receiverRateLimit,
TrustedProxies: trustedProxies,
AllowedEgressCIDRs: allowedEgressCIDRs,
}, nil
}
// warnSharedRateLimitBucket logs a startup warning whenever
// TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty, in any environment.
// PrefixStrings renders a prefix list as its CIDR strings, for
// logging a list an operator has to be able to read back.
func PrefixStrings(prefixes []netip.Prefix) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(prefixes))
for _, prefix := range prefixes {
out = append(out, prefix.String())
}
return out
}
// warnEgressAllowlist logs the effective ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS
// whenever it is non-empty.
//
// With no trusted proxies every rate limiter keys on the connecting
// peer's address. Whether that is harmless or dangerous depends on
// what is in front of the process, which this code cannot observe:
// with nothing in front, the peer is the client and the limits are
// per-client as intended; behind a reverse proxy the peer is the proxy
// for every request, so all clients share one bucket per limiter.
//
// The login endpoint no longer spends budget on arrival — it verifies
// credentials first and charges only failures — so a shared bucket
// cannot deny the operator a correct password. What it does collapse
// is the failure counting: one client's wrong passwords throttle
// everyone else's wrong passwords, and the receiver's limits become
// service-wide ceilings.
//
// The warning is deliberately not gated on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT. That
// variable defaults to dev, so gating on it would silence the warning
// for exactly the operator who forgot to configure the deployment —
// the case it exists to catch.
//
// The default of trusting nobody is deliberate — trusting forwarded
// headers from arbitrary peers lets any client choose its own bucket —
// so this warns rather than failing startup or changing the key.
func (c *Config) warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log *slog.Logger) {
if len(c.TrustedProxies) > 0 {
// It prints the blocks themselves rather than a count, because
// this is the one setting that lets a delivery target reach the
// host's own network: an operator reading the startup log has to
// be able to see exactly which hole is open. Silence means the
// list is empty and the SSRF guard is refusing every
// private/reserved range, which is the default.
func (c *Config) warnEgressAllowlist(log *slog.Logger) {
if len(c.AllowedEgressCIDRs) == 0 {
return
}
log.Warn(
"TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty: every rate limit keys on the "+
"connecting peer's address. With nothing proxying to "+
"this process that is the client itself and the limits "+
"are per-client as intended. Behind a reverse proxy the "+
"peer is the proxy on every request, so all clients "+
"share one bucket per limit: the receiver limits become "+
"service-wide ceilings, and one client's failed logins "+
"throttle every other client's failed logins — a "+
"correct password still gets in. If anything proxies to "+
"this process, set TRUSTED_PROXIES to its address.",
"environment", c.Environment,
"trustedProxies", len(c.TrustedProxies),
"ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS lets delivery targets reach these "+
"otherwise-blocked networks. Anyone who can create a "+
"delivery target can now make this process issue "+
"requests into them, and read back the response. Only "+
"the addresses the README lists as blocked "+
"unconditionally stay blocked regardless of what is "+
"listed here; a public cloud metadata address such as "+
"168.63.129.16 is reachable once it, or a block "+
"covering it, is listed.",
"allowedEgressCIDRs",
strings.Join(PrefixStrings(c.AllowedEgressCIDRs), ","),
)
}
@@ -485,14 +787,6 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
s.log = log
s.params = &params
// Set default DataDir. All SQLite databases (main application
// DB and per-webhook event DBs) live here. The same default is
// used regardless of environment; override with DATA_DIR if
// needed.
if s.DataDir == "" {
s.DataDir = "/var/lib/webhooker"
}
if s.Debug {
params.Logger.EnableDebugLogging()
}
@@ -501,8 +795,12 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
log.Info("Configuration loaded",
"environment", s.Environment,
"port", s.Port,
// Logged because which interfaces the cleartext listener
// answers on is not otherwise observable from inside a
// container, and it decides whether anything but the local
// host can reach the admin UI.
"bindAddress", s.BindAddress,
"debug", s.Debug,
"maintenanceMode", s.MaintenanceMode,
"dataDir", s.DataDir,
"retentionSweepInterval", s.RetentionSweepInterval.String(),
// Logged because a perfectly valid non-positive value here
@@ -511,12 +809,12 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
"sessionIdleTimeout", s.SessionIdleTimeout.String(),
"receiverRateLimit", s.ReceiverRateLimit,
"trustedProxies", len(s.TrustedProxies),
"hasSentryDSN", s.SentryDSN != "",
"hasMetricsAuth",
s.MetricsUsername != "" && s.MetricsPassword != "",
"allowedEgressCIDRs", len(s.AllowedEgressCIDRs),
"sentryEnabled", s.SentryEnabled(),
"hasMetricsAuth", s.MetricsAuthEnabled(),
)
s.warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log)
s.warnEgressAllowlist(log)
return s, nil
}
internal/config/config_test.go
+363 -89
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package config_test
import (
"bytes"
"log/slog"
"os"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -26,6 +25,12 @@ const (
// cidrPrivateV4 is the sample trusted-proxy block the
// TRUSTED_PROXIES cases are built from.
cidrPrivateV4 = "10.0.0.0/8"
// metricsAuthValue is the sample METRICS_PASSWORD the metrics
// credential cases are built from. It is asserted absent from
// the startup error, so it must not be a substring of either
// variable name that error prints.
metricsAuthValue = "s3cret"
)
func TestEnvironmentConfig(t *testing.T) {
@@ -38,9 +43,9 @@ func TestEnvironmentConfig(t *testing.T) {
isProd bool
}{
{
name: "default is dev",
isDev: true,
isProd: false,
name: "default is prod",
isDev: false,
isProd: true,
},
{
name: "explicit dev",
@@ -65,14 +70,12 @@ func TestEnvironmentConfig(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
if tt.envValue != "" {
t.Setenv(
"WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", tt.envValue,
)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(
"WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT",
))
}
for k, v := range tt.envVars {
@@ -118,6 +121,11 @@ func testEnvironmentConfigSuccess(
app := fxtest.New(
t,
// fx's own log is discarded, not sent to t.Logf: a hook still
// running after a start or stop timeout would write there after
// the test has returned. The same holds for every fxtest.New
// below.
fx.NopLogger,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
@@ -188,14 +196,11 @@ func TestRetentionSweepInterval(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
if tt.set {
t.Setenv("RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL", tt.value)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(
"RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL",
))
}
if tt.expectError {
@@ -266,6 +271,7 @@ func testRetentionSweepIntervalSuccess(
app := fxtest.New(
t,
fx.NopLogger,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
@@ -329,14 +335,11 @@ func TestSessionIdleTimeout(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
if tt.set {
t.Setenv("SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT", tt.value)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(
"SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT",
))
}
if tt.expectError {
@@ -358,6 +361,7 @@ func testSessionIdleTimeoutSuccess(
app := fxtest.New(
t,
fx.NopLogger,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
@@ -384,20 +388,17 @@ func TestDefaultDataDir(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("env="+name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
if env != "" {
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", env)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(
"WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT",
))
}
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv("DATA_DIR"))
var cfg *config.Config
app := fxtest.New(
t,
fx.NopLogger,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
@@ -418,6 +419,36 @@ func TestDefaultDataDir(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestDataDirHelper pins the exported resolver against the value
// Config carries. The entry point takes the DATA_DIR lock through the
// helper before the fx graph exists, so the two disagreeing would mean
// locking one directory and writing to another.
func TestDataDirHelper(t *testing.T) {
for _, set := range []string{"", "/tmp/webhooker-datadir-helper"} {
name := "set"
if set == "" {
name = "unset"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
if set != "" {
t.Setenv("DATA_DIR", set)
}
expected := set
if expected == "" {
expected = config.DefaultDataDir
}
assert.Equal(t, expected, config.DataDir())
})
}
}
func TestReceiverRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
@@ -467,14 +498,11 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
if tt.set {
t.Setenv("RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT", tt.value)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(
"RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT",
))
}
if tt.expectError {
@@ -498,6 +526,7 @@ func testReceiverRateLimitSuccess(
app := fxtest.New(
t,
fx.NopLogger,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
@@ -515,6 +544,11 @@ func testReceiverRateLimitSuccess(
}
func TestTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
// Unset, the RFC 1918 private ranges are trusted, so a reverse
// proxy on a Docker network or a private LAN is covered without
// configuration.
defaultProxies := []string{cidrPrivateV4, "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16"}
tests := []struct {
name string
set bool
@@ -523,18 +557,21 @@ func TestTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
expected []string
}{
{
// The default must be "trust nobody": an empty list
// means forwarded headers are ignored, never that
// every peer may speak for the client.
name: caseUnsetUsesDefault,
set: false,
expected: []string{},
expected: defaultProxies,
},
{
name: "blank value trusts nothing",
name: "blank value uses default",
set: true,
value: " ",
expected: []string{},
expected: defaultProxies,
},
{
name: "set value replaces the default entirely",
set: true,
value: "203.0.113.7",
expected: []string{"203.0.113.7/32"},
},
{
name: caseValidValueParsed,
@@ -577,12 +614,11 @@ func TestTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
if tt.set {
t.Setenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES", tt.value)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES"))
}
if tt.expectError {
@@ -606,6 +642,7 @@ func testTrustedProxiesSuccess(
app := fxtest.New(
t,
fx.NopLogger,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
@@ -627,46 +664,60 @@ func testTrustedProxiesSuccess(
assert.Equal(t, expected, got)
}
// TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning covers the startup warning that
// tells an operator a deployment behind a reverse proxy shares one
// rate-limit bucket between every client, which turns the receiver
// limits into service-wide ceilings and collapses login failure
// counting. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty,
// in any environment: WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT defaults to dev, so gating
// on it would silence the warning for exactly the operator who never
// configured the deployment. It stays quiet once proxies are named.
func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
// TestAllowedEgressCIDRs covers ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS, the escape
// hatch that lets a self-hosted deployment forward to its own
// network. Unset it must stay empty, so the SSRF guard keeps
// refusing every private/reserved range; a set-but-unparseable
// value must abort startup naming the variable rather than
// silently running with a list the operator did not write.
func TestAllowedEgressCIDRs(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
environment string
trustedProxies string
expectWarning bool
name string
set bool
value string
expected []string
expectError bool
}{
{
name: "prod without trusted proxies warns",
environment: config.EnvironmentProd,
expectWarning: true,
name: caseUnsetUsesDefault,
set: false,
expected: []string{},
},
{
name: "prod with trusted proxies is quiet",
environment: config.EnvironmentProd,
trustedProxies: cidrPrivateV4,
expectWarning: false,
name: "empty value yields empty list",
set: true,
value: "",
expected: []string{},
},
{
// The default environment. An internet-exposed
// deployment whose operator never set
// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT lands here and has exactly
// the exposure the warning announces.
name: "dev without trusted proxies warns",
environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
expectWarning: true,
name: caseValidValueParsed,
set: true,
value: cidrPrivateV4,
expected: []string{cidrPrivateV4},
},
{
name: "dev with trusted proxies is quiet",
environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
trustedProxies: cidrPrivateV4,
expectWarning: false,
name: "multiple blocks with whitespace",
set: true,
value: " 10.0.0.0/8 , 127.0.0.0/8 ",
expected: []string{cidrPrivateV4, "127.0.0.0/8"},
},
{
name: "bare address becomes a single host",
set: true,
value: "172.17.0.5",
expected: []string{"172.17.0.5/32"},
},
{
name: caseUnparseableFails,
set: true,
value: cidrPrivateV4 + ",not-an-address",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "out-of-range prefix length fails startup",
set: true,
value: "10.0.0.0/33",
expectError: true,
},
}
@@ -674,14 +725,83 @@ func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", tt.environment)
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
if tt.trustedProxies == "" {
require.NoError(
t, os.Unsetenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES"),
if tt.set {
t.Setenv("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS", tt.value)
}
if tt.expectError {
expectStartupErrorFor(
t, "ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS", config.ErrInvalidCIDR,
)
} else {
t.Setenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES", tt.trustedProxies)
testAllowedEgressCIDRsSuccess(t, tt.expected)
}
})
}
}
func testAllowedEgressCIDRsSuccess(
t *testing.T,
expected []string,
) {
t.Helper()
var cfg *config.Config
app := fxtest.New(
t,
fx.NopLogger,
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
config.New,
),
fx.Populate(&cfg),
)
require.NoError(t, app.Err())
app.RequireStart()
defer app.RequireStop()
assert.Equal(
t, expected, config.PrefixStrings(cfg.AllowedEgressCIDRs),
)
}
// TestEgressAllowlistWarning covers the startup log that shows an
// operator the hole ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS opened. It must stay
// silent on the default (empty) list and, when set, print the
// blocks themselves rather than a count.
func TestEgressAllowlistWarning(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
allowed string
expectWarning bool
}{
{
name: "empty allowlist is quiet",
expectWarning: false,
},
{
name: "non-empty allowlist warns",
allowed: "10.0.0.0/8,127.0.0.0/8",
expectWarning: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", config.EnvironmentDev)
if tt.allowed != "" {
t.Setenv("ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS", tt.allowed)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
@@ -693,8 +813,7 @@ func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
))
require.NoError(
t,
config.WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest(log),
t, config.WarnEgressAllowlistForTest(log),
)
if !tt.expectWarning {
@@ -706,23 +825,178 @@ func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
logged := buf.String()
assert.Contains(t, logged, `"level":"WARN"`)
assert.Contains(t, logged, "TRUSTED_PROXIES")
assert.Contains(t, logged, "share one bucket")
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "throttle every other client's failed logins",
)
// The warning must not claim a lockout the login
// endpoint no longer permits: credentials are verified
// before any budget is spent.
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "a correct password still gets in",
)
// The text must stay accurate for a developer with
// nothing in front of the process, where an empty
// list costs nothing.
assert.Contains(
t, logged, "nothing proxying to this process",
)
assert.Contains(t, logged, "ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS")
// The blocks themselves, not a count: the operator has
// to be able to read back which networks are open.
assert.Contains(t, logged, "10.0.0.0/8")
assert.Contains(t, logged, "127.0.0.0/8")
// What stays shut is the whole unconditional set, not
// link-local alone; a public metadata address is not in
// it, so a listed block covering it opens it.
assert.Contains(t, logged, "blocked unconditionally")
assert.Contains(t, logged, "168.63.129.16 is reachable")
// The listed blocks need not be private or reserved.
assert.NotContains(t, logged, "private/reserved")
})
}
}
// metricsEnv describes what one subtest below puts in the
// environment for a single METRICS_ variable. A variable that is
// set to the empty string and one that is not set at all are
// distinct inputs here, because the reported bug arrived through
// the first of them.
type metricsEnv struct {
set bool
value string
}
// unset leaves the variable out of the environment entirely.
func unset() metricsEnv {
return metricsEnv{set: false, value: ""}
}
// setTo sets the variable, including to the empty string.
func setTo(value string) metricsEnv {
return metricsEnv{set: true, value: value}
}
// metricsAuthCase is one row of the table in TestMetricsAuthConfig,
// named so the table can live in its own function and keep the test
// itself short.
type metricsAuthCase struct {
name string
username metricsEnv
password metricsEnv
expectError bool
expectAuth bool
}
// metricsAuthCases enumerates every combination of the two
// credentials, counting "set to the empty string" and "not set at
// all" as separate inputs on each side.
func metricsAuthCases() []metricsAuthCase {
return []metricsAuthCase{
{
name: "both unset leaves metrics unmounted",
username: unset(),
password: unset(),
},
{
name: "both empty leaves metrics unmounted",
username: setTo(""),
password: setTo(""),
},
{
name: "both set enables metrics auth",
username: setTo("metrics"),
password: setTo(metricsAuthValue),
expectAuth: true,
},
{
name: "username with unset password fails",
username: setTo("metrics"),
password: unset(),
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "username with empty password fails",
username: setTo("metrics"),
password: setTo(""),
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "password with unset username fails",
username: unset(),
password: setTo(metricsAuthValue),
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "password with empty username fails",
username: setTo(""),
password: setTo(metricsAuthValue),
expectError: true,
},
}
}
// TestMetricsAuthConfig covers every combination of METRICS_USERNAME
// and METRICS_PASSWORD. Either both carry a value, in which case
// /metrics is served behind basic auth, or neither does, in which
// case the route is never mounted. One without the other is a
// startup error rather than a fallback: mounting on the username
// alone published /metrics behind a credential map that accepted an
// empty password, which is the defect this test exists to pin. See
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/205.
func TestMetricsAuthConfig(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range metricsAuthCases() {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
if tt.username.set {
t.Setenv("METRICS_USERNAME", tt.username.value)
}
if tt.password.set {
t.Setenv("METRICS_PASSWORD", tt.password.value)
}
if tt.expectError {
assertMetricsAuthRejected(t)
return
}
assertMetricsAuthAccepted(t, tt.expectAuth)
})
}
}
// assertMetricsAuthRejected requires that fx refused to build the
// graph, that the failure is ErrIncompleteMetricsAuth, and that the
// operator is told both variable names — the point of failing here
// rather than degrading is that the message says what to fix.
func assertMetricsAuthRejected(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
var cfg *config.Config
app := fx.New(
fx.NopLogger,
fx.Provide(globals.New, logger.New, config.New),
fx.Populate(&cfg),
)
err := app.Err()
require.Error(t, err)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, config.ErrIncompleteMetricsAuth)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "METRICS_USERNAME")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "METRICS_PASSWORD")
// The password is a secret and must not reach a startup error.
assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), metricsAuthValue)
}
// assertMetricsAuthAccepted requires that startup succeeded and that
// MetricsAuthEnabled — the single value the /metrics mount and the
// startup log both read — reports what the environment asked for.
func assertMetricsAuthAccepted(t *testing.T, expectAuth bool) {
t.Helper()
var cfg *config.Config
app := fxtest.New(
t,
fx.NopLogger,
fx.Provide(globals.New, logger.New, config.New),
fx.Populate(&cfg),
)
require.NoError(t, app.Err())
app.RequireStart()
defer app.RequireStop()
assert.Equal(t, expectAuth, cfg.MetricsAuthEnabled())
}
internal/config/dotenv_test.go
+147
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
package config_test
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
)
// dotEnvKey is a throwaway variable name the .env tests write and
// read, so they cannot disturb real configuration.
const dotEnvKey = "WEBHOOKER_TEST_DOTENV_VALUE"
// malformedDotEnv is a file godotenv cannot parse. The first line is
// the realistic typo — a space where the `=` belongs — and the rest
// make sure nothing downstream treats the file as salvageable line by
// line.
const malformedDotEnv = "PORT 19615\n" +
"this is not = valid ! syntax\n" +
"\"unclosed\n"
// writeDotEnv writes contents to a .env file in a fresh temporary
// directory and returns its path.
func writeDotEnv(t *testing.T, contents string) string {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), config.DotEnvPath)
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte(contents), 0o600))
return path
}
// TestLoadDotEnv_MissingFileIsFine pins the case most deployments are
// in. The file is optional: it is a development convenience, and a
// deployment that configures the environment directly must start
// normally rather than be refused for a file it was never meant to
// have.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // ClearEnvForTest uses t.Setenv.
func TestLoadDotEnv_MissingFileIsFine(t *testing.T) {
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
absent := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), config.DotEnvPath)
require.NoError(t, config.LoadDotEnvFileForTest(absent))
_, present := os.LookupEnv(dotEnvKey)
assert.False(t, present, "nothing may be set from an absent file")
}
// TestLoadDotEnv_AppliesValues pins that a well-formed file still
// reaches the environment, which is the whole reason the file is read
// at all.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // ClearEnvForTest uses t.Setenv.
func TestLoadDotEnv_AppliesValues(t *testing.T) {
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
path := writeDotEnv(t, "# a comment\n"+dotEnvKey+"=from-dot-env\n")
require.NoError(t, config.LoadDotEnvFileForTest(path))
assert.Equal(t, "from-dot-env", os.Getenv(dotEnvKey))
}
// TestLoadDotEnv_RealEnvironmentWins pins that the file cannot
// override a variable the process was actually started with. A
// deployment that sets DATA_DIR in its unit file must not have it
// silently replaced by a stale .env left in the working directory.
func TestLoadDotEnv_RealEnvironmentWins(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(dotEnvKey, "from-environment")
path := writeDotEnv(t, dotEnvKey+"=from-dot-env\n")
require.NoError(t, config.LoadDotEnvFileForTest(path))
assert.Equal(t, "from-environment", os.Getenv(dotEnvKey))
}
// TestLoadDotEnv_MalformedFileAborts is the defect this fixes. One bad
// line makes godotenv apply none of the file, so every variable in it
// reverts to its default; the process used to start that way with no
// log line naming the file at all.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // ClearEnvForTest uses t.Setenv.
func TestLoadDotEnv_MalformedFileAborts(t *testing.T) {
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
path := writeDotEnv(
t, malformedDotEnv+dotEnvKey+"=from-dot-env\n",
)
err := config.LoadDotEnvFileForTest(path)
require.Error(t, err)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, config.ErrDotEnvUnreadable)
assert.Contains(
t, err.Error(), config.DotEnvPath,
"the failure must name the file it could not read",
)
_, present := os.LookupEnv(dotEnvKey)
assert.False(
t, present,
"a rejected file must apply nothing, not part of itself",
)
}
// TestLoadDotEnv_UnreadableFileAborts pins that only absence is
// tolerated. A .env that exists but cannot be read is a file the
// operator meant to be applied, so it fails like a malformed one
// rather than being treated as though it were not there.
func TestLoadDotEnv_UnreadableFileAborts(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A directory in the file's place: open succeeds and the read
// fails, which no umask or root-ness can turn back into success
// the way a chmod could.
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), config.DotEnvPath)
require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(path, 0o750))
err := config.LoadDotEnvFileForTest(path)
require.Error(t, err)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, config.ErrDotEnvUnreadable)
}
// TestLoadDotEnv_ReadsTheWorkingDirectory pins the path LoadDotEnv
// itself opens, which the tests above bypass. It is relative to the
// process working directory, as it was under godotenv/autoload and as
// the README documents.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // t.Chdir moves the whole process.
func TestLoadDotEnv_ReadsTheWorkingDirectory(t *testing.T) {
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(
filepath.Join(dir, config.DotEnvPath),
[]byte(dotEnvKey+"=from-working-directory\n"),
0o600,
))
t.Chdir(dir)
require.NoError(t, config.LoadDotEnv())
assert.Equal(t, "from-working-directory", os.Getenv(dotEnvKey))
}
internal/config/env_test.go
+362 -105
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package config_test
import (
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -18,9 +17,24 @@ const testEnvKey = "WEBHOOKER_TEST_VALUE"
// Real configuration variables exercised by the config.New tests.
const (
envKeyPort = "PORT"
envKeyDebug = "DEBUG"
envKeyMaintenanceMode = "MAINTENANCE_MODE"
envKeyPort = "PORT"
envKeyDebug = "DEBUG"
envKeyBindAddress = "BIND_ADDRESS"
)
// Sample BIND_ADDRESS values used by the tables below.
const (
// bindAddressDefault is the shipped default. It is asserted
// against the package's own constant in
// TestNewUsesDefaultsWhenUnset, so the two cannot drift.
bindAddressDefault = "127.0.0.1"
// bindAddressWildcard is the value a container deployment sets.
bindAddressWildcard = "0.0.0.0"
// bindAddressSample is an arbitrary specific address, standing
// for "one interface of several".
bindAddressSample = "10.1.2.3"
)
// envBoolCase is one row of the envBool table.
@@ -106,10 +120,10 @@ func TestEnvBool(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
if tt.set {
t.Setenv(testEnvKey, tt.value)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(testEnvKey))
}
got, err := config.EnvBoolForTest(
@@ -130,17 +144,62 @@ func TestEnvBool(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// envIntCase is one row of the envPositiveInt and envPort tables.
type envIntCase struct {
name string
set bool
value string
expectError bool
errIs error
expected int
}
// runEnvIntCases runs each row through parse, which is
// envPositiveInt or envPort, with testEnvKey set to the row's value
// or left unset.
func runEnvIntCases(
t *testing.T,
parse func(key string, defaultValue int) (int, error),
defaultValue int,
tests []envIntCase,
) {
t.Helper()
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
if tt.set {
t.Setenv(testEnvKey, tt.value)
}
got, err := parse(testEnvKey, defaultValue)
if tt.expectError {
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), testEnvKey)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.value)
if tt.errIs != nil {
require.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.errIs)
}
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, got)
})
}
}
//nolint:paralleltest // runEnvIntCases uses t.Setenv.
func TestEnvPositiveInt(t *testing.T) {
const defaultValue = 7
tests := []struct {
name string
set bool
value string
expectError bool
errIs error
expected int
}{
runEnvIntCases(t, config.EnvPositiveIntForTest, defaultValue, []envIntCase{
{
name: "unset returns the default integer",
expected: defaultValue,
@@ -177,51 +236,14 @@ func TestEnvPositiveInt(t *testing.T) {
expectError: true,
errIs: config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
if tt.set {
t.Setenv(testEnvKey, tt.value)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(testEnvKey))
}
got, err := config.EnvPositiveIntForTest(
testEnvKey, defaultValue,
)
if tt.expectError {
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), testEnvKey)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.value)
if tt.errIs != nil {
require.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.errIs)
}
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, got)
})
}
})
}
//nolint:paralleltest // runEnvIntCases uses t.Setenv.
func TestEnvPort(t *testing.T) {
const defaultValue = 8080
tests := []struct {
name string
set bool
value string
expectError bool
errIs error
expected int
}{
runEnvIntCases(t, config.EnvPortForTest, defaultValue, []envIntCase{
{
name: "unset returns the default port",
expected: defaultValue,
@@ -249,7 +271,14 @@ func TestEnvPort(t *testing.T) {
set: true,
value: "0",
expectError: true,
errIs: config.ErrNonPositiveValue,
errIs: config.ErrInvalidPort,
},
{
name: "negative is rejected",
set: true,
value: "-1",
expectError: true,
errIs: config.ErrInvalidPort,
},
{
name: "above the port range is rejected",
@@ -258,29 +287,44 @@ func TestEnvPort(t *testing.T) {
expectError: true,
errIs: config.ErrInvalidPort,
},
}
{
name: "too large for an int is rejected",
set: true,
value: "99999999999999999999",
expectError: true,
errIs: config.ErrInvalidPort,
},
})
}
for _, tt := range tests {
// TestEnvBindAddress covers BIND_ADDRESS parsing.
//
// Only IP address literals are accepted. Every rejection below is a
// value an operator plausibly writes — a hostname, a host:port, a
// CIDR block — and each has to abort startup rather than fall back to
// the default, because falling back would bind an address other than
// the one asked for and, in the wildcard-default case this setting
// exists to end, publish cleartext on every interface.
func TestEnvBindAddress(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range envBindAddressCases() {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
if tt.set {
t.Setenv(testEnvKey, tt.value)
} else {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(testEnvKey))
}
got, err := config.EnvPortForTest(
testEnvKey, defaultValue,
got, err := config.EnvBindAddressForTest(
testEnvKey, bindAddressDefault,
)
if tt.expectError {
require.Error(t, err)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, config.ErrInvalidBindAddress)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), testEnvKey)
if tt.errIs != nil {
require.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.errIs)
}
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.value)
return
}
@@ -291,6 +335,122 @@ func TestEnvPort(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// envBindAddressCase is one row of the envBindAddress table.
type envBindAddressCase struct {
name string
set bool
value string
expectError bool
expected string
}
// envBindAddressCases is the envBindAddress table, kept out of the
// test body so the test itself stays readable.
func envBindAddressCases() []envBindAddressCase {
return append(
envBindAddressAcceptedCases(),
envBindAddressRejectedCases()...,
)
}
// envBindAddressAcceptedCases are the values that parse: the three
// spellings of "unset" that take the default, and the literals.
func envBindAddressAcceptedCases() []envBindAddressCase {
return []envBindAddressCase{
{
name: "unset returns the default",
expected: bindAddressDefault,
},
{
name: "empty returns the default",
set: true,
value: "",
expected: bindAddressDefault,
},
{
name: "whitespace returns the default",
set: true,
value: " ",
expected: bindAddressDefault,
},
{
name: "ipv4 wildcard is parsed",
set: true,
value: bindAddressWildcard,
expected: bindAddressWildcard,
},
{
name: "ipv4 literal is parsed",
set: true,
value: bindAddressSample,
expected: bindAddressSample,
},
{
name: "surrounding whitespace is trimmed",
set: true,
value: " " + bindAddressSample + " ",
expected: bindAddressSample,
},
{
name: "ipv6 wildcard is parsed",
set: true,
value: "::",
expected: "::",
},
{
name: "ipv6 literal is parsed",
set: true,
value: "2001:db8::5",
expected: "2001:db8::5",
},
}
}
// envBindAddressRejectedCases are the values that abort startup.
// Each is something an operator plausibly writes, and none may fall
// back to the default: the default is loopback, so a silent fallback
// would bind somewhere other than what was asked for.
func envBindAddressRejectedCases() []envBindAddressCase {
return []envBindAddressCase{
{
name: "garbage is rejected",
set: true,
value: "not-an-address",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "hostname is rejected",
set: true,
value: "localhost",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "unresolvable hostname is rejected",
set: true,
value: "no-such-host.invalid",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "host and port is rejected",
set: true,
value: bindAddressDefault + ":8080",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "bracketed ipv6 is rejected",
set: true,
value: "[::1]",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "CIDR block is rejected",
set: true,
value: "10.0.0.0/8",
expectError: true,
},
}
}
// buildConfig constructs a Config through fx exactly as the
// application does, returning the config and any construction error.
func buildConfig(t *testing.T) (*config.Config, error) {
@@ -312,13 +472,58 @@ func buildConfig(t *testing.T) (*config.Config, error) {
}
func TestNewRejectsBadEnvValues(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
key string
value string
expectError bool
check func(t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config)
}{
for _, tt := range badEnvValueCases() {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
t.Setenv(tt.key, tt.value)
cfg, err := buildConfig(t)
if tt.expectError {
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.key)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.value)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, cfg)
tt.check(t, cfg)
})
}
}
// badEnvValueCase is one row of the config.New table: a variable, the
// value it is set to, and either the assertion that startup fails
// naming both, or a check on the Config that resulted.
type badEnvValueCase struct {
name string
key string
value string
expectError bool
check func(t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config)
}
// badEnvValueCases is the config.New table, kept out of the test body
// so the test itself stays readable. It is assembled from per-variable
// groups because one literal covering every variable outgrew the
// function-length budget.
func badEnvValueCases() []badEnvValueCase {
cases := listenerEnvValueCases()
cases = append(cases, flagEnvValueCases()...)
cases = append(cases, sentryEnvValueCases()...)
return cases
}
// listenerEnvValueCases covers the two variables that describe the
// HTTP listener.
func listenerEnvValueCases() []badEnvValueCase {
return []badEnvValueCase{
{
name: "valid PORT is used",
key: envKeyPort,
@@ -340,6 +545,41 @@ func TestNewRejectsBadEnvValues(t *testing.T) {
value: "70000",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "valid BIND_ADDRESS is used",
key: envKeyBindAddress,
value: bindAddressWildcard,
check: func(t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config) {
t.Helper()
assert.Equal(
t, bindAddressWildcard, cfg.BindAddress,
)
},
},
{
name: "unparseable BIND_ADDRESS aborts startup",
key: envKeyBindAddress,
value: "not-an-address",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "hostname BIND_ADDRESS aborts startup",
key: envKeyBindAddress,
value: "localhost",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "BIND_ADDRESS with a port aborts startup",
key: envKeyBindAddress,
value: bindAddressDefault + ":8080",
expectError: true,
},
}
}
// flagEnvValueCases covers the boolean variables.
func flagEnvValueCases() []badEnvValueCase {
return []badEnvValueCase{
{
name: "valid DEBUG is used",
key: envKeyDebug,
@@ -355,35 +595,42 @@ func TestNewRejectsBadEnvValues(t *testing.T) {
value: "ture",
expectError: true,
},
}
}
// sentryEnvValueCases covers SENTRY_DSN. The three rejected values are
// the ones measured on the defect: each initialised the SDK with an
// error and left the process serving with error reporting off.
func sentryEnvValueCases() []badEnvValueCase {
return []badEnvValueCase{
{
name: "unparseable MAINTENANCE_MODE aborts startup",
key: envKeyMaintenanceMode,
value: "sometimes",
name: "valid SENTRY_DSN is used",
key: envKeySentryDSN,
value: validSentryDSN,
check: func(t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config) {
t.Helper()
assert.Equal(t, validSentryDSN, cfg.SentryDSN)
assert.True(t, cfg.SentryEnabled())
},
},
{
name: "unparseable SENTRY_DSN aborts startup",
key: envKeySentryDSN,
value: "not-a-dsn",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "SENTRY_DSN that is not a URL aborts startup",
key: envKeySentryDSN,
value: "%%%",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "keyless SENTRY_DSN aborts startup",
key: envKeySentryDSN,
value: "https://example.invalid/1",
expectError: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
t.Setenv(tt.key, tt.value)
cfg, err := buildConfig(t)
if tt.expectError {
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.key)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.value)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, cfg)
tt.check(t, cfg)
})
}
}
@@ -391,19 +638,29 @@ func TestNewRejectsBadEnvValues(t *testing.T) {
// break the legitimate unset case: absent variables still get their
// documented defaults.
func TestNewUsesDefaultsWhenUnset(t *testing.T) {
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
t.Setenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT", "dev")
for _, key := range []string{
envKeyPort, envKeyDebug, envKeyMaintenanceMode,
} {
require.NoError(t, os.Unsetenv(key))
}
cfg, err := buildConfig(t)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, cfg)
assert.Equal(t, 8080, cfg.Port)
assert.False(t, cfg.Debug)
assert.False(t, cfg.MaintenanceMode)
// Loopback, not the wildcard: the default must not publish the
// cleartext admin UI and the unauthenticated receiver on every
// interface of a host that configured nothing. The value is read
// from the package rather than repeated, so the README's
// documented default and the compiled-in one are pinned to the
// same constant.
assert.Equal(
t, config.DefaultBindAddressForTest, cfg.BindAddress,
)
assert.Equal(t, bindAddressDefault, cfg.BindAddress)
// An absent SENTRY_DSN is the common case and must stay a normal
// start with error reporting off, not a refusal.
assert.Empty(t, cfg.SentryDSN)
assert.False(t, cfg.SentryEnabled())
}
internal/config/export_test.go
+28 -6
View File
@@ -6,17 +6,17 @@ import "log/slog"
// the external config_test package so each helper can be covered by
// its own table-driven test without weakening the package API.
// WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest loads a Config from the current
// environment and emits its startup warnings to log. The real logger
// writes to stdout, so this lets the warning's firing condition be
// asserted against a handler the test controls.
func WarnSharedRateLimitBucketForTest(log *slog.Logger) error {
// WarnEgressAllowlistForTest loads a Config from the current
// environment and emits its egress-allowlist startup warning to
// log, so a test can assert both that the warning fires only when
// the list is non-empty and that it names the blocks it opened.
func WarnEgressAllowlistForTest(log *slog.Logger) error {
c, err := loadFromEnv()
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log)
c.warnEgressAllowlist(log)
return nil
}
@@ -35,3 +35,25 @@ func EnvPositiveIntForTest(key string, defaultValue int) (int, error) {
func EnvPortForTest(key string, defaultValue int) (int, error) {
return envPort(key, defaultValue)
}
// EnvSentryDSNForTest exposes envSentryDSN.
func EnvSentryDSNForTest(key string) (string, error) {
return envSentryDSN(key)
}
// LoadDotEnvFileForTest exposes the loader LoadDotEnv runs, over a
// caller-named file rather than the process working directory, so
// each .env state can be covered without moving the test process.
func LoadDotEnvFileForTest(path string) error {
return loadDotEnvFile(path)
}
// EnvBindAddressForTest exposes envBindAddress.
func EnvBindAddressForTest(key, defaultValue string) (string, error) {
return envBindAddress(key, defaultValue)
}
// DefaultBindAddressForTest exposes the compiled-in BIND_ADDRESS
// default, so a test pins the documented value rather than repeating
// a literal that could drift from it.
const DefaultBindAddressForTest = defaultBindAddress
internal/config/sentry_test.go
+140
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
package config_test
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
)
// envKeySentryDSN is the variable envSentryDSN reads in production.
const envKeySentryDSN = "SENTRY_DSN"
// validSentryDSN is a syntactically complete DSN. The host is under
// .invalid (RFC 2606), so nothing a test builds around it can reach a
// real Sentry installation.
const validSentryDSN = "https://abc123@sentry.invalid/42"
// envSentryDSNCase is one row of the envSentryDSN table.
type envSentryDSNCase struct {
name string
set bool
value string
expectError bool
expected string
}
// envSentryDSNCases is the envSentryDSN table. The three invalid
// values are the ones measured on the defect: each initialised the SDK
// with an error and left the process serving with reporting off.
func envSentryDSNCases() []envSentryDSNCase {
return []envSentryDSNCase{
{
name: "unset means reporting off",
expected: "",
},
{
name: "empty means reporting off",
set: true,
value: "",
expected: "",
},
{
name: "whitespace means reporting off",
set: true,
value: " ",
expected: "",
},
{
name: "a valid DSN is kept",
set: true,
value: validSentryDSN,
expected: validSentryDSN,
},
{
name: "surrounding whitespace is trimmed",
set: true,
value: " " + validSentryDSN + "\t",
expected: validSentryDSN,
},
{
name: "a value that is not a URL is rejected",
set: true,
value: "not-a-dsn",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "an unparseable URL is rejected",
set: true,
value: "%%%",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "a DSN without a public key is rejected",
set: true,
value: "https://example.invalid/1",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "a DSN without a project id is rejected",
set: true,
value: "https://abc123@sentry.invalid/",
expectError: true,
},
{
name: "a non-HTTP scheme is rejected",
set: true,
value: "ftp://abc123@sentry.invalid/42",
expectError: true,
},
}
}
// TestEnvSentryDSN covers the helper directly. What it pins beyond the
// value is the failure shape: a set-but-unparseable DSN names the
// variable and the value, exactly as the other fail-loud helpers do,
// so an operator reads the fix off the message.
func TestEnvSentryDSN(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range envSentryDSNCases() {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Cannot use t.Parallel() here because t.Setenv
// is incompatible with parallel subtests.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
if tt.set {
t.Setenv(envKeySentryDSN, tt.value)
}
got, err := config.EnvSentryDSNForTest(envKeySentryDSN)
if tt.expectError {
require.Error(t, err)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, config.ErrInvalidSentryDSN)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), envKeySentryDSN)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.value)
assert.Empty(t, got)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, got)
})
}
}
// TestSentryEnabled_TracksTheDSN pins that the one method answering
// "is anything being reported" agrees with the DSN in every state. The
// startup log, the SDK initialisation and the sentryhttp middleware
// all read it, so a log field cannot report reporting as on while
// nothing is sending.
func TestSentryEnabled_TracksTheDSN(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.False(t, (&config.Config{}).SentryEnabled())
assert.True(
t,
(&config.Config{SentryDSN: validSentryDSN}).SentryEnabled(),
)
}
internal/config/testing.go
+50
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
package config
import (
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// ClearEnvForTest unsets every variable in the process environment
// for the rest of the test, so a test sees only the variables it sets
// itself, not whatever the developer's shell exports. When the test
// ends it leaves the environment exactly as it found it: each variable
// it unset is put back, and any variable added since is removed.
func ClearEnvForTest(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
present := make(map[string]bool)
for _, entry := range os.Environ() {
key, _, _ := strings.Cut(entry, "=")
present[key] = true
// t.Setenv registers the restore; the Unsetenv after it is
// what makes the key absent, since a key set to the empty
// string is still present, and godotenv will not overwrite a
// present key.
t.Setenv(key, "")
err := os.Unsetenv(key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unsetting %s: %v", key, err)
}
}
// A variable the test adds other than through t.Setenv, as loading
// a .env file does, has no restore of its own.
t.Cleanup(func() {
for _, entry := range os.Environ() {
key, _, _ := strings.Cut(entry, "=")
if present[key] {
continue
}
err := os.Unsetenv(key)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("unsetting %s: %v", key, err)
}
}
})
}
internal/config/testing_test.go
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
package config_test
import (
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
)
// TestClearEnvForTest_RemovesAddedVariables pins that a variable set
// after the clear other than through t.Setenv, as a test's .env file
// sets one, is gone once the test ends, so it cannot reach the tests
// that run after it.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // ClearEnvForTest uses t.Setenv.
func TestClearEnvForTest_RemovesAddedVariables(t *testing.T) {
// The outer clear keeps a value of the key exported in the shell
// from making it a variable the inner clear has to put back.
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
t.Run("loads a .env file after the clear", func(t *testing.T) {
config.ClearEnvForTest(t)
path := writeDotEnv(t, dotEnvKey+"=from-dot-env\n")
require.NoError(t, config.LoadDotEnvFileForTest(path))
require.Equal(t, "from-dot-env", os.Getenv(dotEnvKey))
})
_, present := os.LookupEnv(dotEnvKey)
assert.False(
t, present,
"a variable set after the clear must not outlive the test",
)
}
internal/database/bootstrap_banner_test.go
+121
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
package database_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"log/slog"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// passwordField is the banner line carrying the plaintext.
const passwordField = "password: "
// bannerPassword returns the password the banner printed.
func bannerPassword(t *testing.T, out string) string {
t.Helper()
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(out, "\n") {
_, value, found := strings.Cut(line, passwordField)
if found {
return strings.TrimSpace(value)
}
}
t.Fatalf("no %q line in the banner:\n%s", passwordField, out)
return ""
}
// TestFirstBoot_PrintsTheAdminPasswordAsABanner is the bootstrap half
// of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/208.
//
// The password is shown exactly once, and it used to be shown as one
// slog record among the roughly 45 fx PROVIDE/RUN/HOOK lines a boot
// writes — which is how deployments lost it and, with no reset path,
// locked themselves out. It must be emitted as a block an operator can
// find by eye, it must carry the plaintext that actually opens the
// account, and it must name the command that recovers it.
func TestFirstBoot_PrintsTheAdminPasswordAsABanner(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db, lc := setupTestDB(t)
var out bytes.Buffer
db.ExportSetBannerOut(&out)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
printed := out.String()
require.Contains(
t, printed, strings.Repeat("=", 20),
"the banner must be ruled off, not read as one more log line",
)
require.Contains(t, printed, "username: admin")
assert.Contains(
t, printed, "resetpw",
"the banner must name the command that recovers the account",
)
password := bannerPassword(t, printed)
require.NotEmpty(t, password)
// The printed plaintext must be the one that opens the account:
// a banner showing a different string would be worse than none.
var user database.User
require.NoError(
t,
db.DB().Where("username = ?", "admin").First(&user).Error,
)
ok, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, user.Password)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(
t, ok, "the printed password must open the seeded account",
)
}
// TestNewDatabase_IsLoggedWithItsPath is the log half of
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/359. A DATA_DIR that is
// unexpectedly empty boots exactly like a first start, so the start
// that creates the database must say so, and where. Opening that
// database again must not.
func TestNewDatabase_IsLoggedWithItsPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
open := func() string {
var out bytes.Buffer
db, err := database.Open(dir, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(&out, nil)))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, db.Close())
return out.String()
}
const created = `level=WARN msg="created a new, empty database"`
first := open()
second := open()
assert.Contains(
t, first,
created+" path="+filepath.Join(dir, database.MainDBFileName),
)
assert.NotContains(
t, second, created, "an existing database is not new",
)
}
internal/database/database.go
+127 -20
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@ package database
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"database/sql"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/fs"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -15,18 +16,32 @@ import (
"go.uber.org/fx"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite" // Pure Go SQLite driver
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/banner"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
)
const (
dataDirPerm = 0750
randomPasswordLen = 16
sessionKeyLen = 32
)
// MainDBFileName is the main application database inside DATA_DIR. It
// is exported so that an entry point acting on a data directory
// outside the fx graph can test for a deployment's existence without
// spelling the name a second time.
const MainDBFileName = "webhooker.db"
// BootstrapPasswordNote is what the first-boot banner tells the
// operator to do about the password it just printed. It names the
// recovery command, because the moment that line scrolls away is
// exactly when the operator needs to know one exists.
const BootstrapPasswordNote = "Save this password now: it is shown " +
"only here, and only once.\nIf it is lost, run `webhooker " +
"resetpw admin` on a stopped deployment."
//nolint:revive // DatabaseParams is a standard fx naming convention.
type DatabaseParams struct {
fx.In
@@ -40,6 +55,39 @@ type Database struct {
db *gorm.DB
log *slog.Logger
params *DatabaseParams
// bannerOut receives the first-boot credentials banner. Nil means
// os.Stdout, resolved at write time rather than at construction so
// that a caller which redirects the variable still captures it.
bannerOut io.Writer
}
// Open connects to the main database in dataDir and migrates it,
// without the fx lifecycle and without seeding an admin account.
//
// It is for entry points that act on an existing deployment's data
// directory from outside the server graph — `webhooker resetpw`. Such a
// caller must already hold the DATA_DIR lock (see internal/datadir),
// and must Close the result.
//
// It does not create the admin account: seeding belongs to a server
// start, and a maintenance command that silently invented an account
// would answer "no such user" by creating one.
func Open(dataDir string, log *slog.Logger) (*Database, error) {
d := &Database{log: log}
err := d.connectTo(dataDir)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return d, nil
}
// Close closes the underlying connection. It is the exported form of
// the fx stop hook, for callers that built the Database with Open.
func (d *Database) Close() error {
return d.close()
}
// New creates a Database that connects on fx start and disconnects on stop.
@@ -122,11 +170,25 @@ func (d *Database) GetOrCreateSessionKey() (string, error) {
return encoded, nil
}
// connect opens the configured data directory and, this being a
// server start, seeds the admin account when the deployment has none.
func (d *Database) connect() error {
// Ensure the data directory exists before opening the database.
dataDir := d.params.Config.DataDir
err := d.connectTo(d.params.Config.DataDir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err := os.MkdirAll(dataDir, dataDirPerm)
return d.ensureAdminUser()
}
// connectTo opens and migrates the main database in dataDir. It seeds
// nothing: whether an empty deployment gets an admin account is the
// caller's decision.
func (d *Database) connectTo(dataDir string) error {
// Ensure the data directory exists before opening the database.
// datadir.DirPerm is the single source of the directory mode; this
// package creates the directory too, since either may run first.
err := os.MkdirAll(dataDir, datadir.DirPerm)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"creating data directory %s: %w",
@@ -136,14 +198,18 @@ func (d *Database) connect() error {
}
// Construct the main application database path inside DATA_DIR.
dbPath := filepath.Join(dataDir, "webhooker.db")
dbURL := fmt.Sprintf(
"file:%s?cache=shared&mode=rwc",
dbPath,
)
dbPath := filepath.Join(dataDir, MainDBFileName)
// Open the database with the pure Go SQLite driver
sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dbURL)
// Checked before opening, which creates the file. A DATA_DIR that
// is unexpectedly empty -- its volume not mounted, say -- looks
// exactly like a first start, so a new database is a warning.
_, statErr := os.Stat(dbPath)
created := errors.Is(statErr, fs.ErrNotExist)
// Opened through OpenSQLite so this handle carries the same WAL
// journaling, busy timeout, immediate-transaction locking, and pool
// bounds as every other database file. See sqlite_open.go.
sqlDB, err := OpenSQLite(dbPath, SQLiteModeCreate)
if err != nil {
d.log.Error(
"failed to open database",
@@ -170,7 +236,12 @@ func (d *Database) connect() error {
}
d.db = db
d.log.Info("connected to database", "path", dbPath)
if created {
d.log.Warn("created a new, empty database", "path", dbPath)
} else {
d.log.Info("connected to database", "path", dbPath)
}
// Run migrations
return d.migrate()
@@ -190,10 +261,16 @@ func (d *Database) migrate() error {
d.log.Info("database migrations completed")
return nil
}
// ensureAdminUser creates the bootstrap admin account when the
// deployment has no users at all.
func (d *Database) ensureAdminUser() error {
// Check if admin user exists
var userCount int64
err = d.db.Model(&User{}).Count(&userCount).Error
err := d.db.Model(&User{}).Count(&userCount).Error
if err != nil {
d.log.Error(
"failed to count users",
@@ -253,16 +330,46 @@ func (d *Database) createAdminUser() error {
return err
}
d.log.Info("admin user created",
"username", "admin",
"password", password,
"message",
"SAVE THIS PASSWORD - it will not be shown again!",
// The plaintext leaves this process here and nowhere else. It is
// deliberately not a log field: as one INFO record among the fx
// graph's own output it read as one more startup line, which is
// how deployments lost it. See internal/banner.
err = banner.Credentials(
d.banner(),
"WEBHOOKER FIRST BOOT: an admin account has been created.",
adminUser.Username,
password,
BootstrapPasswordNote,
)
if err != nil {
// Fail the start. The account is already committed, so the
// next boot seeds nothing and prints nothing: continuing here
// would hand the operator a running service whose only
// password was never shown. `webhooker resetpw` recovers it.
d.log.Error(
"failed to print the admin credentials banner",
"error", err,
)
return err
}
d.log.Info("admin user created", "username", adminUser.Username)
return nil
}
// banner returns where the credentials banner is written. os.Stdout is
// resolved here rather than stored, so that a test which redirects the
// variable captures the banner.
func (d *Database) banner() io.Writer {
if d.bannerOut != nil {
return d.bannerOut
}
return os.Stdout
}
func (d *Database) close() error {
if d.db != nil {
sqlDB, err := d.db.DB()
internal/database/event_db_isolation.go
+159
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
package database
import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
)
// omitAssociationsCallback is the name the association guard is
// registered under on a per-webhook database's create and update
// callback chains.
const omitAssociationsCallback = "webhooker:omit_associations"
// omitAssociations makes every create and update issued against a
// per-webhook database skip GORM's automatic association save.
//
// A per-webhook database holds the event tier only, but Delivery
// declares belongs-to Event and Target and the delivery engine fills
// both in memory before writing. Without this guard GORM upserts
// those parent rows here on the delivery and retry write paths,
// copying targets.config, which holds destination URLs and bearer
// credentials, into the file most likely to be backed up or handed
// to someone else. Registering the guard on the connection covers
// every write path, including writes inside a transaction and write
// paths added later. Every event-tier row this file holds is written
// explicitly, so nothing depends on the automatic save.
func omitAssociations(db *gorm.DB) error {
omit := func(tx *gorm.DB) {
tx.Statement.Omits = append(
tx.Statement.Omits, clause.Associations,
)
}
err := db.Callback().Create().
Before("gorm:save_before_associations").
Register(omitAssociationsCallback, omit)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"registering create association guard: %w", err,
)
}
err = db.Callback().Update().
Before("gorm:save_before_associations").
Register(omitAssociationsCallback, omit)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"registering update association guard: %w", err,
)
}
return nil
}
// eventDBSweptVersion is the PRAGMA user_version purgeTargetRows
// stamps into a per-webhook database once it has removed any leaked
// target rows *and* the VACUUM that removes their bytes has returned.
// Nothing else in the tree uses user_version, so 0 means "not swept
// by this build".
//
// The stamp, not the DELETE, is what records that a file is done. A
// DELETE commits on its own, so a sweep that is interrupted or whose
// VACUUM fails leaves a file whose rows are gone but whose credential
// bytes are still in the free pages -- indistinguishable, by row
// count, from a file that never leaked. Both leave the stamp unset,
// so the next open sweeps again.
const eventDBSweptVersion = 1
// purgeTargetRows deletes target rows that an earlier build's
// association upsert wrote into a per-webhook database, and rewrites
// the file so their bytes are gone with them. AutoMigrate creates a
// targets table in every one of these files because Delivery declares
// a belongs-to Target, but nothing in the event tier may put rows in
// it. The rows it did put there are junk, not history: they carry an
// empty webhook_id, and delivery rows resolve their target against
// the main database, so nothing here refers to them.
//
// The DELETE only unlinks the rows: modernc.org/sqlite leaves
// secure_delete at SQLite's default of off, so the credential bytes
// stay readable in the file's free pages and a backup of a swept file
// would still hand them over. VACUUM rewrites the file without them.
//
// This runs before every migration and is gated on
// eventDBSweptVersion, so a file pays for the rewrite once, on the
// first open that finds it unstamped, and every open after that is a
// PRAGMA read. A file this build created is stamped before its
// targets table exists, so it never vacuums at all. A failure here
// fails the open with the stamp left unset, so the sweep is retried
// rather than skipped -- a webhook whose file cannot be swept stays
// unusable instead of quietly serving from a file that still holds
// recoverable credentials.
func purgeTargetRows(
db *gorm.DB, log *slog.Logger, webhookID string,
) error {
var version int
// Row().Scan, not (*gorm.DB).Scan: see internal/gormlog.
err := db.Raw("PRAGMA user_version").Row().Scan(&version)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"reading sweep marker of webhook database %s: %w",
webhookID, err,
)
}
if version >= eventDBSweptVersion {
return nil
}
var purged int64
if db.Migrator().HasTable("targets") {
res := db.Exec("DELETE FROM targets")
if res.Error != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"purging target rows from webhook database %s: %w",
webhookID, res.Error,
)
}
purged = res.RowsAffected
// Unconditional: a zero row count here does not mean there is
// nothing to remove, only that no *live* row is left. See
// eventDBSweptVersion.
err = db.Exec("VACUUM").Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"purged %d leaked target rows from webhook database "+
"%s but vacuuming it failed, so the deleted "+
"target credentials are still recoverable from "+
"the file; it stays marked unswept and the next "+
"open retries: %w",
purged, webhookID, err,
)
}
}
err = db.Exec(fmt.Sprintf(
"PRAGMA user_version = %d", eventDBSweptVersion,
)).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"marking webhook database %s swept: %w", webhookID, err,
)
}
if purged > 0 {
log.Warn(
"purged leaked target rows from per-webhook database",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"rows", purged,
)
}
return nil
}
internal/database/event_db_isolation_test.go
+438
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
package database_test
import (
"bytes"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// testDataDirPerm is the mode the test data directory is created
// with.
const testDataDirPerm = 0o750
// eventDBDataDir returns a data directory that a WebhookDBManager
// can be pointed at.
func eventDBDataDir(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "events")
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(dir, testDataDirPerm))
return dir
}
// openRawEventDB opens the per-webhook database file directly,
// without the manager, so a test can put a file on disk in a state
// the manager has to cope with, or inspect one afterwards.
func openRawEventDB(
t *testing.T, dataDir, webhookID string,
) *sql.DB {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(
dataDir, fmt.Sprintf("events-%s.db", webhookID),
)
sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
"sqlite",
fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=rwc", path),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
return sqlDB
}
// eventDBFileBytes reads a per-webhook database file off disk, so a
// test can assert on what the file itself still holds rather than on
// what a query returns.
func eventDBFileBytes(t *testing.T, dataDir, webhookID string) []byte {
t.Helper()
//nolint:gosec // reads a file the test just created under t.TempDir()
raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(
dataDir, fmt.Sprintf("events-%s.db", webhookID),
))
require.NoError(t, err)
return raw
}
// eventDBUserVersion returns the PRAGMA user_version of a per-webhook
// database file, which is the marker purgeTargetRows stamps once it
// has swept and vacuumed.
func eventDBUserVersion(t *testing.T, sqlDB *sql.DB) int {
t.Helper()
var version int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(), "PRAGMA user_version",
).Scan(&version))
return version
}
// clearEventDBSweptMarker resets the sweep marker to 0, which is what
// a file written by a build without the sweep looks like. Tests that
// seed a leaked row have to create the file through the manager to
// get the real targets table shape, and that stamps it.
func clearEventDBSweptMarker(t *testing.T, sqlDB *sql.DB) {
t.Helper()
_, err := sqlDB.ExecContext(t.Context(), "PRAGMA user_version = 0")
require.NoError(t, err)
}
// countTargetRows returns the number of rows in the targets table of
// a per-webhook database file, or -1 if the table does not exist.
func countTargetRows(t *testing.T, sqlDB *sql.DB) int {
t.Helper()
var tables int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(),
"SELECT count(*) FROM sqlite_master "+
"WHERE type = 'table' AND name = 'targets'",
).Scan(&tables))
if tables == 0 {
return -1
}
var rows int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(), "SELECT count(*) FROM targets",
).Scan(&rows))
return rows
}
// TestOpenPurgesLeakedTargetRows covers the sweep for event
// databases written by a build that let GORM upsert target rows
// into them: opening the database clears them, and opening it again
// is a no-op.
func TestOpenPurgesLeakedTargetRows(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
// Create the file the way the application does, so the targets
// table has exactly the shape AutoMigrate gives it, then write
// a leaked row into it the way the association upsert did.
initial := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err := initial.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, initial.CloseAll())
seed := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
_, err = seed.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"INSERT INTO targets "+
"(id, webhook_id, name, type, config) "+
"VALUES (?, '', ?, ?, ?)",
uuid.New().String(),
"leaked-target",
"slack",
`{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/T000/B000/secret"}`,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, 1, countTargetRows(t, seed))
clearEventDBSweptMarker(t, seed)
require.NoError(t, seed.Close())
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
check := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Zero(t, countTargetRows(t, check))
assert.Equal(
t, 1, eventDBUserVersion(t, check),
"a completed sweep must mark the file so later opens skip it",
)
require.NoError(t, check.Close())
// Idempotent: a second open leaves it at zero and does not
// error.
again := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = again.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, again.CloseAll())
recheck := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Zero(t, countTargetRows(t, recheck))
}
// TestOpenPurgeRemovesCredentialBytes covers the sweep at the level
// that matters for a backup handed to someone else: the leaked
// credential must be gone from the raw bytes of the file, not merely
// unreachable by query. A bare DELETE unlinks the row and leaves the
// bytes readable in the free pages, so this fails without the VACUUM
// in purgeTargetRows.
func TestOpenPurgeRemovesCredentialBytes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
credential := "T00000000/B00000000/" + uuid.New().String()
initial := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err := initial.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, initial.CloseAll())
seed := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
_, err = seed.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"INSERT INTO targets "+
"(id, webhook_id, name, type, config) "+
"VALUES (?, '', ?, ?, ?)",
uuid.New().String(),
"leaked-target",
"slack",
fmt.Sprintf(
`{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/%s"}`, credential,
),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
clearEventDBSweptMarker(t, seed)
require.NoError(t, seed.Close())
// The seed has to be in the file for its absence later to mean
// anything.
require.True(
t,
bytes.Contains(
eventDBFileBytes(t, dataDir, webhookID),
[]byte(credential),
),
"seeded credential is not in the file, so this test proves nothing",
)
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
assert.NotContains(
t,
string(eventDBFileBytes(t, dataDir, webhookID)),
credential,
"leaked credential is still recoverable from the raw file",
)
}
// TestOpenRevacuumsAfterIncompleteSweep covers the case a row count
// cannot see: the rows are already deleted but the file was never
// vacuumed, because an earlier sweep died between the two or its
// VACUUM failed. The credential bytes are still recoverable, and the
// unset marker is the only thing that says so, so the next open must
// vacuum rather than conclude from the empty table that there is
// nothing to do.
func TestOpenRevacuumsAfterIncompleteSweep(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
credential := "T00000000/B00000000/" + uuid.New().String()
initial := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err := initial.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, initial.CloseAll())
seed := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
_, err = seed.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"INSERT INTO targets "+
"(id, webhook_id, name, type, config) "+
"VALUES (?, '', ?, ?, ?)",
uuid.New().String(),
"leaked-target",
"slack",
fmt.Sprintf(
`{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/%s"}`, credential,
),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Exactly the state an interrupted sweep leaves: rows gone,
// marker unset, bytes still in the free pages.
_, err = seed.ExecContext(t.Context(), "DELETE FROM targets")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Zero(t, countTargetRows(t, seed))
clearEventDBSweptMarker(t, seed)
require.NoError(t, seed.Close())
require.True(
t,
bytes.Contains(
eventDBFileBytes(t, dataDir, webhookID),
[]byte(credential),
),
"the deleted row's bytes must still be in the file, or this "+
"test proves nothing",
)
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
assert.NotContains(
t,
string(eventDBFileBytes(t, dataDir, webhookID)),
credential,
"an interrupted sweep was not retried, so the credential is "+
"still recoverable from the raw file",
)
check := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Equal(t, 1, eventDBUserVersion(t, check))
}
// TestOpenSkipsSweptDatabase covers the other half of the marker: a
// file this build created is marked without ever being vacuumed, and
// a marked file is not swept again.
func TestOpenSkipsSweptDatabase(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
marked := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Equal(t, 1, eventDBUserVersion(t, marked))
// A marked file is left alone, so a row written into it survives
// a reopen. Nothing writes target rows any more; this stands in
// for the sweep having run.
_, err = marked.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"INSERT INTO targets "+
"(id, webhook_id, name, type, config) "+
"VALUES (?, '', ?, ?, ?)",
uuid.New().String(), "sentinel", "slack", `{}`,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, marked.Close())
again := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
_, err = again.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, again.CloseAll())
check := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Equal(
t, 1, countTargetRows(t, check),
"a marked file must not be swept again",
)
}
// TestOpenSucceedsWithoutTargetsTable covers an existing event
// database that never grew a targets table. The sweep must not fail
// startup on it.
func TestOpenSucceedsWithoutTargetsTable(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
seed := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
_, err := seed.ExecContext(
t.Context(),
"CREATE TABLE events (id text PRIMARY KEY)",
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, seed.Close())
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, db)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
}
// TestEventDBCreateOmitsAssociations covers the connection-level
// guard directly: a Delivery carrying its Event and Target in
// memory, written through the manager's handle, must store only the
// delivery row.
func TestEventDBCreateOmitsAssociations(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := eventDBDataDir(t)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
target := database.Target{
WebhookID: webhookID,
Name: "leaky-target",
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/secret"}`,
}
target.ID = uuid.New().String()
event := database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: "POST",
Headers: `{}`,
Body: `{}`,
}
event.ID = uuid.New().String()
d := &database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: target.ID,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusPending,
Event: event,
Target: target,
}
d.ID = uuid.New().String()
require.NoError(t, db.Create(d).Error)
require.NoError(t, db.Model(d).
Update("status", database.DeliveryStatusDelivered).
Error)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
check := openRawEventDB(t, dataDir, webhookID)
assert.Zero(t, countTargetRows(t, check))
}
internal/database/event_tier_indexes_test.go
+221
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
package database_test
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// TestWebhookDBManager_OpenAddsEventTierIndexes verifies that opening a
// per-webhook database that predates these indexes creates them. It
// stands in for an older database file by dropping the indexes
// AutoMigrate just created, then reopening the same file.
func TestWebhookDBManager_OpenAddsEventTierIndexes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
indexes := []struct {
model any
name string
}{
{&database.Delivery{}, "idx_deliveries_status"},
{&database.Delivery{}, "idx_deliveries_event_id"},
{&database.DeliveryResult{}, "idx_delivery_results_delivery_id"},
{&database.Event{}, "idx_events_deleted_at_created_at"},
{&database.Event{}, "idx_events_created_at"},
}
mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
// A fresh database has them.
for _, ix := range indexes {
require.True(t, db.Migrator().HasIndex(ix.model, ix.name))
}
// Stand in for a database file created before the indexes existed.
for _, ix := range indexes {
require.NoError(t, db.Migrator().DropIndex(ix.model, ix.name))
require.False(t, db.Migrator().HasIndex(ix.model, ix.name))
}
// Drop the cached connection so the next open reopens the file and
// runs AutoMigrate against it, as a restart would.
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
db, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
for _, ix := range indexes {
assert.True(t, db.Migrator().HasIndex(ix.model, ix.name),
"opening the existing database should create %s", ix.name)
}
}
// TestEventTierQueriesUseTheirIndexes verifies that the statements the
// indexes are for use them. GORM builds each statement in a dry run as
// the code named above it does, soft-delete condition included, and
// SQLite, which keeps no statistics on these tables, must plan to seek
// on each index listed by the columns in parentheses.
func TestEventTierQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
db, err := mgr.GetDB(uuid.New().String())
require.NoError(t, err)
dry := db.Session(&gorm.Session{DryRun: true})
ids := []string{
uuid.New().String(), uuid.New().String(), uuid.New().String(),
}
cutoff := time.Now()
var (
deliveries []database.Delivery
results []database.DeliveryResult
depths []struct{ Depth int }
removed []database.TargetTotals
)
byStatus := "idx_deliveries_status (status=? AND deleted_at=?)"
byEvent := "idx_deliveries_event_id (event_id=? AND deleted_at=?)"
// The delivery engine: recovery and the retry sweep, the sweep for
// stranded pending deliveries, and the queue depth count.
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Where(
"status = ?", database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
).Find(&deliveries), byStatus)
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Where(
"status = ? AND updated_at < ?",
database.DeliveryStatusPending, cutoff,
).Limit(500).Find(&deliveries), byStatus)
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Select("target_id", "status", "count(*) as depth").
Where("status IN ?", []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
}).Group("target_id, status").Find(&depths), byStatus)
// The event log: each event's deliveries, then their attempts
// (loadEventsWithDeliveries, loadDeliveryResults).
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Where("event_id = ?", ids[0]).
Find(&deliveries), byEvent)
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Where("delivery_id IN ?", ids).
Order("attempt_num ASC").Find(&results),
"idx_delivery_results_delivery_id (delivery_id=? AND deleted_at=?)")
// Retention (reapExpired, deleteEvents): one batch of expired
// events, then their attempts, deliveries and the events.
var expired []string
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Model(&database.Event{}).
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff).
Limit(database.ExportReapBatchSize).Pluck("id", &expired),
"idx_events_created_at (created_at<?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Where(
"delivery_id IN (?)", dry.Unscoped().Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Select("id").Where("event_id IN ?", ids),
).Delete(&database.DeliveryResult{}),
"idx_delivery_results_delivery_id (delivery_id=?)",
"idx_deliveries_event_id (event_id=?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Select("target_id, count(*) AS deliveries_removed, "+
"count(CASE WHEN status = ? THEN 1 END) AS failed_removed",
database.DeliveryStatusFailed).
Where("event_id IN ?", ids).Group("target_id").Find(&removed),
"idx_deliveries_event_id (event_id=?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Where("event_id IN ?", ids).
Delete(&database.Delivery{}), "idx_deliveries_event_id (event_id=?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Unscoped().Where("id IN ?", ids).
Delete(&database.Event{}), "sqlite_autoindex_events_1 (id=?)")
}
// TestStatisticsQueriesUseTheirIndexes does the same for the webhook
// page's statistics (readEventStats in the handlers): deliveries in
// progress, each target's deliveries finished since a time, which must
// come from the index alone, and events received since a time.
func TestStatisticsQueriesUseTheirIndexes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
db, err := mgr.GetDB(uuid.New().String())
require.NoError(t, err)
dry := db.Session(&gorm.Session{DryRun: true})
since := time.Now()
var (
count int64
byTarget []struct{ TargetID string }
)
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("status IN ?", []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
}).Count(&count),
"idx_deliveries_status (status=? AND deleted_at=?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Select("target_id, "+
"count(CASE WHEN status = ? THEN 1 END) AS delivered, "+
"count(CASE WHEN status = ? THEN 1 END) AS failed",
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed).
Where("status IN ? AND finished_at >= ?",
[]database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
}, since).
Group("target_id").Find(&byTarget),
"COVERING INDEX idx_deliveries_status "+
"(status=? AND deleted_at=? AND finished_at>?)")
assertPlanUses(t, db, dry.Model(&database.Event{}).
Where("created_at >= ?", since).Count(&count),
"idx_events_deleted_at_created_at "+
"(deleted_at=? AND created_at>?)")
}
// assertPlanUses asserts that SQLite's plan for a statement GORM built
// in a dry run, run with the same SQL and arguments GORM would send,
// names each of the given indexes.
func assertPlanUses(
t *testing.T, db, built *gorm.DB, indexes ...string,
) {
t.Helper()
var plan []struct{ Detail string }
require.NoError(t, db.Raw(
"EXPLAIN QUERY PLAN "+built.Statement.SQL.String(),
built.Statement.Vars...,
).Scan(&plan).Error)
for _, index := range indexes {
assert.Contains(t, fmt.Sprint(plan), index,
built.Statement.SQL.String())
}
}
internal/database/export_test.go
+24
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,10 @@ package database
import (
"context"
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"testing"
"time"
"go.uber.org/fx"
@@ -27,6 +29,10 @@ func NewTestRetentionReaper(
}
}
// ExportReapBatchSize exposes how many expired events one retention
// transaction deletes.
const ExportReapBatchSize = reapBatchSize
// ExportSweep runs a single retention sweep synchronously for tests.
func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportSweep(ctx context.Context) {
r.sweep(ctx)
@@ -66,8 +72,26 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) ExportSetInterval(d time.Duration) {
r.interval = d
}
// ExportSetBannerOut redirects the first-boot credentials banner, so a
// test can read what the operator would have seen. It must be called
// before the fx start hook runs, which is where the account is seeded.
func (d *Database) ExportSetBannerOut(w io.Writer) {
d.bannerOut = w
}
// DummyPasswordHashForTest exposes the encoded hash that unknown
// usernames are verified against.
func DummyPasswordHashForTest() string {
return dummyPasswordHash()
}
// HashAtShippedCostForTest makes HashPassword hash at the shipped
// memory cost until t ends. t must not run in parallel with other
// tests, which would hash at that cost alongside it.
func HashAtShippedCostForTest(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
hashAtShippedCostInTest = true
t.Cleanup(func() { hashAtShippedCostInTest = false })
}
internal/database/model_apikey.go
+3 -2
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ type APIKey struct {
Description string `json:"description"`
LastUsedAt *time.Time `json:"lastUsedAt,omitempty"`
// Relations
User User `json:"user,omitzero"`
// Relations. No model marshals the record it belongs to:
// User.APIKeys leads back here, and the JSON could loop.
User User `json:"-"`
}
internal/database/model_delivery.go
+45 -6
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
package database
import (
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// DeliveryStatus represents the status of a delivery
type DeliveryStatus string
@@ -11,16 +17,49 @@ const (
DeliveryStatusRetrying DeliveryStatus = "retrying"
)
// Terminal reports whether a delivery in this status has finished, so
// the delivery engine will make no further attempt of its own.
//
// It is what decides which deliveries the event log offers to replay:
// a pending or retrying delivery is still the engine's, and replaying
// one would race it.
func (s DeliveryStatus) Terminal() bool {
switch s {
case DeliveryStatusDelivered, DeliveryStatusFailed:
return true
case DeliveryStatusPending, DeliveryStatusRetrying:
return false
default:
return false
}
}
// Delivery represents a delivery attempt for an event to a target
//
//nolint:lll // a struct tag cannot wrap
type Delivery struct {
BaseModel
EventID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"eventId"`
TargetID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"targetId"`
Status DeliveryStatus `gorm:"not null;default:'pending'" json:"status"`
EventID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null;index:idx_deliveries_event_id,priority:1" json:"eventId"`
TargetID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null;index:idx_deliveries_status,priority:4" json:"targetId"`
Status DeliveryStatus `gorm:"not null;default:'pending';index:idx_deliveries_status,priority:1" json:"status"`
// Relations
Event Event `json:"event,omitzero"`
Target Target `json:"target,omitzero"`
// DeletedAt repeats the BaseModel field only to be the second column
// of the event_id and status indexes, for the reason DeliveryResult
// gives.
DeletedAt gorm.DeletedAt `gorm:"index:idx_deliveries_event_id,priority:2;index:idx_deliveries_status,priority:2" json:"deletedAt,omitzero"`
// FinishedAt is when the delivery became delivered or failed, and
// nil while it is pending or retrying. It and then TargetID end the
// status index, so the webhook page counts each target's deliveries
// that finished in a recent window by reading just that window from
// the index.
FinishedAt *time.Time `gorm:"index:idx_deliveries_status,priority:3" json:"finishedAt,omitempty"`
// Relations. No model marshals the record it belongs to:
// Event.Deliveries and Target.Deliveries lead back here, and the
// JSON could loop.
Event Event `json:"-"`
Target Target `json:"-"`
DeliveryResults []DeliveryResult `json:"deliveryResults,omitempty"`
}
internal/database/model_delivery_result.go
+15 -3
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,21 @@
package database
import "gorm.io/gorm"
// DeliveryResult represents the result of a delivery attempt
//
//nolint:lll // a struct tag cannot wrap
type DeliveryResult struct {
BaseModel
DeliveryID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"deliveryId"`
// DeliveryID and DeletedAt make up one index, in that order.
// DeletedAt repeats the BaseModel field only to join it: GORM adds
// "deleted_at IS NULL" to almost every query, and where a column is
// matched against several values SQLite otherwise reads through the
// deleted_at index, which every live row matches.
DeliveryID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null;index:idx_delivery_results_delivery_id,priority:1" json:"deliveryId"`
DeletedAt gorm.DeletedAt `gorm:"index:idx_delivery_results_delivery_id,priority:2" json:"deletedAt,omitzero"`
AttemptNum int `gorm:"not null" json:"attemptNum"`
Success bool `json:"success"`
StatusCode int `json:"statusCode,omitempty"`
@@ -12,6 +23,7 @@ type DeliveryResult struct {
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
Duration int64 `json:"durationMs"` // Duration in milliseconds
// Relations
Delivery Delivery `json:"delivery,omitzero"`
// Relations. No model marshals the record it belongs to:
// Delivery.DeliveryResults leads back here, and the JSON could loop.
Delivery Delivery `json:"-"`
}
internal/database/model_entrypoint.go
+7 -3
View File
@@ -6,12 +6,16 @@ type Entrypoint struct {
WebhookID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"webhookId"`
// Path is the URL path for this entrypoint.
// Path is the URL path for this entrypoint. It is the
// entrypoint's only credential: possession of the UUID
// authorises submission, so the receiver checks nothing else
// about the sender.
Path string `gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null" json:"path"`
Description string `json:"description"`
Active bool `gorm:"default:true" json:"active"`
// Relations
Webhook Webhook `json:"webhook,omitzero"`
// Relations. No model marshals the record it belongs to:
// Webhook.Entrypoints leads back here, and the JSON could loop.
Webhook Webhook `json:"-"`
}
internal/database/model_event.go
+35 -3
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,27 @@
package database
import (
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// Event represents a captured webhook event
//
//nolint:lll // a struct tag cannot wrap
type Event struct {
BaseModel
// CreatedAt and DeletedAt repeat the BaseModel fields only to index
// them for retention, which finds events by age. Its lookups carry
// GORM's "deleted_at IS NULL" (see DeliveryResult) and compare
// created_at with <, so their index has deleted_at first: SQLite
// narrows by a < only on the last column it uses. Its final delete
// has no deleted_at condition and uses the index on created_at
// alone. The other tables keep the unindexed BaseModel created_at.
CreatedAt time.Time `gorm:"index;index:idx_events_deleted_at_created_at,priority:2" json:"createdAt"`
DeletedAt gorm.DeletedAt `gorm:"index:idx_events_deleted_at_created_at,priority:1" json:"deletedAt,omitzero"`
WebhookID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"webhookId"`
EntrypointID string `gorm:"type:uuid;not null" json:"entrypointId"`
@@ -13,8 +31,22 @@ type Event struct {
Body string `gorm:"type:text" json:"body"`
ContentType string `json:"contentType"`
// Relations
Webhook Webhook `json:"webhook,omitzero"`
Entrypoint Entrypoint `json:"entrypoint,omitzero"`
// BodyBytes is the size of Body in bytes, recorded when the event
// is stored so the recent events list can show it without reading
// the body.
BodyBytes int64 `gorm:"not null" json:"bodyBytes"`
// ResubmittedFromID names the event this one was copied from by
// an operator resubmit. It is nil for an event that arrived on
// the receiver, which is every event created before the column
// existed. It is not a foreign key: the source event can be
// reaped by retention while its copies remain, and the id is
// kept as the record of where the copy came from either way.
ResubmittedFromID *string `gorm:"type:uuid;index" json:"resubmittedFromId,omitempty"`
// Relations. No model marshals the record it belongs to, so
// Webhook and Entrypoint are left out of the JSON.
Webhook Webhook `json:"-"`
Entrypoint Entrypoint `json:"-"`
Deliveries []Delivery `json:"deliveries,omitempty"`
}
internal/database/model_parent_test.go
+126
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
package database_test
import (
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// TestPreloadedModelsMarshalWithoutTheirParent pins that a child's
// reference to the record it belongs to is left out of the JSON, so a
// webhook and its targets cannot marshal each other in a loop, and that
// GORM still preloads that reference, since it ignores json tags.
func TestPreloadedModelsMarshalWithoutTheirParent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := startedTestDB(t)
stored := database.Webhook{
UserID: uuid.New().String(),
Name: testWebhookName,
Entrypoints: []database.Entrypoint{{Path: uuid.New().String()}},
Targets: []database.Target{{
Name: "log",
Type: database.TargetTypeLog,
}},
}
require.NoError(t, db.Create(&stored).Error)
entrypointID := stored.Entrypoints[0].ID
targetID := stored.Targets[0].ID
var webhook database.Webhook
require.NoError(t, db.
Preload("Entrypoints.Webhook").
Preload("Targets.Webhook").
First(&webhook, "id = ?", stored.ID).Error)
require.Len(t, webhook.Entrypoints, 1)
require.Len(t, webhook.Targets, 1)
assert.Equal(t, stored.ID, webhook.Entrypoints[0].Webhook.ID)
assert.Equal(t, stored.ID, webhook.Targets[0].Webhook.ID)
encoded := marshalModel(t, webhook)
assert.Contains(t, encoded, entrypointID)
assert.Contains(t, encoded, targetID)
// Each child holds the parent's id as its webhookId, so the parent
// is looked for by its own id field.
parentIDField := `"id":"` + stored.ID + `"`
assert.NotContains(t, marshalModel(t, webhook.Entrypoints[0]), parentIDField)
assert.NotContains(t, marshalModel(t, webhook.Targets[0]), parentIDField)
var target database.Target
require.NoError(t, db.
Preload("Webhook").
First(&target, "id = ?", targetID).Error)
assert.Equal(t, stored.ID, target.Webhook.ID)
encoded = marshalModel(t, target)
assert.Contains(t, encoded, stored.ID)
assert.NotContains(t, encoded, parentIDField)
}
// TestModelsMarshalWithoutTheirParent covers the other references to a
// parent: each model is built with its parent set, and the parent's id
// must not appear in the JSON.
func TestModelsMarshalWithoutTheirParent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
parent := database.BaseModel{ID: uuid.New().String()}
cases := []struct {
name string
model any
}{
{
name: "Webhook.User",
model: database.Webhook{User: database.User{BaseModel: parent}},
},
{
name: "APIKey.User",
model: database.APIKey{User: database.User{BaseModel: parent}},
},
{
name: "Delivery.Event",
model: database.Delivery{Event: database.Event{BaseModel: parent}},
},
{
name: "Delivery.Target",
model: database.Delivery{Target: database.Target{BaseModel: parent}},
},
{
name: "DeliveryResult.Delivery",
model: database.DeliveryResult{
Delivery: database.Delivery{BaseModel: parent},
},
},
{
name: "Event.Webhook",
model: database.Event{Webhook: database.Webhook{BaseModel: parent}},
},
{
name: "Event.Entrypoint",
model: database.Event{
Entrypoint: database.Entrypoint{BaseModel: parent},
},
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.NotContains(t, marshalModel(t, tc.model), parent.ID)
})
}
}
internal/database/model_target.go
+3 -2
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ type Target struct {
MaxRetries int `json:"maxRetries,omitempty"`
MaxQueueSize int `json:"maxQueueSize,omitempty"`
// Relations
Webhook Webhook `json:"webhook,omitzero"`
// Relations. No model marshals the record it belongs to:
// Webhook.Targets leads back here, and the JSON could loop.
Webhook Webhook `json:"-"`
Deliveries []Delivery `json:"deliveries,omitempty"`
}
internal/database/model_totals.go
+99
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
package database
import (
"fmt"
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// The running totals in a webhook's event database keep the webhook
// page's lifetime figures right after retention has removed the rows
// they count, and let the page show them without counting every row.
// Each total changes in the transaction that writes or deletes the
// rows it counts.
// EventTotals is the single row counting a webhook's events: every
// event ever stored, how many of them retention has deleted, and when
// the newest arrived, which retention leaves as it is.
type EventTotals struct {
ID int64 `gorm:"primaryKey"`
Events int64 `gorm:"not null"`
EventsRemoved int64 `gorm:"not null"`
// LastEventAt is when the newest event arrived, or nil before the
// first.
LastEventAt *time.Time
}
// TableName names the table AddEventTotals updates.
func (EventTotals) TableName() string {
return "event_totals"
}
// TargetTotals is one row per target counting its deliveries: every
// delivery ever created, how many became delivered and how many
// failed, and how many deliveries and failed deliveries retention has
// deleted. The webhook's delivery figures are these rows summed.
type TargetTotals struct {
TargetID string `gorm:"type:uuid;primaryKey"`
Deliveries int64 `gorm:"not null"`
Delivered int64 `gorm:"not null"`
Failed int64 `gorm:"not null"`
DeliveriesRemoved int64 `gorm:"not null"`
FailedRemoved int64 `gorm:"not null"`
}
// TableName names the table AddTargetTotals updates.
func (TargetTotals) TableName() string {
return "target_totals"
}
// AddEventTotals adds each count in add to the webhook's event totals,
// and records add.LastEventAt as when the newest event arrived if it is
// set. Call it on the transaction that writes or deletes the events it
// counts.
func AddEventTotals(tx *gorm.DB, add EventTotals) error {
err := tx.Exec(
`UPDATE event_totals SET
events = events + ?,
events_removed = events_removed + ?,
last_event_at = coalesce(?, last_event_at)`,
add.Events, add.EventsRemoved, add.LastEventAt,
).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("adding to event totals: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// AddTargetTotals adds each count in add to the totals of the target
// add.TargetID names, creating its row the first time. Call it on the
// transaction that writes or deletes the deliveries it counts.
func AddTargetTotals(tx *gorm.DB, add TargetTotals) error {
err := tx.Exec(
`INSERT INTO target_totals (target_id, deliveries, delivered,
failed, deliveries_removed, failed_removed)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT (target_id) DO UPDATE SET
deliveries = deliveries + excluded.deliveries,
delivered = delivered + excluded.delivered,
failed = failed + excluded.failed,
deliveries_removed =
deliveries_removed + excluded.deliveries_removed,
failed_removed = failed_removed + excluded.failed_removed`,
add.TargetID, add.Deliveries, add.Delivered,
add.Failed, add.DeliveriesRemoved, add.FailedRemoved,
).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"adding to totals of target %s: %w", add.TargetID, err,
)
}
return nil
}
internal/database/model_user.go
+47 -2
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,58 @@
package database
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// MaxUsernameBytes is the longest username, in bytes, that a user may
// have. The same number appears in the check constraint on
// User.Username, because a struct tag cannot reference a constant.
//
// A login stores the username in the session cookie, and both
// securecookie and browsers refuse a cookie value past about 4096
// bytes. That value is the session base64-encoded twice, so it holds
// 4096 × 3/4 × 3/4 = 2304 bytes of session, and the signature,
// timestamp and the session's other values take about 270 of those: a
// username longer than about 2030 bytes can never log in. The limit is
// about half that, so the session can carry more values later without
// locking out an account whose username is already at the limit.
const MaxUsernameBytes = 1024
// ErrUsernameTooLong is returned when a user is saved with a username
// longer than MaxUsernameBytes.
var ErrUsernameTooLong = errors.New("username is too long")
// User represents a user of the webhooker service
//
//nolint:lll // a struct tag cannot wrap
type User struct {
BaseModel
Username string `gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null" json:"username"`
Password string `gorm:"not null" json:"-"` // Argon2 hashed
Username string `gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null;check:length(CAST(username AS BLOB)) <= 1024" json:"username"`
Password string `gorm:"not null" json:"-"` // Argon2 hashed
// Relations
Webhooks []Webhook `json:"webhooks,omitempty"`
APIKeys []APIKey `json:"apiKeys,omitempty"`
}
// BeforeSave rejects a username longer than MaxUsernameBytes when a whole
// User is created or saved, so those calls get ErrUsernameTooLong rather
// than the database's constraint error. A column update such as
// Update("username", ...) is caught only by the check constraint, as is
// any path that writes the table without this model.
func (u *User) BeforeSave(_ *gorm.DB) error {
if len(u.Username) > MaxUsernameBytes {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %d bytes, limit is %d",
ErrUsernameTooLong,
len(u.Username),
MaxUsernameBytes,
)
}
return nil
}
internal/database/model_user_test.go
+65
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
package database_test
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// usernameAtLimit is exactly MaxUsernameBytes long, built from a
// two-byte character. A check that counted characters rather than bytes
// would see half the length and let the one-byte-longer name through.
func usernameAtLimit() string {
return strings.Repeat("é", database.MaxUsernameBytes/2)
}
func TestUserCreate_RejectsOverlongUsername(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := startedTestDB(t)
err := db.Create(&database.User{
Username: usernameAtLimit() + "x",
Password: "hash",
}).Error
require.ErrorIs(t, err, database.ErrUsernameTooLong)
}
func TestUserCreate_AcceptsUsernameAtLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := startedTestDB(t)
require.NoError(t, db.Create(&database.User{
Username: usernameAtLimit(),
Password: "hash",
}).Error)
}
// TestUsersTable_EnforcesUsernameLimitWithoutTheModel inserts with raw
// SQL, as a path that bypassed User.BeforeSave would, so only the
// table's check constraint stands between it and an over-long
// username. Accepting the name at the limit and refusing the next byte
// also pins the constraint's number to MaxUsernameBytes.
func TestUsersTable_EnforcesUsernameLimitWithoutTheModel(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := startedTestDB(t)
insert := "INSERT INTO users (id, username, password) VALUES (?, ?, ?)"
require.NoError(t, db.Exec(
insert, uuid.New().String(), usernameAtLimit(), "hash",
).Error)
err := db.Exec(
insert, uuid.New().String(), usernameAtLimit()+"x", "hash",
).Error
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "CHECK constraint failed")
}
internal/database/model_webhook.go
+3 -2
View File
@@ -66,8 +66,9 @@ type Webhook struct {
// must equal DefaultRetentionDays.
RetentionDays int `gorm:"default:30" json:"retentionDays"`
// Relations
User User `json:"user,omitzero"`
// Relations. No model marshals the record it belongs to:
// User.Webhooks leads back here, and the JSON could loop.
User User `json:"-"`
Entrypoints []Entrypoint `json:"entrypoints,omitempty"`
Targets []Target `json:"targets,omitempty"`
}
internal/database/models.go
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ package database
// Migrate runs database migrations for the main application database.
// Only configuration-tier models are stored in the main database.
// Event-tier models (Event, Delivery, DeliveryResult) live in
// Event-tier models (Event, Delivery, DeliveryResult, EventTotals,
// TargetTotals) live in
// per-webhook dedicated databases managed by WebhookDBManager.
func (d *Database) Migrate() error {
return d.db.AutoMigrate(
internal/database/password.go
+22 -1
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"math/big"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
)
@@ -63,10 +64,30 @@ func DefaultPasswordConfig() *PasswordConfig {
}
}
// HashPassword generates an Argon2id hash of the password
// testArgon2Memory is the Argon2id memory cost, in KiB, that a test
// binary hashes with: 1 MB instead of the shipped 64 MB. Every test
// that starts a database hashes the bootstrap admin password, dozens
// of them run in parallel, and under the race detector each 64 MB hash
// holds about 150 MB. VerifyPassword reads the cost from the hash it
// checks, so verification follows.
const testArgon2Memory = 1024
// hashAtShippedCostInTest makes a test binary hash at the shipped
// memory cost. Only TestHashPassword_ShippedParameters sets it.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // set by one test, see above
var hashAtShippedCostInTest bool
// HashPassword generates an Argon2id hash of the password. A binary
// built by go test hashes at testArgon2Memory; one built by go build
// always hashes at the defaults.
func HashPassword(password string) (string, error) {
config := DefaultPasswordConfig()
if testing.Testing() && !hashAtShippedCostInTest {
config.Memory = testArgon2Memory
}
// Generate a salt
salt := make([]byte, config.SaltLen)
internal/database/password_test.go
+33
View File
@@ -192,6 +192,39 @@ func TestHashPasswordUniqueness(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestHashPassword_ShippedParameters hashes and verifies through
// HashPassword at the shipped Argon2id parameters. Every other test
// hashes at the lower memory cost a test binary uses, so this is the
// one that keeps production hashing covered. One hash and one
// verification: each costs 64 MB.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // changes the hashing cost for the whole binary
func TestHashPassword_ShippedParameters(t *testing.T) {
database.HashAtShippedCostForTest(t)
password := "correct horse battery staple"
hash, err := database.HashPassword(password)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("hashing with the shipped parameters: %v", err)
}
const shipped = "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=1,p=4$"
if !strings.HasPrefix(hash, shipped) {
t.Errorf("hash = %q, want prefix %q", hash, shipped)
}
valid, err := database.VerifyPassword(password, hash)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("VerifyPassword() error = %v", err)
}
if !valid {
t.Error("VerifyPassword() returned false for correct password")
}
}
// TestVerifyDummyPassword_DoesRealWork covers the anti-enumeration
// path. Login charges an unknown username a verification against a
// dummy hash so that a nonexistent account is not answered in
internal/database/retention.go
+124 -67
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,19 @@ import (
// computation.
const hoursPerDay = 24
// reapBatchSize is how many expired events one retention transaction
// deletes. A transaction holds the event database's write lock, which
// the receiver and the delivery workers wait for, so a large prune is
// split into transactions each short enough to finish well inside the
// busy timeout.
const reapBatchSize = 1000
// reapBatchPause is how long retention waits after one batch before
// starting the next. A writer waiting for the write lock checks for it
// again after at most 100 ms, so a longer pause lets it in between two
// batches instead of only after the whole prune.
const reapBatchPause = 200 * time.Millisecond
// RetentionReaperParams holds the fx dependencies for the
// RetentionReaper.
type RetentionReaperParams struct {
@@ -171,32 +184,31 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) sweep(ctx context.Context) {
wh := webhooks[i]
// Skip retain-forever webhooks before building any query.
// RetainsForever covers both the RetentionForeverDays
// sentinel and the non-positive values that predate it: the
// sentinel is a positive number, so without this the reaper
// would compute a cutoff a thousand years in the past and
// issue a DELETE matching nothing on every single sweep.
if wh.RetainsForever() {
continue
}
// Nothing to reap if the per-webhook database has never
// been created.
if !r.dbManager.DBExists(wh.ID) {
continue
}
r.reapWebhook(wh.ID, wh.RetentionDays)
r.reapWebhook(ctx, wh.ID, wh.RetentionDays)
}
}
// reapWebhook removes every expired event (and its dependents) from a
// single webhook's database.
// single webhook's database, or as many as it reaches before ctx is
// cancelled.
func (r *RetentionReaper) reapWebhook(
ctx context.Context,
webhookID string,
retentionDays int,
) {
// A retain-forever webhook has no cutoff, so its database is not
// even opened.
cutoff, ok := retentionCutoff(time.Now(), retentionDays)
if !ok {
return
}
db, err := r.dbManager.GetDB(webhookID)
if err != nil {
r.log.Error(
@@ -208,12 +220,7 @@ func (r *RetentionReaper) reapWebhook(
return
}
cutoff, ok := retentionCutoff(time.Now(), retentionDays)
if !ok {
return
}
deleted, err := reapExpired(db, cutoff)
deleted, err := reapExpired(ctx, db, cutoff)
if err != nil {
r.log.Error(
"retention sweep: failed to reap expired events",
@@ -265,57 +272,107 @@ func retentionCutoff(
), true
}
// reapExpired hard-deletes, in foreign-key-safe order, the delivery
// results, deliveries, and events associated with events older than
// cutoff. Deletes are unscoped so rows are physically removed rather
// than soft-deleted, reclaiming disk. It returns the number of events
// deleted.
func reapExpired(db *gorm.DB, cutoff time.Time) (int64, error) {
// Fresh subqueries are built per statement to avoid reusing a
// mutated builder across executions.
expiredEventIDs := func() *gorm.DB {
return db.Model(&Event{}).
Select("id").
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff)
}
expiredDeliveryIDs := func() *gorm.DB {
return db.Model(&Delivery{}).
Select("id").
Where("event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs())
}
// reapExpired hard-deletes the events older than cutoff, with their
// deliveries and delivery results, reapBatchSize events per
// transaction with reapBatchPause between transactions, until none is
// left. Once ctx is cancelled it returns after the batch in hand,
// leaving the rest to the next sweep, so stopping the app does not
// wait for a long prune. It returns the number of events deleted.
func reapExpired(
ctx context.Context, db *gorm.DB, cutoff time.Time,
) (int64, error) {
var total int64
// 1. Delivery results whose delivery belongs to an expired event.
res := db.Unscoped().
Where("delivery_id IN (?)", expiredDeliveryIDs()).
Delete(&DeliveryResult{})
if res.Error != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"deleting expired delivery results: %w",
res.Error,
)
}
for {
var eventIDs []string
// 2. Deliveries belonging to an expired event.
del := db.Unscoped().
Where("event_id IN (?)", expiredEventIDs()).
Delete(&Delivery{})
if del.Error != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"deleting expired deliveries: %w",
del.Error,
)
}
err := db.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
err := tx.Unscoped().Model(&Event{}).
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff).
Limit(reapBatchSize).
Pluck("id", &eventIDs).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("selecting expired events: %w", err)
}
// 3. The expired events themselves.
ev := db.Unscoped().
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff).
Delete(&Event{})
if ev.Error != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"deleting expired events: %w",
ev.Error,
)
}
if len(eventIDs) == 0 {
return nil
}
return ev.RowsAffected, nil
return deleteEvents(tx, eventIDs)
})
if err != nil {
return total, err
}
total += int64(len(eventIDs))
if len(eventIDs) < reapBatchSize {
return total, nil
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return total, nil
case <-time.After(reapBatchPause):
}
}
}
// deleteEvents hard-deletes the given events and, in foreign-key-safe
// order before them, their delivery results and deliveries, then adds
// what it deleted to the running totals. It runs on reapExpired's
// transaction, so the totals change exactly when the rows do. Deletes
// are unscoped so rows are physically removed rather than
// soft-deleted, reclaiming disk.
func deleteEvents(tx *gorm.DB, eventIDs []string) error {
// 1. The delivery results of the events' deliveries.
err := tx.Unscoped().
Where("delivery_id IN (?)", tx.Unscoped().Model(&Delivery{}).
Select("id").
Where("event_id IN ?", eventIDs)).
Delete(&DeliveryResult{}).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("deleting expired delivery results: %w", err)
}
// 2. The events' deliveries, after counting them, and the failed
// ones among them, per target. The status is tested in the select
// list rather than the WHERE clause: there, SQLite would read every
// failed delivery the webhook has through the status index,
// instead of only these through the event_id index.
var removed []TargetTotals
err = tx.Unscoped().Model(&Delivery{}).
Select("target_id, count(*) AS deliveries_removed, "+
"count(CASE WHEN status = ? THEN 1 END) AS failed_removed",
DeliveryStatusFailed).
Where("event_id IN ?", eventIDs).
Group("target_id").
Find(&removed).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("counting expired deliveries: %w", err)
}
err = tx.Unscoped().
Where("event_id IN ?", eventIDs).
Delete(&Delivery{}).Error
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("deleting expired deliveries: %w", err)
}
// 3. The events themselves.
ev := tx.Unscoped().Where("id IN ?", eventIDs).Delete(&Event{})
if ev.Error != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("deleting expired events: %w", ev.Error)
}
for i := range removed {
err = AddTargetTotals(tx, removed[i])
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
return AddEventTotals(tx, EventTotals{EventsRemoved: ev.RowsAffected})
}
internal/database/retention_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ func TestRetentionReaper_HugeFiniteRetentionRetainsRecentEvents(
t,
overflowingRetentionDays,
database.RetentionForeverDays,
"the test value must not be rescued by the forever skip",
"the test value must not be treated as retain-forever",
)
webhookID := createWebhook(
internal/database/sqlite_mode_test.go
+240
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
package database_test
import (
"context"
"io/fs"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
)
// ownerOnly is the mode every SQLite file the service owns must have.
// Spelled out rather than referencing database.SQLiteFilePerm so the
// test fails if the constant itself is loosened.
const ownerOnly fs.FileMode = 0o600
// requireOwnerOnly asserts that path exists and is readable and
// writable by its owner and by nobody else.
func requireOwnerOnly(t *testing.T, path string) {
t.Helper()
info, err := os.Stat(path)
require.NoError(t, err, "%s must exist", path)
assert.Equal(
t,
ownerOnly,
info.Mode().Perm(),
"%s holds credentials and must not be readable by "+
"anyone but its owner",
path,
)
}
// requireDatabaseSetOwnerOnly asserts the mode of a database file and
// of both WAL sidecars. The sidecars carry the same rows as the
// database, so tightening only the main file fixes nothing.
func requireDatabaseSetOwnerOnly(t *testing.T, dbPath string) {
t.Helper()
requireOwnerOnly(t, dbPath)
requireOwnerOnly(t, dbPath+"-wal")
requireOwnerOnly(t, dbPath+"-shm")
}
// TestMainDatabaseFilesAreOwnerOnly covers the tier the defect was
// reported against: webhooker.db holds targets.config in plaintext —
// bearer tokens, API keys, Slack webhook URLs — and the session
// encryption key.
func TestMainDatabaseFilesAreOwnerOnly(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
l, err := logger.New(lc, logger.LoggerParams{
Globals: &globals.Globals{
Appname: testAppname,
Version: testVersion,
},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
// A directory the application creates itself, not one t.TempDir
// made at 0700, so the mode below is the application's.
dataDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "data")
db, err := database.New(lc, database.DatabaseParams{
Config: &config.Config{DataDir: dataDir},
Logger: l,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
// Write through the real model so the WAL is populated and both
// sidecars are on disk while the handle is open.
require.NoError(t, db.DB().Create(&database.Webhook{
Name: testWebhookName,
}).Error)
requireDatabaseSetOwnerOnly(
t, filepath.Join(dataDir, database.MainDBFileName),
)
// The data directory grants nothing to `other`. Asserted as a
// property rather than as an exact 0750, because MkdirAll applies
// the ambient umask: the exact mode is the developer's umask as
// much as the application's request, and pinning it would make
// `make check` pass or fail on where it is run. The group bits are
// deliberately left unasserted — deployments may rely on them.
info, err := os.Stat(dataDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Zero(
t,
info.Mode().Perm()&0o007,
"the data directory must not be world-accessible",
)
}
// TestPerWebhookEventDatabaseFilesAreOwnerOnly covers the events-*.db
// tier. These carry no credential canaries since
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206, but they hold every
// received request body and header.
func TestPerWebhookEventDatabaseFilesAreOwnerOnly(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, db.Create(&database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: http.MethodPost,
Body: "{}",
}).Error)
requireDatabaseSetOwnerOnly(t, mgr.DBPath(webhookID))
}
// TestArchiveDatabaseFilesAreOwnerOnly covers the archive-*.db tier.
// internal/delivery builds that path and opens it through OpenSQLite,
// the same single open path exercised here, so the mode is settled for
// all three tiers in one place.
func TestArchiveDatabaseFilesAreOwnerOnly(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ctx := context.Background()
path := filepath.Join(
t.TempDir(), "archive-"+uuid.New().String()+".db",
)
sqlDB, err := database.OpenSQLite(path, database.SQLiteModeCreate)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, sqlDB.Close()) }()
_, err = sqlDB.ExecContext(ctx, "create table t (id integer)")
require.NoError(t, err)
requireDatabaseSetOwnerOnly(t, path)
}
// TestOpenSQLiteTightensFilesLeftWorldReadable is the upgrade case: a
// data directory an earlier build left at 0644, including a
// developer's own scratch directory, is fixed when it is opened rather
// than staying exposed until it is recreated.
func TestOpenSQLiteTightensFilesLeftWorldReadable(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, database.MainDBFileName)
// A database and both sidecars as the pre-fix build left them.
for _, p := range []string{path, path + "-wal", path + "-shm"} {
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(p, nil, 0o644)) //nolint:gosec // the mode under test
}
sqlDB, err := database.OpenSQLite(path, database.SQLiteModeCreate)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.Close())
requireDatabaseSetOwnerOnly(t, path)
}
// TestOpenSQLiteExistingModeDoesNotCreateTheFile guards the mechanism
// the fix uses: OpenSQLite now creates the database file itself, and
// must not do so for a caller that asked for an existing database. An
// empty file materialized here would turn a missing-database error
// into a silently empty one.
func TestOpenSQLiteExistingModeDoesNotCreateTheFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ctx := context.Background()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent.db")
sqlDB, err := database.OpenSQLite(path, database.SQLiteModeExisting)
if err == nil {
// sql.Open is lazy: force the connection that fails.
require.Error(t, sqlDB.PingContext(ctx))
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.Close())
}
_, statErr := os.Stat(path)
assert.ErrorIs(t, statErr, fs.ErrNotExist)
}
// TestReopenAfterRestartKeepsFilesOwnerOnly is the restart case: a
// process that closed its files must be able to open them again at
// 0600, including through a gorm handle, and the sidecars must come
// back at 0600 too rather than at SQLite's own default.
func TestReopenAfterRestartKeepsFilesOwnerOnly(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ctx := context.Background()
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, database.MainDBFileName)
first, err := database.OpenSQLite(path, database.SQLiteModeCreate)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = first.ExecContext(ctx, "create table t (id integer)")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, first.Close())
second, err := database.OpenSQLite(path, database.SQLiteModeCreate)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, second.Close()) }()
_, err = second.ExecContext(ctx, "insert into t (id) values (1)")
require.NoError(t, err)
requireDatabaseSetOwnerOnly(t, path)
var got int
require.NoError(t,
second.QueryRowContext(ctx, "select id from t").Scan(&got))
assert.Equal(t, 1, got)
}
internal/database/sqlite_open.go
+252
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
package database
import (
"database/sql"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"net/url"
"os"
"time"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite" // Pure Go SQLite driver
)
// Every SQLite file this service opens — the main database, the
// per-webhook event databases, and the archive databases — is opened
// through OpenSQLite, so the durability settings below are properties
// of the service rather than of one call site.
//
// modernc.org/sqlite installs no busy handler and issues no pragmas of
// its own: it executes only the pragmas named in explicit `_pragma=`
// DSN parameters, and gorm.io/driver/sqlite adds none when it is
// handed an existing *sql.DB. Every setting therefore has to be
// spelled out here or it is simply not in effect.
// SQLite URI open modes.
const (
// SQLiteModeCreate creates the database file when it is missing.
SQLiteModeCreate = "rwc"
// SQLiteModeExisting requires the file to exist already.
SQLiteModeExisting = "rw"
)
const (
// SQLiteBusyTimeout is how long SQLite retries a lock conflict
// before returning SQLITE_BUSY.
//
// Under WAL a reader never blocks a writer, so the only conflict
// left is writer against writer: this process's delivery workers
// against each other, or against another process holding the write
// lock. Those clear in milliseconds. Ten seconds is far above that
// and still well inside the receiver's request budget, so an
// inbound webhook waits rather than being rejected with a 500.
SQLiteBusyTimeout = 10 * time.Second
// sqliteMaxOpenConns bounds the connection pool for one database
// file.
//
// The pool needs a bound at all because database/sql cannot detect
// a connection left mid-transaction: modernc.org/sqlite implements
// neither driver.Validator nor driver.SessionResetter, so a
// connection whose COMMIT failed is returned to the pool with its
// transaction still open and handed out again indefinitely. That is
// what turned four `database is locked` errors into 593
// `cannot start a transaction within a transaction` in
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/256.
//
// Four is above the one writer SQLite allows at a time, so reads
// still proceed while a write is in flight, and low enough that
// contention is resolved by the busy handler rather than by piling
// up connections against a lock only one of them can hold.
sqliteMaxOpenConns = 4
// sqliteMaxIdleConns keeps the pool warm without holding every
// connection open through an idle period.
sqliteMaxIdleConns = 2
// sqliteConnMaxLifetime and sqliteConnMaxIdleTime retire pooled
// connections on a schedule. With _txlock=immediate a failed
// COMMIT should no longer be reachable, but these bound the damage
// if one happens anyway: a poisoned connection is closed and
// replaced within the lifetime instead of wedging the file until
// the process restarts.
sqliteConnMaxLifetime = 5 * time.Minute
sqliteConnMaxIdleTime = time.Minute
)
// SQLiteFilePerm is the mode every SQLite file this service owns is
// created with and held at: owner read/write, nothing for group or
// other.
//
// These files hold credentials in plaintext. The main database stores
// `targets.config` — bearer tokens, API keys, Slack webhook URLs — and
// the session encryption key. SQLite left to itself creates them 0644
// (see reserveSQLiteFile), which made the 0750 data directory the only
// barrier; a bind-mounted directory supplied at 0755 removes it and
// every local user on the host can read every stored credential.
//
// This is a file-mode fix and not encryption at rest. An unattended
// process needs a key it can read without a human, so the key lands
// beside the data and an attacker who can read the database can read
// it too. See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/212.
const SQLiteFilePerm fs.FileMode = 0o600
// reserveSQLiteFile puts path at SQLiteFilePerm before the driver ever
// touches it, and tightens any sidecar already on disk.
//
// The mode has to be settled here rather than by a chmod after opening,
// because SQLite picks it: robust_open substitutes
// SQLITE_DEFAULT_FILE_PERMISSIONS (0644) whenever it is handed mode 0,
// and findCreateFileMode yields 0 for a main database opened by URI
// with no `modeof` parameter. A chmod afterwards would leave a window
// in which the credentials are on disk world-readable.
//
// Creating the file ourselves also settles the sidecars, which is the
// half that could quietly not work. SQLite does not create those at a
// mode we choose — it derives both from the main database file:
// `-wal` through findCreateFileMode, which stats the path with the
// suffix stripped, and `-shm` in unixOpenSharedMemory from an fstat of
// the already-open database descriptor. A main file at 0600 therefore
// produces sidecars at 0600. A zero-length file is a valid empty
// database, so reserving it changes nothing else.
//
// create says whether the caller is opening in a mode that may create
// the database. When it is false a missing file is left missing, so
// SQLite still reports the absence rather than this function
// materializing an empty database the caller asked not to create.
//
// Chmod of a file that already exists is what tightens a data
// directory an earlier build left at 0644 — including a developer's
// own scratch directory — without any migration machinery.
func reserveSQLiteFile(path string, create bool) error {
if create {
// gosec G304: the path is the database file the caller asked
// to open, and the driver is about to open the same path
// anyway. Creating it here is what fixes its mode.
f, err := os.OpenFile( //nolint:gosec // see above
path, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE, SQLiteFilePerm,
)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("creating %s: %w", path, err)
}
err = f.Close()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("closing %s: %w", path, err)
}
}
// O_CREATE leaves an existing file's mode alone, and umask can only
// have narrowed a new one. Chmod settles both cases at exactly
// SQLiteFilePerm.
for _, p := range append(
[]string{path}, sqliteSidecarPaths(path)...,
) {
err := os.Chmod(p, SQLiteFilePerm)
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
return fmt.Errorf("securing %s: %w", p, err)
}
}
return nil
}
// sqliteSidecarPaths returns the files SQLite maintains beside a
// database under WAL. They carry the same rows as the database itself,
// so a fix that tightens only the main file has fixed nothing.
func sqliteSidecarPaths(path string) []string {
return []string{path + "-wal", path + "-shm"}
}
// SQLiteDSN builds the connection string for one database file.
//
// mode is the SQLite URI open mode: "rwc" to create the file when it
// is missing, "rw" to require that it already exists.
//
// Three settings carry the fix for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/256 and none of them is
// optional:
//
// - journal_mode=WAL, so a reader — an operator running
// `sqlite3 <db> .dump` over their own data — takes a snapshot
// instead of blocking every writer behind it.
//
// - busy_timeout, so a writer that does meet a lock waits for it.
// Without one SQLite gives up immediately; nothing above it
// retries.
//
// - _txlock=immediate, so every transaction takes the write lock at
// BEGIN. A deferred transaction acquires it lazily on its first
// write, and that upgrade returns SQLITE_BUSY *without* consulting
// the busy handler, because SQLite cannot block a transaction that
// may already hold a read snapshot. Such a COMMIT then fails while
// the transaction stays open on the connection. A busy timeout
// alone does not prevent this; BEGIN IMMEDIATE does, by putting
// the wait somewhere the handler applies.
//
// Note what is absent: `cache=shared`. Under a shared cache an
// in-process conflict is reported as SQLITE_LOCKED rather than
// SQLITE_BUSY, and the busy handler does not retry SQLITE_LOCKED — so
// leaving it in would have defeated the busy timeout for exactly the
// contention this service generates. Dropping it is part of the fix,
// not housekeeping.
//
// synchronous is deliberately left at SQLite's default of FULL: this
// is a webhook receiver whose one promise is that an event it answered
// 200 for is durable.
// The order of the _pragma parameters is load-bearing.
// modernc.org/sqlite executes them in the order they appear, on every
// new connection, before the connection is handed to the pool. Setting
// journal_mode first means that pragma itself runs with no busy
// handler installed: the pool opens connections lazily, so the moment
// a new one is created is a moment the database is under load, and
// PRAGMA journal_mode takes a lock. It would fail immediately with
// SQLITE_BUSY and fail the query that caused the connection to be
// opened. busy_timeout is therefore set first, so every pragma after
// it — and the whole life of the connection — is covered.
func SQLiteDSN(path, mode string) string {
q := url.Values{}
q.Set("mode", mode)
q.Set("_txlock", "immediate")
q.Add(
"_pragma",
fmt.Sprintf(
"busy_timeout(%d)",
SQLiteBusyTimeout.Milliseconds(),
),
)
q.Add("_pragma", "journal_mode(WAL)")
return "file:" + path + "?" + q.Encode()
}
// OpenSQLite opens the SQLite file at path with the service's
// durability settings and pool bounds applied. mode is the SQLite URI
// open mode ("rwc" or "rw").
//
// The file and its WAL sidecars are settled at SQLiteFilePerm before
// the driver sees the path; see reserveSQLiteFile.
//
// The handle is returned rather than a *gorm.DB because the callers
// wrap it in gorm themselves with their own logger.
func OpenSQLite(path, mode string) (*sql.DB, error) {
err := reserveSQLiteFile(path, mode == SQLiteModeCreate)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", SQLiteDSN(path, mode))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"opening sqlite database %s: %w", path, err,
)
}
sqlDB.SetMaxOpenConns(sqliteMaxOpenConns)
sqlDB.SetMaxIdleConns(sqliteMaxIdleConns)
sqlDB.SetConnMaxLifetime(sqliteConnMaxLifetime)
sqlDB.SetConnMaxIdleTime(sqliteConnMaxIdleTime)
return sqlDB, nil
}
internal/database/sqlite_open_test.go
+178
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
package database_test
import (
"context"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// livePragma reads a pragma off a live handle. Reading the DSN back
// would prove only that the string was built; these tests assert that
// SQLite actually applied it.
func livePragma(t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB, name string) string {
t.Helper()
var v string
row := db.Raw("pragma " + name).Row()
require.NoError(t, row.Scan(&v))
return v
}
func TestSQLiteDSNCarriesTheDurabilitySettings(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dsn := database.SQLiteDSN(
"/var/lib/webhooker/webhooker.db",
database.SQLiteModeCreate,
)
assert.Contains(t, dsn, "journal_mode%28WAL%29")
assert.Contains(t, dsn, "busy_timeout%2810000%29")
assert.Contains(t, dsn, "_txlock=immediate")
assert.Contains(t, dsn, "mode=rwc")
// busy_timeout must come first. The driver runs these in order on
// every new connection, and PRAGMA journal_mode takes a lock — a
// connection opened while the database is busy would fail on that
// pragma, with no busy handler yet installed to wait it out.
assert.Less(
t,
strings.Index(dsn, "busy_timeout"),
strings.Index(dsn, "journal_mode"),
"busy_timeout must be applied before journal_mode",
)
// cache=shared turns an in-process conflict into SQLITE_LOCKED,
// which the busy handler does not retry. It must never come back.
// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/256.
assert.NotContains(t, strings.ToLower(dsn), "cache=shared")
}
// TestPerWebhookDBAppliesPragmasOnALiveHandle is the check the issue
// asks for by name: the settings are confirmed by querying the running
// database, not by inspecting the connection string.
func TestPerWebhookDBAppliesPragmasOnALiveHandle(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(
t, "wal",
strings.ToLower(livePragma(t, db, "journal_mode")),
)
assert.Equal(
t, "10000", livePragma(t, db, "busy_timeout"),
)
}
func TestMainDBAppliesPragmasOnALiveHandle(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ctx := context.Background()
dir := t.TempDir()
sqlDB, err := database.OpenSQLite(
filepath.Join(dir, database.MainDBFileName),
database.SQLiteModeCreate,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, sqlDB.Close()) }()
var journal string
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.
QueryRowContext(ctx, "pragma journal_mode").
Scan(&journal))
assert.Equal(t, "wal", strings.ToLower(journal))
var busy string
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.
QueryRowContext(ctx, "pragma busy_timeout").
Scan(&busy))
assert.Equal(t, "10000", busy)
}
// TestConcurrentReaderDoesNotBlockWrites is the unit-scale form of the
// reproduction in
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/256: an operator's
// long-held read of their own data used to make every concurrent write
// fail. Under WAL the reader takes a snapshot and the writes proceed.
func TestConcurrentReaderDoesNotBlockWrites(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
// A second handle on the same file, holding a read transaction
// open across every write below — what `sqlite3 <db> .dump` is.
readerSQL, err := database.OpenSQLite(
mgr.DBPath(webhookID), database.SQLiteModeExisting,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, readerSQL.Close()) }()
readerConn, err := readerSQL.Conn(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, readerConn.Close()) }()
_, err = readerConn.ExecContext(ctx, "begin deferred")
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = readerConn.ExecContext(
ctx, "select count(*) from events",
)
require.NoError(t, err)
for range 25 {
err = db.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
return tx.Create(&database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: "POST",
Body: "{}",
}).Error
})
require.NoError(t, err)
}
_, err = readerConn.ExecContext(ctx, "commit")
require.NoError(t, err)
var count int64
require.NoError(
t,
db.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&count).Error,
)
assert.Equal(t, int64(25), count)
}
internal/database/testing.go
+16 -3
View File
@@ -24,11 +24,24 @@ func NewTestDatabase(db *gorm.DB) *Database {
// NewTestWebhookDBManager creates a WebhookDBManager backed by the given
// data directory. Intended for use in tests without the fx lifecycle.
func NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir string) *WebhookDBManager {
return &WebhookDBManager{
dataDir: dataDir,
log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
return NewTestWebhookDBManagerWithLogger(
dataDir,
slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
os.Stderr,
&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
)),
)
}
// NewTestWebhookDBManagerWithLogger is NewTestWebhookDBManager with the
// logger supplied by the caller. The per-webhook databases this manager
// opens hand that logger to gormlog, so a test that needs to see the SQL
// the service emits can capture it.
func NewTestWebhookDBManagerWithLogger(
dataDir string, log *slog.Logger,
) *WebhookDBManager {
return &WebhookDBManager{
dataDir: dataDir,
log: log,
}
}
internal/database/totals_test.go
+417
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
package database_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// readEventTotals reads a webhook database's row of event totals,
// asserting that it has exactly one.
func readEventTotals(t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB) database.EventTotals {
t.Helper()
var rows []database.EventTotals
require.NoError(t, db.Find(&rows).Error)
require.Len(t, rows, 1)
return rows[0]
}
// readTargetTotals reads a webhook database's target totals, keyed by
// target.
func readTargetTotals(
t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB,
) map[string]database.TargetTotals {
t.Helper()
var rows []database.TargetTotals
require.NoError(t, db.Find(&rows).Error)
byTarget := make(map[string]database.TargetTotals, len(rows))
for _, row := range rows {
byTarget[row.TargetID] = row
}
return byTarget
}
// TestWebhookDBManager_TotalsSurviveReopen verifies that a new event
// database starts with one row of zero event totals and no target
// totals, that adding to a target twice adds to the one row, and that
// opening the database again keeps everything added.
func TestWebhookDBManager_TotalsSurviveReopen(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
db, err := mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
fresh := readEventTotals(t, db)
assert.Equal(t, database.EventTotals{ID: fresh.ID}, fresh)
assert.Empty(t, readTargetTotals(t, db))
first, second := uuid.New().String(), uuid.New().String()
require.NoError(t, database.AddEventTotals(db, database.EventTotals{
Events: 2,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: first, Deliveries: 2, Delivered: 1,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: first, Failed: 1,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: second, Deliveries: 1,
}))
// Drop the cached connection so the next open reopens the file,
// as a restart would.
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
db, err = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, database.EventTotals{ID: fresh.ID, Events: 2},
readEventTotals(t, db))
assert.Equal(t, map[string]database.TargetTotals{
first: {
TargetID: first, Deliveries: 2, Delivered: 1, Failed: 1,
},
second: {TargetID: second, Deliveries: 1},
}, readTargetTotals(t, db))
}
// seedExpiredEvents stores count events created at the given time,
// each with a delivered delivery to one target and a failed delivery
// to the other, and one attempt for each delivery.
//
// It and seedBareEvents insert 50 rows per statement, not more. The
// SQLite driver looks up each parameter's value by scanning the
// statement's arguments from the first until it reaches that
// parameter's, so the time to bind a statement grows with the square of
// its parameter count: at 500 rows, several thousand parameters, the
// seeding took most of these tests' time under -race.
func seedExpiredEvents(
t *testing.T,
db *gorm.DB,
webhookID string,
count int,
createdAt time.Time,
delivered, failed string,
) {
t.Helper()
events := make([]database.Event, count)
deliveries := make([]database.Delivery, 0, 2*count)
for i := range events {
events[i] = database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: http.MethodPost,
}
events[i].ID = uuid.New().String()
events[i].CreatedAt = createdAt
deliveries = append(deliveries,
database.Delivery{
EventID: events[i].ID,
TargetID: delivered,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
},
database.Delivery{
EventID: events[i].ID,
TargetID: failed,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
},
)
}
require.NoError(t, db.CreateInBatches(events, 50).Error)
require.NoError(t, db.CreateInBatches(deliveries, 50).Error)
results := make([]database.DeliveryResult, len(deliveries))
for i := range deliveries {
results[i] = database.DeliveryResult{
DeliveryID: deliveries[i].ID, AttemptNum: 1,
}
}
require.NoError(t, db.CreateInBatches(results, 50).Error)
}
// seedBareEvents stores count events created at the given time, with
// no deliveries.
func seedBareEvents(
t *testing.T,
db *gorm.DB,
webhookID string,
count int,
createdAt time.Time,
) {
t.Helper()
events := make([]database.Event, count)
for i := range events {
events[i] = database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: http.MethodPost,
}
events[i].CreatedAt = createdAt
}
require.NoError(t, db.CreateInBatches(events, 50).Error)
}
// TestRetentionReaper_PrunesMoreThanOneBatch verifies that a prune
// larger than one transaction's batch removes every expired event with
// its deliveries and delivery results, keeps the recent event, and
// adds what it removed to the event and target totals, so the totals
// within retention match the rows still stored.
func TestRetentionReaper_PrunesMoreThanOneBatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
webhookID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 30)
db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
expired := database.ExportReapBatchSize + 1
delivered, failed := uuid.New().String(), uuid.New().String()
seedExpiredEvents(t, db, webhookID, expired,
time.Now().Add(-40*24*time.Hour), delivered, failed)
// One recent event, delivered to the first target.
recent := seedEventChain(t, db, webhookID, time.Now())
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("id = ?", recent.deliveryID).
Update("target_id", delivered).Error)
// The totals storing those rows would have left.
n := int64(expired)
require.NoError(t, database.AddEventTotals(db, database.EventTotals{
Events: n + 1,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: delivered, Deliveries: n + 1, Delivered: n + 1,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: failed, Deliveries: n, Failed: n,
}))
env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
// Only the recent event's rows are left.
for _, model := range []any{
&database.Event{}, &database.Delivery{}, &database.DeliveryResult{},
} {
var count int64
require.NoError(t, db.Model(model).Count(&count).Error)
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), count, "%T rows left", model)
}
assertChainPresent(t, db, recent)
eventTotals := readEventTotals(t, db)
assert.Equal(t, database.EventTotals{
ID: eventTotals.ID, Events: n + 1, EventsRemoved: n,
}, eventTotals)
targetTotals := readTargetTotals(t, db)
assert.Equal(t, map[string]database.TargetTotals{
delivered: {
TargetID: delivered, Deliveries: n + 1, Delivered: n + 1,
DeliveriesRemoved: n,
},
failed: {
TargetID: failed, Deliveries: n, Failed: n,
DeliveriesRemoved: n, FailedRemoved: n,
},
}, targetTotals)
// A sweep with nothing left to remove changes nothing.
env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.Equal(t, eventTotals, readEventTotals(t, db))
assert.Equal(t, targetTotals, readTargetTotals(t, db))
}
// TestRetentionReaper_WriteDuringPruneSucceeds verifies that a prune
// of several batches lets other writers in between its batches: an
// event stored once the first batch is deleted is stored while expired
// events are still left, not only after the prune has finished.
func TestRetentionReaper_WriteDuringPruneSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
webhookID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 30)
db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Three batches of expired events, with nothing else stored: only
// the number of batches matters here.
expired := 3 * database.ExportReapBatchSize
seedBareEvents(t, db, webhookID, expired,
time.Now().Add(-40*24*time.Hour))
cutoff := time.Now().Add(-30 * 24 * time.Hour)
countExpired := func() int64 {
var count int64
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Event{}).
Where("created_at < ?", cutoff).
Count(&count).Error)
return count
}
pruned := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(pruned)
env.reaper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
}()
t.Cleanup(func() { <-pruned })
// Every stored event is expired until the write below.
require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
var count int64
err := db.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&count).Error
return err == nil && count < int64(expired)
}, 10*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond)
event := &database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: http.MethodPost,
}
require.NoError(t, db.Create(event).Error)
assert.Positive(t, countExpired(),
"the event was stored only after the whole prune")
<-pruned
assert.Zero(t, countExpired())
var stored database.Event
require.NoError(t, db.First(&stored, "id = ?", event.ID).Error)
}
// TestRetentionReaper_StopDuringPruneLeavesTheRest verifies that
// stopping the reaper during a prune of several batches returns
// between two batches, well inside the stop timeout, leaving the
// remaining expired events for the next sweep, and that the totals
// match the rows left.
func TestRetentionReaper_StopDuringPruneLeavesTheRest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupRetentionTest(t)
webhookID := createWebhook(t, env.mainDB.DB(), 30)
db, err := env.mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Two batches and one more of expired events, a few of them with a
// delivered and a failed delivery for the target totals to count.
// Most carry nothing else, to keep the test quick.
const withDeliveries = 10
expiredAt := time.Now().Add(-40 * 24 * time.Hour)
delivered, failed := uuid.New().String(), uuid.New().String()
seedExpiredEvents(t, db, webhookID, withDeliveries, expiredAt,
delivered, failed)
seedBareEvents(t, db, webhookID,
2*database.ExportReapBatchSize+1-withDeliveries, expiredAt)
n := int64(2*database.ExportReapBatchSize + 1)
require.NoError(t, database.AddEventTotals(db, database.EventTotals{
Events: n,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: delivered, Deliveries: withDeliveries,
Delivered: withDeliveries,
}))
require.NoError(t, database.AddTargetTotals(db, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: failed, Deliveries: withDeliveries,
Failed: withDeliveries,
}))
env.reaper.ExportSetInterval(time.Millisecond)
env.reaper.ExportStart()
// Stop once the first batch is deleted. The stop lands in the pause
// after it, or at worst during the second batch, so at least the
// last event is left.
require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
var count int64
err := db.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&count).Error
return err == nil && count < n
}, 10*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond)
// The app's stop timeout.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
require.NoError(t, env.reaper.ExportStop(ctx))
var events int64
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Event{}).Count(&events).Error)
assert.Positive(t, events, "the stop waited for the whole prune")
eventTotals := readEventTotals(t, db)
assert.Equal(t, events, eventTotals.Events-eventTotals.EventsRemoved)
targetTotals := readTargetTotals(t, db)
require.Len(t, targetTotals, 2)
for target, totals := range targetTotals {
var deliveries, failures int64
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("target_id = ?", target).
Count(&deliveries).Error)
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("target_id = ? AND status = ?",
target, database.DeliveryStatusFailed).
Count(&failures).Error)
assert.Equal(t, deliveries,
totals.Deliveries-totals.DeliveriesRemoved, target)
assert.Equal(t, failures, totals.Failed-totals.FailedRemoved,
target)
}
}
internal/database/webhook_db_manager.go
+124 -46
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package database
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
@@ -14,6 +13,7 @@ import (
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/logger"
)
@@ -33,14 +33,33 @@ var errInvalidCachedDBType = errors.New(
"invalid cached database type",
)
// ErrEventDBNotRemoved is in DeleteDB's error when the event
// database file itself could not be removed: it is still on disk.
var ErrEventDBNotRemoved = errors.New(
"event database file not removed",
)
// ErrSidecarNotRemoved is in DeleteDB's error when the event
// database file was removed, so its events are gone, but its -wal
// or -shm sidecar could not be.
var ErrSidecarNotRemoved = errors.New(
"event database file removed, but a -wal or -shm sidecar was not",
)
// WebhookDBManager manages per-webhook SQLite database files
// for event storage. Each webhook gets its own dedicated
// database containing Events, Deliveries, and DeliveryResults.
// database containing Events, Deliveries, DeliveryResults and the
// running totals of them (EventTotals, TargetTotals).
// Database connections are opened lazily and cached.
type WebhookDBManager struct {
dataDir string
dbs sync.Map // map[webhookID]*gorm.DB
log *slog.Logger
// mu is held while a database is opened, deleted, or closed, so
// each file has at most one open handle. Reading an already cached
// handle does not take it.
mu sync.Mutex
}
// NewWebhookDBManager creates a new WebhookDBManager and
@@ -54,8 +73,9 @@ func NewWebhookDBManager(
log: params.Logger.Get(),
}
// Create data directory if it doesn't exist
err := os.MkdirAll(m.dataDir, dataDirPerm)
// Create data directory if it doesn't exist. datadir.DirPerm is the
// single source of the directory mode; either package may run first.
err := os.MkdirAll(m.dataDir, datadir.DirPerm)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"creating data directory %s: %w",
@@ -85,43 +105,39 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) GetDB(
) (*gorm.DB, error) {
// Fast path: already open
if val, ok := m.dbs.Load(webhookID); ok {
cachedDB, castOK := val.(*gorm.DB)
if !castOK {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"%w for webhook %s",
errInvalidCachedDBType,
webhookID,
)
}
return asGormDB(val, webhookID)
}
return cachedDB, nil
// Slow path: open the database under the lock, looking in the
// cache again first. A caller that raced another one here then
// waits for its handle instead of opening a second one.
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
if val, ok := m.dbs.Load(webhookID); ok {
return asGormDB(val, webhookID)
}
// Slow path: open/create the database
db, err := m.openDB(webhookID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Store it; if another goroutine beat us, close ours
actual, loaded := m.dbs.LoadOrStore(webhookID, db)
if loaded {
// Another goroutine created it first; close our duplicate
sqlDB, closeErr := db.DB()
if closeErr == nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
}
m.dbs.Store(webhookID, db)
existingDB, castOK := actual.(*gorm.DB)
if !castOK {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"%w for webhook %s",
errInvalidCachedDBType,
webhookID,
)
}
return db, nil
}
return existingDB, nil
// asGormDB returns a value read from the cache as the database
// handle it is.
func asGormDB(val any, webhookID string) (*gorm.DB, error) {
db, ok := val.(*gorm.DB)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"%w for webhook %s",
errInvalidCachedDBType,
webhookID,
)
}
return db, nil
@@ -148,10 +164,18 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) DBExists(
}
// DeleteDB closes the connection and deletes the database file
// for a webhook. The file is permanently removed.
// for a webhook, with its -wal and -shm sidecars. The files are
// permanently removed. Each file is tried even when another could
// not be removed, and the error wraps ErrEventDBNotRemoved or
// ErrSidecarNotRemoved to say which was left, naming each file.
func (m *WebhookDBManager) DeleteDB(
webhookID string,
) error {
// Held until the files are gone, so GetDB cannot open the file
// again between the close and the removal.
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
// Close and remove from cache
if val, ok := m.dbs.LoadAndDelete(webhookID); ok {
if gormDB, castOK := val.(*gorm.DB); castOK {
@@ -162,16 +186,23 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) DeleteDB(
}
}
// Delete the main DB file and WAL/SHM files
path := m.dbPath(webhookID)
for _, suffix := range []string{"", "-wal", "-shm"} {
err := os.Remove(path + suffix)
if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"deleting webhook database file %s%s: %w",
path, suffix, err,
)
}
dbErr := removeFile(path)
sidecarErr := errors.Join(
removeFile(path+"-wal"),
removeFile(path+"-shm"),
)
if dbErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %w",
ErrEventDBNotRemoved, errors.Join(dbErr, sidecarErr),
)
}
if sidecarErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrSidecarNotRemoved, sidecarErr)
}
m.log.Info(
@@ -182,9 +213,25 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) DeleteDB(
return nil
}
// removeFile removes path. A file that is already gone counts as
// removed; the error from any other failure names the file.
func removeFile(path string) error {
err := os.Remove(path)
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return nil
}
return err
}
// CloseAll closes all open per-webhook database connections.
// Called during application shutdown.
func (m *WebhookDBManager) CloseAll() error {
// An open already under way finishes and is cached first, so it
// is closed here rather than cached after this loop has passed.
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
var lastErr error
m.dbs.Range(func(key, value any) bool {
@@ -234,12 +281,11 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) openDB(
webhookID string,
) (*gorm.DB, error) {
path := m.dbPath(webhookID)
dbURL := fmt.Sprintf(
"file:%s?cache=shared&mode=rwc",
path,
)
sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dbURL)
// See sqlite_open.go: WAL, a busy timeout, immediate-transaction
// locking, and a bounded pool, all of which this file needs most —
// it is the one every delivery worker writes to concurrently.
sqlDB, err := OpenSQLite(path, SQLiteModeCreate)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"opening webhook database %s: %w",
@@ -262,9 +308,29 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) openDB(
)
}
// Keep main-database rows out of this file. See
// event_db_isolation.go.
err = omitAssociations(db)
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"guarding webhook database %s: %w",
webhookID, err,
)
}
err = purgeTargetRows(db, m.log, webhookID)
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
return nil, err
}
// Run migrations for event-tier models only
err = db.AutoMigrate(
&Event{}, &Delivery{}, &DeliveryResult{},
&EventTotals{}, &TargetTotals{},
)
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
@@ -275,6 +341,18 @@ func (m *WebhookDBManager) openDB(
)
}
// A new database gets its row of event totals, all zero. Target
// totals rows are created by the first delivery to each target.
err = db.FirstOrCreate(&EventTotals{}).Error
if err != nil {
_ = sqlDB.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"creating event totals for webhook database %s: %w",
webhookID, err,
)
}
m.log.Info(
"opened per-webhook database",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
internal/database/webhook_db_manager_test.go
+129 -3
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
package database_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
@@ -104,6 +108,54 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_CreateAndGetDB(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, `{"test": true}`, readEvent.Body)
}
// Many callers ask for one webhook's database at the same moment,
// before it is cached. Only one of them may open the file; the others
// must wait for its handle. openDB logs one "opened per-webhook
// database" line per open, and those lines are what is counted.
func TestWebhookDBManager_ConcurrentFirstTouchOpensOnce(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var logs bytes.Buffer
mgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManagerWithLogger(
t.TempDir(),
slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(&logs, nil)),
)
t.Cleanup(func() { assert.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll()) })
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
const callers = 16
start := make(chan struct{})
handles := make([]*gorm.DB, callers)
errs := make([]error, callers)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for i := range callers {
wg.Go(func() {
<-start
handles[i], errs[i] = mgr.GetDB(webhookID)
})
}
close(start)
wg.Wait()
for i := range callers {
require.NoError(t, errs[i])
assert.Same(t, handles[0], handles[i])
}
assert.Equal(
t, 1,
strings.Count(logs.String(), "opened per-webhook database"),
)
}
func TestWebhookDBManager_DeleteDB(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -130,17 +182,91 @@ func TestWebhookDBManager_DeleteDB(t *testing.T) {
}
require.NoError(t, db.Create(event).Error)
// Under WAL, an open database that has been written to has both
// sidecars beside it.
dbPath := mgr.DBPath(webhookID)
require.FileExists(t, dbPath+"-wal")
require.FileExists(t, dbPath+"-shm")
// Delete the DB
require.NoError(t, mgr.DeleteDB(webhookID))
// File should no longer exist
assert.False(t, mgr.DBExists(webhookID))
// Verify the file is actually gone from disk
// Verify the files are actually gone from disk
assert.NoFileExists(t, dbPath)
assert.NoFileExists(t, dbPath+"-wal")
assert.NoFileExists(t, dbPath+"-shm")
}
// blockRemoval puts a non-empty directory at path, which os.Remove
// cannot remove whoever runs the test, root included.
func blockRemoval(t *testing.T, path string) {
t.Helper()
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(path, "keep"), 0o700))
}
// TestWebhookDBManager_DeleteDBKeepsDatabaseFile proves that when the
// event database file cannot be removed, the error says so, and both
// sidecars are still removed.
func TestWebhookDBManager_DeleteDBKeepsDatabaseFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
dbPath := mgr.DBPath(webhookID)
_, err = os.Stat(dbPath)
assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(err))
blockRemoval(t, dbPath)
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(dbPath+"-wal", nil, 0o600))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(dbPath+"-shm", nil, 0o600))
err := mgr.DeleteDB(webhookID)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, database.ErrEventDBNotRemoved)
require.NotErrorIs(t, err, database.ErrSidecarNotRemoved)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), dbPath)
assert.NoFileExists(t, dbPath+"-wal")
assert.NoFileExists(t, dbPath+"-shm")
}
// TestWebhookDBManager_DeleteDBKeepsSidecar proves that when the
// event database file is removed but a sidecar is not, the error
// says the database file is gone, and the other sidecar is still
// removed.
func TestWebhookDBManager_DeleteDBKeepsSidecar(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mgr, lc := setupTestWebhookDBManager(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, lc.Start(ctx))
defer func() { require.NoError(t, lc.Stop(ctx)) }()
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
dbPath := mgr.DBPath(webhookID)
require.NoError(t, mgr.CreateDB(webhookID))
// Closing removes the sidecars, so the ones below are the only
// ones there.
require.NoError(t, mgr.CloseAll())
blockRemoval(t, dbPath+"-wal")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(dbPath+"-shm", nil, 0o600))
err := mgr.DeleteDB(webhookID)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, database.ErrSidecarNotRemoved)
require.NotErrorIs(t, err, database.ErrEventDBNotRemoved)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), dbPath+"-wal")
assert.NoFileExists(t, dbPath)
assert.NoFileExists(t, dbPath+"-shm")
}
func TestWebhookDBManager_LazyCreation(t *testing.T) {
internal/datadir/lock.go
+128
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
// Package datadir guards exclusive access to the directory holding
// every SQLite database webhooker writes.
//
// Two processes sharing a DATA_DIR each open the same per-webhook
// event databases and each run delivery recovery over the same rows,
// so every pending delivery goes out twice. SQLite's own locking does
// not prevent that: both writers are serialised correctly and both
// deliver. The only thing that prevents it is refusing to be the
// second process.
//
// The lock lives here rather than in the server's fx graph so that any
// entry point which touches DATA_DIR — the server, or a CLI
// subcommand that must not operate on a live deployment's data — takes
// it the same way.
package datadir
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"github.com/gofrs/flock"
)
// LockFileName is the advisory lock file created inside DATA_DIR. Its
// contents are never read: the lock is the flock(2) held on the open
// descriptor, not the file's existence, so a leftover file from a
// process that was killed with SIGKILL blocks nothing.
const LockFileName = "webhooker.lock"
// DirPerm is the mode DATA_DIR is created with. It is the single
// source of that mode: internal/database consumes it rather than
// keeping its own copy, so the two packages that both create the
// directory cannot drift into disagreeing about its permissions.
const DirPerm = 0o750
// ErrLocked reports that another live process holds the data
// directory. Callers that need to know whether a deployment is running
// — rather than merely failing to start — test for this with
// errors.Is.
var ErrLocked = errors.New(
"data directory is already in use by another instance",
)
// ErrNoDir reports that Acquire was given an empty directory.
var ErrNoDir = errors.New("no data directory given")
// Lock is a held exclusive advisory lock on a data directory. It is
// valid only while the process that took it lives: the kernel drops it
// when the descriptor closes, whether that is Release, a normal exit,
// or a SIGKILL.
type Lock struct {
dir string
file *flock.Flock
}
// Acquire takes the exclusive advisory lock on dir, creating dir if it
// does not exist. It never waits: if another process holds the lock it
// returns an error wrapping ErrLocked and naming dir.
//
// The returned Lock must be held for as long as the caller intends to
// use dir.
func Acquire(dir string) (*Lock, error) {
if dir == "" {
return nil, ErrNoDir
}
err := os.MkdirAll(dir, DirPerm)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"creating data directory %s: %w", dir, err,
)
}
path := filepath.Join(dir, LockFileName)
fl := flock.New(path)
held, err := fl.TryLock()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"locking data directory %s: %w", dir, err,
)
}
if !held {
// A no-op on flock v0.13.0, which closes its own descriptor on
// a failed TryLock; kept so no version can leak one.
_ = fl.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s (%s). Only one webhooker may use a data "+
"directory: two both run delivery recovery over the "+
"same rows and both deliver",
ErrLocked, dir, path,
)
}
return &Lock{dir: dir, file: fl}, nil
}
// Dir returns the locked directory.
func (l *Lock) Dir() string {
return l.dir
}
// Path returns the lock file backing the lock.
func (l *Lock) Path() string {
return l.file.Path()
}
// Release drops the lock and closes the descriptor. It is safe to call
// more than once.
//
// The lock file is deliberately left on disk. Unlinking it would let
// the next process create and lock a fresh inode while a third still
// holds the old one, which is the one outcome this package exists to
// prevent.
func (l *Lock) Release() error {
err := l.file.Unlock()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"releasing lock on data directory %s: %w", l.dir, err,
)
}
return nil
}
internal/datadir/lock_test.go
+250
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
package datadir_test
import (
"bufio"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/datadir"
)
// holderEnv names the directory the re-executed test binary should
// lock and hold. When it is unset the child test does nothing, so an
// ordinary run is unaffected.
const holderEnv = "WEBHOOKER_DATADIR_LOCK_HOLDER"
// holderReadyPrefix labels the child's one-line report that it holds
// the lock, so the parent can find it among the testing package's own
// output on the same descriptor.
const holderReadyPrefix = "DATADIR-LOCK-HELD "
// holderReadyTimeout bounds the wait for the child to take the lock.
// It only has to cover process start on a loaded shared host.
const holderReadyTimeout = 60 * time.Second
// holderHold is how long the child keeps the lock if nothing kills it.
// A sleep rather than a bare block, so the runtime's deadlock detector
// has a pending timer and the child cannot outlive a killed test run
// by more than this.
const holderHold = 10 * time.Minute
// TestLockHolder is the child half of the two-process tests below. It
// takes the lock on the directory named by holderEnv, reports the lock
// file on standard output, and then holds it until it is killed.
func TestLockHolder(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := os.Getenv(holderEnv)
if dir == "" {
return
}
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Written to the descriptor directly: the parent reads fd 1, not
// the testing package's buffered report.
_, err = fmt.Fprintf(
os.Stdout, "%s%s\n", holderReadyPrefix, lock.Path(),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
time.Sleep(holderHold)
}
// startHolder re-executes this test binary as a separate process that
// takes and holds the lock on dir, and returns once that process
// actually holds it. The child is killed when the test ends.
func startHolder(t *testing.T, dir string) *exec.Cmd {
t.Helper()
//nolint:gosec // Re-executing this test binary, with a fixed arg.
cmd := exec.CommandContext(
t.Context(), os.Args[0], "-test.run", "^TestLockHolder$",
)
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), holderEnv+"="+dir)
cmd.Stderr = os.Stderr
stdout, err := cmd.StdoutPipe()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, cmd.Start())
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
_ = cmd.Wait()
})
ready := make(chan string, 1)
go func() {
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(stdout)
for scanner.Scan() {
after, found := strings.CutPrefix(
scanner.Text(), holderReadyPrefix,
)
if found {
ready <- after
break
}
}
close(ready)
// Keep draining so the child never blocks on a full pipe.
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, stdout)
}()
select {
case path, ok := <-ready:
require.True(
t, ok, "holder exited without taking the lock",
)
require.Equal(t, filepath.Join(dir, datadir.LockFileName), path)
case <-time.After(holderReadyTimeout):
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for the holder to take the lock")
}
return cmd
}
// TestSecondInstanceRefused is the regression test for the duplicate
// delivery this package exists to prevent: a real second process
// pointed at a data directory a live process already holds must be
// refused, with an error that names the directory.
func TestSecondInstanceRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
startHolder(t, dir)
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.Error(t, err, "the second instance took the lock too")
require.Nil(t, lock)
require.ErrorIs(
t, err, datadir.ErrLocked,
"the refusal must be distinguishable from any other failure",
)
assert.Contains(
t, err.Error(), dir,
"the refusal must name the directory it is about",
)
}
// TestRestartAfterHardKill is the other half of the regression: a
// process killed with SIGKILL runs no cleanup and leaves its lock file
// behind, and the next start must not be blocked by it. This is what a
// pidfile would get wrong; the kernel drops a flock when the
// descriptor closes, however the process died.
func TestRestartAfterHardKill(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
holder := startHolder(t, dir)
require.NoError(t, holder.Process.Kill())
// Wait for the kill to have actually happened. Re-acquiring while
// the corpse still holds a descriptor would be a race, and would
// make this test pass or fail on scheduling.
_ = holder.Wait()
require.FileExists(
t, filepath.Join(dir, datadir.LockFileName),
"the stale lock file is what must not block the restart",
)
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(
t, err, "a hard-killed instance must not block the next start",
)
require.NoError(t, lock.Release())
}
// TestSecondFdInSameProcessRefused pins the flock(2) property the
// tests in cmd/webhooker rely on: descriptors are locked
// independently, so a second acquisition is denied even when it comes
// from the process that already holds the lock.
func TestSecondFdInSameProcessRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
first, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = first.Release() }()
_, err = datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, datadir.ErrLocked)
}
// TestReleaseAllowsReacquire covers the clean-shutdown path: the lock
// is released on exit, so a restart is not blocked by the previous
// run.
func TestReleaseAllowsReacquire(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
first, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, first.Release())
second, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, second.Release())
}
// TestAcquireCreatesDataDir covers a first start against a DATA_DIR
// that does not exist yet, which is the normal case for a fresh
// deployment: the lock is taken before anything else creates it.
func TestAcquireCreatesDataDir(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nested", "data")
lock, err := datadir.Acquire(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = lock.Release() }()
assert.Equal(t, dir, lock.Dir())
assert.FileExists(t, filepath.Join(dir, datadir.LockFileName))
}
// TestAcquireEmptyDir rejects an empty directory rather than locking
// the process's working directory.
func TestAcquireEmptyDir(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := datadir.Acquire("")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, datadir.ErrNoDir)
}
// TestAcquireUnusableDir reports an unusable DATA_DIR clearly, naming
// it, instead of failing later and deeper.
func TestAcquireUnusableDir(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
file := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "not-a-directory")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(file, nil, 0o600))
_, err := datadir.Acquire(file)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), file)
}
internal/delivery/archive_sweeper.go
+29 -14
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"time"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/lifecycle"
@@ -25,14 +26,14 @@ type ArchiveSweeperParams struct {
Logger *logger.Logger
}
// ArchiveSweeper periodically prunes expired rows from
// per-webhook archive databases whose database target carries a
// positive expiry.
// ArchiveSweeper periodically prunes expired rows from the
// archive databases of database targets that carry a positive
// expiry.
//
// Without it, pruning happens only when an archive is
// (re)opened, and archives are only ever reopened by writes: an
// archive belonging to a webhook that has stopped receiving
// events would keep its expired rows forever. The sweep closes
// archive whose target has stopped receiving events would keep
// its expired rows forever. The sweep closes
// that gap without changing anything for archives whose expiry
// is unset or "never".
//
@@ -44,8 +45,13 @@ type ArchiveSweeper struct {
eng *Engine
log *slog.Logger
interval time.Duration
cancel context.CancelFunc
wg sync.WaitGroup
// cancel needs no lock: fx calls the stop hook only after the
// start hook has returned, so stop never reads it while start
// is still setting it.
cancel context.CancelFunc
wg sync.WaitGroup
}
// NewArchiveSweeper creates the archive sweeper and registers
@@ -155,17 +161,25 @@ func (s *ArchiveSweeper) run(ctx context.Context) {
// soft-deleted along with it, so GORM's default scope already
// excludes them.
//
// A failure for one webhook is logged and the sweep continues,
// A failure for one target is logged and the sweep continues,
// matching how the write path already treats a prune error as
// non-fatal.
func (s *ArchiveSweeper) sweep(ctx context.Context) {
var targets []database.Target
err := s.db.DB().
WithContext(ctx).
Model(&database.Target{}).
Where("type = ?", database.TargetTypeDatabase).
Find(&targets).Error
if err != nil {
// The app stopping as a sweep starts cancels the listing.
// Stopping is not a failure, so it must not produce an
// error line.
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return
}
s.log.Error(
"archive sweep: failed to list database targets",
"error", err,
@@ -210,19 +224,20 @@ func (s *ArchiveSweeper) sweepTarget(target *database.Target) {
return
}
err = s.eng.dbTarget.sweepWebhook(target.WebhookID, expiry)
err = s.eng.dbTarget.sweepArchive(target.ID, expiry)
if err == nil {
return
}
// A writer evicted underneath the sweep means the operator
// deleted the webhook (or its last database target) while the
// sweep was walking the target list. That is an ordinary
// A writer evicted, or a target row gone, underneath the sweep
// means the operator deleted the target or its webhook while
// the sweep was walking the target list. That is an ordinary
// interleaving, not a failure, so it must not produce an
// error line.
if errors.Is(err, errArchiveWriterEvicted) {
if errors.Is(err, errArchiveWriterEvicted) ||
errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
s.log.Debug(
"archive sweep: writer evicted mid-sweep",
"archive sweep: target deleted mid-sweep",
"webhook_id", target.WebhookID,
"target_id", target.ID,
)
internal/delivery/archive_sweeper_test.go
+203 -133
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -34,18 +36,23 @@ const (
sweepConcurrentWrites = 20
)
// sweeperEnv bundles the pieces an archive sweep test drives:
// a main configuration database holding webhooks and targets, a
// delivery engine owning the archive writer registry, and the
// data directory the archive files live in.
type sweeperEnv struct {
// archiveTestWebhookName is the name of every webhook
// seedDatabaseTarget creates. It is not safe in a file name as it
// stands, so every archive test goes through archiveNamePart.
const archiveTestWebhookName = "Sweep Test!"
// archiveEnv bundles the pieces an archive test drives: a main
// configuration database holding webhooks and targets, a delivery
// engine owning the archive writer registry, the archive sweeper,
// and the data directory the archive files live in.
type archiveEnv struct {
sweeper *delivery.ArchiveSweeper
eng *delivery.Engine
mainDB *database.Database
dataDir string
}
func setupSweeperTest(t *testing.T) *sweeperEnv {
func setupArchiveTest(t *testing.T) *archiveEnv {
t.Helper()
dataDir := t.TempDir()
@@ -78,7 +85,7 @@ func setupSweeperTest(t *testing.T) *sweeperEnv {
1,
)
return &sweeperEnv{
return &archiveEnv{
sweeper: delivery.NewTestArchiveSweeper(
mainDB, eng, log,
),
@@ -88,25 +95,27 @@ func setupSweeperTest(t *testing.T) *sweeperEnv {
}
}
// archivePath returns where the engine keeps a webhook's
// archive file.
func (env *sweeperEnv) archivePath(webhookID string) string {
// archivePath returns where the engine keeps a database target's
// archive file, for the names seedDatabaseTarget gave it.
func (env *archiveEnv) archivePath(tgt *database.Target) string {
return filepath.Join(
env.dataDir, fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", webhookID),
env.dataDir,
delivery.ArchiveFileName(
archiveTestWebhookName, tgt.Name, tgt.ID,
),
)
}
// seedDatabaseTarget creates a webhook with one database target
// carrying the given target config JSON, and returns the
// webhook id.
func (env *sweeperEnv) seedDatabaseTarget(
// carrying the given target config JSON, and returns the target.
func (env *archiveEnv) seedDatabaseTarget(
t *testing.T, configJSON string,
) string {
) *database.Target {
t.Helper()
wh := &database.Webhook{
UserID: uuid.New().String(),
Name: "sweep-test",
Name: archiveTestWebhookName,
}
require.NoError(
t,
@@ -115,9 +124,19 @@ func (env *sweeperEnv) seedDatabaseTarget(
Create(wh).Error,
)
return env.addDatabaseTarget(t, wh.ID, configJSON)
}
// addDatabaseTarget creates one more database target on an
// existing webhook and returns it.
func (env *archiveEnv) addDatabaseTarget(
t *testing.T, webhookID, configJSON string,
) *database.Target {
t.Helper()
tgt := &database.Target{
WebhookID: wh.ID,
Name: "archive",
WebhookID: webhookID,
Name: "Archive",
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
Active: true,
Config: configJSON,
@@ -129,19 +148,19 @@ func (env *sweeperEnv) seedDatabaseTarget(
Create(tgt).Error,
)
return wh.ID
return tgt
}
// seedArchiveRows creates the archive file for a webhook and
// seedArchiveRows creates the archive file for a target and
// inserts one row per supplied archived-at timestamp, returning
// the archive path. The handle is closed before returning, so
// the archive is idle exactly as it would be with no traffic.
func (env *sweeperEnv) seedArchiveRows(
t *testing.T, webhookID string, archivedAt ...time.Time,
func (env *archiveEnv) seedArchiveRows(
t *testing.T, tgt *database.Target, archivedAt ...time.Time,
) string {
t.Helper()
path := env.archivePath(webhookID)
path := env.archivePath(tgt)
sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
"sqlite", fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=rwc", path),
@@ -160,7 +179,7 @@ func (env *sweeperEnv) seedArchiveRows(
for i, at := range archivedAt {
row := delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{
EventID: fmt.Sprintf("ev-%d", i),
WebhookID: webhookID,
WebhookID: tgt.WebhookID,
Method: http.MethodPost,
Body: `{"seeded":true}`,
ArchivedAt: at,
@@ -243,13 +262,13 @@ func TestArchiveSweeper_LoopOutlivesStartHookContext(
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
now := time.Now()
path := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID,
t, tgt,
now.Add(-48*time.Hour),
now.Add(-time.Minute),
)
@@ -287,60 +306,60 @@ func TestArchiveSweeper_LoopOutlivesStartHookContext(
}
// TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotResurrectEvictedWriter covers the
// interleaving where a sweep tick has already listed a webhook's
// target when the webhook is deleted and its writer evicted. The
// sweep must not put a writer back into the registry: nothing
// would ever evict it again, which is precisely the leak this
// change exists to close.
// interleaving where a sweep tick has already listed a target
// when the target is deleted and its writer evicted. The sweep
// must not put a writer back into the registry: nothing would
// ever evict it again, which is precisely the leak this change
// exists to close.
func TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotResurrectEvictedWriter(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
t, tgt, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
// Prime the registry the way a delivery would, then evict as
// the deletion path does. The target row is deliberately left
// in place: this is the tick that listed the webhook before
// in place: this is the tick that listed the target before
// the deletion committed.
_, err := env.eng.ExportEnsureArchiveWriter(webhookID)
_, err := env.eng.ExportEnsureArchiveWriter(tgt.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
env.eng.EvictWebhook(webhookID)
require.False(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID))
env.eng.EvictTarget(tgt.ID)
require.False(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID))
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
"a sweep must never re-register a writer for a webhook "+
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID),
"a sweep must never re-register a writer for a target "+
"whose registry entry has already been released",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_LeavesNoRegistryEntry states the same
// invariant in its general form: sweeping an archive whose
// webhook has no cached writer must not leave one behind, so the
// target has no cached writer must not leave one behind, so the
// registry keeps holding only writers a delivery created and an
// eviction can reach.
func TestArchiveSweep_LeavesNoRegistryEntry(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
path := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID,
t, tgt,
time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
)
require.False(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID))
require.False(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID))
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
@@ -349,7 +368,7 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_LeavesNoRegistryEntry(t *testing.T) {
"the sweep must still prune an idle archive",
)
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID),
"the sweep must release the registry entry it created",
)
}
@@ -364,34 +383,31 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedByDelivery(
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
t, tgt, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
event.WebhookID = webhookID
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"1h"}`,
)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, tgt)
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
require.False(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID))
require.False(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID))
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
assert.True(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID),
"a delivery's writer must stay registered",
)
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
assert.True(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID),
"a sweep must not drop a writer a delivery owns",
)
}
@@ -423,15 +439,15 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedDuringSweep(
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
t, tgt, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
sweepWriter, created, err := env.eng.ExportSweepWriterFor(
webhookID,
tgt.ID,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.True(
@@ -442,37 +458,34 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedDuringSweep(
// The delivery lands mid-sweep and adopts the entry.
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
event.WebhookID = webhookID
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"1h"}`,
)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, tgt)
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
adopted := env.eng.ExportArchiveWriterFor(webhookID)
adopted := env.eng.ExportArchiveWriterFor(tgt.ID)
require.NotNil(t, adopted)
require.True(
t, sweepWriter.Same(adopted),
"the delivery must have adopted the sweep's writer",
)
require.True(
t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(tgt.ID),
"the delivery leaves the archive handle open",
)
// The sweep finishes.
env.eng.ExportReleaseSweepWriter(webhookID, sweepWriter)
env.eng.ExportReleaseSweepWriter(tgt.ID, sweepWriter)
require.True(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID),
"a writer adopted by a delivery during a sweep must "+
"stay registered, or its open handle is unreachable",
)
env.eng.EvictWebhook(webhookID)
env.eng.EvictTarget(tgt.ID)
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID),
"the adopted writer must still be evictable",
)
assert.False(
@@ -481,34 +494,34 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_KeepsWriterAdoptedDuringSweep(
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_ContinuesAfterPerWebhookFailure proves a
// failure for one webhook does not abort the sweep for the
// TestArchiveSweep_ContinuesAfterPerTargetFailure proves a
// failure for one target does not abort the sweep for the
// others: an unparseable expiry and an unreadable archive both
// have to be logged and stepped over.
func TestArchiveSweep_ContinuesAfterPerWebhookFailure(
func TestArchiveSweep_ContinuesAfterPerTargetFailure(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
// Seeded first so the sweep reaches them before the healthy
// webhook: targets come back in insertion order.
badConfigID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"!!!"}`)
// target: targets come back in insertion order.
badConfig := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"!!!"}`)
env.seedArchiveRows(
t, badConfigID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
t, badConfig, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
corruptID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
corrupt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(
env.archivePath(corruptID),
env.archivePath(corrupt),
[]byte("this is not a sqlite database"),
0o600,
))
healthyID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
healthy := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
healthyPath := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, healthyID,
t, healthy,
time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
)
@@ -518,14 +531,14 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_ContinuesAfterPerWebhookFailure(
assert.Equal(
t, []string{sweepRowNew},
archivedEventIDs(t, healthyPath),
"a failure for an earlier webhook must not stop the "+
"a failure for an earlier target must not stop the "+
"sweep from pruning the ones after it",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_OpenExistingDoesNotCreateFile pins the second
// of the two no-create guards. The first is the stat in
// sweepWebhook; this one is the SQLite open mode, which is what
// sweepExpired; this one is the SQLite open mode, which is what
// protects the window between that stat and the open. Flipping
// the sweep's mode to create-if-missing makes this fail.
func TestArchiveSweep_OpenExistingDoesNotCreateFile(
@@ -561,13 +574,13 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_OpenExistingDoesNotCreateFile(
func TestArchiveSweep_PrunesIdleArchive(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
now := time.Now()
path := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID,
t, tgt,
now.Add(-48*time.Hour),
now.Add(-time.Minute),
)
@@ -600,11 +613,11 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_PrunesIdleArchive(t *testing.T) {
func TestArchiveSweep_LeavesArchiveClosed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
path := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
t, tgt, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
@@ -640,39 +653,94 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_ClosesHandleOfRegisteredWriter(
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
t, tgt, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
event.WebhookID = webhookID
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"1h"}`,
)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, tgt)
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
require.True(
t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(tgt.ID),
"the delivery must leave the archive handle open",
)
env.sweeper.ExportSweep(context.Background())
require.True(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID),
"the delivery's registry entry must survive the sweep",
)
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(tgt.ID),
"the sweep must leave the archive closed",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_ClosesHandleBeforeReopening proves the sweep
// closes the handle it finds open before it reopens the file.
// TestArchiveSweep_LeavesArchiveClosed cannot see this: without the
// close, the reopen replaces the handle without closing it, the
// sweep then closes only the new one, and one connection leaks per
// archive per sweep.
func TestArchiveSweep_ClosesHandleBeforeReopening(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive.db")
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
path, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
)
require.NoError(t, w.Open(time.Hour))
before, err := w.DB().DB()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, w.SweepExpired(time.Hour))
assert.Error(
t, before.PingContext(t.Context()),
"the handle open before the sweep must be closed by it",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_CancelledSweepLogsNoError proves a sweep whose
// context is already cancelled, as when the app stops just as a
// sweep starts, returns without an error line: stopping is not a
// failure.
func TestArchiveSweep_CancelledSweepLogsNoError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
var errorLines bytes.Buffer
sweeper := delivery.NewTestArchiveSweeper(
env.mainDB, env.eng,
slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
&errorLines,
&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError},
)),
)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
sweeper.ExportSweep(ctx)
assert.Empty(
t, errorLines.String(),
"a cancelled sweep must not log at error level",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_NeverExpiryUntouched proves the sweep is a
// no-op for the default retention policy, so archives with no
// expiry (or the literal "never") behave exactly as before.
@@ -684,11 +752,11 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_NeverExpiryUntouched(t *testing.T) {
`{"expiry":""}`,
"",
} {
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, configJSON)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, configJSON)
path := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID,
t, tgt,
time.Now().Add(-10000*time.Hour),
)
@@ -699,7 +767,7 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_NeverExpiryUntouched(t *testing.T) {
"config %q must keep rows forever", configJSON,
)
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID),
"config %q must leave no registry entry behind",
configJSON,
)
@@ -722,10 +790,10 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_NeverExpirySkipsBeforeOpening(
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"never"}`)
path := env.archivePath(webhookID)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"never"}`)
path := env.archivePath(tgt)
seedUnmigratedArchive(t, path)
require.False(t, archiveTableExists(t, path))
@@ -768,16 +836,16 @@ func archiveTableExists(t *testing.T, path string) bool {
}
// TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateArchiveFile proves the sweep
// never conjures an archive: a webhook with a database target
// that has never received an event must still have no archive
// file (nor SQLite sidecar) after a sweep.
// never conjures an archive: a database target that has never
// received an event must still have no archive file (nor SQLite
// sidecar) after a sweep, and no registry entry either.
func TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateArchiveFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
path := env.archivePath(webhookID)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
path := env.archivePath(tgt)
require.NoFileExists(t, path)
@@ -789,6 +857,11 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateArchiveFile(t *testing.T) {
"the sweep must not create an archive file",
)
}
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID),
"the sweep must leave no registry entry behind",
)
}
// TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateAfterWriterExists covers the
@@ -800,11 +873,11 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateAfterWriterExists(
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
path, err := env.eng.ExportEnsureArchiveWriter(webhookID)
path, err := env.eng.ExportEnsureArchiveWriter(tgt.ID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoFileExists(t, path)
@@ -819,17 +892,17 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_DoesNotCreateAfterWriterExists(
func TestArchiveSweep_SkipsDeletedWebhookTargets(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
path := env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
t, tgt, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
require.NoError(
t,
env.mainDB.DB().
Where("webhook_id = ?", webhookID).
Where("webhook_id = ?", tgt.WebhookID).
Delete(&database.Target{}).Error,
)
@@ -842,14 +915,14 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_SkipsDeletedWebhookTargets(t *testing.T) {
}
// TestArchiveSweep_ConcurrentWrites proves the sweep serialises
// against writes through the per-webhook writer mutex. Run
// under -race, an unsynchronised sweep would be caught here.
// against writes through the target's writer mutex. Run under
// -race, an unsynchronised sweep would be caught here.
func TestArchiveSweep_ConcurrentWrites(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
@@ -862,13 +935,10 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_ConcurrentWrites(t *testing.T) {
for range sweepConcurrentWrites {
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
event.WebhookID = webhookID
deliveries = append(
deliveries,
seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"1h"}`,
),
seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, tgt),
)
}
@@ -894,7 +964,7 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_ConcurrentWrites(t *testing.T) {
wg.Wait()
assert.FileExists(t, env.archivePath(webhookID))
assert.FileExists(t, env.archivePath(tgt))
}
// TestArchiveSweeper_StopsCleanly proves the background loop
@@ -902,11 +972,11 @@ func TestArchiveSweep_ConcurrentWrites(t *testing.T) {
func TestArchiveSweeper_StopsCleanly(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
webhookID := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"1h"}`)
env.seedArchiveRows(
t, webhookID, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
t, tgt, time.Now().Add(-48*time.Hour),
)
env.sweeper.ExportSetInterval(time.Millisecond)
@@ -930,7 +1000,7 @@ func TestArchiveSweeper_StopHookHonoursStopTimeout(
) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupSweeperTest(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
lc := &recordingLifecycle{}
env.sweeper.ExportRegisterHooks(lc)
internal/delivery/circuit_breaker.go
+10 -2
View File
@@ -76,12 +76,20 @@ func (cb *CircuitBreaker) Allow() bool {
}
}
// CooldownRemaining returns how much time is left before
// an open circuit transitions to half-open.
// CooldownRemaining returns how long a delivery that Allow refused
// should wait before it is tried again. Closed, it returns zero.
// Open, it returns what is left of the cooldown, or zero once that
// has passed. Half-open, it returns the whole cooldown: the one
// probe delivery is still in flight, and if it fails the circuit
// reopens for that long.
func (cb *CircuitBreaker) CooldownRemaining() time.Duration {
cb.mu.Lock()
defer cb.mu.Unlock()
if cb.state == CircuitHalfOpen {
return cb.cooldown
}
if cb.state != CircuitOpen {
return 0
}
internal/delivery/circuit_breaker_test.go
+5 -3
View File
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_ClosedReturnsZero(
)
}
func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_HalfOpenReturnsZero(
func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_HalfOpenReturnsCooldown(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -282,9 +282,11 @@ func TestCircuitBreaker_CooldownRemaining_HalfOpenReturnsZero(
require.True(t, cb.Allow())
assert.Equal(t, time.Duration(0),
// The cooldown newShortCooldownCB gives the breaker.
assert.Equal(t, 50*time.Millisecond,
cb.CooldownRemaining(),
"half-open circuit should have zero cooldown remaining",
"a delivery refused while half-open should wait "+
"a whole cooldown",
)
}
internal/delivery/client_ssrf_test.go
+51 -13
View File
@@ -18,26 +18,27 @@ func newSSRFTestEngine() *delivery.Engine {
log := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
Transport: delivery.NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
Transport: delivery.NewTestGuard().
NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
}
return delivery.NewTestEngine(log, client, 1)
}
// TestClientForConfig_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard asserts that a
// client returned by clientForConfig for a config with a
// TestClientForRequest_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard asserts that a
// client returned by clientForRequest for a config with a
// per-target timeout still refuses connections to
// private/reserved addresses (the timeout must not drop the
// SSRF-safe transport).
func TestClientForConfig_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard(t *testing.T) {
func TestClientForRequest_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
engine := newSSRFTestEngine()
blocked := []string{
"http://127.0.0.1/hook",
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
loopbackHookURL,
metadataURL,
"http://[fe80::1]/hook",
}
@@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ func TestClientForConfig_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard(t *testing.T) {
Timeout: 5,
}
client := engine.ExportClientForConfig(cfg)
client := engine.ExportClientForRequest(cfg, nil)
require.NotSame(t, engine.ExportClient(), client,
"a per-target timeout must yield a "+
@@ -91,10 +92,11 @@ func TestClientForConfig_TimeoutKeepsSSRFGuard(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestClientForConfig_NoTimeoutUnchanged asserts that with
// no per-target timeout the shared SSRF-safe client is
// returned unchanged.
func TestClientForConfig_NoTimeoutUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
// TestClientForRequest_NoTimeoutUnchanged asserts that a
// request with neither a per-target timeout nor an origin-scoped
// header gets the shared SSRF-safe client unchanged: there is then
// nothing for a redirect policy to strip.
func TestClientForRequest_NoTimeoutUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
engine := newSSRFTestEngine()
@@ -103,10 +105,46 @@ func TestClientForConfig_NoTimeoutUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
URL: "https://example.com/hook",
}
client := engine.ExportClientForConfig(cfg)
client := engine.ExportClientForRequest(cfg, nil)
assert.Same(t, engine.ExportClient(), client,
"without a per-target timeout the shared client "+
"must be returned unchanged",
)
}
// TestClientForRequest_HeadersKeepSSRFGuard asserts that the
// redirect policy an origin-scoped header installs is added to a
// client that still carries the SSRF-safe transport. The guard is
// a dial hook, so keeping it is what makes each redirect hop pass
// the private-IP check too.
func TestClientForRequest_HeadersKeepSSRFGuard(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
engine := newSSRFTestEngine()
cfg := &delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
URL: "https://example.com/with-headers",
Headers: map[string]string{
"X-Api-Key": "configured",
},
}
client := engine.ExportClientForRequest(
cfg, []string{"X-Api-Key"},
)
require.NotNil(t, client.CheckRedirect,
"an origin-scoped header must install a redirect policy",
)
assert.Same(t,
engine.ExportClient().Transport, client.Transport,
"the SSRF-safe transport must be reused, not dropped",
)
assert.Equal(t,
engine.ExportClient().Timeout, client.Timeout,
"the shared client's timeout must be inherited",
)
}
internal/delivery/delivery_totals_test.go
+177
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// targetTotals reads one target's totals from a webhook database, all
// zero when it has no row.
func targetTotals(
t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB, targetID string,
) database.TargetTotals {
t.Helper()
var rows []database.TargetTotals
require.NoError(t, db.Where("target_id = ?", targetID).
Find(&rows).Error)
if len(rows) == 0 {
return database.TargetTotals{TargetID: targetID}
}
return rows[0]
}
// TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_FinishTimeAndTargetTotals pins what a status
// write records for the webhook page's statistics: the time a delivery
// finished, set only when it becomes delivered or failed, and one more
// on its target's delivered or failed total.
func TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_FinishTimeAndTargetTotals(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
status database.DeliveryStatus
finished bool
delivered int64
failed int64
}{
{database.DeliveryStatusRetrying, false, 0, 0},
{database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, true, 1, 0},
{database.DeliveryStatusFailed, true, 0, 1},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(string(tt.status), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{}`)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
before := time.Now()
require.NoError(t, e.ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
db, &d, tt.status,
))
var stored database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, db.First(&stored, "id = ?", d.ID).Error)
assert.Equal(t, tt.status, stored.Status)
if tt.finished {
require.NotNil(t, stored.FinishedAt)
assert.False(t, stored.FinishedAt.Before(before))
} else {
assert.Nil(t, stored.FinishedAt)
}
assert.Equal(t, database.TargetTotals{
TargetID: targetID,
Delivered: tt.delivered,
Failed: tt.failed,
}, targetTotals(t, db, targetID))
})
}
}
// TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_DeletedDeliveryIsNotCounted covers a
// delivery retention deleted while the engine still held it. Failing
// it afterwards writes no row, so it adds no failure either: retention
// has already counted what it removed.
func TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_DeletedDeliveryIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{}`)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
require.NoError(t, db.Unscoped().
Delete(&database.Delivery{}, "id = ?", d.ID).Error)
require.NoError(t, e.ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
db, &d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
))
assert.Equal(t, database.TargetTotals{TargetID: targetID},
targetTotals(t, db, targetID))
}
// TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_FinishedDeliveryIsNotSettledAgain covers a
// delivery settled a second time, as recovery can do when a worker has
// settled it since recovery read it. Neither status writes over the
// first, and the totals do not move.
func TestUpdateDeliveryStatus_FinishedDeliveryIsNotSettledAgain(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
finished := []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
}
for _, first := range finished {
t.Run(string(first), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{}`)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
// The delivery as recovery read it, before the worker
// settled it.
readBefore := d
require.NoError(t, e.ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
db, &d, first,
))
var settled database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, db.First(&settled, "id = ?", d.ID).Error)
require.NotNil(t, settled.FinishedAt)
totals := targetTotals(t, db, targetID)
for _, again := range finished {
stale := readBefore
require.NoError(t, e.ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
db, &stale, again,
))
}
var stored database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, db.First(&stored, "id = ?", d.ID).Error)
assert.Equal(t, first, stored.Status)
require.NotNil(t, stored.FinishedAt)
assert.True(t, settled.FinishedAt.Equal(*stored.FinishedAt))
assert.Equal(t, totals, targetTotals(t, db, targetID))
})
}
}
internal/delivery/engine.go
+1135 -90
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
internal/delivery/engine_integration_test.go
+197 -7
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
@@ -70,11 +69,12 @@ func iMainDB(t *testing.T) *gorm.DB {
t.TempDir(), "main-test.db",
)
dsn := fmt.Sprintf(
"file:%s?cache=shared&mode=rwc", dbPath,
// Opened the way the service opens the main database, so these
// tests cannot pass against journal and locking settings
// production does not use.
sqlDB, err := database.OpenSQLite(
dbPath, database.SQLiteModeCreate,
)
sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dsn)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
@@ -355,9 +355,14 @@ func TestProcessRetryTask_SuccessfulRetry(t *testing.T) {
s := newISetup(t)
var receivedBody string
ts := httptest.NewServer(
http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
receivedBody = string(body)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
},
),
@@ -377,6 +382,17 @@ func TestProcessRetryTask_SuccessfulRetry(t *testing.T) {
bodyStr := event.Body
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
// The target row exists because the engine confirms a scheduled
// retry's target has not been deleted before it runs it. A retry
// task whose target id names no row at all is a state the service
// does not produce: the handler read that target to build the
// task. See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/107.
iCreateTarget(
t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "retry-target",
database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, 5,
)
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"retry-target", cfg, 5, 2, &bodyStr,
@@ -386,6 +402,8 @@ func TestProcessRetryTask_SuccessfulRetry(t *testing.T) {
context.TODO(), &task,
)
assert.Equal(t, event.Body, receivedBody)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
@@ -432,9 +450,14 @@ func TestProcessRetryTask_LargeBody_FetchFromDB(
s := newISetup(t)
var receivedBody string
ts := httptest.NewServer(
http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
receivedBody = string(body)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
},
),
@@ -456,6 +479,12 @@ func TestProcessRetryTask_LargeBody_FetchFromDB(
)
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
iCreateTarget(
t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "retry-large",
database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, 5,
)
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"retry-large", cfg, 5, 2, nil,
@@ -465,6 +494,8 @@ func TestProcessRetryTask_LargeBody_FetchFromDB(
context.TODO(), &task,
)
assert.Equal(t, largeBody, receivedBody)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
@@ -558,6 +589,12 @@ func TestWorkerLifecycle_ProcessesRetryChannel(
bodyStr := event.Body
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
iCreateTarget(
t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "retry-chan-test",
database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, 5,
)
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"retry-chan-test", cfg, 5, 2, &bodyStr,
@@ -886,6 +923,82 @@ func TestSweepSingleRetry_TypeNoLongerRetries(
)
}
// TestFailUnretryableRetry_WritesNoTargetRow proves the
// orphaned-retry terminal path leaves no target row — and so no
// plaintext target config — in the per-webhook event database.
//
// That path loads the delivery without its Target relation on
// purpose. Populating d.Target makes GORM's SaveBeforeAssociations
// upsert the whole target row on the status UPDATE, which for a slack
// target writes the incoming-webhook credential into events-*.db.
// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206.
func TestFailUnretryableRetry_WritesNoTargetRow(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "no-target-row",
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
// A Slack incoming-webhook URL: the target config IS the
// credential, which is what makes a leaked target row a
// disclosure rather than a curiosity.
hookURL := "https://hooks.slack.com/services/T00/B00/x"
iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID,
s.WebhookID, "credential-bearing",
database.TargetTypeLog, iHTTPConfig(hookURL), 5,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"orphaned":"retry"}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
iSeedFailedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
// The table exists in the per-webhook database because GORM
// migrates the Delivery relation's model alongside it. It must
// stay empty.
var targetRows int64
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.
Table("targets").
Count(&targetRows).Error)
assert.Zero(t, targetRows,
"orphaned-retry terminal failure wrote a target row "+
"into the per-webhook event database",
)
var configs []string
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.
Table("targets").
Pluck("config", &configs).Error)
assert.NotContains(
t, strings.Join(configs, " "), hookURL,
)
}
func TestRecoverSingleRetry_UnknownTargetType(
t *testing.T,
) {
@@ -1125,6 +1238,83 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_TargetTimeout(t *testing.T) {
iAssertResultFailed(t, db, del.ID)
}
// TestDeliverHTTP_CutsStoredResponseAtMaxBodyLog pins the size
// this engine stores for an oversized response, because the
// event log's redaction is written against it: the row holds
// exactly maxBodyLog bytes and records nothing about how much
// more the remote sent, so a credential echoed across that
// boundary reaches the database already severed and no reader
// of the row can tell the cut happened.
func TestDeliverHTTP_CutsStoredResponseAtMaxBodyLog(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
// Padded so the cut falls five bytes before the end of the
// echoed webhook URL.
const (
severedTail = 5
overshoot = 100000
)
sent := strings.Repeat(
"A",
delivery.ExportMaxBodyLog-len(slackWebhookURL)+
severedTail,
) + slackWebhookURL + strings.Repeat("Z", overshoot)
s := newISetup(t)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadGateway)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, sent)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
cfgJSON := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"cut":"test"}`,
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
del := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
bodyStr := event.Body
task := iTask(
del, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"cut-target", cfgJSON, 0, 1, &bodyStr,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
results := iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, del.ID)
require.Len(t, results, 1)
stored := results[0].ResponseBody
assert.Len(
t, stored, delivery.ExportMaxBodyLog,
"an oversized response is stored at exactly the cap",
)
assert.Equal(
t, sent[:delivery.ExportMaxBodyLog], stored,
)
assert.NotContains(
t, stored, slackWebhookURL,
"the echoed URL is severed by the cut",
)
assert.Contains(
t, stored, "T00000000",
"the severed prefix still carries the credential",
)
}
// iSeedEventAndDelivery creates event + delivery
// for standalone tests.
func iSeedEventAndDelivery(
internal/delivery/engine_lifecycle_test.go
+100
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,14 @@ package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"gorm.io/gorm/clause"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
@@ -269,3 +271,101 @@ func TestEngine_StopHookHonoursStopTimeout(t *testing.T) {
requireStopHookExpires(t, lc.hooks[0], "delivery engine")
}
// deliverToArchive gives the setup's webhook a database target,
// runs one delivery to it through the running engine, and returns
// the target's ID and archive file path. The archive writer holds
// the file open afterwards.
func deliverToArchive(t *testing.T, s iSetup) (string, string) {
t.Helper()
iCreateWebhook(t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "hook")
tgt := &database.Target{
WebhookID: s.WebhookID,
Name: "archive",
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
}
require.NoError(
t, s.MainDB.Omit(clause.Associations).Create(tgt).Error,
)
deliveryID, task := seedLogTask(t, s)
task.TargetID = tgt.ID
task.TargetType = database.TargetTypeDatabase
s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{task})
iWaitForDelivered(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID)
return tgt.ID, filepath.Join(
filepath.Dir(s.DBMgr.DBPath(s.WebhookID)),
"archive-hook-archive-"+tgt.ID+".db",
)
}
// TestEngine_StopHookClosesArchives is the regression test for an
// archive split across two files by a clean stop. The engine never
// closed its archive writers, so after a stop the archived rows
// could sit in archive-{id}.db-wal while archive-{id}.db held no
// table at all, and copying the .db on its own gave an empty
// database.
func TestEngine_StopHookClosesArchives(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)
_, path := deliverToArchive(t, s)
require.FileExists(
t, path+"-wal",
"an open archive should have a -wal for the stop to remove",
)
require.NoError(t, lc.hooks[0].OnStop(context.Background()))
wals, err := filepath.Glob(
filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(path), "archive-*.db-wal"),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Empty(
t, wals, "a clean stop must leave no archive -wal behind",
)
// With no -wal beside it, the row can only be in the .db.
count, err := countArchivedRows(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, int64(1), count)
}
// TestEngine_StopHookTimeoutLeavesArchivesOpen covers a stop whose
// budget runs out while a worker is still running. The archive
// writers are left open, as a kill would leave them: closing them
// would wait for any write in progress, and that worker would then
// open new writers that nothing closes.
func TestEngine_StopHookTimeoutLeavesArchivesOpen(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
lc := startEngineViaHook(t, s.Engine)
targetID, _ := deliverToArchive(t, s)
release := make(chan struct{})
t.Cleanup(func() {
close(release)
s.Engine.EvictWebhook(s.WebhookID)
})
s.Engine.ExportWedgeWorker(release)
requireStopHookExpires(t, lc.hooks[0], "delivery engine")
require.True(
t, s.Engine.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(targetID),
"a stop that timed out must not close archive writers",
)
}
internal/delivery/engine_test.go
+199 -38
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package delivery_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
@@ -18,6 +17,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import (
_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
)
// testContentType is the event content type used in tests.
@@ -37,11 +38,12 @@ func testWebhookDB(t *testing.T) *gorm.DB {
t.TempDir(), "events-test.db",
)
dsn := fmt.Sprintf(
"file:%s?cache=shared&mode=rwc", dbPath,
// Opened the way the service opens a per-webhook database, so
// these tests cannot pass against journal and locking settings
// production does not use.
sqlDB, err := database.OpenSQLite(
dbPath, database.SQLiteModeCreate,
)
sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dsn)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
@@ -55,7 +57,10 @@ func testWebhookDB(t *testing.T) *gorm.DB {
&database.Event{},
&database.Delivery{},
&database.DeliveryResult{},
&database.EventTotals{},
&database.TargetTotals{},
))
require.NoError(t, db.Create(&database.EventTotals{}).Error)
return db
}
@@ -346,23 +351,15 @@ func TestDeliverDatabase_ImmediateSuccess(
db := testWebhookDB(t)
// The database target archives for real now, so the engine
// needs a webhook DB manager to locate the data directory.
e := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
nil,
database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(t.TempDir()),
slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
os.Stderr,
&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
)),
&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
1,
)
// The database target archives for real, so the engine needs
// the target in the main database and a data directory.
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, "")
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{"db":"target"}`)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, db, event, "")
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, db, event, tgt)
e.ExportDeliverDatabase(db, d)
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(db, d)
var updated database.Delivery
@@ -894,6 +891,100 @@ func TestDeliverHTTP_CircuitBreakerBlocks(t *testing.T) {
)
}
// recordingScheduler keeps the delay of every retry it is asked to
// schedule, and schedules nothing.
type recordingScheduler struct {
delays []time.Duration
}
func (s *recordingScheduler) ScheduleRetry(
_ delivery.Task, delay time.Duration,
) {
s.delays = append(s.delays, delay)
}
// TestDeliverHTTP_HalfOpenBreakerDelaysQueuedTasks proves that while a
// half-open breaker's one probe delivery is in flight, every other task
// for the target is put back with a whole cooldown as its delay rather
// than none, and that its status is written the first time the breaker
// turns it away and not on each pass after that.
func TestDeliverHTTP_HalfOpenBreakerDelaysQueuedTasks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
db := testWebhookDB(t)
e := testEngine(t, 1)
// Every write of retrying moves the retry counter, so on a registry
// this test owns the counter is the number of those writes.
reg := prometheus.NewRegistry()
e.ExportSetMetrics(metrics.New(reg))
targetID := uuid.New().String()
cb := newShortCooldownCB(t)
e.ExportSetCircuitBreaker(targetID, cb)
for range delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold {
cb.RecordFailure()
}
time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
require.True(t, cb.Allow(), "the probe delivery should go through")
require.Equal(t, delivery.CircuitHalfOpen, cb.State())
cfg := newHTTPTargetConfig(
"http://will-not-be-called.invalid",
)
sched := &recordingScheduler{}
const queued, passes = 3, 4
for range queued {
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{"cb":"half-open"}`)
dlv := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
for range passes {
// Each pass starts from the stored row, as a retry does.
var row database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, db.First(
&row, "id = ?", dlv.ID,
).Error)
fix := buildHTTPFixture(
row, event, targetID,
"test-cb-half-open", cfg, 5, 1,
)
e.ExportDeliverHTTPWithScheduler(
context.TODO(), db, fix.Delivery, fix.Task, sched,
)
}
assertDeliveryStatus(t, db, dlv.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
}
require.Len(t, sched.delays, queued*passes)
for _, delay := range sched.delays {
// The cooldown newShortCooldownCB gives the breaker.
assert.Equal(t, 50*time.Millisecond, delay,
"a task turned away while half-open should wait "+
"a whole cooldown",
)
}
assert.InDelta(t, float64(queued),
mCounter(t, reg, mRetries, mTypeHTTP), 0,
"status should be written once per task, not once per pass",
)
}
func TestGetCircuitBreaker_CreatesOnDemand(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -1070,6 +1161,10 @@ func TestIsForwardableHeader(t *testing.T) {
assert.False(t,
delivery.ExportIsForwardableHeader("Content-Length"),
)
assert.False(t,
delivery.ExportIsForwardableHeader("Content-Type"),
)
}
func TestTruncate(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1144,11 +1239,82 @@ func TestDoHTTPRequest_ForwardsHeaders(t *testing.T) {
testContentType,
receivedHeaders.Get("Content-Type"),
)
}
assert.Equal(t,
"webhooker/1.0",
receivedHeaders.Get("User-Agent"),
)
// The event's stored inbound headers carry the same Content-Type the
// receiver saved as the event's ContentType, so a delivery could send
// it twice. It must go out exactly once, with a Content-Type configured
// on the target winning, then the event's ContentType.
func TestApplyRequestHeaders_SendsOneContentType(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := map[string]struct {
inbound string
event string
configured string
want []string
}{
"inbound and event agree": {
inbound: testContentType,
event: testContentType,
want: []string{testContentType},
},
"inbound and event disagree": {
inbound: "text/plain",
event: testContentType,
want: []string{testContentType},
},
"event has none": {
inbound: testContentType,
want: nil,
},
"target configures its own": {
inbound: testContentType,
event: testContentType,
configured: "application/xml",
want: []string{"application/xml"},
},
}
for name, tc := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
inbound, err := json.Marshal(map[string][]string{
headerContentType: {tc.inbound},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
cfg := &delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{}
if tc.configured != "" {
cfg.Headers = map[string]string{
headerContentType: tc.configured,
}
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"https://target.example.com/hook",
http.NoBody,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
delivery.ExportApplyRequestHeaders(
req,
&database.Event{
Headers: string(inbound),
ContentType: tc.event,
},
cfg,
"webhooker/dev",
)
assert.Equal(t,
tc.want, req.Header.Values(headerContentType),
)
})
}
}
func TestProcessDelivery_RoutesToCorrectHandler(
@@ -1158,32 +1324,27 @@ func TestProcessDelivery_RoutesToCorrectHandler(
db := testWebhookDB(t)
// The database target archives for real now, so the engine
// needs a webhook DB manager to locate the data directory.
e := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
nil,
database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(t.TempDir()),
slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
os.Stderr,
&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
)),
&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
1,
)
// The database target archives for real, so the engine needs
// the target in the main database and a data directory.
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
archive := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, "")
tests := []struct {
name string
targetType database.TargetType
targetID string
wantStatus database.DeliveryStatus
}{
{
"database target",
database.TargetTypeDatabase,
archive.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
},
{
"log target",
database.TargetTypeLog,
uuid.New().String(),
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
},
}
@@ -1193,7 +1354,7 @@ func TestProcessDelivery_RoutesToCorrectHandler(
t.Parallel()
runRoutingSubtest(
t, db, e, tt.targetType,
t, db, env.eng, tt.targetType, tt.targetID,
tt.wantStatus,
)
})
@@ -1205,6 +1366,7 @@ func runRoutingSubtest(
db *gorm.DB,
e *delivery.Engine,
targetType database.TargetType,
targetID string,
wantStatus database.DeliveryStatus,
) {
t.Helper()
@@ -1212,8 +1374,7 @@ func runRoutingSubtest(
event := seedEvent(t, db, `{"routing":"test"}`)
dlv := seedDelivery(
t, db, event.ID,
uuid.New().String(),
t, db, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
internal/delivery/event_db_isolation_test.go
+165
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// assertNoTargetRows opens the per-webhook database file directly,
// outside GORM, and fails if its targets table holds any rows.
// Target config is the credential for slack and http targets, and
// event databases are the files that get backed up and handed
// around.
func assertNoTargetRows(t *testing.T, dbPath string) {
t.Helper()
sqlDB, err := sql.Open(
"sqlite", fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=ro", dbPath),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() }()
var tables int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(),
"SELECT count(*) FROM sqlite_master "+
"WHERE type = 'table' AND name = 'targets'",
).Scan(&tables))
if tables == 0 {
return
}
var rows int
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.QueryRowContext(
t.Context(), "SELECT count(*) FROM targets",
).Scan(&rows))
assert.Zero(
t, rows,
"per-webhook event database must hold no target rows",
)
}
// TestEventDBHoldsNoTargetRows drives a delivery and then a retry
// through the real engine write paths and asserts neither leaves a
// target row behind in events-*.db.
func TestEventDBHoldsNoTargetRows(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
dbPath := s.DBMgr.DBPath(s.WebhookID)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"leak":"none"}`,
)
body := event.Body
// A new delivery.
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"leaky-target", cfg, 5, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
assertNoTargetRows(t, dbPath)
// A retry. Its target exists in the main database, because the
// engine confirms a scheduled retry's target has not been
// deleted before running it; see
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/107.
iCreateTarget(
t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "leaky-target",
database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, 5,
)
rd := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
rTask := iTask(
rd, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"leaky-target", cfg, 5, 2, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(context.TODO(), &rTask)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, rd.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
assertNoTargetRows(t, dbPath)
}
// TestEventDBHoldsNoTargetRowsOnFailedDelivery covers the failure
// write path, which updates the delivery to failed and records a
// result, rather than the success path above.
func TestEventDBHoldsNoTargetRowsOnFailedDelivery(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"leak":"none"}`,
)
body := event.Body
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"leaky-target", cfg, 0, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
assertNoTargetRows(t, s.DBMgr.DBPath(s.WebhookID))
}
internal/delivery/event_timestamp_test.go
+442
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,442 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// tsEventCreatedAt is the receipt time seeded on the events these
// tests deliver. It is far enough from both the zero time and from
// now that neither can be mistaken for it.
func tsEventCreatedAt() time.Time {
return time.Date(
2026, time.March, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, time.UTC,
)
}
// tsZeroStamp is what a Slack message renders when the event handed
// to FormatSlackMessage carries no CreatedAt.
const tsZeroStamp = "*Timestamp:* `0001-01-01T00:00:00Z`"
// tsEventBody is the body seeded on every event in this file. It is
// small enough that a Task can inline it.
const tsEventBody = `{"hello":"world"}`
// tsUndeliverableHook stands in for a Slack incoming webhook on the
// tests that never send: the config parser requires a URL, but no
// request is made.
const tsUndeliverableHook = "https://hooks.slack.com/services/T/B/x"
// tsSink is a stand-in Slack incoming webhook that records the raw
// body posted to it.
type tsSink struct {
*httptest.Server
bodies chan []byte
}
func newTSSink(t *testing.T) *tsSink {
t.Helper()
s := &tsSink{bodies: make(chan []byte, 8)}
s.Server = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
select {
case s.bodies <- body:
default:
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
},
))
t.Cleanup(s.Close)
return s
}
// text returns the Slack message text from the single payload the
// sink received.
func (s *tsSink) text(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
select {
case raw := <-s.bodies:
t.Logf("raw slack payload: %s", raw)
var payload struct {
Text string `json:"text"`
}
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &payload))
return payload.Text
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("slack sink received no payload")
return ""
}
}
func tsSlackConfig(t *testing.T, url string) string {
t.Helper()
data, err := json.Marshal(
delivery.SlackTargetConfig{WebhookURL: url},
)
require.NoError(t, err)
return string(data)
}
// tsSeedEvent writes an event whose CreatedAt is tsEventCreatedAt
// rather than the write time, so an assertion on the rendered
// timestamp cannot pass by accident against "roughly now".
func tsSeedEvent(
t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB, webhookID string,
) database.Event {
t.Helper()
event := database.Event{
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: uuid.New().String(),
Method: http.MethodPost,
Headers: `{}`,
Body: tsEventBody,
ContentType: "application/json",
}
event.ID = uuid.New().String()
event.CreatedAt = tsEventCreatedAt()
event.UpdatedAt = tsEventCreatedAt()
require.NoError(t, db.Create(&event).Error)
var stored database.Event
require.NoError(t,
db.First(&stored, "id = ?", event.ID).Error,
)
require.Equal(t,
tsEventCreatedAt().UTC(), stored.CreatedAt.UTC(),
"seeded created_at did not round-trip",
)
return event
}
// tsSeedTarget writes the slack target row into the main database.
// The retry path confirms the target still exists before sending.
func tsSeedTarget(
t *testing.T, mainDB *gorm.DB, webhookID, config string,
) database.Target {
t.Helper()
target := database.Target{
WebhookID: webhookID,
Name: "slack-sink",
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: config,
Active: true,
}
require.NoError(t, mainDB.Create(&target).Error)
return target
}
func tsTask(
d database.Delivery,
event database.Event,
webhookID string,
target database.Target,
attemptNum int,
body *string,
) delivery.Task {
return delivery.Task{
DeliveryID: d.ID,
EventID: event.ID,
WebhookID: webhookID,
EntrypointID: event.EntrypointID,
TargetID: target.ID,
TargetName: target.Name,
TargetType: database.TargetTypeSlack,
TargetConfig: target.Config,
MaxRetries: 0,
Method: event.Method,
Headers: event.Headers,
ContentType: event.ContentType,
Body: body,
AttemptNum: attemptNum,
}
}
func tsAssertRealTimestamp(t *testing.T, text string) {
t.Helper()
assert.NotContains(t, text, tsZeroStamp,
"slack message carries the zero timestamp",
)
assert.Contains(t, text,
"*Timestamp:* `"+
tsEventCreatedAt().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)+"`",
"slack message does not carry the event's receipt time",
)
}
// tsCase is one end-to-end delivery of a seeded event to a slack
// sink, over whichever engine path `process` names.
type tsCase struct {
// status is the delivery row's status before the engine runs.
// The retry path refuses a delivery that is not retrying.
status database.DeliveryStatus
// inlineBody mirrors a Task built for a body under
// MaxInlineBodySize. When false the engine reads the body back
// from the stored row.
inlineBody bool
attemptNum int
process func(
ctx context.Context, e *delivery.Engine, task *delivery.Task,
)
}
// run delivers one event through the named path and returns the
// Slack message text the sink received.
func (c tsCase) run(t *testing.T) (iSetup, database.Delivery, string) {
t.Helper()
s := newISetup(t)
sink := newTSSink(t)
cfg := tsSlackConfig(t, sink.URL)
target := tsSeedTarget(t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, cfg)
event := tsSeedEvent(t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, target.ID, c.status,
)
var body *string
if c.inlineBody {
bodyStr := event.Body
body = &bodyStr
}
task := tsTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, target, c.attemptNum, body,
)
c.process(context.TODO(), s.Engine, &task)
return s, d, sink.text(t)
}
// TestSlackFirstAttemptCarriesEventTimestamp covers the path an
// event takes on its first delivery: the task comes from the
// receiver and the engine reconstructs the event from it.
func TestSlackFirstAttemptCarriesEventTimestamp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, d, text := tsCase{
status: database.DeliveryStatusPending,
inlineBody: true,
attemptNum: 1,
process: func(
ctx context.Context,
e *delivery.Engine,
task *delivery.Task,
) {
e.ExportProcessNewTask(ctx, task)
},
}.run(t)
tsAssertRealTimestamp(t, text)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
}
// TestSlackFirstAttemptLargeBodyCarriesEventTimestamp covers the
// first-attempt path for an event whose body exceeded
// MaxInlineBodySize, so the task carries no body and the engine
// reads it back from the stored row.
func TestSlackFirstAttemptLargeBodyCarriesEventTimestamp(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
_, _, text := tsCase{
status: database.DeliveryStatusPending,
inlineBody: false,
attemptNum: 1,
process: func(
ctx context.Context,
e *delivery.Engine,
task *delivery.Task,
) {
e.ExportProcessNewTask(ctx, task)
},
}.run(t)
tsAssertRealTimestamp(t, text)
}
// TestSlackRetryCarriesEventTimestamp covers the retry path, which
// reconstructs the event from the same task the first attempt used.
func TestSlackRetryCarriesEventTimestamp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, d, text := tsCase{
status: database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
inlineBody: true,
attemptNum: 2,
process: func(
ctx context.Context,
e *delivery.Engine,
task *delivery.Task,
) {
e.ExportProcessRetryTask(ctx, task)
},
}.run(t)
tsAssertRealTimestamp(t, text)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
}
// TestFormatSlackMessageOverTaskReconstructedEvent asserts on the
// formatted message directly, over the event the delivery paths
// reconstruct from a Task. It is the unit-level guard under the
// end-to-end tests: revert the CreatedAt population in hydrateEvent
// and this fails on the zero timestamp.
func TestFormatSlackMessageOverTaskReconstructedEvent(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
cfg := tsSlackConfig(t, tsUndeliverableHook)
target := tsSeedTarget(t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, cfg)
event := tsSeedEvent(t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, target.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
bodyStr := event.Body
task := tsTask(d, event, s.WebhookID, target, 1, &bodyStr)
rebuilt, err := s.Engine.ExportEventForTask(
s.WebhookDB, &task,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, rebuilt.CreatedAt.IsZero(),
"reconstructed event carries the zero time",
)
assert.Equal(t,
tsEventCreatedAt().UTC(), rebuilt.CreatedAt.UTC(),
)
tsAssertRealTimestamp(
t, delivery.FormatSlackMessage(&rebuilt),
)
}
// TestFormatSlackMessageZeroTimestamp asserts the rendering choice
// directly, without going through the engine: a zero CreatedAt (the
// shape a reaped-row fallback produces) renders as "unknown" rather
// than the year-1 zero time, while a real CreatedAt still renders as
// RFC3339.
func TestFormatSlackMessageZeroTimestamp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
zeroEvent := database.Event{
Method: http.MethodPost,
ContentType: testContentType,
Body: tsEventBody,
}
zeroText := delivery.FormatSlackMessage(&zeroEvent)
assert.NotContains(t, zeroText, "0001-01-01",
"slack message carries the zero-time year",
)
assert.Contains(t, zeroText, "*Timestamp:* `unknown`",
"slack message does not mark an unset receipt time as unknown",
)
nonZeroEvent := zeroEvent
nonZeroEvent.CreatedAt = tsEventCreatedAt()
nonZeroText := delivery.FormatSlackMessage(&nonZeroEvent)
assert.Contains(t, nonZeroText,
"*Timestamp:* `"+
tsEventCreatedAt().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)+"`",
"slack message does not render a real receipt time as RFC3339",
)
}
// TestEventReconstructionSurvivesAReapedRow pins the fallback: an
// event row reaped by retention while its delivery still holds the
// body inline is still delivered, with the receipt time unset,
// rather than dropped.
func TestEventReconstructionSurvivesAReapedRow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
cfg := tsSlackConfig(t, tsUndeliverableHook)
target := tsSeedTarget(t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, cfg)
event := tsSeedEvent(t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, target.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
bodyStr := event.Body
task := tsTask(d, event, s.WebhookID, target, 1, &bodyStr)
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.Unscoped().Delete(
&database.Event{}, "id = ?", event.ID,
).Error)
rebuilt, err := s.Engine.ExportEventForTask(
s.WebhookDB, &task,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, bodyStr, rebuilt.Body)
assert.True(t, rebuilt.CreatedAt.IsZero())
// A task with no inlined body has nothing left to deliver, so
// the same reaped row is an error there.
noBody := task
noBody.Body = nil
_, err = s.Engine.ExportEventForTask(s.WebhookDB, &noBody)
require.Error(t, err)
}
internal/delivery/export_test.go
+201 -27
View File
@@ -5,11 +5,15 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"time"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
)
// ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted exposes the sentinel returned by
@@ -24,11 +28,37 @@ const (
ExportRetryChannelSize = retryChannelSize
ExportDefaultFailureThreshold = defaultFailureThreshold
ExportDefaultCooldown = defaultCooldown
// ExportMaxBodyLog is the cap the engine applies to a
// recorded response body. The event log's handling of a cut
// response is written against this number, so a test has to
// be able to name it.
ExportMaxBodyLog = maxBodyLog
// ExportPendingSweepMinAge is how long a delivery must sit at
// pending before the sweep treats it as stranded. A test has to
// name it to age a row past the bound.
ExportPendingSweepMinAge = pendingSweepMinAge
)
// ExportIsBlockedIP exposes isBlockedIP for testing.
func ExportIsBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return isBlockedIP(ip)
// NewTestGuard builds an SSRF Guard from an explicit egress
// allowlist, without going through config. Passing no prefixes
// yields the default guard, which blocks every private/reserved
// range.
func NewTestGuard(allowed ...netip.Prefix) *Guard {
return &Guard{allowed: allowed}
}
// ExportCheckIP exposes the guard's single decision point, so a
// test can assert the policy both the validator and the dialer
// inherit without needing a live destination.
func (g *Guard) ExportCheckIP(ip net.IP) error {
return g.checkIP(ip)
}
// ExportAlwaysBlockedNetworks exposes alwaysBlockedNetworks.
func ExportAlwaysBlockedNetworks() []*net.IPNet {
return alwaysBlockedNetworks
}
// ExportBlockedNetworks exposes blockedNetworks.
@@ -36,11 +66,28 @@ func ExportBlockedNetworks() []*net.IPNet {
return blockedNetworks
}
// ExportBlockedPublicNetworks exposes blockedPublicNetworks.
func ExportBlockedPublicNetworks() []*net.IPNet {
return blockedPublicNetworks
}
// ExportIsForwardableHeader exposes isForwardableHeader.
func ExportIsForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
return isForwardableHeader(name)
}
// ExportApplyRequestHeaders exposes applyRequestHeaders, so a test
// can inspect the header set an outbound delivery actually carries
// and the origin-scoped names it reports for the redirect policy.
func ExportApplyRequestHeaders(
req *http.Request,
event *database.Event,
cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
userAgent string,
) []string {
return applyRequestHeaders(req, event, cfg, userAgent)
}
// ExportTruncate exposes truncate for testing.
func ExportTruncate(s string, maxLen int) string {
return truncate(s, maxLen)
@@ -56,6 +103,19 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverHTTP(
e.httpTarget.Deliver(ctx, webhookDB, d, task, e)
}
// ExportDeliverHTTPWithScheduler delivers via the http target, handing
// any retry to sched instead of the engine, so a test can see the
// delay each retry is given.
func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverHTTPWithScheduler(
ctx context.Context,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
d *database.Delivery,
task *Task,
sched Scheduler,
) {
e.httpTarget.Deliver(ctx, webhookDB, d, task, sched)
}
// ExportDeliverDatabase delivers via the database target.
func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverDatabase(
webhookDB *gorm.DB, d *database.Delivery,
@@ -92,6 +152,16 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportDeliverSlack(
)
}
// ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus exposes updateDeliveryStatus. It passes no
// target type, so no metric moves.
func (e *Engine) ExportUpdateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
d *database.Delivery,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
) error {
return e.updateDeliveryStatus(webhookDB, d, "", status)
}
// ExportProcessNewTask exposes processNewTask.
func (e *Engine) ExportProcessNewTask(
ctx context.Context, task *Task,
@@ -106,6 +176,16 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportProcessRetryTask(
e.processRetryTask(ctx, task)
}
// ExportEventForTask exposes the event reconstruction the delivery
// paths run: buildEventFromTask followed by hydrateEvent.
func (e *Engine) ExportEventForTask(
webhookDB *gorm.DB, task *Task,
) (database.Event, error) {
return e.hydrateEvent(
webhookDB, buildEventFromTask(task), task,
)
}
// ExportProcessDelivery exposes processDelivery.
func (e *Engine) ExportProcessDelivery(
ctx context.Context,
@@ -124,6 +204,14 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportGetCircuitBreaker(
return e.httpTarget.getCircuitBreaker(targetID)
}
// ExportSetCircuitBreaker makes cb the http target's circuit breaker
// for targetID, so a test can use one with a short cooldown.
func (e *Engine) ExportSetCircuitBreaker(
targetID string, cb *CircuitBreaker,
) {
e.httpTarget.circuitBreakers.Store(targetID, cb)
}
// ExportParseHTTPConfig exposes parseHTTPConfig.
func (e *Engine) ExportParseHTTPConfig(
configJSON string,
@@ -148,12 +236,27 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportDoHTTPRequest(
return e.httpTarget.doHTTPRequest(ctx, cfg, event)
}
// ExportClientForConfig exposes the http target's
// clientForConfig.
func (e *Engine) ExportClientForConfig(
// ExportClientForRequest exposes the http target's
// clientForRequest.
func (e *Engine) ExportClientForRequest(
cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
originScoped []string,
) *http.Client {
return e.httpTarget.clientForConfig(cfg)
return e.httpTarget.clientForRequest(cfg, originScoped)
}
// ErrExportTooManyRedirects exposes the sentinel the redirect
// policy returns once a chain exceeds the hop cap. It carries the
// Err prefix rather than this file's usual Export one because it
// is a sentinel error.
var ErrExportTooManyRedirects = errTooManyRedirects
// ExportMaxDeliveryRedirects exposes the redirect hop cap.
const ExportMaxDeliveryRedirects = maxDeliveryRedirects
// ExportSameDeliveryOrigin exposes sameDeliveryOrigin.
func ExportSameDeliveryOrigin(origin, dest *url.URL) bool {
return sameDeliveryOrigin(origin, dest)
}
// ExportClient returns the http target's shared HTTP client.
@@ -231,6 +334,51 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportWedgeWorker(release <-chan struct{}) {
})
}
// ExportInflightHeld reports how many deliveries the engine currently
// owns, so a test can prove ownership is released rather than leaked.
func (e *Engine) ExportInflightHeld() int {
return e.inflight.held()
}
// ExportRetainDelivery takes the first reference on a delivery, as the
// queueing side does. It lets a test put a delivery into the state a
// worker or a full channel would, without running the pool.
func (e *Engine) ExportRetainDelivery(deliveryID string) bool {
return e.inflight.retainIdle(deliveryID)
}
// ExportRecoverRetryingDeliveries exposes recoverRetryingDeliveries.
func (e *Engine) ExportRecoverRetryingDeliveries(
webhookDB *gorm.DB, webhookID string,
) {
e.recoverRetryingDeliveries(webhookDB, webhookID)
}
// ExportFailMissingTarget exposes failMissingTarget, so a test can hand
// it a delivery as a batch read it earlier.
func (e *Engine) ExportFailMissingTarget(
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
webhookID string,
d *database.Delivery,
) {
e.failMissingTarget(webhookDB, webhookID, d)
}
// ExportSendRecoveredDeliveries exposes sendRecoveredDeliveries, so a
// test can hand it a target map that lacks a delivery's target.
func (e *Engine) ExportSendRecoveredDeliveries(
ctx context.Context,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
deliveries []database.Delivery,
webhookID string,
targetMap map[string]database.Target,
settled map[string]struct{},
) {
e.sendRecoveredDeliveries(
ctx, webhookDB, deliveries, webhookID, targetMap, settled,
)
}
// ExportDeliveryCh returns the delivery channel.
func (e *Engine) ExportDeliveryCh() chan Task {
return e.deliveryCh
@@ -253,6 +401,7 @@ func NewTestEngine(
deliveryCh: make(chan Task, deliveryChannelSize),
retryCh: make(chan Task, retryChannelSize),
workers: workers,
mtr: metrics.New(prometheus.NewRegistry()),
}
e.initTargets(client)
@@ -267,6 +416,7 @@ func NewTestEngineSmallRetry(
e := &Engine{
log: log,
retryCh: make(chan Task, 1),
mtr: metrics.New(prometheus.NewRegistry()),
}
e.initTargets(nil)
@@ -289,12 +439,24 @@ func NewTestEngineWithDB(
deliveryCh: make(chan Task, deliveryChannelSize),
retryCh: make(chan Task, retryChannelSize),
workers: workers,
mtr: metrics.New(prometheus.NewRegistry()),
}
e.initTargets(client)
return e
}
// ExportSetMetrics substitutes the engine's metric set, so a test can
// assert on collectors registered on a registry it holds.
func (e *Engine) ExportSetMetrics(mtr *metrics.Set) {
e.mtr = mtr
}
// ExportSampleQueueDepths runs one queue depth sample synchronously.
func (e *Engine) ExportSampleQueueDepths(ctx context.Context) {
e.sampleQueueDepths(ctx)
}
// NewTestCircuitBreaker creates a CircuitBreaker with
// custom settings for testing.
func NewTestCircuitBreaker(
@@ -312,7 +474,7 @@ func NewTestCircuitBreaker(
type ExportArchivedEvent = archivedEvent
// ExportArchiveWriter wraps an archiveWriter so black-box tests
// can exercise the per-webhook archive file mechanics.
// can exercise the archive file mechanics.
type ExportArchiveWriter struct {
w *archiveWriter
}
@@ -350,6 +512,12 @@ func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Reopen(
return e.w.reopen(expiry)
}
// SetNow replaces the clock the writer measures its reopen
// debounce on.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) SetNow(now func() time.Time) {
e.w.now = now
}
// Reopens reports how many times the file has been opened.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Reopens() int {
return e.w.reopens
@@ -387,6 +555,12 @@ func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Evict() {
e.w.evict()
}
// Rename gives the archive file a new name in the same directory,
// as a rename of the webhook or target does.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Rename(name string) error {
return e.w.rename(name)
}
// HandleOpen reports whether the writer currently holds an open
// archive handle.
func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) HandleOpen() bool {
@@ -406,16 +580,16 @@ func (e *ExportArchiveWriter) Same(
}
// ExportArchiveWriterFor returns the archive writer the registry
// currently caches for a webhook, or nil when none is cached. It
// never creates one, so a test can hold a reference to the very
// writer an eviction is about to detach.
// currently caches for a database target, or nil when none is
// cached. It never creates one, so a test can hold a reference to
// the very writer an eviction is about to detach.
func (e *Engine) ExportArchiveWriterFor(
webhookID string,
targetID string,
) *ExportArchiveWriter {
e.dbTarget.mu.Lock()
defer e.dbTarget.mu.Unlock()
w, ok := e.dbTarget.writers[webhookID]
w, ok := e.dbTarget.writers[targetID]
if !ok {
return nil
}
@@ -424,26 +598,26 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportArchiveWriterFor(
}
// ExportHasArchiveWriter reports whether the database target
// currently caches an archive writer for a webhook.
// type currently caches an archive writer for a target.
func (e *Engine) ExportHasArchiveWriter(
webhookID string,
targetID string,
) bool {
e.dbTarget.mu.Lock()
defer e.dbTarget.mu.Unlock()
_, ok := e.dbTarget.writers[webhookID]
_, ok := e.dbTarget.writers[targetID]
return ok
}
// ExportArchiveHandleOpen reports whether the cached archive
// writer for a webhook holds an open database handle. It
// writer for a target holds an open database handle. It
// returns false when no writer is cached.
func (e *Engine) ExportArchiveHandleOpen(
webhookID string,
targetID string,
) bool {
e.dbTarget.mu.Lock()
w, ok := e.dbTarget.writers[webhookID]
w, ok := e.dbTarget.writers[targetID]
e.dbTarget.mu.Unlock()
if !ok {
@@ -457,12 +631,12 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportArchiveHandleOpen(
}
// ExportEnsureArchiveWriter creates (if needed) and returns the
// archive file path of the cached writer for a webhook, so a
// archive file path of the cached writer for a target, so a
// test can prime the registry the way a delivery would.
func (e *Engine) ExportEnsureArchiveWriter(
webhookID string,
targetID string,
) (string, error) {
w, err := e.dbTarget.writerFor(webhookID)
w, err := e.dbTarget.writerFor(targetID)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
@@ -470,14 +644,14 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportEnsureArchiveWriter(
return w.path, nil
}
// ExportSweepWriterFor takes a webhook's registry writer exactly
// ExportSweepWriterFor takes a target's registry writer exactly
// as the idle sweep does, reporting whether the sweep had to
// create the entry. It lets a test drive the registry through the
// sweep's own entry point instead of choreographing goroutines.
func (e *Engine) ExportSweepWriterFor(
webhookID string,
targetID string,
) (*ExportArchiveWriter, bool, error) {
w, created, err := e.dbTarget.sweepWriterFor(webhookID)
w, created, err := e.dbTarget.sweepWriterFor(targetID)
if err != nil {
return nil, false, err
}
@@ -488,9 +662,9 @@ func (e *Engine) ExportSweepWriterFor(
// ExportReleaseSweepWriter releases a sweep-created registry entry
// exactly as a finished sweep does.
func (e *Engine) ExportReleaseSweepWriter(
webhookID string, w *ExportArchiveWriter,
targetID string, w *ExportArchiveWriter,
) {
e.dbTarget.releaseSweepWriter(webhookID, w.w)
e.dbTarget.releaseSweepWriter(targetID, w.w)
}
// NewTestArchiveSweeper builds an ArchiveSweeper backed by the
internal/delivery/inflight.go
+110
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
package delivery
import "sync"
// inflightSet records which deliveries the engine currently owns.
//
// A delivery is owned from the moment a task for it is handed to a
// channel or to a retry timer until the engine has no further plan for
// it in memory. Restart recovery and both arms of the periodic sweep
// re-dispatch only deliveries the set does not hold, which is what
// makes them exact rather than a guess about how long a row has sat at
// pending.
//
// This replaces reasoning from timestamps. A delivery's row says
// pending from creation until its outcome is written, which covers
// four different situations — never dispatched, waiting in a channel,
// being attempted right now, and genuinely stranded — and no column
// distinguishes them. Only the engine knows which, and it knows
// exactly. `deliveryChannelSize` is 10000 against 10 workers, so a
// perfectly healthy delivery can wait far longer than any age bound
// worth setting before its attempt even begins; an age bound alone
// re-sends it. See
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/256.
//
// In-memory state is sufficient because a data directory admits one
// process: internal/datadir takes an flock on it at startup and a
// second instance refuses to run. Deliveries owned by a process that
// died are not in any successor's set, and restart recovery is what
// picks those up.
//
// References are counted rather than held as a plain set because
// ownership outlives the worker that took it. A target that schedules
// a retry from inside Deliver adds a reference while the worker still
// holds one, so the delivery stays owned across the gap between the
// worker returning and the timer firing — the window in which a sweep
// would otherwise find the row at retrying and send it again.
//
// The zero value is ready to use, and the Engine holds one by value.
// That is deliberate: an engine built by a constructor that forgot to
// initialise this would not refuse to re-dispatch anything, and the
// symptom would be duplicate deliveries rather than a failure anybody
// notices.
type inflightSet struct {
mu sync.Mutex
ids map[string]int
}
// retain adds a reference to a delivery the caller already knows the
// engine owns, so that ownership survives the current holder letting
// go. It cannot fail.
func (s *inflightSet) retain(deliveryID string) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
if s.ids == nil {
s.ids = make(map[string]int)
}
s.ids[deliveryID]++
}
// retainIdle takes the first reference on a delivery, and reports
// whether it got it. It fails when the engine already owns the
// delivery, which is what makes two claimants — restart recovery and
// the sweep run concurrently, or two sweep arms — mutually exclusive
// rather than merely atomic.
func (s *inflightSet) retainIdle(deliveryID string) bool {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
if s.ids[deliveryID] > 0 {
return false
}
if s.ids == nil {
s.ids = make(map[string]int)
}
s.ids[deliveryID] = 1
return true
}
// release drops one reference. The delivery becomes eligible for
// re-dispatch again once the last one goes.
func (s *inflightSet) release(deliveryID string) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
n := s.ids[deliveryID] - 1
if n <= 0 {
delete(s.ids, deliveryID)
return
}
s.ids[deliveryID] = n
}
// held reports how many deliveries the engine currently owns. It
// exists so a test can assert that ownership is released rather than
// leaked: a reference that is never dropped hides its delivery from
// every sweep for the life of the process, which is the one way this
// mechanism can fail silently.
func (s *inflightSet) held() int {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return len(s.ids)
}
internal/delivery/inflight_test.go
+495
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,495 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// These tests pin the rule that decides whether a delivery may be
// handed back to a worker: the engine re-dispatches only what it does
// not already own. Age alone is not that rule — a healthy delivery
// waiting in a 10000-deep channel is old and must not be re-sent. See
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/256.
// fSweepSetup seeds the main database with the webhook row the sweep
// enumerates, and returns the setup.
func fSweepSetup(
t *testing.T, targetID, name string,
) iSetup {
t.Helper()
s := newISetup(t)
iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID,
s.WebhookID, name,
database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
)
require.NoError(t, s.MainDB.Create(&database.Webhook{
BaseModel: database.BaseModel{ID: s.WebhookID},
UserID: uuid.New().String(),
Name: name,
}).Error)
return s
}
// fDrain collects every task the engine has queued.
//
// Every caller drives the dispatch paths synchronously and has already
// waited for them to return, so anything they queued is in the channel
// by now. The short grace covers nothing but scheduler jitter, and is
// kept small because one of these tests runs the drain forty times.
func fDrain(e *delivery.Engine) []delivery.Task {
var out []delivery.Task
for {
select {
case task := <-e.ExportDeliveryCh():
out = append(out, task)
case task := <-e.ExportRetryCh():
out = append(out, task)
case <-time.After(25 * time.Millisecond):
return out
}
}
}
// TestArchiveHandleIsWAL closes the last gap in the durability
// evidence: the main and per-webhook tiers each assert their journal
// mode on a live handle, and the archive tier gets its settings from
// the same code path but nothing checked the running file.
func TestArchiveHandleIsWAL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-wal.db"),
archiveTestLogger(), 0,
)
require.NoError(t, w.Open(0))
var mode string
row := w.DB().Raw("pragma journal_mode").Row()
require.NoError(t, row.Scan(&mode))
assert.Equal(t, "wal", strings.ToLower(mode))
var busy string
row = w.DB().Raw("pragma busy_timeout").Row()
require.NoError(t, row.Scan(&busy))
assert.Equal(t, "10000", busy)
}
// TestSweepLeavesAQueuedDeliveryAlone is the case the age bound cannot
// see. The delivery is queued and untouched, so its row is arbitrarily
// old and still perfectly healthy; only ownership distinguishes it
// from a stranded one.
func TestSweepLeavesAQueuedDeliveryAlone(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
targetID := uuid.New().String()
s := fSweepSetup(t, targetID, "queued")
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"queued":true}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
rAgePending(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
// Queued exactly as the receiver queues it, and never dequeued:
// no workers are running in this engine.
s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{{
DeliveryID: d.ID,
EventID: event.ID,
WebhookID: s.WebhookID,
TargetID: targetID,
}})
require.Equal(t, 1, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
tasks := fDrain(s.Engine)
assert.Len(
t, tasks, 1,
"the sweep must not queue a delivery that is "+
"already waiting for a worker",
)
}
// TestRecoveryAndSweepDoNotDoubleDispatch drives the two entry points
// the engine starts concurrently against one aged pending row. Before
// ownership they both dispatched it.
func TestRecoveryAndSweepDoNotDoubleDispatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
targetID := uuid.New().String()
s := fSweepSetup(t, targetID, "racing")
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"racing":true}`,
)
ctx := context.Background()
for range 40 {
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
rAgePending(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Go(func() {
s.Engine.ExportRecoverPendingDeliveries(
ctx, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID,
)
})
wg.Go(func() {
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
ctx, s.WebhookID,
)
})
wg.Wait()
tasks := fDrain(s.Engine)
require.Len(
t, tasks, 1,
"delivery %s dispatched %d times",
d.ID, len(tasks),
)
// No worker runs in this engine, so the reference the winner
// took is never released and earlier iterations' deliveries
// stay owned — which is itself the property under test, since
// both paths see them on every subsequent pass.
}
}
// TestConcurrentClaimsOfOneDeliveryYieldOneOwner exercises the
// exclusion directly, rather than arguing it from a SQL predicate.
func TestConcurrentClaimsOfOneDeliveryYieldOneOwner(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
eng := newISetup(t).Engine
deliveryID := uuid.New().String()
var (
wg sync.WaitGroup
mu sync.Mutex
won int
)
for range 64 {
wg.Go(func() {
if eng.ExportRetainDelivery(deliveryID) {
mu.Lock()
won++
mu.Unlock()
}
})
}
wg.Wait()
assert.Equal(t, 1, won)
assert.Equal(t, 1, eng.ExportInflightHeld())
}
// TestOwnershipIsReleasedAfterDelivery guards the other direction: a
// leaked reference hides a delivery from every sweep for the life of
// the process.
func TestOwnershipIsReleasedAfterDelivery(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID,
s.WebhookID, "released",
database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"released":true}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
s.Engine.ExportStart()
defer func() {
require.NoError(
t, s.Engine.ExportStop(context.Background()),
)
}()
body := `{"released":true}`
s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{{
DeliveryID: d.ID,
EventID: event.ID,
WebhookID: s.WebhookID,
TargetID: targetID,
TargetName: "released",
TargetType: database.TargetTypeLog,
Body: &body,
EntrypointID: event.EntrypointID,
}})
iWaitForDelivered(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
assert.Eventually(
t,
func() bool {
return s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld() == 0
},
2*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond,
"the delivery stayed owned after it was delivered",
)
}
// TestNotifyAfterRecoveryDoesNotSendAgain is the startup race of
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/299. The receiver has
// written a delivery, restart recovery finds it pending, sends it and
// releases it, and only then does the receiver's Notify for it arrive.
// Nothing owns the delivery by then, so Notify takes it.
func TestNotifyAfterRecoveryDoesNotSendAgain(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
targetID := uuid.New().String()
s := fSweepSetup(t, targetID, "recovered")
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"recovered":true}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
s.Engine.ExportStart()
defer func() {
require.NoError(
t, s.Engine.ExportStop(context.Background()),
)
}()
// Restart recovery sends the delivery and lets it go.
iWaitForDelivered(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
require.Eventually(
t,
func() bool {
return s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld() == 0
},
5*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond,
)
body := event.Body
s.Engine.Notify([]delivery.Task{{
DeliveryID: d.ID,
EventID: event.ID,
WebhookID: s.WebhookID,
TargetID: targetID,
TargetName: "recovered",
TargetType: database.TargetTypeLog,
Body: &body,
EntrypointID: event.EntrypointID,
}})
// Notify took the delivery, and a worker releases it once it has
// run the task.
require.Eventually(
t,
func() bool {
return s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld() == 0
},
5*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond,
)
assert.Len(
t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID), 1,
"the delivery was sent a second time",
)
}
// TestRetryingRecoverySkipsASuccessfulResult is the retrying-side twin
// of the pending reconcile. A second attempt that reached the receiver
// and whose status write then failed sits at retrying holding a
// successful result, and re-sending it is the same duplicate.
func TestRetryingRecoverySkipsASuccessfulResult(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
targetID := uuid.New().String()
s := fSweepSetup(t, targetID, "retry-settled")
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"retry":true}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
rSeedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID, 1, false)
rSeedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID, 2, true)
s.Engine.ExportRecoverRetryingDeliveries(
s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID,
)
assert.Empty(
t, fDrain(s.Engine),
"a retrying delivery holding a successful result "+
"must not be sent again",
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
}
// TestRetryingSweepSkipsASuccessfulResult is the same rule on the
// periodic sweep's retrying arm.
func TestRetryingSweepSkipsASuccessfulResult(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
targetID := uuid.New().String()
s := fSweepSetup(t, targetID, "retry-swept")
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"swept":true}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
rSeedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID, 1, false)
rSeedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID, 2, true)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
assert.Empty(t, fDrain(s.Engine))
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
var attempts int64
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.
Model(&database.DeliveryResult{}).
Where("delivery_id = ?", d.ID).
Count(&attempts).Error)
assert.Equal(
t, int64(2), attempts,
"settling must not invent an attempt",
)
}
// TestScheduledRetryIsNotSweptDuringBackoff closes the window between
// a target scheduling a retry and the timer firing. The row says
// retrying and nothing is running, which is exactly what an orphaned
// retry looks like from the database.
func TestScheduledRetryIsNotSweptDuringBackoff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
targetID := uuid.New().String()
s := fSweepSetup(t, targetID, "backoff")
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"backoff":true}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
s.Engine.ExportScheduleRetry(delivery.Task{
DeliveryID: d.ID,
EventID: event.ID,
WebhookID: s.WebhookID,
TargetID: targetID,
AttemptNum: 2,
}, time.Hour)
require.Equal(t, 1, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
assert.Empty(
t, fDrain(s.Engine),
"the sweep must not duplicate a retry that is "+
"already scheduled",
)
}
// TestRedispatchStampsTheRow pins the cadence control: a stranded
// delivery that has just been handed out is not selected again by the
// next tick a minute later.
func TestRedispatchStampsTheRow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
targetID := uuid.New().String()
s := fSweepSetup(t, targetID, "stamped")
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"stamped":true}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
rAgePending(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
ctx := context.Background()
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(ctx, s.WebhookID)
require.Len(t, fDrain(s.Engine), 1)
var row database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.
First(&row, "id = ?", d.ID).Error)
assert.WithinDuration(
t, time.Now(), row.UpdatedAt, time.Minute,
"a re-dispatched delivery must be stamped so the "+
"next tick does not select it again",
)
}
internal/delivery/metrics_test.go
+564
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,564 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
dto "github.com/prometheus/client_model/go"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/metrics"
)
// Metric names as exposed on /metrics.
const (
mAttempts = "webhooker_delivery_attempts_total"
mSucceeded = "webhooker_deliveries_succeeded_total"
mFailed = "webhooker_deliveries_failed_total"
mRetries = "webhooker_delivery_retries_total"
mDuration = "webhooker_delivery_duration_seconds"
mPending = "webhooker_deliveries_pending"
mRetrying = "webhooker_deliveries_retrying"
mBreakers = "webhooker_circuit_breakers_open"
)
const (
mTypeHTTP = "http"
mTypeLog = "log"
mTypeUnknown = "unknown"
)
// mIsolate gives the setup's engine a metric set registered on a
// registry this test holds, so its exact assertions can gather from
// it.
func mIsolate(
t *testing.T, s iSetup,
) *prometheus.Registry {
t.Helper()
reg := prometheus.NewRegistry()
s.Engine.ExportSetMetrics(metrics.New(reg))
return reg
}
// mFind returns the series of the named metric carrying the given
// target_type label.
func mFind(
t *testing.T,
reg *prometheus.Registry,
name, targetType string,
) *dto.Metric {
t.Helper()
families, err := reg.Gather()
require.NoError(t, err)
for _, fam := range families {
if fam.GetName() != name {
continue
}
for _, m := range fam.GetMetric() {
for _, label := range m.GetLabel() {
if label.GetName() == "target_type" &&
label.GetValue() == targetType {
return m
}
}
}
}
t.Fatalf(
"metric %s{target_type=%q} not found",
name, targetType,
)
return nil
}
func mCounter(
t *testing.T,
reg *prometheus.Registry,
name, targetType string,
) float64 {
t.Helper()
return mFind(t, reg, name, targetType).
GetCounter().GetValue()
}
func mGauge(
t *testing.T,
reg *prometheus.Registry,
name, targetType string,
) float64 {
t.Helper()
return mFind(t, reg, name, targetType).
GetGauge().GetValue()
}
// mHTTPDurations returns how many samples the delivery duration
// histogram holds for the http target type, which is the type every
// test here times.
func mHTTPDurations(
t *testing.T, reg *prometheus.Registry,
) uint64 {
t.Helper()
return mFind(t, reg, mDuration, mTypeHTTP).
GetHistogram().GetSampleCount()
}
// TestDeliveryMetrics_SuccessAndRetryExhaustion drives one delivery
// that succeeds and one that fails every attempt until its retries
// are exhausted, and asserts every delivery counter across both.
func TestDeliveryMetrics_SuccessAndRetryExhaustion(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
reg := mIsolate(t, s)
mDeliverOK(t, s)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mAttempts, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mSucceeded, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mFailed, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mRetries, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(1),
mHTTPDurations(t, reg))
mExhaustRetries(t, s)
// Two further attempts: the first is retried, the second is
// the last one allowed and fails the delivery terminally.
assert.InDelta(t, 3.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mAttempts, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mSucceeded, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mRetries, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mFailed, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(3),
mHTTPDurations(t, reg))
// Two consecutive failures are below the trip threshold.
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mBreakers, mTypeHTTP), 0)
// The label is the target type and nothing finer: two http
// targets shared one series, and no other type's moved.
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mAttempts, mTypeLog), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mFailed, mTypeLog), 0)
}
// mDeliverOK delivers one event to a target that answers 200.
func mDeliverOK(t *testing.T, s iSetup) {
t.Helper()
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"ok":true}`,
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
body := event.Body
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-ok", iHTTPConfig(ts.URL), 3, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
}
// mExhaustRetries delivers to a target that answers 500 with a
// two-attempt budget, driving both attempts so the delivery ends
// terminally failed.
func mExhaustRetries(t *testing.T, s iSetup) {
t.Helper()
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"ok":false}`,
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
body := event.Body
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
// The retry below is only run if its target still exists; see
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/107.
iCreateTarget(
t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "metrics-fail",
database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, 2,
)
first := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-fail", cfg, 2, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &first)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
// The engine's own scheduler would re-enqueue this after the
// backoff; driving the second attempt directly keeps the test
// deterministic and off the wall clock.
second := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-fail", cfg, 2, 2, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(
context.TODO(), &second,
)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
}
// TestDeliveryMetrics_CircuitBreakerGauge proves the open-breaker
// gauge follows a breaker that trips.
func TestDeliveryMetrics_CircuitBreakerGauge(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
reg := mIsolate(t, s)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"trip":true}`,
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
body := event.Body
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
// A retry budget above the failure threshold, so the breaker
// rather than the budget is what stops the delivery.
maxRetries := delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold + 5
// The retries below are only run if their target still exists;
// see https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/107.
iCreateTarget(
t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "metrics-trip",
database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, maxRetries,
)
first := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-trip", cfg, maxRetries, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &first)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mBreakers, mTypeHTTP), 0)
for attempt := 2; attempt <= delivery.
ExportDefaultFailureThreshold; attempt++ {
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-trip", cfg, maxRetries, attempt, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(
context.TODO(), &task,
)
}
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mBreakers, mTypeHTTP), 0)
}
// TestDeliveryMetrics_BreakerBlockedIsNotAnAttempt proves a delivery
// an open circuit breaker refuses is neither counted as an attempt
// nor observed in the duration histogram.
//
// It sends nothing and records no result row, so counting it would
// climb the attempts counter with no traffic behind it and pull the
// duration quantiles down with near-zero samples for as long as the
// breaker stayed open — the metric moving the wrong way during the
// outage it exists to reveal.
func TestDeliveryMetrics_BreakerBlockedIsNotAnAttempt(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
reg := mIsolate(t, s)
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"blocked":true}`,
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
body := event.Body
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
maxRetries := delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold + 5
iCreateTarget(
t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "metrics-blocked",
database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, maxRetries,
)
first := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-blocked", cfg, maxRetries, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &first)
for attempt := 2; attempt <= delivery.
ExportDefaultFailureThreshold; attempt++ {
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-blocked", cfg, maxRetries, attempt, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(context.TODO(), &task)
}
require.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mBreakers, mTypeHTTP), 0,
"breaker should be open before the blocked attempt")
threshold := float64(
delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold,
)
assert.InDelta(t, threshold,
mCounter(t, reg, mAttempts, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(threshold),
mHTTPDurations(t, reg))
retriesBefore := mCounter(t, reg, mRetries, mTypeHTTP)
blocked := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"metrics-blocked", cfg, maxRetries,
delivery.ExportDefaultFailureThreshold+1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(context.TODO(), &blocked)
// The breaker refused it: rescheduled without rewriting the
// retrying status it already had, so the retry counter did not
// move, and nothing was attempted or timed.
assert.InDelta(t, retriesBefore,
mCounter(t, reg, mRetries, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, threshold,
mCounter(t, reg, mAttempts, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(threshold),
mHTTPDurations(t, reg))
}
// TestDeliveryMetrics_OrphanedRetryFailureLabelled proves the
// terminal failure of a delivery whose target no longer retries is
// counted against the target's real type, not against unknown. The
// type is threaded in as an argument because populating d.Target on
// that path would write the target row into the per-webhook database
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206).
func TestDeliveryMetrics_OrphanedRetryFailureLabelled(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
reg := mIsolate(t, s)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "orphaned-label",
)
deliveryID := iSeedRetryingWithType(
t, s, database.TargetTypeLog,
)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertStatus(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mCounter(t, reg, mFailed, mTypeLog), 0)
}
// TestDeliveryMetrics_QueueDepthGauges proves the sampler publishes
// the queued deliveries it finds in the per-webhook databases, and
// that a drained queue reads zero rather than keeping its last
// value.
func TestDeliveryMetrics_QueueDepthGauges(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
reg := mIsolate(t, s)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "queue-depth",
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID,
"queue-depth-target", database.TargetTypeHTTP,
iHTTPConfig("https://example.com/hook"), 3,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"queued":true}`,
)
pending := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
retrying := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
s.Engine.ExportSampleQueueDepths(context.Background())
assert.InDelta(t, 2.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mPending, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mRetrying, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mPending, mTypeLog), 0)
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.
Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("id IN ?", []string{pending.ID, retrying.ID}).
Update(
"status", database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
).Error)
s.Engine.ExportSampleQueueDepths(context.Background())
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mPending, mTypeHTTP), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mRetrying, mTypeHTTP), 0)
}
// TestDeliveryMetrics_QueueDepthDeletedTarget proves a backlog queued
// against a target that has since been deleted stays visible, in the
// unknown series, instead of being dropped. That backlog is the one
// nobody is watching, so losing it would defeat the queue-depth
// alerting this metric exists for.
func TestDeliveryMetrics_QueueDepthDeletedTarget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
reg := mIsolate(t, s)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "deleted-target",
)
// No target row is created: this is a delivery whose target was
// deleted out from under it.
targetID := uuid.New().String()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"orphan":true}`,
)
iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
s.Engine.ExportSampleQueueDepths(context.Background())
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mPending, mTypeUnknown), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 1.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mRetrying, mTypeUnknown), 0)
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0,
mGauge(t, reg, mPending, mTypeHTTP), 0)
}
internal/delivery/queue_depth.go
+196
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
package delivery
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// queueDepthSampleInterval is how often the pending and retrying
// queue depths are counted and published as gauges.
const queueDepthSampleInterval = 30 * time.Second
// queueDepthSampler publishes the pending and retrying queue depths
// on a timer for as long as the engine runs.
//
// The depths are counted out of the databases rather than tracked as
// deltas alongside the status transitions. A delta counter would have
// to be seeded correctly at startup from rows written by a previous
// process, and would drift permanently on any transition that failed
// to persist. Counting is the measurement that cannot go wrong, and
// it is the same whole-database walk the retry sweep already makes.
func (e *Engine) queueDepthSampler(ctx context.Context) {
defer e.wg.Done()
ticker := time.NewTicker(queueDepthSampleInterval)
defer ticker.Stop()
e.sampleQueueDepths(ctx)
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
e.sampleQueueDepths(ctx)
}
}
}
// sampleQueueDepths counts every queued delivery across all
// per-webhook databases and publishes the result.
func (e *Engine) sampleQueueDepths(ctx context.Context) {
if e.database == nil || e.dbManager == nil {
return
}
types, err := e.targetTypesByID()
if err != nil {
e.log.Error(
"queue depth sample: failed to load target types",
"error", err,
)
return
}
var webhookIDs []string
err = e.database.DB().
Model(&database.Webhook{}).
Pluck("id", &webhookIDs).Error
if err != nil {
e.log.Error(
"queue depth sample: failed to query webhook IDs",
"error", err,
)
return
}
pending := make(map[database.TargetType]int)
retrying := make(map[database.TargetType]int)
for _, webhookID := range webhookIDs {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
default:
}
if !e.dbManager.DBExists(webhookID) {
continue
}
e.sampleWebhookQueueDepths(
webhookID, types, pending, retrying,
)
}
e.mtr.SetQueueDepths(pending, retrying)
}
// targetTypesByID maps every configured target id to its type. The
// deliveries live in the per-webhook databases but carry only a
// target id, so the type label has to come from the main database.
//
// Find rather than Scan: see sampleWebhookQueueDepths.
func (e *Engine) targetTypesByID() (
map[string]database.TargetType, error,
) {
var rows []struct {
ID string
Type database.TargetType
}
err := e.database.DB().
Model(&database.Target{}).
Select("id", "type").
Find(&rows).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("loading targets: %w", err)
}
types := make(map[string]database.TargetType, len(rows))
for _, row := range rows {
types[row.ID] = row.Type
}
return types, nil
}
// sampleWebhookQueueDepths adds one webhook's queued deliveries into
// the running totals.
//
// A delivery whose target has since been deleted is not in the type
// map and so counts under the empty target type. Set.SetQueueDepths
// folds that into the unknown series rather than dropping it: a
// backlog stuck behind a deleted target is a backlog that still needs
// to be alertable.
//
// The aggregate is read with Find, not Scan. (*gorm.DB).Scan swaps
// GORM's own trace recorder in for the logging adapter, and that
// recorder does not implement gorm.ParamsFilter, so the statement
// reaches the log with its bound values interpolated — here, the
// status list. Find goes through the normal query callback, which is
// filtered. See internal/gormlog and its scan_guard_test.go.
func (e *Engine) sampleWebhookQueueDepths(
webhookID string,
types map[string]database.TargetType,
pending, retrying map[database.TargetType]int,
) {
webhookDB, err := e.dbManager.GetDB(webhookID)
if err != nil {
e.log.Error(
"queue depth sample: failed to get webhook database",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"error", err,
)
return
}
var rows []struct {
TargetID string
Status database.DeliveryStatus
Depth int
}
err = webhookDB.
Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Select("target_id", "status", "count(*) as depth").
Where("status IN ?", []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
}).
Group("target_id, status").
Find(&rows).Error
if err != nil {
e.log.Error(
"queue depth sample: "+
"failed to count queued deliveries",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"error", err,
)
return
}
for _, row := range rows {
targetType := types[row.TargetID]
switch row.Status {
case database.DeliveryStatusPending:
pending[targetType] += row.Depth
case database.DeliveryStatusRetrying:
retrying[targetType] += row.Depth
case database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed:
// Excluded by the query above: a delivery that has
// reached a terminal state is not queued.
}
}
}
internal/delivery/queue_depth_gormlog_test.go
+175
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
)
// qdAggregateMarker identifies the queue-depth aggregate in the
// captured SQL. It is the one statement in this test that binds
// anything, and the raw count() expression appears in no other.
const qdAggregateMarker = "count(*)"
// qdSyncBuf collects log output from whichever goroutine GORM writes
// on.
type qdSyncBuf struct {
mu sync.Mutex
b bytes.Buffer
}
func (q *qdSyncBuf) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
q.mu.Lock()
defer q.mu.Unlock()
return q.b.Write(p)
}
func (q *qdSyncBuf) String() string {
q.mu.Lock()
defer q.mu.Unlock()
return q.b.String()
}
// qdMainDB opens a main database whose GORM logger is the service's
// adapter, writing through log.
func qdMainDB(t *testing.T, log *slog.Logger) *gorm.DB {
t.Helper()
sqlDB, err := database.OpenSQLite(
filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "main-gormlog.db"),
database.SQLiteModeCreate,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sqlDB.Close() })
db, err := gorm.Open(
sqlite.Dialector{Conn: sqlDB},
&gorm.Config{Logger: gormlog.New(log)},
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, db.AutoMigrate(
&database.Webhook{},
&database.Target{},
))
return db
}
// qdLinesContaining returns every captured line carrying marker.
func qdLinesContaining(out, marker string) []string {
var found []string
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(out, "\n") {
if strings.Contains(line, marker) {
found = append(found, line)
}
}
return found
}
// TestQueueDepthSample_LogsNoBoundValue holds the queue-depth sampler
// to the values-off property internal/gormlog exists to provide.
//
// The aggregate binds the delivery status list. Read with
// (*gorm.DB).Scan it was logged with those values interpolated, because
// Scan records the statement through GORM's own traceRecorder, which
// does not implement gorm.ParamsFilter. Read with Find it goes through
// the normal query callback and the adapter's filter applies. Restore
// the Scan call in queue_depth.go and this fails on the status literals
// below; scan_guard_test.go catches the same regression statically.
func TestQueueDepthSample_LogsNoBoundValue(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
buf := &qdSyncBuf{}
log := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
))
mainDB := qdMainDB(t, log)
dbMgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManagerWithLogger(
t.TempDir(), log,
)
webhookID := uuid.New().String()
webhookDB := iSeedWebhookDB(t, dbMgr, webhookID)
iCreateWebhook(t, mainDB, webhookID, "queue-depth-gormlog")
targetID := uuid.New().String()
iCreateTarget(t, mainDB, targetID, webhookID,
"queue-depth-gormlog-target", database.TargetTypeHTTP,
iHTTPConfig("https://example.com/hook"), 3,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, webhookDB, webhookID, `{"queued":true}`,
)
iSeedDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
iSeedDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
engine := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
database.NewTestDatabase(mainDB),
dbMgr,
log,
&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
2,
)
engine.ExportSampleQueueDepths(context.Background())
out := buf.String()
lines := qdLinesContaining(out, qdAggregateMarker)
require.NotEmpty(
t, lines,
"the queue-depth aggregate was never logged, so the "+
"assertions below are vacuous",
)
for _, line := range lines {
assert.Contains(
t, line, "?",
"the aggregate was logged without its placeholders: %s",
line,
)
for _, status := range []database.DeliveryStatus{
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
} {
assert.NotContains(
t, line, string(status),
"a bound status value was interpolated into the "+
"logged statement: %s", line,
)
}
}
}
internal/delivery/recovery_durability_test.go
+378
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// These tests cover the delivery half of
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/256: a delivery that
// reached its receiver but whose bookkeeping write failed used to be
// left at pending and re-sent on the next restart, giving the receiver
// a second copy while the event log recorded one attempt.
// rSeedResult records a DeliveryResult against a delivery, standing in
// for the attempt row the send path writes before the status.
func rSeedResult(
t *testing.T,
db *gorm.DB,
deliveryID string,
attemptNum int,
success bool,
) {
t.Helper()
require.NoError(t, db.Create(&database.DeliveryResult{
DeliveryID: deliveryID,
AttemptNum: attemptNum,
Success: success,
}).Error)
}
// rAgePending backdates a delivery past the sweep's age bound, which is
// what separates a stranded delivery from one a worker still holds.
func rAgePending(
t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB, deliveryID string,
) {
t.Helper()
old := time.Now().Add(
-2 * delivery.ExportPendingSweepMinAge,
)
require.NoError(t, db.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("id = ?", deliveryID).
UpdateColumn("updated_at", old).Error)
}
func TestRecoverySkipsPendingWithSuccessfulResult(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID,
s.WebhookID, "already-delivered",
database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"delivered":true}`,
)
// The delivery whose send succeeded and whose result row landed:
// only the status write failed, so it sits at pending.
done := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
rSeedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, done.ID, 1, true)
// A delivery that was genuinely never attempted.
fresh := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
s.Engine.ExportRecoverPendingDeliveries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID,
)
select {
case task := <-s.Engine.ExportDeliveryCh():
assert.Equal(
t, fresh.ID, task.DeliveryID,
"only the unattempted delivery may be re-sent",
)
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("expected the unattempted delivery")
}
select {
case task := <-s.Engine.ExportDeliveryCh():
t.Fatalf(
"re-sent an already delivered delivery: %s",
task.DeliveryID,
)
case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
}
// It is settled rather than merely skipped: leaving it pending
// would strand it again on the next sweep.
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, done.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
}
// TestRecoveryContinuesTheAttemptNumbering pins the audit trail: a
// recovered delivery that already recorded two attempts is re-sent as
// attempt three, not as attempt one again.
func TestRecoveryContinuesTheAttemptNumbering(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
iCreateTarget(t, s.MainDB, targetID,
s.WebhookID, "numbering",
database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"numbering":true}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
rSeedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID, 1, false)
rSeedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID, 2, false)
s.Engine.ExportRecoverPendingDeliveries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID,
)
select {
case task := <-s.Engine.ExportDeliveryCh():
assert.Equal(t, d.ID, task.DeliveryID)
assert.Equal(t, 3, task.AttemptNum)
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("expected the delivery to be recovered")
}
}
// TestSweepRecoversStrandedPending is the half that removes the
// restart requirement: a delivery left at pending is picked up by the
// periodic sweep.
func TestSweepRecoversStrandedPending(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
targetID := uuid.New().String()
s := fSweepSetup(t, targetID, "stranded")
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"stranded":true}`,
)
stranded := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
rAgePending(t, s.WebhookDB, stranded.ID)
// A delivery a worker may still be holding: young, and therefore
// none of the sweep's business.
inFlight := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
select {
case task := <-s.Engine.ExportDeliveryCh():
assert.Equal(t, stranded.ID, task.DeliveryID)
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("expected the stranded delivery")
}
select {
case task := <-s.Engine.ExportDeliveryCh():
t.Fatalf(
"swept an in-flight delivery: %s",
task.DeliveryID,
)
case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
}
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, inFlight.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
}
// TestSweepClaimsAStrandedDeliveryOnlyOnce guards the repeat the sweep
// would otherwise be: the row stays pending for as long as the attempt
// runs, and a sweep a minute later must not send it a second time.
func TestSweepClaimsAStrandedDeliveryOnlyOnce(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
targetID := uuid.New().String()
s := fSweepSetup(t, targetID, "claimed")
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"claimed":true}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
rAgePending(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
ctx := context.Background()
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(ctx, s.WebhookID)
select {
case task := <-s.Engine.ExportDeliveryCh():
assert.Equal(t, d.ID, task.DeliveryID)
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("expected the stranded delivery")
}
// The delivery is still pending — nothing has run it yet — but
// the claim must keep the next sweep off it.
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(ctx, s.WebhookID)
select {
case task := <-s.Engine.ExportDeliveryCh():
t.Fatalf(
"sent a claimed delivery again: %s",
task.DeliveryID,
)
case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
}
}
// TestSweepSettlesStrandedPendingWithoutResending is the sweep's own
// version of the reconcile: a stranded delivery holding a successful
// result is settled where it stands, and the receiver hears nothing.
func TestSweepSettlesStrandedPendingWithoutResending(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
targetID := uuid.New().String()
s := fSweepSetup(t, targetID, "settled")
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"settled":true}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
rSeedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID, 1, true)
rAgePending(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
select {
case task := <-s.Engine.ExportDeliveryCh():
t.Fatalf(
"re-sent a delivery that already succeeded: %s",
task.DeliveryID,
)
case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
}
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
var attempts int64
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.
Model(&database.DeliveryResult{}).
Where("delivery_id = ?", d.ID).
Count(&attempts).Error)
assert.Equal(
t, int64(1), attempts,
"settling must not invent an attempt",
)
}
// TestFailedResultWriteLeavesDeliveryRecoverable is the rule the
// targets now follow: a bookkeeping write that fails must not advance
// the status, because pending and retrying are the states the sweeps
// recover and delivered is a claim the database refused to record.
func TestFailedResultWriteLeavesDeliveryRecoverable(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
var hits atomic.Int64
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
hits.Add(1)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
},
))
defer ts.Close()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"unwritable":true}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
// Drop the table the attempt row goes in, so the send succeeds
// and only the bookkeeping write fails.
require.NoError(
t,
s.WebhookDB.Exec("drop table delivery_results").Error,
)
full := &database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: targetID,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusPending,
Event: event,
Target: database.Target{
Name: "unwritable",
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: iHTTPConfig(ts.URL),
},
}
full.ID = d.ID
s.Engine.ExportDeliverHTTP(
context.Background(), s.WebhookDB, full,
&delivery.Task{DeliveryID: d.ID, AttemptNum: 1},
)
assert.Equal(
t, int64(1), hits.Load(),
"the send itself must still happen",
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
}
internal/delivery/redirect.go
+107
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
package delivery
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
)
// maxDeliveryRedirects caps a redirect chain. Installing a
// CheckRedirect replaces net/http's default policy including its
// own limit, so the limit is restated rather than dropped.
const maxDeliveryRedirects = 10
// schemeHTTPS names the scheme the origin comparison treats
// specially: a step down from it is never the same origin.
const schemeHTTPS = "https"
var errTooManyRedirects = errors.New("too many redirects")
// offOriginHeaderPolicy returns a CheckRedirect that drops every
// origin-scoped header once a redirect leaves the origin the
// operator configured. names is the set applyRequestHeaders
// reports: the operator's configured headers and the inbound event
// headers this delivery forwarded, under one rule rather than two.
//
// net/http withholds Authorization and Cookie across a host change
// and forwards everything else. A target header is routinely a
// credential under another name — X-Api-Key, PRIVATE-TOKEN,
// X-Auth-Token — and a forwarded inbound header is routinely a
// sender's signature — X-Hub-Signature — so an open redirect at an
// otherwise trusted destination would hand either to a host the
// operator never named. Redirects are still followed: refusing them
// would break every destination that legitimately redirects and
// would record the 3xx as the delivery's result.
//
// The strip is per hop, not permanent: net/http re-copies the
// initial request's headers for every hop, so a chain that returns
// to the configured origin carries them again, exactly as net/http
// treats Authorization.
//
// Each hop is dialled through the same SSRF-safe transport, whose
// guard runs per connection, so a redirect aimed at a private or
// reserved address is still refused at connect time.
func offOriginHeaderPolicy(
names []string,
) func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
return func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= maxDeliveryRedirects {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: stopped after %d",
errTooManyRedirects, maxDeliveryRedirects,
)
}
if sameDeliveryOrigin(via[0].URL, req.URL) {
return nil
}
for _, name := range names {
req.Header.Del(name)
}
return nil
}
}
// sameDeliveryOrigin reports whether dest is close enough to the
// configured target URL to keep carrying its origin-scoped headers.
//
// This is stricter than the rule net/http applies to Authorization:
// the port is part of the comparison (a different port is a
// different service), and a subdomain of the configured host is not
// the same origin. An https origin stepping down to http is never
// the same origin whatever the hosts are, because that puts the
// header on the wire in clear.
func sameDeliveryOrigin(origin, dest *url.URL) bool {
if origin.Scheme == schemeHTTPS && dest.Scheme != schemeHTTPS {
return false
}
return originHostPort(origin) == originHostPort(dest)
}
// originHostPort renders a URL's host for comparison, lowercased
// and with the scheme's default port normalised away so that
// "https://h" and "https://h:443" are one origin.
//
// The port is joined with net.JoinHostPort rather than a bare
// colon: Hostname() unwraps an IPv6 literal's brackets, so
// "[2001:db8::1]:8080" and "[2001:db8::1:8080]" — a different
// address on a different port — would otherwise render the same
// string and pass as one origin.
func originHostPort(u *url.URL) string {
host := strings.ToLower(u.Hostname())
port := u.Port()
if port == "" ||
(u.Scheme == "http" && port == "80") ||
(u.Scheme == schemeHTTPS && port == "443") {
return host
}
return net.JoinHostPort(host, port)
}
internal/delivery/redirect_test.go
+391
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// The headers these tests drive stand in for the two classes the
// off-origin rule covers: an operator-configured credential and an
// inbound header the delivery path forwards. net/http withholds
// Authorization and Cookie across a host change, and nothing else.
const (
probeHeaderName = "X-Api-Key"
probeHeaderValue = "QQNEVERONTHEWIREQQ"
inboundHeaderName = "X-Hub-Signature"
inboundHeaderValue = "sha1=QQINBOUNDQQ"
)
// redirectProbe records what the last hop of a redirect chain
// actually received.
type redirectProbe struct {
mu sync.Mutex
seen http.Header
hits int
}
func (p *redirectProbe) serve(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
) {
p.mu.Lock()
p.seen = r.Header.Clone()
p.hits++
p.mu.Unlock()
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
func (p *redirectProbe) result() (http.Header, int) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
return p.seen, p.hits
}
// deliverWithProbeHeaders runs one real delivery of a new task
// through the engine to targetURL, carrying both probe headers —
// probeHeaderName configured on the target, inboundHeaderName
// forwarded from the event — and returns the delivery status the
// engine recorded.
func deliverWithProbeHeaders(
t *testing.T, targetURL string,
) database.DeliveryStatus {
t.Helper()
s := newISetup(t)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"hello":"world"}`,
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
inbound, err := json.Marshal(map[string][]string{
inboundHeaderName: {inboundHeaderValue},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
event.Headers = string(inbound)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
cfg, err := json.Marshal(delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
URL: targetURL,
Headers: map[string]string{
probeHeaderName: probeHeaderValue,
},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
body := event.Body
task := iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID,
"redirect-target", string(cfg), 0, 1, &body,
)
s.Engine.ExportProcessNewTask(context.TODO(), &task)
var updated database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.First(
&updated, "id = ?", d.ID,
).Error)
return updated.Status
}
// A 302 to an origin the operator never configured must not carry
// the credential they configured for the one they did, nor the
// inbound header this delivery forwarded — one rule for both
// classes. The chain is still followed, so the delivery is recorded
// from the final hop.
func TestDelivery_CrossOriginRedirectDropsOriginScopedHeaders(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var probe redirectProbe
final := httptest.NewServer(
http.HandlerFunc(probe.serve),
)
defer final.Close()
// httptest listens on loopback, so reach the second server
// under loopback's other name: the hop then differs in
// hostname as well as port and is cross-host by any reading.
finalURL, err := url.Parse(final.URL)
require.NoError(t, err)
finalURL.Host = "localhost:" + finalURL.Port()
finalURL.Path = "/moved"
origin := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(
w, r, finalURL.String(),
http.StatusFound,
)
},
))
defer origin.Close()
status := deliverWithProbeHeaders(t, origin.URL)
seen, hits := probe.result()
assert.Equal(t, 1, hits,
"the redirect must still be followed",
)
assert.Empty(t, seen.Get(probeHeaderName),
"a configured credential header must not reach an "+
"origin the operator did not configure",
)
assert.Empty(t, seen.Get(inboundHeaderName),
"a forwarded inbound header must not reach an origin "+
"the operator did not configure",
)
assert.Equal(t,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, status,
"the final hop's 200 is the delivery's result",
)
}
// Stripping must not fire within the configured origin, or every
// destination that redirects its own path would lose its
// credential and start answering 401 — and would lose the inbound
// signature header the target endpoint verifies. webhooker's own
// receiver verifies no signature; it only forwards the header.
func TestDelivery_SameOriginRedirectKeepsOriginScopedHeaders(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
var probe redirectProbe
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/moved" {
probe.serve(w, r)
return
}
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/moved", http.StatusFound,
)
},
))
defer srv.Close()
status := deliverWithProbeHeaders(t, srv.URL+"/hook")
seen, hits := probe.result()
assert.Equal(t, 1, hits)
assert.Equal(t, probeHeaderValue, seen.Get(probeHeaderName),
"a redirect within the configured origin must keep "+
"the configured header",
)
assert.Equal(t,
inboundHeaderValue, seen.Get(inboundHeaderName),
"a redirect within the configured origin must keep "+
"the forwarded inbound header",
)
assert.Equal(t,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered, status,
)
}
// The origin comparison is deliberately stricter than the one
// net/http applies to Authorization: the port counts and a
// subdomain does not inherit. Only the default-port spellings of
// one origin are the same origin.
func TestSameDeliveryOrigin(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The configured target URL every case redirects away from.
// Destination paths differ only so that no literal repeats.
const configured = "https://h/a"
cases := map[string]struct {
origin string
dest string
want bool
}{
"other path": {configured, "https://h/b", true},
"default port spelled": {configured, "https://h:443/c", true},
"host in another case": {configured, "https://H/d", true},
"http default port": {"http://h:80/a", "http://h/e", true},
"upgrade to https": {"http://h/a", "https://h/f", true},
"downgrade to http": {configured, "http://h/g", false},
"another host": {configured, "https://i/h", false},
"a subdomain": {configured, "https://x.h/i", false},
"the parent domain": {"https://x.h/a", "https://h/j", false},
"another port": {configured, "https://h:8443/k", false},
// Hostname() unwraps an IPv6 literal's brackets, so a
// bracketed host whose last group is the origin's port
// renders identically to the origin unless the port is
// re-joined with brackets. Each dest below differs from
// its origin in address AND in port.
"ipv6 port as final group": {
"https://[2001:db8::1]:8080/a",
"https://[2001:db8::1:8080]/l",
false,
},
"ipv6 loopback port as final group": {
"https://[::1]:8080/a",
"https://[::1:8080]/m",
false,
},
"ipv6 same origin": {
"https://[2001:db8::1]:8080/a",
"https://[2001:DB8::1]:8080/n",
true,
},
}
for name, tc := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
origin, err := url.Parse(tc.origin)
require.NoError(t, err)
dest, err := url.Parse(tc.dest)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tc.want,
delivery.ExportSameDeliveryOrigin(
origin, dest,
),
)
})
}
}
// Installing a CheckRedirect discards net/http's own redirect
// limit, so the cap this policy restates is the only thing between
// a self-redirecting destination and an unbounded chain. A
// destination that always redirects must be cut off after exactly
// maxDeliveryRedirects requests, with the sentinel surfacing to the
// caller rather than a generic net/http error.
func TestRedirectPolicy_StopsAtHopCap(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var hits atomic.Int64
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
hits.Add(1)
http.Redirect(
w, r, "/loop", http.StatusFound,
)
},
))
defer srv.Close()
engine := delivery.NewTestEngine(
slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
&http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second},
1,
)
client := engine.ExportClientForRequest(
&delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{URL: srv.URL},
[]string{probeHeaderName},
)
require.NotNil(t, client.CheckRedirect)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, srv.URL, http.NoBody,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp, doErr := client.Do(req)
if resp != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
require.Error(t, doErr,
"an endless redirect chain must not be followed forever",
)
require.ErrorIs(t, doErr, delivery.ErrExportTooManyRedirects)
assert.Equal(t,
int64(delivery.ExportMaxDeliveryRedirects), hits.Load(),
"the chain must stop after exactly %d hops",
delivery.ExportMaxDeliveryRedirects,
)
}
// The set the redirect policy strips is whatever the delivery path
// actually put on the wire, so a header added to the forward set is
// covered without a second edit. A header the event never carried
// is not in the set, and neither is the inbound Content-Type, because
// it is not forwarded. Two more are deliberately excluded: a
// Content-Type configured on the target describes the body, which a
// 307 carries across hosts, and the inbound User-Agent every real
// sender supplies is overwritten before the request goes out.
func TestApplyRequestHeaders_ReportsOriginScopedNames(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
inbound, err := json.Marshal(map[string][]string{
inboundHeaderName: {inboundHeaderValue},
"Content-Type": {testContentType},
"User-Agent": {"curl/8.7.1"},
"Host": {"inbound.example.com"},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost,
"https://target.example.com/hook",
http.NoBody,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
names := delivery.ExportApplyRequestHeaders(
req,
&database.Event{
Headers: string(inbound),
ContentType: testContentType,
},
&delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
Headers: map[string]string{
probeHeaderName: probeHeaderValue,
"Content-Type": testContentType,
},
},
"webhooker/dev",
)
assert.Equal(t,
[]string{probeHeaderName, inboundHeaderName}, names,
"both header classes are reported, and only those: "+
"Host and the inbound Content-Type are never "+
"forwarded, User-Agent is the delivery path's own",
)
assert.NotContains(t, names, "Content-Type",
"a Content-Type configured on the target must survive "+
"a cross-origin 307/308 with the body it describes",
)
}
internal/delivery/ssrf.go
+332 -51
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,11 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
)
const (
@@ -22,41 +25,243 @@ var (
errNoIPs = errors.New(
"hostname resolved to no IP addresses",
)
errBlockedIP = errors.New(
"blocked private/reserved IP range",
// ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP reports an address in the
// default blocklist's private and reserved ranges,
// blockedNetworks.
ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP = errors.New(
"blocked private or reserved address",
)
// errBlockedPublicMetadata reports a public address on the
// default blocklist, one in blockedPublicNetworks.
errBlockedPublicMetadata = errors.New(
"blocked cloud metadata address",
)
errBlockedMetadata = errors.New(
"blocked link-local, cloud instance metadata or " +
"unspecified address: ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS cannot open it",
)
errInvalidScheme = errors.New(
"only http and https are allowed",
)
)
// blockedNetworks contains all private/reserved IP ranges
// that should be blocked to prevent SSRF attacks.
// blockedNetworks and blockedPublicNetworks together are the
// default blocklist: the private and reserved IP ranges, plus
// the public cloud metadata addresses, that are blocked to
// prevent SSRF attacks. An operator can permit specific blocks
// out of this set with ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS; see Guard.
//
// blockedNetworks holds the private and reserved IP ranges.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
var blockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
// blockedPublicNetworks holds the default blocklist's public
// addresses, kept apart from blockedNetworks so that they are
// refused as cloud metadata addresses, never as private or
// reserved ones.
//
// A public address belongs on the default blocklist only if it
// hands credentials, user data or bootstrap material to whatever
// can reach it, without the caller presenting anything; it goes
// in this list. A provider's other public addresses are not
// refused, since reaching them can be legitimate and no list of
// them could be complete.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
var blockedPublicNetworks []*net.IPNet
// alwaysBlockedNetworks are the ranges no configuration can
// open, so a supplied CIDR that covers one still leaves it
// blocked. An entry is here for one of two reasons: it is a
// metadata endpoint (the link-local blocks and the cloud
// instance metadata endpoints that live outside them), or it is
// an unspecified address. Reaching a metadata endpoint is
// credential or user-data theft rather than delivery to an
// internal service.
//
// Inclusion criterion for metadata endpoints — one belongs here
// only if BOTH hold, and every metadata entry below satisfies
// both:
//
// 1. It is a fixed address assigned by the provider, or a
// range reserved by IANA — never one the operator chose.
// That is what makes a host route free: it cannot collide
// with anything the operator runs.
// 2. Reaching it discloses credentials, or user data or
// bootstrap material — something granting onward access, or
// not cheaply rotated.
//
// Both halves are load-bearing, so use them to refuse a
// metadata candidate and say why. An endpoint disclosing only
// the operator's own inventory (instance id, region, disks, NICs)
// fails (2): letting a delivery target reach the operator's own
// infrastructure is the feature ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS exists to
// provide. But (2) is not "IAM credentials only" either —
// fd00:42::42 serves /user_data and /conf rather than tokens,
// and user data routinely carries bootstrap secrets. An address
// stays out if it fails (1) however well it clears (2): a host
// route inside a block operators really assign from, such as
// 10.0.0.0/8, can collide with a real internal service and
// forfeits the justification in (1).
//
// A publicly routable unicast address does not belong here even
// when it clears both halves. Nothing in this list can be
// reopened, so putting a public address here leaves the operator
// no escape hatch at all — the condition ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS
// exists to remove. Default-block it in blockedPublicNetworks
// instead, which an allowlist can override.
//
// This is a criterion, not an enumeration of every metadata
// address in existence.
//
// The unspecified addresses 0.0.0.0 and :: are here for a
// separate reason: they disclose nothing, but no host can have
// either, and on Linux a connection to one reaches this host's
// own loopback. Listing them means an allowlist reaches loopback
// only through an entry that covers a loopback address
// (127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128, 0.0.0.0/0), never through one that
// covers only 0.0.0.0 or :: (0.0.0.0/8, for example). Nothing
// else lives at either address, so refusing them costs nothing.
//
// Every entry is either already in blockedNetworks — this list is
// what makes it unconditional — or an alternate encoding of
// 169.254.169.254 that Contains does not match against
// 169.254.0.0/16. Every entry outside the link-local blocks is a
// /32 or /128 host route, so blocking it costs an operator
// nothing else on the surrounding network.
//
// Derive membership from the address, never from the vendor's
// prose. Several providers call these endpoints "link-local" or
// even "localhost" in their own documentation while the address
// is a ULA outside fe80::/10, so a set derived from the docs
// comes out wrong.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // package-level network list is appropriate here
var alwaysBlockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
//nolint:gochecknoinits // init is the idiomatic way to parse CIDRs once at startup
func init() {
cidrs := []string{
blockedNetworks = mustParseCIDRs([]string{
// IPv4 loopback.
"127.0.0.0/8",
// RFC 1918 private network.
"10.0.0.0/8",
// RFC 1918 private network.
"172.16.0.0/12",
// RFC 1918 private network.
"192.168.0.0/16",
// IPv4 link-local.
"169.254.0.0/16",
// "This network", holding the IPv4 unspecified address 0.0.0.0.
"0.0.0.0/8",
// Carrier-grade NAT shared address space.
"100.64.0.0/10",
// IETF protocol assignments.
"192.0.0.0/24",
// IPv4 documentation (TEST-NET-1).
"192.0.2.0/24",
// Benchmarking.
"198.18.0.0/15",
// IPv4 documentation (TEST-NET-2).
"198.51.100.0/24",
// IPv4 documentation (TEST-NET-3).
"203.0.113.0/24",
// IPv4 multicast.
"224.0.0.0/4",
// Reserved, including the broadcast address.
"240.0.0.0/4",
// IPv6 loopback.
"::1/128",
// IPv6 unspecified address.
"::/128",
// IPv6 unique local addresses.
"fc00::/7",
// IPv6 link-local.
"fe80::/10",
}
// IPv6 multicast.
"ff00::/8",
// IPv6 documentation.
"2001:db8::/32",
})
blockedPublicNetworks = mustParseCIDRs([]string{
// Azure WireServer, a public address that serves VM credentials.
"168.63.129.16/32",
})
// Every entry is named. The set must not grow or shrink
// without a matching change to
// TestAlwaysBlockedNetworks_PinnedSet.
//
// The IPv4-mapped form ::ffff:169.254.169.254 needs no
// entry: net.IPNet.Contains normalises it via To4() before
// comparing, so 169.254.0.0/16 already matches it. To4()
// does not normalise the IPv4-compatible or NAT64 forms,
// which is why those are listed separately.
alwaysBlockedNetworks = mustParseCIDRs([]string{
// IPv4 link-local, carrying the 169.254.169.254
// metadata service used by AWS, Azure, DigitalOcean,
// Hetzner, OpenStack and others. Not Alibaba, which uses
// 100.100.100.200 below exclusively.
"169.254.0.0/16",
// IPv6 link-local, its IPv6 counterpart.
"fe80::/10",
// IPv6 metadata endpoints in ULA space. Each is a host
// route, and fd00::/8 is an ordinary block for an
// operator to allowlist, so without these entries that
// one allowlist line hands out cloud credentials on
// every provider below.
//
// AWS IPv6 IMDS.
"fd00:ec2::254/128",
// AWS EKS Pod Identity Agent, which issues pod identity
// credentials. A second AWS endpoint, distinct from
// IMDS above. AWS's own docs call it "localhost".
"fd00:ec2::23/128",
// GCP metadata server for IPv6-only instances.
"fd20:ce::254/128",
// Oracle OCI IMDS, serving /opc/v2 instance principals.
"fd00:c1::a9fe:a9fe/128",
// Scaleway metadata, serving /user_data and /conf.
"fd00:42::42/128",
// Linode/Akamai metadata. Akamai's docs call it
// "link-local"; it is not.
"fd00:a9fe:a9fe::1/128",
// IPv4 metadata endpoints outside link-local.
//
// Alibaba Cloud metadata. It sits in CGNAT
// 100.64.0.0/10, which Tailscale also uses, so an
// operator allowlisting a Tailscale peer's range would
// otherwise reopen it.
"100.100.100.200/32",
// Oracle Cloud Classic metadata. Inside the blocked
// 192.0.0.0/24, so this entry is what stops an
// allowlist from opening it.
"192.0.0.192/32",
// The unspecified addresses, each of which reaches this
// host's loopback on Linux.
//
// IPv4 unspecified address, inside the blocked 0.0.0.0/8.
"0.0.0.0/32",
// IPv6 unspecified address.
"::/128",
// 169.254.169.254 as an IPv4-compatible IPv6 address.
"::a9fe:a9fe/128",
// 169.254.169.254 behind the NAT64 well-known prefix.
"64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe/128",
})
}
// mustParseCIDRs parses a list of CIDR literals, panicking on a
// bad one. The inputs are compile-time constants, so a failure
// is a programming error rather than a runtime condition.
func mustParseCIDRs(cidrs []string) []*net.IPNet {
networks := make([]*net.IPNet, 0, len(cidrs))
for _, cidr := range cidrs {
_, network, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
@@ -67,16 +272,15 @@ func init() {
))
}
blockedNetworks = append(
blockedNetworks, network,
)
networks = append(networks, network)
}
return networks
}
// isBlockedIP checks whether an IP address falls within
// any blocked private/reserved network range.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
for _, network := range blockedNetworks {
// matchesAny reports whether ip falls inside any of networks.
func matchesAny(networks []*net.IPNet, ip net.IP) bool {
for _, network := range networks {
if network.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
@@ -85,9 +289,33 @@ func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return false
}
// Guard makes every SSRF decision in the process.
//
// It holds the operator's ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS allowlist and
// applies it in exactly one place, checkIP, which both the
// target-creation validator (ValidateTargetURL) and the delivery
// dialer call. Routing both through the same function is the
// point: when the two paths decided separately they drifted and
// disagreed, which is what made a target creatable but
// undeliverable.
//
// The guard is always on. The allowlist only ever adds specific
// networks to what the default blocklist refuses, and no
// configuration turns the guard off wholesale.
type Guard struct {
// allowed is the operator's ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS. Empty
// (the default) means the default blocklist stands as-is.
allowed []netip.Prefix
}
// NewGuard builds the process-wide SSRF guard from configuration.
func NewGuard(cfg *config.Config) *Guard {
return &Guard{allowed: cfg.AllowedEgressCIDRs}
}
// ValidateTargetURL checks that an HTTP delivery target
// URL is safe from SSRF attacks.
func ValidateTargetURL(
func (g *Guard) ValidateTargetURL(
ctx context.Context, targetURL string,
) error {
parsed, err := url.Parse(targetURL)
@@ -111,36 +339,87 @@ func ValidateTargetURL(
}
if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
return checkBlockedIP(ip)
return g.checkIP(ip)
}
return validateHostname(ctx, host)
return g.validateHostname(ctx, host)
}
func validateScheme(scheme string) error {
if scheme != "http" && scheme != "https" {
// NewSSRFSafeTransport creates an http.Transport with a
// custom DialContext that refuses connections to any address
// this guard blocks. It resolves and checks at dial time, so a
// name that passed validation but now answers with a blocked
// address (DNS rebinding) is still refused.
func (g *Guard) NewSSRFSafeTransport() *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{
DialContext: g.ssrfDialContext,
}
}
// allows reports whether ip falls inside the operator's
// configured egress allowlist.
func (g *Guard) allows(ip net.IP) bool {
if len(g.allowed) == 0 {
return false
}
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
if !ok {
return false
}
// Config unmaps every parsed prefix, so an IPv4-mapped
// address has to be unmapped too or it would never match.
addr = addr.Unmap()
for _, prefix := range g.allowed {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// checkIP is the single point at which SSRF policy is decided.
//
// The order is the policy:
//
// 1. alwaysBlockedNetworks is refused before the allowlist is
// consulted, so no configured CIDR reaches link-local, a
// cloud metadata endpoint at a non-public address, or an
// unspecified address.
// 2. The allowlist is consulted next, so a listed private
// network, or a listed public address on the default
// blocklist, becomes reachable.
// 3. Everything else keeps the default blocklist's answer.
func (g *Guard) checkIP(ip net.IP) error {
if matchesAny(alwaysBlockedNetworks, ip) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"unsupported URL scheme %q: %w",
scheme, errInvalidScheme,
"target IP %s: %w", ip, errBlockedMetadata,
)
}
if g.allows(ip) {
return nil
}
if matchesAny(blockedNetworks, ip) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"target IP %s: %w", ip, ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP,
)
}
if matchesAny(blockedPublicNetworks, ip) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"target IP %s: %w", ip, errBlockedPublicMetadata,
)
}
return nil
}
func checkBlockedIP(ip net.IP) error {
if isBlockedIP(ip) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"target IP %s is in a blocked "+
"private/reserved range: %w",
ip, errBlockedIP,
)
}
return nil
}
func validateHostname(
func (g *Guard) validateHostname(
ctx context.Context, host string,
) error {
dnsCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(
@@ -165,11 +444,11 @@ func validateHostname(
}
for _, ipAddr := range ips {
if isBlockedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
err = g.checkIP(ipAddr.IP)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"hostname %q resolves to blocked "+
"IP %s: %w",
host, ipAddr.IP, errBlockedIP,
"hostname %q resolves to a blocked address: %w",
host, err,
)
}
}
@@ -177,16 +456,7 @@ func validateHostname(
return nil
}
// NewSSRFSafeTransport creates an http.Transport with a
// custom DialContext that blocks connections to
// private/reserved IP addresses.
func NewSSRFSafeTransport() *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{
DialContext: ssrfDialContext,
}
}
func ssrfDialContext(
func (g *Guard) ssrfDialContext(
ctx context.Context,
network, addr string,
) (net.Conn, error) {
@@ -209,11 +479,11 @@ func ssrfDialContext(
}
for _, ipAddr := range ips {
if isBlockedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
err = g.checkIP(ipAddr.IP)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"ssrf: connection to %s (%s) "+
"blocked: %w",
host, ipAddr.IP, errBlockedIP,
"ssrf: connection to %s blocked: %w",
host, err,
)
}
}
@@ -225,3 +495,14 @@ func ssrfDialContext(
net.JoinHostPort(ips[0].IP.String(), port),
)
}
func validateScheme(scheme string) error {
if scheme != "http" && scheme != "https" {
return fmt.Errorf(
"unsupported URL scheme %q: %w",
scheme, errInvalidScheme,
)
}
return nil
}
internal/delivery/ssrf_allowlist_test.go
+716
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,716 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// Addresses the SSRF tests in this package share.
const (
// metadataIP is the cloud instance metadata address, and
// metadataURL an endpoint on it. The guard must never reach
// either, whatever an operator lists.
metadataIP = "169.254.169.254"
metadataURL = "http://" + metadataIP + "/latest/meta-data/"
// linkLocalIPv4 is the IPv4 link-local block, which holds
// metadataIP.
linkLocalIPv4 = "169.254.0.0/16"
// loopbackHookURL is a target on this host: blocked by
// default, reachable only once an operator allowlists
// loopback.
loopbackHookURL = "http://127.0.0.1/hook"
// publicIP is an ordinary public address, which the guard
// permits with or without an allowlist.
publicIP = "93.184.216.34"
// allowAllIPv4 and allowAllIPv6 are the widest allowlist
// entries expressible: the whole internet, in each family.
// Nothing unconditionally blocked may be reachable under
// them.
allowAllIPv4 = "0.0.0.0/0"
allowAllIPv6 = "::/0"
// allowAllULA is the ordinary ULA block an operator lists to
// reach their own IPv6 network. Several providers park a
// metadata endpoint inside it.
allowAllULA = "fd00::/8"
// metadataRefusalClause is the part of the refusal that only
// alwaysBlockedNetworks produces. Asserting it, rather than
// the bare word "blocked", is what proves the unconditional
// set did the refusing and not the default blocklist.
metadataRefusalClause = "ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS cannot open it"
)
// TestGuardAllowlist_PermittedCIDRDelivers proves the escape
// hatch actually works end to end: with 127.0.0.0/8 allowed, the
// guard's own transport connects to a loopback server and gets a
// response back. The default guard, given the identical URL,
// refuses it — so the delivery succeeds because of the allowlist
// and nothing else.
func TestGuardAllowlist_PermittedCIDRDelivers(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
},
))
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
// httptest listens on loopback, which the default blocklist
// covers: exactly the "forward to a service on this host"
// case the allowlist exists for.
requireLoopback(t, srv.URL)
guard := delivery.NewTestGuard(
netip.MustParsePrefix("127.0.0.0/8"),
)
require.NoError(t,
guard.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), srv.URL),
"an allowlisted loopback target must pass validation",
)
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
Transport: guard.NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, srv.URL, nil,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
require.NoError(t,
err, "an allowlisted loopback target must be deliverable",
)
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNoContent, resp.StatusCode)
// The same URL through the default guard must still fail, or
// this test would pass without the allowlist doing anything.
assert.Error(t,
delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), srv.URL,
),
"without the allowlist the same target must be refused",
)
}
// TestGuardAllowlist_UnlistedPrivateStillRefused proves the
// allowlist grants only what it names. A guard that opens one
// private block must keep refusing every other one, at both the
// validation and the delivery entry point.
func TestGuardAllowlist_UnlistedPrivateStillRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Only 10.1.0.0/16 is open — a narrow block inside a much
// wider private range, so the test can tell "permits the
// listed block" from "permits anything private".
guard := delivery.NewTestGuard(
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/16"),
)
refused := []string{
"http://192.168.1.10/hook",
"http://172.16.0.1/hook",
loopbackHookURL,
"http://[fc00::1]/hook",
"http://100.64.0.1/hook",
// Private, adjacent to the allowed block, outside it.
"http://10.2.0.1/hook",
}
for _, target := range refused {
t.Run(target, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := guard.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), target,
)
require.Error(t,
err, "%s is not allowlisted and must be refused",
target,
)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "blocked")
assertDialRefused(t, guard, target)
})
}
// The block that is listed must in fact be permitted, so the
// refusals above are selective rather than a guard that
// ignores its allowlist entirely.
assert.NoError(t,
guard.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), "http://10.1.2.3/hook",
),
"the allowlisted block must be permitted",
)
}
// TestGuardAllowlist_MetadataAlwaysRefused is the load-bearing
// case: cloud instance metadata endpoints are credential theft
// rather than delivery to an internal service, and the
// unspecified addresses 0.0.0.0 and :: reach this host's loopback
// on Linux, so no allowlist reaches any of them. Every guard
// below names a CIDR that covers its target — including
// 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0, and the ordinary ULA and CGNAT blocks an
// operator would really list — and the address must stay
// refused anyway, on both the validation and the delivery path.
func TestGuardAllowlist_MetadataAlwaysRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tt := range metadataAlwaysRefusedCases() {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
guard := delivery.NewTestGuard(
netip.MustParsePrefix(tt.allow),
)
err := guard.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), tt.target,
)
require.Error(t,
err,
"%s must stay blocked even though %s covers it",
tt.target, tt.allow,
)
assert.Contains(t,
err.Error(),
metadataRefusalClause,
"the refusal must say why it cannot be opened",
)
// The metadata clause, not just "blocked": that is
// what distinguishes the unconditional set from the
// ordinary blocklist.
assertDialRefusedWith(
t, guard, tt.target, metadataRefusalClause,
)
})
}
}
// metadataAlwaysRefusedCase is one (allowlist, target) pair that
// must be refused: allow covers target, and target must stay
// blocked regardless.
type metadataAlwaysRefusedCase struct {
name string
allow string
target string
}
// metadataAlwaysRefusedCases enumerates every unconditionally
// blocked address (link-local, the cloud metadata endpoints and
// the unspecified addresses) together with an allowlist entry
// that would otherwise reach it. Split by family of address only
// to stay under the function-length limit.
func metadataAlwaysRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
cases := linkLocalRefusedCases()
cases = append(cases, ulaMetadataRefusedCases()...)
cases = append(cases, ipv4MetadataRefusedCases()...)
cases = append(cases, encodedMetadataRefusedCases()...)
return append(cases, unspecifiedRefusedCases()...)
}
// linkLocalRefusedCases covers the link-local blocks, including
// an operator naming the metadata address outright.
func linkLocalRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
return []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase{
{
name: "exact metadata host",
allow: "169.254.169.254/32",
target: metadataURL,
},
{
name: "whole link-local block",
allow: linkLocalIPv4,
target: metadataURL,
},
{
name: "supernet covering link-local",
allow: "169.0.0.0/8",
target: metadataURL,
},
{
name: "the entire IPv4 internet",
allow: allowAllIPv4,
target: metadataURL,
},
{
name: "other link-local address",
allow: allowAllIPv4,
target: "http://169.254.1.1/",
},
{
name: "IPv6 link-local",
allow: allowAllIPv6,
target: "http://[fe80::1]/",
},
}
}
// ulaMetadataRefusedCases covers the metadata endpoints parked
// in ULA space. Every one is opened by the single ordinary
// allowlist entry fd00::/8, which is the whole reason they need
// their own /128 host routes: fe80::/10 does not cover a ULA,
// whatever the vendor's documentation calls the address.
func ulaMetadataRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
return []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase{
{
name: "AWS IPv6 IMDS under an allowlisted ULA block",
allow: allowAllULA,
target: "http://[fd00:ec2::254]/latest/meta-data/",
},
{
// A second AWS credential endpoint, distinct from
// IMDS. AWS's own docs call this one "localhost".
name: "AWS EKS Pod Identity under an allowlisted ULA block",
allow: allowAllULA,
target: "http://[fd00:ec2::23]/v1/credentials",
},
{
name: "GCP IPv6 metadata under an allowlisted ULA block",
allow: allowAllULA,
target: "http://[fd20:ce::254]/computeMetadata/v1/",
},
{
name: "Oracle OCI IPv6 IMDS under an allowlisted ULA block",
allow: allowAllULA,
target: "http://[fd00:c1::a9fe:a9fe]/opc/v2/instance/",
},
{
name: "Scaleway IPv6 metadata under an allowlisted ULA block",
allow: allowAllULA,
target: "http://[fd00:42::42]/conf",
},
{
// Akamai's docs call this "link-local"; it is a ULA,
// so fe80::/10 does not cover it.
name: "Linode IPv6 metadata under an allowlisted ULA block",
allow: allowAllULA,
target: "http://[fd00:a9fe:a9fe::1]/v1/instance",
},
}
}
// ipv4MetadataRefusedCases covers the IPv4 metadata endpoints
// that sit outside link-local: one in CGNAT and one in the
// blocked 192.0.0.0/24, each reachable only through an allowlist
// that this set overrides.
func ipv4MetadataRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
return []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase{
{
// Tailscale uses 100.64.0.0/10, so an operator
// forwarding to a Tailscale peer lists exactly this.
name: "Alibaba metadata under allowlisted CGNAT",
allow: "100.64.0.0/10",
target: "http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/",
},
{
// Inside the already-blocked 192.0.0.0/24, so only
// an allowlist can reach it — and must not.
name: "Oracle Cloud Classic metadata under 0.0.0.0/0",
allow: allowAllIPv4,
target: "http://192.0.0.192/latest/meta-data/",
},
}
}
// encodedMetadataRefusedCases covers the alternate IPv6
// encodings of 169.254.169.254.
func encodedMetadataRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
return []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase{
{
// To4() does not normalise the IPv4-compatible form,
// so this needs its own always-blocked entry.
name: "IPv4-compatible IPv6 form of the metadata IP",
allow: allowAllIPv6,
target: "http://[::a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/",
},
{
// Nor the NAT64 well-known prefix form.
name: "NAT64 form of the metadata IP",
allow: allowAllIPv6,
target: "http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/",
},
{
// Already refused before this change: IPNet.Contains
// calls To4() first, so the mapped form matches
// 169.254.0.0/16. Pinned so it cannot regress.
//
// Allowed under 0.0.0.0/0 rather than ::/0: allows()
// unmaps before matching, so ::/0 would not cover the
// unmapped v4 address and the case would not prove
// the allowlist was overridden.
name: "IPv4-mapped IPv6 form of the metadata IP",
allow: allowAllIPv4,
target: "http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/",
},
}
}
// unspecifiedRefusedCases covers the unspecified addresses, each
// of which reaches this host's loopback on Linux.
func unspecifiedRefusedCases() []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase {
return []metadataAlwaysRefusedCase{
{
name: "IPv4 unspecified address under 0.0.0.0/0",
allow: allowAllIPv4,
target: "http://0.0.0.0:8080/hook",
},
{
name: "IPv6 unspecified address under ::/0",
allow: allowAllIPv6,
target: "http://[::]:8080/hook",
},
}
}
// TestGuardAllowlist_PublicUnaffected asserts the allowlist does
// not narrow anything: public addresses were reachable before it
// existed and stay reachable, whether or not a list is set.
func TestGuardAllowlist_PublicUnaffected(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
guards := map[string]*delivery.Guard{
"default": delivery.NewTestGuard(),
"with allowlist": delivery.NewTestGuard(
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
),
}
for name, guard := range guards {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.NoError(t,
guard.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(),
"http://"+publicIP+"/webhook",
),
)
})
}
}
// TestGuardAllowlist_AzureWireServerReopenable covers Azure's
// WireServer, a public address that serves VM credentials. The
// default guard refuses it, but because it is public it sits in
// the default blocklist rather than the unconditional set, so an
// operator who lists it can reach it.
func TestGuardAllowlist_AzureWireServerReopenable(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const wireServerIP = "168.63.129.16"
target := "http://" + wireServerIP + "/?comp=versions"
defaultGuard := delivery.NewTestGuard()
err := defaultGuard.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), target)
require.Error(t, err,
"WireServer must be refused with no allowlist set",
)
assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), metadataRefusalClause,
"WireServer must be refused by the default blocklist, "+
"which an allowlist can override",
)
require.NotErrorIs(t, err, delivery.ErrBlockedPrivateOrReservedIP,
"WireServer is public, not private or reserved",
)
assertDialRefused(t, defaultGuard, target)
listed := delivery.NewTestGuard(
netip.MustParsePrefix(wireServerIP + "/32"),
)
assert.NoError(t,
listed.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), target),
"an operator who lists WireServer must be able to reach it",
)
}
// TestGuardCheckIP_BothPathsShareOneDecision asserts that the
// validator and the dialer are not two policies that happen to
// agree: both are defined in terms of checkIP, so the exported
// decision function is the whole answer for a given address.
func TestGuardCheckIP_BothPathsShareOneDecision(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
guard := delivery.NewTestGuard(
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
)
tests := []struct {
ip string
allowed bool
}{
{"10.1.2.3", true},
{publicIP, true},
{"192.168.1.1", false},
{"127.0.0.1", false},
{metadataIP, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.ip, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ip := net.ParseIP(tt.ip)
require.NotNil(t, ip)
decision := guard.ExportCheckIP(ip)
validation := guard.ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), "http://"+hostFor(tt.ip)+"/x",
)
if tt.allowed {
require.NoError(t, decision)
require.NoError(t, validation)
return
}
require.Error(t, decision)
require.Error(t, validation,
"validation must refuse what checkIP refuses",
)
})
}
}
// TestAlwaysBlockedNetworks_PinnedSet pins the unconditional set
// exactly, so it cannot quietly grow or shrink.
//
// It stays deliberately small. Everything else in the default
// blocklist is an operator's own network and must remain
// openable, or the escape hatch would not work — which is why
// the metadata endpoints outside the link-local range are host
// routes rather than the blocks that contain them.
func TestAlwaysBlockedNetworks_PinnedSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
nets := delivery.ExportAlwaysBlockedNetworks()
got := make([]string, 0, len(nets))
for _, n := range nets {
got = append(got, n.String())
}
want := []string{
// IPv4 link-local: the 169.254.169.254 metadata
// service on AWS, Azure and others.
linkLocalIPv4,
// IPv6 link-local.
"fe80::/10",
// AWS IPv6 IMDS, inside the ULA space an operator may
// legitimately allowlist.
"fd00:ec2::254/128",
// AWS EKS Pod Identity Agent, likewise ULA.
"fd00:ec2::23/128",
// GCP metadata for IPv6-only instances, likewise ULA.
"fd20:ce::254/128",
// Oracle OCI IMDS over IPv6, likewise ULA.
"fd00:c1::a9fe:a9fe/128",
// Scaleway metadata over IPv6, likewise ULA.
"fd00:42::42/128",
// Linode/Akamai metadata over IPv6, likewise ULA.
"fd00:a9fe:a9fe::1/128",
// Alibaba Cloud metadata, inside CGNAT.
"100.100.100.200/32",
// Oracle Cloud Classic metadata, inside the blocked
// 192.0.0.0/24.
"192.0.0.192/32",
// The IPv4 and IPv6 unspecified addresses, each of
// which reaches this host's loopback on Linux.
"0.0.0.0/32",
"::/128",
// 169.254.169.254 as an IPv4-compatible IPv6 address.
"::a9fe:a9fe/128",
// 169.254.169.254 behind the NAT64 well-known prefix.
"64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe/128",
}
assert.Equal(t, want, got)
}
// TestDefaultBlocklist_PinnedSet pins each list of the default
// blocklist on its own, the private and reserved ranges in
// blockedNetworks and the public addresses in
// blockedPublicNetworks, so moving an entry from one list to the
// other fails it. For the first address of each entry it then
// checks that the default guard refuses it, and that listing the
// entry in ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS opens it unless the unconditional
// set holds that address.
func TestDefaultBlocklist_PinnedSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// public marks an entry of blockedPublicNetworks; every other
// entry belongs in blockedNetworks.
tests := []struct {
cidr string
public bool
reopenable bool
}{
{cidr: "127.0.0.0/8", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "10.0.0.0/8", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "172.16.0.0/12", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "192.168.0.0/16", reopenable: true},
{cidr: linkLocalIPv4, reopenable: false},
// Its first address, 0.0.0.0, is in the unconditional set.
{cidr: "0.0.0.0/8", reopenable: false},
{cidr: "100.64.0.0/10", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "192.0.0.0/24", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "192.0.2.0/24", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "198.18.0.0/15", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "198.51.100.0/24", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "203.0.113.0/24", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "224.0.0.0/4", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "240.0.0.0/4", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "::1/128", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "::/128", reopenable: false},
{cidr: "fc00::/7", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "fe80::/10", reopenable: false},
{cidr: "ff00::/8", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "2001:db8::/32", reopenable: true},
{cidr: "168.63.129.16/32", public: true, reopenable: true},
}
wantPrivate := make([]string, 0, len(tests))
wantPublic := make([]string, 0, len(tests))
for _, tt := range tests {
if tt.public {
wantPublic = append(wantPublic, tt.cidr)
} else {
wantPrivate = append(wantPrivate, tt.cidr)
}
}
gotPrivate := make([]string, 0, len(tests))
for _, n := range delivery.ExportBlockedNetworks() {
gotPrivate = append(gotPrivate, n.String())
}
gotPublic := make([]string, 0, len(tests))
for _, n := range delivery.ExportBlockedPublicNetworks() {
gotPublic = append(gotPublic, n.String())
}
assert.ElementsMatch(t, wantPrivate, gotPrivate, "blockedNetworks")
assert.ElementsMatch(t, wantPublic, gotPublic, "blockedPublicNetworks")
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.cidr, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
prefix := netip.MustParsePrefix(tt.cidr)
ip := net.IP(prefix.Addr().AsSlice())
require.Error(t,
delivery.NewTestGuard().ExportCheckIP(ip),
"the default guard must refuse %s", ip,
)
err := delivery.NewTestGuard(prefix).ExportCheckIP(ip)
if tt.reopenable {
assert.NoError(t, err, "listing %s must open it", tt.cidr)
} else {
assert.Error(t, err, "listing %s must not open it", tt.cidr)
}
})
}
}
// requireLoopback fails the test unless rawURL's host is a
// loopback address, so the allowlist test cannot silently stop
// exercising a blocked range.
func requireLoopback(t *testing.T, rawURL string) {
t.Helper()
parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
require.NoError(t, err)
ip := net.ParseIP(parsed.Hostname())
require.NotNil(t, ip, "test server host must be an IP literal")
require.True(t, ip.IsLoopback(),
"test server must listen on loopback, got %s", ip,
)
}
// assertDialRefused asserts the guard's transport refuses to
// connect to target, which is the delivery-time half of the
// policy. It never reaches the network: the guard checks the
// resolved address before dialling.
func assertDialRefused(
t *testing.T, guard *delivery.Guard, target string,
) {
t.Helper()
assertDialRefusedWith(t, guard, target, "blocked")
}
// assertDialRefusedWith is assertDialRefused with the refusal
// text pinned. Callers testing the unconditional set pass
// metadataRefusalClause so the subtest cannot pass on an
// ordinary blocklist refusal instead.
func assertDialRefusedWith(
t *testing.T, guard *delivery.Guard, target, clause string,
) {
t.Helper()
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
Transport: guard.NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, target, nil,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if resp != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
require.Error(t, err,
"delivery to %s must be refused by the dialer", target,
)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), clause,
"the refusal must come from the SSRF guard",
)
}
// hostFor renders an IP as it appears in a URL host, bracketing
// IPv6 literals.
func hostFor(ip string) string {
if net.ParseIP(ip).To4() == nil {
return "[" + ip + "]"
}
return ip
}
internal/delivery/ssrf_test.go
+51 -13
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
func TestIsBlockedIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
func TestGuardCheckIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ func TestIsBlockedIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
{"192.168.0.1", "192.168.0.1", true},
{"192.168.255.255", "192.168.255.255", true},
{"169.254.0.1", "169.254.0.1", true},
{"169.254.169.254", "169.254.169.254", true},
{metadataIP, metadataIP, true},
{"8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8", false},
{"1.1.1.1", "1.1.1.1", false},
{"93.184.216.34", "93.184.216.34", false},
{publicIP, publicIP, false},
{"::1", "::1", true},
{"fd00::1", "fd00::1", true},
{"fc00::1", "fc00::1", true},
@@ -56,12 +56,14 @@ func TestIsBlockedIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
"failed to parse IP %s", tt.ip,
)
refused := delivery.NewTestGuard().ExportCheckIP(ip) != nil
assert.Equal(t,
tt.blocked,
delivery.ExportIsBlockedIP(ip),
"isBlockedIP(%s) = %v, want %v",
refused,
"default guard refuses %s = %v, want %v",
tt.ip,
delivery.ExportIsBlockedIP(ip),
refused,
tt.blocked,
)
})
@@ -72,12 +74,12 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
blockedURLs := []string{
"http://127.0.0.1/hook",
loopbackHookURL,
"http://127.0.0.1:8080/hook",
"https://10.0.0.1/hook",
"http://192.168.1.1/webhook",
"http://172.16.0.1/api",
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
metadataURL,
"http://[::1]/hook",
"http://[fc00::1]/hook",
"http://[fe80::1]/hook",
@@ -88,7 +90,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), u,
)
@@ -99,6 +101,42 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestDefaultGuard_RefusesUnspecifiedMulticastAndDocumentation
// covers the unspecified addresses and the IPv6 multicast and
// documentation ranges: with no allowlist set, each is refused
// both when a target is created and when a delivery dials it.
func TestDefaultGuard_RefusesUnspecifiedMulticastAndDocumentation(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
guard := delivery.NewTestGuard()
targets := []string{
// The unspecified addresses. On Linux a connection to
// either reaches this host's loopback.
"http://0.0.0.0:8080/hook",
"http://[::]:8080/hook",
// IPv6 multicast, all nodes.
"http://[ff02::1]/hook",
// IPv6 documentation.
"http://[2001:db8::1]/hook",
}
for _, target := range targets {
t.Run(target, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
require.Error(t,
guard.ValidateTargetURL(context.Background(), target),
"%s must be refused at target creation", target,
)
assertDialRefused(t, guard, target)
})
}
}
func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -112,7 +150,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), u,
)
@@ -126,7 +164,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidScheme(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), "ftp://example.com/hook",
)
@@ -140,7 +178,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidScheme(t *testing.T) {
func TestValidateTargetURL_EmptyHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), "http:///path",
)
@@ -150,7 +188,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_EmptyHost(t *testing.T) {
func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), "://invalid",
)
internal/delivery/target.go
+12
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ type Scheduler interface {
// own circuit breaker, and reschedules via the injected
// Scheduler. Fire-and-forget targets simply record a single
// attempt.
//
// An implementation reports each attempt it actually dispatches to
// Engine.observeAttempt, alongside the DeliveryResult it records for
// it. Deliver is also entered for attempts that never happen — an
// open circuit breaker refuses one — so the count cannot be taken
// from around this call.
type Target interface {
Deliver(
ctx context.Context,
@@ -74,6 +80,12 @@ type attemptResult struct {
errMsg string
}
// elapsed returns how long the attempt took. The field is stored in
// milliseconds because that is what DeliveryResult persists.
func (r attemptResult) elapsed() time.Duration {
return time.Duration(r.duration) * time.Millisecond
}
// initTargets builds the target registry, wiring each target
// to the engine's persistence helpers and giving the HTTP and
// Slack targets the shared SSRF-safe client. It is called by
internal/delivery/target_config_edit.go
+119
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
package delivery
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// errUnknownTargetTypeForEdit is returned when a stored target has a
// type the edit form has no field set for.
var errUnknownTargetTypeForEdit = errors.New(
"unknown target type",
)
// TargetConfigForm is the UNMASKED projection of a target's stored
// configuration, for pre-filling the target edit form.
//
// It is the deliberate exception to the rule TargetView enforces
// everywhere else: TargetView exists so that no template can render
// a target's stored blob, because a destination URL's path segments
// and a header value are both routinely the credential. An operator
// cannot correct a value they cannot see, so the edit form — and
// only the edit form — is shown the full value.
//
// Everything that keeps that exception narrow lives at the call
// site: the route is behind RequireAuth and the webhook's ownership
// check, and its group sets NoCache so the rendered secret is not
// written to a shared cache. Do not reach for this type from any
// other page.
type TargetConfigForm struct {
// URL is the destination for an HTTP target and the webhook
// URL for a Slack target.
URL string
// Headers is the HTTP target's configured headers in the
// textarea representation, one "Name: value" per line.
Headers string
// Timeout is the HTTP target's per-request timeout in seconds,
// empty when unset.
Timeout string
// Expiry is the database (archive) target's row expiry.
Expiry string
}
// NewTargetConfigForm parses a target's stored configuration into
// the edit form's fields.
//
// A configuration that does not parse is an error rather than a
// zero-valued form that silently looks like a target with no
// settings. The caller shows the operator that the stored value
// could not be read, so that saving the form is understood as
// replacing it rather than preserving it.
func NewTargetConfigForm(
t *database.Target,
) (TargetConfigForm, error) {
switch t.Type {
case database.TargetTypeHTTP:
cfg, err := parseHTTPConfig(t.Config)
if err != nil {
return TargetConfigForm{}, err
}
return TargetConfigForm{
URL: cfg.URL,
Headers: FormatTargetHeaders(cfg.Headers),
Timeout: FormatTargetTimeout(cfg.Timeout),
}, nil
case database.TargetTypeSlack:
cfg, err := parseSlackConfig(t.Config)
if err != nil {
return TargetConfigForm{}, err
}
return TargetConfigForm{URL: cfg.WebhookURL}, nil
case database.TargetTypeDatabase:
return databaseConfigForm(t.Config)
case database.TargetTypeLog:
// The log target takes no configuration.
return TargetConfigForm{}, nil
default:
return TargetConfigForm{}, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %q", errUnknownTargetTypeForEdit, t.Type,
)
}
}
// databaseConfigForm parses an archive target's optional expiry.
// An absent or empty configuration is the keep-forever default and
// yields an empty field, so re-saving the form unchanged stores the
// same empty configuration it started with. An expiry that is set
// but not a valid duration is an error, not a blank field.
func databaseConfigForm(
configJSON string,
) (TargetConfigForm, error) {
if configJSON == "" {
return TargetConfigForm{}, nil
}
var cfg databaseTargetConfig
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(configJSON), &cfg)
if err != nil {
return TargetConfigForm{}, fmt.Errorf(
"parsing config JSON: %w", err,
)
}
if cfg.Expiry == "" || cfg.Expiry == archiveExpiryNever {
return TargetConfigForm{}, nil
}
err = ValidateArchiveExpiry(cfg.Expiry)
if err != nil {
return TargetConfigForm{}, err
}
return TargetConfigForm{Expiry: cfg.Expiry}, nil
}
internal/delivery/target_config_view.go
+38 -7
View File
@@ -23,21 +23,51 @@ type ConfigField struct {
Value string
}
// deletedNameSuffix marks the name of a target that no longer
// exists. Deletes are soft and delivery history outlives the
// target, so the event log shows names of targets that are gone;
// an operator reading one needs to know it cannot be delivered
// to, replayed to, or configured.
const deletedNameSuffix = " (deleted)"
// TargetView is the display-safe projection of a target for
// the UI. It deliberately has no raw configuration field, so
// no template — present or future — can render the stored
// blob.
type TargetView struct {
ID string
Name string
ID string
Name string
// Deleted reports that this target's row is soft deleted.
// Only views built for historical display carry it set:
// every other projection is of a live row.
Deleted bool
Type database.TargetType
Active bool
Config []ConfigField
}
// DisplayName is the name to render, marked when the target has
// been deleted. Templates showing a name against historical data
// must use it rather than Name, which stays the stored name.
func (v TargetView) DisplayName() string {
if v.Deleted {
return v.Name + deletedNameSuffix
}
return v.Name
}
// NewTargetViews projects targets for rendering, replacing
// each stored configuration blob with named, display-safe
// fields.
//
// A soft-deleted row projects exactly as a live one does, minus
// the deleted marker on its name: masking is a property of the
// projection, not of the row's state, so a deleted target's
// credential is as unreachable from a template as a live
// target's.
func NewTargetViews(
targets []database.Target,
) []TargetView {
@@ -47,11 +77,12 @@ func NewTargetViews(
t := &targets[i]
views = append(views, TargetView{
ID: t.ID,
Name: t.Name,
Type: t.Type,
Active: t.Active,
Config: targetConfigFields(t),
ID: t.ID,
Name: t.Name,
Deleted: t.DeletedAt.Valid,
Type: t.Type,
Active: t.Active,
Config: targetConfigFields(t),
})
}
internal/delivery/target_config_view_test.go
+58 -10
View File
@@ -2,9 +2,11 @@ package delivery_test
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
@@ -17,6 +19,14 @@ const (
slackWebhookURL = "https://hooks.slack.com" +
slackSecretPath
// slackMaskedURL is what a Slack webhook URL renders as
// once masked: scheme and host, path elided.
slackMaskedURL = "https://hooks.slack.com/..."
// slackTargetName is the target name the Slack projection
// tests use.
slackTargetName = "slack-target"
viewExampleOrigin = "https://example.com"
viewExampleHook = viewExampleOrigin + "/hook"
viewMaskedOrigin = viewExampleOrigin + "/..."
@@ -33,7 +43,7 @@ func TestMaskedWebhookURL(t *testing.T) {
}{
"slack webhook": {
url: slackWebhookURL,
want: "https://hooks.slack.com/...",
want: slackMaskedURL,
},
"query string dropped": {
url: viewExampleOrigin + "/a?token=secret",
@@ -125,23 +135,61 @@ func viewFor(
return views[0]
}
func TestNewTargetViews_Slack(t *testing.T) {
// TestNewTargetViews_DeletedTarget proves the projection marks
// a soft-deleted target's name and masks its configuration by
// the same rules a live target's is. Delivery history outlives
// the target it names, so this projection is what an operator
// reads about a target that no longer exists.
func TestNewTargetViews_DeletedTarget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
view := viewFor(t, database.Target{
Name: "slack-target",
target := slackTarget()
target.DeletedAt = gorm.DeletedAt{
Time: time.Now(),
Valid: true,
}
view := viewFor(t, target)
assert.True(t, view.Deleted)
assert.Equal(t, slackTargetName, view.Name)
assert.Equal(
t, slackTargetName+" (deleted)", view.DisplayName(),
)
assert.Equal(
t,
map[string]string{"Webhook URL": slackMaskedURL},
fieldMap(view.Config),
)
}
// slackTarget is the live Slack target the projection tests
// share.
func slackTarget() database.Target {
return database.Target{
Name: slackTargetName,
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Active: true,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"` +
slackWebhookURL + `"}`,
})
}
}
func TestNewTargetViews_Slack(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
view := viewFor(t, slackTarget())
assert.Equal(t, slackTargetName, view.Name)
// A live target is never marked, so the marker cannot
// reach a name that still exists.
assert.False(t, view.Deleted)
assert.Equal(t, slackTargetName, view.DisplayName())
assert.Equal(t, "slack-target", view.Name)
assert.Equal(
t,
map[string]string{
"Webhook URL": "https://hooks.slack.com/...",
},
map[string]string{"Webhook URL": slackMaskedURL},
fieldMap(view.Config),
)
}
@@ -212,7 +260,7 @@ func TestNewTargetViews_HTTPMasksDestinationURL(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(
t,
"https://hooks.slack.com/...",
slackMaskedURL,
fields["Destination URL"],
)
internal/delivery/target_database.go
+242 -101
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package delivery
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
@@ -11,22 +11,75 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// databaseTarget is a no-retry target that archives the
// full inbound event into a per-webhook archive SQLite file,
// separate from the per-webhook event database. The event is
// already persisted in the per-webhook event DB by the time
// delivery runs; the database target additionally writes a
// durable long-term copy into archive-{webhookID}.db and then
// records a single attempt whose outcome reflects whether the
// archive write succeeded. See archiveWriter for the
// close/reopen, auto-recreate, and expiry semantics.
// archiveNameMaxLen is how many characters of a webhook or target
// name an archive file name keeps.
const archiveNameMaxLen = 40
// databaseTarget is a no-retry target that archives the full
// inbound event into the target's own archive SQLite file, separate
// from the per-webhook event database. The event is already
// persisted in the per-webhook event DB by the time delivery runs;
// the database target additionally writes a durable long-term copy
// into the file ArchiveFileName names and then records a single
// attempt whose outcome reflects whether the archive write
// succeeded. See archiveWriter for the close/reopen, auto-recreate,
// and expiry semantics.
type databaseTarget struct {
eng *Engine
// writers holds one archive writer per database target, keyed
// by target ID.
mu sync.Mutex
writers map[string]*archiveWriter
}
// ArchiveFileName returns the file name of a database target's
// archive: archive-WEBHOOKNAME-TARGETNAME-TARGETID.db, with both
// names passed through archiveNamePart. The target ID keeps the
// name unique when two targets' names come out the same.
func ArchiveFileName(webhookName, targetName, targetID string) string {
return "archive-" + archiveNamePart(webhookName) + "-" +
archiveNamePart(targetName) + "-" + targetID + ".db"
}
// archiveNamePart makes a webhook or target name safe to put in a
// file name. It is lowercased; ASCII letters and digits are kept,
// every other run of characters becomes a single "-", and no "-" is
// left at either end. It is cut to archiveNameMaxLen characters, and
// a name with nothing left is "unnamed".
func archiveNamePart(name string) string {
var b strings.Builder
dash := false
for _, r := range strings.ToLower(name) {
if (r < 'a' || r > 'z') && (r < '0' || r > '9') {
dash = b.Len() > 0
continue
}
if dash {
b.WriteByte('-')
dash = false
}
b.WriteRune(r)
}
part := b.String()
if len(part) > archiveNameMaxLen {
part = strings.TrimRight(part[:archiveNameMaxLen], "-")
}
if part == "" {
return "unnamed"
}
return part
}
// Deliver implements Target. It archives the event, then
// records one successful attempt and marks the delivery
// delivered. An archiving error fails the delivery: the
@@ -42,7 +95,14 @@ func (t *databaseTarget) Deliver(
_ *Task,
_ Scheduler,
) {
start := time.Now()
err := t.archive(d)
elapsed := time.Since(start)
t.eng.observeAttempt(d.Target.Type, elapsed)
if err != nil {
t.eng.log.Error(
"failed to archive event to database target",
@@ -51,28 +111,41 @@ func (t *databaseTarget) Deliver(
"error", err,
)
t.eng.recordResult(
recErr := t.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, 1, false, 0, "",
err.Error(), 0,
err.Error(), elapsed.Milliseconds(),
)
if recErr != nil {
t.eng.bookkeepingFailed(d, recErr)
t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
return
}
t.eng.settleStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
return
}
t.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, 1, true, 0, "", "", 0,
recErr := t.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, 1, true, 0, "", "",
elapsed.Milliseconds(),
)
if recErr != nil {
t.eng.bookkeepingFailed(d, recErr)
t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
return
}
t.eng.settleStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
}
// archive writes the full event as a row into the webhook's
// archive writes the full event as a row into the target's
// archive database, honouring the optional per-target expiry
// parsed from the target config JSON.
func (t *databaseTarget) archive(d *database.Delivery) error {
@@ -86,7 +159,7 @@ func (t *databaseTarget) archive(d *database.Delivery) error {
return err
}
w, err := t.writerFor(webhookID)
w, err := t.writerFor(d.TargetID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -104,30 +177,31 @@ func (t *databaseTarget) archive(d *database.Delivery) error {
return w.write(row, expiry)
}
// writerFor returns the archiveWriter for a webhook, creating
// and caching it on first use. Each webhook has one writer so
// its close/reopen debounce state is shared across concurrent
// deliveries. The archive file lives beside the per-webhook
// event database in the data directory.
// writerFor returns the archive writer for a database target,
// creating and caching it on first use. Each target has one writer
// so its close/reopen debounce state is shared across concurrent
// deliveries, and so a rename and the idle sweep take the same lock
// as its writes.
func (t *databaseTarget) writerFor(
webhookID string,
targetID string,
) (*archiveWriter, error) {
path, err := t.archivePath(webhookID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
if t.writers == nil {
t.writers = make(map[string]*archiveWriter)
}
w, ok := t.writers[webhookID]
w, ok := t.writers[targetID]
if !ok {
w = newArchiveWriter(path, t.eng.log)
t.writers[webhookID] = w
var err error
w, err = t.newWriter(targetID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if t.writers == nil {
t.writers = make(map[string]*archiveWriter)
}
t.writers[targetID] = w
}
// A delivery claims the entry: even if the idle sweep created
@@ -139,40 +213,39 @@ func (t *databaseTarget) writerFor(
}
// sweepWriterFor returns the archive writer the idle sweep should
// prune a webhook through, together with whether the sweep itself
// created the registry entry.
// prune a target's archive through, together with whether the sweep
// itself created the registry entry.
//
// The sweep must route its prune through the registered writer so
// the writer's mutex orders it against concurrent writes, but it
// must never leave a registry entry behind: a sweep that ran
// concurrently with the webhook's deletion would otherwise
// concurrently with the target's deletion would otherwise
// re-create an entry that nothing will ever evict again, which is
// exactly the leak eviction exists to prevent. An entry the sweep
// creates is therefore marked sweep-owned and handed back to
// releaseSweepWriter when the sweep is done.
func (t *databaseTarget) sweepWriterFor(
webhookID string,
targetID string,
) (*archiveWriter, bool, error) {
path, err := t.archivePath(webhookID)
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
w, ok := t.writers[targetID]
if ok {
return w, false, nil
}
w, err := t.newWriter(targetID)
if err != nil {
return nil, false, err
}
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
if t.writers == nil {
t.writers = make(map[string]*archiveWriter)
}
w, ok := t.writers[webhookID]
if ok {
return w, false, nil
}
w = newArchiveWriter(path, t.eng.log)
w.sweepOwned = true
t.writers[webhookID] = w
t.writers[targetID] = w
return w, true, nil
}
@@ -189,57 +262,92 @@ func (t *databaseTarget) sweepWriterFor(
// delivery that adopted the writer keeps a registered, evictable
// one.
func (t *databaseTarget) releaseSweepWriter(
webhookID string, w *archiveWriter,
targetID string, w *archiveWriter,
) {
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
cur, ok := t.writers[webhookID]
cur, ok := t.writers[targetID]
if !ok || cur != w || !cur.sweepOwned {
return
}
delete(t.writers, webhookID)
delete(t.writers, targetID)
}
// archivePath returns the archive file path for a webhook: it
// lives beside the per-webhook event database in the data
// directory. It does not touch the filesystem.
func (t *databaseTarget) archivePath(
webhookID string,
) (string, error) {
// newWriter builds the writer for a database target's archive. The
// file is the one ArchivePath gives for the webhook and the target as
// the main database names them now; from then on only rename changes
// the name the writer uses. It does not touch the archive file.
func (t *databaseTarget) newWriter(
targetID string,
) (*archiveWriter, error) {
if t.eng.dbManager == nil {
return "", errArchiveNoDataDir
return nil, errArchiveNoDataDir
}
dir := filepath.Dir(t.eng.dbManager.DBPath(webhookID))
var target database.Target
return filepath.Join(
dir, fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", webhookID),
), nil
err := t.eng.database.DB().
Preload("Webhook").
First(&target, "id = ?", targetID).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"loading database target %s: %w", targetID, err,
)
}
w := newArchiveWriter(
ArchivePath(t.eng.dbManager, &target.Webhook, &target),
t.eng.log,
)
w.webhookID = target.WebhookID
return w, nil
}
// evict drops a webhook's archive writer from the registry and
// closes its handle, so a deleted webhook does not leave a
// writer (and an open archive handle within its debounce
// window) alive for the process lifetime.
// rename moves a database target's archive file to the name for
// webhookName and targetName. It goes through the target's writer,
// so the move holds the lock that writes and the idle sweep take,
// and later writes use the new name.
//
// The writer is created if there is none, and it stays cached. The
// handlers rename before they save the new name, so until the save
// the main database still has the old one; a delivery in that window
// must find this writer rather than build one from the old name.
func (t *databaseTarget) rename(
targetID, webhookName, targetName string,
) error {
w, err := t.writerFor(targetID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return w.rename(ArchiveFileName(webhookName, targetName, targetID))
}
// evict drops a database target's archive writer from the registry
// and closes its handle, so a deleted target does not leave a
// writer (and an open archive handle within its debounce window)
// alive for the process lifetime.
//
// The map entry is removed under the registry lock, which is
// then released before the handle is closed under the writer's
// own lock: that ordering keeps the registry available to other
// webhooks while an in-flight write on this one drains, and
// targets while an in-flight write on this one drains, and
// closing under the writer's lock means eviction can never race
// a write.
//
// Eviction is idempotent and silent for a webhook with no
// writer, which is the common case: a webhook with no database
// target never creates one. It never deletes the archive file.
func (t *databaseTarget) evict(webhookID string) {
// Eviction is idempotent and silent for a target with no writer,
// which is the common case: only a database target that has
// received an event or been renamed has one. It never deletes the
// archive file.
func (t *databaseTarget) evict(targetID string) {
t.mu.Lock()
w, ok := t.writers[webhookID]
w, ok := t.writers[targetID]
if ok {
delete(t.writers, webhookID)
delete(t.writers, targetID)
}
t.mu.Unlock()
@@ -252,43 +360,76 @@ func (t *databaseTarget) evict(webhookID string) {
t.eng.log.Info(
"evicted archive writer",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"target_id", targetID,
"path", w.path,
)
}
// sweepWebhook prunes one webhook's archive of rows older than
// expiry, without requiring a write. It returns nil (nothing to
// do) when the archive file does not exist, so a sweep never
// creates an archive for a webhook that has a database target
// but has never received an event.
// evictWebhook evicts, exactly as evict does, the writer of every
// database target of a webhook.
func (t *databaseTarget) evictWebhook(webhookID string) {
t.mu.Lock()
var gone []*archiveWriter
for targetID, w := range t.writers {
if w.webhookID == webhookID {
delete(t.writers, targetID)
gone = append(gone, w)
}
}
t.mu.Unlock()
for _, w := range gone {
w.evict()
t.eng.log.Info(
"evicted archive writer",
"webhook_id", webhookID,
"path", w.path,
)
}
}
// evictAll evicts every cached archive writer, exactly as evict
// does for one target. The engine calls it at shutdown, once its
// workers have returned. Closing the last handle on an archive
// moves the contents of its -wal into the .db and removes the
// -wal, so a clean stop leaves each archive as a single file.
func (t *databaseTarget) evictAll() {
t.mu.Lock()
writers := t.writers
t.writers = nil
t.mu.Unlock()
for _, w := range writers {
w.evict()
}
}
// sweepArchive prunes one database target's archive of rows older
// than expiry, without requiring a write. A missing archive file is
// left missing (see sweepExpired), so a sweep never creates an
// archive for a target that has never received an event.
//
// It also never leaves a registry entry behind: an entry it had
// to create to reach the writer's mutex is released again once
// the prune is done, so a sweep racing a webhook deletion cannot
// the prune is done, so a sweep racing a target deletion cannot
// resurrect the writer the eviction just dropped.
func (t *databaseTarget) sweepWebhook(
webhookID string, expiry time.Duration,
func (t *databaseTarget) sweepArchive(
targetID string, expiry time.Duration,
) error {
path, err := t.archivePath(webhookID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Check before taking a writer at all: a webhook whose
// archive has never been created gets no writer, no handle,
// and no file.
if !fileExists(path) {
return nil
}
w, created, err := t.sweepWriterFor(webhookID)
w, created, err := t.sweepWriterFor(targetID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if created {
defer t.releaseSweepWriter(webhookID, w)
defer t.releaseSweepWriter(targetID, w)
}
return w.sweepExpired(expiry)
internal/delivery/target_database_archive.go
+112 -25
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,19 @@
package delivery
import (
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sync"
"time"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
)
@@ -30,18 +32,18 @@ const (
// path: open the archive file, creating it if missing, so a
// first write (or a write after the operator moved the file
// away) recreates it.
archiveModeCreate = "rwc"
archiveModeCreate = database.SQLiteModeCreate
// archiveModeExisting is the SQLite URI mode used by the idle
// sweep: open read-write but never create. A sweep must never
// conjure an empty archive file for a webhook that has a
// database target but has never received an event.
archiveModeExisting = "rw"
archiveModeExisting = database.SQLiteModeExisting
)
var (
// errArchiveMissingWebhookID is returned when an event to
// archive has no webhook id to key its archive file on.
// archive has no webhook id to record in its archive row.
errArchiveMissingWebhookID = errors.New(
"cannot archive event without a webhook id",
)
@@ -61,13 +63,19 @@ var (
)
// errArchiveWriterEvicted is returned when a writer that has
// been evicted (its webhook was deleted, or its last database
// target was removed) is used again. An evicted writer is no
// longer in the registry, so reopening its file would leak a
// handle nothing owns.
// been evicted (its target or its webhook was deleted) is used
// again. An evicted writer is no longer in the registry, so
// reopening its file would leak a handle nothing owns.
errArchiveWriterEvicted = errors.New(
"archive writer has been evicted",
)
// ErrArchiveNameTaken is returned when an archive cannot be
// renamed because a file already has the new name. That file may
// be an archive with rows of its own, so it is never replaced.
ErrArchiveNameTaken = errors.New(
"a file already has the archive's new name",
)
)
// databaseTargetConfig is the optional per-target JSON config
@@ -80,7 +88,7 @@ type databaseTargetConfig struct {
}
// archivedEvent is one fully captured webhook event stored in a
// per-webhook archive database for long-term retention. It is a
// database target's archive for long-term retention. It is a
// self-contained copy — independent of the per-webhook event
// database, which may prune events under its own retention.
type archivedEvent struct {
@@ -170,8 +178,8 @@ func ValidateArchiveExpiry(expiry string) error {
return nil
}
// archiveWriter owns one per-webhook archive SQLite file. It
// serialises writes, and after each write closes and reopens
// archiveWriter owns one database target's archive SQLite file.
// It serialises writes, and after each write closes and reopens
// the file (debounced to at most once per debounce window) so
// an operator can move the file away for offline archiving. The
// next write recreates a moved or removed file, because the
@@ -186,17 +194,26 @@ type archiveWriter struct {
lastReopen time.Time
reopens int
// now is the clock the reopen debounce is measured on. It is
// time.Now outside tests.
now func() time.Time
// evicted marks a writer that has been removed from the
// per-webhook registry. Its handle is closed and it must
// never open the file again: nothing holds it any more, so a
// reopen would leak the handle for the process lifetime.
// registry. Its handle is closed and it must never open the
// file again: nothing holds it any more, so a reopen would
// leak the handle for the process lifetime.
evicted bool
// webhookID is the webhook the archive's target belongs to,
// so deleting the webhook can find its writers. It is set
// when the writer is created and never changes.
webhookID string
// sweepOwned marks a registry entry that the idle sweep
// created because no writer was cached for the webhook. The
// created because no writer was cached for the target. The
// sweep removes such an entry again when it is done, so a
// sweep can never leave — or resurrect — a registry entry
// for a webhook that has been deleted. A delivery that adopts
// for a target that has been deleted. A delivery that adopts
// the writer clears the flag, handing the entry to the
// registry proper.
//
@@ -215,6 +232,7 @@ func newArchiveWriter(
path: path,
log: log,
debounce: archiveReopenDebounce,
now: time.Now,
}
}
@@ -250,7 +268,7 @@ func (w *archiveWriter) write(
)
}
if time.Since(w.lastReopen) >= w.debounce {
if w.now().Sub(w.lastReopen) >= w.debounce {
return w.reopen(expiry)
}
@@ -273,9 +291,11 @@ func (w *archiveWriter) open(expiry time.Duration) error {
func (w *archiveWriter) openMode(
mode string, expiry time.Duration,
) error {
dbURL := fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=%s", w.path, mode)
sqlDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dbURL)
// Opened through database.OpenSQLite so an archive file carries
// the same WAL journaling, busy timeout, immediate-transaction
// locking, and pool bounds as every other database file. See
// internal/database/sqlite_open.go.
sqlDB, err := database.OpenSQLite(w.path, mode)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"opening archive database %s: %w", w.path, err,
@@ -308,7 +328,7 @@ func (w *archiveWriter) openMode(
}
w.db = gdb
w.lastReopen = time.Now()
w.lastReopen = w.now()
w.reopens++
if expiry > 0 {
@@ -383,11 +403,78 @@ func (w *archiveWriter) sweepExpired(expiry time.Duration) error {
return nil
}
// rename gives the archive file a new name in the same directory,
// and the writer uses the file under that name from now on. The
// handle is closed first, which folds the -wal into the .db; any
// -wal or -shm still beside the file (left by a crash) is moved with
// it, because SQLite finds them by name. A missing file is not an
// error: the operator may have moved it away, and the next write
// creates it under the new name.
//
// If a file already has the new name, nothing is moved and the
// error is ErrArchiveNameTaken. If one file fails to move, those
// already moved are moved back before the error is returned, so the
// archive is never split across two names.
func (w *archiveWriter) rename(name string) error {
w.mu.Lock()
defer w.mu.Unlock()
if w.evicted {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s", errArchiveWriterEvicted, w.path,
)
}
path := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(w.path), name)
if path == w.path {
return nil
}
suffixes := []string{"", "-wal", "-shm"}
for _, suffix := range suffixes {
if fileExists(path + suffix) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %s", ErrArchiveNameTaken, name+suffix,
)
}
}
w.close()
for i, suffix := range suffixes {
err := os.Rename(w.path+suffix, path+suffix)
if err == nil || errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
continue
}
for _, moved := range suffixes[:i] {
backErr := os.Rename(path+moved, w.path+moved)
if backErr != nil && !errors.Is(backErr, fs.ErrNotExist) {
w.log.Error(
"failed to move archive file back",
"from", path+moved,
"to", w.path+moved,
"error", backErr,
)
}
}
return fmt.Errorf(
"renaming archive %s to %s: %w", w.path+suffix, path+suffix, err,
)
}
w.path = path
return nil
}
// evict closes the writer's handle and marks it unusable. It is
// called when the writer leaves the registry, either because the
// webhook was deleted or because its last database target was
// removed. The archive FILE is deliberately left on disk: it is
// long-term storage an operator may still want.
// called when the writer leaves the registry, because its target
// or its webhook was deleted, or at shutdown. The archive FILE is
// deliberately left on disk: it is long-term storage an operator
// may still want.
func (w *archiveWriter) evict() {
w.mu.Lock()
defer w.mu.Unlock()
internal/delivery/target_database_evict_test.go
+135 -81
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
@@ -16,85 +17,109 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// evictTestEngine builds an engine backed by a temporary data
// directory and returns it along with that directory.
func evictTestEngine(t *testing.T) (*delivery.Engine, string) {
// deliverTo archives one event to a database target, leaving the
// target's writer cached with its handle open.
func deliverTo(
t *testing.T, env *archiveEnv, tgt *database.Target,
) {
t.Helper()
dataDir := t.TempDir()
eng := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
nil,
database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir),
archiveTestLogger(),
&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
1,
)
return eng, dataDir
}
// TestEvictWebhook_ClosesAndRemovesWriter proves that evicting
// a webhook drops its archive writer from the registry and
// closes the open archive handle, rather than leaving both
// alive for the process lifetime.
func TestEvictWebhook_ClosesAndRemovesWriter(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
eng, dataDir := evictTestEngine(t)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
webhookID := event.WebhookID
require.True(
t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
"a delivery should have cached an archive writer",
)
require.True(
t, eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
"the writer should hold an open handle after a write",
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(
webhookDB, seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, tgt),
)
}
eng.EvictWebhook(webhookID)
// TestEvictWebhook_ClosesAndRemovesWriter proves that evicting
// a webhook drops the archive writers of its database targets
// from the registry and closes their open handles, rather than
// leaving them alive for the process lifetime, and leaves another
// webhook's writer alone.
func TestEvictWebhook_ClosesAndRemovesWriter(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.False(
t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(webhookID),
"eviction should remove the registry entry",
)
assert.False(
t, eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(webhookID),
"eviction should close the archive handle",
)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
first := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, "")
second := env.addDatabaseTarget(t, first.WebhookID, "")
other := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, "")
archivePath := filepath.Join(
dataDir, fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", webhookID),
for _, tgt := range []*database.Target{first, second, other} {
deliverTo(t, env, tgt)
require.True(
t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(tgt.ID),
"the writer should hold an open handle after a write",
)
}
env.eng.EvictWebhook(first.WebhookID)
for _, tgt := range []*database.Target{first, second} {
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID),
"eviction should remove the registry entry",
)
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(tgt.ID),
"eviction should close the archive handle",
)
assert.FileExists(
t, env.archivePath(tgt),
"eviction must not delete the archive file",
)
}
assert.True(
t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(other.ID),
"another webhook's writer must be left alone",
)
}
// TestEvictTarget_LeavesOtherTargets proves that evicting one
// database target leaves the writer of another target of the same
// webhook in place.
func TestEvictTarget_LeavesOtherTargets(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
doomed := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, "")
kept := env.addDatabaseTarget(t, doomed.WebhookID, "")
deliverTo(t, env, doomed)
deliverTo(t, env, kept)
env.eng.EvictTarget(doomed.ID)
assert.False(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(doomed.ID))
assert.FileExists(
t, archivePath,
t, env.archivePath(doomed),
"eviction must not delete the archive file",
)
assert.True(
t, env.eng.ExportArchiveHandleOpen(kept.ID),
"the other target's writer must be left alone",
)
}
// TestEvictWebhook_UnknownWebhookIsNoOp proves eviction is safe
// for the common case of a webhook that never had a database
// target, and that repeating it does not panic.
// for the common case of a webhook or target that never had an
// archive writer, and that repeating it does not panic.
func TestEvictWebhook_UnknownWebhookIsNoOp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
eng, _ := evictTestEngine(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
assert.NotPanics(t, func() {
eng.EvictWebhook("no-such-webhook")
eng.EvictWebhook("no-such-webhook")
env.eng.EvictWebhook("no-such-webhook")
env.eng.EvictWebhook("no-such-webhook")
env.eng.EvictTarget("no-such-target")
env.eng.EvictTarget("no-such-target")
})
assert.False(
t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter("no-such-webhook"),
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter("no-such-target"),
"eviction must not create a writer",
)
}
@@ -288,17 +313,14 @@ func TestEvictWebhook_RacingWriteDoesNotReopenHandle(
) {
t.Parallel()
eng, _ := evictTestEngine(t)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, "")
// Prime the registry so the test can hold the very writer the
// eviction is about to detach.
eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
deliverTo(t, env, tgt)
w := eng.ExportArchiveWriterFor(event.WebhookID)
w := env.eng.ExportArchiveWriterFor(tgt.ID)
require.NotNil(t, w)
require.True(t, w.HandleOpen())
@@ -308,7 +330,7 @@ func TestEvictWebhook_RacingWriteDoesNotReopenHandle(
// eviction has to contend for the writer's mutex.
race.awaitFirstWrite()
eng.EvictWebhook(event.WebhookID)
env.eng.EvictWebhook(tgt.WebhookID)
sawEvicted, otherErr := race.wait()
@@ -323,41 +345,73 @@ func TestEvictWebhook_RacingWriteDoesNotReopenHandle(
"been evicted",
)
assert.False(
t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(event.WebhookID),
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID),
"the registry entry must stay gone",
)
}
// TestEvictWebhook_LaterDeliveryRecreatesWriter proves eviction
// does not break archiving for a webhook that is still alive: a
// does not break archiving for a target that is still alive: a
// subsequent delivery gets a brand new writer from the registry.
// It says nothing about the evicted writer itself — that is what
// TestEvictedWriter_WriteDoesNotReopenFile covers.
func TestEvictWebhook_LaterDeliveryRecreatesWriter(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
eng, _ := evictTestEngine(t)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, "")
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
deliverTo(t, env, tgt)
require.True(t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID))
eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
require.True(
t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(event.WebhookID),
)
env.eng.EvictWebhook(tgt.WebhookID)
eng.EvictWebhook(event.WebhookID)
// A fresh delivery for the same webhook gets a brand new
// A fresh delivery for the same target gets a brand new
// writer from the registry, so archiving keeps working.
second := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event, "",
)
eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, second)
deliverTo(t, env, tgt)
assert.True(
t, eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(event.WebhookID),
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID),
"a later delivery should recreate the writer",
)
}
// TestEngineStop_WriteAfterStopIsRefused proves the engine's stop
// closes each archive writer the way deleting its webhook does: a
// write that reaches a writer after the stop is refused, reopens
// nothing and adds no row.
func TestEngineStop_WriteAfterStopIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, "")
deliverTo(t, env, tgt)
w := env.eng.ExportArchiveWriterFor(tgt.ID)
require.NotNil(t, w)
require.True(t, w.HandleOpen())
require.NoError(t, env.eng.ExportStop(context.Background()))
err := w.Write(evictTestRow("ev-after-stop"), 0)
require.ErrorIs(
t, err, delivery.ErrExportArchiveWriterEvicted,
"a write after the stop must be refused",
)
assert.False(
t, w.HandleOpen(),
"a refused write must not reopen the archive",
)
assert.False(
t, env.eng.ExportHasArchiveWriter(tgt.ID),
"the stop should empty the registry",
)
count, err := countArchivedRows(w.Path())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(
t, int64(1), count, "the refused row must not be written",
)
}
internal/delivery/target_database_export.go
+275
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
package delivery
import (
"compress/gzip"
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"path/filepath"
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/gormlog"
)
// archiveTableQuery counts the archive's table: 0 when the archive
// writer has created the file but not yet the table in it.
const archiveTableQuery = "SELECT count(*) FROM sqlite_master " +
"WHERE type = 'table' AND name = 'archived_events'"
// ArchivePath returns where a database target's archive file is: in
// the data directory, beside the webhook's event database, under the
// name ArchiveFileName gives it.
func ArchivePath(
dbMgr *database.WebhookDBManager,
webhook *database.Webhook,
target *database.Target,
) string {
return filepath.Join(
filepath.Dir(dbMgr.DBPath(webhook.ID)),
ArchiveFileName(webhook.Name, target.Name, target.ID),
)
}
// ArchiveExportFileName returns the name a database target's archive
// downloads under:
// archive-WEBHOOKNAME-TARGETNAME-YYYYMMDDTHHMMSSZ.json.gz, the names
// made safe as in ArchiveFileName and the time in UTC.
func ArchiveExportFileName(
webhookName, targetName string, at time.Time,
) string {
return "archive-" + archiveNamePart(webhookName) + "-" +
archiveNamePart(targetName) + "-" +
at.UTC().Format("20060102T150405Z") + ".json.gz"
}
// ArchiveExport is a database target's archive opened for download.
// It reads the file on its own connection, inside one read-only
// transaction, so it writes out the archive as it stood when
// OpenArchiveExport returned.
//
// Archives are in WAL mode, where a reader works from a snapshot and
// never blocks a writer: archive writes go on while an export is open,
// and the export does not see them. SQLite cannot checkpoint the -wal
// past an open snapshot, so the -wal grows until the export is closed.
type ArchiveExport struct {
db *sql.DB
tx *gorm.DB
// empty is true when there is nothing to read: no file, or a file
// without the archive's table yet.
empty bool
}
// exportedName is how an export names its webhook and its target.
type exportedName struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
}
// OpenArchiveExport opens the archive file at path for export and
// takes the snapshot the export reads. It never creates the file: with
// no file at path, the export has no rows.
//
// Once it has returned, the file is open, so a rename or a move of it
// does not affect the export, which reads the same file under its new
// name.
//
// The transaction lasts as long as ctx does, so ctx must last for the
// whole export.
func OpenArchiveExport(
ctx context.Context, path string, log *slog.Logger,
) (*ArchiveExport, error) {
if !fileExists(path) {
return &ArchiveExport{empty: true}, nil
}
db, err := database.OpenSQLite(path, archiveModeExisting)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening archive %s: %w", path, err)
}
gdb, err := gorm.Open(
sqlite.Dialector{Conn: db}, &gorm.Config{
// Never leave this at GORM's default. See
// internal/gormlog.
Logger: gormlog.New(log),
},
)
if err != nil {
_ = db.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening archive %s: %w", path, err)
}
// ReadOnly makes the driver begin a deferred transaction in place
// of the BEGIN IMMEDIATE the connection string asks for, so the
// export never takes the archive's write lock.
tx := gdb.WithContext(ctx).Begin(&sql.TxOptions{ReadOnly: true})
if tx.Error != nil {
_ = db.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading archive %s: %w", path, tx.Error)
}
// The transaction's first read is what takes the snapshot.
var tables int
err = tx.Raw(archiveTableQuery).Row().Scan(&tables)
if err != nil {
_ = tx.Rollback()
_ = db.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading archive %s: %w", path, err)
}
return &ArchiveExport{db: db, tx: tx, empty: tables == 0}, nil
}
// WriteGzipJSON writes the export to w as one gzipped JSON object:
// webhook and target, each an id and a name; exported_at; and
// archived_events, one object per archived row, keyed by column name.
// A body that is not valid UTF-8 cannot be a JSON string, so it is
// written in base64, with "body_encoding": "base64" beside it.
//
// Each row is written out before the next is read, so neither the
// archive nor its JSON is ever held in memory whole. After an error
// the gzip stream is left unfinished, so what was written does not
// decompress as a whole file.
func (x *ArchiveExport) WriteGzipJSON(
ctx context.Context,
w io.Writer,
webhook *database.Webhook,
target *database.Target,
exportedAt time.Time,
) error {
head, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"webhook": exportedName{ID: webhook.ID, Name: webhook.Name},
"target": exportedName{ID: target.ID, Name: target.Name},
"exported_at": exportedAt.UTC(),
})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encoding archive export: %w", err)
}
zw := gzip.NewWriter(w)
err = x.writeJSON(ctx, zw, head)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing archive export: %w", err)
}
return zw.Close()
}
// Close ends the export's transaction and closes its connection.
func (x *ArchiveExport) Close() error {
if x.db == nil {
return nil
}
_ = x.tx.Rollback()
return x.db.Close()
}
// writeJSON writes head with archived_events added as its last key,
// the rows going into it one at a time.
func (x *ArchiveExport) writeJSON(
ctx context.Context, w io.Writer, head []byte,
) error {
// head goes out without its closing brace, so that
// archived_events can follow it.
_, err := w.Write(head[:len(head)-1])
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = io.WriteString(w, `,"archived_events":[`)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = x.writeRows(ctx, w)
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = io.WriteString(w, "\n]}\n")
return err
}
// writeRows writes each archived row to w, oldest first, one per line,
// separated by commas.
func (x *ArchiveExport) writeRows(ctx context.Context, w io.Writer) error {
if x.empty {
return nil
}
rows, err := x.tx.WithContext(ctx).
Model(&archivedEvent{}).Order("id").Rows()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
for sep := "\n"; rows.Next(); sep = ",\n" {
var ev archivedEvent
err = x.tx.ScanRows(rows, &ev)
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = io.WriteString(w, sep)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = writeRow(w, &ev)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
return rows.Err()
}
// writeRow writes an archived row to w as a JSON object keyed by
// column name, its body in base64 when it is not valid UTF-8.
func writeRow(w io.Writer, ev *archivedEvent) error {
row := map[string]any{
"id": ev.ID,
"event_id": ev.EventID,
"webhook_id": ev.WebhookID,
"entrypoint_id": ev.EntrypointID,
"method": ev.Method,
"headers": ev.Headers,
"body": ev.Body,
"content_type": ev.ContentType,
"archived_at": ev.ArchivedAt.UTC(),
}
if !utf8.ValidString(ev.Body) {
row["body"] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(ev.Body))
row["body_encoding"] = "base64"
}
line, err := json.Marshal(row)
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = w.Write(line)
return err
}
internal/delivery/target_database_export_test.go
+412
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,412 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"compress/gzip"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// The webhook and the target the export tests' archives belong to.
const (
exportWebhookID = "wh-export"
exportWebhookName = "Orders (EU)"
exportTargetID = "tgt-export"
exportTargetName = "Long-term archive"
)
const (
// binaryBody is a body that is not valid UTF-8.
binaryBody = "\xff\xfe\x00\x01binary\x80"
// openedEventID is the event the snapshot tests archive before
// they open the export.
openedEventID = "opened"
)
// writeExportTo writes export to w as the archive of the export tests'
// webhook and target, exported at 2026-10-02T12:03:04Z.
func writeExportTo(
t *testing.T, export *delivery.ArchiveExport, w io.Writer,
) error {
t.Helper()
return export.WriteGzipJSON(
t.Context(), w,
&database.Webhook{
BaseModel: database.BaseModel{ID: exportWebhookID},
Name: exportWebhookName,
},
&database.Target{
BaseModel: database.BaseModel{ID: exportTargetID},
Name: exportTargetName,
},
time.Date(2026, 10, 2, 12, 3, 4, 0, time.UTC),
)
}
// exportArchive runs a whole export of the archive at path and returns
// its JSON, decompressed and parsed.
func exportArchive(t *testing.T, path string) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
export, err := delivery.OpenArchiveExport(
t.Context(), path, archiveTestLogger(),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, export.Close()) }()
return writeExport(t, export)
}
// writeExport writes an opened export and returns its JSON,
// decompressed and parsed. Reading to the end makes the gzip reader
// check that the stream was finished.
func writeExport(
t *testing.T, export *delivery.ArchiveExport,
) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
var buf bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, writeExportTo(t, export, &buf))
zr, err := gzip.NewReader(&buf)
require.NoError(t, err)
raw, err := io.ReadAll(zr)
require.NoError(t, err)
var got map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &got))
return got
}
// exportedEvents returns an export's archived_events.
func exportedEvents(t *testing.T, got map[string]any) []map[string]any {
t.Helper()
list, ok := got["archived_events"].([]any)
require.True(t, ok, "archived_events must be an array: %v", got)
events := make([]map[string]any, len(list))
for i, v := range list {
events[i], ok = v.(map[string]any)
require.True(t, ok, "an archived event must be an object: %v", v)
}
return events
}
// exportedEventIDs returns the event_id of each of an export's
// archived_events.
func exportedEventIDs(t *testing.T, got map[string]any) []string {
t.Helper()
events := exportedEvents(t, got)
ids := make([]string, 0, len(events))
for _, ev := range events {
ids = append(ids, fmt.Sprint(ev["event_id"]))
}
return ids
}
// TestArchiveExport_MatchesStoredRows proves an export holds the
// webhook, the target, the time, and every column of every stored
// row: a body that is valid UTF-8 as a string, and one that is not in
// base64, marked as such.
func TestArchiveExport_MatchesStoredRows(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive.db")
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(path, archiveTestLogger(), 0)
bodies := []string{`{"order":1}`, "plain text", "", binaryBody}
for i, body := range bodies {
require.NoError(t, w.Write(delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{
EventID: fmt.Sprintf("ev-%d", i),
WebhookID: exportWebhookID,
EntrypointID: "ep-1",
Method: "POST",
Headers: `{"X-Test":["yes"]}`,
Body: body,
ContentType: testContentType,
}, 0))
}
var stored []delivery.ExportArchivedEvent
require.NoError(t, openArchiveDBForRead(t, path).
Order("id").Find(&stored).Error)
got := exportArchive(t, path)
assert.Equal(t,
map[string]any{"id": exportWebhookID, "name": exportWebhookName},
got["webhook"],
)
assert.Equal(t,
map[string]any{"id": exportTargetID, "name": exportTargetName},
got["target"],
)
assert.Equal(t, "2026-10-02T12:03:04Z", got["exported_at"])
events := exportedEvents(t, got)
require.Len(t, events, len(bodies))
for i, row := range stored {
assertExportedRow(t, row, events[i])
}
}
// assertExportedRow checks that ev, from an export, holds every column
// of the stored row.
func assertExportedRow(
t *testing.T, row delivery.ExportArchivedEvent, ev map[string]any,
) {
t.Helper()
archivedAt, err := time.Parse(
time.RFC3339Nano, fmt.Sprint(ev["archived_at"]),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, archivedAt.Equal(row.ArchivedAt))
assert.EqualValues(t, row.ID, ev["id"])
assert.Equal(t, row.EventID, ev["event_id"])
assert.Equal(t, row.WebhookID, ev["webhook_id"])
assert.Equal(t, row.EntrypointID, ev["entrypoint_id"])
assert.Equal(t, row.Method, ev["method"])
assert.Equal(t, row.Headers, ev["headers"])
assert.Equal(t, row.ContentType, ev["content_type"])
if row.Body != binaryBody {
assert.Equal(t, row.Body, ev["body"])
assert.Len(t, ev, 9, "the nine columns and nothing else: %v", ev)
return
}
body, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(fmt.Sprint(ev["body"]))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, binaryBody, string(body))
assert.Equal(t, "base64", ev["body_encoding"])
assert.Len(t, ev, 10, "the nine columns and body_encoding: %v", ev)
}
// TestArchiveExport_Empty proves an archive with nothing in it exports
// as an empty archived_events: no file, which the export must not
// create; a file the archive writer has not yet put its table in; and
// a table with no rows.
func TestArchiveExport_Empty(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
missing := filepath.Join(dir, "missing.db")
noTable := filepath.Join(dir, "no-table.db")
noRows := filepath.Join(dir, "no-rows.db")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(noTable, nil, 0o600))
require.NoError(t,
delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(noRows, archiveTestLogger(), 0).
Open(0),
)
for _, path := range []string{missing, noTable, noRows} {
assert.Empty(t, exportedEvents(t, exportArchive(t, path)), path)
}
for _, suffix := range archiveFileSuffixes() {
assert.NoFileExists(t, missing+suffix)
}
}
// TestArchiveExport_ReadsOneSnapshot proves an export writes the
// archive as it was when it was opened, and holds up no archive
// write: a row written while the export is open is stored, and is not
// in the export. A write held up for the whole busy timeout would
// fail.
func TestArchiveExport_ReadsOneSnapshot(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive.db")
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(path, archiveTestLogger(), 0)
require.NoError(t, w.Write(delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: openedEventID}, 0))
export, err := delivery.OpenArchiveExport(
t.Context(), path, archiveTestLogger(),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, export.Close()) }()
require.NoError(t, w.Write(delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "during"}, 0))
assert.Equal(t,
[]string{openedEventID}, exportedEventIDs(t, writeExport(t, export)),
)
var stored int64
require.NoError(t, openArchiveDBForRead(t, path).
Model(&delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{}).Count(&stored).Error)
assert.Equal(t, int64(2), stored)
}
// TestArchiveExport_SurvivesRename proves that renaming the archive
// while an export of it is open, as renaming its webhook or target
// does, leaves the export reading the same file.
func TestArchiveExport_SurvivesRename(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-old.db")
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(path, archiveTestLogger(), 0)
require.NoError(t, w.Write(delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: openedEventID}, 0))
export, err := delivery.OpenArchiveExport(
t.Context(), path, archiveTestLogger(),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, export.Close()) }()
require.NoError(t, w.Rename("archive-new.db"))
require.NoError(t, w.Write(delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "after"}, 0))
require.NoFileExists(t, path)
assert.Equal(t,
[]string{openedEventID}, exportedEventIDs(t, writeExport(t, export)),
)
}
// heapPeak is an io.Writer that discards what it is given and records
// the largest heap it saw at a write. It collects garbage before each
// reading, so the heap it reads is what is still held.
type heapPeak struct {
max uint64
}
func (p *heapPeak) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
var m runtime.MemStats
runtime.GC()
runtime.ReadMemStats(&m)
p.max = max(p.max, m.HeapAlloc)
return len(b), nil
}
// exportHeapGrowth exports an archive of rows random bodies, each
// bodySize bytes of base64, and returns how far the heap rose above
// where it stood when the export began, at its highest.
func exportHeapGrowth(t *testing.T, rows, bodySize int) uint64 {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive.db")
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(path, archiveTestLogger(), 0)
// Base64 makes four characters of every three bytes.
random := make([]byte, bodySize/4*3)
for range rows {
_, _ = rand.Read(random)
require.NoError(t, w.Write(delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{
Body: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(random),
}, 0))
}
export, err := delivery.OpenArchiveExport(
t.Context(), path, archiveTestLogger(),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { require.NoError(t, export.Close()) }()
runtime.GC()
var start runtime.MemStats
runtime.ReadMemStats(&start)
// Through a buffer, the heap is read once per 8 KiB of output
// rather than at each of gzip's small writes, which takes far
// longer.
peak := &heapPeak{max: start.HeapAlloc}
buffered := bufio.NewWriterSize(peak, 8<<10)
require.NoError(t, writeExportTo(t, export, buffered))
require.NoError(t, buffered.Flush())
return peak.max - start.HeapAlloc
}
// TestArchiveExport_Streams proves an export holds neither the archive
// nor its output in memory whole: exporting 384 KiB more of archive
// raises the heap's peak by less than half of that. The export's own
// memory, mostly gzip's compressor, is the same for both archives, so
// it cancels out. The bodies are random bytes in base64, which gzip
// shrinks by only a quarter, so an export that read every row before
// writing, or built the JSON or the gzipped file before writing it,
// would raise the peak by at least three quarters of the difference.
//
// The smaller archive has two rows so that its export, too, writes
// out more than the 8 KiB buffer in exportHeapGrowth before it ends:
// the heap must be read while the export's own memory is held.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // It measures the heap, which tests share.
func TestArchiveExport_Streams(t *testing.T) {
const (
bodySize = 16 << 10
smallRows = 2
largeRows = smallRows + 24
limit = (largeRows - smallRows) * bodySize / 2
)
small := exportHeapGrowth(t, smallRows, bodySize)
large := exportHeapGrowth(t, largeRows, bodySize)
assert.Less(t, large, small+limit,
"the heap rose by %d for %d rows and by %d for %d rows",
small, smallRows, large, largeRows,
)
}
// TestArchiveExportFileName proves the download is named for the
// webhook and the target, with the names made safe as for the archive
// file, and the export time in UTC.
func TestArchiveExportFileName(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cest := time.FixedZone("CEST", int((2 * time.Hour).Seconds()))
assert.Equal(t,
"archive-orders-eu-long-term-archive-20261002T120304Z.json.gz",
delivery.ArchiveExportFileName(
exportWebhookName, exportTargetName,
time.Date(2026, 10, 2, 14, 3, 4, 0, cest),
),
)
}
internal/delivery/target_database_test.go
+318 -44
View File
@@ -4,13 +4,12 @@ import (
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
@@ -74,25 +73,18 @@ func removeArchiveFiles(t *testing.T, path string) {
// TestDeliverDatabase_ArchivesEvent verifies that delivering to
// a database target marks the delivery delivered and archives
// the full event into a separate per-webhook archive file.
// the full event into the target's own archive file.
func TestDeliverDatabase_ArchivesEvent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := t.TempDir()
dbMgr := database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir)
e := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
nil, dbMgr,
archiveTestLogger(),
&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
1,
)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, "")
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":true}`)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, "")
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, tgt)
e.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
var updated database.Delivery
@@ -105,8 +97,7 @@ func TestDeliverDatabase_ArchivesEvent(t *testing.T) {
)
archivePath := filepath.Join(
dataDir,
fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", event.WebhookID),
env.dataDir, "archive-sweep-test-archive-"+tgt.ID+".db",
)
assert.FileExists(t, archivePath)
@@ -193,13 +184,20 @@ func TestArchiveWriter_RecreatesAfterRemoval(
func TestArchiveWriter_ReopenDebounce(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A generous debounce keeps the two rapid writes inside
// the window even on a heavily loaded test machine.
const debounce = 2 * time.Second
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "archive-wh.db")
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
path, archiveTestLogger(), 2*time.Second,
path, archiveTestLogger(), debounce,
)
// The writer measures its reopen debounce on this clock, which
// only the test moves, so how long the host takes between
// writes cannot change the result.
now := time.Now()
w.SetNow(func() time.Time { return now })
require.NoError(t, w.Write(
delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "a"}, 0,
))
@@ -211,7 +209,7 @@ func TestArchiveWriter_ReopenDebounce(t *testing.T) {
// initial open — no extra close/reopen.
assert.Equal(t, 1, w.Reopens())
time.Sleep(2100 * time.Millisecond)
now = now.Add(debounce)
require.NoError(t, w.Write(
delivery.ExportArchivedEvent{EventID: "c"}, 0,
@@ -288,31 +286,31 @@ func TestParseArchiveExpiry(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// seedDatabaseTargetDelivery seeds a pending delivery for a
// database target with the given config JSON and returns the
// in-memory delivery the target handler is invoked with.
// seedDatabaseTargetDelivery seeds a pending delivery of an event
// to a database target and returns the in-memory delivery the
// target handler is invoked with.
func seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t *testing.T,
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
event database.Event,
config string,
tgt *database.Target,
) *database.Delivery {
t.Helper()
dlv := seedDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event.ID, uuid.New().String(),
t, webhookDB, event.ID, tgt.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
d := &database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: dlv.TargetID,
TargetID: tgt.ID,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusPending,
Event: event,
Target: database.Target{
Name: "test-db",
Name: tgt.Name,
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
Config: config,
Config: tgt.Config,
},
}
d.ID = dlv.ID
@@ -330,22 +328,14 @@ func TestDeliverDatabase_ArchiveFailureFailsDelivery(
) {
t.Parallel()
dataDir := t.TempDir()
e := delivery.NewTestEngineWithDB(
nil, database.NewTestWebhookDBManager(dataDir),
archiveTestLogger(),
&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second},
1,
)
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, `{"expiry":"nonsense"}`)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"archived":false}`)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(
t, webhookDB, event, `{"expiry":"nonsense"}`,
)
d := seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, tgt)
e.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(webhookDB, d)
var updated database.Delivery
@@ -373,10 +363,7 @@ func TestDeliverDatabase_ArchiveFailureFailsDelivery(
)
assert.NoFileExists(t,
filepath.Join(
dataDir,
fmt.Sprintf("archive-%s.db", event.WebhookID),
),
env.archivePath(tgt),
"no archive file should exist for a failed config",
)
}
@@ -400,3 +387,290 @@ func TestValidateArchiveExpiry(t *testing.T) {
)
}
}
// TestArchiveFileName pins the archive file name and the rules
// that make a webhook or target name safe to put in it.
func TestArchiveFileName(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const id = "3f2a1c9e-8d4b-4c1a-9e2f-0a1b2c3d4e5f"
cases := []struct {
name string
webhook string
target string
want string
}{
{
"plain names", "orders", "archive",
"archive-orders-archive-" + id + ".db",
},
{
"lowercased", "Orders", "Main Archive",
"archive-orders-main-archive-" + id + ".db",
},
{
"a run of other characters is one dash",
`a /\..b`, "c__--d",
"archive-a-b-c-d-" + id + ".db",
},
{
"no dash at either end", " --orders!! ", "(archive)",
"archive-orders-archive-" + id + ".db",
},
{
"path separators", "../../etc/passwd", "a/b",
"archive-etc-passwd-a-b-" + id + ".db",
},
{
"letters outside ASCII are dropped",
"Bestellungen Größe", "café",
"archive-bestellungen-gr-e-caf-" + id + ".db",
},
{
"nothing left is unnamed", "", "!!!",
"archive-unnamed-unnamed-" + id + ".db",
},
{
"cut to 40 characters", strings.Repeat("a", 50), "x",
"archive-" + strings.Repeat("a", 40) + "-x-" + id + ".db",
},
{
"no dash left by the cut",
strings.Repeat("a", 39) + " b", "x",
"archive-" + strings.Repeat("a", 39) + "-x-" + id + ".db",
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.Equal(
t, tc.want,
delivery.ArchiveFileName(tc.webhook, tc.target, id),
)
})
}
}
// TestDeliverDatabase_EachTargetHasItsOwnArchive proves two
// database targets of one webhook archive into separate files.
func TestDeliverDatabase_EachTargetHasItsOwnArchive(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
first := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, "")
second := env.addDatabaseTarget(t, first.WebhookID, "")
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
for _, tgt := range []*database.Target{first, second} {
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(
webhookDB,
seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, tgt),
)
}
require.NotEqual(
t, env.archivePath(first), env.archivePath(second),
)
assert.Equal(
t, []string{event.ID},
archivedEventIDs(t, env.archivePath(first)),
)
assert.Equal(
t, []string{event.ID},
archivedEventIDs(t, env.archivePath(second)),
)
}
// TestRename_MovesTheFile proves a rename moves the archive, rows
// and all, and that later writes go to the new name.
func TestRename_MovesTheFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, "")
oldPath := env.archivePath(tgt)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
first := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(
webhookDB, seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, first, tgt),
)
require.FileExists(t, oldPath)
require.NoError(
t, env.eng.Rename(tgt.ID, "Orders", "Long Term"),
)
newPath := filepath.Join(
env.dataDir, "archive-orders-long-term-"+tgt.ID+".db",
)
assert.NoFileExists(t, oldPath)
assert.Equal(t, []string{first.ID}, archivedEventIDs(t, newPath))
second := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":2}`)
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(
webhookDB,
seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, second, tgt),
)
assert.ElementsMatch(
t, []string{first.ID, second.ID},
archivedEventIDs(t, newPath),
)
assert.NoFileExists(
t, oldPath, "a write after the rename must use the new name",
)
}
// TestRename_NeverReplacesAFile plants a file at the new name, once
// the .db alone, once a lone -wal and once a lone -shm, and proves
// each time that the rename is refused, the planted file survives,
// and the archive keeps its name and its rows.
func TestRename_NeverReplacesAFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, suffix := range archiveFileSuffixes() {
t.Run("planted .db"+suffix, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, "")
oldPath := env.archivePath(tgt)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
first := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(
webhookDB,
seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, first, tgt),
)
newPath := filepath.Join(
env.dataDir, "archive-orders-long-term-"+tgt.ID+".db",
)
plantedPath := newPath + suffix
require.NoError(
t, os.WriteFile(plantedPath, []byte("planted"), 0o600),
)
require.ErrorIs(
t, env.eng.Rename(tgt.ID, "Orders", "Long Term"),
delivery.ErrArchiveNameTaken,
)
//nolint:gosec // reads the file the test planted under t.TempDir()
planted, err := os.ReadFile(plantedPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "planted", string(planted))
second := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":2}`)
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(
webhookDB,
seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, second, tgt),
)
assert.ElementsMatch(
t, []string{first.ID, second.ID},
archivedEventIDs(t, oldPath),
)
})
}
}
// TestRename_BeforeTheNameIsSaved covers the order the handlers
// use: they rename before they save the new name, so a delivery in
// between must write under the new name although the main database
// still has the old one. It also shows that renaming an archive that
// does not exist yet is not an error.
func TestRename_BeforeTheNameIsSaved(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := setupArchiveTest(t)
tgt := env.seedDatabaseTarget(t, "")
require.NoError(
t, env.eng.Rename(tgt.ID, "Orders", "Archive"),
)
webhookDB := testWebhookDB(t)
event := seedEvent(t, webhookDB, `{"n":1}`)
env.eng.ExportDeliverDatabase(
webhookDB, seedDatabaseTargetDelivery(t, webhookDB, event, tgt),
)
assert.FileExists(
t,
filepath.Join(
env.dataDir, "archive-orders-archive-"+tgt.ID+".db",
),
)
assert.NoFileExists(t, env.archivePath(tgt))
}
// TestArchiveWriter_RenameMovesSidecars proves a rename carries
// the -wal and -shm a crash can leave beside an archive no handle
// has opened since. SQLite finds them by name, so a -wal left
// behind would lose the transactions it holds.
func TestArchiveWriter_RenameMovesSidecars(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
oldPath := filepath.Join(dir, "archive-old.db")
newPath := filepath.Join(dir, "archive-new.db")
for _, suffix := range archiveFileSuffixes() {
require.NoError(
t, os.WriteFile(oldPath+suffix, []byte(suffix), 0o600),
)
}
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
oldPath, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
)
require.NoError(t, w.Rename("archive-new.db"))
for _, suffix := range archiveFileSuffixes() {
assert.NoFileExists(t, oldPath+suffix)
assert.FileExists(t, newPath+suffix)
}
assert.Equal(t, newPath, w.Path())
}
// TestArchiveWriter_RenameMovesBackOnFailure makes the -wal fail to
// move after the .db has moved, and proves the .db is moved back, so
// the archive is never split across two names. The new name is 255
// bytes, the longest a file name may be, so the .db can take it but
// the -wal, four bytes longer, cannot.
func TestArchiveWriter_RenameMovesBackOnFailure(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
oldPath := filepath.Join(dir, "archive-old.db")
newName := strings.Repeat("a", 252) + ".db"
for _, suffix := range archiveFileSuffixes() {
require.NoError(
t, os.WriteFile(oldPath+suffix, []byte(suffix), 0o600),
)
}
w := delivery.NewExportArchiveWriter(
oldPath, archiveTestLogger(), 0,
)
require.Error(t, w.Rename(newName))
for _, suffix := range archiveFileSuffixes() {
assert.FileExists(t, oldPath+suffix)
}
assert.NoFileExists(t, filepath.Join(dir, newName))
assert.Equal(t, oldPath, w.Path())
}
internal/delivery/target_headers.go
+263
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
package delivery
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds bounds a per-target request timeout.
// A delivery attempt holds a worker for its whole duration, so an
// unbounded timeout lets one misconfigured target stall the queue
// indefinitely. Five minutes is far beyond any healthy webhook
// receiver and still finite.
const MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds = 300
// Errors returned when a target's header or timeout form input
// cannot be turned into a configuration.
//
// None of these ever quotes a header VALUE. A target header value
// is routinely an authorization token, and these messages are shown
// to the user in an error page body.
var (
errHeaderLineMalformed = errors.New(
`each header line must be "Name: value"`,
)
errHeaderNameInvalid = errors.New(
"header name must be a valid HTTP token",
)
errHeaderValueInvalid = errors.New(
"header value must not contain control characters",
)
errHeaderDuplicate = errors.New(
"header given more than once",
)
errHeaderReserved = errors.New(
"header is set by the delivery engine and cannot be " +
"overridden",
)
errTimeoutInvalid = errors.New(
"timeout must be a whole number of seconds",
)
errTimeoutOutOfRange = errors.New(
"timeout is out of range",
)
)
// isReservedTargetHeader reports whether name (canonicalised) is a
// header a target configuration may not set, because the delivery
// path or net/http itself writes it regardless.
//
// These are rejected rather than accepted-and-ignored. Storing a
// header that provably never reaches the wire tells the operator
// their configuration took effect when it did not, which is the
// same failure mode as silently substituting a default for an
// invalid value.
func isReservedTargetHeader(name string) bool {
switch name {
case "Host", "Content-Length", "Transfer-Encoding", "Connection":
return true
case "User-Agent":
// applyRequestHeaders sets the User-Agent after it applies
// the configured headers, so a configured one would always
// be overwritten.
return true
case "Trailer":
// net/http strips Trailer from the request it writes
// (reqWriteExcludeHeader), so a configured one is accepted
// and stored and then provably never reaches the wire.
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// ParseTargetHeaders turns the target form's headers field — one
// "Name: value" pair per line, blank lines ignored — into the map
// stored in HTTPTargetConfig.Headers. Names are canonicalised, so a
// name repeated in a different case is still a duplicate rather than
// one pair silently overwriting the other.
//
// An input with no pairs yields an empty map, which omitempty drops
// from the stored config: a target configured with no headers keeps
// the same config JSON it had before this field existed.
func ParseTargetHeaders(raw string) (map[string]string, error) {
headers := make(map[string]string)
for i, line := range strings.Split(raw, "\n") {
lineNum := i + 1
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if line == "" {
continue
}
name, value, err := parseHeaderLine(line)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("line %d: %w", lineNum, err)
}
if _, dup := headers[name]; dup {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"line %d: %w: %q", lineNum,
errHeaderDuplicate, name,
)
}
headers[name] = value
}
return headers, nil
}
// parseHeaderLine splits and validates one "Name: value" line,
// returning the canonicalised name and the trimmed value.
func parseHeaderLine(line string) (string, string, error) {
rawName, value, found := strings.Cut(line, ":")
if !found {
return "", "", errHeaderLineMalformed
}
rawName = strings.TrimSpace(rawName)
if !validHeaderName(rawName) {
// Quotes nothing. The text before the first colon is only
// a name if it parses as one; when it does not, it is as
// likely to be a pasted value whose own colon split the
// line, and half of a token would be echoed into the 400.
return "", "", errHeaderNameInvalid
}
name := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(rawName)
if isReservedTargetHeader(name) {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %q", errHeaderReserved, name,
)
}
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if !validHeaderValue(value) {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf(
"%w: %q", errHeaderValueInvalid, name,
)
}
return name, value, nil
}
// validHeaderName reports whether name is a non-empty RFC 9110
// field name. Rejecting anything else here is what keeps a value
// containing CR or LF from being smuggled in as part of a name and
// injecting a second header into the outbound request.
func validHeaderName(name string) bool {
if name == "" {
return false
}
for i := range len(name) {
if !isTokenByte(name[i]) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// isTokenByte reports whether c is a "tchar" per RFC 9110 5.6.2.
func isTokenByte(c byte) bool {
switch {
case c >= 'a' && c <= 'z',
c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z',
c >= '0' && c <= '9':
return true
}
return strings.IndexByte("!#$%&'*+-.^_`|~", c) >= 0
}
// validHeaderValue reports whether value is a legal field value:
// no control characters, which is the other half of the header
// injection guard. An empty value is legal.
func validHeaderValue(value string) bool {
for i := range len(value) {
c := value[i]
if c < 0x20 || c == 0x7f {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// FormatTargetHeaders renders a stored header map back into the
// form's textarea representation, one "Name: value" per line.
//
// Names are sorted so that loading the edit form twice without
// saving produces identical text; Go map iteration order would
// otherwise reshuffle the field on every render.
func FormatTargetHeaders(headers map[string]string) string {
if len(headers) == 0 {
return ""
}
names := make([]string, 0, len(headers))
for name := range headers {
names = append(names, name)
}
slices.Sort(names)
var b strings.Builder
for _, name := range names {
b.WriteString(name)
b.WriteString(": ")
b.WriteString(headers[name])
b.WriteString("\n")
}
return b.String()
}
// ParseTargetTimeout interprets the target form's timeout field as
// a whole number of seconds. An empty field means "unset" and yields
// 0, which omitempty drops from the stored config and which the
// delivery path reads as "use the shared client's timeout".
//
// Anything else that is not a whole number in range is an error, not
// a silently substituted default: a target whose timeout was typed
// wrong must say so at the form rather than deliver on a timeout its
// operator did not choose.
func ParseTargetTimeout(raw string) (int, error) {
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if raw == "" {
return 0, nil
}
v, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
if err != nil || v < 0 {
return 0, errTimeoutInvalid
}
if v > MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"%w: at most %d seconds",
errTimeoutOutOfRange, MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds,
)
}
return v, nil
}
// FormatTargetTimeout renders a stored timeout for the form field.
// An unset timeout renders as an empty field rather than "0", so the
// placeholder can describe the default the target actually uses.
func FormatTargetTimeout(timeout int) string {
if timeout <= 0 {
return ""
}
return strconv.Itoa(timeout)
}
internal/delivery/target_headers_test.go
+293
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"encoding/json"
"strconv"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// Literals these tests repeat, named so that the header names and the
// keep-forever archive config each have one definition.
const (
headerAuthorization = "Authorization"
headerContentType = "Content-Type"
bearerValue = "Bearer abc"
archiveConfigNever = "{\"expiry\":\"never\"}"
)
func TestParseTargetHeaders_AcceptsPairs(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(
" Authorization: Bearer abc \n\n" +
"x-tenant:acme\r\n" +
"X-Empty:\n",
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(
t,
map[string]string{
headerAuthorization: bearerValue,
"X-Tenant": "acme",
"X-Empty": "",
},
got,
)
}
// A configuration with no headers must stay indistinguishable from
// one written before the field existed, so omitempty drops the key.
func TestParseTargetHeaders_EmptyInputYieldsNoHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders("\n \n")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, got)
encoded, err := json.Marshal(delivery.HTTPTargetConfig{
URL: "https://example.com/h",
Headers: got,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.JSONEq(
t, `{"url":"https://example.com/h"}`, string(encoded),
)
}
func TestParseTargetHeaders_Rejects(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := map[string]string{
"no colon": "Authorization Bearer abc",
"empty name": ": value",
"space in name": "X Bad: value",
"reserved host": "Host: evil.example",
"reserved ua": "User-Agent: curl/8",
"reserved length": "Content-Length: 0",
"duplicate any case": "X-A: 1\nx-a: 2",
}
for name, input := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(input)
require.Error(t, err)
})
}
}
// net/http strips Trailer from the request it writes, so accepting
// one would store a header that never reaches the target.
func TestParseTargetHeaders_RejectsTrailer(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders("Trailer: X-Checksum")
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "Trailer")
}
// A header value is routinely a bearer token and these errors are
// rendered into a 400 body, so no message may quote one.
func TestParseTargetHeaders_ErrorsNeverQuoteAValue(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const secret = "QQNEVERINAMESSAGEQQ"
inputs := []string{
// The value, after the colon, in a duplicate name.
"X-A: " + secret + "\nx-a: " + secret,
// The value after the colon of an unusable name.
"X Bad Name: " + secret,
// The line splits on the value's own colon, so the
// secret lands in the text an unusable-name error is
// tempted to quote as the name.
"X-Api-Key " + secret + ":x",
// The same, with nothing before the secret at all.
secret + " and more:x",
// A control character in the value.
"X-A: " + secret + "\x01",
}
for _, input := range inputs {
_, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(input)
require.Error(t, err, input)
assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), secret, input)
}
}
// Loading the edit form twice without saving must not reshuffle
// the textarea, which Go's map iteration order would otherwise do.
func TestFormatTargetHeaders_IsSorted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := delivery.FormatTargetHeaders(map[string]string{
"X-Zed": "z",
headerAuthorization: bearerValue,
"X-Alpha": "a",
})
assert.Equal(
t,
"Authorization: Bearer abc\nX-Alpha: a\nX-Zed: z\n",
got,
)
assert.Empty(t, delivery.FormatTargetHeaders(nil))
}
func TestFormatTargetHeaders_RoundTripsThroughParse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
want := map[string]string{
headerAuthorization: bearerValue,
"X-Tenant": "acme",
}
got, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(
delivery.FormatTargetHeaders(want),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, want, got)
}
func TestParseTargetTimeout(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := delivery.ParseTargetTimeout(" 30 ")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, 30, got)
got, err = delivery.ParseTargetTimeout("")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Zero(t, got)
for _, bad := range []string{"soon", "-1", "1e3", "100000"} {
_, err = delivery.ParseTargetTimeout(bad)
require.Error(t, err, bad)
}
}
func TestFormatTargetTimeout(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.Equal(t, "30", delivery.FormatTargetTimeout(30))
assert.Empty(t, delivery.FormatTargetTimeout(0))
assert.Empty(t, delivery.FormatTargetTimeout(-1))
}
func TestNewTargetConfigForm(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
form, err := delivery.NewTargetConfigForm(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":"https://example.com/h",` +
`"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer abc"},` +
`"timeout":9}`,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "https://example.com/h", form.URL)
assert.Equal(t, "Authorization: Bearer abc\n", form.Headers)
assert.Equal(t, "9", form.Timeout)
form, err = delivery.NewTargetConfigForm(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"https://hooks.example/s"}`,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "https://hooks.example/s", form.URL)
form, err = delivery.NewTargetConfigForm(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
Config: `{"expiry":"720h"}`,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "720h", form.Expiry)
form, err = delivery.NewTargetConfigForm(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeLog,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, form.URL)
}
// A keep-forever archive target must pre-fill as an empty field, so
// saving the form back unchanged stores the same empty config.
func TestNewTargetConfigForm_DatabaseNeverIsBlank(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, cfg := range []string{"", `{}`, archiveConfigNever} {
form, err := delivery.NewTargetConfigForm(
&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
Config: cfg,
},
)
require.NoError(t, err, cfg)
assert.Empty(t, form.Expiry, cfg)
}
}
// An unreadable stored config is an error rather than a blank form
// that looks like a target with no settings, so the caller can tell
// the operator that saving replaces the stored value.
func TestNewTargetConfigForm_UnreadableConfigErrors(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []*database.Target{
{Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP, Config: "not json"},
{Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP, Config: `{}`},
{Type: database.TargetTypeSlack, Config: ""},
{
Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase,
Config: `{"expiry":"soon"}`,
},
{Type: database.TargetType("nope")},
}
for _, target := range cases {
_, err := delivery.NewTargetConfigForm(target)
require.Error(t, err, target.Type)
}
}
// The ceiling exists so one misconfigured target cannot hold a
// delivery worker indefinitely, and it is inclusive.
func TestParseTargetTimeout_CeilingIsInclusive(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
assert.Positive(t, delivery.MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds)
got, err := delivery.ParseTargetTimeout(
strconv.Itoa(delivery.MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, delivery.MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds, got)
_, err = delivery.ParseTargetTimeout(
strconv.Itoa(delivery.MaxTargetTimeoutSeconds + 1),
)
require.Error(t, err)
}
// Control characters in a value are how a second header would be
// smuggled into the outbound request.
func TestParseTargetHeaders_RejectsControlCharactersInValues(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
for _, bad := range []string{
"X-A: one\x01two",
"X-A: one\ttwo",
"X-A: one\x7ftwo",
} {
_, err := delivery.ParseTargetHeaders(bad)
require.Error(t, err, bad)
}
}
internal/delivery/target_http.go
+207 -53
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"sort"
"sync"
"time"
@@ -74,23 +75,31 @@ func (c *httpCore) fireAndForget(
d *database.Delivery,
res attemptResult,
) {
c.eng.recordResult(
c.eng.observeAttempt(d.Target.Type, res.elapsed())
err := c.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, 1, res.success,
res.statusCode, res.respBody, res.errMsg,
res.duration,
)
if err != nil {
c.eng.bookkeepingFailed(d, err)
return
}
if res.success {
c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d,
c.eng.settleStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
return
}
c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
c.eng.settleStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
}
@@ -107,21 +116,37 @@ func (c *httpCore) withRetry(
return
}
// Allow may have moved the breaker to half-open, and the
// attempt below may open or close it, so the gauge is
// republished on every exit from here.
defer c.publishCircuitState(d.Target.Type)
attemptNum := task.AttemptNum
res := attempt()
c.eng.recordResult(
c.eng.observeAttempt(d.Target.Type, res.elapsed())
err := c.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, attemptNum, res.success,
res.statusCode, res.respBody, res.errMsg,
res.duration,
)
if err != nil {
// The breaker still learns the outcome: it describes the
// target's health, which is unaffected by this database's.
c.recordCircuitOutcome(cb, res.success)
c.eng.bookkeepingFailed(d, err)
return
}
if res.success {
cb.RecordSuccess()
c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d,
c.eng.settleStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
@@ -135,6 +160,20 @@ func (c *httpCore) withRetry(
)
}
// recordCircuitOutcome feeds one attempt's outcome to the target's
// circuit breaker.
func (c *httpCore) recordCircuitOutcome(
cb *CircuitBreaker, success bool,
) {
if success {
cb.RecordSuccess()
return
}
cb.RecordFailure()
}
func (c *httpCore) circuitBreakerBlock(
webhookDB *gorm.DB,
d *database.Delivery,
@@ -146,6 +185,8 @@ func (c *httpCore) circuitBreakerBlock(
return false
}
defer c.publishCircuitState(d.Target.Type)
remaining := cb.CooldownRemaining()
c.eng.log.Info(
@@ -156,10 +197,14 @@ func (c *httpCore) circuitBreakerBlock(
"cooldown_remaining", remaining,
)
c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
// A delivery already at retrying is left as it is, so a task
// the breaker keeps turning away writes nothing each time.
if d.Status != database.DeliveryStatusRetrying {
c.eng.settleStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
}
retryTask := *task
sched.ScheduleRetry(retryTask, remaining)
@@ -176,16 +221,17 @@ func (c *httpCore) handleRetry(
attemptNum int,
) {
if attemptNum >= maxRetries {
c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d,
c.eng.settleStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
return
}
c.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
c.eng.settleStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
backoff := calcBackoff(attemptNum)
@@ -215,6 +261,28 @@ func (c *httpCore) getCircuitBreaker(
return cb
}
// publishCircuitState recounts this core's open breakers and
// publishes the gauge. Each core holds the breakers of exactly one
// target type, so the recount is over that type's targets alone.
// Counting rather than adjusting a delta keeps the gauge honest
// however a breaker changed state.
func (c *httpCore) publishCircuitState(
targetType database.TargetType,
) {
open := 0
c.circuitBreakers.Range(func(_, val any) bool {
cb, ok := val.(*CircuitBreaker)
if ok && cb.State() == CircuitOpen {
open++
}
return true
})
c.eng.mtr.SetCircuitBreakersOpen(targetType, open)
}
// remainingBackoff returns how long remains of the backoff
// window for the last attempt of a recovered retrying
// delivery. It implements rescheduler.
@@ -296,13 +364,19 @@ func (t *httpTarget) Deliver(
"error", err,
)
t.eng.recordResult(
recErr := t.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, task.AttemptNum,
false, 0, "", err.Error(), 0,
)
if recErr != nil {
t.eng.bookkeepingFailed(d, recErr)
t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
return
}
t.eng.settleStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
return
@@ -368,9 +442,11 @@ func (t *httpTarget) doHTTPRequest(
)
}
applyRequestHeaders(req, event, cfg)
originScoped := applyRequestHeaders(
req, event, cfg, t.eng.userAgent(),
)
client := t.clientForConfig(cfg)
client := t.clientForRequest(cfg, originScoped)
resp, doErr := executeHTTPRequest(client, req)
@@ -396,23 +472,41 @@ func (t *httpTarget) doHTTPRequest(
return resp.StatusCode, string(body), dur, nil
}
func (t *httpTarget) clientForConfig(
// clientForRequest returns the client for one delivery attempt.
// originScoped is the header set applyRequestHeaders built for that
// attempt; a request with neither a per-target timeout nor an
// origin-scoped header gets the shared client, because there is
// then nothing for the redirect policy to strip and net/http's
// default policy already withholds Authorization and Cookie across
// hosts.
func (t *httpTarget) clientForRequest(
cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
originScoped []string,
) *http.Client {
if cfg.Timeout > 0 {
// Reuse the shared client's SSRF-safe transport so
// a per-target timeout does not drop the
// request-time private-IP guard. Only the timeout
// is overridden.
return &http.Client{
Timeout: time.Duration(
cfg.Timeout,
) * time.Second,
Transport: t.client.Transport,
}
if cfg.Timeout <= 0 && len(originScoped) == 0 {
return t.client
}
return t.client
// Reuse the shared client's SSRF-safe transport so neither a
// per-target timeout nor the redirect policy drops the
// request-time private-IP guard — which, being a dial hook,
// also covers every redirect hop.
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: t.client.Timeout,
Transport: t.client.Transport,
}
if cfg.Timeout > 0 {
client.Timeout = time.Duration(
cfg.Timeout,
) * time.Second
}
if len(originScoped) > 0 {
client.CheckRedirect = offOriginHeaderPolicy(originScoped)
}
return client
}
func parseHTTPConfig(
@@ -449,45 +543,105 @@ func isForwardableHeader(name string) bool {
"Upgrade", "Proxy-Authorization",
"Proxy-Connection", "Content-Length":
return false
case "Content-Type":
// applyRequestHeaders sets Content-Type itself. The receiver
// already stored this inbound value as the event's
// ContentType, so forwarding it too would send it twice.
return false
default:
return true
}
}
// applyRequestHeaders builds one outbound delivery's header set and
// returns the canonical names of every header in it that is scoped
// to the configured origin: the inbound event headers this delivery
// forwarded, plus the operator's configured headers. The redirect
// policy strips exactly that set on a hop that leaves the origin,
// so the forward set is decided here and only here — a header added
// to it is covered off-origin without a second edit elsewhere.
//
// Content-Type goes out once: a Content-Type configured on the target
// wins, otherwise the event's ContentType, otherwise none. The inbound
// Content-Type in the event's headers is never forwarded.
//
// userAgent is set last, over any configured or inbound User-Agent.
func applyRequestHeaders(
req *http.Request,
event *database.Event,
cfg *HTTPTargetConfig,
) {
userAgent string,
) []string {
if event.ContentType != "" {
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type", event.ContentType,
)
}
var originalHeaders map[string][]string
if event.Headers != "" {
jsonErr := json.Unmarshal(
[]byte(event.Headers),
&originalHeaders,
)
if jsonErr == nil {
for k, vals := range originalHeaders {
if isForwardableHeader(k) {
for _, v := range vals {
req.Header.Add(k, v)
}
}
}
}
}
originScoped := forwardEventHeaders(req, event)
for k, v := range cfg.Headers {
req.Header.Set(k, v)
originScoped[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)] = struct{}{}
}
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "webhooker/1.0")
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", userAgent)
// A Content-Type configured on the target describes the body
// being sent rather than the sender. A 307/308 preserves the
// body across hosts, so stripping it would send that body
// untyped.
delete(originScoped, "Content-Type")
// User-Agent is overwritten just above, so an inbound one never
// reaches the wire and the value that does identifies this
// delivery path rather than the sender. Reporting it would strip
// it off-origin and leave net/http's own default in its place.
delete(originScoped, "User-Agent")
names := make([]string, 0, len(originScoped))
for name := range originScoped {
names = append(names, name)
}
sort.Strings(names)
return names
}
// forwardEventHeaders copies the inbound event's forwardable
// headers onto the outbound request and returns the canonical names
// it forwarded. Headers the event never carried are absent from the
// result, so the redirect policy strips what was actually sent.
func forwardEventHeaders(
req *http.Request,
event *database.Event,
) map[string]struct{} {
forwarded := make(map[string]struct{})
if event.Headers == "" {
return forwarded
}
var inbound map[string][]string
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(event.Headers), &inbound) != nil {
return forwarded
}
for k, vals := range inbound {
if !isForwardableHeader(k) || len(vals) == 0 {
continue
}
for _, v := range vals {
req.Header.Add(k, v)
}
forwarded[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)] = struct{}{}
}
return forwarded
}
// executeHTTPRequest sends an HTTP request using the provided
internal/delivery/target_log.go
+19 -5
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package delivery
import (
"context"
"time"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
@@ -34,6 +35,8 @@ func (t *logTarget) Deliver(
_ *Task,
_ Scheduler,
) {
start := time.Now()
t.eng.log.Info(
"webhook event delivered to log target",
"delivery_id", d.ID,
@@ -48,11 +51,22 @@ func (t *logTarget) Deliver(
"body", d.Event.Body,
)
t.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, 1, true, 0, "", "", 0,
)
elapsed := time.Since(start)
t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
t.eng.observeAttempt(d.Target.Type, elapsed)
err := t.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, 1, true, 0, "", "",
elapsed.Milliseconds(),
)
if err != nil {
t.eng.bookkeepingFailed(d, err)
return
}
t.eng.settleStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
}
internal/delivery/target_redact.go
+272
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
package delivery
import (
"net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
)
// RedactionMarker stands in for a target credential found in
// text the target's remote peer chose.
const RedactionMarker = "(redacted)"
// Redactor removes one target's own credential material from
// text that target's remote peer chose: a delivery response
// body, or a delivery error stored before the delivery path
// learned to mask the URLs it embeds.
//
// It removes byte-identical echoes of strings taken from the
// target's stored configuration, and nothing else. Anything
// the remote re-encodes survives: JSON "\/" escaping (what
// PHP's json_encode emits by default), percent-encoding, HTML
// entities, and an echo of only part of a path. It cannot
// remove a secret the remote invented.
//
// The zero Redactor removes nothing, which is what a caller
// holding no target for a delivery gets.
type Redactor struct {
secrets []string
}
// NewRedactor builds the redactor for one target.
func NewRedactor(t *database.Target) Redactor {
// Drop empty strings here rather than at the site that
// produced one. strings.ReplaceAll with an empty old string
// inserts the marker at every byte boundary, so a single
// empty secret destroys every body and error the target
// renders; filtering at the collection point means no field
// added to targetSecrets later can reintroduce that.
// url.Parse("https://@example.com/in") is the known
// producer: a non-nil User whose String is "".
secrets := slices.DeleteFunc(
targetSecrets(t),
func(s string) bool { return s == "" },
)
// Longest first, so replacing a secret that is contained
// in a longer one cannot leave a fragment of the longer
// one behind. Configured headers arrive in map order, so
// the sort is also what makes the result deterministic.
slices.SortFunc(secrets, func(a, b string) int {
if d := len(b) - len(a); d != 0 {
return d
}
return strings.Compare(a, b)
})
return Redactor{secrets: secrets}
}
// Redact replaces every occurrence of the target's credential
// material in s.
func (r Redactor) Redact(s string) string {
if s == "" {
return s
}
for _, secret := range r.secrets {
s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, secret, RedactionMarker)
}
return s
}
// RedactCut redacts s, which its caller has already cut to a
// byte budget, and additionally drops any tail of s that is a
// proper prefix of a secret.
//
// The cut lands wherever the remote's padding puts it, so the
// remote chooses where inside the credential it falls. The
// severed prefix left behind equals no secret, so plain
// Redact would render it verbatim.
func (r Redactor) RedactCut(s string) string {
s = r.Redact(s)
if n := r.secretPrefixSuffix(s); n > 0 {
return s[:len(s)-n] + RedactionMarker
}
return s
}
// secretPrefixSuffix returns the length of the longest suffix
// of s that is a proper prefix of one of the secrets, or 0
// when there is none.
func (r Redactor) secretPrefixSuffix(s string) int {
longest := 0
for _, secret := range r.secrets {
// Proper prefixes only: a whole secret at the tail was
// already replaced by Redact.
n := min(len(secret)-1, len(s))
for ; n > longest; n-- {
if strings.HasSuffix(s, secret[:n]) {
longest = n
break
}
}
}
return longest
}
// targetSecrets returns the credential-bearing strings a
// target's configuration carries.
//
// The destination URL contributes. Its path, query and
// userinfo are the credential for both target types that have
// one — an incoming-webhook URL is a bearer token, which is
// why MaskURL elides exactly those parts — and they are the
// material this service actually sends, so a remote that
// echoes the request back echoes them.
//
// Configured request headers contribute their values, but
// only for the credential-shaped names isCredentialHeaderName
// picks out. That is the same class-based rule applied to
// URLs: an echoed Accept or User-Agent still renders, an
// echoed Authorization does not.
func targetSecrets(t *database.Target) []string {
if t == nil {
return nil
}
switch t.Type {
case database.TargetTypeSlack:
cfg, err := parseSlackConfig(t.Config)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
return urlSecrets(cfg.WebhookURL)
case database.TargetTypeHTTP:
cfg, err := parseHTTPConfig(t.Config)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
return append(
urlSecrets(cfg.URL),
headerSecrets(cfg.Headers)...,
)
case database.TargetTypeDatabase, database.TargetTypeLog:
// Neither has a destination URL, so neither has
// anything to redact.
return nil
default:
return nil
}
}
// urlSecrets returns the substrings of a destination URL that
// must not survive into a rendered page: the whole URL, the
// parts of it MaskURL elides, and any userinfo.
//
// No length floor is applied to the path, and none to the
// userinfo. A short path or a four-byte username is treated as
// a credential exactly like a long one, because the field takes
// an arbitrary URL and no part of it can be assumed non-secret —
// the same rule MaskURL applies. headerSecrets does carry a
// floor, and the difference is deliberate: a header is picked
// out by a name-shaped guess and its value may be ordinary
// text, whereas a URL's path and userinfo are credential
// material by position.
func urlSecrets(raw string) []string {
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if raw == "" {
return nil
}
secrets := []string{raw}
parsed, err := url.Parse(raw)
if err != nil {
return secrets
}
if parsed.Path != "" && parsed.Path != "/" {
requestURI := parsed.RequestURI()
secrets = append(secrets, requestURI)
if escaped := parsed.EscapedPath(); escaped != requestURI {
secrets = append(secrets, escaped)
}
}
if parsed.User != nil {
secrets = append(secrets, parsed.User.String())
if pw, ok := parsed.User.Password(); ok && pw != "" {
secrets = append(secrets, pw)
}
}
return secrets
}
// minHeaderSecretBytes is the shortest header value treated as
// a credential. Unlike a URL path, a header value can be a
// couple of bytes long, and redacting those would scatter the
// marker through ordinary response text for no gain.
const minHeaderSecretBytes = 4
// headerSecrets returns the values of the configured headers
// whose names are credential-shaped.
func headerSecrets(headers map[string]string) []string {
var secrets []string
for name, value := range headers {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if len(value) < minHeaderSecretBytes {
continue
}
if isCredentialHeaderName(name) {
secrets = append(secrets, value)
}
}
return secrets
}
// isCredentialHeaderName classifies a header by its name. The
// value is never inspected, so the rule is the same
// class-based one MaskURL applies to a destination URL.
//
// The fragments are short on purpose, and match anywhere in
// the name, so abbreviations an operator might use are covered
// too: X-Sig, X-Pass, X-HMAC. That over-matches — a header
// named X-Design contains "sig" — and over-matching is the
// safe direction here: the cost is a marker where an echoed
// header value would have rendered.
func isCredentialHeaderName(name string) bool {
name = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(name))
// Names that carry a credential by definition.
switch name {
case "authorization", "proxy-authorization", "cookie":
return true
}
// What operators call their own credential headers:
// X-Api-Key, X-Hub-Signature, X-Auth-Token.
for _, fragment := range []string{
"auth",
"credential",
"hmac",
"key",
"pass",
"secret",
"sig",
"token",
} {
if strings.Contains(name, fragment) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
internal/delivery/target_redact_test.go
+284
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"net/url"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// The secret path segments of a Slack incoming webhook URL.
const (
redactSecretPath = "/services/T11111111/B11111111/" +
"YYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY"
redactWebhookURL = "https://hooks.slack.com" +
redactSecretPath
)
func TestRedactor_RemovesSlackWebhookURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"` + redactWebhookURL + `"}`,
})
got := r.Redact("no_service for " + redactWebhookURL)
assert.NotContains(t, got, redactSecretPath)
assert.NotContains(t, got, "T11111111")
// One marker, not a marker with the host left in front of
// it: the whole URL is replaced before the path it
// contains, which is what sorting the secrets longest
// first buys.
assert.Equal(
t,
"no_service for "+delivery.RedactionMarker,
got,
)
}
// TestRedactor_RemovesSecretSeveredByACut covers the input the
// redactor exists for: text cut to a byte budget with the
// credential straddling the cut. The remote chooses the
// padding, so it chooses where the cut lands inside the
// credential, and the severed prefix that remains equals no
// secret.
func TestRedactor_RemovesSecretSeveredByACut(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"` + redactWebhookURL + `"}`,
})
// Every cut position inside the credential, not just a
// convenient one.
for n := 1; n < len(redactWebhookURL); n++ {
severed := redactWebhookURL[:n]
cut := "padding " + severed
got := r.RedactCut(cut)
assert.Equal(
t,
"padding "+delivery.RedactionMarker,
got,
"cut after %d bytes of the credential", n,
)
}
}
// TestRedactor_RedactsCredentialShapedHeaderValues pins the
// class-based header rule: a header whose name says credential
// has its value redacted, and a routine header does not, so
// ordinary response content survives.
func TestRedactor_RedactsCredentialShapedHeaderValues(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":"https://example.com/in",` +
`"headers":{` +
`"Authorization":"Bearer AAAAAAAAAAAA",` +
`"Cookie":"session=BBBBBBBBBBBB",` +
`"X-Api-Key":"CCCCCCCCCCCC",` +
`"X-Hub-Signature":"sha256=DDDDDDDDDDDD",` +
`"X-Sig":"EEEEEEEEEEEE",` +
`"X-Pass":"FFFFFFFFFFFF",` +
`"X-HMAC":"GGGGGGGGGGGG",` +
`"X-Credential":"HHHHHHHHHHHH",` +
`"Accept":"application/json",` +
`"User-Agent":"webhooker/1.0"}}`,
})
for _, secret := range []string{
"Bearer AAAAAAAAAAAA",
"session=BBBBBBBBBBBB",
"CCCCCCCCCCCC",
"sha256=DDDDDDDDDDDD",
// Abbreviated names an operator might use.
"EEEEEEEEEEEE",
"FFFFFFFFFFFF",
"GGGGGGGGGGGG",
"HHHHHHHHHHHH",
} {
got := r.Redact("echo: " + secret)
assert.Equal(
t,
"echo: "+delivery.RedactionMarker,
got,
secret,
)
}
const routine = "Accept: application/json, " +
"User-Agent: webhooker/1.0"
assert.Equal(t, routine, r.Redact(routine))
}
// TestRedactor_IgnoresVeryShortHeaderValues pins the floor
// under a header value. Redacting a two-byte value would put
// the marker through every response that happens to contain
// those bytes.
func TestRedactor_IgnoresVeryShortHeaderValues(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":"https://example.com/in",` +
`"headers":{"X-Api-Key":"ab"}}`,
})
const response = "rabbit"
assert.Equal(t, response, r.Redact(response))
}
// TestRedactor_RemovesBarePath covers a remote that echoes
// only the request path rather than the whole URL. The path
// segments are the credential on their own.
func TestRedactor_RemovesBarePath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"` + redactWebhookURL + `"}`,
})
got := r.Redact("POST " + redactSecretPath + " 404")
assert.NotContains(t, got, redactSecretPath)
assert.Equal(
t,
"POST "+delivery.RedactionMarker+" 404",
got,
)
}
// TestRedactor_RemovesHTTPURLQueryAndUserinfo covers the HTTP
// target, whose destination is an arbitrary URL: the query
// string and the userinfo carry credentials as readily as the
// path does.
func TestRedactor_RemovesHTTPURLQueryAndUserinfo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Assembled rather than written out, so the literal is
// not itself a credential-shaped string.
dest := url.URL{
Scheme: "https",
User: url.UserPassword("user", "hunter2"),
Host: "example.com",
Path: "/in",
RawQuery: "token=s3cr3t",
}
raw := dest.String()
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":"` + raw + `"}`,
})
for _, echoed := range []string{
raw,
"/in?token=s3cr3t",
"hunter2",
} {
got := r.Redact("rejected: " + echoed)
assert.NotContains(t, got, "s3cr3t", echoed)
assert.NotContains(t, got, "hunter2", echoed)
assert.Contains(
t, got, delivery.RedactionMarker, echoed,
)
}
}
// TestRedactor_LeavesUnrelatedTextAlone pins that the
// redactor matches literally: it does not guess at what a
// secret looks like, so ordinary response content survives.
func TestRedactor_LeavesUnrelatedTextAlone(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const response = "ok=false error=channel_not_found"
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeSlack,
Config: `{"webhookUrl":"` + redactWebhookURL + `"}`,
})
assert.Equal(t, response, r.Redact(response))
}
// TestRedactor_EmptyUserinfoDoesNotShredTheBody covers a
// destination URL written with a bare "@" and no userinfo:
// url.Parse returns a non-nil User whose String is empty. An
// empty secret in the list would make strings.ReplaceAll
// insert the marker at every byte boundary, destroying every
// body and error string the target renders.
func TestRedactor_EmptyUserinfoDoesNotShredTheBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const dest = "https://@example.com/in"
// The premise: this URL really does parse to a non-nil
// User contributing an empty string.
parsed, err := url.Parse(dest)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, parsed.User)
require.Empty(t, parsed.User.String())
r := delivery.NewRedactor(&database.Target{
Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP,
Config: `{"url":"` + dest + `"}`,
})
const body = "ok=false error=channel_not_found"
assert.Equal(t, body, r.Redact(body))
assert.Equal(t, body, r.RedactCut(body))
// The real credential material still goes, so filtering the
// empty string out did not disarm the redactor.
assert.Equal(
t,
"POST "+delivery.RedactionMarker,
r.Redact("POST "+dest),
)
}
// TestRedactor_ZeroValueAndConfiglessTargets pins that a
// caller with no target, an unparseable config, or a target
// type with no destination URL gets a redactor that changes
// nothing rather than one that panics.
func TestRedactor_ZeroValueAndConfiglessTargets(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const text = "some response body"
var zero delivery.Redactor
assert.Equal(t, text, zero.Redact(text))
assert.Equal(t, text, delivery.NewRedactor(nil).Redact(text))
for _, tgt := range []database.Target{
{Type: database.TargetTypeLog},
{Type: database.TargetTypeDatabase},
{Type: database.TargetTypeSlack, Config: "not json"},
{Type: database.TargetTypeHTTP, Config: ""},
} {
assert.Equal(
t, text,
delivery.NewRedactor(&tgt).Redact(text),
tgt.Type,
)
}
}
internal/delivery/target_slack.go
+16 -5
View File
@@ -95,13 +95,19 @@ func (t *slackTarget) failConfig(
d *database.Delivery,
err error,
) {
t.eng.recordResult(
recErr := t.eng.recordResult(
webhookDB, d, 1,
false, 0, "", err.Error(), 0,
)
if recErr != nil {
t.eng.bookkeepingFailed(d, recErr)
t.eng.updateDeliveryStatus(
webhookDB, d, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
return
}
t.eng.settleStatus(
webhookDB, d, d.Target.Type,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
}
@@ -130,7 +136,7 @@ func (t *slackTarget) attempt(
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "webhooker/1.0")
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", t.eng.userAgent())
resp, doErr := executeHTTPRequest(t.client, req)
durationMs := time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
@@ -225,10 +231,15 @@ func FormatSlackMessage(
event.ContentType,
)
timestamp := "unknown"
if !event.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
timestamp = event.CreatedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
}
fmt.Fprintf(
&b,
"*Timestamp:* `%s`\n",
event.CreatedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
timestamp,
)
fmt.Fprintf(
internal/delivery/terminal_state_test.go
+824
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,824 @@
package delivery_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/database"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/delivery"
)
// The two terminal-state gaps of
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/107: a delivery failed
// with nothing in its event log to say why, and a retrying delivery
// whose target was deleted, which used to keep sending and then never
// terminalise. Section 4 is the same deleted-target gap for a pending
// delivery: https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/293.
// tUnknownType is a target type no build implements. It stands in for
// a target whose type was written by a build that knew a type this one
// does not.
const tUnknownType = database.TargetType("pubsub")
// tSeedDeletedTarget creates a target, a delivery against it at the
// given status with one recorded failed attempt, and then deletes the
// target the way the source page does.
//
// It asserts the delete is soft, because that is the whole reason the
// engine could not tell a deleted target from a target id that never
// named a row: the surviving row is invisible to a scoped read.
func tSeedDeletedTarget(
t *testing.T,
s iSetup,
name, url string,
status database.DeliveryStatus,
) string {
t.Helper()
targetID := uuid.New().String()
iCreateTarget(
t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, name,
database.TargetTypeHTTP, iHTTPConfig(url), 5,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"target":"deleted"}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID, status,
)
iSeedFailedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
require.NoError(t, s.MainDB.Delete(
&database.Target{}, "id = ?", targetID,
).Error)
var scoped, unscoped int64
require.NoError(t, s.MainDB.
Model(&database.Target{}).
Where("id = ?", targetID).
Count(&scoped).Error)
require.NoError(t, s.MainDB.Unscoped().
Model(&database.Target{}).
Where("id = ?", targetID).
Count(&unscoped).Error)
require.Zero(t, scoped,
"the deleted target is still visible to a scoped read",
)
require.Equal(t, int64(1), unscoped,
"the delete was hard, so this test proves nothing about "+
"the soft-delete case it exists for",
)
return d.ID
}
// tLastResult returns a delivery's final recorded attempt, asserting
// the expected number of them.
func tLastResult(
t *testing.T,
s iSetup,
deliveryID string,
want int,
) database.DeliveryResult {
t.Helper()
results := iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID)
require.Len(t, results, want)
return results[want-1]
}
// --- 1. A failure with nothing recorded ---
func TestProcessDelivery_UnknownTargetType_RecordsWhy(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"unknown":"type"}`,
)
seeded := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
target := database.Target{
Name: "mystery",
Type: tUnknownType,
Config: iHTTPConfig("http://example.com/hook"),
}
target.ID = targetID
d := database.Delivery{
EventID: event.ID,
TargetID: targetID,
Status: database.DeliveryStatusPending,
Event: event,
Target: target,
}
d.ID = seeded.ID
body := event.Body
task := iTask(
seeded, event, s.WebhookID, targetID, "mystery",
target.Config, 0, 1, &body,
)
task.TargetType = tUnknownType
s.Engine.ExportProcessDelivery(
context.Background(), s.WebhookDB, &d, &task,
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
last := tLastResult(t, s, d.ID, 1)
assert.False(t, last.Success)
assert.Equal(t, 1, last.AttemptNum)
assert.Contains(t, last.Error, string(tUnknownType),
"the recorded reason does not name the offending type",
)
}
// --- 2. A retrying delivery whose target is gone ---
func TestRecoverSingleRetry_TargetDeleted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "deleted-target-recovery",
)
deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
t, s, "gone-on-recovery", "http://example.com/hook",
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
s.Engine.ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
last := tLastResult(t, s, deliveryID, 2)
assert.False(t, last.Success)
assert.Equal(t, 2, last.AttemptNum)
assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "gone-on-recovery")
assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "was deleted")
assert.Empty(t, s.Engine.ExportRetryCh(),
"a delivery whose target is gone was rescheduled",
)
assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld(),
"the terminal path leaked its ownership reference",
)
}
func TestSweepSingleRetry_TargetDeleted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "deleted-target-sweep",
)
deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
t, s, "gone-on-sweep", "http://example.com/hook",
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
// Twice, because the bug was an error the sweep repeated every
// minute for the life of the database: the second sweep must
// find nothing left to do.
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
last := tLastResult(t, s, deliveryID, 2)
assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "gone-on-sweep")
assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "was deleted")
assert.Empty(t, s.Engine.ExportRetryCh())
assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
}
// TestSweepSingleRetry_TargetNeverExisted covers the other half of the
// soft-delete distinction: an id with no row at all, deleted or
// otherwise, must not be reported as something the operator deleted.
func TestSweepSingleRetry_TargetNeverExisted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "target-never-existed",
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"target":"absent"}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
iSeedFailedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID, database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
last := tLastResult(t, s, d.ID, 2)
assert.Contains(t, last.Error, targetID)
assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "no longer exists")
assert.NotContains(t, last.Error, "was deleted",
"an id that never named a row was reported as a deletion",
)
}
// TestFailMissingTarget_WritesNoTargetRow holds the new terminal path
// to the same rule as the existing one: no target row, and so no
// plaintext target config, may be written into the per-webhook event
// database. See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/206.
func TestFailMissingTarget_WritesNoTargetRow(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "no-target-row-deleted",
)
hookURL := "https://hooks.slack.com/services/T00/B00/x"
deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
t, s, "credential-bearing", hookURL,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
var configs []string
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.
Table("targets").
Pluck("config", &configs).Error)
assert.Empty(t, configs,
"the deleted-target terminal path wrote a target row "+
"into the per-webhook event database",
)
}
// --- 3. The scheduled retry chain ---
// tRetryChainSetup wires a counting sink and a retrying delivery
// against a live target pointing at it, and returns the task a
// scheduled retry would carry — config and all, snapshotted as
// ScheduleRetry snapshots it.
func tRetryChainSetup(
t *testing.T,
s iSetup,
name string,
hits *atomic.Int64,
) (delivery.Task, string) {
t.Helper()
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
hits.Add(1)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
},
))
t.Cleanup(ts.Close)
iCreateWebhook(t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, name)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
cfg := iHTTPConfig(ts.URL)
iCreateTarget(
t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, name,
database.TargetTypeHTTP, cfg, 5,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"chain":"retry"}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
iSeedFailedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
body := event.Body
return iTask(
d, event, s.WebhookID, targetID, name, cfg, 5, 2, &body,
), targetID
}
// TestProcessRetryTask_TargetDeleted_MakesNoAttempt is the half the
// deployability audit found worse than filed: terminalising on
// recovery and sweep alone leaves the already-scheduled timer chain
// running, and it holds the target's configuration from before the
// deletion, so it goes on sending to a destination that was removed.
func TestProcessRetryTask_TargetDeleted_MakesNoAttempt(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
var hits atomic.Int64
task, targetID := tRetryChainSetup(
t, s, "gone-mid-chain", &hits,
)
require.NoError(t, s.MainDB.Delete(
&database.Target{}, "id = ?", targetID,
).Error)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(
context.Background(), &task,
)
assert.Zero(t, hits.Load(),
"a scheduled retry fired at a target the operator "+
"had already deleted",
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, task.DeliveryID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
last := tLastResult(t, s, task.DeliveryID, 2)
assert.False(t, last.Success)
assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "was deleted")
assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
}
// TestProcessRetryTask_TargetDeleted_CountsFailureOnTarget verifies
// that the failure of a retry abandoned because its target is gone is
// added to that target's own totals, not to a row with no target.
func TestProcessRetryTask_TargetDeleted_CountsFailureOnTarget(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
var hits atomic.Int64
task, targetID := tRetryChainSetup(
t, s, "gone-counted", &hits,
)
require.NoError(t, s.MainDB.Delete(
&database.Target{}, "id = ?", targetID,
).Error)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(
context.Background(), &task,
)
var rows []database.TargetTotals
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.Find(&rows).Error)
assert.Equal(t, []database.TargetTotals{
{TargetID: targetID, Failed: 1},
}, rows)
}
// TestProcessRetryTask_TargetPresent_StillDelivers is the guard's
// mutation check: a liveness check that refused every retry would pass
// the test above and break every retry there is.
func TestProcessRetryTask_TargetPresent_StillDelivers(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
var hits atomic.Int64
task, _ := tRetryChainSetup(t, s, "still-there", &hits)
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(
context.Background(), &task,
)
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), hits.Load())
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, task.DeliveryID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
}
// TestProcessRetryTask_TargetUnreadable_StillDelivers pins the other
// half of the guard: only a target that is confirmed gone stops a
// retry. A main database that cannot be read is a transient fault, and
// a guard that abandoned deliveries on one would be a worse bug than
// the one it fixes.
func TestProcessRetryTask_TargetUnreadable_StillDelivers(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
var hits atomic.Int64
task, _ := tRetryChainSetup(t, s, "unreadable-main", &hits)
sqlDB, err := s.MainDB.DB()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.Close())
s.Engine.ExportProcessRetryTask(
context.Background(), &task,
)
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), hits.Load(),
"a retry was abandoned because the main database "+
"could not be read, not because its target was gone",
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, task.DeliveryID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
}
// TestRecoverSingleRetry_TargetUnreadable_LeavesDeliveryAlone is the
// same rule on the recovery path. A read failure that is not
// "record not found" must leave every retrying delivery of every
// webhook exactly as it was.
func TestRecoverSingleRetry_TargetUnreadable_LeavesDeliveryAlone(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
iCreateWebhook(
t, s.MainDB, s.WebhookID, "unreadable-on-recovery",
)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
iCreateTarget(
t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "healthy",
database.TargetTypeHTTP,
iHTTPConfig("http://example.com/hook"), 5,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"still":"retrying"}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
iSeedFailedResult(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID)
sqlDB, err := s.MainDB.DB()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.Close())
s.Engine.ExportRecoverRetryingDeliveries(
s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusRetrying,
)
assert.Len(t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID), 1,
"an unreadable main database produced a terminal "+
"failure row",
)
assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
}
// --- 4. A pending delivery whose target is gone ---
func TestRecoverPending_TargetDeleted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
t, s, "gone-while-pending", "http://example.com/hook",
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
s.Engine.ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
last := tLastResult(t, s, deliveryID, 2)
assert.False(t, last.Success)
assert.Equal(t, 2, last.AttemptNum)
assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "gone-while-pending")
assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "was deleted")
assert.Empty(t, fDrain(s.Engine),
"a delivery whose target is gone was sent",
)
assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld(),
"the terminal path leaked its ownership reference",
)
}
// TestRecoverPending_TargetDeleted_LeavesAnOwnedDeliveryAlone: the
// terminal write takes ownership like every other recovery write, so a
// delivery the engine still holds is not failed underneath its worker.
func TestRecoverPending_TargetDeleted_LeavesAnOwnedDeliveryAlone(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
t, s, "gone-but-owned", "http://example.com/hook",
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
require.True(t, s.Engine.ExportRetainDelivery(deliveryID))
s.Engine.ExportRecoverWebhookDeliveries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
assert.Len(t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID), 1,
"a delivery the engine owns was failed underneath it",
)
}
// TestFailMissingTarget_LeavesASettledDeliveryAlone: the recovery paths
// read their batch before taking ownership, and a worker may send a
// delivery and let it go in between. The terminal write goes by the row
// as it is now, not as the batch read it.
func TestFailMissingTarget_LeavesASettledDeliveryAlone(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
t, s, "gone-after-sending", "http://example.com/hook",
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
var batch database.Delivery
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.First(
&batch, "id = ?", deliveryID,
).Error)
// A worker settles the delivery after the batch was read.
require.NoError(t, s.WebhookDB.Model(&database.Delivery{}).
Where("id = ?", deliveryID).
Update("status", database.DeliveryStatusDelivered).Error)
s.Engine.ExportFailMissingTarget(
s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, &batch,
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
database.DeliveryStatusDelivered,
)
assert.Len(t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID), 1,
"a delivery settled after the batch read was then failed",
)
assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
}
// TestSweepPending_TargetDeleted sweeps twice over a batch that also
// holds a healthy stranded delivery. The one whose target is gone is
// failed once and then left alone; the healthy one is queued by the
// first sweep and not again by the second.
func TestSweepPending_TargetDeleted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
liveTargetID := uuid.New().String()
s := fSweepSetup(t, liveTargetID, "still-there")
deliveryID := tSeedDeletedTarget(
t, s, "gone-on-pending-sweep", "http://example.com/hook",
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
rAgePending(t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"target":"live"}`,
)
healthy := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, liveTargetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
rAgePending(t, s.WebhookDB, healthy.ID)
ctx := context.Background()
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(ctx, s.WebhookID)
tasks := fDrain(s.Engine)
require.Len(t, tasks, 1,
"the first sweep did not queue the healthy delivery",
)
assert.Equal(t, healthy.ID, tasks[0].DeliveryID)
s.Engine.ExportSweepWebhookRetries(ctx, s.WebhookID)
assert.Empty(t, fDrain(s.Engine),
"the second sweep queued a delivery again",
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, deliveryID,
database.DeliveryStatusFailed,
)
last := tLastResult(t, s, deliveryID, 2)
assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "gone-on-pending-sweep")
assert.Contains(t, last.Error, "was deleted")
}
// TestSendRecoveredDeliveries_TargetMissingFromMap: the batch's target
// map is empty when its query failed, so every delivery in the batch is
// looked up on its own. A healthy one is sent to the target that lookup
// finds.
func TestSendRecoveredDeliveries_TargetMissingFromMap(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
iCreateTarget(
t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "found-on-lookup",
database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"map":"empty"}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
s.Engine.ExportSendRecoveredDeliveries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookDB,
[]database.Delivery{d}, s.WebhookID,
map[string]database.Target{}, nil,
)
tasks := fDrain(s.Engine)
require.Len(t, tasks, 1,
"the healthy delivery was not queued exactly once",
)
assert.Equal(t, d.ID, tasks[0].DeliveryID)
assert.Equal(t, targetID, tasks[0].TargetID)
assert.Equal(t, database.TargetTypeLog, tasks[0].TargetType)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
}
// TestRecoverPending_TargetUnreadable_LeavesDeliveryAlone: a failed
// read of the main database is not a deleted target. Restart recovery
// holds every pending delivery of the webhook in one batch, so failing
// on this would fail all of them.
func TestRecoverPending_TargetUnreadable_LeavesDeliveryAlone(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s := newISetup(t)
targetID := uuid.New().String()
iCreateTarget(
t, s.MainDB, targetID, s.WebhookID, "healthy",
database.TargetTypeLog, "", 0,
)
event := iSeedEvent(
t, s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID, `{"still":"pending"}`,
)
d := iSeedDelivery(
t, s.WebhookDB, event.ID, targetID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
sqlDB, err := s.MainDB.DB()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, sqlDB.Close())
s.Engine.ExportRecoverPendingDeliveries(
context.Background(), s.WebhookDB, s.WebhookID,
)
iAssertStatus(
t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID,
database.DeliveryStatusPending,
)
assert.Empty(t, iResults(t, s.WebhookDB, d.ID),
"an unreadable main database produced a terminal "+
"failure row",
)
assert.Empty(t, fDrain(s.Engine))
assert.Zero(t, s.Engine.ExportInflightHeld())
}
internal/delivery/url_mask_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func TestDoHTTPRequest_TransportErrorMasksURL(t *testing.T) {
func TestValidateTargetURL_UnparsableURLIsMasked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
context.TODO(),
"https://hooks.slack.com"+maskSecretPath+"\n",
)

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