Name log fields, metrics and the Core Rule Set package for what they are (closes #192 )

Log field, metric, action and event names now say what they count and, for timings, the unit. Package internal/waf is internal/coreruleset. Model: opus-5-5
Name request log actions so they say what they mean (closes #229 )
2026-11-09 07:21:52 +00:00 · 2026-11-09 06:48:26 +01:00 · 2026-11-09 05:47:34 +01:00 · 2026-11-09 04:03:17 +01:00 · 2026-11-09 03:30:49 +01:00 · 2026-11-09 02:03:39 +01:00
152 changed files with 21292 additions and 11585 deletions
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ COPY . .
 # .git present, a version that is still empty, dev or unknown fails the
 # build: git is missing or could not read the checkout. The no_fs_access
 # tag keeps Coraza from writing the files of a multipart body to the
-# system's temporary directory, since smallwebwaf writes only to its state
+# system's temporary directory, since sww writes only to its state
 # directory.
 ARG VERSION
 RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
    fi; \
    CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags no_fs_access -trimpath \
        -ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-        -o /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf ./cmd/smallwebwaf
+        -o /usr/local/bin/sww ./cmd/sww

 # runsvinit, the image's entrypoint, built at the last commit of its
 # archived repository. It has no go.mod, and `go build` of its directory
@@ -117,8 +117,9 @@ RUN git checkout --quiet --detach b4b2c785308b1ce785b6155c7fe5f16879080193 \
    && CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags="-s -w" \
        -o /usr/local/bin/runsvinit .

-# The image an app's Dockerfile builds FROM, described under "Deployment"
-# in SPEC.md. It is the last stage, so a plain `docker build .` builds it.
+# The image, described under "Deployment" in SPEC.md. It runs rproxy unless
+# SWW_COMMAND says discriminator, and an app's Dockerfile can build FROM it.
+# It is the last stage, so a plain `docker build .` builds it.
 #
 # ubuntu 26.04, 2026-09-27
 FROM ubuntu@sha256:f144425ff09be612d6d9ad965196e9cdc23dae1f42110a8a11a3e9a8198759f7
@@ -132,34 +133,22 @@ RUN mkdir /etc/sysusers.d \
    && echo 'u  _runit-log  -  "runit svlogd user"  /nonexistent  /sbin/nologin' \
        > /etc/sysusers.d/runit.conf

-# ca-certificates, nix-bin and runit, from Ubuntu's archive as it was at
-# the snapshot moment, which is never earlier than the Ubuntu image above.
-# apt checks every package against the snapshot's InRelease files, and
-# this step checks those against the hashes named here, which are those
-# of the amd64 archive: other architectures use Ubuntu's ports archive.
-# apt also fetches the live archive's InRelease files, which change daily
-# and which the install does not use. The snapshot service is HTTPS only
-# and this image has no CA certificates yet, so this step uses the Go
-# image's. The snapshot service answers 503 at times; apt retries a
-# failed download, waiting twice as long before each retry, and this
-# step gives it five retries, about half a minute in all, where its
-# default of three gives up after seven seconds.
-RUN --mount=type=bind,from=builder,source=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt,target=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
-    apt-get update --snapshot 20261001T000000Z \
-        -o Acquire::https::CaInfo=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
-        -o Acquire::Retries=5 \
-    && printf '%s\n' \
-        '45f95ce276cdba3e41870516a130e03c58b8b7a79e9546b0efe9e526d255740c  snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute_InRelease' \
-        '802e675dd9de4c7f3916434a95e7c1d8eec0e82886622d7805ab19a2c6fe0365  snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-updates_InRelease' \
-        '64b3353f0bd4970b4f7271962245bcea9ff24d4cc7bea16b433f8a60e42ca3dd  snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-backports_InRelease' \
-        '1d5041572116a8b23aabf79ac7439ad8af83d57ad3fb0f9aa0d4523ec10c5908  snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-security_InRelease' \
-        | (cd /var/lib/apt/lists && sha256sum --check --strict) \
+# ca-certificates, nix-bin and runit, from Ubuntu's archive. apt fetches
+# them over plain HTTP and checks each one against the archive's signed
+# package lists, so no CA certificates are needed.
+#
+# nix-bin depends on xz-utils, whose install links man pages with
+# update-alternatives. The image's dpkg config drops man pages, so each
+# link warns. z-man, read after /etc/dpkg/dpkg.cfg.d/excludes, re-includes
+# the man1 pages for this install alone; the same step deletes them again,
+# so no man page or package is added.
+RUN echo 'path-include=/usr/share/man/man1/*' > /etc/dpkg/dpkg.cfg.d/z-man \
+    && apt-get update \
    && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install --yes --no-install-recommends \
-        --snapshot 20261001T000000Z \
-        -o Acquire::https::CaInfo=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
-        -o Acquire::Retries=5 \
        ca-certificates nix-bin runit \
-    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* /etc/dpkg/dpkg.cfg.d/z-man \
+    && find /usr/share/man/man1 ! -type d -delete \
+    && find /etc/alternatives -type l -xtype l -delete

 # Nix run by root expects a group of build users, which nix-bin does not
 # create; with the setting empty, root's builds run without them.
@@ -186,27 +175,27 @@ RUN curl -fsSL -o /tmp/nixexprs.tar.xz \
 ENV PATH=${PATH}:/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin

 COPY --from=runsvinit /usr/local/bin/runsvinit /usr/local/bin/runsvinit
-COPY --from=builder /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf
+COPY --from=builder /usr/local/bin/sww /usr/local/bin/sww

 # 65532 is above the uids Ubuntu keeps for system users, which end at
 # 999; useradd warns about it unless --key raises that end for this call.
-RUN groupadd --system --gid 65532 smallwebwaf \
+RUN groupadd --system --gid 65532 sww \
    && useradd --system --key SYS_UID_MAX=65532 --uid 65532 \
-        --gid smallwebwaf --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin \
-        smallwebwaf
+        --gid sww --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin \
+        sww

-# The state files' directory, SWWAF_STATE_DIR by default, where a volume
+# The state files' directory, SWW_STATE_DIR by default, where a volume
 # is mounted to keep them across deploys. The run script gives it to the
-# smallwebwaf user at each start.
-RUN mkdir /var/lib/smallwebwaf
+# sww user at each start of discriminator.
+RUN mkdir /var/lib/sww

-# The default rule file, in SWWAF_RULES_DIR by default, where an app's
-# Dockerfile can copy rule files of its own beside it.
-COPY share/rules.d/00-default.rules /etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/00-default.rules
+# The default rule file, in SWW_RULES_DIR by default, where a Dockerfile
+# built FROM this image can copy rule files of its own beside it.
+COPY share/rules.d/00-default.rules /etc/sww/rules.d/00-default.rules

 # runsvinit starts runit's runsvdir on /etc/service, where Ubuntu's sv
 # looks too.
-COPY --chmod=755 share/smallwebwaf.run /etc/service/smallwebwaf/run
+COPY --chmod=755 share/sww.run /etc/service/sww/run

 EXPOSE 8080

@@ -214,6 +203,6 @@ EXPOSE 8080
 # check runs every second from the start until it first passes, for up
 # to a minute, and every 30 seconds after that.
 HEALTHCHECK --start-period=1m --start-interval=1s \
-    CMD ["/usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf", "healthcheck"]
+    CMD ["/usr/local/bin/sww", "healthcheck"]

 ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/runsvinit"]
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
 - R1: rate limits per minute, per hour and per day
 - R2: netblocks that bypass rate limiting
 - R3: alerts on attacks through webhook, Slack or ntfy
- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests or bytes per minute or hour, for given IPs
-  or netblocks, crossing a threshold
+- R4: alerts on anomalies: requests made or bytes transferred per minute or
+  hour, for given IPs or netblocks, crossing a threshold
 - R5: temporary blocks for abusers, permanent bans for repeat offenders
 - R6: one or more RBLs or IP reputation APIs
 - R7: AS number lookup
@@ -24,14 +24,19 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:

 ## Verdict

-Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8 (scaling limits by AS
-number or country) or the bytes half of R4 at all, and the tools that come
-closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML or a web UI.
-The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar; `SPEC.md` in this
-directory begins that spec. It reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field as
-libraries and data sources (Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set for attack
-detection, DNSBLs, AbuseIPDB, optionally a CrowdSec decision feed) instead of
-reimplementing them.
+Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8, which asks for limits
+scaled by AS number or country. None meets R4's alerts on bytes transferred. The
+tools that come closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML
+or a web UI. The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar;
+`SPEC.md` in this directory begins that spec.
+
+The sidecar reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field instead of
+reimplementing them. It takes these as libraries and data sources:
+
+- Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set, for attack detection
+- DNSBLs
+- AbuseIPDB
+- optionally, a CrowdSec decision feed

 Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:

@@ -45,13 +50,16 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
      external blacklist URLs, optional CrowdSec), R7 partly (AS number used for
      blacklist and whitelist decisions), R9 (ModSecurity with the Core Rule
      Set, or Coraza plugin), env-var settings.
-    - Fails: R8 (AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a
-      limit), R4 (no volume or byte threshold alerts in the free edition;
-      reporting is a paid feature), R5 escalation, and R10 in spirit: since 1.6
-      it needs a `bunkerweb` container plus a `bw-scheduler` container and a
-      database, or the all-in-one image that bundles nginx, scheduler, UI and
-      Redis in one container. It is designed to be the front door for many
-      sites, not a per-app sidecar. AGPL-3.0.
+    - Fails:
+        - R8: AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a limit.
+        - R4: no alerts on request-count or byte thresholds in the free edition;
+          reporting is a paid feature.
+        - R5: no escalation for repeat offenders.
+        - R10: since 1.6 it is not one plain sidecar. It needs a `bunkerweb`
+          container, a `bw-scheduler` container and a database, or the
+          all-in-one image that bundles nginx, the scheduler, the UI and Redis.
+    - It is designed as the proxy in front of many sites, not as a sidecar for
+      one app. AGPL-3.0.
    - Unverified: whether several rates (minute, hour, day) can be stacked on
      the same URL pattern; the documented design is one rate per URL pattern.
 - CrowdSec is the strongest detection and ban engine, but it is not a proxy.
@@ -66,16 +74,20 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
      listed AS numbers is possible, but each is a hand-written YAML scenario,
      it reacts after the fact by banning, and it is not an inline limiter that
      answers 429.
-    - Fails: R10 (needs the security engine container with persistent state, log
-      acquisition from traefik, a bouncer such as the traefik plugin, and YAML
-      for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications), bytes half of R4.
+    - Fails:
+        - R10, because it needs:
+            - the security engine container with persistent state
+            - log acquisition from traefik
+            - a bouncer such as the traefik plugin
+            - YAML for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications
+        - R4's alerts on bytes.
 - CrowdSec plus traefik's own `rateLimit` middleware is the best combination
  with no new code. It gives inline limiting (one window per middleware, keyed
  by IP, with `sourceCriterion` exclusions), bans with escalation, alerts and
-  reputation. It still fails R8, the bytes half of R4, R1's three stacked
-  windows only by chaining three middlewares per router, and R10 entirely: the
-  configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not in
-  one sidecar's environment.
+  reputation lookups. It still fails R8, R4's alerts on bytes, and R10 entirely:
+  the configuration lives in traefik labels and CrowdSec YAML on each host, not
+  in one sidecar's environment. It meets R1's three windows only by chaining
+  three middlewares per router.

 ## Candidate by candidate

@@ -87,10 +99,10 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
      cached, streamed decision list (recommended), standalone against the
      central API, or AppSec only. Supports captcha remediation.
    - Covers: R5, R6, R9, R3 and R7 through the engine (see Verdict).
-    - Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4 bytes.
+    - Misses: the plugin itself does no rate limiting; R8; R4's alerts on bytes.
    - Configuration: traefik static config to load the plugin, dynamic config or
      labels for the middleware, CrowdSec YAML for everything else.
-    - Sidecar fit: no. It lives inside traefik, plus a separate engine
+    - Sidecar fit: no. It runs inside traefik and needs a separate engine
      container.
    - Maturity: widely used (about 900 stars, listed in the traefik plugin
      catalog, documented by CrowdSec itself), actively maintained. Traefik
@@ -115,7 +127,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
    - What it is: nginx-derived (Tengine) reverse proxy with a proprietary
      semantic detection engine and a web console. About 22,000 stars.
    - Covers: R9 well, basic per-IP rate limiting with block duration, bot
-      challenge, authentication gate.
+      challenge, authentication in front of the app.
    - Misses: R8, R7, R4; R1 has one window per rule. Country blocking, alert
      messages, syslog forwarding and the better reputation database are paid
      (Lite about 10 USD per month, Pro about 100 USD per month); the free
@@ -128,7 +140,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
 - Coraza (`corazawaf/coraza`) and Coraza-based proxies
    - What it is: a Go library that implements the ModSecurity rule language and
      runs the OWASP Core Rule Set. OWASP project, actively maintained, the
-      successor path now that ModSecurity is in maintenance only.
+      successor to ModSecurity, which is now in maintenance only.
    - Packagings: `coraza-caddy` (Caddy module), `coraza-spoa` (HAProxy),
      `coraza-proxy-wasm` (Envoy), a traefik WASM plugin, and
      `coreruleset/coraza-crs-docker` (Caddy plus Coraza plus the Core Rule Set,
@@ -142,7 +154,7 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
 - ModSecurity Core Rule Set containers (`owasp/modsecurity-crs`)
    - What it is: official images of Apache or nginx with ModSecurity and the
      Core Rule Set, as a reverse proxy configured by env vars (`BACKEND`,
-      paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images carry
+      paranoia level, anomaly thresholds, many more). Current images contain
      ModSecurity 2.9.x on Apache and Core Rule Set 4.x.
    - Covers: R9, and R10 (single container, env vars, one backend).
    - Misses: R1 to R8.
@@ -152,16 +164,16 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
 - Anubis (`TecharoHQ/anubis`), 1.27 current
    - What it is: a single-binary reverse proxy that makes browsers solve a
      proof-of-work challenge before passing them to `TARGET`. Aimed at
-      scrapers, which is likely a large share of unwanted traffic on a public
-      gitea.
+      scrapers, which are likely a large share of the unwanted traffic on a
+      public code forge.
    - Covers: R10 well (one container, env vars for listener, target,
      difficulty, cookies). Policy rules can match on path, user agent, headers,
      IP ranges, and with the vendor's hosted data service also AS number and
      country, and can weigh a request toward a harder challenge.
    - Misses: R1, R3, R4, R5, R6, R9. Bot policy needs a YAML file, not env
      vars. AS number and country matching depend on the vendor's hosted
-      service. Breaks non-browser clients unless paths are exempted; for gitea,
-      git-over-HTTP and API paths must be allowed through by rule.
+      service. Breaks non-browser clients unless paths are exempted; for a code
+      forge, git-over-HTTP and API paths must be allowed through by rule.
    - Maturity: very active, widely deployed on code forges since 2025.
    - Value here: complementary. It can be chained (traefik, then the sidecar,
      then Anubis, then the app) if challenge pages are wanted.
@@ -180,13 +192,13 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
      temporary ban, no escalation, state lost on traefik restart) and R2
      (allowlist). Nothing else.
    - `juitde/traefik-plugin-fail2ban`, fail2ban connector plugins, GeoBlock
-      plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): same
-      shape, each one small feature, configured in traefik, state in memory.
+      plugins (country allow or deny through an external lookup API): each adds
+      one small feature, is configured in traefik and keeps its state in memory.
    - Sidecar fit: no; they live inside traefik.
 - Traefik built-in middlewares
    - `rateLimit` (one average-and-burst window per middleware, optional Redis
      in traefik 3.x), `inFlightReq`, `ipAllowList`. No bans, alerts, reputation
-      or AS number awareness.
+      lookups or AS number lookups.
 - caddy-waf (`fabriziosalmi/caddy-waf`), 0.4.x
    - What it is: a Caddy module with regex rules and anomaly scoring, per-IP
      and per-path rate limiting with one configurable window, IP and DNS
@@ -198,12 +210,12 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
 - open-appsec (Check Point)
    - Machine-learning WAF agent attached to nginx, Kong, Envoy or similar, with
      a declarative policy file or the vendor's cloud console. Covers R9 only;
-      rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. Not a sidecar in the
-      required sense.
+      rate limiting and richer features are in paid tiers. It attaches to an
+      existing proxy, so it is not the sidecar R10 asks for.
 - iocaine
    - Serves generated garbage pages to clients the fronting proxy classifies as
-      scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope except as a
-      curiosity for scraper traffic.
+      scrapers. Not a limiter, WAF or ban tool; out of scope, and only of
+      passing interest for scraper traffic.
 - Pangolin
    - A tunnelled access platform that bundles traefik and optionally CrowdSec.
      Replaces the ingress rather than adding a sidecar; out of scope.
@@ -214,17 +226,17 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
  Everyone else offers one window per rule or none.
 - R2 bypass netblocks: BunkerWeb, CrowdSec, traefik, fail2ban plugins.
 - R3 alerts: CrowdSec (best), BunkerWeb (denied requests only), SafeLine (paid).
- R4 volume and byte anomalies: none. CrowdSec can approximate request-count
-  anomalies with a custom scenario; nothing handles bytes.
- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb has fixed or permanent,
-  not both by history.
+- R4 alerts on request counts and bytes: none. CrowdSec can approximate alerts
+  on request counts with a custom scenario; no surveyed tool alerts on bytes.
+- R5 temporary then permanent: CrowdSec only. BunkerWeb's ban is either one
+  fixed length or permanent, and does not change with a client's history.
 - R6 reputation: CrowdSec, BunkerWeb, go-away, caddy-waf (static lists).
 - R7 AS number lookup: CrowdSec (enrichment), BunkerWeb and caddy-waf (allow or
  deny), Anubis (hosted service).
 - R8 biased thresholds: none.
 - R9 attack detection: Coraza or ModSecurity with the Core Rule Set (open,
-  standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps the
-  first).
+  standard), CrowdSec AppSec, SafeLine (closed engine), BunkerWeb (wraps Coraza
+  or ModSecurity).
 - R10 env-var sidecar: `owasp/modsecurity-crs`, `coraza-crs-docker`, Anubis.
  None of these covers anything beyond its one job.

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-.PHONY: bootstrap setup test lint fmt fmt-check tidy check docker hooks build \
-	run example-app gitea-requests
+.PHONY: bootstrap setup test lint fmt fmt-check tidy check docker publish \
+	hooks build run example-app

 # Makefile targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
 # per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
 # of README.md). tidy writes go.mod and go.sum as `go mod tidy` does,
 # which test checks. build and run are for working on the code by hand;
-# example-app checks the image with an app built on it; gitea-requests
-# reports the gitea requests the Core Rule Set refuses at the defaults.
+# example-app checks the image with an app built on it; publish builds
+# the image on the Docker host and pushes it to the registry.

 bootstrap:
 	@script/bootstrap
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ check:
 docker:
 	@script/docker

+publish:
+	@script/publish
+
 hooks:
 	@script/install-precommit

@@ -46,6 +49,3 @@ run:

 example-app:
 	@script/example-app
-
-gitea-requests:
-	@script/gitea-requests
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-// Command smallwebwaf is a web application firewall for one app: it runs
-// between traefik and the app, and passes requests through within its
-// limits. Everything it does is in internal/smallwebwaf.
-package main
-
-import (
-	"os"
-
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
-)
-
-// Version is the version of the binary, set when it is built with
-// -ldflags "-X main.Version=...".
-var Version = "dev" //nolint:gochecknoglobals // the linker sets it
-
-func main() {
-	os.Exit(smallwebwaf.Main(Version))
-}
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// Command sww is a web application firewall. `sww rproxy` is the reverse
+// proxy in front of one app, which asks discriminator about each request.
+// `sww discriminator` decides, for many sites, and keeps what lasts. `sww
+// healthcheck` is the container's health check. Everything it does is in
+// internal/sww.
+package main
+
+import (
+	"os"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/sww"
+)
+
+// Version is the version of the binary, set when it is built with
+// -ldflags "-X main.Version=...".
+var Version = "dev" //nolint:gochecknoglobals // the linker sets it
+
+func main() {
+	os.Exit(sww.Main(Version))
+}
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
 # A real app names the smallwebwaf image by digest. This one takes the
 # image script/example-app has just built, or else the one `make docker`
 # builds.
-ARG SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE=smallwebwaf
-FROM ${SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE}
+ARG SWW_IMAGE=smallwebwaf
+FROM ${SWW_IMAGE}

 # Packages the app needs, from the nixpkgs in the image.
 RUN nix-env -iA nixpkgs.busybox
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# Admin endpoints
+
+The endpoints under `/_sww/`, what each takes and what each answers.
+`sww discriminator` answers them at its own address, on the private network.
+"Admin endpoints" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how their tokens work.
+
+- `GET /_sww/healthz`: `200` and `ok`, to anyone.
+- `GET /_sww/metrics`: the metrics, for `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` (see
+  [`metrics.md`](metrics.md)).
+- `GET /_sww/bans`: every ban held, under `bans`, each as `bans.json` lists it.
+  Needs `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN`, as do the three below.
+- `POST /_sww/bans`: bans a netblock. The body is a JSON object of `netblock`,
+  `duration` and, if you like, `reason`. `netblock` is a netblock such as
+  `203.0.113.0/24`, or a client's address, which bans its IPv4 netblock
+  (`SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX`) or its IPv6 group. `duration` is a duration such
+  as `1h` or `7d`, or `permanent`. A bad body is answered `400`, saying what is
+  wrong:
+    - one that is not such an object, or has another field;
+    - one longer than 4 KiB;
+    - one that names an IPv4-mapped netblock, or an address with a zone.
+- `DELETE /_sww/bans/<client>`: lifts every active ban covering the address
+  `<client>`. It answers `404` when none is active.
+- `GET /_sww/clients/<ip>`: what `discriminator` knows of the client. Under
+  `client`, its counters and history as `clients.json` holds them, or `null`
+  when `clients.json` does not hold it. Under `bans`, every ban covering the
+  address, with its notes.
+- `POST /_sww/report`: takes `rproxy`'s report, without a token. It answers
+  `204`, or `400` to a body that is no report (see "The report" in
+  [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
+
+No check runs on these requests. A missing or wrong token is answered `401`. An
+endpoint whose token is unset answers `404`, as does any other path.
+
+`sww rproxy` answers only the health check of these, at its own address. It asks
+`discriminator` about any other request under `/_sww/`. One that passes the
+checks is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that prefix (see "`rproxy`"
+in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
+
+## Examples
+
+With `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` set, the token in `$TOKEN`, and `discriminator` reached
+as `discriminator:8080` on its network:
+
+```sh
+# Every ban.
+curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" http://discriminator:8080/_sww/bans
+
+# Ban 203.0.113.0/24 for seven days.
+curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+    --json '{"netblock": "203.0.113.0/24", "duration": "7d", "reason": "probes for logins"}' \
+    http://discriminator:8080/_sww/bans
+
+# Lift the bans on 203.0.113.9.
+curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -X DELETE \
+    http://discriminator:8080/_sww/bans/203.0.113.9
+
+# What discriminator knows of 203.0.113.9.
+curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+    http://discriminator:8080/_sww/clients/203.0.113.9
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+# Alerts
+
+The alert events, the JSON object the webhook gets, and the messages Slack and
+ntfy get. "Alerting" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says when an alert is sent, held
+back or dropped.
+
+## Events
+
+- `ban`: a ban `discriminator` made.
+- `permanent_ban`: a permanent ban it made, or an existing ban made permanent by
+  a request.
+- `core_rule_set_match`: the Core Rule Set scored a request at or over the
+  threshold. The request was refused unless the alert's `detail` gives `mode`:
+  `detect` or `observe`.
+- `anomaly`: a count over an anomaly threshold.
+- `reputation_hit`: a request from a client on a blocklist, the CrowdSec
+  decision list or a DNS blocklist, or with an AbuseIPDB score that is a hit.
+  One alert per source.
+- `source_failure`: one of:
+    - GeoJS failing;
+    - a list that cannot be fetched;
+    - a DNS blocklist or AbuseIPDB failing or refusing a query;
+    - the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
+- `file_error`: one of:
+    - a rule file or state file edit with an error;
+    - a state file that cannot be written;
+    - a replacement lookup database that cannot be read.
+- `summary`: the hourly summary of alerts held back.
+
+## The JSON object
+
+This is the alert for a ban for a broken rate limit, shown indented; it is sent
+on one line:
+
+```json
+{
+    "instance": "fsn1/discriminator",
+    "time": "2026-10-06T12:00:50.123461Z",
+    "event": "ban",
+    "host": "app.example",
+    "client": "203.0.113.9",
+    "netblock": "203.0.113.9/32",
+    "asn": "",
+    "as_name": "",
+    "country": "",
+    "reason": "requests per minute over the limit of 500",
+    "detail": {
+        "ban_expires": "2026-10-06T13:00:50.123Z",
+        "cause": "limit",
+        "notes": {
+            "asn": "",
+            "as_name": "",
+            "country": "",
+            "kind": "requests",
+            "limit": 500,
+            "window": "minute",
+            "count": 501,
+            "request": {
+                "time": "2026-10-06T12:00:50.123456789Z",
+                "method": "GET",
+                "host": "app.example",
+                "path": "/owner/repo/commits/branch/main?page=501",
+                "status": 403,
+                "user_agent": "scraper/1.0"
+            },
+            "requests": 501,
+            "refused": 0,
+            "earlier_bans": {
+                "limit": 0,
+                "attack": 0,
+                "admin": 0,
+                "crowdsec": 0
+            }
+        }
+    },
+    "suppressed_repeats": 0
+}
+```
+
+- `instance`: `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME`. `time`: when the alert was raised. `event`:
+  one of the events above.
+- `host`: the site of the request that raised the alert, since one
+  `discriminator` serves many sites. It is left out of `source_failure`,
+  `file_error` and `summary`.
+- `client`: the address whose request raised the alert. Empty for
+  `source_failure`, `file_error` and `summary`.
+- `netblock`: empty for `source_failure`, `file_error` and `summary`; otherwise
+  one of:
+    - the ban's netblock;
+    - the netblock an anomaly counted, empty in the `asn` and `total` scopes;
+    - for the other events, the client as rate limiting counts it: an IPv4
+      address as a /32, or an IPv6 group.
+- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`: the client's, as known when the alert was
+  raised. They are empty when GeoJS had not answered yet.
+- `reason`: a short sentence, such as
+  `requests per minute over the limit of 500` or `listed by a blocklist`.
+- `detail`: what is particular to the event:
+    - for a ban, its `cause`, `ban_expires` and `notes` (the notes are listed
+      under `bans.json` in [`state-files.md`](state-files.md));
+    - for an anomaly, the `scope`, `window`, `kind`, `count` and `threshold`;
+    - for a reputation hit, the `source` and, for AbuseIPDB, the `score`;
+    - for a Core Rule Set match, the `rule_ids`, `score`, `method` and `path`;
+    - for a source failure, the `source` and `error`;
+    - for a file error, the `file` and `error`;
+    - for a summary, the `hour` it covers, the `count` of alerts held back, and
+      that count by event in `events`;
+    - `mode`, when the request was not refused: `detect` or `observe`.
+- `suppressed_repeats`: how many repeats the cooldown held back before this
+  alert.
+
+## Slack and ntfy
+
+Slack and ntfy get a message with a title and a text. The title is the instance
+and the event, such as `fsn1/discriminator: ban`. The text is the `reason`, then
+one line for each of these that the alert has:
+
+- the host, the client, the netblock and the country;
+- the file, the source, the error and the mode from `detail`;
+- the suppressed repeats, if any.
+
+Slack gets the title in bold and the text below it, with `&`, `<` and `>`
+escaped. ntfy gets the text as the message, with these headers:
+
+- `Title`: the title;
+- `Authorization`: the token, as `Bearer <token>`, while `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN`
+  is set;
+- `Priority` and `Tags`: by event, as listed below.
+
+The priority and tag by event:
+
+- `ban`: priority `default`, tag `no_entry`.
+- `permanent_ban`: priority `high`, tag `no_entry`.
+- `core_rule_set_match`: priority `default`, tag `shield`.
+- `anomaly`: priority `high`, tag `chart_with_upwards_trend`.
+- `reputation_hit`: priority `low`, tag `label`.
+- `source_failure` and `file_error`: priority `high`, tag `warning`.
+- `summary`: priority `default`, tag `bar_chart`.
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# What the image holds
+
+The contents of the `smallwebwaf` image, and how each part is pinned. The image
+runs `rproxy` by default, or `discriminator` with `SWW_COMMAND=discriminator`.
+"Deployment" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says why each part is there and why it
+is pinned that way.
+
+## Contents
+
+- Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, pinned by digest.
+- `ca-certificates`, `nix-bin` and `runit` from Ubuntu's archive.
+- Nix, with nixpkgs `nixos-26.05.11045.774debe7a0d1` set up for root as
+  `nixpkgs`. No Nix daemon; `build-users-group =` in `/etc/nix/nix.conf`. Root's
+  Nix profile, `/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin`, last on the `PATH`.
+  Unpacked, nixpkgs takes about 500 MiB.
+- `runsvinit` as the entrypoint, built from `github.com/peterbourgon/runsvinit`
+  at a fixed commit hash.
+- The `sww` binary, and the user `sww` (uid and gid 65532).
+- The service directory `/etc/service/sww`, with the `run` script
+  `share/sww.run`.
+- `/var/lib/sww` for `discriminator`'s state files, and `/etc/sww/rules.d` with
+  the default rule file `share/rules.d/00-default.rules`.
+- `EXPOSE 8080`, and the `HEALTHCHECK` that runs `sww healthcheck`.
+
+## Pins
+
+- Ubuntu's packages are not pinned: they come from the live archive, whose
+  packages change with every update.
+- nixpkgs: the release file `nixexprs.tar.xz` of
+  `nixos-26.05.11045.774debe7a0d1` on `releases.nixos.org`, named with its
+  SHA-256 hash.
+- `runsvinit`: the archived repository, unchanged since 2015, at its last commit
+  (`b4b2c78`, eight commits after `v2.0.0`), by commit hash, with a `go.mod` the
+  build writes.
+- The Go image that builds `sww`: by digest.
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+# The metrics
+
+What `GET /_sww/metrics` answers with, at `discriminator`'s own address.
+"Metrics endpoint" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) describes the endpoint. Prometheus
+keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
+`honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
+
+Every `sww_*request_bytes_total` and `sww_*response_bytes_total` series counts
+body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says.
+
+## Traffic
+
+- `sww_requests_total`, `sww_request_bytes_total` and
+  `sww_response_bytes_total`, by `status_class` such as `2xx` and by `action`;
+- `sww_request_duration_seconds` and `sww_upstream_duration_seconds`, as
+  histograms;
+- `sww_requests_in_flight`: the questions and requests to its own endpoints that
+  `discriminator` is handling.
+
+## Limits and bans
+
+- `sww_rate_limit_hits_total`, by `window` and by `kind` (`requests`, `bytes` or
+  `refusals`);
+- `sww_offences_total`, by `kind`;
+- `sww_bans_made_total`, by `cause`;
+- `sww_active_bans` and `sww_permanent_bans`.
+
+## Attack detection
+
+- `sww_rule_matches_total`, by `rule_id` and `action`, and `sww_rules_loaded`;
+- `sww_core_rule_set_matches_total`, by `mode` and `rule_id`, for the rules that
+  fired.
+
+## Countries and AS numbers
+
+For the `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` busiest of each, the rest as `other`:
+
+- `sww_country_requests_total`, `sww_country_request_bytes_total`,
+  `sww_country_response_bytes_total` and `sww_country_list_refusals_total`, by
+  `country`;
+- `sww_asn_requests_total`, `sww_asn_request_bytes_total` and
+  `sww_asn_response_bytes_total`, by `asn`.
+
+## Lookups
+
+- `sww_geojs_requests_total` and `sww_geojs_failures_total`;
+- `sww_requests_without_geojs_answer_total`: the requests that needed an answer
+  and went on without it;
+- with the file source, `sww_lookup_database_last_read_timestamp_seconds` and
+  `sww_lookup_database_read_failures_total`.
+
+## Reputation sources
+
+By `source`: each list's URL, each zone, and `abuseipdb`:
+
+- `sww_reputation_hits_total`, `sww_reputation_queries_total` and
+  `sww_reputation_failures_total`;
+- `sww_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds`, for a list;
+- `sww_reputation_daily_budget_remaining`, for AbuseIPDB.
+
+## State files
+
+By `file`:
+
+- `sww_state_file_writes_total`, `sww_state_file_write_failures_total`,
+  `sww_state_file_last_write_timestamp_seconds` and `sww_state_file_size_bytes`;
+- `sww_state_file_edits_taken_in_total` and
+  `sww_state_file_edits_set_aside_total`;
+- `sww_tracked_clients`: the clients in the table.
+
+## Remote log, alerts and the process
+
+- while a syslog server is set, `sww_remote_log_lines_sent_total`,
+  `sww_remote_log_lines_dropped_total` and `sww_remote_log_lines_waiting`;
+- by `destination`, `sww_alerts_sent_total`, `sww_alert_send_failures_total`,
+  `sww_alerts_suppressed_total` and `sww_alerts_dropped_total`;
+- Go's own `go_` metrics and the process's `process_` metrics.
+
+## When a request is counted
+
+`discriminator` counts a denied request at its decision, and a request to its
+own endpoints when it is answered. It counts an allowed request when its report
+comes, with the status, bytes and times the report gives. These are not counted:
+
+- a report itself;
+- an allowed request whose report never comes;
+- a question refused with `400`;
+- a question whose body stopped arriving.
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+# The request log's fields
+
+The fields of the JSON objects `rproxy` and `discriminator` write about each
+request. "Request log" and "The log" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) say when a line
+is written and how the log is sent to a syslog server. A field that does not
+apply to a request is left out.
+
+## `discriminator`'s lines
+
+`sww discriminator` writes two lines for each question it answers, joined by
+`request_id`. The field `discriminator_line` says which of the two a line is:
+
+- `decision`: the line it writes once it has answered the question;
+- `report`: the line it writes when `rproxy`'s report comes, with everything
+  known. The repetition is intended.
+
+A request to its own endpoints writes one line, without `discriminator_line`. A
+report writes no line but the `report` line of the request it names.
+
+These questions write no line:
+
+- a question refused with `400` (see "The question" under "`discriminator`" in
+  [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md));
+- a question whose body stopped arriving, which gets no answer.
+
+A `report` line:
+
+```
+{"type":"request","discriminator_line":"report","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","instance":"fsn1/discriminator","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","method":"GET","scheme":"https","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","forwarded_for":"203.0.113.9","client_group":"203.0.113.9/32","asn":"AS64496","as_name":"Example Net","country":"DE","request_headers":{"accept":"*/*"},"action":"forward","counts":{"minute":1,"hour":12,"day":40,"minute_bytes":5120,"hour_bytes":61440,"day_bytes":204800},"core_rule_set_score":0,"duration_total_ms":3.217,"duration_checks_ms":0.041,"duration_core_rule_set_ms":0.029,"duration_upstream_total_ms":3.104}
+```
+
+### Every line
+
+Every one of these lines has:
+
+- `type`: `request` (the process's own messages have `process`);
+- the standard web log fields;
+- `request_id`, `peer_ip` and `client_group`;
+- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`;
+- `action` and `duration_total_ms`.
+
+### Standard web log fields
+
+- `time`: when `discriminator` had read the question's body, RFC 3339 with
+  milliseconds, in UTC. The `report` line gives the same time as the `decision`
+  line.
+- `instance`: `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME`.
+- `client_ip`: the visitor's address, as `rproxy` worked it out.
+- `method`, `path` and `query`: the visitor's request.
+- `scheme`: how the visitor reached `rproxy` or the trusted proxy in front of
+  it.
+- `host`: the site the visitor asked for.
+- `protocol`: the question's own, `HTTP/1.1`.
+- `status`:
+    - on the `decision` line, what `discriminator` answered: `200` for `allow`,
+      the status of `deny`, or `0` for `close`, as the visitor is then sent
+      nothing;
+    - on the `report` line, what the visitor got, `0` if nothing.
+- `request_bytes`:
+    - on the `decision` line, how much of the question's body the Core Rule Set
+      read;
+    - on the `report` line, the bytes of the visitor's body that `rproxy` read,
+      with what a WebSocket carried from the visitor.
+- `response_bytes`:
+    - on the `decision` line, the body of `discriminator`'s answer;
+    - on the `report` line, the bytes of the answer's body, with what a
+      WebSocket carried from the app.
+- `referer` and `user_agent`.
+
+### Request detail
+
+- `request_id`: the id `rproxy` made for the request when it arrived.
+- `peer_ip`: the address of `rproxy`'s TCP peer, normally traefik.
+- `forwarded_for`: the `X-Forwarded-For` header the visitor's request came with.
+- `client_group`: the client as rate limiting counts it, an IPv4 address as a
+  /32 or an IPv6 group.
+- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`: the client's, as looked up. Each is empty
+  when:
+    - lookups are off;
+    - the client is not looked up;
+    - the source cannot place the client;
+    - GeoJS had not answered by the time `discriminator` answered.
+- `content_type`: the visitor's `Content-Type`.
+- `content_length`: the body length the visitor announced.
+- `request_headers`: the headers listed in `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS`, by name in
+  lower case.
+- `has_authorization` and `has_cookie`: true when the request had those headers.
+  Their values are never logged.
+
+### Response detail
+
+- `response_content_type`: the type of `discriminator`'s own answer.
+- `aborted`: true when `rproxy` went away before the answer.
+
+### Decision
+
+- `action`: what was done:
+    - `forward`: answered `allow`, so that `rproxy` passes it to the app;
+    - `client_denied`: refused for `SWW_DENY_NETS`, for a reputation source with
+      the action `deny`, or for a tag in `SWW_TAG_DENY`;
+    - `temporarily_banned`: refused under a ban that runs out, or for a `ban`
+      rule, a trap path or a CrowdSec decision that made such a ban;
+    - `permanently_banned`: refused under a ban that never runs out, including a
+      ban this request made or made permanent;
+    - `country_denied`, `client_is_rate_limited`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and
+      `blocked_by_core_rule_set`: refused by that check;
+    - `request_header_too_large`: over a header limit;
+    - `own_endpoint`: answered at one of `discriminator`'s own endpoints, or
+      `404` for a path under `/_sww/`.
+- `would_action`: in `observe` mode, what `enforce` mode would have done with a
+  request it would have refused. `action` then names what was done, normally
+  `forward`.
+- `heuristic`: the heuristic that refused the request, in `observe` mode too. It
+  is left out when none did.
+- `heuristic_figures`: an object of the figures that heuristic acted on. Each
+  heuristic and its figures:
+    - `deny_nets`: `netblock`, the entry of `SWW_DENY_NETS` the client is in;
+    - `active_ban`: `netblock`, the ban's netblock, and `ban_expires`;
+    - `countries`: `country`, and `setting`, the country list that refused it;
+    - `tag_deny`: `tag`, the tag of `SWW_TAG_DENY` the request carries;
+    - `blocklists`: `lists`, the blocklist URLs that list the client;
+    - `crowdsec`: `scenario`, the decision's scenario, and `expires`, when the
+      decision ends;
+    - `dnsbl`: `zones`, the DNS blocklist zones that list the client, their keys
+      masked;
+    - `abuseipdb`: `score`, and `min_score`, `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE`;
+    - `rate_limits`: `window`, `count` and `limit`;
+    - `trap_paths`: `path`, the trap path asked for;
+    - `rule_files`: `rule_id` and `rule_action`, of the rule that refused it;
+    - `header_limits`: `fields`, `fields_limit`, `cookies` and `cookies_limit`;
+    - `core_rule_set`: `score`, and `threshold`, `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD`;
+    - `refusal_limit`: `window`, `count` and `limit`, of the error burst;
+    - `byte_limits`: `window`, `count` and `limit`, the count in bytes.
+- `after_answer_heuristic`: the heuristic that banned the client after
+  `discriminator` answered the request, in `observe` mode too: `refusal_limit`
+  or `byte_limits`.
+- `after_answer_heuristic_figures`: an object of the figures that heuristic
+  acted on, as listed above.
+
+    `byte_limits` bans when the report comes, so only the `report` line names
+    it.
+
+- `rate_limit_percent` and `rate_limit_percent_setting`: the client's percentage
+  of the rate limits and the setting that lowered it, when one did.
+  `bytes_limit_percent` and `bytes_limit_percent_setting` do the same for the
+  byte limits.
+- `counts`: the client's totals as rate limiting counts them, this request
+  included. It is left out when rate limiting did not count the request. It
+  holds:
+    - `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests;
+    - `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: the body bytes
+      `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, in that window.
+
+    A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
+    [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes counted for an allowed request and its
+    response are added when its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the
+    three byte totals leave them out.
+
+- `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
+    - `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
+    - `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit;
+    - `minute_refusals` for the error burst (`SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`).
+
+    When the bytes counted for a request and its response break a limit, the
+    request has been passed on whole, so its `action` stays `forward`. Only its
+    `report` line gives that limit.
+
+- `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that
+  refused.
+- `core_rule_set_score` and `core_rule_set_rule_ids`: the Core Rule Set's score
+  and the rules that matched, for a request it inspected.
+- `reputation`: the sources the client is on, in this order:
+    - blocklist URLs;
+    - the CrowdSec decision list's URL;
+    - DNS blocklist zones;
+    - `abuseipdb`.
+- `tags`: the request's tags, sorted, left out when it has none. Each tag and
+  where it comes from is under "Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md).
+- `routewatch_tags_missing`: why the request got no tags from routewatch,
+  present only while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set:
+    - `no_answer_yet`: routewatch has not answered about this client yet;
+    - `request_failed`: a query to routewatch failed within the last minute, and
+      the process log says why;
+    - `no_route`: routewatch knows no live route for the address.
+- `offence`: `limit`, for a request that broke a limit.
+- `ban_expires`: when the client's ban ends, for a request that made one or was
+  refused under one: a time, or `permanent`.
+
+### Timings
+
+All in milliseconds:
+
+- `duration_total_ms`:
+    - on the `decision` line, from `discriminator` having read the question's
+      body to the line;
+    - on the `report` line, from `rproxy` having read the request's headers to
+      the end of the answer.
+- `duration_checks_ms`: to the end of the checks;
+- `duration_core_rule_set_ms`: the part of that the Core Rule Set took;
+- `duration_upstream_total_ms`: on the `report` line of an allowed request, from
+  the hand-over to the app to the end of the answer.
+
+### Requests to its own endpoints
+
+The line of a request to `discriminator`'s own endpoints has these fields, with
+these meanings where they differ:
+
+- `client_ip` and `peer_ip`: the request's TCP peer.
+- `request_id`: a new random one of 26 letters and digits.
+- `scheme`: `http`.
+- `time`: when the request's headers had been read.
+- `request_bytes`: the bytes read of a ban to add, and otherwise `0`.
+- `action`: `own_endpoint`.
+- `duration_total_ms`: from the request's headers being read to the line.
+
+## `rproxy`'s line
+
+`sww rproxy` writes one short line for each request. `request_id` joins it to
+`discriminator`'s two. It has these fields and no others:
+
+- `type`: `request`.
+- `time`: when the request arrived, RFC 3339 with milliseconds, in UTC.
+- `request_id`: the id `rproxy` made for the request when it arrived.
+- `client_ip`: the visitor's address.
+- `host` and `method`.
+- `path` and `query`: as the visitor sent them.
+- `status`: what the visitor got, `0` if nothing.
+- `request_bytes`: the bytes of the visitor's body that `rproxy` read, with what
+  a WebSocket carried from the visitor.
+- `response_bytes`: the bytes of the answer's body, with what a WebSocket
+  carried from the app.
+- `duration_request_ms`: milliseconds from the request's headers being read
+  until the app had been sent the whole request, or the answer started if that
+  was sooner. It includes the wait for `discriminator`.
+- `duration_response_ms`: milliseconds from then until the end of the answer.
+- `disposition`: what was done with the request: `allow`, `deny` or `close`. It
+  is `discriminator`'s answer, or the value of `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION`. It is
+  left out when:
+    - `discriminator` was not asked, as for the health check;
+    - the visitor went away while `discriminator` was being asked;
+    - `discriminator`'s answer had no valid `X-Sww-Disposition`;
+    - `rproxy` could not pass on `discriminator`'s answer, and answered `502`.
+- `default_disposition`: `true` when `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` gave
+  `disposition`, and otherwise left out.
+
+For example:
+
+```
+{"type":"request","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","host":"app.example","method":"GET","path":"/","query":"","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"duration_request_ms":1.204,"duration_response_ms":3.104,"disposition":"allow"}
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+# Rule files
+
+The format of a rule file, and the default file the image ships. "Rule files" in
+[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how the files are read, watched and mounted, and
+what each action leads to.
+
+## The format
+
+A rule is a line of four fields separated by spaces or tabs: an id, a target, an
+action and a regex. The regex runs to the end of the line. Blank lines and lines
+starting with `#` are ignored.
+
+```
+# id           target      action  regex
+env-file       path        ban     (?i)^/\.env(\.[a-z]+)?$
+scanner-agent  user_agent  ban     (?i)\b(sqlmap|nikto|nuclei|wpscan)\b
+```
+
+- The id is letters, digits, `-` and `_`, unique across all files. The log line,
+  the metrics, the alerts and a ban's notes name the rule by it.
+- The target is what the regex is matched against:
+    - `path`: the path without the query;
+    - `uri`: the path and the query together;
+    - `query`: the query as sent;
+    - `method`, `host`, `user_agent` and `referer`;
+    - `header:<Name>`: any one request header but `Host` and
+      `Transfer-Encoding`.
+- The action is `log`, `block` or `ban`.
+- The regex is in Go's syntax, RE2. It matches anywhere in the target unless
+  anchored with `^` and `$`. `(?i)` at its front makes it ignore case.
+
+## The default file
+
+The image ships one file, `share/rules.d/00-default.rules`, installed as
+`/etc/sww/rules.d/00-default.rules`:
+
+```
+# 00-default.rules: probes no real visitor sends, anchored at the site root
+
+# id             target      action  regex
+env-file         path        ban     (?i)^/\.env(\.[a-z]+)?$
+vcs-dir          path        ban     (?i)^/\.(git|svn|hg|bzr)(/|$)
+secrets-dir      path        ban     (?i)^/\.(aws|ssh|docker|kube)/
+secret-file      path        ban     (?i)^/\.(htpasswd|htaccess|npmrc|netrc|pgpass|git-credentials|bash_history|DS_Store)$
+editor-dir       path        ban     (?i)^/\.(vscode|idea)/
+backup-file      path        ban     (?i)^/[^/]+\.(php(\.[a-z0-9]+|~)|sql(\.[a-z0-9]+)?)$
+log-file         path        ban     (?i)^/(debug|error|access)\.log$
+compose-file     path        ban     (?i)^/(docker-)?compose\.ya?ml$
+php-shell        path        ban     (?i)^/(shell|c99|r57|wso|alfa)\.php$
+scanner-agent    user_agent  ban     (?i)\b(sqlmap|nikto|nuclei|masscan|zgrab|wpscan)\b
+path-traversal   uri         block   (\.\./){2,}
+empty-agent      user_agent  log     ^$
+```
+
+## A file of your own
+
+`discriminator` reads the rule files in its own container. Rules of your own go
+in a file named to sort after the default, such as `50-site.rules`:
+
+```
+# 50-site.rules: WordPress probes, which this site never serves
+wp-probe         path        ban     (?i)^/(wp-login\.php|xmlrpc\.php|wp-admin/)
+```
+
+A `Dockerfile` built on the `smallwebwaf` image, for `discriminator` to run
+from, adds it:
+
+```dockerfile
+COPY 50-site.rules /etc/sww/rules.d/50-site.rules
+```
+
+Or mount it there. A `path` rule applies on every site behind that
+`discriminator`.
@@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
+# Settings
+
+Every setting, its default and the values it takes, in the groups of "Settings"
+in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md). That section gives the conventions, the settings
+that take `off`, the `_FILE` form, and what each group does and why.
+
+The settings that start with `SWW_` are `discriminator`'s. Those that start with
+`SWRP_` are `rproxy`'s, and are under "`rproxy`" below. `SWW_COMMAND` chooses
+between the two (see "The image's command" below).
+
+## Forms of values
+
+- A duration is Go's syntax, with `d` for days: `90s`, `15m`, `24h`, `7d`. Zero
+  and negative durations are refused.
+- A size is a number of bytes with an optional `K`, `M` or `G`, which are powers
+  of 1024, so `1K` is 1024 bytes. Examples: `512K`, `100M`, `5G`.
+- A count is a whole number of requests, such as `1000`.
+- A list is comma separated, with spaces around items ignored. An empty item is
+  refused.
+- A netblock is an address and a prefix length, such as `10.0.0.0/8`. A bare
+  address stands for itself alone.
+- A country is a two-letter code of ISO 3166-1, in either case: `de` and `DE`
+  are the same. `xk` stands for Kosovo. A code that is not a country is refused,
+  such as `nk` (North Korea is `kp`) or the withdrawn `su`.
+- An AS number is `AS` and the number, in either case, such as `AS64496`.
+- A percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100.
+- A path prefix starts with `/`, such as `/assets/`.
+
+## Core
+
+- `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `discriminator` listens: `:` and a
+  port, such as `:9000`. Leave the host out (see "Ports" in
+  [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
+- `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` (default: the container's host name): the `instance` name
+  in each line `discriminator` logs, and in each alert and metric, such as
+  `fsn1/discriminator`. Valid UTF-8. No control character while
+  `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` is set. 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a
+  space while `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set and `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` is not.
+- `SWW_MODE` (default `enforce`): `enforce` or `observe`.
+- `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` (default `64`): the prefix length of an IPv6 client's
+  group, from 32 to 128.
+- `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` (default `20000`): the most clients kept, a whole
+  number above zero.
+- `SWW_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): how many of its own bans `discriminator`
+  keeps, a whole number above zero.
+
+## Tokens
+
+- `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for the ban endpoints and
+  `/_sww/clients/<ip>`. At least 32 characters.
+- `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for `/_sww/metrics`. At least
+  32 characters.
+
+## State files
+
+- `SWW_STATE_DIR` (default `/var/lib/sww`): the directory of the state files, an
+  absolute path that exists and can be written.
+- `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` (default `10s`): how long `bans.json` waits to be
+  written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. A duration.
+- `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` (default `15m`): how often every state file is
+  written. A duration.
+
+## Logging
+
+- `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` (default `info`): the least severe of `discriminator`'s own
+  messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`.
+- `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` (default
+  `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range`): the
+  request headers recorded in the log line, in either case. `Host` and
+  `Transfer-Encoding` are refused; the host is the field `host`.
+- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` (default unset): a syslog server that also gets every
+  line written to stdout: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://`,
+  each with a host and a port and nothing more.
+- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` (default unset): a file of PEM certificates that
+  a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own.
+  A file that cannot be read, or holds no certificate, is refused.
+- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` (default `10000`): the most lines held while they wait
+  to be sent, a whole number above zero.
+- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` (default `local0`): the syslog facility: `kern`,
+  `user`, `mail`, `daemon`, `auth`, `syslog`, `lpr`, `news`, `uucp`, `cron`,
+  `authpriv`, `ftp`, or `local0` to `local7`.
+- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` (default: `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME`): the app name in each
+  syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space.
+
+## Metrics
+
+- `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` (default `50`): how many AS numbers and how many countries
+  get series of their own. A whole number above zero.
+
+## Static lists
+
+- `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` (default empty): netblocks you trust, such as your monitoring
+  (see step 4 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
+- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are
+  exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits.
+- `SWW_DENY_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are refused (see step
+  4 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
+
+## Request rate limits, per client
+
+The request past one of these limits is refused, and the client is banned.
+
+- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a
+  client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
+  person opening two pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files each.
+- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `1500`): the most requests a client may
+  make in an hour. A count or `off`. It is the main limit against scrapers. A
+  person reading a site for an hour, a page every 20 seconds, makes about 900. A
+  scraper making one request every 2 seconds makes 1,800 an hour, more than the
+  limit.
+- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `6000`): the most requests a client may make
+  in a day. A count or `off`. The default is four hours at the hour limit. A
+  scraper making one request every 10 seconds makes 8,640 a day, more than the
+  limit.
+- A CI runner asks its code forge for work all day and can pass the limits. Put
+  the runners' addresses in `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`. Do the same for a
+  network where many people share one address, such as an office.
+- Counting cannot catch a client that stays under all three limits (see "Request
+  rate limits, per client" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
+- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes exempt from rate
+  limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`.
+
+## Byte limits, per client
+
+These count body bytes, never headers. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
+counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. The bytes
+counted for a request and its response are added to the client's total once the
+response has ended. The request that takes a client's total past a limit is not
+cut off; the client is banned.
+
+- `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
+  (default `50G`) and `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes
+  counted for a client in each window, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says
+  which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that
+  passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response
+  ends.
+- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): what the byte limits and the byte anomaly
+  thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the
+  visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
+  counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
+
+## Lookup of AS number and country
+
+- `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` (default `geojs`): `geojs`, `file` or `off`. `off` stops
+  the start while a setting that needs a lookup is set:
+    - `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES`;
+    - `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`;
+    - `SWW_TAG_DENY` or `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` naming a `country=` tag, or an
+      `asn=` tag while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is unset;
+    - the two byte percentage lists and `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`;
+    - `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` below `100`;
+    - an anomaly threshold per AS number.
+- `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` (default empty): the IPinfo Lite database file, in its
+  `.mmdb` form, for `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file`.
+- `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` (default `800ms`): how long a request waits for its
+  client's first answer from GeoJS, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. A
+  duration; never `off`.
+- `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` (default `false`): `true` has `rproxy` pass the app
+  the client's AS number in `X-Client-ASN` and its country in
+  `X-Client-Country`.
+
+## Country list
+
+- `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): when set, the only
+  countries whose clients get through, such as `us,de`. A country whose
+  `country=` tag is in `SWW_TAG_DENY` stops the start.
+
+## Request tags
+
+Every request gets tags from what `discriminator` knows of its client. See
+"Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md).
+
+- `SWW_TAG_LISTS` (default empty): address lists that each add a tag, as
+  `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. A name is the
+  tag, and may hold `=`, such as `vpn=mullvad`. Each list is an `http` or
+  `https` URL fetched like a blocklist. A name or URL listed twice is refused.
+  So is a URL that is also in `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS`, `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`,
+  or the CrowdSec decision list.
+- `SWW_TAG_DENY` (default empty): tags whose requests are refused, such as
+  `torexit,country=CN`. A tag listed twice, an `asn=` tag without a number, or a
+  `country=` tag without a country, is refused.
+- `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default empty): tags that lower a client's limits, as
+  tag and percentage pairs, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`. A percentage is from
+  `1` to `99`, of every rate limit and byte limit. The lowest percentage among a
+  client's tags applies. A tag listed twice is refused. So is
+  `exploitsignature`: a request gets that tag after the rate limits have counted
+  it.
+
+- `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` (default unset): the `http` or `https` URL of a
+  routewatch instance. [routewatch](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/routewatch) is a
+  service that gives an address's announced netblock and origin AS.
+  `discriminator` asks it about each client, in the background, and adds the
+  tags `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>` from its answer. While it is
+  unset, nothing asks routewatch and no request gets a `prefix=` tag.
+
+`SWW_TAG_DENY` and `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` accept tags in either case. A tag
+that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
+
+- a name in `SWW_TAG_LISTS`;
+- an `asn=` or `country=` tag;
+- a `prefix=` tag with a netblock, while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set. It matches
+  only that exact announced netblock, such as `prefix=192.0.2.0/24`;
+- a `dnsbl=` tag of a zone in `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES`, in lower case, with a key
+  masked as the `reputation` field shows it;
+- `abuseipdb`, while `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` is set;
+- `exploitsignature`, in `SWW_TAG_DENY` only, while `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` is
+  `true`, or while neither `SWW_WAF_MODE` nor `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` is
+  `off`.
+
+`crowdsec` stops the start in both settings, because a CrowdSec decision refuses
+the request first.
+
+## Biased thresholds
+
+- `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` and `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` (default empty): a
+  percentage of the byte limits alone, for the AS numbers or countries listed,
+  such as `AS14061:50` or `cn:25`. It takes the place of the percentage
+  `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` gives their `asn=` or `country=` tag. An AS number or
+  country listed twice is refused.
+- `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default `100`): the percentage for a client the
+  lookup cannot place.
+- `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` (default unset): the `http` or `https` URL of a
+  text file with one AS number and percentage on each line, such as
+  `AS64496:50`. Each entry counts like an `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT`.
+  A URL that is also in `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` is refused.
+
+## Attack detection
+
+- `SWW_RULES_DIR` (default `/etc/sww/rules.d`): the directory of the rule files.
+- `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` (default `true`): `false` reads no rule file.
+- `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` (default empty): paths only scanners ask for, such as
+  `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`. Each starts with `/` and holds no `?`.
+- `SWW_WAF_MODE` (default `block`): `off`, `detect` or `block`.
+- `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` (default `1`): the Core Rule Set's paranoia level,
+  from 1 to 4.
+- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` (default `5`): the score at which a request is a
+  match. A whole number above zero, or `off`.
+- `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` (default
+  `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140`): the ids of Core Rule Set rules
+  to switch off. Each a whole number above zero. An id from 900000 to 900999 is
+  refused: those are the rules that set the Core Rule Set up, and
+  `smallwebwaf`'s own.
+- `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes the Core Rule Set does
+  not inspect.
+- `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` (default `off`): `off`, or how much of a request body the
+  Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `64K`. A question carries no more of a
+  body than 64 KiB, and the Core Rule Set reads at most 64 KiB less one byte of
+  it, whatever the value (see "The answer" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
+- `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` (default unset): a file of Core Rule Set
+  exclusions, written as Coraza directives. It is loaded before the Core Rule
+  Set's rules, so it holds only `SecAction` and `SecRule` lines that exclude
+  with `ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById` or `ctl:ruleRemoveById`. A file that cannot be
+  read or does not parse stops the start, whatever `SWW_WAF_MODE` is. So does a
+  file that names a number from 900000 to 900999 outside a comment, alone or in
+  a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
+  such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
+  yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
+- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may get
+  in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or
+  `off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
+
+## Ban lengths, response and scope
+
+- `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` (default `403`): `403`, `429` or `close`.
+- `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` (default `1h`): the ban for a first broken limit. A
+  duration.
+- `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` (default `24h`): the time after a ban ends
+  within which breaking a limit again lengthens the next ban. A duration.
+- `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the longest ban for a broken limit; one
+  that would be longer is permanent. A duration.
+- `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the ban for a first clear sign of
+  attack. A duration.
+- `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` (default `32`): how much a ban on an IPv4 client
+  covers: the prefix length of its netblock, from 0 to 32.
+
+## Reputation
+
+- `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` (default empty): blocklists to fetch, such as
+  `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. Each an `http` or `https` URL
+  without a user or a fragment. A URL listed twice is refused.
+- `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` (default `24h`): how long a list waits after its last
+  try before it is fetched again. A duration of `1h` or more.
+- `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` (default `deny`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`.
+- `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` (default empty): the DNS blocklists to ask, such as
+  `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. Each a DNS name of at most 189 characters. A Spamhaus
+  zone carries its key, as in `<key>.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net`. A zone listed twice
+  is refused, whatever its case or key.
+- `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` (default unset): the resolver to ask the zones through,
+  such as `192.0.2.53` or `[2001:db8::53]:5353`. An IP address with an optional
+  port, 53 when none is given. Unset, the host's resolver is used.
+- `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` (default unset): the key of your AbuseIPDB account. A
+  control character in it is refused.
+- `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` (default `75`): the least abuse confidence score,
+  from 0 to 100, that is a hit.
+- `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` (default `900`): the most checks made in a day, a
+  whole number above zero. AbuseIPDB's free accounts may make 1,000.
+- `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` (default unset): the local API of a CrowdSec engine
+  you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`. An `http` or `https` URL without a
+  user or a fragment; its decision list is at `v1/decisions` under it. Set
+  without the key, it is refused. So is a decision list URL that is also in
+  `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS`, or that is `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`.
+- `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` (default unset): the key the engine gave for
+  `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it. Set without the
+  URL, it is refused.
+- `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` (default `limit:25`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or
+  `log`, for DNS blocklist and AbuseIPDB hits.
+- `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` (default `24h`): how long a zone's verdict or
+  AbuseIPDB's score is used. A duration.
+- `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` (default `2s`): how long a query to a zone or a check
+  with AbuseIPDB may take. A duration.
+
+## Alerting
+
+- `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the webhook that receives each alert
+  as a JSON object. An `http` or `https` URL without a user or a fragment.
+- `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` (default empty): headers sent with each post, such
+  as `Authorization:Bearer 0123456789abcdef`. A list of name, `:` and value. A
+  value cannot hold a comma.
+- `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the Slack incoming webhook that
+  receives each alert as a message, checked as the webhook URL is.
+- `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` (default unset): the ntfy topic that receives each alert,
+  as the topic's full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`, checked as the
+  webhook URL is.
+- `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` (default unset): an ntfy access token. A control
+  character in it is refused.
+- `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` (default
+  `ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error`):
+  the event types alerts are sent for, from those in [`alerts.md`](alerts.md)
+  but `summary`. Any other name is refused.
+- `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` (default `15m`): how long after an alert is sent its
+  repeats are held back. A duration or `off`.
+- `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` (default `60`): the most alerts sent in an hour. A
+  whole number above zero, or `off`.
+
+## Anomaly thresholds
+
+Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most body bytes
+counted in a minute and in an hour. The bytes are those `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names.
+Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by default. The four
+thresholds per client are:
+
+- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`;
+- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`;
+- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`;
+- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR`.
+
+The other scopes' names have another prefix before the same four endings, such
+as `REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`:
+
+- `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_...`: per netblock around a client. Two settings give the
+  netblock's length:
+    - `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` (default `24`, from 0 to 32) for an IPv4
+      client;
+    - `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` (default `48`, from 0 to 128) for an IPv6
+      client.
+- `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_...`: per AS number.
+- `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_...`: the whole service.
+- `SWW_WATCH_...`: each netblock in `SWW_WATCH_NETS`, as a whole.
+  `SWW_WATCH_NETS` (default empty) is a list of name, `=` and netblock, such as
+  `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. An item without `=` or a
+  name, or with a bad netblock, is refused. So is a name used twice.
+
+## Settings given as files
+
+To give a token as a file, as "Tokens" under "Deployment" in
+[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) describes, make the file on the host:
+
+```sh
+mkdir -p /srv/app/tokens
+openssl rand -hex 32 > /srv/app/tokens/metrics
+chown 65532:65532 /srv/app/tokens/metrics
+chmod 0400 /srv/app/tokens/metrics
+```
+
+Then mount its directory into the container read-only, and name the file:
+
+```sh
+docker run \
+    -v /srv/app/tokens:/etc/sww/tokens:ro \
+    -e SWW_COMMAND=discriminator \
+    -e SWW_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE=/etc/sww/tokens/metrics \
+    ...
+```
+
+## Fixed limits
+
+A few limits are fixed rather than settings:
+
+- at most 100,000 GeoJS answers are kept;
+- at most 100,000 DNS blocklist verdicts and 100,000 AbuseIPDB scores are kept;
+- at most 1,000 DNS blocklist queries are under way at once;
+- at most 20,000 anomaly counters are kept;
+- each alert destination's queue holds at most 1,000 alerts;
+- `discriminator` holds at most 10,000 answered requests awaiting their reports;
+- `discriminator` refuses a request with more than 50 cookies or more than 100
+  header fields (see "Answering in time" under "`discriminator`" in
+  [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md));
+- `rproxy` takes a request line and headers of at most 32 KiB, and closes a
+  kept-open connection idle for 120 seconds;
+- `rproxy` reads at most 1 MiB of the body of `discriminator`'s answer, and
+  answers `502` to a longer one.
+
+## `discriminator`'s answer and `rproxy`'s wait
+
+`SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` is the longest a question waits on an outside source. Keep
+it well under `rproxy`'s `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, as the default is. No question waits
+for `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT`, since the DNS blocklists and AbuseIPDB are asked
+in the background (see "Answering in time" under "`discriminator`" in
+[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
+
+## `rproxy`
+
+`sww rproxy` reads the settings below and no others. They are read once at
+start, and an invalid value stops the start. None can be given as a file, since
+`rproxy` never touches disk. "`rproxy`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says what
+they do.
+
+A time here is a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as `2000`.
+
+- `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` (required, no default): `discriminator`'s URL. An `http` or
+  `https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more. `rproxy`
+  speaks HTTP/1.1 to it.
+- `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long `rproxy` waits for
+  `discriminator`'s answer, to a question and to a report. A time; never `off`.
+- `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` (default `allow`): what is done with a request when
+  `discriminator` cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not
+  answer within `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`. `allow` passes it to the app, and `deny`
+  answers `503`. It does not apply to an answer `discriminator` gives, such as
+  an error.
+- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` (default `100M`): the largest request body. A size or
+  `off`.
+- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` (default `1G`): the largest response body. A size or
+  `off`.
+- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` (default `60000`): how long the visitor may take to
+  send its request line and headers. It then also bounds, from the end of the
+  headers, the time until the app has been sent the whole request. A time or
+  `off`.
+- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` (default `1800000`): how long the answer may take,
+  from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor. A time or
+  `off`.
+- `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `rproxy` listens, such as `:9000`.
+- `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` (default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`): the app. An `http` or
+  `https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more.
+- `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` (default `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`):
+  the netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` is believed. Set but empty, it trusts
+  nothing. A client outside these netblocks cannot claim another address. Where
+  other containers reach `rproxy` directly, or visitors on a private network
+  reach traefik, they can name another address in the header. Narrowing the
+  setting to traefik's own network closes that gap.
+
+## The image's command
+
+`SWW_COMMAND` (default `rproxy`) chooses what the image runs and what its health
+check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator` (see "Deployment" in
+[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). It cannot be given as a file.
+
+## Where earlier settings went
+
+Nothing reads these names any more:
+
+- `SWW_UPSTREAM_URL` is `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`.
+- `SWW_TRUSTED_PROXIES` is `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
+- `SWW_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` is `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE`.
+- `SWW_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` is `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE`.
+- `SWW_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` are
+  `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
+- `SWW_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` are
+  `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
+- `SWW_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES` have no
+  setting. `rproxy` closes a kept-open connection idle for 120 seconds, and
+  takes a request line and headers of at most 32 KiB.
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+# State files
+
+The five JSON files in `SWW_STATE_DIR`, and what each holds. "Persistent state"
+in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how they are written, read and edited. Each has
+a top-level `version` of 1.
+
+## `bans.json`
+
+Active and past bans: every ban an admin made, and up to `SWW_MAX_BANS` of those
+`discriminator` made. Per entry:
+
+- `netblock`, `start` and `expires` (`null` for a permanent ban);
+- `cause`: `attack`, `limit`, `admin` or `crowdsec`;
+- `reason`: a short reason;
+- `lifted`: when an admin lifted it, if one did;
+- `notes`: the notes below.
+
+An entry an admin adds needs `netblock`, `start` and `expires`; `reason`,
+`notes` and `cause` may be left out, and the cause is then `admin`:
+
+```json
+{
+    "version": 1,
+    "bans": [
+        {
+            "netblock": "203.0.113.0/24",
+            "start": "2026-10-06T12:00:00Z",
+            "expires": null,
+            "reason": "probes for logins"
+        }
+    ]
+}
+```
+
+"Bans" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how an edit lifts, keeps or forgets a
+ban. The notes:
+
+- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`: the client's, added when the lookup answers
+  (empty when lookups are off);
+- for a broken limit, `kind` (`requests`, `bytes` or `refusals`), `limit`,
+  `window` and `count`: what the limit was on, the limit, its window and the
+  count reached;
+- `limit_percent` and `limit_percent_setting`: the client's percentage of that
+  limit and the setting that gave it, when a setting lowered it;
+- for a clear sign of attack, `rule_id` and `target`, or `trap_path`;
+- `reputation`: the sources the client was on, each with its `source` and, for
+  AbuseIPDB, its `score`;
+- `request`: the request that caused the ban, each text cut to 256 bytes:
+    - `time`, `method` and `host`;
+    - `path`, with its query string;
+    - `status` and `user_agent`;
+- `requests` and `refused`: the netblock's requests since it was first seen, and
+  how many this ban has refused so far, kept up to date while the ban lasts;
+- `earlier_bans`: how many earlier bans the netblock had, by cause.
+
+## `clients.json`
+
+Per client, one per line: its minute, hour and day counters, and its history
+since it was first seen:
+
+- the first and last time seen;
+- the AS number, AS name and country last looked up, and when;
+- total requests, and how many were forwarded and how many refused;
+- body bytes of its requests, and of the responses it was sent;
+- responses by status class;
+- offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and
+  `blocked_by_core_rule_set`. A file may also hold `token_refused`, which is
+  kept, and which nothing adds to.
+
+## `lookups.json`
+
+GeoJS answers, one per line:
+
+- `client`;
+- `asn`, `as_name` and `country`;
+- `answered`: when GeoJS answered;
+- `used`: when the answer was last used.
+
+## `reputation.json`
+
+- the last good copy of each list fetched from a URL, with when it was last
+  tried;
+- each DNS blocklist verdict still in use;
+- AbuseIPDB's scores, and the checks spent today.
+
+## `alerts.json`
+
+- the anomaly counters;
+- the alert cooldowns: for each event and netblock, source, file or anomaly
+  scope, when it was last sent and the count of repeats held back since;
+- the alerts sent and held back in the current hour;
+- the alerts waiting for each destination.
+
+## Sizes
+
+- `clients.json`: about 1 KiB per client, about 20 MiB at the default
+  `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`. Written every 15 minutes, that is under 2 GiB of
+  disk writes a day.
+- `bans.json`: about 1.2 KiB per ban, at most about 2.5 KiB, so about 6 MiB at
+  the default `SWW_MAX_BANS`. Written every 15 minutes, a full file comes to
+  about 600 MiB of writes a day, and a hundred new bans a day add about 600 MiB
+  more.
+- `lookups.json`: about 150 bytes per answer, under 1.5 GiB of writes a day when
+  full.
+- `reputation.json` and `alerts.json`: usually a few MiB or less.
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 // Package alerts sends alerts on bans, on traffic over an anomaly
 // threshold, on a source that fails and on a file with an error to each
 // destination set: to the webhook
-// SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names, each as one JSON object, as the "Alert
-// webhook schema" section of SPEC.md describes, to the Slack incoming
-// webhook SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names, as a message, and to the
-// ntfy topic SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL names. A repeat within
-// SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN is held back, and so is an alert past
-// SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary. The others wait in a
+// SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names, each as one JSON object, as "The JSON
+// object" in docs/alerts.md describes, to the Slack incoming
+// webhook SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names, as a message, and to the
+// ntfy topic SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL names. A repeat within
+// SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN is held back, and so is an alert past
+// SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary. The others wait in a
 // bounded queue of each destination's own, so that a destination that is
 // slow or unreachable holds up neither the others nor any request. The
 // state is written to alerts.json and read from it by the state package.
@@ -34,45 +34,45 @@ import (
 	"time"
 )

-// The events an alert is for, as SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS names them.
+// The events an alert is for, as SWW_ALERT_EVENTS names them.
 const (
-	// EventBan is a ban smallwebwaf made.
+	// EventBan is a ban sww made.
 	EventBan = "ban"
-	// EventPermanentBan is a permanent ban smallwebwaf made, or a ban it
+	// EventPermanentBan is a permanent ban sww made, or a ban it
 	// made permanent.
 	EventPermanentBan = "permanent_ban"
 	// EventAnomaly is a count of requests or bytes over an anomaly
 	// threshold.
 	EventAnomaly = "anomaly"
-	// EventWAFBlock is a request the Core Rule Set scored at or over
-	// SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, refused in block mode, let through in
+	// EventCoreRuleSetMatch is a request the Core Rule Set scored at or over
+	// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, refused in block mode, let through in
 	// detect mode.
-	EventWAFBlock = "waf_block"
+	EventCoreRuleSetMatch = "core_rule_set_match"
 	// EventReputationHit is a request whose client a blocklist, the
 	// CrowdSec decision list or a DNSBL zone lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score
 	// is a hit.
 	EventReputationHit = "reputation_hit"
-	// EventSourceFailure is GeoJS failing or refusing smallwebwaf, a fetch
+	// EventSourceFailure is GeoJS failing or refusing sww, a fetch
 	// of a list failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB
 	// failing or refused, or the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
 	EventSourceFailure = "source_failure"
-	// EventFileError is a rule file or state file edited while smallwebwaf
+	// EventFileError is a rule file or state file edited while sww
 	// runs that does not parse, a replacement of the lookup database that
 	// cannot be read, or a state file that cannot be written.
 	EventFileError = "file_error"
 	// EventSummary is the summary sent as an hour ends: of the alerts held
-	// back in it past SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, and of the repeats held
+	// back in it past SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, and of the repeats held
 	// back by the cooldowns dropped as it ends, which no alert let through
-	// has given. It is sent with SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR off too, for
-	// those repeats. SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS does not name it.
+	// has given. It is sent with SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR off too, for
+	// those repeats. SWW_ALERT_EVENTS does not name it.
 	EventSummary = "summary"
 )

-// Events returns every event SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS can name, which is its
+// Events returns every event SWW_ALERT_EVENTS can name, which is its
 // default.
 func Events() []string {
 	return []string{
-		EventBan, EventPermanentBan, EventWAFBlock, EventAnomaly,
+		EventBan, EventPermanentBan, EventCoreRuleSetMatch, EventAnomaly,
 		EventReputationHit, EventSourceFailure, EventFileError,
 	}
 }
@@ -80,12 +80,12 @@ func Events() []string {
 // The destinations alerts are sent to, as the metrics and alerts.json
 // name them.
 const (
-	// DestinationWebhook is the webhook SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names.
+	// DestinationWebhook is the webhook SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names.
 	DestinationWebhook = "webhook"
 	// DestinationSlack is the Slack incoming webhook
-	// SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names.
+	// SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names.
 	DestinationSlack = "slack"
-	// DestinationNtfy is the ntfy topic SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL names.
+	// DestinationNtfy is the ntfy topic SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL names.
 	DestinationNtfy = "ntfy"
 )

@@ -121,26 +121,26 @@ var (
 // NtfyURL set, no alert is sent.
 type Params struct {
 	// WebhookURL is where each alert is posted as JSON
-	// (SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset. WebhookHeaders
-	// are sent with each (SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS).
+	// (SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset. WebhookHeaders
+	// are sent with each (SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS).
 	WebhookURL     *url.URL
 	WebhookHeaders http.Header
 	// SlackURL is the Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a
-	// message (SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset.
+	// message (SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset.
 	SlackURL *url.URL
 	// NtfyURL is the ntfy topic each alert is published to
-	// (SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL), nil while it is unset. NtfyToken, unless
-	// empty, is sent with each as a bearer token (SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN).
+	// (SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL), nil while it is unset. NtfyToken, unless
+	// empty, is sent with each as a bearer token (SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN).
 	NtfyURL   *url.URL
 	NtfyToken string
-	// Events are the events alerts are sent for (SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS).
+	// Events are the events alerts are sent for (SWW_ALERT_EVENTS).
 	Events []string
 	// Cooldown is how long a repeat of an alert is held back
-	// (SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN), 0 for no time. MaxPerHour is the most alerts
-	// sent in an hour (SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR), 0 for no limit.
+	// (SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN), 0 for no time. MaxPerHour is the most alerts
+	// sent in an hour (SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR), 0 for no limit.
 	Cooldown   time.Duration
 	MaxPerHour int
-	// Instance is SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME, which every alert gives.
+	// Instance is SWW_INSTANCE_NAME, which every alert gives.
 	Instance string
 	// Now tells the time of an alert, normally time.Now in UTC.
 	Now func() time.Time
@@ -149,15 +149,17 @@ type Params struct {
 }

 // Alert is one alert, as the webhook is sent it and alerts.json holds it,
-// with the fields of the "Alert webhook schema" section of SPEC.md. ASN,
-// ASName and Country are, for a ban, the client's as the ban's notes give
-// them.
+// with the fields of "The JSON object" in docs/alerts.md. ASN, ASName and
+// Country are, for a ban, the client's as the ban's notes give them. Host is
+// the site of the request that raised the alert, while one discriminator serves
+// many sites, and "" otherwise.
 //
-//nolint:tagliatelle // SPEC.md's alert webhook schema names its fields in snake_case
+//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/alerts.md names the alert's fields in snake_case
 type Alert struct {
 	Instance string       `json:"instance"`
 	Time     time.Time    `json:"time"`
 	Event    string       `json:"event"`
+	Host     string       `json:"host,omitempty"`
 	Client   netip.Addr   `json:"client"`
 	Netblock netip.Prefix `json:"netblock"`
 	ASN      string       `json:"asn"`
@@ -218,7 +220,7 @@ type State struct {
 // requests to it failed, and how many alerts were dropped from its full
 // queue or given up as it refused them.
 type Counts struct {
-	Sent, Failed, Dropped int64
+	Sent, SendFailures, Dropped int64
 }

 // Queue takes the alerts raised, holds back those it must, and sends the
@@ -262,7 +264,7 @@ type destination struct {
 	// waiting are the alerts waiting to be sent, oldest first.
 	waiting []*Alert

-	sent, failed, dropped atomic.Int64
+	sent, sendFailures, dropped atomic.Int64
 }

 // cooldownKey is what makes an alert a repeat of another: the same event
@@ -299,17 +301,17 @@ func New(params Params) *Queue {
 	}

 	if params.WebhookURL != nil {
-		q.addDestination(DestinationWebhook, "SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL",
+		q.addDestination(DestinationWebhook, "SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL",
 			params.WebhookURL, q.webhookMessage)
 	}

 	if params.SlackURL != nil {
-		q.addDestination(DestinationSlack, "SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL",
+		q.addDestination(DestinationSlack, "SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL",
 			params.SlackURL, slackMessage)
 	}

 	if params.NtfyURL != nil {
-		q.addDestination(DestinationNtfy, "SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL",
+		q.addDestination(DestinationNtfy, "SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL",
 			params.NtfyURL, q.ntfyMessage)
 	}

@@ -317,7 +319,7 @@ func New(params Params) *Queue {
 }

 // Raise sends alert, which names its event and what is particular to it,
-// unless no destination is set or SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS leaves its event
+// unless no destination is set or SWW_ALERT_EVENTS leaves its event
 // out. It gives alert the instance and the time. An alert that repeats
 // the last one let through less than Cooldown before is held back and
 // counted. The next one let through gives that count, unless an hour of
@@ -361,7 +363,7 @@ func (q *Queue) Raise(alert Alert) {
 }

 // WouldSend reports whether Raise would let an alert for event on
-// netblock through now: a destination is set, SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS chooses
+// netblock through now: a destination is set, SWW_ALERT_EVENTS chooses
 // event, no alert for event on netblock was let through less than
 // Cooldown before, and fewer than MaxPerHour alerts have been let through
 // in the hour under way. Unlike Raise, it counts nothing.
@@ -424,7 +426,9 @@ func (q *Queue) Counts(name string) Counts {
 	for _, d := range q.destinations {
 		if d.name == name {
 			return Counts{
-				Sent: d.sent.Load(), Failed: d.failed.Load(), Dropped: d.dropped.Load(),
+				Sent:         d.sent.Load(),
+				SendFailures: d.sendFailures.Load(),
+				Dropped:      d.dropped.Load(),
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -604,13 +608,13 @@ func (q *Queue) endHour(now time.Time) {

 	if heldBack > 0 {
 		reasons = append(reasons, fmt.Sprintf("%d alerts held back in the hour from %s, "+
-			"past the %d an hour SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows", heldBack,
+			"past the %d an hour SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows", heldBack,
 			q.hour.Start.Format(time.RFC3339), q.params.MaxPerHour))
 	}

 	if repeats > 0 {
 		reasons = append(reasons, fmt.Sprintf("%d repeats held back by "+
-			"SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives", repeats))
+			"SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives", repeats))
 	}

 	if len(reasons) > 0 {
@@ -673,7 +677,7 @@ func (d *destination) run(ctx context.Context) {
 				retryAt = time.Time{}
 			case errors.Is(err, errRefused):
 				d.remove(alert)
-				d.failed.Add(1)
+				d.sendFailures.Add(1)
 				d.dropped.Add(1)

 				retryDelay = 0
@@ -681,8 +685,8 @@ func (d *destination) run(ctx context.Context) {

 				d.processLog.Warn("gave up an alert "+d.setting+" refused",
 					"event", alert.Event, "error", err.Error())
-			case ctx.Err() == nil: // not cut off as smallwebwaf stops
-				d.failed.Add(1)
+			case ctx.Err() == nil: // not cut off as sww stops
+				d.sendFailures.Add(1)

 				retryDelay = min(max(retryDelayFactor*retryDelay, firstRetryDelay),
 					maxRetryDelay)
@@ -869,7 +873,7 @@ func ntfyPriority(event string) string {
 		return "high"
 	case EventReputationHit:
 		return "low"
-	default: // ban, waf_block and summary
+	default: // ban, core_rule_set_match and summary
 		return "default"
 	}
 }
@@ -880,7 +884,7 @@ func ntfyTag(event string) string {
 	switch event {
 	case EventBan, EventPermanentBan:
 		return "no_entry"
-	case EventWAFBlock:
+	case EventCoreRuleSetMatch:
 		return "shield"
 	case EventAnomaly:
 		return "chart_with_upwards_trend"
@@ -900,12 +904,16 @@ func title(alert *Alert) string {
 }

 // text returns the text of alert in Slack and ntfy: its reason, then a
-// line for each of its client, netblock and country, the file, source,
-// error and mode its detail gives, and its suppressed repeats, that it
-// has.
+// line for each of its host, client, netblock and country, the file,
+// source, error and mode its detail gives, and its suppressed repeats, that
+// it has.
 func text(alert *Alert) string {
 	lines := []string{alert.Reason}

+	if alert.Host != "" {
+		lines = append(lines, "host: "+alert.Host)
+	}
+
 	if alert.Client.IsValid() {
 		lines = append(lines, "client: "+alert.Client.String())
 	}
@@ -34,12 +34,12 @@ const (
 	// webhookURL is where the alerts are posted, slackURL the Slack
 	// incoming webhook, and ntfyURL the ntfy topic. ntfyToken is the ntfy
 	// token of the tests that set one.
-	webhookURL = "https://alerts.example/smallwebwaf?team=ops"
+	webhookURL = "https://alerts.example/sww?team=ops"
 	slackURL   = "https://hooks.slack.example/services/T0123/B4567/abcdef"
-	ntfyURL    = "https://ntfy.example/smallwebwaf-alerts"
+	ntfyURL    = "https://ntfy.example/sww-alerts"
 	ntfyToken  = "tk_0123456789abcdefghijklmnopq"
 	// instance is the instance name every alert gives.
-	instance = "fsn1app1/gitea"
+	instance = "fsn1app1/blog"
 	// started is when each test starts, as an alert gives it, and
 	// anHourOn an hour later.
 	started  = "2000-01-01T00:00:00Z"
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ func TestWouldSendOnlyForTheChosenEvents(t *testing.T) {

 	if q.WouldSend(alerts.EventBan, netblock(1)) ||
 		q.WouldSend(alerts.EventPermanentBan, netblock(1)) {
-		t.Error("a ban alert would be sent, though SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS leaves it out")
+		t.Error("a ban alert would be sent, though SWW_ALERT_EVENTS leaves it out")
 	}

 	if !q.WouldSend(alerts.EventFileError, netip.Prefix{}) {
@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ func TestWouldSendWithOnlySlackOrOnlyNtfySet(t *testing.T) {
 	onlyNtfy.NtfyURL = parseURL(ntfyURL)

 	for setting, params := range map[string]alerts.Params{
-		"SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL": onlySlack,
-		"SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL":          onlyNtfy,
+		"SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL": onlySlack,
+		"SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL":          onlyNtfy,
 	} {
 		if !alerts.New(params).WouldSend(alerts.EventBan, netblock(1)) {
 			t.Errorf("a ban alert would not be sent with only %s set", setting)
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ func TestAlertsPastTheHourlyLimitAreRolledIntoOneSummary(t *testing.T) {
 			"as_name":  "",
 			"country":  "",
 			"reason": "3 alerts held back in the hour from 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z, " +
-				"past the 2 an hour SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows",
+				"past the 2 an hour SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows",
 			"detail": map[string]any{
 				"hour":  started,
 				"count": float64(3),
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ func TestFailedRequestIsSentAgainWithBackoff(t *testing.T) {
 		wantCounts(t, q, 0, int64(len(want)), 0, 0)

 		if !strings.Contains(log.String(),
-			`"msg":"sending an alert to SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) {
+			`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) {
 			t.Errorf("process log %q names no failure", log.String())
 		}

@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ func TestRefusedAlertIsGivenUpAndTheNextSent(t *testing.T) {
 		wantCounts(t, q, 1, 3, 0, 1)

 		if !strings.Contains(log.String(),
-			`"msg":"gave up an alert SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL refused"`) {
+			`"msg":"gave up an alert SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL refused"`) {
 			t.Errorf("process log %q names no alert given up", log.String())
 		}
 	})
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ func TestFailedRequestIsLoggedWithoutTheURL(t *testing.T) {

 		logged := log.String()
 		if !strings.Contains(logged,
-			`"msg":"sending an alert to SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
+			`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
 			strings.Contains(logged, "alerts.example") || strings.Contains(logged, "team=ops") {
 			t.Errorf("process log %q names no failure, or names the URL", logged)
 		}
@@ -782,8 +782,8 @@ func TestSlackAndNtfyAreSentTheSummaryAndTheRepeatsHeldBack(t *testing.T) {
 		}

 		const summary = "1 alerts held back in the hour from 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z, " +
-			"past the 1 an hour SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows; 1 repeats held back " +
-			"by SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives\nsuppressed repeats: 1"
+			"past the 1 an hour SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows; 1 repeats held back " +
+			"by SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives\nsuppressed repeats: 1"

 		wantSlackMessage(t, slack[1], "*"+instance+": summary*\n"+summary)
 		wantNtfyMessage(t, ntfy[1], instance+": summary", "default bar_chart", summary)
@@ -897,11 +897,11 @@ func TestDestinationThatDoesNotAnswerHoldsUpNeitherOther(t *testing.T) {
 		synctest.Wait()

 		wantDestinationCounts(t, q, alerts.DestinationSlack,
-			alerts.Counts{Sent: 3, Failed: 1})
+			alerts.Counts{Sent: 3, SendFailures: 1})

 		logged := log.String()
 		if !strings.Contains(logged,
-			`"msg":"sending an alert to SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
+			`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
 			strings.Contains(logged, "hooks.slack.example") ||
 			strings.Contains(logged, "T0123") {
 			t.Errorf("process log %q names no failure, or names the URL", logged)
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ func TestDropsAreCountedForEachDestination(t *testing.T) {
 		for destination, want := range map[string]alerts.Counts{
 			alerts.DestinationWebhook: {Sent: all},
 			alerts.DestinationSlack:   {Dropped: 1},
-			alerts.DestinationNtfy:    {Failed: all, Dropped: all},
+			alerts.DestinationNtfy:    {SendFailures: all, Dropped: all},
 		} {
 			wantDestinationCounts(t, q, destination, want)
 		}
@@ -965,8 +965,8 @@ func TestEachDestinationIsSentOnlyTheAlertsWaitingForIt(t *testing.T) {
 		synctest.Wait()

 		wantBodies(t, standIns[alerts.DestinationSlack],
-			`{"text":"*fsn1app1/gitea: file_error*\nsecond"}`,
-			`{"text":"*fsn1app1/gitea: file_error*\nthird"}`)
+			`{"text":"*fsn1app1/blog: file_error*\nsecond"}`,
+			`{"text":"*fsn1app1/blog: file_error*\nthird"}`)
 		wantBodies(t, standIns[alerts.DestinationNtfy], "fourth")

 		// alerts.json then lists Slack and ntfy alone, with no alert waiting.
@@ -1223,12 +1223,12 @@ func wantEvents(t *testing.T, webhook *standIn, want ...string) {
 // requests to it that it counts as failed, the alerts it counts as held
 // back, and those it counts as dropped for the webhook.
 func wantCounts(
-	t *testing.T, q *alerts.Queue, sent, failed, suppressed, dropped int64,
+	t *testing.T, q *alerts.Queue, sent, sendFailures, suppressed, dropped int64,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()

 	wantDestinationCounts(t, q, alerts.DestinationWebhook,
-		alerts.Counts{Sent: sent, Failed: failed, Dropped: dropped})
+		alerts.Counts{Sent: sent, SendFailures: sendFailures, Dropped: dropped})

 	if q.Suppressed() != suppressed {
 		t.Errorf("%d alerts held back, want %d", q.Suppressed(), suppressed)
@@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ type eventMessage struct {
 	title, priorityAndTag, text string
 }

-// anAlertForEachEvent returns an alert for each event SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS
+// anAlertForEachEvent returns an alert for each event SWW_ALERT_EVENTS
 // names, the first in observe mode, each with its message.
 func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 	return []eventMessage{
@@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 				Reason: "requests per hour over the limit of 10000",
 				Detail: map[string]any{"mode": "observe"},
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/gitea: ban", "default no_entry",
+			"fsn1app1/blog: ban", "default no_entry",
 			"requests per hour over the limit of 10000\nclient: 203.0.113.9\n" +
 				"netblock: 203.0.113.0/24\ncountry: DE\nmode: observe",
 		},
@@ -1275,25 +1275,27 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 				Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.7/32"), Country: "FR",
 				Reason: "matched the rule env-file",
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/gitea: permanent_ban", "high no_entry",
+			"fsn1app1/blog: permanent_ban", "high no_entry",
 			"matched the rule env-file\nclient: 198.51.100.7\n" +
 				"netblock: 198.51.100.7/32\ncountry: FR",
 		},
 		{
 			alerts.Alert{
-				Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock, Client: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"),
+				Event: alerts.EventCoreRuleSetMatch, Client: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"),
 				Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32"),
 				Reason:   "refused by the Core Rule Set",
+				Host:     "app.example",
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/gitea: waf_block", "default shield",
-			"refused by the Core Rule Set\nclient: 192.0.2.1\nnetblock: 192.0.2.1/32",
+			"fsn1app1/blog: core_rule_set_match", "default shield",
+			"refused by the Core Rule Set\nhost: app.example\nclient: 192.0.2.1\n" +
+				"netblock: 192.0.2.1/32",
 		},
 		{
 			alerts.Alert{
 				Event: alerts.EventAnomaly, Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.0/24"),
 				Reason: "requests per minute over the threshold of 5000",
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/gitea: anomaly", "high chart_with_upwards_trend",
+			"fsn1app1/blog: anomaly", "high chart_with_upwards_trend",
 			"requests per minute over the threshold of 5000\nnetblock: 192.0.2.0/24",
 		},
 		{
@@ -1302,7 +1304,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 				Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.2/32"),
 				Reason:   "listed by a DNS blocklist",
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/gitea: reputation_hit", "low label",
+			"fsn1app1/blog: reputation_hit", "low label",
 			"listed by a DNS blocklist\nclient: 192.0.2.2\nnetblock: 192.0.2.2/32",
 		},
 		{
@@ -1310,7 +1312,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 				Event: alerts.EventSourceFailure, Reason: "asking GeoJS failed",
 				Detail: map[string]any{"source": "geojs"},
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/gitea: source_failure", "high warning",
+			"fsn1app1/blog: source_failure", "high warning",
 			"asking GeoJS failed\nsource: geojs",
 		},
 		{
@@ -1318,12 +1320,12 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 				Event:  alerts.EventFileError,
 				Reason: "a rule file has an error, and the rules stay as they were",
 				Detail: map[string]any{
-					"file": "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/50-app.rules", "error": "line 2: no action",
+					"file": "/etc/sww/rules.d/50-app.rules", "error": "line 2: no action",
 				},
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/gitea: file_error", "high warning",
+			"fsn1app1/blog: file_error", "high warning",
 			"a rule file has an error, and the rules stay as they were\n" +
-				"file: /etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/50-app.rules\nerror: line 2: no action",
+				"file: /etc/sww/rules.d/50-app.rules\nerror: line 2: no action",
 		},
 	}
 }
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 // Package anomaly counts requests and bytes over a minute and an hour, per
 // client, per surrounding netblock, per AS number, for the whole service
 // and per named netblock, and raises an anomaly alert for a count over its
-// threshold, as "Anomaly thresholds" under "Configuration surface" in
-// SPEC.md describes. It refuses and bans nothing. At most 20,000 counters
+// threshold, as "Anomaly thresholds" under "Settings" in SPEC.md
+// describes. It refuses and bans nothing. At most 20,000 counters
 // are kept, in memory, and written to alerts.json and read from it by the
 // state package.
 package anomaly
@@ -28,22 +28,22 @@ const maxCounters = 20000
 // alerts name them.
 const (
 	// ScopeClient is one client: an IPv4 address, or an IPv6 netblock of
-	// SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX.
+	// SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX.
 	ScopeClient = "client"
-	// ScopeNet is the netblock around a client, SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX
-	// or SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX long.
+	// ScopeNet is the netblock around a client, SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX
+	// or SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX long.
 	ScopeNet = "net"
 	// ScopeASN is an AS number.
 	ScopeASN = "asn"
 	// ScopeTotal is the whole service.
 	ScopeTotal = "total"
-	// ScopeWatch is a named netblock of SWWAF_WATCH_NETS.
-	ScopeWatch = "watch"
+	// ScopeWatchedNet is a named netblock of SWW_WATCH_NETS.
+	ScopeWatchedNet = "watched_net"
 )

 // Scopes returns every scope.
 func Scopes() []string {
-	return []string{ScopeClient, ScopeNet, ScopeASN, ScopeTotal, ScopeWatch}
+	return []string{ScopeClient, ScopeNet, ScopeASN, ScopeTotal, ScopeWatchedNet}
 }

 // The windows a counter counts in, as the alerts name them.
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ type Thresholds struct {
 	BytesPerHour      int64
 }

-// NamedNetblock is a netblock SWWAF_WATCH_NETS names.
+// NamedNetblock is a netblock SWW_WATCH_NETS names.
 type NamedNetblock struct {
 	Name     string
 	Netblock netip.Prefix
@@ -70,14 +70,14 @@ type NamedNetblock struct {

 // Params are what New needs.
 type Params struct {
-	// The thresholds of each scope: SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_*,
-	// SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_*, SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_*, SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_* and
-	// SWWAF_WATCH_*.
+	// The thresholds of each scope: SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_*,
+	// SWW_ANOMALY_NET_*, SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_*, SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_* and
+	// SWW_WATCH_*.
 	Client, Net, ASN, Total, Watch Thresholds
 	// NetV4Prefix and NetV6Prefix are the lengths of the netblock around a
-	// client (SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX and SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX).
+	// client (SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX and SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX).
 	NetV4Prefix, NetV6Prefix int
-	// NamedNetblocks are SWWAF_WATCH_NETS.
+	// NamedNetblocks are SWW_WATCH_NETS.
 	NamedNetblocks []NamedNetblock
 	// Alerts receive the anomaly alerts.
 	Alerts *alerts.Queue
@@ -103,15 +103,17 @@ type Counter struct {

 // Request is a request that has ended, as the counters count it.
 type Request struct {
+	// Host is the site the alert names, "" for none.
+	Host string
 	// Client is the client's address, and ClientGroup the client it is
 	// counted as: its IPv4 address, or the IPv6 netblock of
-	// SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX its address is in.
+	// SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX its address is in.
 	Client      netip.Addr
 	ClientGroup netip.Prefix
 	// ASN, ASName and Country are the client's as looked up, each "" when
 	// unknown.
 	ASN, ASName, Country string
-	// Bytes are the request's bytes, as SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT counts them.
+	// Bytes are the request's bytes, as SWW_BYTES_COUNT counts them.
 	Bytes int64
 }

@@ -255,7 +257,7 @@ func (c *Counters) scopesOf(r Request) []scope {
 	for _, named := range p.NamedNetblocks {
 		if named.Netblock.Contains(client) {
 			all = append(all, scope{
-				key{scope: ScopeWatch, netblock: named.Netblock, name: named.Name}, p.Watch,
+				key{scope: ScopeWatchedNet, netblock: named.Netblock, name: named.Name}, p.Watch,
 			})
 		}
 	}
@@ -389,13 +391,14 @@ func alertFor(r Request, k key, o overThreshold) alerts.Alert {
 		detail["asn"] = k.asn
 	case ScopeTotal:
 		counted = "the whole service"
-	default: // watch
+	default: // watched_net
 		counted = "the named netblock " + k.name + ", " + k.netblock.String()
 		detail["name"] = k.name
 	}

 	return alerts.Alert{
 		Event:    alerts.EventAnomaly,
+		Host:     r.Host,
 		Client:   r.Client,
 		Netblock: k.netblock,
 		ASN:      r.ASN,
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ func TestBanWithoutACauseIsAnAdmins(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{{Netblock: netblock, Start: midnight()}})

 	if got := ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Cause; got != bans.CauseAdmin {
@@ -24,16 +24,16 @@ func TestBanWithoutACauseIsAnAdmins(t *testing.T) {
 func TestAdminsBansAreNeverDroppedAndDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	rules := defaultRules()
-	rules.MaxBans = 1
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	params := defaultParams()
+	params.MaxBans = 1
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	adminsOnly := netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")
 	both := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
 	second := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
 	third := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.3/32")

 	// Seen longest ago, a netblock with two of an admin's bans alone, and
-	// then one with an admin's ban before a ban smallwebwaf made: the one
+	// then one with an admin's ban before a ban sww made: the one
 	// ban counted toward MaxBans.
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{
 		{Netblock: adminsOnly, Start: midnight().Add(-3 * time.Hour), Cause: bans.CauseAdmin},
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ func TestAdminsBansAreNeverDroppedAndDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{adminsOnly: 2, both: 2})

-	// A new ban drops the ban smallwebwaf made, and only that one.
+	// A new ban drops the ban sww made, and only that one.
 	ledger.BanForLimit(second, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
 	wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{adminsOnly: 2, both: 1, second: 1})

@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ func TestAdminsBansAreNeverDroppedAndDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
 func TestEarlierBansCountABanDroppedAfterAnAdminsBan(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	rules := defaultRules()
-	rules.MaxBans = 2
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	params := defaultParams()
+	params.MaxBans = 2
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
 	other := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ func TestEarlierBansCountABanDroppedAfterAnAdminsBan(t *testing.T) {
 func TestEarlierBansCountABanAnAdminKeepsOnce(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")

 	// The netblock breaks a limit twice, the second time after its first
@@ -114,10 +114,10 @@ func TestEarlierBansCountABanAnAdminKeepsOnce(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestReasonOfTheBansSmallwebwafMakes(t *testing.T) {
+func TestReasonOfTheBansSwwMakes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())

 	limit, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32"), midnight(),
 		bans.Notes{Kind: "requests", Limit: 1000, Window: "minute"})
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ func TestLiftedBanForALimitRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {
 		Lifted:   midnight().Add(10 * time.Minute),
 	}

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{lifted})

 	// While it would still last, it refuses nothing, and a limit broken
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ func TestLiftedBanForAnAttackRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {

 	// A permanent ban for a clear sign of attack, lifted.
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{{
 		Netblock: netblock,
 		Start:    midnight(),
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ func TestLiftedBanForAnAttackRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {
 func TestLoadEditCountsTheBansAnAdminMade(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	made, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32"), midnight(),
 		bans.Notes{})
 	atStart := bans.Ban{
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ func TestLoadEditCountsTheBansAnAdminMade(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("%d bans made by an admin after the start's, want none", got)
 	}

-	// The admin keeps the ban smallwebwaf made, keeps the one read at the
+	// The admin keeps the ban sww made, keeps the one read at the
 	// start, and adds one without a cause: that one alone is made.
 	kept := made
 	kept.Cause = bans.CauseAdmin
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ func TestAdminsBanIsMadeWhileAnotherLasts(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())

 	// An hour's ban for a broken limit.
 	ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ func TestLiftLiftsEveryActiveBanCoveringTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	wide := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
 	other := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{
 		// Ended an hour ago.
 		{
@@ -341,3 +341,48 @@ func TestLiftLiftsEveryActiveBanCoveringTheClient(t *testing.T) {

 	wantChanged(t, ledger, false)
 }
+
+func TestPermanentBanOnAWiderNetblockIsReturnedOverATemporaryBan(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	client := netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9")
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
+
+	// The temporary ban is made first, so that its netblock is looked at first.
+	ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+	ledger.BanForAdmin(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24"), midnight(), time.Time{},
+		"for good")
+
+	wantPermanentBan(t, ledger, client, midnight().Add(time.Minute))
+}
+
+func TestOlderPermanentBanIsReturnedOverANewerTemporaryBan(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
+
+	ledger.BanForAdmin(netblock, midnight(), time.Time{}, "for good")
+	ledger.BanForAdmin(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), midnight().Add(time.Hour),
+		"for an hour")
+
+	wantPermanentBan(t, ledger, netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(2*time.Minute))
+}
+
+// wantPermanentBan checks that Find and Check return a permanent ban for
+// client at now.
+func wantPermanentBan(
+	t *testing.T, ledger *bans.Ledger, client netip.Addr, now time.Time,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for name, look := range map[string]func(netip.Addr, time.Time) (bans.Ban, bool, bool){
+		"Find":  ledger.Find,
+		"Check": ledger.Check,
+	} {
+		ban, banned, _ := look(client, now)
+		if !banned || !ban.Permanent() {
+			t.Errorf("%s returned %+v and banned %v, want a permanent ban", name, ban, banned)
+		}
+	}
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// Package bans is the ban ledger: the bans smallwebwaf makes on the
+// Package bans is the ban ledger: the bans sww makes on the
 // netblocks of clients that break a rate limit, a byte limit or the error
 // burst, show a clear sign of attack or are listed by the CrowdSec
 // decision list, and
@@ -21,14 +21,14 @@ import (

 // The causes of bans.
 const (
-	// CauseLimit is a ban smallwebwaf made for a broken limit.
+	// CauseLimit is a ban sww made for a broken limit.
 	CauseLimit = "limit"
-	// CauseAttack is a ban smallwebwaf made for a clear sign of attack.
+	// CauseAttack is a ban sww made for a clear sign of attack.
 	CauseAttack = "attack"
-	// CauseAdmin is a ban an admin made, or one smallwebwaf made that an
+	// CauseAdmin is a ban an admin made, or one sww made that an
 	// admin keeps. It is never dropped.
 	CauseAdmin = "admin"
-	// CauseCrowdSec is a ban smallwebwaf made for a client the CrowdSec
+	// CauseCrowdSec is a ban sww made for a client the CrowdSec
 	// decision list lists. It ends when CrowdSec's decision does.
 	CauseCrowdSec = "crowdsec"
 )
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ const repeatFactor = 3
 // maxTextBytes is how much of each text in a ban's notes is kept.
 const maxTextBytes = 256

-// Rules are how long a ban lasts, and how many bans are held.
-type Rules struct {
+// Params are how long a ban lasts, and how many bans are held.
+type Params struct {
 	// LimitBanDuration is how long a first ban for a broken limit lasts.
 	LimitBanDuration time.Duration
 	// LimitBanRepeatWindow is how soon after the end of the netblock's
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ type Ban struct {
 	Expires time.Time
 	// Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack, CauseAdmin or CauseCrowdSec.
 	Cause string
-	// Reason is a short text: for a ban smallwebwaf made, the limit broken,
+	// Reason is a short text: for a ban sww made, the limit broken,
 	// the rule that matched or the scenario of CrowdSec's decision; for an
 	// admin's, what the admin wrote.
 	Reason string
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ type Notes struct {
 	LimitPercentSetting string `json:"limit_percent_setting,omitempty"`
 	// RuleID and Target are, for a ban for a clear sign of attack, the id
 	// of the rule file rule that matched, and its target; TrapPath is, for
-	// one for a request for a path in SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS, that path as the
+	// one for a request for a path in SWW_TRAP_PATHS, that path as the
 	// client sent it.
 	RuleID   string `json:"rule_id,omitempty"`
 	Target   string `json:"target,omitempty"`
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ type Request struct {

 // Ledger holds the bans. It is safe for concurrent use.
 type Ledger struct {
-	rules Rules
+	params Params
 	// changed receives a value when a ban is made, unless one is waiting
 	// already.
 	changed chan struct{}
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ type Ledger struct {
 	// Find make each netblock they find the most recently seen.
 	netblocks *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, *[]Ban]
 	// held is how many bans netblocks holds whose cause is not CauseAdmin,
-	// at most rules.MaxBans.
+	// at most params.MaxBans.
 	held int
 	// made is how many bans have been made since the start, by cause: by
 	// the ledger, and by an admin, through BanForAdmin or in an edit of
@@ -199,13 +199,13 @@ type Ledger struct {
 	// v4Lengths and v6Lengths are the lengths of the IPv4 and IPv6
 	// netblocks that have been banned. Check looks for a ban at each of
 	// them, so that a ban read from bans.json refuses every client in its
-	// netblock even when it was made with another SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX,
+	// netblock even when it was made with another SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX,
 	// or another length of an IPv6 client's netblock.
 	v4Lengths, v6Lengths []int
 }

 // New returns a Ledger with no ban yet.
-func New(rules Rules) *Ledger {
+func New(params Params) *Ledger {
 	// The ledger drops bans itself, and never those whose cause is
 	// CauseAdmin, however many there are, so the LRU has no limit of its
 	// own: it keeps the netblocks in the order they were last seen.
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ func New(rules Rules) *Ledger {
 	}

 	return &Ledger{
-		rules:     rules,
+		params:    params,
 		changed:   make(chan struct{}, 1),
 		netblocks: netblocks,
 		made:      map[string]int{},
@@ -274,16 +274,27 @@ func (l *Ledger) Find(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) (Ban, bool, bool) {

 // activeBan returns the ban in bans, a netblock's bans oldest first, that
 // is active at now, or nil when none is. If several are, it returns the
-// one that started last. Every ban is looked at, since a ban an admin adds
-// to bans.json can start before the netblock's others and outlast them.
+// newest permanent one, or the newest when none is permanent. Every ban is
+// looked at, since a ban an admin adds to bans.json can start before the
+// netblock's others and outlast them.
 func activeBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) *Ban {
+	var newest *Ban
+
 	for i := len(bans) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
-		if bans[i].ActiveAt(now) {
+		if !bans[i].ActiveAt(now) {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if bans[i].Permanent() {
 			return &bans[i]
 		}
+
+		if newest == nil {
+			newest = &bans[i]
+		}
 	}

-	return nil
+	return newest
 }

 // BanForLimit bans netblock at now for a broken limit, with notes, and
@@ -581,7 +592,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) Load(bans []Ban) {
 }

 // LoadEdit is Load for an admin's edit of bans.json, taken in while
-// smallwebwaf runs. Each ban in it whose cause is CauseAdmin, and which
+// sww runs. Each ban in it whose cause is CauseAdmin, and which
 // the ledger did not hold, with the same netblock and start, is one the
 // admin made, and is counted among the bans made.
 func (l *Ledger) LoadEdit(bans []Ban) {
@@ -743,13 +754,16 @@ func (l *Ledger) markChanged() {
 }

 // active returns the ban active at now on a netblock client is in, or
-// nil.
+// nil. If several netblocks have one, it returns a permanent ban when
+// there is one.
 func (l *Ledger) active(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) *Ban {
 	lengths := l.v6Lengths
 	if client.Is4() {
 		lengths = l.v4Lengths
 	}

+	var first *Ban
+
 	for _, length := range lengths {
 		bans, found := l.netblocks.Get(netip.PrefixFrom(client, length).Masked())
 		if !found {
@@ -757,12 +771,20 @@ func (l *Ledger) active(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) *Ban {
 		}

 		ban := activeBan(*bans, now)
-		if ban != nil {
+		if ban == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if ban.Permanent() {
 			return ban
 		}
+
+		if first == nil {
+			first = ban
+		}
 	}

-	return nil
+	return first
 }

 // covering returns the bans of each netblock held that client is in,
@@ -790,7 +812,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) covering(client netip.Addr) []*[]Ban {
 // unless ban's cause is CauseAdmin, which does not count toward MaxBans.
 func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
 	counted := ban.Cause != CauseAdmin
-	if counted && l.held == l.rules.MaxBans {
+	if counted && l.held == l.params.MaxBans {
 		l.dropOne()
 	}

@@ -825,7 +847,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
 // new ban longer. A ban an admin adds to bans.json can start after
 // another and end before it, so that one is looked for among them all.
 func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
-	length := l.rules.LimitBanDuration
+	length := l.params.LimitBanDuration

 	var last *Ban

@@ -836,18 +858,18 @@ func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
 		}
 	}

-	if last != nil && now.Sub(last.Expires) <= l.rules.LimitBanRepeatWindow {
+	if last != nil && now.Sub(last.Expires) <= l.params.LimitBanRepeatWindow {
 		lastLength := last.Expires.Sub(last.Start)
 		// This is repeatFactor * lastLength > MaxBanDuration, written so
 		// that it cannot overflow.
-		if lastLength > l.rules.MaxBanDuration/repeatFactor {
+		if lastLength > l.params.MaxBanDuration/repeatFactor {
 			return time.Time{}
 		}

 		length = repeatFactor * lastLength
 	}

-	if length > l.rules.MaxBanDuration {
+	if length > l.params.MaxBanDuration {
 		return time.Time{}
 	}

@@ -865,7 +887,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) attackExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
 		}
 	}

-	return now.Add(l.rules.AttackBanDuration)
+	return now.Add(l.params.AttackBanDuration)
 }

 // dropOne drops the earliest ban whose cause is not CauseAdmin of the
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ const day = 24 * time.Hour
 func TestRepeatsTripleUntilPermanent(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	now := midnight()

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func TestRepeatWindowRunsOut(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()

-			ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+			ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 			netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")

 			first, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@ func TestRepeatWindowRunsOut(t *testing.T) {
 func TestFirstBanLongerThanTheMaximumIsPermanent(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	rules := defaultRules()
-	rules.LimitBanDuration = rules.MaxBanDuration + time.Hour
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	params := defaultParams()
+	params.LimitBanDuration = params.MaxBanDuration + time.Hour
+	ledger := bans.New(params)

 	ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), midnight(),
 		bans.Notes{})
@@ -97,9 +97,9 @@ func TestLongestBanSetFarOffDoesNotOverflow(t *testing.T) {
 	// With bans of up to 100,000 days, the 14th ban in a row, of 3^13
 	// hours, is within the maximum, and three times as long would not fit
 	// in a time.Duration. The 15th is permanent.
-	rules := defaultRules()
-	rules.MaxBanDuration = 100000 * day
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	params := defaultParams()
+	params.MaxBanDuration = 100000 * day
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	now := midnight()

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ func TestLongestBanSetFarOffDoesNotOverflow(t *testing.T) {
 func TestBrokenLimitDuringABanMakesNoOther(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")

 	first, made := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ func TestBrokenLimitDuringABanMakesNoOther(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCheckRefusesWhileTheBanLastsAndCountsTheRefusals(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Requests: 5})

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ func TestCheckRefusesWhileTheBanLastsAndCountsTheRefusals(t *testing.T) {
 func TestFindCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Requests: 5})

@@ -200,9 +200,9 @@ func TestFindCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
 func TestMaxBansDropsTheEarliestBanOfTheNetblockSeenLongestAgo(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	rules := defaultRules()
-	rules.MaxBans = 3
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	params := defaultParams()
+	params.MaxBans = 3
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	a := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
 	b := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
 	c := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.3/32")
@@ -239,9 +239,9 @@ func TestFullLedgerDropsTheEarlierBanOfTheNetblockBannedAgain(t *testing.T) {

 	// With room for one ban, the netblock's ended ban goes to make room for
 	// its new one, whose notes still count it.
-	rules := defaultRules()
-	rules.MaxBans = 1
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	params := defaultParams()
+	params.MaxBans = 1
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")

 	first, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ func TestFullLedgerDropsTheEarlierBanOfTheNetblockBannedAgain(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRequestDuringAnAttackBanMakesItPermanent(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	notes := bans.Notes{RuleID: "env-file", Target: "path"}

@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ func TestRequestDuringAnAttackBanMakesItPermanent(t *testing.T) {
 func TestAttackAfterAnAttackBanHasEndedBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")

 	// A ban for a broken limit before does not count.
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ func TestAttackAfterAnAttackBanHasEndedBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
 func TestWouldBanGivesTheBanWithoutMakingIt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	first, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
 	wantChanged(t, ledger, true)
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ func TestWouldBanGivesTheBanWithoutMakingIt(t *testing.T) {
 func TestWouldBePermanentAnswersAsTheBanWouldBeMade(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	now := midnight()

@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ func TestWouldBePermanentAnswersAsTheBanWouldBeMade(t *testing.T) {
 func TestAttackBanDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")

 	// Three times the seven days would be permanent; a limit broken as the
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ func TestAttackBanDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRequestTextsAreCutTo256Bytes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	long := strings.Repeat("a", 300)
 	request := bans.Request{
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ func TestRequestTextsAreCutTo256Bytes(t *testing.T) {
 func TestLookupFillsTheNotesOfTheNetblocksBansWithoutOne(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	other := netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.7/32")

@@ -494,9 +494,9 @@ func TestLookupFillsTheNotesOfTheNetblocksBansWithoutOne(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-// defaultRules are the rules at the settings' defaults.
-func defaultRules() bans.Rules {
-	return bans.Rules{
+// defaultParams are the params at the settings' defaults.
+func defaultParams() bans.Params {
+	return bans.Params{
 		LimitBanDuration:     time.Hour,
 		LimitBanRepeatWindow: day,
 		MaxBanDuration:       7 * day,
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ const scenario = "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf"
 func TestCrowdSecBanLastsUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func TestCrowdSecBanLastsUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCrowdSecBanIsNeverMadePermanent(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
 	ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), expires, scenario, bans.Notes{})
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func TestCrowdSecBanIsNeverMadePermanent(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCrowdSecBanIsCountedAndDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")

 	// Three times the three days would be permanent; a limit broken as the
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import (
 func TestChangedAfterABanIsMade(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")

 	wantChanged(t, ledger, false)
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ func TestChangedAfterABanIsMade(t *testing.T) {
 func TestSnapshotListsEveryBanByNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	v6 := netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64")
 	high := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
 	low := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
@@ -67,14 +67,14 @@ func TestSnapshotListsEveryBanByNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 func TestLoadedBansCarryOn(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	before := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	before := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	ban, _ := before.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Limit: 1})

 	// Loaded into a new ledger, as across a restart, the ban still refuses
 	// while it lasts, and once it has ended a broken limit bans for three
 	// times as long, with the loaded ban counted among the earlier ones.
-	after := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	after := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	after.Load(before.Snapshot())

 	_, banned, _ := after.Check(netblock.Addr(), ban.Expires.Add(-time.Second))
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ func TestLoadedBanRefusesEveryClientInItsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 	// Two entries as an admin might write them, with addresses not masked
 	// to their lengths, the IPv6 one shorter than the /64 an IPv6 client's
 	// ban covers, beside a ban the ledger makes on one IPv4 address.
-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{
 		{Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/24"), Start: midnight()},
 		{Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::1/48"), Start: midnight()},
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ func TestPermanentBanStartedBeforeAnEndedOneRefuses(t *testing.T) {
 		Expires:  midnight().Add(time.Hour),
 	}

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{permanent, ended})

 	now := midnight().Add(2 * time.Hour)
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ func TestPermanentBanStartedBeforeAnEndedOneRefuses(t *testing.T) {
 func TestNextBanWorkedOutFromTheBanThatEndedLast(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	// A 9-hour ban smallwebwaf made, the third in a row, and an admin's
+	// A 9-hour ban sww made, the third in a row, and an admin's
 	// 1-hour ban added to bans.json over it, with no cause and no notes.
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	nineHours := bans.Ban{
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ func TestNextBanWorkedOutFromTheBanThatEndedLast(t *testing.T) {
 		Expires:  midnight().Add(2 * time.Hour),
 	}

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{nineHours, admins})

 	// Once both have ended, a limit broken within the repeat window bans
@@ -219,9 +219,9 @@ func TestLoadKeepsAtMostMaxBansDroppingTheEarliest(t *testing.T) {
 		Cause:    bans.CauseLimit,
 	}

-	rules := defaultRules()
-	rules.MaxBans = 1
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	params := defaultParams()
+	params.MaxBans = 1
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{later, earlier})

 	held := ledger.Snapshot()
@@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ func TestLoadReplacesTheBansHeld(t *testing.T) {

 	// Room for three bans, so that the second load, were it added to the
 	// two bans held, would drop none of them to make room.
-	rules := defaultRules()
-	rules.MaxBans = 3
-	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	params := defaultParams()
+	params.MaxBans = 3
+	ledger := bans.New(params)
 	kept := bans.Ban{
 		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64"),
 		Start:    midnight(),
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ func TestLoadCutsTheTextsTo256Bytes(t *testing.T) {
 		}},
 	}

-	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{ban})

 	cut := long[:256]
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+package config
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"math"
+	"net/netip"
+	"net/url"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// RProxy is the settings of `sww rproxy`. A size or time limit of zero
+// is off.
+type RProxy struct {
+	// ListenAddr is where rproxy listens (SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR).
+	ListenAddr string
+	// UpstreamURL is the app (SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL).
+	UpstreamURL *url.URL
+	// TrustedProxies are the netblocks whose X-Forwarded-For is believed
+	// (SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES).
+	TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
+	// WAFBackend is discriminator's URL (SWRP_WAF_BACKEND).
+	WAFBackend *url.URL
+	// Timeout is how long rproxy waits for discriminator's answer to a question,
+	// and to a report (SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS). It cannot be off.
+	Timeout time.Duration
+	// DefaultDisposition is what is done with a request when discriminator cannot be
+	// connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer within Timeout:
+	// allow or deny (SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION).
+	DefaultDisposition string
+	// MaxRequestSize is the largest request body (SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE), and
+	// MaxResponseSize the largest response body (SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE).
+	MaxRequestSize  int64
+	MaxResponseSize int64
+	// MaxRequestTime bounds sending the whole request: the visitor's request
+	// line and headers, and then, from their end, its body on its way to the
+	// app (SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS). MaxResponseTime bounds the answer, from
+	// the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor
+	// (SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS).
+	MaxRequestTime  time.Duration
+	MaxResponseTime time.Duration
+
+	// settings are the values read, as given or by default, for the log line
+	// at start.
+	settings []slog.Attr
+}
+
+var (
+	errNeedsWAFBackend = errors.New(
+		"is required: it is discriminator's URL, such as http://discriminator:8080")
+	errNotDisposition  = errors.New("is not allow or deny")
+	errNotMilliseconds = errors.New(
+		"is not a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as 2000")
+	errNotMillisecondsOrOff = errors.New(
+		"is not a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as 60000, or off")
+)
+
+// RProxyFromEnvironment reads rproxy's settings with lookupEnv, normally
+// os.LookupEnv. A setting that is not set takes its default, and
+// SWRP_WAF_BACKEND, which has none, must be set. A setting that is set but
+// invalid is an error that names it. Since rproxy never touches disk, its
+// settings have no _FILE form.
+func RProxyFromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*RProxy, error) {
+	env := &environment{lookupEnv: withoutFileForms(lookupEnv)}
+	cfg := &RProxy{
+		ListenAddr:         env.address("SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"),
+		UpstreamURL:        env.appURL("SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL),
+		TrustedProxies:     env.netblocks("SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
+		WAFBackend:         env.wafBackend("SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"),
+		Timeout:            env.milliseconds("SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS", "2000"),
+		DefaultDisposition: env.disposition("SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION", "allow"),
+		MaxRequestSize:     env.size("SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE", "100M"),
+		MaxResponseSize:    env.size("SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE", "1G"),
+		MaxRequestTime:     env.millisecondsOrOff("SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS", "60000"),
+		MaxResponseTime:    env.millisecondsOrOff("SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS", "1800000"),
+	}
+
+	if env.err != nil {
+		return nil, env.err
+	}
+
+	cfg.settings = env.settings
+
+	return cfg, nil
+}
+
+// RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL reads only SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR and
+// SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL. The health check in rproxy's container needs no other
+// setting, so it reads no other.
+func RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(
+	lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
+) (string, *url.URL, error) {
+	env := &environment{lookupEnv: withoutFileForms(lookupEnv)}
+	listenAddr := env.address("SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR")
+	upstreamURL := env.appURL("SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL)
+
+	if env.err != nil {
+		return "", nil, env.err
+	}
+
+	return listenAddr, upstreamURL, nil
+}
+
+// withoutFileForms returns lookupEnv finding no setting named with _FILE, since
+// rproxy never touches disk.
+func withoutFileForms(
+	lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
+) func(string) (string, bool) {
+	return func(name string) (string, bool) {
+		if strings.HasSuffix(name, "_FILE") {
+			return "", false
+		}
+
+		return lookupEnv(name)
+	}
+}
+
+// LogValue makes an RProxy log as each setting's name with the value it was
+// given, or its default.
+func (c *RProxy) LogValue() slog.Value {
+	return slog.GroupValue(c.settings...)
+}
+
+// wafBackend reads the setting that is discriminator's URL, which must be set.
+func (e *environment) wafBackend(name string) *url.URL {
+	value := e.value(name, "")
+	if value == "" {
+		e.check(name, errNeedsWAFBackend)
+
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	backend, err := parseUpstreamURL(value)
+	e.check(name, err)
+
+	return backend
+}
+
+// disposition reads the setting that is what is done with a request when discriminator
+// cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer in time:
+// allow or deny.
+func (e *environment) disposition(name, defaultValue string) string {
+	value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
+	if value != "allow" && value != "deny" {
+		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotDisposition))
+	}
+
+	return value
+}
+
+// milliseconds reads a setting that is a whole number of milliseconds above
+// zero.
+func (e *environment) milliseconds(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
+	value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
+
+	duration, valid := parseMilliseconds(value)
+	if !valid {
+		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotMilliseconds))
+	}
+
+	return duration
+}
+
+// millisecondsOrOff reads a setting that is a whole number of milliseconds
+// above zero, or off, which is 0.
+func (e *environment) millisecondsOrOff(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
+	value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
+	if value == off {
+		return 0
+	}
+
+	duration, valid := parseMilliseconds(value)
+	if !valid {
+		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotMillisecondsOrOff))
+	}
+
+	return duration
+}
+
+// parseMilliseconds reads a whole number of milliseconds above zero, and
+// reports whether it is one.
+func parseMilliseconds(value string) (time.Duration, bool) {
+	n, err := strconv.ParseInt(value, 10, 64)
+	if err != nil || n <= 0 || n > math.MaxInt64/int64(time.Millisecond) {
+		return 0, false
+	}
+
+	return time.Duration(n) * time.Millisecond, true
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+package config_test
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+)
+
+// rproxy's settings, by name, and their values in these tests.
+const (
+	wafBackend        = "SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"
+	rproxyTimeout     = "SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS"
+	rproxyDefault     = "SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION"
+	rproxyListen      = "SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"
+	rproxyUpstream    = "SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL"
+	rproxyTrusted     = "SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
+	rproxyMaxRequest  = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
+	rproxyMaxResponse = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
+	rproxyRequestTime = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
+	rproxyAnswerTime  = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
+	backendURL        = "http://discriminator:8080"
+	rproxyDefaultAddr = ":8080"
+	rproxyDefaultApp  = "http://127.0.0.1:8081"
+	notASize          = "a lot"
+)
+
+// rproxyConfig reads rproxy's settings from env.
+func rproxyConfig(env map[string]string) (*config.RProxy, error) {
+	return config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
+		value, ok := env[name]
+
+		return value, ok
+	})
+}
+
+func TestRProxyDefaults(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.ListenAddr != rproxyDefaultAddr ||
+		cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != rproxyDefaultApp ||
+		cfg.WAFBackend.String() != backendURL {
+		t.Errorf("addresses %q, %v, %v", cfg.ListenAddr, cfg.UpstreamURL, cfg.WAFBackend)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.Timeout != 2*time.Second || cfg.DefaultDisposition != "allow" {
+		t.Errorf("timeout %v, default disposition %q", cfg.Timeout, cfg.DefaultDisposition)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.MaxRequestSize != 100<<20 || cfg.MaxResponseSize != 1<<30 {
+		t.Errorf("sizes %d and %d", cfg.MaxRequestSize, cfg.MaxResponseSize)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.MaxRequestTime != time.Minute || cfg.MaxResponseTime != 30*time.Minute {
+		t.Errorf("times %v and %v", cfg.MaxRequestTime, cfg.MaxResponseTime)
+	}
+
+	want := []netip.Prefix{
+		netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
+		netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/12"),
+		netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16"),
+	}
+	if !slices.Equal(cfg.TrustedProxies, want) {
+		t.Errorf("trusted proxies %v, want %v", cfg.TrustedProxies, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRProxySettingsAreRead(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{
+		wafBackend:        "https://waf.example:8443",
+		rproxyListen:      ":9000",
+		rproxyUpstream:    "http://app:3000",
+		rproxyTrusted:     "192.0.2.0/24",
+		rproxyTimeout:     "150",
+		rproxyDefault:     "deny",
+		rproxyMaxRequest:  "1K",
+		rproxyMaxResponse: off,
+		rproxyRequestTime: off,
+		rproxyAnswerTime:  "250",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.ListenAddr != ":9000" || cfg.UpstreamURL.Host != "app:3000" ||
+		cfg.WAFBackend.Host != "waf.example:8443" ||
+		cfg.TrustedProxies[0] != netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.0/24") {
+		t.Errorf("addresses %+v", cfg)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.Timeout != 150*time.Millisecond || cfg.DefaultDisposition != "deny" ||
+		cfg.MaxRequestSize != 1024 || cfg.MaxResponseSize != 0 ||
+		cfg.MaxRequestTime != 0 || cfg.MaxResponseTime != 250*time.Millisecond {
+		t.Errorf("limits %+v", cfg)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRProxyInvalidSettingsAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name, value string
+	}{
+		{wafBackend, ""},
+		{wafBackend, "discriminator:8080"},
+		{wafBackend, "http://discriminator:8080/path"},
+		{rproxyTimeout, "0"},
+		{rproxyTimeout, "-1"},
+		{rproxyTimeout, off},
+		{rproxyTimeout, "2s"},
+		{rproxyTimeout, "1.25"},
+		{rproxyTimeout, "99999999999999999"},
+		{rproxyDefault, "maybe"},
+		{rproxyListen, "8080"},
+		{rproxyUpstream, "app"},
+		{rproxyUpstream, "127.0.0.1:8081"},
+		{rproxyUpstream, "ftp://127.0.0.1:8081"},
+		{rproxyUpstream, "http://"},
+		{rproxyUpstream, "http://:8081"},
+		{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:0"},
+		{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:99999"},
+		{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:8081/app"},
+		{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:8081/?a=1"},
+		{rproxyUpstream, "http://user:secret@127.0.0.1:8081"},
+		{rproxyTrusted, "not a netblock"},
+		{rproxyTrusted, "10.0.0.0/33"},
+		{rproxyTrusted, "10.0.0.0/8,,192.168.0.0/16"},
+		{rproxyTrusted, "fe80::1%eth0"},
+		{rproxyMaxRequest, notASize},
+		{rproxyMaxResponse, notASize},
+		{rproxyRequestTime, "0"},
+		{rproxyRequestTime, "1m"},
+		{rproxyAnswerTime, "0"},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			_, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL, tc.name: tc.value})
+			if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), tc.name+": ") {
+				t.Errorf("error %v, want one naming %s", err, tc.name)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRProxyTrustedProxiesSetButEmptyTrustNothing(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL, rproxyTrusted: ""})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if len(cfg.TrustedProxies) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("trusted proxies %v, want none", cfg.TrustedProxies)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRProxyNeedsItsBackend(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	_, err := rproxyConfig(nil)
+	if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), wafBackend+": is required") {
+		t.Errorf("error %v, want one saying %s is required", err, wafBackend)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRProxyReadsNoFile(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "backend")
+
+	err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("http://from-a-file:8080\n"), 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	_, err = rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend + "_FILE": path})
+	if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), wafBackend+": is required") {
+		t.Errorf("error %v, want %s still required", err, wafBackend)
+	}
+
+	cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{
+		wafBackend:              backendURL,
+		rproxyTimeout + "_FILE": "/nonexistent/timeout",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("settings: %v, with the file left unread", err)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.Timeout != 2*time.Second {
+		t.Errorf("timeout %v, want the default", cfg.Timeout)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRProxySettingsAreLoggedByName(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	group := cfg.LogValue().Group()
+
+	names := make([]string, 0, len(group))
+	for _, attr := range group {
+		names = append(names, attr.Key)
+	}
+
+	for _, name := range []string{
+		rproxyListen, rproxyUpstream, rproxyTrusted, wafBackend, rproxyTimeout, rproxyDefault,
+		rproxyMaxRequest, rproxyMaxResponse, rproxyRequestTime, rproxyAnswerTime,
+	} {
+		if !slices.Contains(names, name) {
+			t.Errorf("%s is not logged, only %v", name, names)
+		}
+	}
+}
@@ -1,20 +1,25 @@
-// Package waf runs the OWASP Core Rule Set 4.25.0, through Coraza, on the
+// Package coreruleset runs the OWASP Core Rule Set 4.25.0, through Coraza, on the
 // method, the URL with its query and the headers of a request, and on its
-// body while SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the six changes smallwebwaf
-// makes to it, as "Attack detection" under "Configuration surface" in
-// SPEC.md describes them. It reads no response.
+// body while SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the eight changes sww
+// makes to it and the exclusions in SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, as
+// "Attack detection" under "Settings" in SPEC.md describes them. It reads no
+// response.
 //
-// smallwebwaf writes only to its state directory, so Coraza is built with
+// sww writes only to its state directory, so Coraza is built with
 // its no_fs_access tag, as the Dockerfile and script/build build it: of a
 // file in a multipart body, Coraza then counts the bytes instead of
 // writing them to the system's temporary directory.
-package waf
+package coreruleset

 import (
+	_ "embed"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
+	"os"
+	"regexp"
 	"slices"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
@@ -25,16 +30,18 @@ import (
 	"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/types"
 )

-// directives are the Core Rule Set as smallwebwaf runs it, with the
-// paranoia level for %d, and bodyDirectives for %s while
-// SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set. Each rule smallwebwaf adds has an id from
-// 900000 to 900999, the ids the Core Rule Set keeps for the rules that set
-// it up, which SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES refuses, so that no setting
-// switches one off. Coraza joins a line ending in \ to the next, without
-// the spaces at the start of the next.
+// directives are the Core Rule Set as sww runs it, with the
+// paranoia level for %d, bodyDirectives for the first %s while
+// SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, the exclusions file for the second, and
+// giteaExclusions for the third.
+// Each rule sww adds has an id from 900000 to 900999, the ids the
+// Core Rule Set keeps for the rules that set it up, which
+// SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES and the exclusions file refuse, so that no
+// setting switches one off. Coraza joins a line ending in \ to the next,
+// without the spaces at the start of the next.
 const directives = `
-# The engine only detects. smallwebwaf compares the request's anomaly
-# score with SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD itself, in block and detect mode
+# The engine only detects. sww compares the request's anomaly
+# score with SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD itself, in block and detect mode
 # alike. It reads no body, unless bodyDirectives switch that on.
 SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly
 SecRequestBodyAccess Off
@@ -69,6 +76,14 @@ SecArgumentsLimit 1000
 SecRule ARGUMENTS_LIMIT_REACHED "@eq 1" "id:900300,phase:2,pass,\
    severity:'CRITICAL',setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+5'"

+# The exclusions file comes before the rules, where the Core Rule Set puts
+# its own file of exclusions that run before the rules, so that they run
+# before the rules of phase 1 too.
+%s
+
+# The eighth change comes before the rules for the same reason.
+%s
+
 # The sixth: only the rules for requests are loaded, and no response is
 # inspected.
 Include @owasp_crs/REQUEST-*.conf
@@ -96,10 +111,19 @@ SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932260 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
    !ARGS:artifactName|!ARGS:redirect_to"

 # The fifth, for Referer: it is not checked for a Unix command without
-# arguments, or for Java starting a process. The cookies are left out in
-# Inspect.
+# arguments, for Java starting a process, or for a Java class name. 944130
+# refused every page opened from the page of java.lang.String.md. The
+# cookies are left out in Inspect.
 SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932340 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
 SecRuleUpdateTargetById 944110 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
+SecRuleUpdateTargetById 944130 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
+
+# The seventh: a container image push that reuses a layer names the image
+# it takes the layer from in the query parameter from, which is not
+# checked for command names. 932260 refused the push of a layer from
+# owner/python3-app.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/v2/.+/blobs/uploads/$" \
+    "id:900500,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:from"
 `

 // bodyDirectives have the Core Rule Set read the part of a request body
@@ -144,6 +168,13 @@ SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" "id:900450,phase:2,pass,\
    severity:'CRITICAL',setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+5'"
 `

+// giteaExclusions are the eighth change: the fields of gitea's own
+// requests that skip the rules that refused them there, as Coraza
+// directives.
+//
+//go:embed gitea.conf
+var giteaExclusions string
+
 // cookiesNotRead are the cookies the Core Rule Set reads a request
 // without, the rest of the fifth change.
 //
@@ -152,33 +183,140 @@ var cookiesNotRead = []string{"gitea_flash", "redirect_to"}

 // Params are what New needs.
 type Params struct {
-	// ParanoiaLevel is SWWAF_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL, from 1 to 4.
+	// ParanoiaLevel is SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL, from 1 to 4.
 	ParanoiaLevel int
 	// DisabledRules are the ids of the rules switched off
-	// (SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES).
+	// (SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES).
 	DisabledRules []int
 	// BodyLimit is the most of a request body the Core Rule Set reads
-	// (SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT), 0 while it is off and it reads none.
+	// (SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT), 0 while it is off and it reads none.
 	BodyLimit int64
+	// ExclusionsFile is the path of a file of exclusions loaded before the
+	// Core Rule Set's rules (SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE), "" while
+	// there is none.
+	ExclusionsFile string
+}
+
+// The ids of sww's own rules, which an exclusions file may not
+// name.
+const (
+	firstOwnRuleID = 900000
+	lastOwnRuleID  = 900999
+)
+
+// numberOrRange matches a number, or a range of numbers such as
+// 900000-900999. Coraza reads a number with a + before it too, so the
+// end of a range may have one.
+var numberOrRange = regexp.MustCompile(`(\d+)(?:-\+?(\d+))?`)
+
+// errSwwRuleID is the error of an exclusions file that names an
+// id of sww's own rules.
+var errSwwRuleID = errors.New("an id of sww's own rules")
+
+// errChangesNoRule is the error of an exclusions file that holds a
+// directive that removes or changes rules as it loads, such as
+// SecRuleRemoveById. The Core Rule Set's rules load after the file, so
+// the directive finds none of them.
+var errChangesNoRule = errors.New("the Core Rule Set's rules load after the file; " +
+	"switch a rule off with SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES, or on some requests " +
+	"with a ctl exclusion")
+
+// directivesIn returns the directives in text as Coraza reads them: it
+// skips blank lines and comment lines, and joins a line ending in \ to
+// the next, without the spaces around either.
+func directivesIn(text string) []string {
+	var directives []string
+
+	joined := ""
+
+	for line := range strings.Lines(text) {
+		line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
+		if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if start, found := strings.CutSuffix(line, `\`); found {
+			joined += start
+
+			continue
+		}
+
+		directives = append(directives, joined+line)
+		joined = ""
+	}
+
+	return directives
+}
+
+// checkExclusions returns an error if exclusions, the text of an
+// exclusions file, names an id of sww's own rules, alone or in a
+// range, or holds a directive whose name starts with SecRuleRemove or
+// SecRuleUpdate.
+func checkExclusions(exclusions string) error {
+	for _, directive := range directivesIn(exclusions) {
+		for _, match := range numberOrRange.FindAllStringSubmatch(directive, -1) {
+			first, _ := strconv.Atoi(match[1])
+
+			last := first
+			if match[2] != "" {
+				last, _ = strconv.Atoi(match[2])
+			}
+
+			if first <= lastOwnRuleID && last >= firstOwnRuleID {
+				return fmt.Errorf("the exclusions file names %s: %w", match[0],
+					errSwwRuleID)
+			}
+		}
+
+		// Coraza takes the directive's name up to the first space, without
+		// regard to case.
+		name, _, _ := strings.Cut(directive, " ")
+		if lower := strings.ToLower(name); strings.HasPrefix(lower, "secruleremove") ||
+			strings.HasPrefix(lower, "secruleupdate") {
+			return fmt.Errorf("%s in the exclusions file changes no rule: %w", name,
+				errChangesNoRule)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
 }

 // CoreRuleSet is the Core Rule Set, ready to inspect requests. It is safe
 // for concurrent use.
 type CoreRuleSet struct {
-	waf       coraza.WAF
+	engine    coraza.WAF
 	bodyLimit int64
 }

-// New returns the Core Rule Set with the six changes, at params'
-// paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, and reading request
-// bodies up to params' limit.
+// New returns the Core Rule Set with the eight changes, at params'
+// paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, reading request
+// bodies up to params' limit, and with params' exclusions file loaded
+// before the Core Rule Set's rules. An exclusions file is an error if it
+// cannot be read or does not parse, or if checkExclusions refuses it.
 func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
 	body := ""
 	if params.BodyLimit > 0 {
 		body = fmt.Sprintf(bodyDirectives, params.BodyLimit)
 	}

-	text := fmt.Sprintf(directives, params.ParanoiaLevel, body)
+	exclusions := ""
+
+	if params.ExclusionsFile != "" {
+		file, err := os.ReadFile(params.ExclusionsFile)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("read the exclusions file: %w", err)
+		}
+
+		exclusions = string(file)
+
+		err = checkExclusions(exclusions)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	text := fmt.Sprintf(directives, params.ParanoiaLevel, body, exclusions,
+		giteaExclusions)

 	if len(params.DisabledRules) > 0 {
 		ids := make([]string, len(params.DisabledRules))
@@ -189,14 +327,14 @@ func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
 		text += "SecRuleRemoveById " + strings.Join(ids, " ") + "\n"
 	}

-	waf, err := coraza.NewWAF(coraza.NewWAFConfig().
+	engine, err := coraza.NewWAF(coraza.NewWAFConfig().
 		WithRootFS(coreruleset.FS).
 		WithDirectives(text))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("load the Core Rule Set: %w", err)
 	}

-	return &CoreRuleSet{waf: waf, bodyLimit: params.BodyLimit}, nil
+	return &CoreRuleSet{engine: engine, bodyLimit: params.BodyLimit}, nil
 }

 // Result is what the Core Rule Set found in a request.
@@ -212,12 +350,11 @@ type Result struct {
 // method, its URL with the query, and its headers, the Cookie header
 // without the cookies in cookiesNotRead, and on body, r's body as the
 // caller has it, as readBody reads it. It returns what it found, what it
-// read of body, which the app is still to be sent, and the error that
-// ended the reading early, if one did.
+// read of body, and the error that ended the reading early, if one did.
 func (c *CoreRuleSet) Inspect(
 	r *http.Request, client netip.Addr, body io.Reader,
 ) (Result, []byte, error) {
-	tx := c.waf.NewTransaction()
+	tx := c.engine.NewTransaction()
 	// Closing would remove the files Coraza wrote, and it writes none.
 	defer func() { _ = tx.Close() }()

@@ -267,7 +404,7 @@ func (c *CoreRuleSet) Inspect(
 }

 // readBody reads body, the body of the request in tx, which has run on
-// the request's headers, while SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set and the body is
+// the request's headers, while SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set and the body is
 // of a kind the Core Rule Set reads: form data and multipart, of which it
 // reads the first c.bodyLimit bytes, and JSON and XML, which it reads only
 // when they are no longer than that, since they cannot be read in part.
@@ -1,20 +1,21 @@
-package waf_test
+package coreruleset_test

 import (
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/netip"
 	"net/url"
+	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"reflect"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"

-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
 )

-// defaultDisabledRules are the rules SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off
+// defaultDisabledRules are the rules SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off
 // by default.
 //
 //nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
@@ -22,10 +23,12 @@ var defaultDisabledRules = []int{920340, 920420, 920440, 920640, 930130, 930140}

 // newCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at paranoia level level, with
 // the rules in disabled switched off.
-func newCoreRuleSet(t *testing.T, level int, disabled ...int) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
+func newCoreRuleSet(t *testing.T, level int, disabled ...int) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
 	t.Helper()

-	crs, err := waf.New(waf.Params{ParanoiaLevel: level, DisabledRules: disabled})
+	crs, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
+		ParanoiaLevel: level, DisabledRules: disabled,
+	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("load the Core Rule Set: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -48,7 +51,7 @@ func get(target string, headers ...string) request {

 // inspect returns what crs finds in r, sent to git.example by a browser,
 // whose Host, User-Agent and Accept r.headers may replace.
-func inspect(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request) waf.Result {
+func inspect(t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, r request) coreruleset.Result {
 	t.Helper()

 	result, _ := inspectBody(t, crs, r, "")
@@ -59,8 +62,8 @@ func inspect(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request) waf.Result {
 // inspectBody is inspect for r with body, which is announced with its
 // Content-Length unless it is "", and returns what crs read of body too.
 func inspectBody(
-	t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string,
-) (waf.Result, string) {
+	t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string,
+) (coreruleset.Result, string) {
 	t.Helper()

 	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), r.method,
@@ -95,7 +98,9 @@ func inspectBody(
 }

 // wantResult checks what crs finds in r.
-func wantResult(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, want waf.Result) {
+func wantResult(
+	t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, r request, want coreruleset.Result,
+) {
 	t.Helper()

 	if got := inspect(t, crs, r); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
@@ -105,28 +110,29 @@ func wantResult(t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, want waf.Result)

 // matched is the result of a request that the rules ids match, each of
 // them a critical one, which adds 5 to the score.
-func matched(ids ...int) waf.Result {
+func matched(ids ...int) coreruleset.Result {
 	const critical = 5

-	return waf.Result{RuleIDs: ids, Score: critical * len(ids)}
+	return coreruleset.Result{RuleIDs: ids, Score: critical * len(ids)}
 }

-// atDefaults returns the Core Rule Set as smallwebwaf runs it by default.
-func atDefaults(t *testing.T) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
+// atDefaults returns the Core Rule Set as sww runs it by default.
+func atDefaults(t *testing.T) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
 	t.Helper()

 	return newCoreRuleSet(t, 1, defaultDisabledRules...)
 }

 // wantChange checks that crs lets through passes, a gitea request one of
-// the six changes is for, and still finds result in refused, a request
+// the eight changes is for, and still finds result in refused, a request
 // like it that the change is not for.
 func wantChange(
-	t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, passes, refused request, result waf.Result,
+	t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, passes, refused request,
+	result coreruleset.Result,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()

-	wantResult(t, crs, passes, waf.Result{})
+	wantResult(t, crs, passes, coreruleset.Result{})
 	wantResult(t, crs, refused, result)
 }

@@ -161,12 +167,12 @@ func TestExpectAndContentEncodingAreAllowed(t *testing.T) {

 	wantResult(t, crs,
 		request{http.MethodPost, push, []string{pushType, length, "Expect: 100-continue"}},
-		waf.Result{})
+		coreruleset.Result{})
 	wantResult(t, crs,
 		request{http.MethodPost, fetch, []string{
 			fetchType, length, "Content-Encoding: gzip",
 		}},
-		waf.Result{})
+		coreruleset.Result{})

 	// Every other header on the Core Rule Set's list stays refused.
 	for _, header := range []string{
@@ -195,7 +201,7 @@ func TestTransferEncodingIsRead(t *testing.T) {
 			"Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-request",
 			"Transfer-Encoding: chunked",
 		}},
-		waf.Result{})
+		coreruleset.Result{})
 }

 func TestMoreParametersThanCorazaKeepsIsAMatch(t *testing.T) {
@@ -249,7 +255,7 @@ func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInSkipTheListsOfFilesPathsAndCommands(t *testi
 	for _, value := range []struct {
 		name string
 		// result is what a parameter that is not one of gitea's gets.
-		result waf.Result
+		result coreruleset.Result
 	}{
 		// A file on the list of system files.
 		{".gitignore", matched(930120)},
@@ -270,7 +276,7 @@ func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInSkipTheListsOfFilesPathsAndCommands(t *testi
 	wantChange(t, crs, get("/?path=|cat%20/etc/passwd"), get("/?q=|cat%20/etc/passwd"),
 		matched(930120, 932160))
 	wantResult(t, crs, get("/?path=../../etc/passwd"),
-		waf.Result{RuleIDs: []int{930100, 930110}, Score: 20})
+		coreruleset.Result{RuleIDs: []int{930100, 930110}, Score: 20})
 	wantResult(t, crs, get("/?path=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"), matched(942100))
 }

@@ -308,13 +314,14 @@ func TestCookiesGiteaFlashAndRedirectToAreNotRead(t *testing.T) {
 		matched(930120))
 }

-func TestRefererIsNotCheckedForACommandOrJavaStartingAProcess(t *testing.T) {
+func TestRefererIsNotCheckedForACommandOrJava(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	const (
 		search      = "https://git.example/explore/repos?q=env"
 		runtimeJava = "https://git.example/openjdk/jdk/src/branch/master/src/" +
 			"java.base/share/classes/java/lang/Runtime.java"
+		stringMD = "https://git.example/owner/repo/src/branch/main/java.lang.String.md"
 	)

 	crs := atDefaults(t)
@@ -323,6 +330,8 @@ func TestRefererIsNotCheckedForACommandOrJavaStartingAProcess(t *testing.T) {
 		matched(932340))
 	wantChange(t, crs, get("/", "Referer: "+runtimeJava),
 		get("/", "X-Page: "+runtimeJava), matched(944110))
+	wantChange(t, crs, get("/", "Referer: "+stringMD), get("/", "X-Page: "+stringMD),
+		matched(944130))

 	// It is still checked for script and SQL injection.
 	wantResult(t, crs,
@@ -337,7 +346,7 @@ func TestEmptyHeaderIsRead(t *testing.T) {

 	// An empty User-Agent is a notice, which adds 2.
 	wantResult(t, atDefaults(t), get("/", "User-Agent: "),
-		waf.Result{RuleIDs: []int{920330}, Score: 2})
+		coreruleset.Result{RuleIDs: []int{920330}, Score: 2})
 }

 func TestParanoiaLevel(t *testing.T) {
@@ -346,7 +355,7 @@ func TestParanoiaLevel(t *testing.T) {
 	// Accept-Charset is refused from paranoia level 2.
 	r := get("/", "Accept-Charset: utf-8")

-	wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1), r, waf.Result{})
+	wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1), r, coreruleset.Result{})
 	wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 2), r, matched(920451))
 }

@@ -358,11 +367,195 @@ func TestEachDisabledRuleIsSwitchedOff(t *testing.T) {
 	r := request{http.MethodTrace, "/", []string{"Host: 192.0.2.1"}}

 	wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1), r,
-		waf.Result{RuleIDs: []int{911100, 920350}, Score: 8})
-	wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1, 920350, 911100), r, waf.Result{})
+		coreruleset.Result{RuleIDs: []int{911100, 920350}, Score: 8})
+	wantResult(t, newCoreRuleSet(t, 1, 920350, 911100), r, coreruleset.Result{})
 }

-// bodyLimit is SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies.
+func TestImagePushThatReusesALayerIsNotCheckedForCommandNames(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	crs := atDefaults(t)
+	reuse := "?mount=sha256:0000&from=owner/python3-app"
+
+	wantChange(t, crs, get("/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/"+reuse), get("/upload/"+reuse),
+		matched(932260))
+
+	// A command after the image's name is still refused.
+	wantResult(t, crs,
+		get("/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?from=owner/app;cat%20/etc/passwd"),
+		matched(930120, 932160))
+}
+
+// withExclusions returns the Core Rule Set at the defaults, with the
+// exclusions file at path.
+func withExclusions(path string) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
+	return coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
+		ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, ExclusionsFile: path,
+	})
+}
+
+// exclusionsFile writes text to a file of exclusions and returns its path.
+func exclusionsFile(t *testing.T, text string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "exclusions.conf")
+
+	err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(text), 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	return path
+}
+
+// backupFileExclusion is an exclusions file that switches 920500, a rule
+// of phase 1, off for the path of a backup file under /files/.
+const backupFileExclusion = `SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /files/" ` +
+	`"id:1,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920500;REQUEST_FILENAME"` + "\n"
+
+func TestExclusionsFileIsLoadedBeforeTheRules(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	crs, err := withExclusions(exclusionsFile(t, backupFileExclusion))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load the exclusions: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	wantChange(t, crs, get("/files/notes.txt~"), get("/notes.txt~"), matched(920500))
+}
+
+func TestRuleSwitchedOffAndNamedInTheExclusionsFileIsOff(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	crs, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
+		ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: []int{920500},
+		ExclusionsFile: exclusionsFile(t, backupFileExclusion),
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load the exclusions: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	wantResult(t, crs, get("/notes.txt~"), coreruleset.Result{})
+}
+
+func TestExclusionsFileMayNameAnyNumberInAComment(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	_, err := withExclusions(exclusionsFile(t,
+		"# 942100: GET /issues/900123\n"+backupFileExclusion))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("the exclusions did not load: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExclusionsFileThatCannotBeUsedIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	missing := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing.conf")
+
+	_, err := withExclusions(missing)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Errorf("%s loaded", missing)
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ text, want string }{
+		{"SecNoSuchDirective On\n", "unknown directive"},
+		// sww's own rules may not be switched off or changed, by
+		// id or in a range, on one line or split over several.
+		{"SecRuleRemoveById 899999-901000\n", "names 899999-901000"},
+		{
+			"SecAction \"id:1,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveById=899999-901000\"\n",
+			"names 899999-901000",
+		},
+		{
+			"SecAction \"id:1,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveById=899999-+901000\"\n",
+			"names 899999-+901000",
+		},
+		{
+			"SecAction \"id:1,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=900500;ARGS:from\"\n",
+			"names 900500",
+		},
+		{"SecRuleRemoveById 899000-\\\n    901000\n", "names 899000-901000"},
+		{
+			"SecAction \"id:1,phase:1,pass,nolog,\\\n" +
+				"    ctl:ruleRemoveById=9005\\\n    00\"\n",
+			"names 900500",
+		},
+		// The Core Rule Set's rules load after the file.
+		{"SecRuleRemoveById 942100\n", "SecRuleRemoveById in the exclusions file"},
+		{
+			"SecRuleUpdateTargetById 942100 \"!ARGS:id\"\n",
+			"SecRuleUpdateTargetById in the exclusions file",
+		},
+	} {
+		_, err := withExclusions(exclusionsFile(t, tc.text))
+		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.want) {
+			t.Errorf("%q gave the error %v, want one with %q", tc.text, err, tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// giteaRequests returns the recorded ordinary gitea requests in testdata.
+// Each has the Referer of a page that names the same, as a page opened
+// from it has.
+func giteaRequests(t *testing.T) []request {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	text, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("testdata", "gitea-requests.txt"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	var requests []request
+
+	for line := range strings.Lines(string(text)) {
+		line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
+		if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		target, header, _ := strings.Cut(line, " ")
+
+		headers := []string{"Referer: http://git.example" + target}
+		if header != "" {
+			headers = append(headers, header)
+		}
+
+		requests = append(requests, get(target, headers...))
+	}
+
+	return requests
+}
+
+func TestOrdinaryGiteaRequestsPassAndAttacksAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
+
+	crs := atDefaults(t)
+
+	for _, r := range giteaRequests(t) {
+		if got := inspect(t, crs, r); got.Score >= threshold {
+			t.Errorf("%s %q refused: %+v", r.target, r.headers[1:], got)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// In q too, off gitea's search pages.
+	for _, parameter := range []string{"id", "q"} {
+		for _, attack := range []string{
+			"1'%20OR%20'1'='1",
+			"..%2Fcustom%2Fconf%2Fapp.ini",
+			"%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2Fscript%3E",
+		} {
+			target := "/owner/repo?" + parameter + "=" + attack
+			if got := inspect(t, crs, get(target)); got.Score < threshold {
+				t.Errorf("%s let through: %+v", target, got)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// bodyLimit is SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies.
 const bodyLimit = 8 << 10

 // The Content-Type headers of the kinds of body the Core Rule Set reads.
@@ -376,12 +569,12 @@ const (
 // injection is an SQL injection, which rule 942100 matches.
 const injection = "1' OR '1'='1"

-// readingBodies returns the Core Rule Set as smallwebwaf runs it by
+// readingBodies returns the Core Rule Set as sww runs it by
 // default, but reading bodies up to bodyLimit.
-func readingBodies(t *testing.T) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
+func readingBodies(t *testing.T) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
 	t.Helper()

-	crs, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
+	crs, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
 		ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: bodyLimit,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
@@ -415,7 +608,8 @@ func padded(head, tail string, n int) string {
 // wantBody checks what crs finds in r with body, and that what it read of
 // body is read.
 func wantBody(
-	t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string, want waf.Result,
+	t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, r request, body string,
+	want coreruleset.Result,
 	read string,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
@@ -439,7 +633,7 @@ func TestBodiesAreReadOnlyWhileBodyLimitIsSet(t *testing.T) {
 		{jsonBody, `{"q":"` + injection + `"}`},
 		{xmlBody, "<q>" + injection + "</q>"},
 	} {
-		wantBody(t, off, post(tc.header), tc.body, waf.Result{}, "")
+		wantBody(t, off, post(tc.header), tc.body, coreruleset.Result{}, "")
 		wantBody(t, on, post(tc.header), tc.body, matched(942100), tc.body)
 	}
 }
@@ -462,7 +656,7 @@ func TestFormDataAndMultipartAreReadUpToTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	} {
 		wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.attackFirst, matched(942100),
 			tc.attackFirst[:bodyLimit+1])
-		wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.attackLast, waf.Result{},
+		wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.attackLast, coreruleset.Result{},
 			tc.attackLast[:bodyLimit+1])
 	}

@@ -472,7 +666,7 @@ func TestFormDataAndMultipartAreReadUpToTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), atLimit, matched(930120, 932160), atLimit)

 	pastLimit := padded("pad=", "&q=/etc/passwd", bodyLimit+1)
-	wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), pastLimit, waf.Result{}, pastLimit)
+	wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), pastLimit, coreruleset.Result{}, pastLimit)
 }

 func TestJSONAndXMLAreReadOnlyWhenNoLargerThanTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
@@ -488,7 +682,7 @@ func TestJSONAndXMLAreReadOnlyWhenNoLargerThanTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
 		wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), fits, matched(942100), fits)

 		larger := padded(tc.head, tc.tail, bodyLimit+1)
-		wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), larger, waf.Result{}, larger)
+		wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), larger, coreruleset.Result{}, larger)
 	}
 }

@@ -506,7 +700,7 @@ func TestOtherBodiesAreNotRead(t *testing.T) {
 		"Content-Type: text/plain",
 		"Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-request",
 	} {
-		wantBody(t, crs, post(header), body, waf.Result{}, "")
+		wantBody(t, crs, post(header), body, coreruleset.Result{}, "")
 	}
 }

@@ -534,8 +728,8 @@ func TestContentEncodingIsRefusedOnTheKindsOfBodyTheCoreRuleSetReads(t *testing.
 	// It is allowed on a body of any other kind, and on every body while no
 	// body is read.
 	fetch := "Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-request"
-	wantBody(t, crs, post(fetch, gzip), "a", waf.Result{}, "")
-	wantBody(t, atDefaults(t), post(formData, gzip), "a", waf.Result{}, "")
+	wantBody(t, crs, post(fetch, gzip), "a", coreruleset.Result{}, "")
+	wantBody(t, atDefaults(t), post(formData, gzip), "a", coreruleset.Result{}, "")
 }

 func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInAreLeftOutAmongFormFieldsToo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -546,18 +740,18 @@ func TestParametersGiteaSendsNamesInAreLeftOutAmongFormFieldsToo(t *testing.T) {

 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		body string
-		want waf.Result
+		want coreruleset.Result
 	}{
-		{"path=.gitignore", waf.Result{}},
+		{"path=.gitignore", coreruleset.Result{}},
 		{"q=.gitignore", matched(930120)},
-		{"redirect_uri=" + local, waf.Result{}},
+		{"redirect_uri=" + local, coreruleset.Result{}},
 		{"next=" + local, matched(931100, 934110)},
 	} {
 		wantBody(t, crs, post(formData), tc.body, tc.want, tc.body)
 	}

 	body := field("path", ".gitignore") + end
-	wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, waf.Result{}, body)
+	wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, coreruleset.Result{}, body)

 	body = field("q", ".gitignore") + end
 	wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, matched(930120), body)
@@ -681,7 +875,7 @@ func TestCorazaWritesNoFile(t *testing.T) {
 func TestBodyLimitOf1GLoads(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	_, err := waf.New(waf.Params{ParanoiaLevel: 1, BodyLimit: 1 << 30})
+	_, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{ParanoiaLevel: 1, BodyLimit: 1 << 30})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Errorf("load the Core Rule Set reading bodies up to 1G: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+# The eighth change: on gitea's paths, some fields skip the rules that refused
+# ordinary gitea requests there. They are the fields where gitea sends a search,
+# a file name or a branch name. Each exclusion runs with the request, before the
+# rules it switches off, those of phase 1 included, so this file is loaded before
+# the Core Rule Set's rules. Each comment names a request the rule refused.
+
+# gitea's searches of code, of issues and pull requests, and of commits send the
+# text searched for in q, which skips these rules there:
+#   930110: ../
+#   930120: .gitignore
+#   931100: http://127.0.0.1:8080
+#   932120: Invoke-WebRequest
+#   932130: $(pwd)
+#   932140: if (a == b) {
+#   932160: /bin/sh
+#   932235: `make check`
+#   932250: ls -la
+#   932260: python3
+#   932380: `whoami`
+#   933100: <?php echo
+#   933130: $_GET[
+#   933135: ${VAR}
+#   934100: process.env
+#   934110: http://127.0.0.1:8080
+#   934130: __proto__
+#   941100: <script>
+#   941110: <script>
+#   941160: <img src=
+#   941180: document.cookie
+#   941390: fetch(
+#   942100: SELECT * FROM users WHERE
+#   942140: information_schema
+#   942190: union select
+#   942230: if (a == b) {
+#   944100: java.lang.Runtime
+#   944110: java.lang.Runtime
+#   944130: java.lang.Runtime
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:explore/code|issues(?:/search)?|pulls|\
+    [^/]+/-/code|\
+    [^/]+/[^/]+/(?:search|issues(?:/search)?|pulls|\
+    commits/(?:branch|tag|commit)/.+/search)|\
+    api/v1/repos/(?:issues/search|[^/]+/[^/]+/issues))$" \
+    "id:900600,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930110;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931100;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932130;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932140;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=933100;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=933130;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=933135;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934110;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934130;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941100;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941110;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941160;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941180;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941390;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942100;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942140;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942190;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942230;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944100;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944110;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;ARGS:q"
+
+# A page opened from the results of one of those searches has the search's
+# address in Referer, which skips these rules then:
+#   941110: <script>
+#   941120: onClick={
+#   941160: <img src=
+#   942100: LIKE '%foo%'
+#   944100: java.lang.Runtime
+SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "@rx ^https?://[^/]+/(?:explore/code|\
+    issues(?:/search)?|pulls|[^/]+/-/code|\
+    [^/]+/[^/]+/(?:search|issues(?:/search)?|pulls|\
+    commits/(?:branch|tag|commit)/.+/search)|\
+    api/v1/repos/(?:issues/search|[^/]+/[^/]+/issues))\?" \
+    "id:900601,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941110;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941120;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941160;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942100;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944100;REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
+
+# gitea's searches of repositories, users, branches, tags and packages send a
+# name in q, which skips these rules there:
+#   930120: .profile
+#   932120: powershell-scripts
+#   932260: python3-app
+#   944130: org.apache.commons.logging
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:explore/repos|user/search_candidates|\
+    [^/]+/-/packages|[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:branches|tags)|api/v1/repos/search)$" \
+    "id:900602,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;ARGS:q"
+
+# gitea's other searches for a name send it in q too, which skips only these
+# rules there:
+#   930120: .profile
+#   932120: powershell-scripts
+#   932260: python3-app
+# The searches:
+#   - the dashboard's filter of repositories;
+#   - the repositories on a user's or an organisation's page, whose path has
+#     one segment;
+#   - the author filter of the issue and pull request lists;
+#   - the lists of users and organisations, and the API's search for users.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:[^/]+|repo/search|\
+    explore/(?:users|organizations)|api/v1/users/search|\
+    [^/]+/[^/]+/(?:issues|pulls)/posters)$" \
+    "id:900603,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:q,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:q"
+
+# These requests name a file in the path, which skips these rules there:
+#   920500: notes.txt~
+#   934100: process.env.d.ts
+#   941130: docs/a b.xhtml
+#   944130: java.lang.String.md
+# The requests:
+#   - a file's page, raw file and download;
+#   - its blame, history, edit, preview and delete pages;
+#   - the API's call for its contents;
+#   - a release attachment's download.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME \
+    "@rx ^/(?:api/v1/repos/)?[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:src|raw|media|blame|commits|_edit|_preview|_delete|contents|releases/download)/" \
+    "id:900610,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920500;REQUEST_FILENAME,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;REQUEST_FILENAME,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;REQUEST_FILENAME,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;REQUEST_FILENAME"
+
+# The requests below name a file in a query parameter. These rules refused
+# them for the file named:
+#   930120: .gitignore
+#   932120: install-script.sh
+#   932130: [draft].md
+#   932160: bin/docker-entrypoint
+#   932260: docker-compose.yml
+#   934100: process.env.d.ts
+#   934130: __proto__.json
+#   941130: index.xhtml
+#   941180: document.write.js
+#   942140: information_schema.sql
+#   944110: java/lang/Runtime.java
+#   944130: java.lang.String.md
+# Each request skips the rules that refused it. The fourth change already has
+# path and redirect_to skip 930120, 932160 and 932260 on every path.
+
+# A file's commit graph, in file.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/[^/]+/[^/]+/graph$" \
+    "id:900620,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:file,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:file,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:file,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:file,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;ARGS:file,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934130;ARGS:file,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;ARGS:file,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941180;ARGS:file,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942140;ARGS:file,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944110;ARGS:file,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;ARGS:file"
+
+# The API's list of a file's commits, in path.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/commits$" \
+    "id:900621,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934130;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941180;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942140;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944110;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;ARGS:path"
+
+# The API's call for the contents of several files, in body, as JSON.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/file-contents$" \
+    "id:900622,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:body,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:body,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:body,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;ARGS:body,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934130;ARGS:body,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;ARGS:body,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941180;ARGS:body,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942140;ARGS:body,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944110;ARGS:body,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;ARGS:body"
+
+# An issue opened from a template, in template.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/[^/]+/[^/]+/issues/new$" \
+    "id:900623,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:template,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:template,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932130;ARGS:template,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:template,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:template,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;ARGS:template,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934130;ARGS:template,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;ARGS:template,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941180;ARGS:template,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942140;ARGS:template,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944110;ARGS:template,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;ARGS:template"
+
+# The sign-in page on the way to a file's edit page, in redirect_to.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/user/login$" \
+    "id:900624,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:redirect_to,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932130;ARGS:redirect_to,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;ARGS:redirect_to,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934130;ARGS:redirect_to,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;ARGS:redirect_to,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941180;ARGS:redirect_to,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942140;ARGS:redirect_to,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944110;ARGS:redirect_to,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;ARGS:redirect_to"
+
+# An attachment uploaded through the API to a release, an issue or a comment,
+# in name.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME \
+    "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:releases|issues|issues/comments)/[0-9]+/assets$" \
+    "id:900625,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:name,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:name,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:name,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;ARGS:name,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934130;ARGS:name,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;ARGS:name,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941180;ARGS:name,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942140;ARGS:name,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;ARGS:name"
+
+# A diff's hidden lines, fetched when shown, in path.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/[^/]+/[^/]+/blob_excerpt/[0-9a-f]+$" \
+    "id:900626,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934100;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=934130;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941130;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941180;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942140;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944110;ARGS:path,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=944130;ARGS:path"
+
+# The requests below name a branch or tag in a query parameter, which skips
+# the list of command names (932260) there. It refused names such as
+# docker-build, python3-migration and feat/docker-support.
+
+# Deleting or restoring a branch, in name.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/[^/]+/[^/]+/branches/(?:delete|restore)$" \
+    "id:900630,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:name"
+
+# A release started from a tag, in tag.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/[^/]+/[^/]+/releases/new$" \
+    "id:900631,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:tag"
+
+# A branch protection rule opened for editing, in rule_name.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/[^/]+/[^/]+/settings/branches/edit$" \
+    "id:900632,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:rule_name"
+
+# A directory listing's last commits, in refSubUrl.
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/[^/]+/[^/]+/lastcommit/" \
+    "id:900633,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:refSubUrl"
+
+# An artifact upload from actions/upload-artifact@v3 sends the header
+# Content-Range, which the Core Rule Set refused (920450).
+SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME \
+    "@rx ^/api/actions_pipeline/_apis/pipelines/workflows/[0-9]+/artifacts/[^/]+/upload$" \
+    "id:900640,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
+    ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920450;REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES:Content-Range"
@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
+# Ordinary gitea 1.27 requests that the Core Rule Set must let through at the
+# defaults. Each line is a path and query, and may end with one header after a
+# space. The tests of internal/coreruleset inspect each as a GET. The Core Rule Set reads
+# the query and the headers the same way for any method.
+
+# Searches with ordinary words and symbols.
+/owner/repo/search?q=package.json
+/owner/repo/search?q=.gitignore
+/owner/repo/search?q=docker-compose.yml
+/owner/repo/search?q=python3
+/owner/repo/search?q=ssh%20key
+/owner/repo/search?q=feat%2Fdocker-support
+/owner/repo/search?q=ls%20-la
+/owner/repo/search?q=sed%20-i
+/owner/repo/search?q=%2Fbin%2Fsh
+/owner/repo/search?q=%60make%20check%60
+/owner/repo/search?q=%60whoami%60
+/owner/repo/search?q=fetch%28
+/owner/repo/search?q=%24%7BVAR%7D
+/owner/repo/search?q=%24%28pwd%29
+/owner/repo/search?q=process.env
+/owner/repo/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
+/owner/repo/search?q=%3Cscript%3E
+/owner/repo/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
+/owner/repo/search?q=union%20select
+/owner/repo/search?q=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A8080
+/owner/repo/search?q=..%2F
+/owner/repo/search?q=%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
+/owner/repo/search?q=eval%28
+/owner/repo/search?q=chmod%20%2Bx
+/owner/repo/search?q=echo%20%24PATH
+/owner/repo/search?q=java.lang.Runtime
+/owner/repo/search?q=document.cookie
+/owner/repo/search?q=alert%281%29
+/owner/repo/search?q=__proto__
+/owner/repo/search?q=C%3A%5CWindows%5CSystem32
+/owner/repo/search?q=Invoke-WebRequest
+/owner/repo/search?q=if%20%28a%20%3D%3D%20b%29%20%7B
+/owner/repo/search?q=sudo%20apt%20install
+/owner/repo/search?q=~%2F.ssh%2Fconfig
+/owner/repo/search?q=.htaccess
+/owner/repo/search?q=%24_GET%5B
+/owner/repo/search?q=%24_POST
+/owner/repo/search?q=%24_SERVER%5B%27REQUEST_URI%27%5D
+/owner/repo/search?q=%3C%3Fphp%20echo
+/owner/repo/search?q=information_schema
+/owner/repo/search?q=LIKE%20%27%25foo%25%27
+/owner/repo/search?q=onClick%3D%7B
+/explore/code?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
+/explore/code?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
+/owner/-/code?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
+/owner/-/code?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
+/owner/repo/issues?type=all&state=open&q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
+/owner/repo/issues?type=all&state=open&q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
+/owner/repo/issues/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
+/owner/repo/issues/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
+/owner/repo/pulls?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
+/owner/repo/pulls?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
+/issues?type=your_repositories&q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
+/issues?type=your_repositories&q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
+/issues/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
+/issues/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
+/pulls?type=your_repositories&q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
+/pulls?type=your_repositories&q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
+/owner/repo/commits/branch/main/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
+/owner/repo/commits/branch/main/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
+/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
+/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
+/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
+/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues?q=%3Cimg%20src%3D
+
+# Searches for the names of repositories, users, branches, tags and packages.
+/explore/repos?q=python3-app
+/explore/repos?q=.profile
+/explore/repos?q=powershell-scripts
+/api/v1/repos/search?q=docker-build
+/user/search_candidates?q=docker-ci
+/owner/repo/branches?q=feat%2Fdocker-support
+/owner/repo/tags?q=docker-v1.0
+/owner/-/packages?q=python3-requests
+/owner/-/packages?q=org.apache.commons.logging
+/repo/search?q=python3-app
+/repo/search?q=docker-build
+/repo/search?q=powershell-scripts
+/repo/search?q=.profile
+/owner?tab=repositories&q=python3-app
+/org?q=python3-app
+/owner/repo/issues/posters?q=docker-ci
+/owner/repo/pulls/posters?q=docker-ci
+/explore/users?q=docker-ci
+/explore/organizations?q=docker-ci
+/api/v1/users/search?q=docker-ci
+
+# Pages, raw files and edit pages of files, and the API's call for their
+# contents.
+/owner/repo/src/branch/main/package.json
+/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/package.json
+/owner/repo/_edit/main/package.json
+/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/package.json
+/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.gitignore
+/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/.gitignore
+/owner/repo/_edit/main/.gitignore
+/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/.gitignore
+/owner/repo/src/branch/main/docker-compose.yml
+/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/docker-compose.yml
+/owner/repo/_edit/main/docker-compose.yml
+/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/docker-compose.yml
+/owner/repo/src/branch/main/Dockerfile
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+# File names in the query string: the commit graph of a file, the API's lists
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+
+# File names of attachments uploaded through the API, to a release, an issue and
+# a comment.
+/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=package.json
+/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/releases/1/assets?name=.gitignore
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+
+# An artifact upload from actions/upload-artifact@v3, which sends Content-Range.
+/api/actions_pipeline/_apis/pipelines/workflows/1/artifacts/9b7c1f3a/upload?itemPath=artifact%2Freport.txt Content-Range: bytes 0-9/10
+
+# Branch and tag names in the query string: deleting and restoring a branch,
+# starting a release from a tag, a branch protection rule, a directory listing's
+# last commits, and a container image push that reuses a layer.
+/owner/repo/branches/delete?name=docker-build&page=1
+/owner/repo/branches/restore?branch_id=1&name=docker-build&page=1
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+/owner/repo/branches/delete?name=ansible-roles&page=1
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+/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=ansible-roles
+/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=ansible-roles
+/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Fansible-roles
+/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Fansible-roles
+/owner/repo/branches/delete?name=whoami&page=1
+/owner/repo/branches/restore?branch_id=1&name=whoami&page=1
+/owner/repo/releases/new?tag=whoami
+/owner/repo/settings/branches/edit?rule_name=whoami
+/owner/repo/lastcommit/main/src?refSubUrl=branch%2Fwhoami
+/v2/owner/app/blobs/uploads/?mount=sha256%3A0000&from=owner%2Fwhoami
+
+# Pages a signed-in user opens.
+/
+/owner/repo
+/owner/repo/issues
+/owner/repo/pulls
+/owner/repo/releases
+/owner/repo/wiki
+/owner/repo/activity
+/owner/repo/branches
+/owner/repo/tags
+/owner/repo/settings
+/owner/repo/actions
+/owner/repo/compare/main...main
+/owner/repo/commits/branch/main
+/owner/repo/archive/main.zip
+/notifications
+/user/settings
+/user/settings/applications
+/explore/repos
+/-/admin
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic abuseipdb. It reads SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY,
+// SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE and SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// abuseIPDB adds the tag abuseipdb and notes AbuseIPDB, as noteHit does, with
+// the score, when its score of the client is a hit, and refuses the request
+// when SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny, as dnsbl does for a zone. While
+// SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is unset it does nothing. A client without a score is
+// checked in the background, by the request's address, if its history counts
+// an offence, and the request does not wait for the answer. The score is then
+// used for each address of the client. Its figures are the score and
+// SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE.
+type abuseIPDB struct{}
+
+func (abuseIPDB) name() string { return "abuseipdb" }
+
+func (abuseIPDB) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
+	if rq.h.config.AbuseIPDBKey == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	client := rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client)
+	held, _ := rq.h.limiter.Client(client)
+	offender := held.History.Offences != ratelimit.Offences{}
+
+	score, hit := rq.h.abuseIPDB.Hit(ctx, client, rq.client, offender)
+	if !hit {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	rq.abuseIPDBHit = true
+	rq.addTag(config.AbuseIPDBTag)
+	rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource, Score: &score},
+		"scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE")
+
+	if rq.h.config.ReputationAction != deny {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return &verdict{
+		action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+		figures: map[string]any{
+			figureScore: score, "min_score": rq.h.config.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
+		},
+	}
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy
+package discriminator

 import (
 	"bytes"
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
-	"os"
 	"strings"
 	"time"

@@ -41,16 +40,22 @@ var (
 	errNotAddress = errors.New("is not an address, such as 203.0.113.9")
 )

-// answerAdmin answers a request for smallwebwaf itself, under
-// /_smallwebwaf/, once it has passed the checks. Each endpoint needs a
-// token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>: the metrics
-// SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without
-// it is refused with 401, which counts toward the error burst. An
-// endpoint whose token is unset answers 404, as any other request under
-// /_smallwebwaf/ does.
+// answerHealth answers a request for the health endpoint.
+func (rq *request) answerHealth() {
+	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint
+	// Set here rather than left to Go's server, which would set it only
+	// after the log line has taken the response's headers.
+	rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
+	_, _ = io.WriteString(rq.out, "ok\n")
+}
+
+// answerAdmin answers a request for one of discriminator's own endpoints. Each
+// needs a token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>: the metrics
+// SWW_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without it is
+// refused with 401. An endpoint whose token is unset answers 404, as any other
+// path does.
 func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
-	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
-	rq.startClientResponseTimeout()
+	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint

 	token, answer := rq.endpoint()

@@ -58,12 +63,8 @@ func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
 	case token == "":
 		http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
 	case !hasToken(rq.in, token):
-		rq.tokenRefused = true
 		rq.out.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer")
-		rq.answer(refusal{
-			status: http.StatusUnauthorized,
-			action: requestlog.ActionAdmin,
-		})
+		http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)
 	default:
 		answer()
 	}
@@ -120,26 +121,7 @@ type banToAdd struct {
 // an admin, from now for the duration the body gives, with its reason,
 // and answers with that ban.
 func (rq *request) addBan() {
-	// The body must arrive within SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, as any
-	// other request's must.
-	rq.stopReadingBody(rq.clientRequestDeadline())
-
 	toAdd, err := rq.readBanToAdd()
-	if refused := rq.refused.Load(); refused != nil {
-		rq.answer(*refused) // the body is over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES
-
-		return
-	}
-
-	if errors.Is(err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded) {
-		rq.answer(refusal{
-			status: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
-			action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
-			limit:  "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT",
-		})
-
-		return
-	}

 	var (
 		netblock netip.Prefix
@@ -168,12 +150,9 @@ func (rq *request) addBan() {
 // readBanToAdd reads the body of POST BansPath: a JSON object with
 // nothing but whitespace after it, in at most banBodyMaxBytes.
 func (rq *request) readBanToAdd() (banToAdd, error) {
-	var body io.ReadCloser = http.NoBody
-	if rq.body != nil {
-		body = rq.body
-	}
+	data, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(nil, rq.in.Body, banBodyMaxBytes))
+	rq.requestBytes = int64(len(data))

-	data, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(nil, body, banBodyMaxBytes))
 	if err != nil {
 		return banToAdd{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errNotBanToAdd, err)
 	}
@@ -271,9 +250,9 @@ type clientAnswer struct {
 	Bans   []state.BanEntry  `json:"bans"`
 }

-// showClient answers GET ClientsPath<ip> with what smallwebwaf knows of
-// the client: its counters, its history, which holds its country as last
-// looked up and its offences, and its bans with their notes.
+// showClient answers GET ClientsPath<ip> with what discriminator knows of the client:
+// its counters, its history, which holds its country as last looked up and its
+// offences, and its bans with their notes.
 func (rq *request) showClient() {
 	addr, err := pathAddress(rq.in.URL.Path, ClientsPath)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -1,30 +1,27 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
-	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"

 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/state"
 )

 const (
-	adminToken = "SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
-	// adminSecret is the SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN the tests set, and adminBearer
+	adminToken = "SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
+	// adminSecret is the SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN the tests set, and adminBearer
 	// how a request carries it.
 	adminSecret = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
 	adminBearer = "Bearer " + adminSecret
-	// adminClient is the client the tests' admin sends its requests from.
-	adminClient = "192.0.2.10"
 	// banOtherClient is the body of a request to ban otherClient for an
 	// hour.
 	banOtherClient = `{"netblock": "` + otherClient + `", "duration": "1h", ` +
@@ -43,8 +40,7 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
 	// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
 	for _, authorization := range []string{adminBearer, bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
 		for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
-			s.adminRequest(adminClient, authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
-				http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
+			s.ownEndpointRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusNotFound)
 		}
 	}

@@ -71,8 +67,8 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheAdminToken(t *testing.T) {
 		for _, authorization := range []string{
 			"", bearer, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(adminSecret), "Basic " + adminSecret,
 		} {
-			got := s.adminRequest(adminClient, authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
-				http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
+			got := s.ownEndpointRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
+				http.StatusUnauthorized)
 			if got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
 				t.Errorf("%s %s with %q was answered without WWW-Authenticate: Bearer",
 					e.method, e.path, authorization)
@@ -90,13 +86,13 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheAdminToken(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}

-	// Any other request under /_smallwebwaf/ is not found.
+	// Any other request under /_sww/ is not found.
 	for _, e := range []adminEndpoint{
-		{http.MethodPut, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient},
-		{http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath, ""},
-		{http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
-		{http.MethodPost, proxy.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
-		{http.MethodGet, strings.TrimSuffix(proxy.ClientsPath, "/"), ""},
+		{http.MethodPut, discriminator.BansPath, banOtherClient},
+		{http.MethodDelete, discriminator.BansPath, ""},
+		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
+		{http.MethodPost, discriminator.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
+		{http.MethodGet, strings.TrimSuffix(discriminator.ClientsPath, "/"), ""},
 	} {
 		s.admin(e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusNotFound)
 	}
@@ -122,10 +118,10 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
 		Reason:   "probes for logins",
 	}

-	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK),
-		want)
+	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, discriminator.BansPath, banOtherClient,
+		http.StatusOK), want)

-	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(expires) {
 		t.Errorf("the ban ends at %s, want %s", line.BanExpires, expires)
 	}
@@ -133,7 +129,7 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
 	// Its notes count the request it refused.
 	want.Notes.Requests, want.Notes.Refused = 1, 1

-	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
+	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, discriminator.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)

 	// Ten minutes on, lifting the bans on client lifts that one, which is
 	// kept, marked lifted.
@@ -142,13 +138,13 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
 	lifted := clk.Now()
 	want.Lifted = &lifted

-	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath+"/"+client, "",
+	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodDelete, discriminator.BansPath+"/"+client, "",
 		http.StatusOK), want)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
+	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, discriminator.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)

 	// No ban on it is active any more.
-	s.admin(http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath+"/"+client, "", http.StatusNotFound)
+	s.admin(http.MethodDelete, discriminator.BansPath+"/"+client, "", http.StatusNotFound)
 }

 func TestBanToAddGivesItsNetblockAndDuration(t *testing.T) {
@@ -185,7 +181,8 @@ func TestBanToAddGivesItsNetblockAndDuration(t *testing.T) {
 			want.Expires = &expires
 		}

-		wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, body, http.StatusOK), want)
+		wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, discriminator.BansPath, body, http.StatusOK),
+			want)
 	}
 }

@@ -254,7 +251,8 @@ func TestBanToAddThatCannotBeReadIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 			"request body too large",
 		},
 	} {
-		got := s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, tc.body, http.StatusBadRequest)
+		got := s.admin(http.MethodPost, discriminator.BansPath, tc.body,
+			http.StatusBadRequest)
 		if !strings.Contains(string(got.body), tc.want) {
 			t.Errorf("%.80s was answered %q, want it to say %q", tc.body, got.body, tc.want)
 		}
@@ -265,64 +263,12 @@ func TestBanToAddThatCannotBeReadIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestBanToAddOverTheRequestSizeLimitIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
-		adminToken:      adminSecret,
-		requestMaxBytes: "16",
-	})
-
-	// Sent in a chunk, its length is not announced, so that it is found
-	// over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES only as it is read.
-	chunk := `{"netblock": "203.0.113.9", "duration": "1h"}`
-	s.adminRequest(adminClient, adminBearer+"\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked",
-		http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath,
-		strconv.FormatInt(int64(len(chunk)), 16)+"\r\n"+chunk+"\r\n0\r\n\r\n",
-		http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
-
-	if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want no ban", held)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBanToAddSlowerThanTheClientRequestTimeoutIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
-		adminToken:           adminSecret,
-		metricsToken:         token,
-		clientRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
-	})
-
-	// The chunk announces 256 bytes and the rest of it never comes, so only
-	// the timeout ends the wait. A hold-up of the test process can only
-	// make the answer later, so the time is checked only for not being
-	// shorter than the timeout.
-	start := time.Now()
-
-	s.adminRequest(adminClient, adminBearer+"\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked",
-		http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, "100\r\n"+`{"netblock": "203.0.113.9", `,
-		http.StatusRequestTimeout, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
-
-	if took := time.Since(start); took < shortTimeout {
-		t.Errorf("answered after %s, before the timeout of %s ran out", took, shortTimeout)
-	}
-
-	wantLimitHits(t, s.addr, clientRequestTimeout, 1)
-
-	if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want no ban", held)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		adminToken:         adminSecret,
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
-		rateLimitExemptNets: adminClient,
 	})
 	start := clk.Now()

@@ -330,7 +276,7 @@ func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
 	// limit of two a minute, and bans it.
 	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)

 	// Asked about by its address in IPv6 form too.
 	for _, addr := range []string{otherClient, "::ffff:" + otherClient} {
@@ -339,7 +285,8 @@ func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
 			Bans   []state.BanEntry  `json:"bans"`
 		}

-		decode(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath+addr, "", http.StatusOK), &got)
+		decode(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, discriminator.ClientsPath+addr, "",
+			http.StatusOK), &got)

 		if got.Client == nil {
 			t.Fatalf("%s: no client", addr)
@@ -361,69 +308,16 @@ func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {

 	// Of an address no request came from and no ban covers, nothing is
 	// known.
-	got := s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath+"198.51.100.99", "", http.StatusOK)
+	got := s.admin(http.MethodGet, discriminator.ClientsPath+"198.51.100.99", "",
+		http.StatusOK)
 	if string(got.body) != "{\n    \"client\": null,\n    \"bans\": []\n}\n" {
 		t.Errorf("an unknown client is answered\n%s", got.body)
 	}

-	s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath+"203.0.113", "", http.StatusBadRequest)
-	s.admin(http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath+"/203.0.113.0/24", "",
+	s.admin(http.MethodGet, discriminator.ClientsPath+"203.0.113", "",
+		http.StatusBadRequest)
+	s.admin(http.MethodDelete, discriminator.BansPath+"/203.0.113.0/24", "",
 		http.StatusBadRequest)
-}
-
-func TestBannedClientIsRefusedAtTheEndpointsEvenWithTheToken(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{adminToken: adminSecret})
-
-	s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK)
-
-	// otherClient cannot lift its own ban either.
-	for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
-		s.adminRequest(otherClient, adminBearer, e.method, e.path, e.body,
-			http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestAdminRequestsCountTowardTheLimits(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
-		adminToken:         adminSecret,
-		rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
-	})
-
-	// A request refused for a missing token and one answered count toward
-	// the limit of two a minute, so the next breaks it.
-	s.adminRequest(client, "", http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
-		http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
-	s.adminRequest(client, adminBearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
-		http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
-	s.adminRequest(client, adminBearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
-		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-}
-
-func TestClientInAllowNetsSkipsTheChecksButNeedsTheToken(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
-
-	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
-		adminToken:         adminSecret,
-		allowNets:          allowed,
-		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
-	})
-
-	// A ban on it refuses nothing, and its requests are not counted.
-	server.Ledger.BanForAdmin(netip.MustParsePrefix(allowed+"/32"), clk.Now(),
-		time.Time{}, "")
-
-	for range 2 {
-		s.adminRequest(allowed, "", http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
-			http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
-		s.adminRequest(allowed, adminBearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
-			http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
-	}
 }

 func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
@@ -435,8 +329,7 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
 	})

 	for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
-		s.adminRequest(adminClient, "", e.method, e.path, e.body,
-			http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
+		s.ownEndpointRequest("", e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusUnauthorized)
 	}

 	if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
@@ -444,56 +337,50 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-// adminEndpoint is a request to an endpoint SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN opens.
+// adminEndpoint is a request to an endpoint SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN opens.
 type adminEndpoint struct {
 	method, path, body string
 }

-// adminEndpoints returns a request to each endpoint SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN
+// adminEndpoints returns a request to each endpoint SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN
 // opens: listing the bans, banning otherClient for an hour, lifting the
 // bans on otherClient, and asking about otherClient.
 func adminEndpoints() []adminEndpoint {
 	return []adminEndpoint{
-		{http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, ""},
-		{http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient},
-		{http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
-		{http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
+		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.BansPath, ""},
+		{http.MethodPost, discriminator.BansPath, banOtherClient},
+		{http.MethodDelete, discriminator.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
+		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
 	}
 }

-// admin sends a request with method for path, with body, from
-// adminClient, with the admin token, and checks that it is answered with
-// status, its log line's action admin. It returns the answer.
+// admin sends a request with method for path, with body, to discriminator's own
+// address, with the admin token, and checks that it is answered with status, its
+// log line's action own_endpoint. It returns the answer.
 func (s *sender) admin(method, path, body string, status int) answer {
 	s.t.Helper()

-	return s.adminRequest(adminClient, adminBearer, method, path, body, status,
-		requestlog.ActionAdmin)
+	return s.ownEndpointRequest(adminBearer, method, path, body, status)
 }

-// adminRequest sends a request with method for path, with body, from the
-// client at from, with authorization as its Authorization header unless
-// it is "", and checks its answer's status and its log line's action, as
-// request does. authorization may end in more header lines. A body that
-// is not "" has its length announced, unless authorization names
-// Transfer-Encoding. It returns the answer.
-func (s *sender) adminRequest(
-	from, authorization, method, path, body string, status int, action string,
+// ownEndpointRequest is admin with authorization as the request's Authorization
+// header unless it is "".
+func (s *sender) ownEndpointRequest(
+	authorization, method, path, body string, status int,
 ) answer {
 	s.t.Helper()

-	var header []string
-
+	req := newRequest(s.t, method, s.discriminatorAddr, path, strings.NewReader(body))
 	if authorization != "" {
-		header = append(header, "Authorization: "+authorization)
+		req.Header.Set("Authorization", authorization)
 	}

-	if body != "" && !strings.Contains(authorization, "Transfer-Encoding") {
-		header = append(header, "Content-Length: "+strconv.Itoa(len(body)))
-	}
+	got := do(s.t, req)
+	wantStatus(s.t, got, status)

-	_, got := s.requestWithBody(method, from, path, strings.Join(header, "\r\n"),
-		body, status, action)
+	line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
+	s.sent++
+	wantLine(s.t, line, status, requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint)

 	return got
 }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"maps"
@@ -10,15 +10,15 @@ import (

 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )

 const (
-	alertWebhookURL = "SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
-	alertMaxPerHour = "SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
+	alertWebhookURL = "SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
+	alertMaxPerHour = "SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
 	// alertInstance is the instance every alert of these tests gives.
-	alertInstance = "fsn1app1/gitea"
+	alertInstance = "fsn1app1/blog"
 )

 func TestBanForABrokenLimitRaisesABanAlertWithItsNotes(t *testing.T) {
@@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ func TestBanForABrokenLimitRaisesABanAlertWithItsNotes(t *testing.T) {
 	start := clk.Now()

 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)

 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
 	ban := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)[0]

 	// A request refused under the ban raises no other alert.
 	clk.advance(time.Minute)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)

 	wantAlerts(t, queue, banAlert(alerts.EventBan, start, client, bans.Ban{
 		Netblock: netblock, Cause: bans.CauseLimit,
@@ -62,22 +62,24 @@ func TestAttackBanRaisesABanAlertThenAPermanentBanAlert(t *testing.T) {

 	// The probe bans the client for seven days, and its next request makes
 	// the ban permanent. The request after that changes nothing.
-	s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)

 	attackBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)[0]

 	clk.advance(time.Minute)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)

 	permanentBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)[0]

-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)

 	// Another client's probe after its first ban has run out without a
 	// request makes a permanent ban at once.
-	s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	clk.advance(7 * 24 * time.Hour)
-	s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.request(otherClient, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)

 	otherBans := server.Ledger.Bans(other)

@@ -201,7 +203,7 @@ func TestObserveModeWorksOutABanOnlyWhenItsAlertWouldBeSent(t *testing.T) {
 // never sent them, and returns the queue they wait in as well.
 func startWithAlerts(
 	t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
-) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
+) (*sender, *clock, *discriminator.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()

 	return startAppWithAlerts(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {}, env)
@@ -210,21 +212,23 @@ func startWithAlerts(
 // startAppWithAlerts is startWithAlerts in front of the app handler.
 func startAppWithAlerts(
 	t *testing.T, handler http.HandlerFunc, env map[string]string,
-) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
+) (*sender, *clock, *discriminator.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()

 	app := startApp(t, handler)
 	clk := &clock{now: time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)}
 	settings := map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies:  trustLocalhost,
-		alertWebhookURL: "https://alerts.example/smallwebwaf",
+		alertWebhookURL: "https://alerts.example/sww",
 		instanceName:    alertInstance,
 	}
 	maps.Copy(settings, env)

 	addr, out, server, queue := startProxyWithAlerts(t, app.URL, "", clk.Now, settings)

-	return &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}, clk, server, queue
+	s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, discriminatorAddr: server.Addr, out: out}
+
+	return s, clk, server, queue
 }

 // banAlert returns the alert for event, raised by a request from client at
@@ -237,6 +241,7 @@ func banAlert(
 		Instance: alertInstance,
 		Time:     raised,
 		Event:    event,
+		Host:     appHost,
 		Client:   netip.MustParseAddr(client),
 		Netblock: ban.Netblock,
 		Reason:   ban.Reason,
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy
+package discriminator

 import (
 	"net/netip"
@@ -15,9 +15,11 @@ func TestWithEveryAnomalyThresholdOffARequestIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
 	// anomaly counters, nor a clock, and the request no response: reading
 	// any of them to count the request panics.
 	rq := &request{
-		h:        &handler{config: &config.Config{LookupSource: "geojs"}},
+		decision: decision{
 			client:   netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9"),
 			lookedUp: true,
+		},
+		h: &handler{config: &config.Config{LookupSource: "geojs"}},
 	}

 	defer func() {
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"maps"
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import (

 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ import (
 // The anomaly thresholds: the prefix of a scope followed by the end of a
 // count.
 const (
-	anomalyClient = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
-	anomalyNet    = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_"
-	anomalyASN    = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_"
-	anomalyTotal  = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
-	anomalyWatch  = "SWWAF_WATCH_"
+	anomalyClient = "SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
+	anomalyNet    = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_"
+	anomalyASN    = "SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_"
+	anomalyTotal  = "SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
+	anomalyWatch  = "SWW_WATCH_"

 	requestsPerMinute = "REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE"
 	requestsPerHour   = "REQUESTS_PER_HOUR"
@@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ const (

 // The other anomaly settings.
 const (
-	anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
-	anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
-	watchNets          = "SWWAF_WATCH_NETS"
+	anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
+	anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
+	watchNets          = "SWW_WATCH_NETS"
 )

 const (
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ func TestEachScopeAndWindowOverItsThresholdAlertsOncePerCooldown(t *testing.T) {
 		{anomalyASN, anomaly.ScopeASN, netip.Prefix{}, asnDE, map[string]any{"asn": asnDE}},
 		{anomalyTotal, anomaly.ScopeTotal, netip.Prefix{}, "the whole service", nil},
 		{
-			anomalyWatch, anomaly.ScopeWatch, netip.MustParsePrefix(clientsNet),
+			anomalyWatch, anomaly.ScopeWatchedNet, netip.MustParsePrefix(clientsNet),
 			"the named netblock office, " + clientsNet, map[string]any{"name": "office"},
 		},
 	} {
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ func TestEachScopeAndWindowOverItsThresholdAlertsOncePerCooldown(t *testing.T) {
 					Instance: alertInstance,
 					Time:     start,
 					Event:    alerts.EventAnomaly,
+					Host:     appHost,
 					Client:   netip.MustParseAddr(client),
 					Netblock: scope.netblock,
 					ASN:      asnDE,
@@ -163,9 +164,9 @@ func TestEveryRequestIsCountedWhateverIsDoneWithIt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	const (
-		allowed = "192.0.2.7"  // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
-		exempt  = "192.0.2.10" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
-		denied  = "192.0.2.20" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
+		allowed = "192.0.2.7"  // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
+		exempt  = "192.0.2.10" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
+		denied  = "192.0.2.20" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
 	)

 	s, _, _, queue := startAppWithAlerts(t, readAndAnswer, map[string]string{
@@ -186,7 +187,7 @@ func TestEveryRequestIsCountedWhateverIsDoneWithIt(t *testing.T) {
 		{allowed, "/", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{exempt, "/", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{client, "/static/app.js", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
-		{denied, "/", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
+		{denied, "/", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
 	} {
 		for range 3 {
 			s.request(sent.from, sent.path, sent.status, sent.action)
@@ -318,7 +319,7 @@ func TestRequestCountsForTheASNumberGeoJSGivesBeforeItEnds(t *testing.T) {
 	// kept.
 	geojsURL, _, release := startHeldGeoJS(t)

-	var server atomic.Pointer[proxy.Server]
+	var server atomic.Pointer[discriminator.Server]

 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
 		release()
@@ -0,0 +1,588 @@
+package discriminator_test
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"maps"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"testing/synctest"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+const (
+	// answerTimeLimit is the default of rproxy's SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS, the time
+	// discriminator has to answer.
+	answerTimeLimit = 2 * time.Second
+	// defaultLookupWait is the default of SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT.
+	defaultLookupWait = 800 * time.Millisecond
+	// The header limits SPEC.md gives.
+	cookieLimit      = 50
+	headerFieldLimit = 100
+	// cookieHeader is the header the cookie limit counts.
+	cookieHeader = "Cookie"
+	// tooLarge is how discriminator refuses a request over the header limits.
+	tooLarge = http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge
+	// silentAbuseIPDBURL is where AbuseIPDB never answers: at the stand-in
+	// that silentGeoJSURL names too.
+	silentAbuseIPDBURL = "silent://abuseipdb/api/v2/check"
+	// wholeLimit is the percentage of a rate limit that lowers it not at all.
+	wholeLimit = 100
+	// clientsDecision is the CrowdSec decision list holding client alone.
+	clientsDecision = `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", "scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", ` +
+		`"scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", "value": "` + client + `"}]`
+)
+
+// cookies returns a Cookie header's value with count cookies.
+func cookies(count int) string {
+	parts := make([]string, 0, count)
+	for i := range count {
+		parts = append(parts, "c"+strconv.Itoa(i)+"=1")
+	}
+
+	return strings.Join(parts, "; ")
+}
+
+// fillHeaders adds headers to a question until the checks see total header
+// fields: all but ClientHeader and PeerHeader, which discriminator removes. Go's
+// client sends nothing else but Host, which the limit does not count, once
+// User-Agent is set.
+func fillHeaders(req *http.Request, total int) {
+	req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "test")
+
+	for i := len(req.Header) - 2; i < total; i++ {
+		req.Header.Set("X-Filler-"+strconv.Itoa(i), "1")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSixteenThousandCookiesAreRefusedWellWithinTheTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
+	req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
+	req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", 16000))
+
+	began := time.Now()
+	got := do(t, req)
+
+	if took := time.Since(began); took >= answerTimeLimit/2 {
+		t.Errorf("answered after %s, want well within %s", took, answerTimeLimit)
+	}
+
+	wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
+
+	line := s.out.requestLine(t)
+	wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
+
+	if line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS != nil {
+		t.Errorf("the Core Rule Set read the request, for %f ms", *line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHeaderLimitRefusalNamesItsHeuristicCountsAndLimits(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s := startDiscriminator(t, "", nil)
+	req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
+	fillHeaders(req, headerFieldLimit+1)
+	do(t, req)
+
+	wantHeuristic(t, s.out.requestLine(t), "header_limits",
+		`{"fields": 101, "fields_limit": 100, "cookies": 0, "cookies_limit": 50}`)
+}
+
+func TestEachHeaderLimitRefusesARequestOverIt(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	repeated := make([]string, headerFieldLimit)
+	for i := range repeated {
+		repeated[i] = "1"
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		make func(*http.Request)
+		// refused is true for a request over a limit, and false for one at it.
+		refused bool
+	}{
+		{"cookies at the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
+			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit))
+		}, false},
+		{"cookies over the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
+			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
+		}, true},
+		{"parts empty or only spaces and tabs are no cookies", func(req *http.Request) {
+			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit)+"; \t;;")
+		}, false},
+		{"parts of no-break spaces count", func(req *http.Request) {
+			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat(" ;", cookieLimit+1))
+		}, true},
+		{"cookies over the limit across two headers", func(req *http.Request) {
+			req.Header[cookieHeader] = []string{cookies(cookieLimit), "last=1"}
+		}, true},
+		{"cookies without a value count", func(req *http.Request) {
+			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", cookieLimit+1))
+		}, true},
+		{"header fields at the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
+			fillHeaders(req, headerFieldLimit)
+		}, false},
+		{"header fields over the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
+			fillHeaders(req, headerFieldLimit+1)
+		}, true},
+		{"a header sent many times counts each time", func(req *http.Request) {
+			req.Header["X-Filler"] = repeated
+		}, true},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
+			req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
+			tc.make(req)
+
+			got := do(t, req)
+			line := s.out.requestLine(t)
+
+			if tc.refused {
+				wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
+				wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
+
+				return
+			}
+
+			wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
+			wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+			if line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS == nil {
+				t.Error("the Core Rule Set did not read a request within the limits")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHeaderLimitsHoldWhateverTheCoreRuleSetSettingsSay(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, env := range []map[string]string{
+		{wafMode: off},
+		{wafMode: "detect"},
+		{wafMode: block, "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS": "/"},
+	} {
+		t.Run(fmt.Sprint(env), func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			s := startDiscriminator(t, "", env)
+			req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
+			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
+
+			wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestClientInTheAllowNetsSkipsTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block, allowNets: client})
+	req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
+	req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
+
+	wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
+}
+
+func TestObserveModeAllowsARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsUnread(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{mode: observe, wafMode: block})
+	req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
+	req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", 16000))
+
+	began := time.Now()
+	got := do(t, req)
+
+	if took := time.Since(began); took >= answerTimeLimit/2 {
+		t.Errorf("answered after %s, want well within %s", took, answerTimeLimit)
+	}
+
+	wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
+
+	line := s.out.requestLine(t)
+	if line.WouldAction != requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge ||
+		line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS != nil {
+		t.Errorf("would_action %q and duration_core_rule_set_ms %v, want %q and none",
+			line.WouldAction, line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestsOverTheHeaderLimitsCountTowardTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
+	ask := func() answer {
+		req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
+		req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
+
+		return do(t, req)
+	}
+
+	wantDisposition(t, ask(), tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
+	wantDisposition(t, ask(), http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
+
+	lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
+	wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+}
+
+func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeAfterTheTrapPathsAndTheRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name, path, action string
+	}{
+		{"a trap path", "/wp-login.php", requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned},
+		{"a block rule", "/blocked", requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{
+				trapPaths: trapPathList, rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
+			})
+			req := s.question(siteA, client, tc.path)
+			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
+
+			wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
+			wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden, tc.action)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNotWaitingForGeoJSNeverLowersAClientsLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
+	s := startDiscriminator(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
+		unknownLimitPercent: "0", lookupTimeout: "1h",
+	})
+	req := s.question(siteA, fromDE, "/")
+	req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
+
+	wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
+
+	line := s.out.requestLine(t)
+	wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
+
+	if line.RateLimitPercent != nil {
+		t.Errorf("limit percentage %d, want none", *line.RateLimitPercent)
+	}
+
+	// The client is under no ban, and GeoJS places it in a country.
+	wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromDE, "/"), http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
+}
+
+func TestAClientGeoJSPlacedInNoCountryCountsAsUnknownWithoutWaiting(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
+	s := startDiscriminator(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
+	s.server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{{
+		Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"), ASN: "AS64512",
+		Answered: s.clock.Now(), Used: s.clock.Now(),
+	}})
+
+	req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
+	req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
+
+	wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
+	wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+}
+
+func TestObserveModeWaitsForGeoJSForARequestOverTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
+	s := startDiscriminator(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
+		mode: observe, addLookupHeaders: on, lookupTimeout: "1h",
+	})
+	req := s.question(siteA, fromDE, "/")
+	req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
+
+	got := do(t, req)
+	wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
+
+	asn, country := got.header.Get("X-Client-Asn"), got.header.Get("X-Client-Country")
+	if asn != asnDE || country != "DE" {
+		t.Errorf("answered with the AS number %q and the country %q, want %q and DE",
+			asn, country, asnDE)
+	}
+}
+
+// newDiscriminatorInBubble makes a discriminator for a synctest bubble: GeoJS never
+// answers, a setting needs its answer, and everything is at its default but
+// for env. No request to it may use the network.
+func newDiscriminatorInBubble(
+	t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
+) (*discriminator.Server, *output) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	settings := map[string]string{tagDeny: "country=KP"}
+	maps.Copy(settings, env)
+
+	server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now, settings)
+
+	return server, out
+}
+
+// askDirectly hands a question about a request from client straight to server,
+// as change leaves it, and returns the answer's status and how long it took.
+func askDirectly(
+	t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, change func(*http.Request),
+) (int, time.Duration) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", http.NoBody)
+	req.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(rproxyPeer, "1234")
+	req.Header.Set(discriminator.ClientHeader, client)
+	req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-id")
+	change(req)
+
+	recorder := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	began := time.Now()
+
+	server.Handler.ServeHTTP(recorder, req)
+
+	return recorder.Code, time.Since(began)
+}
+
+// banClient bans client at now.
+func banClient(_ *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, now time.Time) {
+	server.Ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix(client+"/32"), now, bans.Notes{})
+}
+
+// countClient counts one request from client at now for the rate limits.
+func countClient(_ *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, now time.Time) {
+	server.Limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(client+"/32"), now, wholeLimit)
+}
+
+// listClient puts client on the blocklist at dropURL.
+func listClient(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, now time.Time) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	err := server.Lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
+		URL: dropURL, Tried: now, Fetched: now, Lines: []string{client},
+	}})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load the blocklist: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// decideOnClient puts client on the CrowdSec decision list.
+func decideOnClient(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, now time.Time) {
+	t.Helper()
+	loadDecisions(t, server, now, clientsDecision)
+}
+
+// leaveAsItIs prepares nothing.
+func leaveAsItIs(*testing.T, *discriminator.Server, time.Time) {}
+
+func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const forbidden = http.StatusForbidden
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		env  map[string]string
+		// prepare gets the server ready, at now, before the question.
+		prepare func(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, now time.Time)
+		// cookie is the request's Cookie header.
+		cookie string
+		status int
+		action string
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "SWW_DENY_NETS", env: map[string]string{denyNets: client},
+			prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "a ban",
+			prepare: banClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "the rate limits", env: map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"},
+			prepare: countClient, status: forbidden,
+			action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "the rate limits, with a biased threshold",
+			env:     map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1", unknownLimitPercent: "50"},
+			prepare: countClient, status: forbidden,
+			action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "a blocklist", env: map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL},
+			prepare: listClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "the CrowdSec decision list",
+			env:     map[string]string{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey},
+			prepare: decideOnClient, status: forbidden,
+			action: requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "the header limits", cookie: cookies(cookieLimit + 1),
+			prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: tooLarge,
+			action: requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge,
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
+			// says, so that a request that does not wait takes no time at all.
+			synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+				server, out := newDiscriminatorInBubble(t, tc.env)
+				tc.prepare(t, server, time.Now())
+
+				status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(req *http.Request) {
+					req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, tc.cookie)
+				})
+
+				if status != tc.status || took != 0 {
+					t.Errorf("answered %d after %s, want %d at once; output:\n%s",
+						status, took, tc.status, out.text())
+				}
+
+				wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), tc.status, tc.action)
+
+				// GeoJS's request is abandoned before the bubble ends.
+				time.Sleep(defaultLookupWait)
+			})
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAQuestionWaitsForASlowGeoJSOnlyAsLongAsTheDefaultSays(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		env  map[string]string
+		// prepare gets the server ready, at now, before the question.
+		prepare func(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, now time.Time)
+		status  int
+		action  string
+	}{
+		{"nothing refuses it", nil, leaveAsItIs, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
+		{
+			"a country list needs the answer", map[string]string{allowedCountries: "DE"},
+			leaveAsItIs, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
+		},
+		{
+			"a blocklist that only logs",
+			map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL, blocklistAction: actionLog},
+			listClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
+		},
+		{
+			"a blocklist that only limits",
+			map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL, blocklistAction: limitQuarter},
+			listClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
+		},
+		{
+			"over a rate limit on an exempt path",
+			map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1", rateLimitExemptPaths: "/"},
+			countClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+				server, out := newDiscriminatorInBubble(t, tc.env)
+				tc.prepare(t, server, time.Now())
+
+				status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(*http.Request) {})
+
+				if status != tc.status || took != defaultLookupWait {
+					t.Errorf("answered %d after %s, want %d after %s; output:\n%s",
+						status, took, tc.status, defaultLookupWait, out.text())
+				}
+
+				wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), tc.status, tc.action)
+			})
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDiscriminatorAnswersWithinTheTimeLimitWhileEveryOutsideSourceHangs(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	held, askedGeoJS, _ := startHeldGeoJS(t)
+
+	// A resolver that takes every query and answers none.
+	resolver, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).ListenPacket(t.Context(), "udp", localhost+":0")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = resolver.Close() })
+
+	server, out, _ := newDiscriminatorWith(t, func(
+		params discriminator.Params,
+	) *discriminator.Server {
+		params.AbuseIPDBURL = silentAbuseIPDBURL
+
+		return discriminator.New(params)
+	}, held, time.Now, map[string]string{
+		tagDeny: "country=KP", wafMode: block,
+		dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: resolver.LocalAddr().String(),
+		abuseIPDBKey:  accountKey,
+		blocklistURLs: held + "/drop.txt", asnLimitPercentURL: held + "/asn.txt",
+		crowdSecURL: held, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
+	})
+
+	// AbuseIPDB is asked only about a client with an offence.
+	group := netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32")
+	server.Limiter.AddToHistory(group, time.Now(), ratelimit.Request{Attack: true})
+
+	go server.Lists.Run(t.Context())
+
+	status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(req *http.Request) {
+		req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "test")
+		req.Header.Set("Accept", "*/*")
+		req.Host = siteA
+	})
+
+	if status != http.StatusOK || took >= answerTimeLimit {
+		t.Errorf("answered %d after %s, want %d within %s; output:\n%s",
+			status, took, http.StatusOK, answerTimeLimit, out.text())
+	}
+
+	// Each outside source was asked, and none has answered. The stand-in for
+	// GeoJS is the lists' too, which name no address.
+	if !slices.Contains(askedGeoJS(), client) {
+		t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %q, not %s", askedGeoJS(), client)
+	}
+
+	if queries := server.DNSBL.Queries(dnsblZone); queries != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("%d queries to the DNS blocklist, want 1", queries)
+	}
+
+	if checked := server.AbuseIPDB.Checked(); checked != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("%d checks with AbuseIPDB, want 1", checked)
+	}
+}
@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
-package proxy
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic active_ban, and the code that makes bans, which several
+// heuristics share. active_ban reads SWW_MODE; the bans are the ban ledger's.

 import (
-	"net/http"
+	"context"
 	"net/netip"
 	"time"

@@ -12,17 +15,21 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )

-// banResponse is a refusal answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and logged
+// banResponse is a refusal answered with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, and logged
 // with action.
 func (rq *request) banResponse(action string) *refusal {
 	return &refusal{status: rq.h.config.BanResponse, action: action}
 }

-// banned reports whether a ban on a netblock the client is in covers the
-// request at now, and notes for the log line when that ban ends. A
-// request that makes the ban permanent, or in observe mode would have,
-// raises the alert for it.
-func (rq *request) banned(now time.Time) bool {
+// activeBan refuses a client a ban covers: a ban on a netblock the client is
+// in, in force at now. It notes for the log line when that ban ends. A request
+// that makes the ban permanent, or in observe mode would have, raises the alert
+// for it. Its figures are the ban's netblock and when it ends.
+type activeBan struct{}
+
+func (activeBan) name() string { return "active_ban" }
+
+func (activeBan) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
 	check := rq.h.ledger.Check
 	if rq.h.config.Observe {
 		check = rq.h.ledger.Find // the ban refuses nothing, and stays as it is
@@ -38,105 +45,41 @@ func (rq *request) banned(now time.Time) bool {
 		rq.alertBan(ban)
 	}

-	return banned
-}
-
-// limitBroken counts the request for the rate limits at now, notes the
-// client's counts for the log line, and reports whether the request takes
-// the client over a rate limit, as its limit percentage lowers it, which
-// breaks it.
-func (rq *request) limitBroken(now time.Time) bool {
-	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
-		rq.limitPercent.percent)
-	rq.line.Counts = counts
-
-	if over {
-		rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.h.config.BanResponse)
+	if !banned {
+		return nil
 	}

-	return over
-}
-
-// countBytes counts the request's bytes, as countedBytes gives them, for
-// the byte limits, once its response has ended, and notes the client's
-// byte totals for the log line; its requests stay there as the rate limits
-// counted them. Only a request passed to the app has them counted, and
-// only one the rate limits counted; in observe mode, not one that enforce
-// mode would have refused. Bytes that take the client over a byte limit,
-// as its limit percentage for the byte limits lowers it, break it; the
-// response was passed on whole.
-func (rq *request) countBytes() {
-	if !rq.counted || rq.line.WouldAction != "" {
-		return
-	}
-
-	now := rq.h.now()
-
-	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountBytes(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
-		rq.countedBytes(), rq.bytesPercent.percent)
-	rq.line.Counts.MinuteBytes = counts.MinuteBytes
-	rq.line.Counts.HourBytes = counts.HourBytes
-	rq.line.Counts.DayBytes = counts.DayBytes
-
-	if over {
-		rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.out.status)
+	return &verdict{
+		action: banAction(ban.Permanent()),
+		figures: map[string]any{
+			figureNetblock: ban.Netblock.String(), "ban_expires": rq.line.BanExpires,
+		},
 	}
 }

-// countRefusal counts the request for the error burst once it has been
-// answered, if smallwebwaf refused it after a rule file match, a trap path
-// or a Core Rule Set match, or for a missing or wrong token, and in
-// observe mode if enforce mode would have: more than
-// SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD such refusals of the client within a minute
-// break a limit. A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS, which the checks skip, is
-// not counted, and nothing is while the threshold is off.
-func (rq *request) countRefusal() {
-	cfg := rq.h.config
-	if cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold == 0 {
-		return
+// banAction is the action of a request refused under a ban or for making one:
+// permanent says the ban never runs out.
+func banAction(permanent bool) string {
+	if permanent {
+		return requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned
 	}

-	// In observe mode, a request that enforce mode would have refused
-	// before it reached the endpoint has had no token refused there.
-	tokenRefused := rq.tokenRefused && rq.line.WouldAction == "" &&
-		!isInside(rq.client, cfg.AllowNets)
-	if !rq.attack && !rq.ruleBlocked && !rq.wafBlocked && !tokenRefused {
-		return
+	return requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned
+}
+
+// limitFigures are the figures of a heuristic that broke hit, a limit: its
+// window, the count and the limit.
+func limitFigures(hit ratelimit.Hit) map[string]any {
+	return map[string]any{
+		figureWindow: hit.Window, figureCount: hit.Count, figureLimit: hit.Limit,
 	}
-
-	now := rq.h.now()
-
-	hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountRefusal(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
-		cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold)
-	if !over {
-		return
-	}
-
-	// What the client was sent, or in observe mode would have been.
-	status := rq.out.status
-
-	switch rq.line.WouldAction {
-	case requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
-		status = http.StatusForbidden
-	case requestlog.ActionBanned:
-		status = cfg.BanResponse
-	}
-
-	rq.banForLimit(now, hit, status)
 }

 // countedBytes returns the request's bytes, once it has ended, as the
 // byte limits and the anomaly thresholds count them: the response's body
-// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT says. For an
-// upgraded connection, such as a WebSocket, which has closed by then, what
-// it carried from the app counts with the response's and what it carried
-// from the client with the request's.
+// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWW_BYTES_COUNT says.
 func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
-	response, request := rq.out.bytes, rq.requestBytes()
-	if rq.upgraded != nil {
-		response += rq.upgraded.fromApp.Load()
-		request += rq.upgraded.toApp.Load()
-	}
+	response, request := rq.out.bytes, rq.requestBytes

 	switch rq.h.config.BytesCount {
 	case "response":
@@ -151,7 +94,7 @@ func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
 // banForLimit bans the client's netblock at now for a broken limit, the
 // one hit names, notes the offence for the log line and counts the hit in
 // the metrics. status is what the client was sent, or is sent:
-// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over a rate limit, the app's answer for
+// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over a rate limit, what the report says for
 // one whose bytes broke a byte limit, the refusal for one that broke the
 // error burst. The ban's notes give the client's limit percentage for a
 // rate limit or a byte limit; the error burst is not lowered. The ban sets
@@ -163,7 +106,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
 	case ratelimit.KindBytes:
 		rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window + "_bytes" // as counts names the byte totals
 	case ratelimit.KindRefusals:
-		rq.line.LimitHit = requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst
+		rq.line.LimitHit = requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals
 	default:
 		rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window
 	}
@@ -191,9 +134,9 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {

 	switch hit.Kind {
 	case ratelimit.KindRequests:
-		notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
+		notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.rateLimitPercent.logged()
 	case ratelimit.KindBytes:
-		notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
+		notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.bytesLimitPercent.logged()
 	}

 	if rq.h.config.Observe {
@@ -218,11 +161,11 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
 // attack, which notes name: the ban rule that matched, or the trap path
 // asked for. It fills in the rest of the notes. In observe mode it makes
 // no ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that
-// alert would be sent.
-func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
+// alert would be sent. It returns the action for that ban.
+func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) string {
 	netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
 	if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseAttack) {
-		return
+		return banAction(rq.h.ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, now, bans.CauseAttack))
 	}

 	notes.ASN = rq.line.ASN
@@ -238,7 +181,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
 			rq.alertBan(ban)
 		}

-		return
+		return banAction(ban.Permanent())
 	}

 	ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, now, notes)
@@ -247,16 +190,18 @@ func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
 	if made {
 		rq.alertBan(ban)
 	}
+
+	return banAction(ban.Permanent())
 }

 // banForCrowdSec bans the client's netblock at now until decision,
 // CrowdSec's decision on the client, ends. In observe mode it makes no
 // ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that alert
-// would be sent.
-func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
+// would be sent. It returns the action for that ban.
+func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) string {
 	netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
 	if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
-		return
+		return banAction(rq.h.ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec))
 	}

 	notes := bans.Notes{
@@ -275,7 +220,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
 			rq.alertBan(ban)
 		}

-		return
+		return banAction(ban.Permanent())
 	}

 	ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, now, decision.Expires,
@@ -285,12 +230,14 @@ func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
 	if made {
 		rq.alertBan(ban)
 	}
+
+	return banAction(ban.Permanent())
 }

 // wouldAlertBan reports whether the alert for a ban on netblock for cause
 // made at now would be sent. In observe mode the ban the request would
 // have made is worked out only then, at most once per
-// SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN and never with no webhook set: its notes count the
+// SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN and never with no webhook set: its notes count the
 // netblock's requests, which can mean going through every client.
 func (rq *request) wouldAlertBan(
 	netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause string,
@@ -323,6 +270,7 @@ func (rq *request) alertBan(ban bans.Ban) {

 	rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
 		Event:    event,
+		Host:     rq.site,
 		Client:   rq.client,
 		Netblock: ban.Netblock,
 		ASN:      ban.Notes.ASN,
@@ -339,11 +287,11 @@ func (rq *request) alertBan(ban bans.Ban) {
 func (rq *request) noted(now time.Time, status int) bans.Request {
 	return bans.Request{
 		Time:      now,
-		Method:    rq.in.Method,
-		Host:      rq.in.Host,
-		Path:      rq.in.URL.RequestURI(),
+		Method:    rq.line.Method,
+		Host:      rq.line.Host,
+		Path:      rq.requestURI,
 		Status:    status,
-		UserAgent: rq.in.UserAgent(),
+		UserAgent: rq.line.UserAgent,
 	}
 }

@@ -355,7 +303,7 @@ func (rq *request) netblockRequests(netblock netip.Prefix) int64 {
 }

 // netblock is the netblock a ban on client covers: its IPv4 address,
-// widened to SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX, or the IPv6 group clientGroup
+// widened to SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX, or the IPv6 group clientGroup
 // counts it in.
 func (h *handler) netblock(client netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
 	addr := client.Unmap()
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"bufio"
@@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ import (
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"slices"
+	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"time"

 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )

@@ -25,6 +26,8 @@ const (
 	userAgent = "ban-test/1.0"
 	// permanent is the log line's ban_expires for a permanent ban.
 	permanent = "permanent"
+	// banResponseClose is the SWW_BAN_RESPONSE that closes the connection.
+	banResponseClose = "close"
 )

 func TestBrokenLimitBansTheClient(t *testing.T) {
@@ -37,7 +40,7 @@ func TestBrokenLimitBansTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	// client for an hour, the default.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)

-	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
 	if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit ||
 		line.BanExpires != expires {
 		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, offence %q and ban_expires %q, "+
@@ -48,7 +51,7 @@ func TestBrokenLimitBansTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	// Every request while the ban lasts is refused.
 	clk.advance(time.Hour - time.Second)

-	line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != expires || line.Offence != "" || line.LimitHit != "" {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, offence %q and limit_hit %q, "+
 			"want %s and neither of the others", line.BanExpires, line.Offence,
@@ -75,7 +78,9 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
 	breakLimit := func() string {
 		s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)

-		return s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited).BanExpires
+		line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+
+		return line.BanExpires
 	}
 	wantExpires := func(got string, length time.Duration) {
 		t.Helper()
@@ -86,19 +91,19 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}

-	// A first ban lasts SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION; one within
-	// SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW after it ended, three times as long.
+	// A first ban lasts SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION; one within
+	// SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW after it ended, three times as long.
 	wantExpires(breakLimit(), 10*time.Minute)
 	clk.advance(10*time.Minute + time.Hour)
 	wantExpires(breakLimit(), 30*time.Minute)

-	// Later than that, SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION again.
+	// Later than that, SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION again.
 	clk.advance(30*time.Minute + time.Hour + time.Second)
 	wantExpires(breakLimit(), 10*time.Minute)
 	clk.advance(10 * time.Minute)
 	wantExpires(breakLimit(), 30*time.Minute)

-	// 90 minutes would be longer than SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION: the ban is
+	// 90 minutes would be longer than SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION: the ban is
 	// permanent.
 	clk.advance(30 * time.Minute)

@@ -108,7 +113,7 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
 	}

 	clk.advance(365 * 24 * time.Hour)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
 }

 func TestBanIsNotCountedAndResetsTheCounters(t *testing.T) {
@@ -120,10 +125,10 @@ func TestBanIsNotCountedAndResetsTheCounters(t *testing.T) {
 	// client for an hour.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)

 	for range 3 {
-		s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+		s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	}

 	// Later the same day the client has its whole allowance again: the
@@ -132,7 +137,7 @@ func TestBanIsNotCountedAndResetsTheCounters(t *testing.T) {
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)

 	banned := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
 	if len(banned) != 2 || banned[0].Notes.Refused != 3 {
@@ -145,8 +150,8 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {

 	// In the IPv4 cases, client breaks the limit; these two are next to it.
 	const (
-		allowed = "203.0.113.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
-		exempt  = "203.0.113.50" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
+		allowed = "203.0.113.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
+		exempt  = "203.0.113.50" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
 	)

 	for _, tc := range []struct {
@@ -161,7 +166,7 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 			nil, []string{otherClient, exempt},
 		},
 		{
-			"the IPv4 netblock SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX sets",
+			"the IPv4 netblock SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX sets",
 			map[string]string{banScopeV4Prefix: "24"}, client,
 			[]string{otherClient, exempt}, []string{"203.0.112.9", allowed},
 		},
@@ -170,7 +175,7 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 			[]string{"2001:db8:5::ffff:1"}, []string{"2001:db8:5:1::1"},
 		},
 		{
-			"the IPv6 netblock SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets",
+			"the IPv6 netblock SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets",
 			map[string]string{ipv6GroupPrefix: "48"}, "2001:db8:7::1",
 			[]string{"2001:db8:7:ffff::1"}, []string{"2001:db8:8::1"},
 		},
@@ -187,10 +192,10 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 			s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", env)

 			s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-			s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+			s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)

 			for _, sent := range tc.refused {
-				s.get(sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+				s.get(sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 			}

 			for _, sent := range tc.let {
@@ -208,14 +213,14 @@ func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
 		lookupTimeout:      "1h",
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 		banScopeV4Prefix:   "24",
-		deniedCountries:    "kp",
+		tagDeny:            denyKP,
 	})

 	// fromDE's ban covers otherClient, which is refused unasked about.
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)

-	line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	if line.Country != "" {
 		t.Errorf("log line has country %q, want none", line.Country)
 	}
@@ -225,19 +230,35 @@ func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+func TestRefusalUnderABanNamesItsHeuristicNetblockAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		rateLimitPerMinute: "1", banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
+	})
+	expires := requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour))
+
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+
+	line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "active_ban",
+		`{"netblock": "`+clientsNet+`", "ban_expires": "`+expires+`"}`)
+}
+
 func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
+	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS

 	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		setting string // "" leaves SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE at its default
+		setting string // "" leaves SWW_BAN_RESPONSE at its default
 		status  int    // 0 is the connection closed without an answer
 	}{
 		{"", http.StatusForbidden},
 		{"403", http.StatusForbidden},
 		{"429", http.StatusTooManyRequests},
-		{"close", 0},
+		{banResponseClose, 0},
 	} {
 		t.Run(banResponse+"="+tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
@@ -247,7 +268,7 @@ func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
 				lookupTimeout:      "1h",
 				rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 				denyNets:           denied,
-				deniedCountries:    "kp",
+				tagDeny:            denyKP,
 			}

 			if tc.setting != "" {
@@ -256,11 +277,11 @@ func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {

 			s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, env)

-			s.get(denied, tc.status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
-			s.get(fromKP, tc.status, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
+			s.get(denied, tc.status, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+			s.get(fromKP, tc.status, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
 			s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-			s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-			s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+			s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+			s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -272,15 +293,15 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
 	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		lookupTimeout:      "1h",
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
-		deniedCountries:    "kp",
+		tagDeny:            denyKP,
 	})
 	start := clk.Now()

 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.request(fromDE, "/repo/commits?page=2",
-		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)

 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32")
 	want := bans.Ban{
@@ -323,7 +344,7 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
 	// The next ban counts this one among the earlier.
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)

 	got = ledger.Bans(netblock)
 	if len(got) != 2 || got[1].Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
@@ -341,15 +362,15 @@ func TestMaxBansDropsTheBanOfTheNetblockSeenLongestAgo(t *testing.T) {

 	// One ban is held, so otherClient's ban drops client's.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
 	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)

 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 }

-// clock is the time a test sets, by which smallwebwaf counts requests and
+// clock is the time a test sets, by which sww counts requests and
 // makes bans.
 type clock struct {
 	mu  sync.Mutex
@@ -372,14 +393,14 @@ func (c *clock) advance(d time.Duration) {
 	c.now = c.now.Add(d)
 }

-// startWithClock starts smallwebwaf in front of an app that answers 200,
+// startWithClock starts discriminator, and rproxy in front of an app that answers 200,
 // with the settings in env on top of trusting localhost's
 // X-Forwarded-For, clients' AS numbers and countries looked up at
 // geojsURL, and a clock set to midnight, the start of a bucket in every
 // window.
 func startWithClock(
 	t *testing.T, geojsURL string, env map[string]string,
-) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server) {
+) (*sender, *clock, *discriminator.Server) {
 	t.Helper()

 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
@@ -389,16 +410,18 @@ func startWithClock(

 	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, clk.Now, settings)

-	return &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}, clk, server
+	return &sender{t: t, addr: addr, discriminatorAddr: server.Addr, out: out}, clk, server
 }

-// sender sends requests to smallwebwaf one after another, each on a
-// connection of its own, and checks each one's answer and log line. They
-// must be the only requests smallwebwaf is sent, since the log lines are
+// sender sends requests to rproxy one after another, each on a connection of its
+// own, and checks each one's answer and log line. discriminatorAddr is where
+// discriminator's own endpoints are, which ownEndpointRequest asks. Every request
+// discriminator gets must come through the sender, since the log lines are
 // matched to them in order.
 type sender struct {
 	t                 *testing.T
 	addr              string
+	discriminatorAddr string
 	out               *output
 	sent              int
 }
@@ -417,22 +440,19 @@ func (s *sender) get(from string, status int, action string) logLine {
 func (s *sender) request(from, path string, status int, action string) logLine {
 	s.t.Helper()

-	line, _ := s.requestWithHeader(from, path, "", status, action)
-
-	return line
+	return s.requestWithHeader(from, path, "", status, action)
 }

 // requestWithHeader is request with header, such as "Authorization:
-// Bearer x", added to the request unless it is "". It returns the body of
-// the answer too.
+// Bearer x", added to the request unless it is "".
 func (s *sender) requestWithHeader(
 	from, path, header string, status int, action string,
-) (logLine, string) {
+) logLine {
 	s.t.Helper()

-	line, got := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodGet, from, path, header, "", status, action)
+	line, _ := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodGet, from, path, header, "", status, action)

-	return line, string(got.body)
+	return line
 }

 // requestWithBody is requestWithHeader for a request with method, whose
@@ -448,10 +468,14 @@ func (s *sender) requestWithBody(
 		header += "\r\n"
 	}

+	// rproxy refuses a request with more than one.
+	if !strings.Contains(header, "User-Agent:") {
+		header += "User-Agent: " + userAgent + "\r\n"
+	}
+
 	conn := dial(s.t, s.addr)
-	send(s.t, conn, method+" "+path+" HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+
-		"\r\nUser-Agent: "+userAgent+"\r\n"+forwardedFor+": "+from+"\r\n"+
-		header+"\r\n"+body)
+	send(s.t, conn, method+" "+path+" HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+"\r\n"+
+		forwardedFor+": "+from+"\r\n"+header+"\r\n"+body)

 	err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(waitLimit))
 	if err != nil {
@@ -476,7 +500,7 @@ func (s *sender) requestWithBody(
 			got.status, status)
 	}

-	line := s.out.requestLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
+	line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
 	s.sent++
 	wantLine(s.t, line, status, action)

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy
+package discriminator

 import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
@@ -17,28 +17,29 @@ type percentage struct {
 }

 // biasedThresholdsSet reports whether a biased threshold can lower a
-// client's limits: one of its lists is not empty,
-// SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is below 100, or SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL
-// is set. The client's lookup is then needed before its request goes on.
+// client's limits by its lookup: SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT or
+// SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT is not empty, SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is
+// below 100, or SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL is set. The client's lookup is
+// then needed before its request goes on.
 func biasedThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
-	return len(cfg.ASNLimitPercent) > 0 || len(cfg.CountryLimitPercent) > 0 ||
-		len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) > 0 || len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) > 0 ||
+	return len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) > 0 || len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) > 0 ||
 		cfg.UnknownLimitPercent < whole || cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL != ""
 }

 // limitPercentages returns the client's limit percentages, for the rate
-// limits and for the byte limits, by its AS number and country as looked
-// up, each "" when unknown, and the blocklists, DNSBL zones and AbuseIPDB
-// that list it. Each is the lowest of those the settings give it, the
-// first of them in the order below when several are lowest: the
-// percentage SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its AS number, the one the file
-// SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names gives it, the one
-// SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its country, for a client without a
-// country, SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist lists,
-// the percentage of SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and for a
-// client a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is a hit,
-// the percentage of SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For the
-// byte limits, SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT
+// limits and for the byte limits, by its tags, its AS number and country
+// as looked up, each "" when unknown, and the blocklists, DNSBL zones and
+// AbuseIPDB that list it. Each is the lowest of those the settings give
+// it, the first of them in the order below when several are lowest: the
+// percentage SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its asn= tag, the one the file
+// SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names gives its AS number, the one
+// SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its country= tag, the lowest it gives its
+// other tags, for a client without a country, unless its request skipped
+// the wait for GeoJS, SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist
+// lists, the percentage of SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and
+// for a client a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is
+// a hit, the percentage of SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For
+// the byte limits, SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT
 // take the place of the first three for an AS number or a country they
 // list.
 func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
@@ -46,45 +47,54 @@ func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
 	asn, country := rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country

 	unknown := percentage{percent: whole}
-	if country == "" {
-		unknown = percentage{cfg.UnknownLimitPercent, "SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"}
+	if country == "" && !rq.skippedLookupWait {
+		unknown = percentage{cfg.UnknownLimitPercent, "SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"}
 	}

 	fetched := percentage{percent: whole}
 	if percent, listed := rq.h.lists.ASNLimitPercent(asn); listed {
-		fetched = percentage{percent, "SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"}
+		fetched = percentage{percent, "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"}
 	}

 	blocklisted := percentage{percent: whole}
 	if rq.blocklisted && cfg.BlocklistAction == "limit" {
-		blocklisted = percentage{cfg.BlocklistLimitPercent, "SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"}
+		blocklisted = percentage{cfg.BlocklistLimitPercent, "SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"}
 	}

 	reputationListed := percentage{percent: whole}
 	if (rq.dnsblListed || rq.abuseIPDBHit) && cfg.ReputationAction == "limit" {
-		reputationListed = percentage{cfg.ReputationLimitPercent, "SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION"}
+		reputationListed = percentage{cfg.ReputationLimitPercent, "SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION"}
 	}

-	asnRequests := lowest(given(cfg.ASNLimitPercent, asn, "SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"),
-		fetched)
-	countryRequests := given(cfg.CountryLimitPercent, country,
-		"SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT")
+	const tagSetting = "SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT"
+
+	asnRequests := lowest(given(cfg.TagLimitPercent, asnTag(asn), tagSetting), fetched)
+	countryRequests := given(cfg.TagLimitPercent, countryTag(country), tagSetting)
+
+	otherTags := percentage{percent: whole}
+
+	for _, tag := range rq.line.Tags {
+		if tag != asnTag(asn) && tag != countryTag(country) {
+			otherTags = lowest(otherTags, given(cfg.TagLimitPercent, tag, tagSetting))
+		}
+	}

 	asnBytes, countryBytes := asnRequests, countryRequests
 	if _, listed := cfg.ASNBytesPercent[asn]; listed {
-		asnBytes = given(cfg.ASNBytesPercent, asn, "SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT")
+		asnBytes = given(cfg.ASNBytesPercent, asn, "SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT")
 	}

 	if _, listed := cfg.CountryBytesPercent[country]; listed {
-		countryBytes = given(cfg.CountryBytesPercent, country, "SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT")
+		countryBytes = given(cfg.CountryBytesPercent, country, "SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT")
 	}

-	return lowest(asnRequests, countryRequests, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed),
-		lowest(asnBytes, countryBytes, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed)
+	return lowest(asnRequests, countryRequests, otherTags, unknown, blocklisted,
+			reputationListed),
+		lowest(asnBytes, countryBytes, otherTags, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed)
 }

 // given returns the percentage percents, the setting named setting, gives
-// code, an AS number or a country, or whole when it does not list code.
+// code, an AS number, a country or a tag, or whole when it does not list code.
 func given(percents map[string]int64, code, setting string) percentage {
 	percent, listed := percents[code]
 	if !listed {
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"maps"
-	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/netip"
@@ -16,18 +15,17 @@ import (

 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup/lookuptest"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )

 // The biased thresholds.
 const (
-	asnLimitPercent     = "SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
-	countryLimitPercent = "SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT"
-	asnBytesPercent     = "SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
-	countryBytesPercent = "SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
-	unknownLimitPercent = "SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
+	tagLimitPercent     = "SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT"
+	asnBytesPercent     = "SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
+	countryBytesPercent = "SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
+	unknownLimitPercent = "SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
 )

 const (
@@ -36,6 +34,11 @@ const (
 	asnDEHalf     = asnDE + ":50"
 	asnDEQuarter  = asnDE + ":25"
 	countryDEHalf = "de:50"
+	// The same, as SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT names fromDE's tags.
+	asnTagDEHalf        = "asn=64496:50"
+	asnTagDEQuarter     = "asn=64496:25"
+	countryTagDEHalf    = "country=DE:50"
+	countryTagDEQuarter = "country=DE:25"
 	// noCountry is in an AS of its own, AS64500, and in no country.
 	noCountry = "192.0.2.80"
 	// fourAMinute is the rate limit these tests set: half of it is 2
@@ -55,8 +58,8 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		setting, value, from string
 	}{
-		{asnLimitPercent, asnDEHalf, fromDE},
-		{countryLimitPercent, countryDEHalf, fromDE},
+		{tagLimitPercent, asnTagDEHalf, fromDE},
+		{tagLimitPercent, countryTagDEHalf, fromDE},
 		{unknownLimitPercent, "50", unplaced},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -73,17 +76,19 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
 			}{
 				{http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 				{http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
-				{http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
+				{http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
 			} {
 				line := s.get(tc.from, sent.status, sent.action)
-				wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+				wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+					line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 					"50 from "+tc.setting)
 			}

 			// fromKP, which no setting lists, has the whole limit.
 			for range 3 {
 				line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-				wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+				wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+					line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 					none)
 			}
 		})
@@ -97,8 +102,8 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheByteLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		setting, value, from string
 	}{
-		{asnLimitPercent, asnDEHalf, fromDE},
-		{countryLimitPercent, "DE:50", fromDE},
+		{tagLimitPercent, asnTagDEHalf, fromDE},
+		{tagLimitPercent, "Country=de:50", fromDE},
 		{unknownLimitPercent, "50", unplaced},
 		{asnBytesPercent, "as64496:50", fromDE},
 		{countryBytesPercent, countryDEHalf, fromDE},
@@ -116,7 +121,8 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheByteLimits(t *testing.T) {
 				t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want %s", line.LimitHit, minuteBytes)
 			}

-			wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
+			wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+				line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
 				"50 from "+tc.setting)

 			// fromKP, which no setting lists, has the whole limit.
@@ -125,7 +131,8 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheByteLimits(t *testing.T) {
 				t.Errorf("log line for %s has limit_hit %q, want none", fromKP, line.LimitHit)
 			}

-			wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting, none)
+			wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+				line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting, none)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -136,9 +143,9 @@ func TestBytesPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(t *testing.T)
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
 		env  map[string]string
-		// limitPercent and bytesPercent are the log line's, as percentText
-		// gives them, and limitHit is its limit_hit.
-		limitPercent, bytesPercent, limitHit string
+		// rateLimitPercent and bytesLimitPercent are the log line's, as
+		// percentText gives them, and limitHit is its limit_hit.
+		rateLimitPercent, bytesLimitPercent, limitHit string
 	}{
 		{
 			"lowering the byte limits alone",
@@ -152,13 +159,13 @@ func TestBytesPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(t *testing.T)
 		},
 		{
 			"raising the byte limits back",
-			map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEHalf, asnBytesPercent: asnDE + ":100"},
-			"50 from " + asnLimitPercent, none, "",
+			map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEHalf, asnBytesPercent: asnDE + ":100"},
+			"50 from " + tagLimitPercent, none, "",
 		},
 		{
 			"raising the byte limits back, by country",
-			map[string]string{countryLimitPercent: countryDEHalf, countryBytesPercent: "de:100"},
-			"50 from " + countryLimitPercent, none, "",
+			map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: countryTagDEHalf, countryBytesPercent: "de:100"},
+			"50 from " + tagLimitPercent, none, "",
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -174,10 +181,12 @@ func TestBytesPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(t *testing.T)
 				t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want %q", line.LimitHit, tc.limitHit)
 			}

-			wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
-				tc.limitPercent)
-			wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
-				tc.bytesPercent)
+			wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+				line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
+				tc.rateLimitPercent)
+			wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+				line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
+				tc.bytesLimitPercent)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -185,19 +194,19 @@ func TestBytesPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(t *testing.T)
 func TestZeroPercentIsAZeroAllowance(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDE + ":0"})
+	s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})

 	// The first request breaks the limit, and bans the client; the log line
 	// gives the 0.
-	line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-	if line.fields["limit_percent"] != float64(0) ||
-		line.fields["limit_percent_setting"] != asnLimitPercent {
-		t.Errorf("log line has limit_percent %v from %v, want 0 from %s",
-			line.fields["limit_percent"], line.fields["limit_percent_setting"],
-			asnLimitPercent)
+	line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	if line.fields["rate_limit_percent"] != float64(0) ||
+		line.fields["rate_limit_percent_setting"] != unknownLimitPercent {
+		t.Errorf("log line has rate_limit_percent %v from %v, want 0 from %s",
+			line.fields["rate_limit_percent"], line.fields["rate_limit_percent_setting"],
+			unknownLimitPercent)
 	}

-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 }

 func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
@@ -207,34 +216,34 @@ func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
 		name string
 		env  map[string]string
 		from string
-		// want is the log line's limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
+		// want is the log line's rate_limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
 		want string
 	}{
 		{
 			"the country's",
-			map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEHalf, countryLimitPercent: "de:25"},
-			fromDE, "25 from " + countryLimitPercent,
+			map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEHalf + "," + countryTagDEQuarter},
+			fromDE, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
 		},
 		{
 			"the AS number's",
-			map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter, countryLimitPercent: countryDEHalf},
-			fromDE, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent,
+			map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter + "," + countryTagDEHalf},
+			fromDE, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
 		},
 		{
 			"the AS number's, the first of two alike",
-			map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter, countryLimitPercent: "de:25"},
-			fromDE, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent,
+			map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter + "," + countryTagDEQuarter},
+			fromDE, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
 		},
 		{
 			"that for a client without a country",
-			map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: "AS64500:50", unknownLimitPercent: "25"},
+			map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: "asn=64500:50", unknownLimitPercent: "25"},
 			noCountry, "25 from " + unknownLimitPercent,
 		},
 		{
-			// SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is left at its default, 100.
+			// SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is left at its default, 100.
 			"the AS number's, for a client without a country",
-			map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: "AS64500:25"},
-			noCountry, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent,
+			map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: "asn=64500:25"},
+			noCountry, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -247,8 +256,9 @@ func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
 			// A quarter of 4 requests a minute: the second breaks the limit.
 			s.get(tc.from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)

-			line := s.get(tc.from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-			wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+			line := s.get(tc.from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+			wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+				line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 				tc.want)
 		})
 	}
@@ -266,7 +276,7 @@ func TestUnknownLimitPercentGivesEveryClientWithoutACountryItsPercentage(t *test
 	for _, from := range []string{unplaced, "10.0.0.8"} {
 		s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 		s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-		s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+		s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
 	}

 	// One in a country has the whole limit.
@@ -281,17 +291,18 @@ func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownLimitPercent(t *testing.T) {
 	// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
 	// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
-		server, out, _ := newProxy(t, "http://app.invalid", unansweredGeoJSURL,
-			time.Now, map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
+		server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
+			map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})

-		// Once the second the request waits for its answer is up, the client
+		// Once the time the request waits for its answer is up, the client
 		// counts as without a country, and its zero allowance refuses the
-		// request before it reaches the app.
+		// request.
 		serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodGet, http.NoBody)

 		line := out.requestLine(t)
-		wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-		wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+		wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+		wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+			line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 			"0 from "+unknownLimitPercent)
 	})
 }
@@ -305,8 +316,12 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
 		setting, value string
 		waits          bool
 	}{
-		{asnLimitPercent, asnDEHalf, true},
-		{countryLimitPercent, countryDEHalf, true},
+		{tagLimitPercent, asnTagDEHalf, true},
+		{tagLimitPercent, countryTagDEHalf, true},
+		{tagDeny, denyKP, true},
+		// A tag the lookup does not give needs no answer.
+		{tagLimitPercent, "vpn:50", false},
+		{tagDeny, "vpn", false},
 		{asnBytesPercent, asnDEHalf, true},
 		{countryBytesPercent, countryDEHalf, true},
 		{unknownLimitPercent, "99", true},
@@ -320,12 +335,9 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
 			// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
 			// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
 			synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
-				// The request's body is over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES, so that it
-				// is refused after the checks, and never reaches the app.
-				server, out, _ := newProxy(t, "http://app.invalid", unansweredGeoJSURL,
-					time.Now, map[string]string{
-						lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), requestMaxBytes: "1",
-						tc.setting: tc.value,
+				server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
+					map[string]string{
+						lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList, tc.setting: tc.value,
 					})
 				began := time.Now()

@@ -340,8 +352,7 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
 					t.Errorf("the request waited %s for its answer, want %s", waited, want)
 				}

-				wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
-					requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
+				wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)

 				// The bubble's clock stops once this function returns, so the
 				// request to GeoJS, which a request that did not wait leaves
@@ -370,15 +381,15 @@ func TestBanForALoweredLimitGivesThePercentageInItsNotesAndItsAlert(t *testing.T
 		{
 			// A quarter of 12 requests a minute is 3: the fourth breaks it.
 			"a rate limit",
-			map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "12", asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter},
-			3, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
-			"requests per minute over the limit of 3", "25 from " + asnLimitPercent,
+			map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "12", tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter},
+			3, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
+			"requests per minute over the limit of 3", "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
 		},
 		{
 			// The byte limits' percentage, not the rate limits'.
 			"a byte limit",
 			map[string]string{
-				bytesLimitPerMinute: twoUploads, asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter,
+				bytesLimitPerMinute: twoUploads, tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter,
 				asnBytesPercent: asnDEHalf,
 			},
 			0, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
@@ -426,7 +437,7 @@ func TestBanForALoweredLimitGivesThePercentageInItsNotesAndItsAlert(t *testing.T
 // clock.
 func startWithLookups(
 	t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
-) (*sender, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
+) (*sender, *discriminator.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()

 	s, _, server, queue := startWithLookupsAndClock(t, env)
@@ -441,7 +452,7 @@ func startWithLookups(
 // country, and no other address.
 func startWithLookupsAndClock(
 	t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
-) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
+) (*sender, *clock, *discriminator.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()

 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ipinfo_lite.mmdb")
@@ -467,13 +478,17 @@ func (s *sender) uploadFrom(from string) logLine {
 	return line
 }

-// serveFromDE hands a request from fromDE with method and body straight to
-// server's handler, without the network, and returns once it is answered.
-func serveFromDE(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, method string, body io.Reader) {
+// serveFromDE hands a question about a request from fromDE with method and body
+// straight to server's handler, without the network, and returns once it is
+// answered.
+func serveFromDE(
+	t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, method string, body io.Reader,
+) {
 	t.Helper()

 	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), method, "/", body)
-	req.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(fromDE, "1234")
+	req.Header.Set(discriminator.ClientHeader, fromDE)
+	req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-id")

 	server.Handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
 }
@@ -490,7 +505,7 @@ func wantPercent(t *testing.T, what string, percent *int64, setting, want string
 }

 // percentText gives a limit percentage and the setting that gave it as
-// text, such as "50 from SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT", or none when both are
+// text, such as "50 from SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT", or none when both are
 // left out.
 func percentText(percent *int64, setting string) string {
 	switch {
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic blocklists. It reads SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, and the blocklists
+// through the reputation lists.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// blocklists notes the blocklists that list the client, as noteListed does,
+// and refuses the request when SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny. Being limit, it
+// lowers the client's limits instead (see limitPercentages), and being log, it
+// does nothing more. Its figure is the blocklists that list the client.
+type blocklists struct{}
+
+func (blocklists) name() string { return "blocklists" }
+
+func (blocklists) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
+	listedBy := rq.h.lists.ListedBy(rq.client)
+	rq.blocklisted = len(listedBy) > 0
+	rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a blocklist")
+
+	if !rq.refusedByBlocklists(listedBy) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return &verdict{
+		action:  requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+		figures: map[string]any{"lists": listedBy},
+	}
+}
+
+// refusedByBlocklists reports whether the heuristic blocklists refuses a
+// client, given listedBy, the blocklists that list it: it does when one lists
+// it and SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny.
+func (rq *request) refusedByBlocklists(listedBy []string) bool {
+	return len(listedBy) > 0 && rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic byte_limits. It reads SWW_BYTES_COUNT, and the byte limits
+// and biased thresholds through the limiter and limitPercentages.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// byteLimits counts the request's bytes, as countedBytes gives them, for the
+// byte limits, once its report has come, and notes the client's byte totals for
+// the log line; its requests stay there as the rate limits counted them. Only
+// an allowed request has them counted, and only one the rate limits counted; in
+// observe mode, not one that enforce mode would have refused. Bytes that take
+// the client over a byte limit, as its limit percentage for the byte limits
+// lowers it, break it, which bans the client; the response was passed on whole.
+// Its figures are the window, the count and the limit.
+type byteLimits struct{}
+
+func (byteLimits) name() string { return "byte_limits" }
+
+func (byteLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
+	if !rq.counted || rq.line.WouldAction != "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountBytes(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
+		rq.countedBytes(), rq.bytesLimitPercent.percent)
+	rq.line.Counts.MinuteBytes = counts.MinuteBytes
+	rq.line.Counts.HourBytes = counts.HourBytes
+	rq.line.Counts.DayBytes = counts.DayBytes
+
+	if !over {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.out.status)
+
+	return &verdict{figures: limitFigures(hit)}
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"bufio"
@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ import (

 // The byte limit settings.
 const (
-	bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
-	bytesLimitPerHour   = "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
-	bytesLimitPerDay    = "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
-	bytesCount          = "SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT"
+	bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
+	bytesLimitPerHour   = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
+	bytesLimitPerDay    = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
+	bytesCount          = "SWW_BYTES_COUNT"
 )

-// The values of SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT.
+// The values of SWW_BYTES_COUNT.
 const (
 	countResponse = "response"
 	countRequest  = "request"
@@ -40,15 +40,13 @@ const (
 	// byteLimit is the byte limit these tests set, as a setting: a request
 	// with a body and its answer, 100 bytes, go over it.
 	byteLimit = "99"
-	// minuteBytes is limit_hit for SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE.
+	// minuteBytes is limit_hit for SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE.
 	minuteBytes = "minute_bytes"
 )

 func TestEachByteLimitBansOnceTheResponseHasEnded(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
-
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		setting, window string
 		// apart is the time between the two requests, which the window
@@ -92,14 +90,29 @@ func TestEachByteLimitBansOnceTheResponseHasEnded(t *testing.T) {
 					line.BanExpires, tc.window, expires)
 			}

-			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)

-			wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{`+
+			wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{`+
 				`instance="`+alertInstance+`",kind="bytes",window="`+tc.window+`"}`, 1)
 		})
 	}
 }

+func TestByteLimitBanNamesItsHeuristicWindowCountAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit})
+
+	line, _ := s.download()
+	wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t, line, "", "null")
+
+	// Two answers of 70 bytes are over the limit of 99.
+	line, _ = s.download()
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "", "null")
+	wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t, line, "byte_limits",
+		`{"window": "minute", "count": 140, "limit": 99}`)
+}
+
 func TestResponseOverAByteLimitByItselfIsPassedOnWhole(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -112,7 +125,7 @@ func TestResponseOverAByteLimitByItselfIsPassedOnWhole(t *testing.T) {
 			len(got.body), got.err, line.LimitHit, answerBytes, minuteBytes)
 	}

-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 }

 func TestBytesOfAnAnswerThatBreaksOffAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
@@ -126,7 +139,7 @@ func TestBytesOfAnAnswerThatBreaksOffAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
 	// The 70 bytes passed on before the app broke off are over the limit of
 	// 50, and ban the client for an hour.
 	line, got := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodGet, client, "/", "", "", http.StatusOK,
-		requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
+		requestlog.ActionForward)
 	if len(got.body) != answerBytes || line.LimitHit != minuteBytes ||
 		line.BanExpires != expires {
 		t.Errorf("got %d bytes, and the log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, "+
@@ -134,7 +147,7 @@ func TestBytesOfAnAnswerThatBreaksOffAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
 			answerBytes, minuteBytes, expires)
 	}

-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 }

 func TestWebSocketBytesAreCountedOnceItCloses(t *testing.T) {
@@ -163,44 +176,11 @@ func TestWebSocketBytesAreCountedOnceItCloses(t *testing.T) {
 					line.LimitHit, line.Counts.MinuteBytes, minuteBytes, tc.counted)
 			}

-			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 		})
 	}
 }

-func TestWebSocketPassesTheAnswerAfterTheClientStopsSending(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	app := startApp(t, echoOnceTheClientStops)
-	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL,
-		map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost})
-	s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}
-
-	conn, reader := s.openWebSocket()
-	send(t, conn, uploadBody)
-
-	// The client closes its sending side and waits for the answer, which the
-	// app sends only once it has seen the client stop. smallwebwaf passes the
-	// close on to the app through CloseWrite on upgradedConn; without that,
-	// it closes both connections, and the answer is lost.
-	tcp, ok := conn.(*net.TCPConn)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("connection is a %T, want a *net.TCPConn", conn)
-	}
-
-	err := tcp.CloseWrite()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("close the sending side: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	got, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
-	if err != nil || string(got) != uploadBody {
-		t.Errorf("got %q (%v), want %q", got, err, uploadBody)
-	}
-
-	s.closeWebSocket(conn)
-}
-
 func TestBytesCountSaysWhichBytesCount(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -238,7 +218,7 @@ func TestBytesCountSaysWhichBytesCount(t *testing.T) {
 				}
 			}

-			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -247,8 +227,8 @@ func TestByteLimitsLeaveOutWhatTheRateLimitsLeaveOut(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	const (
-		allowed = "192.0.2.7"  // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
-		exempt  = "192.0.2.10" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
+		allowed = "192.0.2.7"  // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
+		exempt  = "192.0.2.10" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
 	)

 	s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{
@@ -406,7 +386,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLeavesOutTheBytesOfARequestEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T)
 	// counted, and the byte limit is not broken. Its line gives the bytes
 	// counted before it.
 	line := s.upload()
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)

 	if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Counts.MinuteBytes != bodyBytes+answerBytes {
 		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and minute_bytes %v, want minute and %d",
@@ -465,28 +445,6 @@ func answerAfterUpgrade(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 	}
 }

-// echoOnceTheClientStops is an app that switches protocols, as for a
-// WebSocket, reads what the client sends until the client stops sending,
-// and then sends it all back.
-func echoOnceTheClientStops(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-	conn, buffered, err := http.NewResponseController(w).Hijack()
-	if err != nil {
-		return
-	}
-
-	defer func() {
-		_ = conn.Close()
-	}()
-
-	_, _ = buffered.WriteString("HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n" +
-		"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
-	_ = buffered.Flush()
-
-	received, _ := io.ReadAll(buffered)
-	_, _ = buffered.Write(received)
-	_ = buffered.Flush()
-}
-
 // webSocket opens a WebSocket from client to answerAfterUpgrade, sends a
 // line of bodyBytes on it, reads the answer, and closes it. It checks the
 // answer, and the log line as request does, and returns the log line.
@@ -543,7 +501,7 @@ func (s *sender) closeWebSocket(conn net.Conn) logLine {

 	_ = conn.Close()

-	line := s.out.requestLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
+	line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
 	s.sent++
 	wantLine(s.t, line, http.StatusSwitchingProtocols, requestlog.ActionForward)

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+package discriminator
+
+import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
+)
+
+// peerAddress is the address of the request's TCP peer.
+func peerAddress(r *http.Request) netip.Addr {
+	addrPort, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(r.RemoteAddr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return netip.Addr{}
+	}
+
+	return addrPort.Addr().Unmap()
+}
+
+// requestIDHeader carries the request's id, from rproxy.
+const requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
+
+// requestID is the request's id: the one a question gives, or for any other
+// request a new random one.
+func requestID(r *http.Request, isQuestion bool) string {
+	if isQuestion {
+		return r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
+	}
+
+	return rand.Text()
+}
+
+// scheme is how the visitor reached rproxy, or the trusted proxy in front of
+// it, as a question says in X-Forwarded-Proto, or otherwise http.
+func scheme(r *http.Request, isQuestion bool) string {
+	proto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")
+	if !isQuestion || proto == "" {
+		return "http"
+	}
+
+	return proto
+}
+
+// clientGroup is the client a request is counted toward: its IPv4
+// address, or its IPv6 group, the netblock its IPv6 address is in of the
+// length SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets, a /64 by default, since one abuser
+// usually holds a whole /64. An IPv4 address in IPv6 form counts as IPv4.
+func (h *handler) clientGroup(addr netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
+	addr = addr.Unmap()
+	if addr.Is6() {
+		return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, h.config.IPv6GroupPrefix).Masked()
+	}
+
+	return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen())
+}
+
+// isInside reports whether addr is in one of the netblocks.
+func isInside(addr netip.Addr, netblocks []netip.Prefix) bool {
+	return slices.ContainsFunc(netblocks, func(netblock netip.Prefix) bool {
+		return netblock.Contains(addr)
+	})
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic core_rule_set. It reads SWW_WAF_MODE, SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS
+// and SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// coreRuleSet inspects the request with the Core Rule Set, unless
+// SWW_WAF_MODE is off or SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS exempts its path, as
+// pathExempt decides, and notes the rules it matched and its score in the
+// log line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
+// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD is a match: it adds the tag exploitsignature,
+// raises the core_rule_set_match alert, and in block mode refuses the request with 403,
+// which is an offence its client's history counts. Its figures are the score
+// and the threshold.
+type coreRuleSet struct{}
+
+func (coreRuleSet) name() string { return "core_rule_set" }
+
+func (coreRuleSet) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
+	cfg := rq.h.config
+	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff || pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.WAFExemptPaths) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	start := time.Now()
+
+	// A question's body has been read into memory, so that reading it here
+	// cannot fail.
+	result, read, _ := rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(rq.in, rq.client, rq.in.Body)
+	rq.requestBytes = int64(len(read))
+
+	rq.line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(time.Since(start)))
+	rq.line.CoreRuleSetRuleIDs = result.RuleIDs
+	rq.line.CoreRuleSetScore = &result.Score
+
+	for _, id := range result.RuleIDs {
+		rq.h.metrics.CoreRuleSetMatched(cfg.WAFMode, id)
+	}
+
+	threshold := cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold
+	if threshold == 0 || result.Score < threshold {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	rq.addTag(config.ExploitSignatureTag)
+	rq.alertCoreRuleSetMatch(result)
+
+	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	rq.blockedByCoreRuleSet = true
+
+	return &verdict{
+		action:  requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet,
+		figures: map[string]any{figureScore: result.Score, "threshold": threshold},
+	}
+}
+
+// alertCoreRuleSetMatch raises the core_rule_set_match alert for the request,
+// which the Core Rule Set scored at result, at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD. Its
+// detail gives the rule ids, the score, the method and the path with the
+// query, and, for a request that is not refused for it, the mode: detect,
+// or observe in observe mode.
+func (rq *request) alertCoreRuleSetMatch(result coreruleset.Result) {
+	detail := map[string]any{
+		"rule_ids": result.RuleIDs,
+		"score":    result.Score,
+		"method":   rq.in.Method,
+		"path":     rq.in.URL.RequestURI(),
+	}
+
+	switch {
+	case rq.h.config.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect:
+		detail["mode"] = config.WAFModeDetect
+	case rq.h.config.Observe:
+		detail["mode"] = "observe"
+	}
+
+	rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
+		Event:    alerts.EventCoreRuleSetMatch,
+		Host:     rq.site,
+		Client:   rq.client,
+		Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
+		ASN:      rq.line.ASN,
+		ASName:   rq.line.ASName,
+		Country:  rq.line.Country,
+		Reason:   "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
+		Detail:   detail,
+	})
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"io"
@@ -8,20 +8,19 @@ import (
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
-	"time"

 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )

-// The Core Rule Set's settings the tests set, besides SWWAF_WAF_MODE, and
+// The Core Rule Set's settings the tests set, besides SWW_WAF_MODE, and
 // its two modes that inspect requests.
 const (
-	wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
-	wafDisabledRules    = "SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
-	wafExemptPaths      = "SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
-	wafBodyLimit        = "SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
+	wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
+	wafDisabledRules    = "SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
+	wafExemptPaths      = "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
+	wafBodyLimit        = "SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
 	block               = "block"
 	detect              = "detect"
 )
@@ -29,32 +28,81 @@ const (
 // formData is the type of a form's body.
 const formData = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"

+// sizeLimit is SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies, 1K as a
+// setting.
+const (
+	sizeLimit        = 1 << 10
+	sizeLimitSetting = "1K"
+)
+
 // sqlInjection asks for / with an SQL injection in its query, which only
 // the Core Rule Set's rule 942100 matches, with a score of 5, the default
-// SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
+// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
 const sqlInjection = "/?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"

-// wantWAF checks the request log line's waf_rule_ids and waf_score, and
-// that it has duration_waf, or with no score, that it has none of the
-// three: the Core Rule Set did not inspect the request.
-func wantWAF(t *testing.T, line logLine, score *int, ruleIDs ...int) {
+// wantCoreRuleSet checks the request log line's core_rule_set_rule_ids and
+// core_rule_set_score, and that it has duration_core_rule_set_ms, or with no
+// score, that it has none of the three: the Core Rule Set did not inspect the
+// request.
+func wantCoreRuleSet(t *testing.T, line logLine, score *int, ruleIDs ...int) {
 	t.Helper()

-	if !slices.Equal(line.WAFRuleIDs, ruleIDs) {
-		t.Errorf("log line has waf_rule_ids %v, want %v", line.WAFRuleIDs, ruleIDs)
+	if !slices.Equal(line.CoreRuleSetRuleIDs, ruleIDs) {
+		t.Errorf("log line has core_rule_set_rule_ids %v, want %v",
+			line.CoreRuleSetRuleIDs, ruleIDs)
 	}

 	switch {
-	case score == nil && (line.WAFScore != nil || line.DurationWAF != nil):
-		t.Errorf("log line has waf_score %v and duration_waf %v, want neither",
-			line.fields["waf_score"], line.fields["duration_waf"])
-	case score != nil && (line.WAFScore == nil || *line.WAFScore != *score):
-		t.Errorf("log line has waf_score %v, want %d", line.fields["waf_score"], *score)
-	case score != nil && line.DurationWAF == nil:
-		t.Error("log line has no duration_waf")
+	case score == nil &&
+		(line.CoreRuleSetScore != nil || line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS != nil):
+		t.Errorf("log line has core_rule_set_score %v and "+
+			"duration_core_rule_set_ms %v, want neither",
+			line.fields["core_rule_set_score"], line.fields["duration_core_rule_set_ms"])
+	case score != nil &&
+		(line.CoreRuleSetScore == nil || *line.CoreRuleSetScore != *score):
+		t.Errorf("log line has core_rule_set_score %v, want %d",
+			line.fields["core_rule_set_score"], *score)
+	case score != nil && line.DurationCoreRuleSetMS == nil:
+		t.Error("log line has no duration_core_rule_set_ms")
 	}
 }

+func TestCoreRuleSetMatchAddsTheExploitSignatureTag(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		mode   string
+		status int
+		action string
+	}{
+		{block, block, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet},
+		{detect, detect, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: tc.mode})
+
+			wantTags(t, s.request(client, sqlInjection, tc.status, tc.action),
+				"exploitsignature")
+			wantTags(t, s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDetectedAttackIsRefusedByTagDenyLast(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		wafMode: detect, tagDeny: "exploitsignature",
+	})
+
+	line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "exploitsignature"}`)
+}
+
 func TestCoreRuleSetRefusesAttacksInBlockModeAndOnlyLogsThemInDetectMode(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -91,19 +139,29 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusesAttacksInBlockModeAndOnlyLogsThemInDetectMode(t *test
 				mode, action string
 				status       int
 			}{
-				{block, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, http.StatusForbidden},
+				{block, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet, http.StatusForbidden},
 				{detect, requestlog.ActionForward, http.StatusOK},
 			} {
 				s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: tc.mode})

-				line, _ := s.requestWithHeader(client, attack.path, attack.header,
+				line := s.requestWithHeader(client, attack.path, attack.header,
 					tc.status, tc.action)
-				wantWAF(t, line, &attack.score, attack.ruleIDs...)
+				wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, &attack.score, attack.ruleIDs...)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }

+func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalNamesItsHeuristicScoreAndThreshold(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
+
+	line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "core_rule_set", `{"score": 5, "threshold": 5}`)
+}
+
 func TestOrdinaryRequestIsInspectedAndPassed(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -111,7 +169,7 @@ func TestOrdinaryRequestIsInspectedAndPassed(t *testing.T) {

 	line := s.request(client, "/owner/repo/src/branch/main/README.md?display=source",
 		http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(0))
 }

 func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
@@ -119,7 +177,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
+	const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS

 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		wafMode:        block,
@@ -128,29 +186,29 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
 		rulesDir:       writeRules(t, testRules),
 	})

-	// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS, and a path SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS
+	// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, and a path SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS
 	// exempts, are not inspected.
 	line := s.request(allowed, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWAF(t, line, nil)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)
 	line = s.request(client, "/api/v1/repos?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusOK,
 		requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWAF(t, line, nil)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)

 	// The prefix is matched as rate limit exempt paths are: a path that
 	// goes up and out of it is inspected.
 	line = s.request(client, "/api/../?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
-		requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
-	wantWAF(t, line, new(25), 930100, 930110, 942100)
+		requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(25), 930100, 930110, 942100)

 	// A request a rule file refuses is not inspected.
 	line = s.request(otherClient, "/blocked?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
-		requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
-	wantWAF(t, line, nil)
+		requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)

-	// With SWWAF_WAF_MODE off, no request is.
+	// With SWW_WAF_MODE off, no request is.
 	s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: off})
 	line = s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWAF(t, line, nil)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)
 }

 func TestAnomalyThreshold(t *testing.T) {
@@ -164,13 +222,14 @@ func TestAnomalyThreshold(t *testing.T) {
 		})

 		line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-		wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
+		wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(5), 942100)
 	}

 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		wafMode: block, wafAnomalyThreshold: "5",
 	})
-	s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
+	s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
 }

 func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
@@ -213,7 +272,7 @@ func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
 			s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
 			line, _ := s.requestWithBody(request.method, client, request.path,
 				request.header, body, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-			wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
+			wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(0))

 			// A list given replaces the default.
 			s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
@@ -221,12 +280,12 @@ func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
 			})
 			score := 5 * len(request.ruleIDs)
 			line, _ = s.requestWithBody(request.method, client, request.path,
-				request.header, body, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
-			wantWAF(t, line, &score, request.ruleIDs...)
+				request.header, body, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
+			wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, &score, request.ruleIDs...)

 			// And switches off the rules it lists.
 			line = s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-			wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
+			wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(0))
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -242,14 +301,14 @@ func TestAttackInAFormBodyIsRefusedOnlyWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
 	line, _ := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
 		http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(0))

 	s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
 	})
 	line, _ = s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
-		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
-	wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
+		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(5), 942100)
 }

 func TestBodiesReachTheAppAsSentWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
@@ -299,7 +358,7 @@ func TestBodiesReachTheAppAsSentWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
 				tc.name, len(got.body), got.status, len(tc.body))
 		}

-		line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
+		line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
 		wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)

 		if line.RequestBytes != int64(len(tc.body)) {
@@ -309,119 +368,6 @@ func TestBodiesReachTheAppAsSentWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestFormBodyLongerThanTheLimitStreamsOnToTheApp(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const (
-		first = "a=" // and twice the limit of b's, then the rest
-		rest  = 64 * sizeLimit
-	)
-
-	// past is closed once the app has received twice what the Core Rule
-	// Set reads, and got is the length of the whole body it received.
-	past := make(chan struct{})
-	got := make(chan int64, 1)
-	app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		n, _ := io.CopyN(io.Discard, r.Body, 2*sizeLimit)
-
-		close(past)
-
-		m, _ := io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
-		got <- n + m
-	})
-	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
-		wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
-	})
-
-	// The client sends the rest only once the app has received the first
-	// part: were smallwebwaf to hold the body until the end, it would
-	// never come.
-	body, sender := io.Pipe()
-
-	go func() {
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(sender, first+strings.Repeat("b", 2*sizeLimit))
-
-		select {
-		case <-past:
-		case <-time.After(waitLimit):
-			t.Error("the app got no more than the Core Rule Set reads " +
-				"before the whole body was sent")
-
-			_ = sender.CloseWithError(io.ErrUnexpectedEOF)
-
-			return
-		}
-
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(sender, strings.Repeat("b", rest))
-		_ = sender.Close()
-	}()
-
-	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", body)
-	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", formData)
-	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
-
-	want := int64(len(first) + 2*sizeLimit + rest)
-	if n := <-got; n != want {
-		t.Errorf("the app got %d bytes, want %d", n, want)
-	}
-
-	wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-}
-
-func TestClientTooSlowToSendWhatTheCoreRuleSetReads(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
-	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
-		wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
-		clientRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting, metricsToken: token,
-	})
-
-	conn := dial(t, addr)
-	send(t, conn, "POST /comment HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nContent-Type: "+formData+
-		"\r\nContent-Length: 100\r\n\r\ncontent=the first bytes")
-
-	wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusRequestTimeout)
-
-	line := out.requestLine(t)
-	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusRequestTimeout, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
-	wantNotSentToTheApp(t, line)
-	wantLimitHits(t, addr, clientRequestTimeout, 1)
-}
-
-func TestBodyOverTheSizeLimitWhileTheCoreRuleSetReadsIt(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
-	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
-		wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: "4K",
-		requestMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting, metricsToken: token,
-	})
-
-	// Sent in chunks, its length is not announced, and is found to be over
-	// the limit as the Core Rule Set reads it.
-	body := io.MultiReader(strings.NewReader("a=" + strings.Repeat("b", 2*sizeLimit)))
-	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", body)
-	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", formData)
-	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
-
-	line := out.requestLine(t)
-	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
-	wantNotSentToTheApp(t, line)
-	wantLimitHits(t, addr, requestMaxBytes, 1)
-}
-
-// wantNotSentToTheApp checks that the request of line was not sent to the
-// app at all.
-func wantNotSentToTheApp(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	_, sent := line.fields["duration_upstream_total"]
-	if sent {
-		t.Error("log line has duration_upstream_total, for a request sent to the app")
-	}
-}
-
 func TestResponsesAreNotInspected(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -441,53 +387,50 @@ func TestResponsesAreNotInspected(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("answered %d with %q, want 200 with the app's page", got.status, got.body)
 	}

-	wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	wantLine(t, out.endedLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 }

 func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
-
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		wafMode: block, errorBurstThreshold: "2", metricsToken: token,
 	})

 	for range 2 {
-		s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
+		s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
+			requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
 	}

 	// The third refusal in a minute breaks the error burst, and bans the
 	// client.
 	line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
-		requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
-	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst ||
+		requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
+	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals ||
 		line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
-		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want error_burst and limit",
+		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want minute_refusals and limit",
 			line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
 	}

-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)

-	want := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, WAFBlocked: 3}
+	want := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, BlockedByCoreRuleSet: 3}
 	if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
 		t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, want)
 	}

-	metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
+	metrics := s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="block",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
+		`sww_core_rule_set_matches_total{instance="app",mode="block",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="waf_blocked"}`, 3)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="waf_blocked",`+
+		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_core_rule_set"}`, 3)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="blocked_by_core_rule_set",`+
 		`instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 3)
 }

 func TestDetectModeMatchIsNoOffenceAndNotCountedTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
-
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		wafMode: detect, errorBurstThreshold: "2", metricsToken: token,
 	})
@@ -503,11 +446,11 @@ func TestDetectModeMatchIsNoOffenceAndNotCountedTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T
 		t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want none", offences)
 	}

-	metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
+	metrics := s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="detect",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
+		`sww_core_rule_set_matches_total{instance="app",mode="detect",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
 	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="waf_blocked"}`)
+		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_core_rule_set"}`)
 }

 func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheCoreRuleSetWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -516,17 +459,17 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheCoreRuleSetWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block, mode: observe})

 	line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
-	wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
+	wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(5), 942100)

 	// It is an offence as in enforce mode.
-	want := ratelimit.Offences{WAFBlocked: 1}
+	want := ratelimit.Offences{BlockedByCoreRuleSet: 1}
 	if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
 		t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, want)
 	}
 }

-func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheCoreRuleSetMatchAlert(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	for _, tc := range []struct {
@@ -540,7 +483,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
 	}{
 		{
 			"block", map[string]string{wafMode: block},
-			http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, "",
+			http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet, "",
 		},
 		{
 			"detect", map[string]string{wafMode: detect},
@@ -575,10 +518,11 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
 			wantAlerts(t, queue, alerts.Alert{
 				Instance: alertInstance,
 				Time:     clk.Now(),
-				Event:    alerts.EventWAFBlock,
+				Event:    alerts.EventCoreRuleSetMatch,
+				Host:     appHost,
 				Client:   netip.MustParseAddr(client),
 				Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
-				Reason:   "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
+				Reason:   "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
 				Detail:   detail,
 			})

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic countries. It reads SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"slices"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// countries refuses a request when SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES is set and
+// does not hold the client's country as it was looked up. A client without a
+// country, or whose country cannot be found, is refused. Its figures are the
+// country and the setting that refused it.
+type countries struct{}
+
+func (countries) name() string { return "countries" }
+
+func (countries) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
+	allowed := rq.h.config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries
+	country := rq.line.Country
+
+	if len(allowed) == 0 || slices.Contains(allowed, country) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return &verdict{
+		action: requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
+		figures: map[string]any{
+			"country": country, "setting": "SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES",
+		},
+	}
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"encoding/json"
@@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
 		env     map[string]string
 		refused []string
 	}{
-		{"denied", map[string]string{deniedCountries: "kp"}, []string{fromKP}},
 		{
 			"exclusively allowed", map[string]string{allowedCountries: "DE"},
 			[]string{fromKP, unplaced},
 		},
 		{
-			"both", map[string]string{deniedCountries: "kp", allowedCountries: "de,fr"},
+			"with a country in SWW_TAG_DENY",
+			map[string]string{tagDeny: denyKP, allowedCountries: "de,fr"},
 			[]string{fromKP, unplaced},
 		},
 	} {
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
 				req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, sent.client)
 				got := do(t, req)

-				line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
+				line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
 				if line.ASN != sent.asn || line.ASName != sent.asName ||
 					line.Country != sent.country {
 					t.Errorf("log line has %q, %q and %q, want %q, %q and %q",
@@ -90,7 +90,24 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestCountryRefusalComesBeforeTheBody(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCountryRefusalNamesItsHeuristicCountryAndSetting(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
+		lookupTimeout: "1h", allowedCountries: "de",
+	})
+
+	line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "countries",
+		`{"country": "KP", "setting": "SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"}`)
+
+	line = s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "countries",
+		`{"country": "", "setting": "SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"}`)
+}
+
+func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	var calls atomic.Int32
@@ -102,20 +119,16 @@ func TestCountryRefusalComesBeforeTheBody(t *testing.T) {
 	addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies:   trustLocalhost,
 		lookupTimeout:    "1h",
-		deniedCountries: "kp",
+		allowedCountries: "de",
 	})

 	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("a body"))
 	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromKP)
 	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)

-	line := out.requestLine(t)
+	line := out.endedLine(t)
 	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)

-	if line.RequestBytes != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("log line has request_bytes %d, want 0", line.RequestBytes)
-	}
-
 	if calls.Load() != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want none", calls.Load())
 	}
@@ -189,7 +202,7 @@ func TestPrivateAddressIsNeverLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
 		env  map[string]string
 	}{
 		{"no setting needs the lookup", nil},
-		{"a country list is set", map[string]string{deniedCountries: "kp"}},
+		{"a tag setting needs it", map[string]string{tagDeny: denyKP}},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
@@ -211,7 +224,7 @@ func TestPrivateAddressIsNeverLookedUp(t *testing.T) {

 				wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)

-				line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
+				line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
 				wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)

 				for _, field := range []string{"asn", "as_name", "country"} {
@@ -249,11 +262,11 @@ func TestExclusiveListRefusesAPrivateAddressUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) {
 		action    string
 	}{
 		{
-			"not in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS", "",
+			"not in SWW_ALLOW_NETS", "",
 			http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
 		},
 		{
-			"in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS", "10.0.0.7,fd00::/8",
+			"in SWW_ALLOW_NETS", "10.0.0.7,fd00::/8",
 			http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
 		},
 	} {
@@ -283,10 +296,10 @@ func TestExclusiveListRefusesAPrivateAddressUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) {
 // startGeoJS starts a stand-in for GeoJS, which places fromDE and fromKP,
 // each in an AS of its own, and no other address. It returns its URL, and
 // what returns the addresses it has been asked about. A test that needs
-// the stand-in to be asked or to answer sets SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT to an
-// hour, whether or not a request waits for the answer: on the default
-// second, a hold-up of the test process can abandon the request to the
-// stand-in, and leave the client unknown.
+// the stand-in to be asked or to answer sets SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT to an
+// hour, whether or not a request waits for the answer: on the default, a
+// hold-up of the test process can abandon the request to the stand-in, and
+// leave the client unknown.
 func startGeoJS(t *testing.T) (string, func() []string) {
 	t.Helper()

@@ -354,7 +367,7 @@ const (
 )

 // geojsAnswer is an answer of GeoJS about one address, with the fields
-// smallwebwaf reads.
+// sww reads.
 //
 //nolint:tagliatelle // GeoJS's own names
 type geojsAnswer struct {
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic crowdsec. It reads SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL, and the decisions
+// through the reputation lists.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// crowdSec refuses a request when a decision of the CrowdSec decision list on
+// the client is in force at now. It then adds the tag crowdsec, notes the
+// list, as noteHit does, and bans the client until that decision ends. Its
+// figures are the decision's scenario and when it ends.
+type crowdSec struct{}
+
+func (crowdSec) name() string { return "crowdsec" }
+
+func (crowdSec) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
+	decision, listed := rq.crowdSecDecisionInForce(now)
+	if !listed {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	rq.addTag(config.CrowdSecTag)
+	rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: rq.h.config.CrowdSecDecisionsURL},
+		"listed by the CrowdSec decision list")
+
+	return &verdict{
+		action: rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision),
+		figures: map[string]any{
+			"scenario": decision.Scenario,
+			"expires":  requestlog.FormatTime(decision.Expires),
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// crowdSecDecisionInForce returns the decision of the CrowdSec decision list on
+// the client that is in force at now, and reports whether there is one, which
+// the heuristic crowdsec refuses the request for.
+func (rq *request) crowdSecDecisionInForce(
+	now time.Time,
+) (reputation.Decision, bool) {
+	return rq.h.lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"net/http"
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import (

 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ import (
 // test puts in the copy of its decision list, at decisionsURL, that it
 // needs, as reputation.json would at start.
 const (
-	crowdSecURL  = "SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
-	crowdSecKey  = "SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
+	crowdSecURL  = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
+	crowdSecKey  = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
 	lapi         = "http://crowdsec.example:8080"
 	decisionsURL = lapi + "/v1/decisions"
 	bouncerKey   = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testi
 	expires := requestlog.FormatTime(fetched.Add(4 * time.Hour))

 	// Its first request is refused, and bans it until the decision ends.
-	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)

 	if line.BanExpires != expires {
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testi
 	// ban, and once it has ended the client is let through.
 	clk.advance(4*time.Hour - time.Second)

-	line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	wantReputation(t, line)

 	if line.BanExpires != expires {
@@ -84,17 +84,33 @@ func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testi

 	// The ban and the hit are counted, and the list has the metrics of any
 	// list fetched from a URL.
-	metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
+	metrics := s.scrape()
 	labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + decisionsURL + `"}`

-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="crowdsec",`+
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="crowdsec",`+
 		`instance="`+alertInstance+`"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds"+labels,
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds"+labels,
 		float64(fetched.Unix()))
 }

+func TestCrowdSecBanNamesItsHeuristicScenarioAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, clk, server, _ := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
+		crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
+	})
+	loadDecisions(t, server, clk.Now(), `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
+		`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
+		`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
+
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "crowdsec", `{"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", `+
+		`"expires": "`+requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(4*time.Hour))+`"}`)
+	wantTags(t, line, "crowdsec")
+}
+
 func TestEndedCrowdSecDecisionNoLongerBansThoughTheCopyStillHoldsIt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -113,9 +129,9 @@ func TestEndedCrowdSecDecisionNoLongerBansThoughTheCopyStillHoldsIt(t *testing.T
 	// Just before its end, the decision bans a client in the netblock, and
 	// one on an IPv6 address bans the address's group, the /64.
 	clk.advance(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
-	s.get("198.51.100.7", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-	s.get("2001:db8::9", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-	s.get("2001:db8::5", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get("198.51.100.7", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get("2001:db8::9", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get("2001:db8::5", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)

 	// Once it has ended, it bans no other client, and the bans it made end
 	// with it.
@@ -148,7 +164,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsAndAlertsTheBan(
 		`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)

 	line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)

 	if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
@@ -168,7 +184,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsAndAlertsTheBan(
 // decisionsURL, answer, the engine's answer, fetched at fetched, as
 // reputation.json would at start.
 func loadDecisions(
-	t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, fetched time.Time, answer string,
+	t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, fetched time.Time, answer string,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic deny_nets. It reads SWW_DENY_NETS.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// denyNets refuses a client in SWW_DENY_NETS. Its figure is the netblock of
+// the setting the client is in.
+type denyNets struct{}
+
+func (denyNets) name() string { return "deny_nets" }
+
+func (denyNets) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
+	for _, netblock := range rq.h.config.DenyNets {
+		if netblock.Contains(rq.client) {
+			return &verdict{
+				action:  requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+				figures: map[string]any{figureNetblock: netblock.String()},
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,477 @@
+package discriminator
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// The headers of rproxy's question and of discriminator's answer, as
+// "discriminator" in SPEC.md gives them.
+const (
+	// ClientHeader marks a request as rproxy's question, and gives the
+	// visitor's address.
+	ClientHeader = "X-Sww-Client"
+	// PeerHeader gives the address of rproxy's own TCP peer.
+	PeerHeader = "X-Sww-Peer"
+	// ContentLengthHeader gives the body length the visitor announced.
+	ContentLengthHeader = "X-Sww-Content-Length"
+	// DispositionHeader gives discriminator's answer.
+	DispositionHeader = "X-Sww-Disposition"
+)
+
+// The values of DispositionHeader.
+const (
+	// DispositionAllow tells rproxy to pass the request to the app.
+	DispositionAllow = "allow"
+	// DispositionDeny tells rproxy to give the visitor the answer's status,
+	// headers and body.
+	DispositionDeny = "deny"
+	// DispositionClose tells rproxy to close the visitor's connection
+	// without an answer, which SWW_BAN_RESPONSE asks for when it is close.
+	// discriminator closing the question's connection instead would read as
+	// discriminator being down, and rproxy would then let the request through.
+	DispositionClose = "close"
+)
+
+// ReportPath is where rproxy sends the report of each request discriminator
+// answered.
+const ReportPath = "/_sww/report"
+
+// QuestionBodyMaxBytes is the most of a visitor's body a question carries.
+const QuestionBodyMaxBytes = 64 << 10
+
+const (
+	// maxAwaitingReport is the most answered requests held until their
+	// reports come. Past it, the request answered longest ago is dropped.
+	maxAwaitingReport = 10000
+	// maxRequestIDBytes is the longest id a question may give.
+	maxRequestIDBytes = 128
+	// reportBodyMaxBytes is the most of a report's body that is read. It is
+	// far above any report's.
+	reportBodyMaxBytes = 1 << 20
+	// maxHTTPStatus is the highest status a report may give.
+	maxHTTPStatus = 599
+	// maxReportedBytes is the most bytes a report may give for each way, 1
+	// PiB, so that adding them up cannot overflow.
+	maxReportedBytes = 1 << 50
+	// maxReportedMilliseconds is the longest duration a report may give,
+	// about 31 years, so that it fits a time.Duration.
+	maxReportedMilliseconds = 1e12
+	// discriminatorTimeout bounds how long a request to discriminator takes to
+	// arrive, and its answer to leave, and discriminatorIdleTimeout how long a
+	// kept-open connection waits for its next request.
+	discriminatorTimeout     = 60 * time.Second
+	discriminatorIdleTimeout = 120 * time.Second
+)
+
+var (
+	errReportFieldMissing = errors.New("a field is missing")
+	errReportValue        = errors.New("a value is out of range")
+)
+
+// Report is the JSON object rproxy posts to ReportPath once the visitor's
+// answer has ended, its fields named as the request log's of the same
+// meaning. RequestID is the question's id. Status is what the visitor got, 0
+// if nothing. The durations are in milliseconds.
+//
+//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
+type Report struct {
+	RequestID               string  `json:"request_id"`
+	Status                  int     `json:"status"`
+	RequestBytes            int64   `json:"request_bytes"`
+	ResponseBytes           int64   `json:"response_bytes"`
+	DurationTotalMS         float64 `json:"duration_total_ms"`
+	DurationUpstreamTotalMS float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total_ms"`
+}
+
+// New returns the server `sww discriminator` runs. It answers
+// rproxy's questions, takes rproxy's reports and answers its own endpoints. It
+// passes nothing to an app. rproxy applies the size and time limits to the
+// visitor. Go's default limit on a request's line and headers, 1 MiB, stays: it
+// is far above rproxy's, and a question refused for its size would have rproxy
+// let the request through.
+func New(params Params) *Server {
+	h := newHandler(params)
+
+	return &Server{
+		Server: &http.Server{
+			Addr:         params.Config.ListenAddr,
+			Handler:      h,
+			ErrorLog:     slog.NewLogLogger(params.ProcessLog.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn),
+			ReadTimeout:  discriminatorTimeout,
+			WriteTimeout: discriminatorTimeout,
+			IdleTimeout:  discriminatorIdleTimeout,
+		},
+		Ledger:     h.ledger,
+		Limiter:    h.limiter,
+		GeoJS:      h.geojs,
+		Anomalies:  h.anomalies,
+		LookupFile: h.lookupFile,
+		Lists:      h.lists,
+		DNSBL:      h.dnsbl,
+		AbuseIPDB:  h.abuseIPDB,
+		RouteWatch: h.routeWatch,
+		Metrics:    h.metrics,
+	}
+}
+
+// ServeHTTP handles one request to discriminator: a request carrying
+// ClientHeader is rproxy's question, and any other is for discriminator
+// itself.
+func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if len(r.Header.Values(ClientHeader)) > 0 {
+		h.answerQuestion(w, r)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	h.answerOwnEndpoint(w, r)
+}
+
+// refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports whether the request is one that does not wait
+// for GeoJS, since the checks will refuse it at now whatever GeoJS answers about
+// its client: the heuristic crowdsec, header_limits, blocklists or rate_limits
+// will refuse it, as a function in that heuristic's file says. In observe mode,
+// which refuses nothing, none is. rproxy lets a request through when
+// discriminator answers too late.
+func (rq *request) refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now time.Time) bool {
+	if rq.h.config.Observe {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	_, decided := rq.crowdSecDecisionInForce(now)
+
+	return decided || overHeaderLimits(rq.headerCounts()) ||
+		rq.refusedByBlocklists(rq.h.lists.ListedBy(rq.client)) ||
+		rq.overAWholeRateLimit(now)
+}
+
+// answerQuestion runs the checks on the visitor's request a question
+// carries, and answers rproxy what to do with it. A denied request's counting
+// is finished here, and an allowed one's by its report.
+func (h *handler) answerQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	client, body, ok := h.readQuestion(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+
+	// One that cannot be read leaves the log line's peer_ip invalid.
+	peer, _ := netip.ParseAddr(r.Header.Get(PeerHeader))
+
+	rq := h.startRequest(w, asTheVisitorSentIt(r, body), client.Unmap(), peer.Unmap(),
+		true)
+	// The last deferred runs first, so that what is held has the finished log
+	// line. Go's server sends the answer only once this function has
+	// returned, so the report cannot come before it is held.
+	defer rq.holdForReport()
+	defer rq.finish()
+
+	rq.site = r.Host
+	rq.line.DiscriminatorLine = requestlog.DiscriminatorLineDecision
+	refused := rq.check(r.Context())
+	rq.checked = time.Now()
+	underOwnPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, ownEndpointPrefix)
+
+	if refused == nil && !underOwnPrefix {
+		// In observe mode, what enforce mode would have refused counts here.
+		defer rq.runAfterAnswer(r.Context())
+
+		rq.allow()
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	// The last deferred runs first: runAfterAnswer before addToHistory, so that
+	// a broken refusal limit is in the client's history.
+	defer rq.addToHistory()
+	defer rq.countAnomalies()
+	defer rq.runAfterAnswer(r.Context())
+
+	if refused != nil {
+		rq.deny(*refused)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	// The app never sees this prefix. discriminator's own endpoints are at its
+	// own address, so this answers as a path with no endpoint does.
+	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionOwnEndpoint
+	rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
+	http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
+}
+
+// readQuestion returns the visitor's address and the body a question carries,
+// and whether discriminator takes the question. It answers a question it does not
+// take with 400 and no disposition, which rproxy treats as it treats no
+// answer. The id of a question it takes is held from here on, without a
+// decision yet, so that another question with that id is refused while this
+// one is being handled.
+//
+// The body is read before any check, since Go's server does not send an answer
+// until it has read the body. A question whose body stops arriving gets no
+// answer, and is not looked at.
+func (h *handler) readQuestion(
+	w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
+) (netip.Addr, []byte, bool) {
+	client, err := netip.ParseAddr(r.Header.Get(ClientHeader))
+	if err != nil || client.Zone() != "" {
+		h.refuseQuestion(w, ClientHeader+" is not an address without a zone")
+
+		return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
+	}
+
+	id := r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
+	if id == "" || len(id) > maxRequestIDBytes || !utf8.ValidString(id) {
+		h.refuseQuestion(w, requestIDHeader+" is not a valid id")
+
+		return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
+	}
+
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, QuestionBodyMaxBytes))
+
+	if _, tooLarge := errors.AsType[*http.MaxBytesError](err); tooLarge {
+		h.refuseQuestion(w, "the body is over 64 KiB")
+
+		return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
+	}
+
+	if err != nil {
+		h.processLog.Warn("a question's body stopped arriving", "error", err.Error())
+		// This panic has Go's server close the connection without an answer,
+		// and log nothing.
+		panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
+	}
+
+	held, _ := h.awaitingReport.ContainsOrAdd(id, nil)
+	if held {
+		h.refuseQuestion(w, requestIDHeader+" is the id of a request discriminator holds")
+
+		return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
+	}
+
+	return client, body, true
+}
+
+// refuseQuestion answers a question discriminator does not take, for reason.
+func (h *handler) refuseQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, reason string) {
+	h.processLog.Warn("a question is refused", "reason", reason)
+	http.Error(w, reason, http.StatusBadRequest)
+}
+
+// asTheVisitorSentIt returns a copy of r, a question, as the checks and the
+// log line are to see it: without the headers rproxy adds for discriminator,
+// with body, which has been read of r, and with the length the visitor
+// announced, as -1 when it announced none. The question's own length covers
+// only the part of the body it carries.
+func asTheVisitorSentIt(r *http.Request, body []byte) *http.Request {
+	sent := r.Clone(r.Context())
+	announced := sent.Header.Get(ContentLengthHeader)
+
+	sent.Header.Del(ClientHeader)
+	sent.Header.Del(PeerHeader)
+	sent.Header.Del(ContentLengthHeader)
+	sent.Header.Del("Content-Length")
+
+	sent.ContentLength = -1
+
+	length, err := strconv.ParseInt(announced, 10, 64)
+	if err == nil && length >= 0 {
+		sent.ContentLength = length
+		sent.Header.Set("Content-Length", announced)
+	}
+
+	sent.Body = http.NoBody
+	if len(body) > 0 {
+		sent.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(body))
+	}
+
+	return sent
+}
+
+// allow answers a question with DispositionAllow and, while
+// SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set, the client's AS number and country.
+func (rq *request) allow() {
+	rq.allowed = true
+
+	header := rq.out.Header()
+	header.Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionAllow)
+
+	if rq.h.config.AddLookupHeaders {
+		setLookupHeaders(header, rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country)
+	}
+
+	rq.out.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+}
+
+// holdForReport holds a copy of what the report's steps need, by the request's
+// id. A report only ever reaches that copy, never the request being handled.
+func (rq *request) holdForReport() {
+	held := rq.decision
+	rq.h.awaitingReport.Add(rq.line.RequestID, &held)
+}
+
+// deny answers a question with what the visitor is to get for r.
+func (rq *request) deny(r refusal) {
+	rq.refused = &r
+
+	if r.status == 0 {
+		// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE is close. Written past rq.out, since the log line's
+		// status stays 0: the visitor is sent nothing.
+		rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionClose)
+		rq.out.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
+	http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(r.status), r.status)
+}
+
+// answerOwnEndpoint answers a request to discriminator's own address. No check
+// runs on it: the address is on the private network, where the peers are
+// rproxy and the admin's tools, not visitors.
+func (h *handler) answerOwnEndpoint(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if r.Method == http.MethodPost && r.URL.Path == ReportPath {
+		h.takeReport(w, r)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	peer := peerAddress(r)
+
+	rq := h.startRequest(w, r, peer, peer, false)
+	defer rq.finish()
+
+	if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == HealthPath {
+		rq.answerHealth()
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	rq.answerAdmin()
+}
+
+// takeReport answers POST ReportPath: it finishes the request the report
+// names, if it holds that request's decision, and ignores the report
+// otherwise.
+func (h *handler) takeReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	report, err := readReport(w, r)
+	if err != nil {
+		h.processLog.Warn("a report is refused", "error", err.Error())
+		http.Error(w, "the body is not a report", http.StatusBadRequest)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	held, found := h.awaitingReport.Peek(report.RequestID)
+	// Remove reports true to one report only, of several that name the id. A
+	// question still being handled is held as nil.
+	if found && held != nil && h.awaitingReport.Remove(report.RequestID) {
+		h.finishWith(r.Context(), held, report)
+	}
+
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+}
+
+// readReport reads a report from r's body, which must be one JSON object with
+// all of Report's fields, in the ranges SPEC.md gives.
+func readReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (Report, error) {
+	var report Report
+
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, reportBodyMaxBytes))
+	if err != nil {
+		return report, fmt.Errorf("read the body: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var fields map[string]json.RawMessage
+
+	err = json.Unmarshal(body, &fields)
+	if err != nil {
+		return report, fmt.Errorf("decode the body: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	for _, name := range []string{
+		"request_id", "status", "request_bytes", "response_bytes",
+		"duration_total_ms", "duration_upstream_total_ms",
+	} {
+		value, there := fields[name]
+		if !there || string(value) == "null" {
+			return report, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errReportFieldMissing, name)
+		}
+	}
+
+	err = json.Unmarshal(body, &report)
+	if err != nil {
+		return report, fmt.Errorf("decode the body: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return report, report.checkRanges()
+}
+
+// checkRanges returns an error for a value of the report that cannot be true.
+func (report *Report) checkRanges() error {
+	switch {
+	case report.Status != 0 &&
+		(report.Status < http.StatusContinue || report.Status > maxHTTPStatus):
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: status", errReportValue)
+	case report.RequestBytes < 0 || report.RequestBytes > maxReportedBytes:
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: request_bytes", errReportValue)
+	case report.ResponseBytes < 0 || report.ResponseBytes > maxReportedBytes:
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: response_bytes", errReportValue)
+	case report.DurationTotalMS < 0 || report.DurationTotalMS > maxReportedMilliseconds:
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_total_ms", errReportValue)
+	case report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS < 0 ||
+		report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS > maxReportedMilliseconds:
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_upstream_total_ms", errReportValue)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// finishWith finishes a request with what its report says, and writes the
+// request's last log line, which holds its decision's fields and the report's.
+// For an allowed request it first runs the heuristics of onReport, and adds the
+// request to its client's history, the anomaly counters and the metrics, with
+// the status and bytes the report gives. A denied request's counting was
+// finished at its decision. ctx is the report's own context.
+func (h *handler) finishWith(ctx context.Context, held *decision, report Report) {
+	rq := &request{
+		decision:     *held,
+		h:            h,
+		out:          &responseWriter{status: report.Status, bytes: report.ResponseBytes},
+		requestBytes: report.RequestBytes,
+	}
+
+	rq.line.DiscriminatorLine = requestlog.DiscriminatorLineReport
+	rq.line.Status = report.Status
+	rq.line.RequestBytes = report.RequestBytes
+	rq.line.ResponseBytes = report.ResponseBytes
+	rq.line.DurationTotalMS = report.DurationTotalMS
+
+	if rq.allowed {
+		rq.line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS = &report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS
+
+		rq.runBanningHeuristics(ctx, onReport())
+		rq.countAnomalies()
+		rq.addToHistory()
+
+		rq.h.metrics.RequestReported(&rq.line,
+			time.Duration(report.DurationTotalMS*float64(time.Millisecond)),
+			time.Duration(report.DurationUpstreamTotalMS*float64(time.Millisecond)))
+	}
+
+	rq.writeLine()
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic dnsbl. It reads SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION, and the DNSBL zones'
+// verdicts through the DNSBL checker.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// dnsbl notes the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists the client, as noteListed
+// does, adds the tag dnsbl=<zone> for each, the zone's key masked, and refuses
+// the request when SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny. Being
+// limit, it lowers the client's limits instead (see limitPercentages), and
+// being log, it does nothing more. A zone without a verdict on the client is
+// asked about it in the background, and the request does not wait for the
+// answer. Its figure is the zones that list the client, their keys masked.
+type dnsbl struct{}
+
+func (dnsbl) name() string { return "dnsbl" }
+
+func (dnsbl) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
+	listedBy := rq.h.dnsbl.ListedBy(ctx, rq.client)
+	rq.dnsblListed = len(listedBy) > 0
+	rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a DNSBL zone")
+
+	for _, zone := range listedBy {
+		rq.addTag(config.DNSBLTagPrefix + strings.ToLower(zone))
+	}
+
+	if !rq.dnsblListed || rq.h.config.ReputationAction != deny {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return &verdict{
+		action:  requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+		figures: map[string]any{"zones": listedBy},
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic header_limits. It reads no setting: its limits are fixed.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// The header limits: the most cookies and header fields a request may have
+// when the checks reach the Core Rule Set. Real clients never reach them.
+const (
+	maxCookies      = 50
+	maxHeaderFields = 100
+)
+
+// headerLimits refuses a request over the header limits, with 431. Its figures
+// are the request's header fields and cookies, and the limit of each.
+type headerLimits struct{}
+
+func (headerLimits) name() string { return "header_limits" }
+
+func (headerLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
+	fields, cookies := rq.headerCounts()
+	if !overHeaderLimits(fields, cookies) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return &verdict{
+		action: requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge,
+		figures: map[string]any{
+			"fields": fields, "fields_limit": maxHeaderFields,
+			"cookies": cookies, "cookies_limit": maxCookies,
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// overHeaderLimits reports whether a request with these counts of header fields
+// and cookies, as headerCounts counts them, is over the header limits: it has
+// more than maxHeaderFields fields or more than maxCookies cookies.
+func overHeaderLimits(fields, cookies int) bool {
+	return fields > maxHeaderFields || cookies > maxCookies
+}
+
+// headerCounts returns the request's header fields, each value of a header sent
+// twice being one, and its cookies, each part of a Cookie header between
+// semicolons being one unless it is empty or only spaces and tabs. The Core
+// Rule Set runs each of its rules on each cookie, so that thousands of small
+// cookies keep it busy for over a second. It trims only spaces and control
+// characters, of which a header value can hold only tabs, so a part of Unicode
+// spaces is a cookie to it.
+func (rq *request) headerCounts() (int, int) {
+	fields, cookies := 0, 0
+
+	for _, values := range rq.in.Header {
+		fields += len(values)
+	}
+
+	for _, value := range rq.in.Header.Values("Cookie") {
+		for part := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
+			if strings.Trim(part, " \t") != "" {
+				cookies++
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return fields, cookies
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+package discriminator_test
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+func TestHealthEndpointCountsTowardNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// With a limit of one request a minute, any request counted before
+	// the last one would have it refused.
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
+
+	const (
+		healthChecks = 3
+		contentType  = "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
+	)
+
+	for range healthChecks {
+		got := s.ownEndpointRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.HealthPath, "",
+			http.StatusOK)
+
+		if string(got.body) != "ok\n" || got.header.Get("Content-Type") != contentType {
+			t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q with Content-Type %q, want ok "+
+				"with %q", got.body, got.header.Get("Content-Type"), contentType)
+		}
+	}
+
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+	for _, line := range s.out.endedLines(t, healthChecks)[:healthChecks] {
+		if line.ResponseContentType != contentType {
+			t.Errorf("health check's log line has response_content_type %q, "+
+				"want %q", line.ResponseContentType, contentType)
+		}
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+package discriminator
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// To add a heuristic, write one file with a type that implements heuristic,
+// and add one line for it to one of the lists below. Its settings go in
+// config.Config, and the comment at the top of its file names them.
+
+// heuristic is one of the checks that decide what discriminator does with a
+// request.
+type heuristic interface {
+	// name is the heuristic's name, which the log line gives.
+	name() string
+	// check looks at the request at now, and returns nil to let it through.
+	// ctx is the request's own context.
+	check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict
+}
+
+// verdict is a heuristic refusing a request, or banning its client: the action
+// the log line names, one of requestlog's Action constants, and the figures the
+// heuristic acted on, by name, such as the count and the limit.
+type verdict struct {
+	action  string
+	figures map[string]any
+}
+
+// The names of the figures that more than one heuristic gives.
+const (
+	figureWindow   = "window"
+	figureCount    = "count"
+	figureLimit    = "limit"
+	figureScore    = "score"
+	figureNetblock = "netblock"
+)
+
+// The lists of heuristics, each in the order its heuristics run. A client in
+// SWW_ALLOW_NETS skips them all.
+
+// beforeLookup are the heuristics that run before the client's AS number and
+// country are looked up, so that a client they refuse is not looked up.
+func beforeLookup() []heuristic {
+	return []heuristic{
+		tagLists{},
+		routeWatchTags{},
+		denyNets{},
+		activeBan{},
+	}
+}
+
+// afterLookup are the heuristics that run once the lookup has been made.
+// tag_deny runs twice: before the rate limits, on the tags known by then, and
+// last, on the tag rule_files and core_rule_set can add.
+func afterLookup() []heuristic {
+	return []heuristic{
+		countries{},
+		blocklists{},
+		crowdSec{},
+		dnsbl{},
+		abuseIPDB{},
+		tagDeny{},
+		rateLimits{},
+		trapPaths{},
+		ruleFiles{},
+		headerLimits{},
+		coreRuleSet{},
+		tagDeny{},
+	}
+}
+
+// afterAnswer are the heuristics that run on a request once discriminator has
+// answered it, before its decision line is written. They ban the client, and do
+// not change what the request got: their verdict's action is not used.
+func afterAnswer() []heuristic {
+	return []heuristic{
+		refusalLimit{},
+	}
+}
+
+// onReport are the heuristics that run on an allowed request when rproxy's
+// report of it comes, before its report line is written. Like afterAnswer, they
+// only ban.
+func onReport() []heuristic {
+	return []heuristic{
+		byteLimits{},
+	}
+}
+
+// runAfterAnswer runs the heuristics of afterAnswer on the request, at the time
+// it is called.
+func (rq *request) runAfterAnswer(ctx context.Context) {
+	rq.runBanningHeuristics(ctx, afterAnswer())
+}
+
+// runHeuristics runs list, beforeLookup or afterLookup, on the request at now,
+// and returns the first verdict, or nil when none gives one. The log line's
+// heuristic and heuristic_figures name the heuristic that gave it, and give its
+// figures. ctx is the request's own context.
+func (rq *request) runHeuristics(
+	ctx context.Context, list []heuristic, now time.Time,
+) *verdict {
+	name, v := rq.firstVerdict(ctx, list, now)
+	if v != nil {
+		rq.line.Heuristic = name
+		rq.line.HeuristicFigures = v.figures
+	}
+
+	return v
+}
+
+// runBanningHeuristics runs list, afterAnswer or onReport, on the request at
+// the time it is called. The log line's after_answer_heuristic and
+// after_answer_heuristic_figures name the heuristic that gave a verdict, and
+// give its figures, so that heuristic and heuristic_figures still name the one
+// that refused the request. ctx is the request's own context.
+func (rq *request) runBanningHeuristics(ctx context.Context, list []heuristic) {
+	name, v := rq.firstVerdict(ctx, list, rq.h.now())
+	if v != nil {
+		rq.line.AfterAnswerHeuristic = name
+		rq.line.AfterAnswerHeuristicFigures = v.figures
+	}
+}
+
+// firstVerdict runs list on the request at now, in order, until a heuristic
+// gives a verdict, and returns that heuristic's name and its verdict, or "" and
+// nil when none gives one. ctx is the request's own context.
+func (rq *request) firstVerdict(
+	ctx context.Context, list []heuristic, now time.Time,
+) (string, *verdict) {
+	for _, each := range list {
+		v := each.check(ctx, rq, now)
+		if v != nil {
+			return each.name(), v
+		}
+	}
+
+	return "", nil
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"io"
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"

-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		lookupTimeout:      "1h",
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
-		deniedCountries:    "kp",
+		tagDeny:            denyKP,
 	})
 	start := clk.Now()

@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	clk.advance(time.Second)
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
 	clk.advance(time.Second)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)

 	want := ratelimit.History{
 		FirstSeen: start,
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 		Requests:  4,
 		Forwarded: 2,
 		Refused:   2,
-		// The app answers with no body, smallwebwaf with its status text.
+		// The app answers with no body, sww with its status text.
 		ResponseBytes: 2 * int64(len("Forbidden\n")),
 		Responses:     ratelimit.Responses{Status2xx: 2, Status4xx: 2},
 		Offences:      ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1},
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ func TestHistoryCountsTheBodiesEachWay(t *testing.T) {

 	got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc")))
 	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
-	out.requestLine(t)
+	out.endedLine(t)

 	history := historyOf(t, server, localhost)
 	if history.RequestBytes != 3 || history.ResponseBytes != 5 {
@@ -95,43 +95,41 @@ func TestHistoryCountsTheBodiesEachWay(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestHealthEndpointIsNotInTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
+func TestOwnEndpointsAreNotInTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
-	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, nil)
+	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})

-	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
-	out.requestLine(t)
+	s.ownEndpointRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
+	s.ownEndpointRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
+		http.StatusUnauthorized)
+	s.scrape()

 	if clients := server.Limiter.Snapshot(); len(clients) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("the table holds %+v, want no client", clients)
 	}
 }

-func TestRequestForSmallwebwafIsRefusedOnlyWithoutTheToken(t *testing.T) {
+func TestPathUnderTheOwnPrefixIsNeitherForwardedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
-	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now,
-		map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
+	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, nil)

-	// The metrics and the 404 are neither forwarded nor refused; the 401
-	// is refused.
-	scrape(t, addr)
-	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_smallwebwaf/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
-	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.MetricsPath), http.StatusUnauthorized)
-	out.requestLines(t, 3)
+	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_sww/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
+	out.endedLine(t)

 	history := historyOf(t, server, localhost)
-	if history.Requests != 3 || history.Forwarded != 0 || history.Refused != 1 {
+	if history.Requests != 1 || history.Forwarded != 0 || history.Refused != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("history counts %d requests, %d forwarded and %d refused, "+
-			"want 3, 0 and 1", history.Requests, history.Forwarded, history.Refused)
+			"want 1, 0 and 0", history.Requests, history.Forwarded, history.Refused)
 	}
 }

 // historyOf returns the history of the client at addr.
-func historyOf(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, addr string) ratelimit.History {
+func historyOf(
+	t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, addr string,
+) ratelimit.History {
 	t.Helper()

 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32")
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+package discriminator
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
+)
+
+// The headers in which an answer of allow gives rproxy the client's AS number
+// and country, for the app, while SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes
+// every header name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so
+// X-Client-ASN arrives as X-Client-Asn; header names are not case-sensitive.
+const (
+	asnHeader     = "X-Client-Asn"
+	countryHeader = "X-Client-Country"
+)
+
+// lookUp looks up the client's AS number and country, in the lookup
+// database or through GeoJS, and notes them for the log line and as the
+// request's asn= and country= tags, unless
+// SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off or the client is on a private, loopback or
+// link-local address, which no lookup can place. The lookup database
+// answers at once. With GeoJS, while a setting needs the answer, such as a
+// country list or a biased threshold, a new client's request waits for it,
+// unless refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports true. ctx is the request's own
+// context.
+func (rq *request) lookUp(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) {
+	if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "off" || !canBePlaced(rq.client) {
+		return
+	}
+
+	client := rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client)
+
+	switch {
+	case rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file":
+		rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.lookupFile.LookUp(client)
+	case rq.refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now):
+		rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUpWithoutWaiting(ctx, client)
+		rq.skippedLookupWait = rq.lookupAnswer.Answered.IsZero()
+	default:
+		rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUp(ctx, client)
+	}
+
+	rq.lookedUp = true
+	rq.line.ASN = rq.lookupAnswer.ASN
+	rq.line.ASName = rq.lookupAnswer.ASName
+	rq.line.Country = rq.lookupAnswer.Country
+
+	if tag := asnTag(rq.line.ASN); tag != "" {
+		rq.addTag(tag)
+	}
+
+	if tag := countryTag(rq.line.Country); tag != "" {
+		rq.addTag(tag)
+	}
+}
+
+// asnTag returns the tag of asn, an AS number as the lookup gives it, such as
+// asn=64496 for AS64496, or "" for no AS number.
+func asnTag(asn string) string {
+	if asn == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+
+	return config.ASNTagPrefix + strings.TrimPrefix(asn, "AS")
+}
+
+// countryTag returns the tag of country, a code as the lookup gives it, such
+// as country=DE for DE, or "" for no country.
+func countryTag(country string) string {
+	if country == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+
+	return config.CountryTagPrefix + country
+}
+
+// addLookup adds answer, an answer about a client from the lookup
+// database or GeoJS, to the client's history, and to the notes of the bans
+// on its netblock that have no AS number, AS name or country yet.
+func (h *handler) addLookup(answer lookup.Answer) {
+	h.limiter.AddLookup(answer.Client, answer.Answered,
+		answer.ASN, answer.ASName, answer.Country)
+	h.ledger.AddLookup(h.netblock(answer.Client.Addr()),
+		answer.ASN, answer.ASName, answer.Country)
+}
+
+// setLookupHeaders sets the headers that give the client's AS number and
+// country, leaving out one that is unknown.
+func setLookupHeaders(header http.Header, asn, country string) {
+	if asn != "" {
+		header.Set(asnHeader, asn)
+	}
+
+	if country != "" {
+		header.Set(countryHeader, country)
+	}
+}
+
+// canBePlaced reports whether a lookup can place addr: private, loopback
+// and link-local addresses have no AS number or country.
+func canBePlaced(addr netip.Addr) bool {
+	return !addr.IsPrivate() && !addr.IsLoopback() && !addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast()
+}
@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
-	"net"
 	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/netip"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"slices"
@@ -22,7 +20,7 @@ import (
 // and country.
 type asnAndCountry struct{ asn, asName, country string }

-// fileSource is the SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE that looks clients up in the
+// fileSource is the SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE that looks clients up in the
 // lookup database.
 const fileSource = "file"

@@ -42,7 +40,7 @@ func TestEveryClientIsLookedUpWithoutWaitingWhileNoSettingNeedsIt(t *testing.T)
 	// comes too. None waits for GeoJS.
 	for _, line := range []logLine{
 		s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
-		s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited),
+		s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited),
 		s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
 	} {
 		got := asnAndCountry{line.ASN, line.ASName, line.Country}
@@ -98,7 +96,7 @@ func TestRequestThatWaitedForItsLookupIsCountedWhenItGoesOn(t *testing.T) {
 		map[string]string{
 			trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
 			lookupTimeout:  "1h",
-			deniedCountries: "kp",
+			tagDeny:        denyKP,
 		})

 	requestFromDE := func() *http.Request {
@@ -142,7 +140,7 @@ func TestRequestThatWaitedForItsLookupIsCountedWhenItGoesOn(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("first request: %v", err)
 	}

-	wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, 2)[1], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	wantLine(t, out.endedLines(t, 2)[1], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)

 	// The third request's count holds all three: the first was counted
 	// when it went on, in the minute under way, and the second's count
@@ -150,7 +148,7 @@ func TestRequestThatWaitedForItsLookupIsCountedWhenItGoesOn(t *testing.T) {
 	clk.advance(500 * time.Millisecond)
 	wantStatus(t, do(t, requestFromDE()), http.StatusOK)

-	if got := out.requestLines(t, 3)[2].Counts.Minute; got != 3 {
+	if got := out.endedLines(t, 3)[2].Counts.Minute; got != 3 {
 		t.Errorf("the third request's count in the minute is %v, want 3", got)
 	}
 }
@@ -164,7 +162,7 @@ func TestASNumberAndNameInTheLogLineTheHistoryTheBanNotesAndTheAlert(t *testing.
 	addr, out, server, queue := startProxyWithAlerts(t, app.URL, geojsURL, clk.Now,
 		map[string]string{
 			trustedProxies:     trustLocalhost,
-			alertWebhookURL:    "https://alerts.example/smallwebwaf",
+			alertWebhookURL:    "https://alerts.example/sww",
 			rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 		})
 	s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}
@@ -181,7 +179,7 @@ func TestASNumberAndNameInTheLogLineTheHistoryTheBanNotesAndTheAlert(t *testing.

 	for _, line := range []logLine{
 		s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
-		s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited),
+		s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited),
 	} {
 		if got := (asnAndCountry{line.ASN, line.ASName, line.Country}); got != want {
 			t.Errorf("log line has %+v, want %+v", got, want)
@@ -266,7 +264,7 @@ func TestClientsAreLookedUpInTheLookupDatabaseAndGeoJSIsNotAsked(t *testing.T) {
 		want asnAndCountry
 	}{
 		{s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward), de},
-		{s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited), de},
+		{s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited), de},
 		{
 			s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied),
 			asnAndCountry{asnKP, asNameKP, "KP"},
@@ -319,7 +317,7 @@ func TestLookupHeadersArePassedToTheAppAndTheClientsOwnRemoved(t *testing.T) {
 	addr, out, _ := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, time.Now, map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies:   trustLocalhost,
 		lookupTimeout:    "1h",
-		addLookupHeaders: "true",
+		addLookupHeaders: on,
 	})
 	s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}

@@ -381,24 +379,21 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays(t *testing.T) {
 	// clock of the test's own: the wait lasts exactly as long as it should,
 	// however slowly the test process runs. Nothing in it may wait on the
 	// network, which would keep that clock from moving on: the request is
-	// handed to the proxy's handler, and GeoJS is one that never answers.
+	// handed to discriminator's handler, and GeoJS is one that never answers.
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
-		// Not the default second. The exclusive list needs the answer, and
-		// the app is never reached.
+		// Not the default. The exclusive list needs the answer, and the app
+		// is never reached.
 		const timeout = 3 * time.Second

-		server, out, _ := newProxy(t, "http://app.invalid", unansweredGeoJSURL,
-			time.Now, map[string]string{
+		server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
+			map[string]string{
 				lookupTimeout:    timeout.String(),
 				allowedCountries: "DE",
 			})

-		req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/",
-			http.NoBody)
-		req.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(fromDE, "1234")
 		began := time.Now()

-		server.Handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
+		serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodGet, http.NoBody)

 		if waited := time.Since(began); waited != timeout {
 			t.Errorf("the request waited %s for its answer, want %s", waited, timeout)
@@ -410,25 +405,25 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }

-// unansweredGeoJSURL is where a GeoJS that never answers is asked: a
+// silentGeoJSURL is where a GeoJS that never answers is asked: a
 // request to it waits, without the network, until it is abandoned.
 // TestMain registers it with Go's default transport, through which GeoJS
 // is asked.
-const unansweredGeoJSURL = "unanswered://geojs/v1/ip/geo.json"
+const silentGeoJSURL = "silent://geojs/v1/ip/geo.json"

 func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
 	transport, _ := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport)
-	transport.RegisterProtocol("unanswered", unansweredGeoJS{})
+	transport.RegisterProtocol("silent", silentGeoJS{})
 	transport.RegisterProtocol("abuseipdb", abuseIPDBStandIn{})

 	m.Run()
 }

-// unansweredGeoJS is the GeoJS at unansweredGeoJSURL.
-type unansweredGeoJS struct{}
+// silentGeoJS is the GeoJS at silentGeoJSURL.
+type silentGeoJS struct{}

 // RoundTrip waits until req is abandoned.
-func (unansweredGeoJS) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+func (silentGeoJS) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 	<-req.Context().Done()

 	return nil, req.Context().Err()
@@ -0,0 +1,432 @@
+package discriminator_test
+
+import (
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/netip"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+const (
+	metricsToken = "SWW_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
+	metricsTopN  = "SWW_METRICS_TOP_N"
+	// token is the SWW_METRICS_TOKEN the tests set, and bearer how a
+	// request carries it.
+	token  = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+	bearer = "Bearer " + token
+)
+
+func TestMetricsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", nil)
+
+	// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
+	for _, authorization := range []string{bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
+		s.ownEndpointRequest(authorization, http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
+			http.StatusNotFound)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMetricsNeedTheTokenAndOtherPathsAreNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		method, path, authorization string
+		status                      int
+	}{
+		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
+		{
+			http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(token),
+			http.StatusUnauthorized,
+		},
+		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "Basic " + token,
+			http.StatusUnauthorized},
+		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusOK},
+		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "bearer " + token, http.StatusOK},
+		{http.MethodPost, discriminator.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
+		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath + "/", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
+		{http.MethodGet, "/_sww/bans", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
+		{http.MethodPost, discriminator.HealthPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
+	} {
+		got := s.ownEndpointRequest(tc.authorization, tc.method, tc.path, "", tc.status)
+
+		if tc.status == http.StatusUnauthorized &&
+			got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
+			t.Errorf("%q was answered without WWW-Authenticate: Bearer",
+				tc.authorization)
+		}
+
+		if tc.status == http.StatusOK &&
+			!strings.Contains(string(got.body), "# TYPE sww_requests_total counter") {
+			t.Errorf("the metrics are\n%s", got.body)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMetricsCountTheTraffic(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
+	})
+	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now,
+		map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
+
+	got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc")))
+	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
+	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_sww/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
+	out.endedLines(t, 2)
+
+	forward := `{action="forward",instance="app",status_class="2xx"}`
+	notFound := `{action="own_endpoint",instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`
+
+	// The request for the metrics is itself under way.
+	metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_requests_total"+forward, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_requests_total"+notFound, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_request_bytes_total"+forward, 3)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_response_bytes_total"+forward, 5)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_response_bytes_total"+notFound,
+		float64(len("Not Found\n")))
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_request_duration_seconds_count{instance="app"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_upstream_duration_seconds_count{instance="app"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 1)
+	metric(t, metrics, `go_goroutines{instance="app"}`)
+	metric(t, metrics, `process_start_time_seconds{instance="app"}`)
+}
+
+func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
+
+	s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		metricsToken:       token,
+		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
+		denyNets:           denied,
+		banResponse:        banResponseClose,
+		limitBanDuration:   "1h",
+		maxBanDuration:     "2h",
+	})
+
+	// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
+	s.get(denied, 0, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+
+	// A first broken limit bans for an hour.
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+
+	metrics := s.scrape()
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_requests_total{action="client_denied",instance="app",status_class="none"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
+		`kind="requests",window="minute"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
+
+	clk.advance(time.Hour)
+	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `sww_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
+
+	// A limit broken again right after would ban for three hours, longer
+	// than SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+
+	metrics = s.scrape()
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
+		`kind="requests",window="minute"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
+	// denied and client.
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_tracked_clients{instance="app"}`, 2)
+}
+
+func TestMetricsCountTheBansAnAdminMakes(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		metricsToken: token,
+		adminToken:   adminSecret,
+	})
+
+	const admins = `sww_bans_made_total{cause="admin",instance="app"}`
+
+	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 0)
+
+	// As an admin's edit of bans.json that adds a ban is taken in.
+	server.Ledger.LoadEdit([]bans.Ban{{
+		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
+		Start:    clk.Now(),
+	}})
+
+	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 1)
+
+	// And a ban made through the endpoint.
+	s.admin(http.MethodPost, discriminator.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK)
+	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 2)
+}
+
+func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const fromFR = "198.51.100.20"
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
+	})
+	env := map[string]string{
+		trustedProxies:   trustLocalhost,
+		metricsToken:     token,
+		metricsTopN:      "2",
+		allowedCountries: "de,fr",
+	}
+	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
+	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, time.Now, env)
+
+	// The answers are kept before the requests, so that none waits for
+	// GeoJS.
+	server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
+		keptAnswer(fromKP, "KP"), keptAnswer(fromDE, "DE"), keptAnswer(fromFR, "FR"),
+	})
+
+	lines := 0
+	send := func(from string, times, status int) {
+		t.Helper()
+
+		for range times {
+			req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc"))
+			req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, from)
+			wantStatus(t, do(t, req), status)
+
+			// Each is counted before the next is sent, so that the
+			// countries are ranked in the order sent.
+			lines++
+			out.endedLines(t, lines)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// With two countries of their own, the third is counted as other.
+	send(fromKP, 3, http.StatusForbidden)
+	send(fromDE, 2, http.StatusOK)
+	send(fromFR, 1, http.StatusOK)
+
+	metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
+	lines++
+
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_requests_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_requests_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_requests_total{country="other",instance="app"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_list_refusals_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_request_bytes_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 0)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_request_bytes_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`, 6)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_response_bytes_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`,
+		float64(3*len("Forbidden\n")))
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_response_bytes_total{country="other",instance="app"}`,
+		float64(len("hello")))
+	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_requests_total{country="FR",instance="app"}`)
+
+	// Once FR is busier than DE, it takes DE's place: its series counts
+	// from then on, and DE's is gone.
+	send(fromFR, 3, http.StatusOK)
+
+	metrics = scrape(t, server.Addr)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_requests_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_requests_total{country="FR",instance="app"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_requests_total{country="other",instance="app"}`, 2)
+	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_requests_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`)
+	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
+		`sww_country_request_bytes_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`)
+}
+
+func TestMetricsByASNumberKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
+	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
+		metricsToken: token,
+		metricsTopN:  "1",
+	})
+
+	// The answers are kept before the requests, so that GeoJS gives none
+	// of its own. Each client is in an AS of its own.
+	answer := func(addr, asn string) lookup.Answer {
+		return lookup.Answer{
+			Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32"), ASN: asn,
+			Answered: clk.Now(), Used: clk.Now(),
+		}
+	}
+	server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
+		answer(fromDE, "AS64501"), answer(fromKP, "AS64502"),
+	})
+
+	// With one AS number of its own, the other is counted as other.
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+	metrics := s.scrape()
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_asn_requests_total{asn="AS64501",instance="app"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_asn_requests_total{asn="other",instance="app"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_asn_request_bytes_total{asn="AS64501",instance="app"}`, 0)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`sww_asn_response_bytes_total{asn="other",instance="app"}`, 0)
+	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
+		`sww_asn_requests_total{asn="AS64502",instance="app"}`)
+}
+
+func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	geojs := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+		}))
+	t.Cleanup(geojs.Close)
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
+	addr, _, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, time.Now,
+		map[string]string{
+			trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
+			metricsToken:   token,
+			tagDeny:        denyKP,
+		})
+
+	// GeoJS fails, so the client has no country= tag, and SWW_TAG_DENY does
+	// not refuse it.
+	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
+	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
+	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
+
+	// The client stops waiting for GeoJS once SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT is up, so
+	// GeoJS's failure can come after its request has ended.
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
+	metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
+
+	for metric(t, metrics, `sww_geojs_failures_total{instance="app"}`) == 0 &&
+		time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		time.Sleep(pollInterval)
+
+		metrics = scrape(t, server.Addr)
+	}
+
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_geojs_requests_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_geojs_failures_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_without_geojs_answer_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
+}
+
+// keptAnswer returns GeoJS's answer that the client at addr is in
+// country, given now.
+func keptAnswer(addr, country string) lookup.Answer {
+	now := time.Now()
+
+	return lookup.Answer{
+		Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32"), Country: country,
+		Answered: now, Used: now,
+	}
+}
+
+// scrape asks discriminator at addr for the metrics, with the token, and returns
+// them.
+func scrape(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, discriminator.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", bearer)
+
+	got := do(t, req)
+	if got.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("the metrics were answered %d", got.status)
+	}
+
+	return string(got.body)
+}
+
+// scrape asks for the metrics, with the token, and returns them.
+func (s *sender) scrape() string {
+	s.t.Helper()
+
+	return string(s.ownEndpointRequest(bearer, http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath,
+		"", http.StatusOK).body)
+}
+
+// metric returns the value of series in metrics, which are in the
+// Prometheus text format. series is a name and its labels in the order of
+// their names, such as
+// sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}. It fails the
+// test if there is no such series.
+func metric(t *testing.T, metrics, series string) float64 {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for line := range strings.Lines(metrics) {
+		value, found := strings.CutPrefix(strings.TrimSuffix(line, "\n"), series+" ")
+		if !found {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		number, err := strconv.ParseFloat(value, 64)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%s has the value %q", series, value)
+		}
+
+		return number
+	}
+
+	t.Fatalf("no series %s in the metrics:\n%s", series, metrics)
+
+	return 0
+}
+
+// wantMetric checks the value of series in metrics, as metric reads it.
+func wantMetric(t *testing.T, metrics, series string, want float64) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	got := metric(t, metrics, series)
+	if got != want {
+		t.Errorf("%s is %v, want %v", series, got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// wantNoSeries checks that metrics have no series series.
+func wantNoSeries(t *testing.T, metrics, series string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	if strings.Contains(metrics, "\n"+series+" ") {
+		t.Errorf("there is a series %s", series)
+	}
+}
@@ -1,33 +1,129 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
-	"bytes"
-	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
-	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"

+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )

-// observe is the value of SWWAF_MODE for observe mode.
+// observe is the value of SWW_MODE for observe mode.
 const observe = "observe"

+func TestBanActionSaysWhetherTheBanRunsOut(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const trapPath = "/wp-login.php"
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name  string
+		cause string
+		// endsIn is how long after the request the ban ends: negative for a
+		// ban that has ended, and zero for a permanent ban.
+		endsIn time.Duration
+		path   string
+		want   string
+	}{
+		{
+			"temporary ban", bans.CauseAdmin, time.Hour, "/",
+			requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
+		},
+		{"permanent ban", bans.CauseAdmin, 0, "/", requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned},
+		{
+			"request that makes a ban permanent", bans.CauseAttack, time.Hour, "/",
+			requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned,
+		},
+		{
+			"trap path after an attack ban ended", bans.CauseAttack, -time.Hour,
+			trapPath, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned,
+		},
+		{
+			"first trap path after another ban ended", bans.CauseAdmin, -time.Hour,
+			trapPath, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
+		},
+	} {
+		for _, modeValue := range []string{"enforce", observe} {
+			t.Run(tc.name+" in "+modeValue, func(t *testing.T) {
+				t.Parallel()
+
+				s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+					trapPaths: trapPathList, mode: modeValue,
+				})
+
+				ban := bans.Ban{
+					Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
+					Start:    clk.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour),
+					Cause:    tc.cause,
+				}
+				if tc.endsIn != 0 {
+					ban.Expires = clk.Now().Add(tc.endsIn)
+				}
+
+				server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{ban})
+
+				if modeValue == observe {
+					line := s.request(client, tc.path, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+					wantWouldAction(t, line, tc.want)
+
+					return
+				}
+
+				s.request(client, tc.path, http.StatusForbidden, tc.want)
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestObserveModeNamesAPermanentBanWhoseAlertWouldBeSent(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
+		trapPaths: trapPathList, mode: observe,
+	})
+
+	server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{{
+		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
+		Start:    clk.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour),
+		Expires:  clk.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
+		Cause:    bans.CauseAttack,
+	}})
+
+	line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
+
+	waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
+	if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventPermanentBan {
+		t.Errorf("alerts waiting are %+v, want one %s", waiting, alerts.EventPermanentBan)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestObserveModeNamesTheHeuristicThatWouldHaveRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		mode: observe, denyNets: client,
+	})
+
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+client+`/32"}`)
+}
+
 func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	const (
-		denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
+		denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
 		banned = otherClient  // under a ban read from bans.json
 	)

 	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		setting string // "" leaves SWWAF_MODE at its default
+		setting string // "" leaves SWW_MODE at its default
 		observe bool
 	}{
 		{"", false},
@@ -42,7 +138,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
 				lookupTimeout:      "1h",
 				rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 				denyNets:           denied,
-				deniedCountries:    "kp",
+				tagDeny:            denyKP,
 			}

 			if tc.setting != "" {
@@ -61,10 +157,10 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
 			s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)

 			for _, sent := range []struct{ from, refusal string }{
-				{denied, requestlog.ActionDenied},
-				{banned, requestlog.ActionBanned},
-				{fromKP, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied},
-				{fromDE, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
+				{denied, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
+				{banned, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned},
+				{fromKP, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
+				{fromDE, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
 			} {
 				if !tc.observe {
 					line := s.get(sent.from, http.StatusForbidden, sent.refusal)
@@ -76,11 +172,6 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
 				// Passed to the app, which answered it.
 				line := s.get(sent.from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 				wantWouldAction(t, line, sent.refusal)
-
-				if line.UpstreamStatus != http.StatusOK {
-					t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %d, want 200",
-						line.UpstreamStatus)
-				}
 			}
 		})
 	}
@@ -107,7 +198,7 @@ func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {

 	for range 2 {
 		line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-		wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+		wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)

 		if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit ||
 			line.BanExpires != "" {
@@ -120,7 +211,7 @@ func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {
 	// The ban read from bans.json refuses nothing, and so counts no
 	// refusal in its notes, but is kept.
 	line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)

 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(kept.Expires) {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s", line.BanExpires,
@@ -133,62 +224,6 @@ func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestObserveModeKeepsTheSizeLimitsAndTheToken(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
-
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-
-	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-		calls.Add(1)
-		answerWithSize(w, 2*sizeLimit, true)
-	})
-	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
-		mode:             observe,
-		trustedProxies:   trustLocalhost,
-		denyNets:         denied,
-		requestMaxBytes:  sizeLimitSetting,
-		responseMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
-		metricsToken:     token,
-	})
-
-	// SWWAF_DENY_NETS would refuse each request; instead a size limit or
-	// the missing token does.
-	for i, tc := range []struct {
-		method, path string
-		body         io.Reader
-		status       int
-		action       string
-	}{
-		{
-			http.MethodPost, "/upload", bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, 2*sizeLimit)),
-			http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
-		},
-		{
-			http.MethodGet, "/download", http.NoBody,
-			http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
-		},
-		{
-			http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody,
-			http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin,
-		},
-	} {
-		req := newRequest(t, tc.method, addr, tc.path, tc.body)
-		req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, denied)
-		wantStatus(t, do(t, req), tc.status)
-
-		line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
-		wantLine(t, line, tc.status, tc.action)
-		wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
-	}
-
-	// The upload was refused before it reached the app.
-	if calls.Load() != 1 {
-		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
-	}
-}
-
 // wantWouldAction checks the request log line's would_action, and that a
 // line that should have none has no such field.
 func wantWouldAction(t *testing.T, line logLine, want string) {
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+// Package discriminator is the server the discriminator command runs. It answers
+// rproxy's questions, takes rproxy's reports and answers its own endpoints, and
+// writes a log line for each.
+package discriminator
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+
+	lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/routewatch"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
+)
+
+// ownEndpointPrefix starts the path of each of discriminator's own endpoints. The app
+// never sees a path under it.
+const ownEndpointPrefix = "/_sww/"
+
+// HealthPath is the health endpoint of discriminator and of rproxy, which the
+// container's health check asks.
+const HealthPath = "/_sww/healthz"
+
+// MetricsPath is where the metrics are, for a request that carries
+// SWW_METRICS_TOKEN.
+const MetricsPath = "/_sww/metrics"
+
+// BansPath is where an admin lists and adds bans, and, followed by / and
+// a client's address, lifts them, with SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN.
+const BansPath = "/_sww/bans"
+
+// ClientsPath is where an admin asks what discriminator knows of a client, by
+// the client's address after it, with SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN.
+const ClientsPath = "/_sww/clients/"
+
+// Params are what New needs.
+type Params struct {
+	Config *config.Config
+	// RequestLog receives two JSON lines per question, one at its decision and
+	// one when its report comes, and one per request to discriminator's own
+	// endpoints.
+	RequestLog io.Writer
+	// ProcessLog receives the process's own messages.
+	ProcessLog *slog.Logger
+	// GeoJSURL is where clients' AS numbers and countries are looked up
+	// while SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is geojs, normally lookup.URL.
+	GeoJSURL string
+	// AbuseIPDBURL is where clients are checked with AbuseIPDB while
+	// SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set, normally reputation.AbuseIPDBURL.
+	AbuseIPDBURL string
+	// LookupFile is the lookup database they are looked up in while
+	// SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, and nil otherwise.
+	LookupFile *lookup.File
+	// CoreRuleSet is what NewCoreRuleSet returns: what inspects requests
+	// while SWW_WAF_MODE is not off, and nil while it is.
+	CoreRuleSet *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet
+	// Now tells the time by which requests are counted for the rate
+	// limits, bans are made and run out, and GeoJS's answers are kept,
+	// normally time.Now in UTC, the time the state files give.
+	Now func() time.Time
+	// Rules are the rule files' rules, which each request is checked
+	// against.
+	Rules *rules.Files
+	// Alerts receive the alert for each ban discriminator makes or makes
+	// permanent, for each count over an anomaly threshold, for each request
+	// whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL zone or
+	// AbuseIPDB lists, for each request the Core Rule Set scores at or over
+	// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, and for GeoJS failing, a fetch of a list
+	// failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB failing,
+	// or the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
+	Alerts *alerts.Queue
+}
+
+// Server is the server discriminator runs, with the parts whose state the state
+// files keep, the lookup database, nil unless SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the
+// lists fetched from URLs, which its Run fetches, the DNSBL zones' verdicts,
+// AbuseIPDB's scores and checks spent, and the metrics. RouteWatch, nil while
+// SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL is unset, keeps its answers in memory only.
+type Server struct {
+	*http.Server
+
+	Ledger     *bans.Ledger
+	Limiter    *ratelimit.Limiter
+	GeoJS      *lookup.GeoJS
+	Anomalies  *anomaly.Counters
+	LookupFile *lookup.File
+	Lists      *reputation.Lists
+	DNSBL      *reputation.DNSBL
+	AbuseIPDB  *reputation.AbuseIPDB
+	RouteWatch *routewatch.Client
+	Metrics    *metrics.Metrics
+}
+
+// newHandler returns the handler with what every request shares, as the
+// settings in params make it.
+func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
+	m := metrics.New(params.Config.MetricsTopN, params.Config.InstanceName)
+	lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB := newReputation(params, m)
+
+	awaitingReport, err := lru.New[string, *decision](maxAwaitingReport)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err) // New fails only for a size below one
+	}
+
+	h := &handler{
+		config:         params.Config,
+		requestLog:     params.RequestLog,
+		processLog:     params.ProcessLog,
+		now:            params.Now,
+		metrics:        m,
+		awaitingReport: awaitingReport,
+		limiter: ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{
+			PerMinute:      params.Config.RateLimitPerMinute,
+			PerHour:        params.Config.RateLimitPerHour,
+			PerDay:         params.Config.RateLimitPerDay,
+			BytesPerMinute: params.Config.BytesLimitPerMinute,
+			BytesPerHour:   params.Config.BytesLimitPerHour,
+			BytesPerDay:    params.Config.BytesLimitPerDay,
+		}, params.Config.MaxTrackedClients),
+		ledger: bans.New(bans.Params{
+			LimitBanDuration:     params.Config.LimitBanDuration,
+			LimitBanRepeatWindow: params.Config.LimitBanRepeatWindow,
+			MaxBanDuration:       params.Config.MaxBanDuration,
+			AttackBanDuration:    params.Config.AttackBanDuration,
+			MaxBans:              params.Config.MaxBans,
+		}),
+		anomalies: anomaly.New(anomaly.Params{
+			Client:         params.Config.AnomalyClient,
+			Net:            params.Config.AnomalyNet,
+			ASN:            params.Config.AnomalyASN,
+			Total:          params.Config.AnomalyTotal,
+			Watch:          params.Config.AnomalyWatch,
+			NetV4Prefix:    params.Config.AnomalyNetV4Prefix,
+			NetV6Prefix:    params.Config.AnomalyNetV6Prefix,
+			NamedNetblocks: params.Config.WatchNets,
+			Alerts:         params.Alerts,
+		}),
+		lookupFile:  params.LookupFile,
+		lists:       lists,
+		dnsbl:       dnsbl,
+		abuseIPDB:   abuseIPDB,
+		rules:       params.Rules,
+		coreRuleSet: params.CoreRuleSet,
+		alerts:      params.Alerts,
+	}
+	if params.Config.RouteWatchURL != "" {
+		h.routeWatch = routewatch.New(routewatch.Params{
+			URL: params.Config.RouteWatchURL, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
+		})
+	}
+
+	h.geojs = lookup.New(lookup.Params{
+		URL:     params.GeoJSURL,
+		Timeout: params.Config.LookupTimeout,
+		// The country list, the headers, the tag settings that name an asn=
+		// or country= tag and the biased thresholds act on the answer before
+		// the request goes on.
+		Wait: len(params.Config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries) > 0 ||
+			params.Config.AddLookupHeaders || params.Config.TagsNeedLookup() ||
+			biasedThresholdsSet(params.Config),
+		Answered:   h.addLookup,
+		Now:        params.Now,
+		ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
+		Metrics:    m,
+		Alerts:     params.Alerts,
+	})
+	m.AddBansAndClients(h.ledger, h.limiter, params.Now)
+	m.AddRules(params.Rules)
+
+	return h
+}
+
+// newReputation returns the lists fetched from URLs, the DNSBL zones'
+// verdicts and AbuseIPDB's scores, as the settings in params name them,
+// with none fetched, asked for or checked yet, and adds their metrics to
+// m, AbuseIPDB's while SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
+func newReputation(
+	params Params, m *metrics.Metrics,
+) (*reputation.Lists, *reputation.DNSBL, *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
+	cfg := params.Config
+	lists := reputation.New(reputation.Params{
+		BlocklistURLs: cfg.BlocklistURLs, Refresh: cfg.BlocklistRefresh,
+		ASNLimitPercentURL:   cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL,
+		TagLists:             cfg.TagLists,
+		CrowdSecDecisionsURL: cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL, CrowdSecKey: cfg.CrowdSecKey,
+		Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog, Alerts: params.Alerts,
+	})
+	dnsbl := reputation.NewDNSBL(reputation.DNSBLParams{
+		Zones: cfg.DNSBLZones, Resolver: cfg.DNSBLResolver, CacheTTL: cfg.ReputationCacheTTL,
+		Timeout: cfg.ReputationTimeout, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
+		Alerts: params.Alerts,
+	})
+	abuseIPDB := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
+		URL: params.AbuseIPDBURL, Key: cfg.AbuseIPDBKey, MinScore: cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
+		DailyBudget: cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget, CacheTTL: cfg.ReputationCacheTTL,
+		Timeout: cfg.ReputationTimeout, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
+		Alerts: params.Alerts,
+	})
+
+	m.AddReputation(lists, dnsbl)
+
+	if cfg.AbuseIPDBKey != "" {
+		m.AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB)
+	}
+
+	return lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB
+}
+
+// NewCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
+// without the rules SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
+// up to SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT, with the exclusions in
+// SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, or nil while SWW_WAF_MODE is off. It
+// reads at most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
+// QuestionBodyMaxBytes may be cut short, and the Core Rule Set does not read a
+// JSON or XML body over its limit. An exclusions file that coreruleset.New refuses is
+// an error in every mode. While the mode is off, a set file is loaded with the
+// Core Rule Set only to check it.
+func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
+	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff && cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile == "" {
+		return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // off is no Core Rule Set, and no error
+	}
+
+	coreRuleSet, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
+		ParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel, DisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules,
+		BodyLimit:      min(cfg.WAFBodyLimit, QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1),
+		ExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff {
+		return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // off is no Core Rule Set, and no error
+	}
+
+	return coreRuleSet, nil
+}
+
+// handler is discriminator's handler. It holds what every request shares; what
+// belongs to one request is in a request.
+type handler struct {
+	config      *config.Config
+	requestLog  io.Writer
+	processLog  *slog.Logger
+	now         func() time.Time
+	metrics     *metrics.Metrics
+	limiter     *ratelimit.Limiter
+	ledger      *bans.Ledger
+	geojs       *lookup.GeoJS
+	anomalies   *anomaly.Counters
+	lookupFile  *lookup.File
+	lists       *reputation.Lists
+	dnsbl       *reputation.DNSBL
+	abuseIPDB   *reputation.AbuseIPDB
+	routeWatch  *routewatch.Client
+	rules       *rules.Files
+	coreRuleSet *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet
+	alerts      *alerts.Queue
+	// awaitingReport holds the decision on each answered question by its id
+	// until its report comes, and nil for a question still being handled.
+	awaitingReport *lru.Cache[string, *decision]
+}
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"bufio"
 	"bytes"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"io"
+	"log/slog"
 	"maps"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
@@ -16,88 +17,88 @@ import (

 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )

 const (
-	// shortTimeout is what a test sets a timeout to, to see it run out.
-	// It starts before the test has set up its case, such as an upgrade
-	// or the app's buffers filling, so it is as long as the hold-up of the
-	// test process that wantTimedOut allows: a shorter one can run out
-	// first on a busy host.
-	shortTimeout = waitLimit / 2
-	// longTimeoutSetting is a timeout that does not run out in a test.
-	longTimeoutSetting = "1m"
 	// waitLimit bounds how long a test waits for what should happen.
 	waitLimit = 10 * time.Second
 	// pollInterval is how often a test looks for a log line.
 	pollInterval = 10 * time.Millisecond
-	// localhost is where every test server listens, and so the address
-	// smallwebwaf sees each test's requests come from.
+	// localhost is where every test server listens, and so the address rproxy
+	// sees each test's requests come from.
 	localhost = "127.0.0.1"
 	// requestType is the type that marks a request log line.
 	requestType = "request"
-	// protocol is the protocol of every test's requests.
+	// protocol is the protocol of every question.
 	protocol = "HTTP/1.1"
+	// trustLocalhost trusts the address every test connects from, and a
+	// network for proxies in front of it.
+	trustLocalhost = localhost + "/32,10.0.0.0/8"
+	// appHost is the host every test asks for.
+	appHost = "app.example"
+	// client is the client's address, as a proxy names it.
+	client = "203.0.113.9"
+	// forwardedFor is the header that lists the client and its proxies,
+	// and forwardedProto the one that gives the scheme the client used.
+	forwardedFor   = "X-Forwarded-For"
+	forwardedProto = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
+	// secure is the scheme a client reached traefik with, and plain the one
+	// rproxy serves.
+	secure = "https"
+	plain  = "http"
 )

-// shortTimeoutSetting is shortTimeout as a setting's value.
-//
-//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot call String
-var shortTimeoutSetting = shortTimeout.String()
-
 // The settings the tests set.
 const (
-	clientRequestTimeout    = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
-	clientHeaderMaxBytes    = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES"
-	clientIdleTimeout       = "SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT"
-	clientResponseTimeout   = "SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
-	upstreamRequestTimeout  = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
-	upstreamResponseTimeout = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
-	mode                    = "SWWAF_MODE"
-	requestMaxBytes         = "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES"
-	responseMaxBytes        = "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES"
-	trustedProxies          = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
-	ipv6GroupPrefix         = "SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
-	maxTrackedClients       = "SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
-	allowNets               = "SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS"
-	rateLimitExemptNets     = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
-	denyNets                = "SWWAF_DENY_NETS"
-	rateLimitPerMinute      = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
-	rateLimitPerDay         = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
-	rateLimitExemptPaths    = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
-	lookupSource            = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
-	lookupDBPath            = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
-	lookupTimeout           = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
-	addLookupHeaders        = "SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
-	deniedCountries         = "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
-	allowedCountries        = "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
-	banResponse             = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
-	limitBanDuration        = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
-	limitBanRepeatWindow    = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
-	maxBanDuration          = "SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
-	maxBans                 = "SWWAF_MAX_BANS"
-	banScopeV4Prefix        = "SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
-	instanceName            = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
-	logRequestHeaders       = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
-	attackBanDuration       = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
-	rulesDir                = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
-	wafMode                 = "SWWAF_WAF_MODE"
+	mode                 = "SWW_MODE"
+	trustedProxies       = "SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
+	ipv6GroupPrefix      = "SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
+	maxTrackedClients    = "SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
+	allowNets            = "SWW_ALLOW_NETS"
+	rateLimitExemptNets  = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
+	denyNets             = "SWW_DENY_NETS"
+	rateLimitPerMinute   = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
+	rateLimitPerDay      = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
+	rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
+	lookupSource         = "SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
+	lookupDBPath         = "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
+	lookupTimeout        = "SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
+	addLookupHeaders     = "SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
+	tagDeny              = "SWW_TAG_DENY"
+	// denyKP is the value of SWW_TAG_DENY that refuses fromKP's country.
+	denyKP               = "country=KP"
+	allowedCountries     = "SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
+	banResponse          = "SWW_BAN_RESPONSE"
+	limitBanDuration     = "SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
+	limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
+	maxBanDuration       = "SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
+	maxBans              = "SWW_MAX_BANS"
+	banScopeV4Prefix     = "SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
+	instanceName         = "SWW_INSTANCE_NAME"
+	logRequestHeaders    = "SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
+	attackBanDuration    = "SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
+	rulesDir             = "SWW_RULES_DIR"
+	wafMode              = "SWW_WAF_MODE"
 )

 // off is the value that switches a setting off.
 const off = "off"

-// output collects what smallwebwaf writes on stdout.
+// on is the value that switches a setting that takes true or false on.
+const on = "true"
+
+// output collects what sww writes on stdout.
 type output struct {
 	mu  sync.Mutex
 	buf bytes.Buffer
 }

-// Write adds lines smallwebwaf writes.
+// Write adds lines sww writes.
 func (o *output) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	o.mu.Lock()
 	defer o.mu.Unlock()
@@ -176,6 +177,73 @@ func (o *output) requestLine(t *testing.T) logLine {
 	return o.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
 }

+// endedLines waits for count requests that went through rproxy, or to discriminator's
+// own endpoints, to have ended, and returns the last log line of each, in the
+// order discriminator took them. A question's last line is the one its report writes.
+func (o *output) endedLines(t *testing.T, count int) []logLine {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		found := o.lastLines(t)
+
+		ended := len(found) >= count
+		for _, line := range found[:min(count, len(found))] {
+			if line.DiscriminatorLine == requestlog.DiscriminatorLineDecision {
+				ended = false
+			}
+		}
+
+		if ended {
+			return found
+		}
+
+		time.Sleep(pollInterval)
+	}
+
+	t.Fatalf("fewer than %d requests have ended after %s", count, waitLimit)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// lastLines returns the last request log line written so far of each request,
+// in the order discriminator took them.
+func (o *output) lastLines(t *testing.T) []logLine {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var found []logLine
+
+	places := map[string]int{}
+
+	for _, fields := range o.lines(t) {
+		if fields["type"] != requestType {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		line := decodeLine(t, fields)
+
+		place, seen := places[line.RequestID]
+		if seen {
+			found[place] = line
+
+			continue
+		}
+
+		places[line.RequestID] = len(found)
+		found = append(found, line)
+	}
+
+	return found
+}
+
+// endedLine waits for a test's one request to have ended, and returns its last
+// log line.
+func (o *output) endedLine(t *testing.T) logLine {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	return o.endedLines(t, 1)[0]
+}
+
 // decodeLine reads a request log line's fields into a logLine.
 func decodeLine(t *testing.T, fields map[string]any) logLine {
 	t.Helper()
@@ -195,7 +263,7 @@ func decodeLine(t *testing.T, fields map[string]any) logLine {
 	return line
 }

-// startApp starts app as the app smallwebwaf passes requests to.
+// startApp starts app as the app rproxy passes requests to.
 func startApp(t *testing.T, app http.HandlerFunc) *httptest.Server {
 	t.Helper()

@@ -205,9 +273,9 @@ func startApp(t *testing.T, app http.HandlerFunc) *httptest.Server {
 	return server
 }

-// startProxy starts smallwebwaf in front of the app at appURL, with the
-// settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns where it listens and
-// what it writes.
+// startProxy starts discriminator, and rproxy in front of the app at appURL, each with
+// the settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns where rproxy listens
+// and what discriminator writes.
 func startProxy(t *testing.T, appURL string, env map[string]string) (string, *output) {
 	t.Helper()

@@ -227,14 +295,14 @@ func startProxyWithGeoJS(
 }

 // startProxyWithClock is startProxyWithGeoJS with requests counted and
-// bans made by the time now tells, and returns the server as well. Unless
-// env sets SWWAF_RULES_DIR, it is an empty directory, of no rules, and
-// unless it sets SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME, that is app, the label instance of
-// every metric.
+// bans made by the time now tells, and returns discriminator's server as well, whose
+// Addr is where discriminator listens. Unless env sets SWW_RULES_DIR, it is an empty
+// directory, of no rules, and unless it sets SWW_INSTANCE_NAME, that is app,
+// the label instance of every metric.
 func startProxyWithClock(
 	t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
 	env map[string]string,
-) (string, *output, *proxy.Server) {
+) (string, *output, *discriminator.Server) {
 	t.Helper()

 	addr, out, server, _ := startProxyWithAlerts(t, appURL, geojsURL, now, env)
@@ -243,14 +311,70 @@ func startProxyWithClock(
 }

 // startProxyWithAlerts is startProxyWithClock, and returns the queue of
-// the alerts the proxy raises as well, as newProxy makes them.
+// the alerts discriminator raises as well, as newDiscriminator makes them.
 func startProxyWithAlerts(
 	t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
 	env map[string]string,
-) (string, *output, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
+) (string, *output, *discriminator.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()

-	server, out, alertQueue := newProxy(t, appURL, geojsURL, now, env)
+	server, out, alertQueue := newDiscriminator(t, geojsURL, now, env)
+	serve(t, server)
+
+	return startRProxy(t, server.Addr, appURL, env), out, server, alertQueue
+}
+
+// serve serves server on a port of its own until the test ends, and sets its
+// Addr to where it listens.
+func serve(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	server.Addr = listener.Addr().String()
+
+	go func() {
+		_ = server.Serve(listener)
+	}()
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		_ = server.Close()
+	})
+}
+
+// startRProxy starts rproxy in front of the app at appURL, asking the discriminator
+// at discriminatorAddr, with the settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns
+// where it listens. What it writes is dropped. SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS is a minute unless
+// env sets it, so that on a busy host SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION does not decide.
+func startRProxy(
+	t *testing.T, discriminatorAddr, appURL string, env map[string]string,
+) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	settings := map[string]string{
+		"SWRP_WAF_BACKEND":  "http://" + discriminatorAddr,
+		"SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
+		"SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS":   "60000",
+	}
+	maps.Copy(settings, env)
+
+	cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
+		value, ok := settings[name]
+
+		return value, ok
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", settings, err)
+	}
+
+	server := rproxy.New(rproxy.Params{
+		Config:     cfg,
+		RequestLog: io.Discard,
+		ProcessLog: requestlog.NewProcessLogger(io.Discard, "rproxy", slog.LevelInfo),
+	})

 	listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
 	if err != nil {
@@ -265,28 +389,36 @@ func startProxyWithAlerts(
 		_ = server.Close()
 	})

-	return listener.Addr().String(), out, server, alertQueue
+	return listener.Addr().String()
 }

-// newProxy makes the server startProxyWithClock starts, without starting
-// it, and returns it, what it writes, and the queue of the alerts the
-// proxy raises, as the settings in env make it. No alert is sent from the
-// queue: they wait in it, for the test to look at. With no geojsURL, there
-// is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE
-// is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup database
-// SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
-// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY. SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off
-// unless env sets it, so that only the tests of the Core Rule Set have
-// their requests inspected by it.
-func newProxy(
-	t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
-	env map[string]string,
-) (*proxy.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
+// newDiscriminator makes discriminator's server, without starting it, and
+// returns it, what it writes, and the queue of the alerts it raises, as the
+// settings in env make it. No alert is sent from the queue: they wait in it,
+// for the test to look at.
+// With no geojsURL, there is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and
+// SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup
+// database SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
+// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY. SWW_WAF_MODE is off unless
+// env sets it, so that only the tests of the Core Rule Set have their requests
+// inspected by it.
+func newDiscriminator(
+	t *testing.T, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
+) (*discriminator.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	return newDiscriminatorWith(t, discriminator.New, geojsURL, now, env)
+}
+
+// newDiscriminatorWith is newDiscriminator for the server build makes.
+func newDiscriminatorWith(
+	t *testing.T, build func(discriminator.Params) *discriminator.Server,
+	geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
+) (*discriminator.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()

 	settings := map[string]string{
-		"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL, rulesDir: t.TempDir(), instanceName: "app",
-		wafMode: off,
+		rulesDir: t.TempDir(), instanceName: "app", wafMode: off,
 	}
 	if geojsURL == "" {
 		settings[lookupSource] = off
@@ -334,13 +466,19 @@ func newProxy(
 		}
 	}

-	server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
+	coreRuleSet, err := discriminator.NewCoreRuleSet(cfg)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Core Rule Set: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	server := build(discriminator.Params{
 		Config:       cfg,
 		RequestLog:   out,
 		ProcessLog:   processLog,
 		GeoJSURL:     geojsURL,
 		AbuseIPDBURL: abuseIPDBURL,
 		LookupFile:   lookupFile,
+		CoreRuleSet:  coreRuleSet,
 		Now:          now,
 		Rules:        ruleFiles,
 		Alerts:       alertQueue,
@@ -378,7 +516,7 @@ func readAnswer(res *http.Response) answer {
 	return answer{status: res.StatusCode, header: res.Header, body: body, err: err}
 }

-// newRequest makes a request for path to smallwebwaf at addr.
+// newRequest makes a request for path to addr, where rproxy or discriminator listens.
 func newRequest(t *testing.T, method, addr, path string, body io.Reader) *http.Request {
 	t.Helper()

@@ -402,15 +540,15 @@ func do(t *testing.T, req *http.Request) answer {
 	return readAnswer(res)
 }

-// get sends a GET request for path to smallwebwaf at addr.
+// get sends a GET request for path to addr.
 func get(t *testing.T, addr, path string) answer {
 	t.Helper()

 	return do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, path, http.NoBody))
 }

-// dial opens a connection to smallwebwaf at addr, for requests the HTTP
-// client cannot make, such as one that stops sending halfway.
+// dial opens a connection to addr, for requests the HTTP client cannot make,
+// such as one that stops sending halfway.
 func dial(t *testing.T, addr string) net.Conn {
 	t.Helper()

@@ -471,14 +609,3 @@ func wantStatus(t *testing.T, got answer, status int) {
 		t.Errorf("status %d, want %d", got.status, status)
 	}
 }
-
-// wantTimedOut checks that what began at start ended once shortTimeout
-// had run out, and not much later.
-func wantTimedOut(t *testing.T, start time.Time) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	took := time.Since(start)
-	if took < shortTimeout || took > shortTimeout+waitLimit/2 {
-		t.Errorf("took %s, want %s", took, shortTimeout)
-	}
-}
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic rate_limits. It reads SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS,
+// SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS and SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, and the rate limits and
+// biased thresholds through the limiter and limitPercentages.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// rateLimits counts the request for the rate limits, unless
+// countedByRateLimits exempts it, by the client's limit percentages, which it
+// notes for the log line with the client's counts. A request that takes the
+// client over a rate limit, as its limit percentage lowers it, breaks it: it is
+// refused, and bans the client. A request exempt from the rate limits is exempt
+// from the byte limits too. Its figures are the window, the count and the
+// limit.
+type rateLimits struct{}
+
+func (rateLimits) name() string { return "rate_limits" }
+
+func (rateLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
+	rq.counted = rq.countedByRateLimits()
+	if !rq.counted {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	rq.rateLimitPercent, rq.bytesLimitPercent = rq.limitPercentages()
+	rq.line.RateLimitPercent, rq.line.RateLimitPercentSetting =
+		rq.rateLimitPercent.logged()
+	rq.line.BytesLimitPercent, rq.line.BytesLimitPercentSetting =
+		rq.bytesLimitPercent.logged()
+
+	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
+		rq.rateLimitPercent.percent)
+	rq.line.Counts = counts
+
+	if !over {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.h.config.BanResponse)
+
+	return &verdict{
+		action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited, figures: limitFigures(hit),
+	}
+}
+
+// overAWholeRateLimit reports whether the heuristic rate_limits will refuse the
+// request at now, whatever its client's limit percentages: the rate limits
+// count it, and one more request from its client takes it over a whole rate
+// limit. It counts nothing.
+func (rq *request) overAWholeRateLimit(now time.Time) bool {
+	return rq.countedByRateLimits() &&
+		rq.h.limiter.OverARateLimit(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now)
+}
+
+// countedByRateLimits reports whether the rate limits count the request: its
+// client is not in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and its path is not exempt
+// under SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS.
+func (rq *request) countedByRateLimits() bool {
+	cfg := rq.h.config
+
+	return !isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) &&
+		!pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"net/http"
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )

-// minute is the window of SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE, as a log line's
+// minute is the window of SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE, as a log line's
 // limit_hit names it.
 const minute = "minute"

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 		req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, sent.client)
 		wantStatus(t, do(t, req), sent.want)

-		line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
+		line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
 		if line.ClientIP != sent.logged {
 			t.Errorf("log line has client_ip %q, want %q", line.ClientIP, sent.logged)
 		}
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 		if sent.want == http.StatusOK {
 			wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 		} else {
-			wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+			wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)

 			if line.LimitHit != minute {
 				t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want minute", line.LimitHit)
@@ -72,10 +72,21 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+func TestRateLimitRefusalNamesItsHeuristicWindowCountAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
+
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "rate_limits", `{"window": "minute", "count": 2, "limit": 1}`)
+}
+
 func TestIPv6GroupPrefixSetsTheClientTheLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	// With SWWAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX at 48, the first two addresses, in two
+	// With SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX at 48, the first two addresses, in two
 	// /64s of one /48, are one client, and the second's request breaks the
 	// limit; the third, in the next /48, is another client.
 	const (
@@ -91,7 +102,7 @@ func TestIPv6GroupPrefixSetsTheClientTheLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
 		status int
 		action string
 	}{
-		{rateLimitPerMinute, "1", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
+		{rateLimitPerMinute, "1", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
 		{bytesLimitPerMinute, byteLimit, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -118,14 +129,14 @@ func TestIPv6GroupPrefixSetsTheClientTheLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
+	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS

 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		rateLimitPerMinute:   "1",
 		rateLimitExemptPaths: "/assets/,/favicon.ico",
 		denyNets:             denied,
-		deniedCountries:      "kp",
+		tagDeny:              denyKP,
 	})

 	// The answers are kept before the requests, so that none waits for
@@ -149,14 +160,17 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {

 	// A path outside every prefix is counted: /assets is not under
 	// /assets/, and breaks the limit.
-	s.request(client, "/assets", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.request(client, "/assets", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)

-	// A ban, SWWAF_DENY_NETS and the country lists still refuse a path
-	// under a prefix.
-	s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-	s.request(denied, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
+	// A ban, SWW_DENY_NETS and SWW_TAG_DENY still refuse a path under a
+	// prefix.
+	s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.request(denied, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
 	s.request(fromKP, "/assets/app.js",
-		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
+		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
 }

 func TestRateLimitCountsPathsThatAreNotExempt(t *testing.T) {
@@ -200,7 +214,7 @@ func TestRateLimitCountsPathsThatAreNotExempt(t *testing.T) {
 			// Counted, the second request breaks the limit of one request
 			// a minute.
 			s.request(client, sent, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-			s.request(client, sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+			s.request(client, sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic refusal_limit. It reads SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD and
+// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// refusalLimit counts the request once it has been answered, if discriminator
+// refused it after a rule file match, a trap path or a Core Rule Set match, and
+// in observe mode if enforce mode would have: more than
+// SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD such refusals of the client within a minute break
+// a limit, which bans the client. A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, which the
+// heuristics skip, is not counted, and nothing is while the threshold is off.
+// Its figures are the window, the count and the limit.
+type refusalLimit struct{}
+
+func (refusalLimit) name() string { return "refusal_limit" }
+
+func (refusalLimit) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
+	cfg := rq.h.config
+	if cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if !rq.attack && !rq.blockedByBlockRule && !rq.blockedByCoreRuleSet {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountRefusal(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
+		cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold)
+	if !over {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// What the client was sent, or in observe mode would have been.
+	status := rq.out.status
+
+	switch rq.line.WouldAction {
+	case requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet:
+		status = http.StatusForbidden
+	case requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned:
+		status = cfg.BanResponse
+	}
+
+	rq.banForLimit(now, hit, status)
+
+	return &verdict{figures: limitFigures(hit)}
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"maps"
@@ -10,15 +10,15 @@ import (

 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )

-const errorBurstThreshold = "SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
+const errorBurstThreshold = "SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"

-// refused is a request the tests here send, which smallwebwaf refuses
-// after a rule file match, or for a missing or wrong token.
+// refused is a request the tests here send, which discriminator refuses after a rule
+// file match.
 type refused int

 const (
@@ -27,11 +27,6 @@ const (
 	// banRule is one its ban rule refuses with 403, and bans the client
 	// for.
 	banRule
-	// noMetricsToken is one for the metrics without a token, and
-	// wrongAdminToken one for the bans with the metrics token, each
-	// refused with 401.
-	noMetricsToken
-	wrongAdminToken
 )

 // send sends r from the client at from, checks its answer and log line as
@@ -42,17 +37,10 @@ func (r refused) send(s *sender, from string) logLine {
 	switch r {
 	case blockRule:
 		return s.request(from, blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden,
-			requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
+			requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
 	case banRule:
-		return s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-	case noMetricsToken:
-		return s.request(from, proxy.MetricsPath, http.StatusUnauthorized,
-			requestlog.ActionAdmin)
-	case wrongAdminToken:
-		line, _ := s.requestWithHeader(from, proxy.BansPath, "Authorization: "+bearer,
-			http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
-
-		return line
+		return s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden,
+			requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	}

 	s.t.Fatalf("no request for the refusal %d", r)
@@ -60,17 +48,16 @@ func (r refused) send(s *sender, from string) logLine {
 	return logLine{}
 }

-// startForErrorBurst is startWithClock with testRules, both tokens and
-// SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD at threshold, and the settings in env.
+// startForErrorBurst is startWithClock with testRules, the metrics token and
+// SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD at threshold, and the settings in env.
 func startForErrorBurst(
 	t *testing.T, threshold string, env map[string]string,
-) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server) {
+) (*sender, *clock, *discriminator.Server) {
 	t.Helper()

 	settings := map[string]string{
 		errorBurstThreshold: threshold,
 		rulesDir:            writeRules(t, testRules),
-		adminToken:          adminSecret,
 		metricsToken:        token,
 	}
 	maps.Copy(settings, env)
@@ -85,15 +72,19 @@ func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
 		name string
 		// refusals are four, one over the threshold of three.
 		refusals []refused
+		// nextAction is the action of the client's next request: the next
+		// request after a ban for a ban rule makes it permanent.
+		nextAction string
 	}{
-		{"block rule", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, blockRule}},
 		{
-			"missing or wrong token",
-			[]refused{noMetricsToken, wrongAdminToken, noMetricsToken, wrongAdminToken},
+			"block rule",
+			[]refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, blockRule},
+			requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
 		},
 		{
-			"a mix ending in a ban rule",
-			[]refused{blockRule, noMetricsToken, blockRule, banRule},
+			"a ban rule last",
+			[]refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, banRule},
+			requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned,
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -116,27 +107,44 @@ func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
 			// The fourth is answered as the others were, breaks the error
 			// burst, and bans the client.
 			line := tc.refusals[3].send(s, client)
-			if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst ||
+			if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals ||
 				line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
-				t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want error_burst "+
+				t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want minute_refusals "+
 					"and limit", line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
 			}

-			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, tc.nextAction)
 		})
 	}
 }

+func TestRefusalLimitBanNamesItsHeuristicWindowCountAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "1", nil)
+
+	const ruleFigures = `{"rule_id": "blocked", "rule_action": "block"}`
+
+	line := blockRule.send(s, client)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", ruleFigures)
+	wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t, line, "", "null")
+
+	// The second refusal is the request refusal_limit bans for, and the line
+	// names both.
+	line = blockRule.send(s, client)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", ruleFigures)
+	wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t, line, "refusal_limit",
+		`{"window": "minute", "count": 2, "limit": 1}`)
+}
+
 func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
-
 	s, clk, server := startForErrorBurst(t, "2", nil)
 	start := clk.Now()

 	blockRule.send(s, client)
-	wrongAdminToken.send(s, client)
+	blockRule.send(s, client)
 	line := blockRule.send(s, client)

 	expires := start.Add(time.Hour)
@@ -173,20 +181,18 @@ func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
 	}

-	wantOffences := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, RuleBlocked: 2, TokenRefused: 1}
+	wantOffences := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, BlockedByBlockRule: 3}
 	if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != wantOffences {
 		t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, wantOffences)
 	}

-	metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
+	metrics := s.scrape()
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
 		`kind="refusals",window="minute"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 2)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="token_refused"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 1)
+		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_block_rule"}`, 3)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 1)
 }

 func TestErrorBurstIsNotLoweredForAClientWithLowerLimits(t *testing.T) {
@@ -197,7 +203,7 @@ func TestErrorBurstIsNotLoweredForAClientWithLowerLimits(t *testing.T) {
 		lookupTimeout:       "1h",
 		errorBurstThreshold: "2",
 		rulesDir:            writeRules(t, testRules),
-		countryLimitPercent: countryDEHalf,
+		tagLimitPercent:     countryTagDEHalf,
 	})

 	// Half of the threshold would be one, which the second refusal is over.
@@ -271,7 +277,8 @@ func TestErrorBurstOffOrAtItsDefault(t *testing.T) {
 				line = blockRule.send(s, client)
 			}

-			if broken := line.LimitHit == requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst; broken != tc.broken {
+			broken := line.LimitHit == requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals
+			if broken != tc.broken {
 				t.Errorf("the 31st refusal broke the error burst: %t, want %t",
 					broken, tc.broken)
 			}
@@ -283,32 +290,28 @@ func TestErrorBurstCountsEachClientTheChecksApplyTo(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	const (
-		allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
-		exempt  = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
+		allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
+		exempt  = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
 	)

 	s, _, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "1", map[string]string{
 		allowNets: allowed, rateLimitExemptNets: exempt,
 	})

-	// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS still needs the token, but is not
-	// counted.
+	// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS is not refused, and so not counted.
 	for range 3 {
-		line := noMetricsToken.send(s, allowed)
-		if line.LimitHit != "" {
-			t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
-		}
+		s.request(allowed, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	}

 	// One the rate limits do not apply to is.
-	noMetricsToken.send(s, exempt)
+	blockRule.send(s, exempt)

-	line := wrongAdminToken.send(s, exempt)
-	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst {
-		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want error_burst", line.LimitHit)
+	line := blockRule.send(s, exempt)
+	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals {
+		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want minute_refusals", line.LimitHit)
 	}

-	s.get(exempt, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(exempt, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 }

 func TestErrorBurstBanSetsTheRefusalsBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
@@ -336,7 +339,6 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
 		mode:                observe,
 		errorBurstThreshold: "1",
 		rulesDir:            writeRules(t, testRules),
-		adminToken:          adminSecret,
 	})
 	start := clk.Now()
 	held := bans.Ban{
@@ -347,11 +349,12 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{held})

-	// Under a ban, enforce mode would have refused these before the
-	// endpoint, so their tokens are not counted.
+	// Under a ban, enforce mode would have refused these before the rule, so
+	// they are not counted.
 	for range 2 {
-		line := wrongAdminToken.send(s, otherClient)
-		wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+		line := s.request(otherClient, blockedPath, http.StatusOK,
+			requestlog.ActionForward)
+		wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)

 		if line.LimitHit != "" {
 			t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
@@ -360,13 +363,13 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {

 	// The block rule's refusal, which enforce mode would have answered 403,
 	// is the second of the client's, and would have banned it.
-	wrongAdminToken.send(s, client)
+	s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)

 	line := s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)

-	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst || line.BanExpires != "" {
-		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, want error_burst "+
+	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitMinuteRefusals || line.BanExpires != "" {
+		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, want minute_refusals "+
 			"and none", line.LimitHit, line.BanExpires)
 	}

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// What the reputation heuristics share: blocklists, crowdsec, dnsbl and
+// abuseipdb.
+
+import (
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+)
+
+// deny is the SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and the SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION that
+// refuses the requests of a client a source lists.
+const deny = "deny"
+
+// noteListed notes each of sources, the URLs of the blocklists or the
+// DNSBL zones, their keys masked, that list the client, as noteHit does,
+// with reason.
+func (rq *request) noteListed(sources []string, reason string) {
+	for _, source := range sources {
+		rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: source}, reason)
+	}
+}
+
+// noteHit adds hit's source, which lists the client, to the log line's
+// reputation, and hit to the notes of a ban the request makes, counts the
+// source in the metrics, and raises a reputation_hit alert with reason,
+// whose detail gives hit's source and score.
+func (rq *request) noteHit(hit bans.ReputationHit, reason string) {
+	detail := map[string]any{"source": hit.Source}
+	if hit.Score != nil {
+		detail["score"] = *hit.Score
+	}
+
+	rq.line.Reputation = append(rq.line.Reputation, hit.Source)
+	rq.reputation = append(rq.reputation, hit)
+	rq.h.metrics.ReputationHit(hit.Source)
+	rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
+		Event:    alerts.EventReputationHit,
+		Host:     rq.site,
+		Client:   rq.client,
+		Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
+		ASN:      rq.line.ASN,
+		ASName:   rq.line.ASName,
+		Country:  rq.line.Country,
+		Reason:   reason,
+		Detail:   detail,
+	})
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"fmt"
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import (

 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ import (

 // The reputation settings.
 const (
-	blocklistURLs      = "SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS"
-	blocklistAction    = "SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"
-	asnLimitPercentURL = "SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"
+	blocklistURLs      = "SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS"
+	blocklistAction    = "SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"
+	asnLimitPercentURL = "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"
 )

-// The actions of SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION:
+// The actions of SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION:
 // limitHalf gives a listed client half of every limit, and limitQuarter a
 // quarter.
 const (
@@ -49,12 +49,12 @@ const (
 func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionDenied
+	forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionClientDenied

 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		action string
 		// statuses and actions are those of a listed client's three
-		// requests, and percent their limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
+		// requests, and percent their rate_limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
 		statuses []int
 		actions  []string
 		percent  string
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 		{
 			// Half of 4 requests a minute: the third breaks the limit.
 			limitHalf, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusForbidden},
-			[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
+			[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
 			"50 from " + blocklistAction,
 		},
 		{
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 				for i := range 3 {
 					line := s.get(from, tc.statuses[i], tc.actions[i])
 					wantReputation(t, line, dropURL)
-					wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent,
-						line.LimitPercentSetting, tc.percent)
+					wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent", line.RateLimitPercent,
+						line.RateLimitPercentSetting, tc.percent)

 					// A request refused for the list is not counted.
 					counted := line.fields["counts"] != nil
@@ -106,7 +106,8 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 			for range 3 {
 				line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusOK, forward)
 				wantReputation(t, line)
-				wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+				wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+					line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 					none)
 			}

@@ -118,16 +119,66 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestBlocklistsComeAfterTheCountryListsAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
+func TestReputationRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndWhatListedTheClient(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		heuristic string
+		env       map[string]string
+		load      func(*testing.T, *discriminator.Server)
+		figures   string
+	}{
+		{
+			"blocklists",
+			map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL, blocklistAction: actionDeny},
+			func(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server) {
+				t.Helper()
+				loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {client}})
+			},
+			`{"lists": ["` + dropURL + `"]}`,
+		},
+		{
+			"dnsbl",
+			map[string]string{
+				dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver,
+				reputationAction: actionDeny,
+			},
+			func(_ *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server) {
+				loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{client: {dnsblZone}})
+			},
+			`{"zones": ["` + dnsblZone + `"]}`,
+		},
+		{
+			"abuseipdb",
+			map[string]string{abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionDeny},
+			func(_ *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server) {
+				loadScores(server, map[string]int64{client: 80})
+			},
+			`{"score": 80, "min_score": 75}`,
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.heuristic, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, tc.env)
+			tc.load(t, server)
+
+			line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+			wantHeuristic(t, line, tc.heuristic, tc.figures)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBlocklistsComeAfterAllowedCountriesAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	s, server, queue := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
-		blocklistURLs: dropURL, deniedCountries: "kp", allowNets: fromDE,
+		blocklistURLs: dropURL, allowedCountries: "de", allowNets: fromDE,
 	})
 	loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {fromDE, fromKP}})

 	// fromKP's country refuses it before the list is looked at, and fromDE,
-	// in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted, nor
+	// in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted, nor
 	// alerted.
 	wantReputation(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied))
 	wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
@@ -143,7 +194,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientABlocklistDeniesAndAlertsIt(t *testing.T) {
 	loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {fromDE}})

 	line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
 	wantReputation(t, line, dropURL)

 	waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
@@ -157,31 +208,33 @@ func TestBlocklistLimitTakesPartInTheLowestPercentageOfEveryLimit(t *testing.T)

 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		action, asnPercent string
-		// want is the upload's limit_percent and bytes_percent, as
+		// want is the upload's rate_limit_percent and bytes_limit_percent, as
 		// percentText gives them, and limitHit its limit_hit.
 		want, limitHit string
 	}{
-		{limitHalf, asnDEQuarter, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent, minuteBytes},
-		{limitQuarter, asnDEHalf, "25 from " + blocklistAction, minuteBytes},
+		{limitHalf, asnTagDEQuarter, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent, minuteBytes},
+		{limitQuarter, asnTagDEHalf, "25 from " + blocklistAction, minuteBytes},
 		// The AS number's, the first of two alike.
-		{limitQuarter, asnDEQuarter, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent, minuteBytes},
-		{actionLog, asnDE + ":100", none, ""},
+		{limitQuarter, asnTagDEQuarter, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent, minuteBytes},
+		{actionLog, "asn=64511:25", none, ""},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.action+" "+tc.asnPercent, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()

 			s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
 				bytesLimitPerMinute: twoUploads, blocklistURLs: dropURL,
-				blocklistAction: tc.action, asnLimitPercent: tc.asnPercent,
+				blocklistAction: tc.action, tagLimitPercent: tc.asnPercent,
 			})
 			loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {fromDE}})

 			// The upload's 100 bytes are over 49, a quarter of 199, and 99,
 			// half of it, and within 199.
 			line := s.uploadFrom(fromDE)
-			wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+			wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+				line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 				tc.want)
-			wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
+			wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+				line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
 				tc.want)

 			if line.LimitHit != tc.limitHit {
@@ -196,35 +249,35 @@ func TestASNLimitPercentFileCountsAsTheSettingDoesTheLowerWinning(t *testing.T)

 	const (
 		fromURL     = "25 from " + asnLimitPercentURL
-		fromSetting = "25 from " + asnLimitPercent
+		fromSetting = "25 from " + tagLimitPercent
 	)

 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
 		env  map[string]string
 		file string
-		// limitPercent and bytesPercent are the upload's, as percentText
-		// gives them.
-		limitPercent, bytesPercent string
+		// rateLimitPercent and bytesLimitPercent are the upload's, as
+		// percentText gives them.
+		rateLimitPercent, bytesLimitPercent string
 	}{
 		{"the file's alone", nil, asnDEQuarter, fromURL, fromURL},
 		{
 			"the file's, lower than the setting's",
-			map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEHalf}, asnDEQuarter, fromURL, fromURL,
+			map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEHalf}, asnDEQuarter, fromURL, fromURL,
 		},
 		{
 			"the setting's, lower than the file's",
-			map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter}, asnDEHalf,
+			map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter}, asnDEHalf,
 			fromSetting, fromSetting,
 		},
 		{
 			"the setting's, the first of two alike",
-			map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter}, asnDEQuarter,
+			map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter}, asnDEQuarter,
 			fromSetting, fromSetting,
 		},
 		{"none, for an AS number the file does not list", nil, asnKP + ":25", none, none},
 		{
-			"SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT's in place of the file's for the byte limits",
+			"SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT's in place of the file's for the byte limits",
 			map[string]string{asnBytesPercent: asnDE + ":100"}, asnDEQuarter, fromURL, none,
 		},
 	} {
@@ -238,10 +291,12 @@ func TestASNLimitPercentFileCountsAsTheSettingDoesTheLowerWinning(t *testing.T)
 			loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{asnURL: {"# by AS number", tc.file}})

 			line := s.uploadFrom(fromDE)
-			wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
-				tc.limitPercent)
-			wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
-				tc.bytesPercent)
+			wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+				line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
+				tc.rateLimitPercent)
+			wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+				line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
+				tc.bytesLimitPercent)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -272,6 +327,7 @@ func TestEachBlocklistThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
 			Instance: alertInstance,
 			Time:     clk.Now(),
 			Event:    alerts.EventReputationHit,
+			Host:     appHost,
 			Client:   netip.MustParseAddr(fromDE),
 			Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32"),
 			ASN:      asnDE,
@@ -289,7 +345,7 @@ func TestEachBlocklistThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(

 	// Each list's hits, none of its fetches failed, and when its copy was
 	// fetched, 0 for the one without.
-	metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
+	metrics := s.scrape()
 	fetched := float64(listsFetched().Unix())

 	for listURL, want := range map[string]struct{ hits, fetched float64 }{
@@ -298,22 +354,22 @@ func TestEachBlocklistThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
 		labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + listURL + `"}`

 		if want.hits == 0 {
-			wantNoSeries(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total"+labels)
+			wantNoSeries(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_hits_total"+labels)
 		} else {
-			wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total"+labels, want.hits)
+			wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_hits_total"+labels, want.hits)
 		}

-		wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
-		wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds"+labels,
+		wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
+		wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds"+labels,
 			want.fetched)
 	}
 }

 // The DNSBL settings.
 const (
-	dnsblZones       = "SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES"
-	dnsblResolver    = "SWWAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER"
-	reputationAction = "SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION"
+	dnsblZones       = "SWW_DNSBL_ZONES"
+	dnsblResolver    = "SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER"
+	reputationAction = "SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION"
 )

 // The DNSBL zones these tests name, which are never asked about the
@@ -329,12 +385,12 @@ const (
 func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionDenied
+	forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionClientDenied

 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		action string
 		// statuses and actions are those of a listed client's three
-		// requests, and percent their limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
+		// requests, and percent their rate_limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
 		statuses []int
 		actions  []string
 		percent  string
@@ -346,7 +402,7 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
 		{
 			// Half of 4 requests a minute: the third breaks the limit.
 			limitHalf, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusForbidden},
-			[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
+			[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
 			"50 from " + reputationAction,
 		},
 		{
@@ -369,10 +425,10 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
 			for _, from := range []string{fromDE, fromKP} {
 				for i := range 3 {
 					line := s.get(from, tc.statuses[i], tc.actions[i])
-					// In the order SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES names them.
+					// In the order SWW_DNSBL_ZONES names them.
 					wantReputation(t, line, listedBy[from]...)
-					wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent,
-						line.LimitPercentSetting, tc.percent)
+					wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent", line.RateLimitPercent,
+						line.RateLimitPercentSetting, tc.percent)

 					// A request refused for the verdict is not counted.
 					counted := line.fields["counts"] != nil
@@ -387,7 +443,8 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
 			for range 3 {
 				line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusOK, forward)
 				wantReputation(t, line)
-				wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+				wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+					line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 					none)
 			}

@@ -415,9 +472,9 @@ func TestDNSBLZonesComeAfterTheBlocklistsAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
 	loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromKP: {dnsblZone}, fromDE: {dnsblZone}})

 	// The blocklist refuses fromKP before its verdict is looked at, and
-	// fromDE, in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted
+	// fromDE, in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted
 	// for the zone, nor alerted, nor asked about.
-	wantReputation(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
+	wantReputation(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
 		dropURL)
 	wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))

@@ -431,6 +488,46 @@ func TestDNSBLZonesComeAfterTheBlocklistsAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+func TestReputationSourcesTagTheRequestWhateverTheirAction(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		env  map[string]string
+		load func(*discriminator.Server)
+		want []string
+	}{
+		{
+			"dnsbl",
+			map[string]string{
+				dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver, reputationAction: actionLog,
+			},
+			func(server *discriminator.Server) {
+				loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {dnsblZone}})
+			},
+			[]string{"asn=64496", "country=DE", "dnsbl=" + dnsblZone},
+		},
+		{
+			abuseipdb,
+			map[string]string{abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog},
+			func(server *discriminator.Server) {
+				loadScores(server, map[string]int64{fromDE: 80})
+			},
+			[]string{abuseipdb, "asn=64496", "country=DE"},
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, tc.env)
+			tc.load(server)
+
+			wantTags(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
+				tc.want...)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientADNSBLZoneDeniesAndAlertsIt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -441,7 +538,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientADNSBLZoneDeniesAndAlertsIt(t *testing.T) {
 	loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {dnsblZone}})

 	line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
 	wantReputation(t, line, dnsblZone)

 	waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
@@ -455,7 +552,7 @@ func TestReputationLimitTakesPartInTheLowestPercentageOfEveryLimit(t *testing.T)

 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		blocklistAction, reputationAction string
-		// want is the request's limit_percent and bytes_percent, as
+		// want is the request's rate_limit_percent and bytes_limit_percent, as
 		// percentText gives them.
 		want string
 	}{
@@ -480,9 +577,11 @@ func TestReputationLimitTakesPartInTheLowestPercentageOfEveryLimit(t *testing.T)
 			// Named by the blocklist, then by the zone.
 			line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 			wantReputation(t, line, dropURL, dnsblZone)
-			wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+			wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+				line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 				tc.want)
-			wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
+			wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+				line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
 				tc.want)
 		})
 	}
@@ -513,6 +612,7 @@ func TestEachZoneThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
 			Instance: alertInstance,
 			Time:     clk.Now(),
 			Event:    alerts.EventReputationHit,
+			Host:     appHost,
 			Client:   netip.MustParseAddr(fromDE),
 			Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32"),
 			ASN:      asnDE,
@@ -530,14 +630,14 @@ func TestEachZoneThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(

 	// Each zone's hits, and its queries and their failures, none, since
 	// every client had its verdicts.
-	metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
+	metrics := s.scrape()

 	for _, zone := range []string{dnsblZone, otherZone} {
 		labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + zone + `"}`

-		wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 2)
-		wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_queries_total"+labels, 0)
-		wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
+		wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 2)
+		wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_queries_total"+labels, 0)
+		wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
 	}
 }

@@ -564,8 +664,8 @@ func TestZoneKeyIsMaskedInTheLogTheAlertAndTheMetrics(t *testing.T) {
 			masked)
 	}

-	metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total{instance="`+
+	metrics := s.scrape()
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_reputation_hits_total{instance="`+
 		alertInstance+`",source="`+masked+`"}`, 1)

 	for name, shown := range map[string]string{
@@ -607,7 +707,7 @@ func TestRequestFromAClientWithoutAVerdictHasTheZoneAskedAboutIt(t *testing.T) {

 // The AbuseIPDB settings, and accountKey, the key the tests set.
 const (
-	abuseIPDBKey = "SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
+	abuseIPDBKey = "SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
 	accountKey   = "abuseipdb-key-0123456789abcdef"
 )

@@ -615,7 +715,7 @@ const (
 // AbuseIPDB.
 const abuseipdb = reputation.AbuseIPDBSource

-// abuseIPDBURL is where newProxy has clients checked with AbuseIPDB: at
+// abuseIPDBURL is where newDiscriminator has clients checked with AbuseIPDB: at
 // abuseIPDBStandIn, which TestMain registers with Go's default transport,
 // through which AbuseIPDB is asked.
 const abuseIPDBURL = "abuseipdb://stand-in/api/v2/check"
@@ -649,8 +749,8 @@ func TestOnlyAClientThatHasCommittedAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDB(t *testing.T
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward)
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward)
 	s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, forward)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 0)

 	// Once the ban has ended, fromDE's first request has it checked in the
@@ -689,7 +789,7 @@ func TestIPv6ClientCostsOneAbuseIPDBCheckWhicheverOfItsAddressesSends(t *testing
 		s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusOK, forward)
 	}

-	s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.get(addresses[0], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)

 	// Once the ban has ended, which set its counters back to zero, a
@@ -722,24 +822,20 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
 		want   ratelimit.Offences
 	}{
 		{
-			"a block rule", blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked,
-			ratelimit.Offences{RuleBlocked: 1},
+			"a block rule", blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden,
+			requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, ratelimit.Offences{BlockedByBlockRule: 1},
 		},
 		{
 			"the Core Rule Set", sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
-			requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, ratelimit.Offences{WAFBlocked: 1},
+			requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet, ratelimit.Offences{BlockedByCoreRuleSet: 1},
 		},
 		{
-			"a ban rule", probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned,
+			"a ban rule", probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
 			ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
 		},
 		{
-			"a trap path", "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned,
-			ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
-		},
-		{
-			"a missing token", proxy.MetricsPath, http.StatusUnauthorized,
-			requestlog.ActionAdmin, ratelimit.Offences{TokenRefused: 1},
+			"a trap path", "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden,
+			requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned, ratelimit.Offences{Attack: 1},
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -748,7 +844,7 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
 			s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 				abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog,
 				rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules), attackBanDuration: "1h",
-				trapPaths: trapPathList, metricsToken: token, wafMode: block,
+				trapPaths: trapPathList, wafMode: block,
 			})

 			s.request(client, tc.path, tc.status, tc.action)
@@ -770,12 +866,12 @@ func TestClientRefusedForAnOffenceIsCheckedWithAbuseIPDBAtItsNextRequest(t *test
 func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionDenied
+	forward, denied := requestlog.ActionForward, requestlog.ActionClientDenied

 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		action string
 		// statuses and actions are those of fromDE's three requests, and
-		// percent their limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
+		// percent their rate_limit_percent, as percentText gives it.
 		statuses []int
 		actions  []string
 		percent  string
@@ -787,7 +883,7 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *test
 		{
 			// Half of 4 requests a minute: the third breaks the limit.
 			limitHalf, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusOK, http.StatusForbidden},
-			[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
+			[]string{forward, forward, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
 			"50 from " + reputationAction,
 		},
 		{
@@ -802,13 +898,14 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *test
 				rateLimitPerMinute: fourAMinute, abuseIPDBKey: accountKey,
 				reputationAction: tc.action,
 			})
-			// At SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default, and just under it.
+			// At SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default, and just under it.
 			loadScores(server, map[string]int64{fromDE: 75, fromKP: 74})

 			for i := range 3 {
 				line := s.get(fromDE, tc.statuses[i], tc.actions[i])
 				wantReputation(t, line, abuseipdb)
-				wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+				wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+					line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 					tc.percent)

 				// A request refused for the score is not counted.
@@ -822,7 +919,8 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *test
 			for range 3 {
 				line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, forward)
 				wantReputation(t, line)
-				wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
+				wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+					line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
 					none)
 			}

@@ -853,7 +951,7 @@ func TestAbuseIPDBHitRaisesAnAlertWithTheScoreOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
 	// The alert is made as a DNSBL zone's is, with the score besides.
 	waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
 	if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventReputationHit ||
-		waiting[0].Reason != "scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE" ||
+		waiting[0].Reason != "scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE" ||
 		waiting[0].Detail["source"] != abuseipdb || waiting[0].Detail["score"] != int64(90) ||
 		queue.Suppressed() != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, %d held back, want AbuseIPDB's reputation_hit "+
@@ -862,13 +960,13 @@ func TestAbuseIPDBHitRaisesAnAlertWithTheScoreOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(

 	// The hits, and the checks, none, since no client committed an
 	// offence, so that the whole budget is left.
-	metrics := s.scrape(unplaced)
+	metrics := s.scrape()
 	labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + abuseipdb + `"}`

-	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 2)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_queries_total"+labels, 0)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_reputation_daily_budget_remaining"+labels, 900)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_queries_total"+labels, 0)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_daily_budget_remaining"+labels, 900)
 }

 func TestWithoutAnAbuseIPDBKeyNoClientIsCheckedNorAScoreUsed(t *testing.T) {
@@ -884,12 +982,12 @@ func TestWithoutAnAbuseIPDBKeyNoClientIsCheckedNorAScoreUsed(t *testing.T) {
 	// fromDE's score is not used, and once it has committed an offence it
 	// is not checked either.
 	wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward))
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)
 	wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, forward))
 	wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t, server, 0)

-	wantNoSeries(t, s.scrape(unplaced), `smallwebwaf_reputation_daily_budget_remaining{`+
+	wantNoSeries(t, s.scrape(), `sww_reputation_daily_budget_remaining{`+
 		`instance="`+alertInstance+`",source="`+abuseipdb+`"}`)
 }

@@ -908,10 +1006,10 @@ func TestBanNotesNameEachReputationSourceThatListedTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	}{
 		{"for a broken rate limit", func(s *sender, from string) {
 			s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-			s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+			s.get(from, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
 		}},
 		{"for a clear sign of attack", func(s *sender, from string) {
-			s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+			s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 		}},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -924,7 +1022,7 @@ func TestBanNotesNameEachReputationSourceThatListedTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 				abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog,
 			})
 			// Every source lists client, and none otherClient, whose score is
-			// under SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default.
+			// under SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default.
 			loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {client}})
 			loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{client: {dnsblZone}, otherClient: nil})
 			loadScores(server, map[string]int64{client: score, otherClient: 74})
@@ -973,11 +1071,11 @@ func verdictsFetched() time.Time {
 }

 // loadVerdicts puts into server's DNSBL, for each client listedBy names,
-// a verdict of each zone SWWAF_DNSBL_ZONES names, fetched at
+// a verdict of each zone SWW_DNSBL_ZONES names, fetched at
 // verdictsFetched, as reputation.json would at start: one that lists the
 // client from each zone listedBy gives for it, and one that does not from
 // each other zone.
-func loadVerdicts(server *proxy.Server, listedBy map[string][]string) {
+func loadVerdicts(server *discriminator.Server, listedBy map[string][]string) {
 	verdicts := make([]reputation.Verdict, 0, len(listedBy)*len(server.DNSBL.Zones()))

 	for client, zones := range listedBy {
@@ -995,7 +1093,7 @@ func loadVerdicts(server *proxy.Server, listedBy map[string][]string) {
 // loadScores puts into server's AbuseIPDB the score scores gives each
 // client, an IPv4 address, fetched at verdictsFetched, as reputation.json
 // would at start.
-func loadScores(server *proxy.Server, scores map[string]int64) {
+func loadScores(server *discriminator.Server, scores map[string]int64) {
 	kept := make([]reputation.Score, 0, len(scores))
 	for client, score := range scores {
 		kept = append(kept, reputation.Score{
@@ -1009,7 +1107,7 @@ func loadScores(server *proxy.Server, scores map[string]int64) {

 // wantAbuseIPDBChecks checks how many clients server has checked with
 // AbuseIPDB.
-func wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, want int) {
+func wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, want int) {
 	t.Helper()

 	if got := server.AbuseIPDB.Checked(); got != want {
@@ -1019,7 +1117,7 @@ func wantAbuseIPDBChecks(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, want int) {

 // loadLists puts copies of lists into server's lists, by URL, each with
 // its lines, fetched at listsFetched, as reputation.json would at start.
-func loadLists(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, copies map[string][]string) {
+func loadLists(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, copies map[string][]string) {
 	t.Helper()

 	lists := make([]reputation.List, 0, len(copies))
@@ -0,0 +1,410 @@
+package discriminator
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
+)
+
+// refusal is discriminator refusing a request: the status the visitor is to get, 0
+// to close its connection without an answer, and the action the log line names.
+type refusal struct {
+	status int
+	action string
+}
+
+// decision is what the checks note of a request: its log line, and what
+// counting the request needs once it has ended. discriminator keeps a copy of it
+// until the request's report comes. It holds no credentials, since the log line
+// never does, and neither the request's objects nor their bodies.
+type decision struct {
+	line   requestlog.Line
+	client netip.Addr
+	// requestURI is the path with the query, as a ban's notes keep it.
+	requestURI string
+	// site is, for a question, the host the visitor asked for, which the
+	// alerts name, since one discriminator serves many sites.
+	site string
+	// allowed is true for a question answered with DispositionAllow.
+	allowed bool
+	// lookedUp is true once the client's AS number and country have been
+	// looked up, whether or not an answer was there, and lookupAnswer is
+	// what the lookup gave then, the zero Answer while GeoJS had given none.
+	lookedUp     bool
+	lookupAnswer lookup.Answer
+	// skippedLookupWait is true for a request that did not wait for GeoJS and
+	// found no answer kept. SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT does not apply to it,
+	// so that not waiting never lowers its client's limits.
+	skippedLookupWait bool
+	// counted is true for a request the rate limits counted, whose bytes
+	// the byte limits count once it has ended. rateLimitPercent and
+	// bytesLimitPercent are then its client's limit percentages for the rate
+	// limits and for the byte limits.
+	counted                             bool
+	rateLimitPercent, bytesLimitPercent percentage
+	// attack is true for a request that matched a ban rule or asked for a
+	// trap path, blockedByBlockRule for one a block rule refused, and
+	// blockedByCoreRuleSet for one the Core Rule Set refused, each an offence
+	// its client's history counts.
+	attack, blockedByBlockRule, blockedByCoreRuleSet bool
+	// reputation is the reputation sources that list the client, for the
+	// notes of a ban the request makes.
+	reputation []bans.ReputationHit
+}
+
+// request is one request to discriminator, from the moment its headers have been
+// read to its log line.
+type request struct {
+	decision
+
+	h   *handler
+	in  *http.Request
+	out *responseWriter
+
+	// blocklisted is true once a blocklist is found to list the client,
+	// dnsblListed once a DNSBL zone's verdict is, and abuseIPDBHit once
+	// AbuseIPDB's score of it is a hit.
+	blocklisted, dnsblListed, abuseIPDBHit bool
+	start                                  time.Time
+	// checked is when the checks were done.
+	checked time.Time
+	// refused is what the request was refused with, nil if it was not.
+	refused *refusal
+	// requestBytes is how many bytes of the request's body have been read.
+	requestBytes int64
+}
+
+// startRequest starts handling r from client, which came through peer: it
+// notes the time, counts the request as under way, and starts the log line
+// with what is known of the request. isQuestion says whether r is a question,
+// whose headers give the request's id and scheme.
+func (h *handler) startRequest(
+	w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, client, peer netip.Addr, isQuestion bool,
+) *request {
+	h.metrics.RequestStarted()
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	forwardedFor := r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For")
+
+	rq := &request{
+		decision: decision{
+			client:     client,
+			requestURI: r.URL.RequestURI(),
+			line: requestlog.Line{
+				Time:             requestlog.FormatTime(start),
+				Instance:         h.config.InstanceName,
+				ClientIP:         client.String(),
+				Method:           r.Method,
+				Scheme:           scheme(r, isQuestion),
+				Host:             r.Host,
+				Path:             rules.Path(r),
+				Query:            r.URL.RawQuery,
+				Protocol:         r.Proto,
+				Referer:          r.Referer(),
+				UserAgent:        r.UserAgent(),
+				RequestID:        requestID(r, isQuestion),
+				PeerIP:           peer.String(),
+				ForwardedFor:     strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "),
+				ClientGroup:      h.clientGroup(client).String(),
+				ContentType:      r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
+				RequestHeaders:   requestHeaders(r, h.config.LogRequestHeaders),
+				HasAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 0,
+				HasCookie:        len(r.Header.Values("Cookie")) > 0,
+				Action:           requestlog.ActionForward,
+			},
+		},
+		h:     h,
+		in:    r,
+		out:   &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w},
+		start: start,
+	}
+
+	// A length of -1 is a body whose length was not announced.
+	if r.ContentLength > 0 {
+		rq.line.ContentLength = r.ContentLength
+	}
+
+	return rq
+}
+
+// addTag adds tag to the request's tags, which stay sorted and hold each tag
+// once.
+func (rq *request) addTag(tag string) {
+	at, found := slices.BinarySearch(rq.line.Tags, tag)
+	if !found {
+		rq.line.Tags = slices.Insert(rq.line.Tags, at, tag)
+	}
+}
+
+// requestHeaders returns the headers of r that names lists, by name in
+// lower case, each with its values joined by ", ". Authorization, Cookie
+// and Set-Cookie are never among them, whatever names says.
+func requestHeaders(r *http.Request, names []string) map[string]string {
+	headers := map[string]string{}
+
+	for _, name := range names {
+		switch name {
+		case "authorization", "cookie", "set-cookie":
+			continue
+		}
+
+		values := r.Header.Values(name)
+		if len(values) > 0 {
+			headers[name] = strings.Join(values, ", ")
+		}
+	}
+
+	return headers
+}
+
+// check is the one place where a request can be refused. It returns nil to let
+// the request through. The heuristics of checkClient decide: a request they
+// refuse is answered with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, 403 for a block rule or the Core
+// Rule Set, or 431 for the header limits. In observe mode nothing is refused,
+// and the log line names what enforce mode would have done. ctx is the
+// request's own context.
+func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
+	v := rq.checkClient(ctx)
+	if v == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	action := v.action
+
+	switch {
+	case rq.h.config.Observe:
+		rq.line.WouldAction = action
+
+		return nil
+	case action == requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule ||
+		action == requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet:
+		return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
+	case action == requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge:
+		return &refusal{status: http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge, action: action}
+	default:
+		return rq.banResponse(action)
+	}
+}
+
+// checkClient runs the heuristics of beforeLookup on the request, then looks
+// up the client's AS number and country, then runs those of afterLookup. It
+// returns the first verdict, or nil when none gives one. A client in
+// SWW_ALLOW_NETS skips them all, and is not looked up. ctx is the request's
+// own context.
+func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) *verdict {
+	if isInside(rq.client, rq.h.config.AllowNets) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	now := rq.h.now()
+
+	v := rq.runHeuristics(ctx, beforeLookup(), now)
+	if v != nil {
+		return v
+	}
+
+	rq.lookUp(ctx, now)
+
+	// The lookup can wait for GeoJS, so the checks after it read the time
+	// again: a request counted at the time it arrived could be counted
+	// after a later one of its client's, which the rate limits would take
+	// for the clock set back.
+	return rq.runHeuristics(ctx, afterLookup(), rq.h.now())
+}
+
+// pathExempt reports whether r is exempt under prefixes,
+// SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS or SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its
+// path as sent, the path the app receives, not percent-decoded, starts
+// with one of prefixes, so that /%61ssets/x is not under /assets/ for an
+// app whose router matches the path as received. A request whose decoded
+// path contains .. anywhere or a backslash, or whose path as sent holds an
+// encoded slash (%2F or %2f), never is, since an app may act on it as a
+// path outside every prefix: /assets/..%2Flogin as /login, or /assets%2Fx
+// as one path segment, as Go's router does.
+func pathExempt(r *http.Request, prefixes []string) bool {
+	decoded := r.URL.Path
+	sent := rules.Path(r)
+
+	if strings.Contains(decoded, "..") || strings.Contains(decoded, `\`) ||
+		strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(sent), "%2f") {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return slices.ContainsFunc(prefixes, func(prefix string) bool {
+		return strings.HasPrefix(sent, prefix)
+	})
+}
+
+// finish counts the request in the metrics and writes its log line.
+func (rq *request) finish() {
+	line := &rq.line
+	line.Status = rq.out.status
+	line.ResponseBytes = rq.out.bytes
+	line.ResponseContentType = rq.out.Header().Get("Content-Type")
+	line.RequestBytes = rq.requestBytes
+
+	switch {
+	case rq.refused != nil:
+		line.Action = rq.refused.action
+	case rq.out.err != nil || rq.in.Context().Err() != nil:
+		line.Aborted = true
+	}
+
+	duration := time.Since(rq.start)
+	line.DurationTotalMS = requestlog.Milliseconds(duration)
+	line.DurationChecksMS = timing(rq.start, rq.checked)
+
+	// Counted before the log line is written, so that the metrics count
+	// every request whose line is out. An allowed request is the exception:
+	// its report gives the status, bytes and times the metrics count.
+	if rq.allowed {
+		rq.h.metrics.RequestAllowed()
+	} else {
+		rq.h.metrics.RequestEnded(line, duration)
+	}
+
+	rq.writeLine()
+}
+
+// writeLine writes the request's log line.
+func (rq *request) writeLine() {
+	err := requestlog.Write(rq.h.requestLog, &rq.line)
+	if err != nil {
+		rq.h.processLog.Error("writing the request log failed", "error", err.Error())
+	}
+}
+
+// timing is the time from start to end in milliseconds, for one of the
+// log line's timings, or nil when end is zero: what it times never
+// happened.
+func timing(start, end time.Time) *float64 {
+	if end.IsZero() {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return new(requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(start)))
+}
+
+// addToHistory adds the request, which has ended, to its client's
+// history, and counts its offences in the metrics, and then the lookup's
+// answer about the client, as answerAtTheEnd gives it, to that history and
+// to the notes of the bans on its netblock: an answer may have come
+// before either was there, and one from GeoJS that comes later is added
+// when it comes.
+func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
+	request := ratelimit.Request{
+		Forwarded:            rq.allowed,
+		Refused:              rq.refused != nil,
+		Status:               rq.out.status,
+		RequestBytes:         rq.requestBytes,
+		ResponseBytes:        rq.out.bytes,
+		BrokeLimit:           rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
+		Attack:               rq.attack,
+		BlockedByBlockRule:   rq.blockedByBlockRule,
+		BlockedByCoreRuleSet: rq.blockedByCoreRuleSet,
+	}
+
+	rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), rq.h.now(), request)
+	rq.h.metrics.Offences(request)
+
+	answer, found := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
+	if found {
+		rq.h.addLookup(answer)
+	}
+}
+
+// countAnomalies counts the request, which has ended, and its bytes, as
+// countedBytes gives them, for the anomaly thresholds, whatever was done
+// with it: a request refused, one from a client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS or
+// SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and one for a path in
+// SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS are counted too. It is counted for its
+// client's AS number when answerAtTheEnd gives one. With every anomaly
+// threshold off, the default, it does nothing.
+func (rq *request) countAnomalies() {
+	if !anomalyThresholdsSet(rq.h.config) {
+		return
+	}
+
+	answer, _ := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
+
+	rq.h.anomalies.Count(rq.h.now(), anomaly.Request{
+		Host:        rq.site,
+		Client:      rq.client,
+		ClientGroup: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
+		ASN:         answer.ASN,
+		ASName:      answer.ASName,
+		Country:     answer.Country,
+		Bytes:       rq.countedBytes(),
+	})
+}
+
+// anomalyThresholdsSet reports whether any anomaly threshold is set.
+func anomalyThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
+	off := anomaly.Thresholds{}
+
+	return cfg.AnomalyClient != off || cfg.AnomalyNet != off || cfg.AnomalyASN != off ||
+		cfg.AnomalyTotal != off || cfg.AnomalyWatch != off
+}
+
+// answerAtTheEnd returns, for a client that was looked up, the lookup's
+// answer about it as the request ends, and whether there is one: the
+// lookup database's, which was there at once, or the one GeoJS has given
+// by then, which a request does not wait for unless a setting needs it.
+func (rq *request) answerAtTheEnd() (lookup.Answer, bool) {
+	if !rq.lookedUp {
+		return lookup.Answer{}, false
+	}
+
+	if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file" {
+		return rq.lookupAnswer, true
+	}
+
+	return rq.h.geojs.Kept(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
+}
+
+// responseWriter is discriminator's answer to a request. It notes the status and
+// size for the log line, and the first error writing the answer.
+type responseWriter struct {
+	http.ResponseWriter
+
+	// status is the status sent, or zero before one is.
+	status int
+	bytes  int64
+	err    error
+}
+
+// WriteHeader sends the status and headers.
+func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(status int) {
+	if w.status == 0 {
+		w.status = status
+	}
+
+	w.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(status)
+}
+
+// Write sends part of the body.
+func (w *responseWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	if w.status == 0 {
+		w.status = http.StatusOK
+	}
+
+	n, err := w.ResponseWriter.Write(p)
+	w.bytes += int64(n)
+
+	if w.err == nil {
+		w.err = err
+	}
+
+	return n, err
+}
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
+	"encoding/json"
 	"io"
-	"maps"
 	"math"
 	"net/http"
 	"reflect"
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"

-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ import (
 const (
 	// requestIDHeader carries the request's id.
 	requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
-	// instance is the SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME a test sets.
-	instance = "fsn1app1/gitea"
+	// instance is the SWW_INSTANCE_NAME a test sets.
+	instance = "fsn1app1/blog"
 	// ipv6Client is a client on IPv6, and ipv6Group the netblock the rate
 	// limits count it as.
 	ipv6Client = "2001:db8::7"
@@ -42,9 +42,6 @@ func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {
 			return
 		}

-		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
-		w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
-		w.Header().Set("Location", "/elsewhere")
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
 		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "moved")
 	})
@@ -70,7 +67,7 @@ func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {

 	// A request's log line can come after its answer: each is waited for
 	// before the next request, so that the lines are in order.
-	full := out.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
+	full := out.endedLines(t, 1)[0]

 	// This one comes from 127.0.0.1, which the rate limits do not count,
 	// with a body of 4 bytes whose length it does not announce, so that its
@@ -81,7 +78,7 @@ func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {
 		"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n4\r\nbody\r\n0\r\n\r\n")
 	wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusNoContent)

-	bare := out.requestLines(t, 2)[1]
+	bare := out.endedLines(t, 2)[1]

 	wantFullLine(t, full)
 	wantBareLine(t, bare)
@@ -108,24 +105,23 @@ func wantFullLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
 	headers := map[string]string{"accept": "text/html", "x-custom": "one, two"}

 	want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
-		Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
+		Type: requestType, DiscriminatorLine: requestlog.DiscriminatorLineReport,
+		Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
 		ClientIP: ipv6Client, Method: http.MethodPost, Scheme: secure,
 		Host: appHost, Path: "/full", Protocol: protocol,
 		Status: http.StatusFound, RequestBytes: 3, ResponseBytes: 5,
-		RequestID: "from-traefik", PeerIP: localhost,
+		RequestID: line.RequestID, PeerIP: localhost,
 		ForwardedFor: "198.51.100.7, " + ipv6Client, ClientGroup: ipv6Group,
 		ContentType: "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", ContentLength: 3,
 		RequestHeaders: headers, HasAuthorization: true, HasCookie: true,
-		ResponseContentType: "text/html", UpstreamStatus: http.StatusFound,
-		CacheControl: "no-store", Location: "/elsewhere",
 		Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
 		// Its 3 bytes in and 5 out, each way counted by default.
 		Counts: ratelimit.Counts{
 			Minute: 1, Hour: 1, Day: 1, MinuteBytes: 8, HourBytes: 8, DayBytes: 8,
 		},
 	})
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) {
-		t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", line.Line, want)
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) || line.RequestID == "from-traefik" {
+		t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v, with a new request id", line.Line, want)
 	}
 }

@@ -135,12 +131,13 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
 	t.Helper()

 	want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
-		Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
+		Type: requestType, DiscriminatorLine: requestlog.DiscriminatorLineReport,
+		Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
 		ClientIP: localhost, Method: http.MethodPost, Scheme: plain,
 		Host: appHost, Path: "/bare", Protocol: protocol,
 		Status: http.StatusNoContent, RequestBytes: 4, RequestID: line.RequestID,
 		PeerIP: localhost, ClientGroup: localhost + "/32",
-		UpstreamStatus: http.StatusNoContent, Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
+		Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
 	})
 	if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) || line.RequestID == "" {
 		t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v, with a request id", line.Line, want)
@@ -148,8 +145,7 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {

 	for _, name := range []string{
 		"forwarded_for", "content_type", "content_length", "request_headers",
-		"has_authorization", "has_cookie", "websocket", "response_content_type",
-		"cache_control", "location", "counts",
+		"has_authorization", "has_cookie", "response_content_type", "counts",
 	} {
 		_, present := line.fields[name]
 		if present {
@@ -160,11 +156,9 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {

 // withTimings returns want with the timings of line.
 func withTimings(line logLine, want requestlog.Line) requestlog.Line {
-	want.DurationTotal = line.DurationTotal
-	want.DurationChecks = line.DurationChecks
-	want.DurationUpstreamConnect = line.DurationUpstreamConnect
-	want.DurationUpstreamFirstByte = line.DurationUpstreamFirstByte
-	want.DurationUpstreamTotal = line.DurationUpstreamTotal
+	want.DurationTotalMS = line.DurationTotalMS
+	want.DurationChecksMS = line.DurationChecksMS
+	want.DurationUpstreamTotalMS = line.DurationUpstreamTotalMS

 	return want
 }
@@ -188,7 +182,7 @@ func TestHasAuthorizationAndHasCookieEachComeFromTheirOwnHeader(t *testing.T) {
 			req.Header.Set(tc.header, "secret")
 			wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)

-			line := out.requestLine(t)
+			line := out.endedLine(t)

 			_, otherPresent := line.fields[tc.other]
 			if line.fields[tc.field] != true || otherPresent {
@@ -199,81 +193,20 @@ func TestHasAuthorizationAndHasCookieEachComeFromTheirOwnHeader(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestRequestIDAndSchemeComeOnlyFromATrustedProxy(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const sentID = "from-traefik"
-
-	sent := http.Header{requestIDHeader: {sentID}, forwardedProto: {secure}}
-	trusted := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
-
-	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		name   string
-		env    map[string]string
-		header http.Header
-		// wantID is the request id logged, "" for a new one.
-		wantID, wantScheme string
-	}{
-		{"a trusted proxy's are kept", trusted, sent, sentID, secure},
-		{"without them, the id is new and the scheme http", trusted, nil, "", plain},
-		{"another peer's are replaced", nil, sent, "", plain},
-	} {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			received := make(chan string, 2)
-			app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-				received <- r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
-			})
-			addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, tc.env)
-
-			// Two requests, so that two new ids can be told apart.
-			ids := make([]string, 0, 2)
-
-			for i := range 2 {
-				req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
-				maps.Copy(req.Header, tc.header)
-				wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
-
-				line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
-				ids = append(ids, line.RequestID)
-
-				got := <-received
-				if line.RequestID != got || line.Scheme != tc.wantScheme {
-					t.Errorf("log line has request_id %q and scheme %q, and the "+
-						"app received id %q; want the same id and scheme %q",
-						line.RequestID, line.Scheme, got, tc.wantScheme)
-				}
-			}
-
-			switch {
-			case tc.wantID != "" && (ids[0] != tc.wantID || ids[1] != tc.wantID):
-				t.Errorf("request ids %q, want %q", ids, tc.wantID)
-			case tc.wantID == "" && (slices.Contains(ids, sentID) ||
-				slices.Contains(ids, "") || ids[0] == ids[1]):
-				t.Errorf("request ids %q, want two new ones", ids)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
 func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
+	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS

 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-		// The pauses set the times apart; a hold-up of the test only
-		// lengthens them.
-		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-		_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
-
+		// The pause sets the times apart; a hold-up of the test only lengthens
+		// it.
 		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)

 		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "done")
 	})
-	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
+
+	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
 		denyNets:       denied,
 	})
@@ -281,23 +214,22 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
 	// Each log line is waited for before the next request, so that the
 	// lines are in order.
 	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusOK)
-	forwarded := out.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
+	forwarded := out.endedLines(t, 1)[0]

 	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
 	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, denied)
 	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
-	refused := out.requestLines(t, 2)[1]
+	refused := out.endedLines(t, 2)[1]

-	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
-	health := out.requestLines(t, 3)[2]
+	wantStatus(t, get(t, server.Addr, discriminator.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
+	health := out.endedLines(t, 3)[2]

 	// A request passed to the app has every timing; one refused, none of
 	// the app's; the health check, which runs no check, only the total.
-	wantTimings(t, forwarded, "duration_total", "duration_checks",
-		"duration_upstream_connect", "duration_upstream_first_byte",
-		"duration_upstream_total")
-	wantTimings(t, refused, "duration_total", "duration_checks")
-	wantTimings(t, health, "duration_total")
+	wantTimings(t, forwarded, "duration_total_ms", "duration_checks_ms",
+		"duration_upstream_total_ms")
+	wantTimings(t, refused, "duration_total_ms", "duration_checks_ms")
+	wantTimings(t, health, "duration_total_ms")

 	if t.Failed() {
 		return
@@ -305,24 +237,19 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {

 	// In whole microseconds, as they are logged, so that the sum below is
 	// exact.
-	total := microseconds(forwarded.DurationTotal)
-	checks := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationChecks)
-	connect := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamConnect)
-	firstByte := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamFirstByte)
-	upstream := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamTotal)
+	total := microseconds(forwarded.DurationTotalMS)
+	checks := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationChecksMS)
+	upstream := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamTotalMS)

-	// The checks end before the request is handed to the app, and the
-	// connection comes before the answer, which the app ends after a
-	// pause.
-	if checks+upstream > total || connect >= firstByte || firstByte >= upstream {
-		t.Errorf("timings in microseconds: total %d, checks %d, connect %d, "+
-			"first byte %d, upstream total %d", total, checks, connect, firstByte,
-			upstream)
+	// The checks end before the request is handed to the app.
+	if checks+upstream > total {
+		t.Errorf("timings in microseconds: total %d, checks %d, upstream total %d",
+			total, checks, upstream)
 	}

-	if *refused.DurationChecks > refused.DurationTotal {
+	if *refused.DurationChecksMS > refused.DurationTotalMS {
 		t.Errorf("refused request's checks took %v of %v milliseconds",
-			*refused.DurationChecks, refused.DurationTotal)
+			*refused.DurationChecksMS, refused.DurationTotalMS)
 	}
 }

@@ -346,26 +273,49 @@ func wantTimings(t *testing.T, line logLine, want ...string) {
 	}
 }

+// wantHeuristic checks that line names heuristic as the one that refused the
+// request, with figures, a JSON object. A heuristic of "" with figures "null" is
+// a line that names none.
+func wantHeuristic(t *testing.T, line logLine, heuristic, figures string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	if line.Heuristic != heuristic ||
+		!reflect.DeepEqual(line.HeuristicFigures, decodeFigures(t, figures)) {
+		t.Errorf("log line has heuristic %q with heuristic_figures %v, want %q with %s",
+			line.Heuristic, line.HeuristicFigures, heuristic, figures)
+	}
+}
+
+// wantAfterAnswerHeuristic checks after_answer_heuristic and
+// after_answer_heuristic_figures as wantHeuristic checks heuristic and
+// heuristic_figures.
+func wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t *testing.T, line logLine, heuristic, figures string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	if line.AfterAnswerHeuristic != heuristic ||
+		!reflect.DeepEqual(line.AfterAnswerHeuristicFigures, decodeFigures(t, figures)) {
+		t.Errorf("log line has after_answer_heuristic %q with "+
+			"after_answer_heuristic_figures %v, want %q with %s",
+			line.AfterAnswerHeuristic, line.AfterAnswerHeuristicFigures, heuristic, figures)
+	}
+}
+
+// decodeFigures decodes figures, a JSON object of a heuristic's figures, as
+// the log line's figures are decoded.
+func decodeFigures(t *testing.T, figures string) map[string]any {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var decoded map[string]any
+
+	err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(figures), &decoded)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode %s: %v", figures, err)
+	}
+
+	return decoded
+}
+
 // microseconds is a timing in whole microseconds.
 func microseconds(milliseconds float64) int64 {
 	return int64(math.Round(milliseconds * 1000))
 }
-
-func TestLogsAnUpgradedConnection(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	app := startApp(t, echoAfterUpgrade)
-	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
-
-	conn := dial(t, addr)
-	send(t, conn, "GET /socket HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n"+
-		"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
-	wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusSwitchingProtocols)
-
-	_ = conn.Close()
-
-	line := out.requestLine(t)
-	if line.fields["websocket"] != true {
-		t.Errorf("log line has websocket %v, want true", line.fields["websocket"])
-	}
-}
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic routewatch_tags. It reads SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strconv"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+)
+
+// routeWatchTags adds to the request the tags asn=<number> and prefix=<netblock>
+// from what routewatch answered about the client. It refuses nothing, and the
+// request does not wait for routewatch. A request that gets no tags from it has
+// the reason in the log line's routewatch_tags_missing. While SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL
+// is unset it does nothing. Answers are kept by client and asked for by the
+// request's address, and a route without an origin AS gives only the prefix= tag.
+type routeWatchTags struct{}
+
+func (routeWatchTags) name() string { return "routewatch_tags" }
+
+func (routeWatchTags) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
+	if rq.h.routeWatch == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	route, missing := rq.h.routeWatch.Route(ctx, rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), rq.client)
+	if missing != "" {
+		rq.line.RouteWatchTagsMissing = string(missing)
+
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	rq.addTag(config.PrefixTagPrefix + route.Netblock.String())
+
+	if route.ASN != 0 {
+		rq.addTag(config.ASNTagPrefix + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(route.ASN), 10))
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+package discriminator_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/netip"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// routeWatchURL is SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL, and tagsMissing the log line's field
+// that says why a request got no tags from routewatch.
+const (
+	routeWatchURL = "SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL"
+	tagsMissing   = "routewatch_tags_missing"
+	fromV6        = "2001:db8:1::5"
+	prefixV6      = "2001:db8::/32"
+	prefixDE      = "203.0.113.0/24"
+	prefixKP      = "198.51.100.0/24"
+)
+
+// standInRoute is what the stand-in for routewatch answers about an address.
+type standInRoute struct {
+	Netblock string `json:"netblock"`
+	ASN      int    `json:"asn"`
+}
+
+// startRouteWatch starts a stand-in for routewatch's IP info API that knows the
+// routes given by address, and returns its URL.
+func startRouteWatch(t *testing.T, routes map[string]standInRoute) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			address := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/ip/")
+
+			result := map[string]any{"ip": address}
+			if route, known := routes[address]; known {
+				result["netblock"], result["asn"] = route.Netblock, route.ASN
+			}
+
+			_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
+				"status": "ok",
+				"data":   map[string]any{"results": []any{result}},
+			})
+		}))
+	t.Cleanup(server.Close)
+
+	return server.URL
+}
+
+// waitForRouteWatch waits until routewatch's answer about from, in the client
+// group of the given length, is kept, so that the next request gets its tags.
+func waitForRouteWatch(
+	t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, from string, bits int,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	addr := netip.MustParseAddr(from)
+	client := netip.PrefixFrom(addr, bits).Masked()
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+
+	for {
+		_, missing := server.RouteWatch.Route(context.Background(), client, addr)
+		if missing == "" {
+			return
+		}
+
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			t.Fatalf("routewatch's answer about %s not kept: %q", from, missing)
+		}
+
+		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
+	}
+}
+
+func wantTagsMissing(t *testing.T, line logLine, want string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	got, _ := line.fields[tagsMissing].(string)
+	if got != want {
+		t.Errorf("log line has %s %q, want %q", tagsMissing, got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRouteWatchTagsAreOnTheLogLineWithTheLookupsTags(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{fromDE: {prefixDE, 64496}})
+	s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{routeWatchURL: url})
+
+	waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromDE, 32)
+
+	line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	wantTags(t, line, "asn=64496", "country=DE", "prefix="+prefixDE)
+	wantTagsMissing(t, line, "")
+}
+
+func TestRouteWatchTagsAreOnALineDenyNetsRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{fromKP: {prefixKP, 64511}})
+	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url, denyNets: fromKP,
+	})
+
+	waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromKP, 32)
+
+	line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+fromKP+`/32"}`)
+	wantTags(t, line, "asn=64511", "prefix="+prefixKP)
+}
+
+func TestRouteWithoutAnOriginASGivesOnlyThePrefixTag(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{fromDE: {prefixDE, 0}})
+	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url,
+	})
+
+	waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromDE, 32)
+
+	wantTags(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
+		"prefix="+prefixDE)
+}
+
+func TestUnsetRouteWatchChangesNothing(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{lookupSource: off})
+
+	if server.RouteWatch != nil {
+		t.Error("RouteWatch is set while SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL is unset")
+	}
+
+	line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	if _, present := line.fields[tagsMissing]; present {
+		t.Errorf("log line has %s", tagsMissing)
+	}
+
+	if _, present := line.fields["tags"]; present {
+		t.Errorf("log line has tags %v", line.fields["tags"])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUnreachableRouteWatchLetsTheRequestThroughAndSaysWhy(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// A stand-in that is closed at once, so that the port refuses connections.
+	dead := httptest.NewServer(http.NotFoundHandler())
+	url := dead.URL
+
+	dead.Close()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url,
+	})
+
+	wantTagsMissing(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
+		"no_answer_yet")
+
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+
+	for {
+		line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+		missing, _ := line.fields[tagsMissing].(string)
+		if missing == "request_failed" {
+			return
+		}
+
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			t.Fatalf("still %q, want request_failed", missing)
+		}
+
+		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAddressWithoutARouteHasNoTagsAndTheLineSaysSo(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: startRouteWatch(t, nil),
+	})
+
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+
+	for {
+		line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+		missing, _ := line.fields[tagsMissing].(string)
+		if missing == "no_route" {
+			return
+		}
+
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			t.Fatalf("still %q, want no_route", missing)
+		}
+
+		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTagDenyRefusesOnARouteWatchPrefix(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{
+		fromDE: {prefixDE, 64496}, fromKP: {prefixKP, 64511},
+	})
+	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url, tagDeny: "prefix=" + prefixKP,
+	})
+
+	waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromKP, 32)
+	waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromDE, 32)
+
+	wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
+		"tag_deny", `{"tag": "prefix=`+prefixKP+`"}`)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+}
+
+func TestTagLimitPercentWorksWithAnIPv6Prefix(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	url := startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{fromV6: {prefixV6, 64496}})
+	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		lookupSource: off, routeWatchURL: url, rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
+		tagLimitPercent: "prefix=" + prefixV6 + ":50",
+	})
+
+	waitForRouteWatch(t, server, fromV6, 64)
+
+	// Half of two is one: the second request breaks the limit.
+	line := s.get(fromV6, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	wantTags(t, line, "asn=64496", "prefix="+prefixV6)
+	s.get(fromV6, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic rule_files. It reads the rules of the rule files, which
+// SWW_RULES_DIR and SWW_RULES_ENABLED name.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
+)
+
+// ruleFiles checks the request against the rules of the rule files at now,
+// notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, adds the tag
+// exploitsignature when it matches any, and refuses the request
+// when the last rule it matches refuses it: with ActionBlockedByBlockRule for a
+// block rule, and for a ban rule with the action for the ban it makes. A ban
+// rule bans the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack, or in observe
+// mode raises the alert for the ban
+// it would have made. Either rule's match is noted as an offence, for the
+// client's history. Its figures are the rule's id and action.
+type ruleFiles struct{}
+
+func (ruleFiles) name() string { return "rule_files" }
+
+func (ruleFiles) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
+	matched := rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in)
+
+	for _, rule := range matched {
+		rq.line.RuleIDs = append(rq.line.RuleIDs, rule.ID)
+		rq.h.metrics.RuleMatched(rule.ID, rule.Action)
+	}
+
+	if len(matched) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	rq.addTag(config.ExploitSignatureTag)
+
+	// Only the last rule matched can refuse the request.
+	last := matched[len(matched)-1]
+	figures := map[string]any{"rule_id": last.ID, "rule_action": last.Action}
+
+	switch last.Action {
+	case rules.ActionBlock:
+		rq.blockedByBlockRule = true
+
+		return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, figures: figures}
+	case rules.ActionBan:
+		rq.attack = true
+
+		return &verdict{
+			action:  rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{RuleID: last.ID, Target: last.Target}),
+			figures: figures,
+		}
+	default:
+		return nil
+	}
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"net/http"
@@ -34,16 +34,17 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
 	line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted")

-	// A block rule refuses with 403, whatever SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE is, and
+	// A block rule refuses with 403, whatever SWW_BAN_RESPONSE is, and
 	// bans no one.
 	line = s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
-		requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
+		requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "blocked")
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)

-	// A ban rule refuses with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and bans the client for
+	// A ban rule refuses with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, and bans the client for
 	// seven days, the default.
-	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusTooManyRequests,
+		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "probe")

 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(7*24*time.Hour)) {
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
 	// against the rules, and makes the ban permanent.
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)

-	line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line)

 	if line.BanExpires != permanent {
@@ -90,7 +91,37 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
 	}

 	clk.advance(365 * 24 * time.Hour)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
+}
+
+func TestEachRuleActionAddsTheExploitSignatureTag(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/noted$\n"+testRules),
+	})
+
+	wantTags(t, s.request(client, "/noted", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
+		"exploitsignature")
+	wantTags(t, s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule), "exploitsignature")
+	wantTags(t, s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
+}
+
+func TestRuleRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndTheRule(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/\n"+testRules),
+	})
+
+	line := s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", `{"rule_id": "blocked", "rule_action": "block"}`)
+
+	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", `{"rule_id": "probe", "rule_action": "ban"}`)
 }

 func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
@@ -101,8 +132,9 @@ func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
 		attackBanDuration: "1h",
 	})

-	// The first probe bans for SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION.
-	line := s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	// The first probe bans for SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION.
+	line := s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour)) {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want an hour on", line.BanExpires)
 	}
@@ -112,7 +144,8 @@ func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)

-	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != permanent {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
 	}
@@ -122,8 +155,8 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	const (
-		allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
-		exempt  = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
+		allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
+		exempt  = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
 	)

 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
@@ -133,14 +166,15 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
 		rateLimitPerMinute:  "1",
 	})

-	// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
+	// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
 	line := s.request(allowed, "/.env", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line)

 	// A probe over the rate limit breaks the limit before any rule sees
 	// it.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line)

 	limitBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
@@ -150,7 +184,7 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {

 	// A client the rate limits do not apply to is still checked.
 	s.get(exempt, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.request(exempt, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.request(exempt, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 }

 func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -162,11 +196,11 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
 	})

 	line := s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "blocked")

 	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "probe")

 	if line.BanExpires != "" {
@@ -185,31 +219,30 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
 func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
-
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		rulesDir:     writeRules(t, testRules),
 		metricsToken: token,
 	})

-	s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
-	s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule)
+	s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)

-	metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
+	metrics := s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total{action="block",instance="app",rule_id="blocked"}`, 1)
+		`sww_rule_matches_total{action="block",instance="app",rule_id="blocked"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total{action="ban",instance="app",rule_id="probe"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rules_loaded{instance="app"}`, 2)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="rule_blocked",`+
+		`sww_rule_matches_total{action="ban",instance="app",rule_id="probe"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rules_loaded{instance="app"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="blocked_by_block_rule",`+
 		`instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="attack"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="attack",instance="app"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 0)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
+		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="blocked_by_block_rule"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="attack"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="attack",instance="app"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 0)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
 }

 // writeRules writes content as a rule file into a new directory, and
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"net/http"
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const (
 	unlistedAddr = "2001:db8::2"
 )

-func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheckButTheSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
+func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheck(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	var calls atomic.Int32
@@ -26,20 +26,18 @@ func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheckButTheSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
 		calls.Add(1)
 	})
 	geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
-	// fromKP is in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS, and in SWWAF_DENY_NETS too, which
+	// fromKP is in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, and in SWW_DENY_NETS too, which
 	// comes after it.
 	addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies:     trustLocalhost,
 		allowNets:          "198.51.100.0/24",
 		denyNets:           fromKP,
-		deniedCountries:    "kp",
+		tagDeny:            denyKP,
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
-		requestMaxBytes:    "1K",
 	})

-	// Neither SWWAF_DENY_NETS, the country lists nor the limit of one
-	// request a minute refuses the client, and its country is not looked
-	// up.
+	// Neither SWW_DENY_NETS, SWW_TAG_DENY nor the limit of one request a
+	// minute refuses the client, and its country is not looked up.
 	wantAnswers(t, addr, out, []sentRequest{
 		{fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
@@ -49,14 +47,6 @@ func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheckButTheSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %v, want nothing", asked())
 	}

-	// The size limit still applies.
-	body := strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("a", 2<<10))
-	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", body)
-	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromKP)
-	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
-	wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, 3)[2],
-		http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
-
 	if calls.Load() != 2 {
 		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want 2", calls.Load())
 	}
@@ -78,11 +68,11 @@ func TestRequestFromAllowNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
-		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
+		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
 	})
 }

-func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookupAndTheBody(t *testing.T) {
+func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

 	var calls atomic.Int32
@@ -94,19 +84,15 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookupAndTheBody(t *testing.T) {
 	addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
 		denyNets:       "203.0.113.0/24",
-		deniedCountries: "kp",
+		tagDeny:        denyKP,
 	})

 	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("a body"))
 	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
 	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)

-	line := out.requestLine(t)
-	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
-
-	if line.RequestBytes != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("log line has request_bytes %d, want 0", line.RequestBytes)
-	}
+	line := out.endedLine(t)
+	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)

 	if len(asked()) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %v, want nothing", asked())
@@ -117,6 +103,15 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookupAndTheBody(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+func TestDenyNetsRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndNetblock(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{denyNets: clientsNet})
+
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+clientsNet+`"}`)
+}
+
 func TestRequestRefusedByDenyNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -130,10 +125,10 @@ func TestRequestRefusedByDenyNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
 	// listedAddr's refused requests are not counted, so the first request
 	// from unlistedAddr is within the limit of one a minute.
 	wantAnswers(t, addr, out, []sentRequest{
-		{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
-		{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
+		{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
+		{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
 		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
-		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
+		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
 	})
 }

@@ -146,19 +141,19 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptNetsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
 		trustedProxies:      trustLocalhost,
 		lookupTimeout:       "1h",
 		rateLimitExemptNets: listedAddr + "," + fromKP,
-		deniedCountries:     "kp",
+		tagDeny:             denyKP,
 		rateLimitPerMinute:  "1",
 	})

 	// listedAddr's requests are neither refused nor counted, so the first
-	// request from unlistedAddr is within the limit of one a minute. The
-	// country lists still refuse an exempt client.
+	// request from unlistedAddr is within the limit of one a minute.
+	// SWW_TAG_DENY still refuses an exempt client.
 	wantAnswers(t, addr, out, []sentRequest{
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
-		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
-		{fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied},
+		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited},
+		{fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied},
 	})
 }

@@ -170,9 +165,9 @@ type sentRequest struct {
 	action string
 }

-// wantAnswers sends requests to smallwebwaf at addr one after another and
+// wantAnswers sends requests to sww at addr one after another and
 // checks each one's answer and log line. They must be the first requests
-// smallwebwaf is sent, since the log lines are matched to them in order.
+// sww is sent, since the log lines are matched to them in order.
 func wantAnswers(t *testing.T, addr string, out *output, requests []sentRequest) {
 	t.Helper()

@@ -180,6 +175,6 @@ func wantAnswers(t *testing.T, addr string, out *output, requests []sentRequest)
 		req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
 		req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, sent.client)
 		wantStatus(t, do(t, req), sent.status)
-		wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], sent.status, sent.action)
+		wantLine(t, out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i], sent.status, sent.action)
 	}
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic tag_deny. It reads SWW_TAG_DENY.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"slices"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// tagDeny refuses a request that carries a tag in SWW_TAG_DENY. Its figure is
+// the first such tag, in sorted order.
+type tagDeny struct{}
+
+func (tagDeny) name() string { return "tag_deny" }
+
+func (tagDeny) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
+	for _, tag := range rq.line.Tags {
+		if slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TagDeny, tag) {
+			return &verdict{
+				action:  requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
+				figures: map[string]any{"tag": tag},
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+package discriminator_test
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+func TestTagDenyRefusesALookupTagAndNamesTheTag(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// The setting takes a country code in either case; the request's tag is
+	// in capitals.
+	s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{tagDeny: "Country=kp"})
+
+	line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "country=KP"}`)
+	wantTags(t, line, "asn=64511", "country=KP")
+
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+}
+
+func TestTagDenyRefusesAnASNTag(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{tagDeny: "asn=64511"})
+
+	wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
+		"tag_deny", `{"tag": "asn=64511"}`)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+}
+
+func TestTagDenyRefusesAListTagBeforeTheRateLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
+		tagLists: "torexit=" + torList, tagDeny: "torexit", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
+	})
+	loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{torList: {fromDE}})
+
+	// Each is refused for its tag: none is counted to break the limit of one.
+	for range 3 {
+		wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
+			"tag_deny", `{"tag": "torexit"}`)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTagDenyRefusesAMixedCaseZoneByItsLowerCaseTag(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const mixedCaseZone = "DNSBL.example"
+
+	// The zone's tag is in lower case, however SWW_DNSBL_ZONES writes it.
+	s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
+		dnsblZones: mixedCaseZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver,
+		reputationAction: actionLog, tagDeny: "dnsbl=" + dnsblZone,
+	})
+	loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {mixedCaseZone}})
+
+	wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied),
+		"tag_deny", `{"tag": "dnsbl=`+dnsblZone+`"}`)
+}
+
+func TestTagDenyRefusesAnExploitSignatureOfARuleThatOnlyLogs(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/\n"), tagDeny: "exploitsignature",
+	})
+
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "exploitsignature"}`)
+	wantTags(t, line, "exploitsignature")
+}
+
+func TestTagLimitPercentLowersALimitTheLowestWinning(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
+		rateLimitPerMinute: fourAMinute,
+		tagLists:           "vpn=" + vpnList + ",tor=" + torList,
+		tagLimitPercent:    "vpn:50,tor:25",
+	})
+	loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromDE}, torList: {fromDE}})
+
+	// A quarter of 4 requests a minute: the second breaks the limit.
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+	line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+	wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
+		line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
+		"25 from "+tagLimitPercent)
+}
+
+func TestTagLimitPercentLowersAByteLimitByAListTag(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
+		bytesLimitPerMinute: twoUploads,
+		tagLists:            "vpn=" + vpnList,
+		tagLimitPercent:     "vpn:50",
+	})
+	loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromDE}})
+
+	// The upload's 100 bytes are over half of 199, 99.
+	line := s.uploadFrom(fromDE)
+	if line.LimitHit != minuteBytes {
+		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want %s", line.LimitHit, minuteBytes)
+	}
+
+	wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+		line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting,
+		"50 from "+tagLimitPercent)
+
+	// fromKP, which the list does not hold, has the whole limit.
+	line = s.uploadFrom(fromKP)
+	if line.LimitHit != "" {
+		t.Errorf("log line for %s has limit_hit %q, want none", fromKP, line.LimitHit)
+	}
+
+	wantPercent(t, "bytes_limit_percent",
+		line.BytesLimitPercent, line.BytesLimitPercentSetting, none)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic tag_lists. It reads the address lists of SWW_TAG_LISTS through
+// the reputation lists.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// tagLists adds to the request one tag for each list of SWW_TAG_LISTS that
+// holds the client, the tag being the list's name. It refuses nothing, and runs
+// first so that every refusal's log line carries these tags.
+type tagLists struct{}
+
+func (tagLists) name() string { return "tag_lists" }
+
+func (tagLists) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
+	for _, name := range rq.h.lists.TagsOf(rq.client) {
+		rq.addTag(name)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+package discriminator_test
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"slices"
+	"testing"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// tagLists is SWW_TAG_LISTS, and vpnList and torList lists it names.
+const (
+	tagLists = "SWW_TAG_LISTS"
+	vpnList  = "https://lists.example/vpn.txt"
+	torList  = "https://lists.example/torexit.txt"
+)
+
+// wantTags checks the log line's tags.
+func wantTags(t *testing.T, line logLine, want ...string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	got, _ := line.fields["tags"].([]any)
+
+	tags := make([]string, 0, len(got))
+	for _, tag := range got {
+		text, _ := tag.(string)
+		tags = append(tags, text)
+	}
+
+	if !slices.Equal(tags, want) {
+		t.Errorf("log line has tags %v, want %v", tags, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLookupAndTagListsGiveTheRequestItsTagsSorted(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
+		tagLists: "vpn=mullvad=" + vpnList + ",TorExit=" + torList,
+	})
+	loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{
+		vpnList: {fromDE}, torList: {fromDE + "/32", fromKP},
+	})
+
+	wantTags(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
+		"asn=64496", "country=DE", "torexit", "vpn=mullvad")
+	wantTags(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
+		"asn=64511", "country=KP", "torexit")
+}
+
+func TestRequestWithoutATagLeavesTheFieldOut(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// With no lookup, a client is not placed and no setting gives it a tag.
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{lookupSource: "off"})
+
+	line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	if _, present := line.fields["tags"]; present {
+		t.Errorf("log line has tags %v, want none", line.fields["tags"])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTagListsTagEvenARequestTheCountryListRefuses(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
+		tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList, allowedCountries: "de",
+	})
+	loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromKP}})
+
+	wantTags(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied),
+		"asn=64511", "country=KP", "vpn")
+}
+
+func TestTagListsTagARequestRefusedBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
+		tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList, denyNets: fromKP, rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
+	})
+	loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromDE, fromKP}})
+
+	line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientDenied)
+	if line.Heuristic != "deny_nets" {
+		t.Errorf("log line has heuristic %q, want deny_nets", line.Heuristic)
+	}
+
+	wantTags(t, line, "vpn")
+
+	// The second request breaks the limit of one a minute, which bans the client.
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
+
+	line = s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	if line.Heuristic != "active_ban" {
+		t.Errorf("log line has heuristic %q, want active_ban", line.Heuristic)
+	}
+
+	wantTags(t, line, "vpn")
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package discriminator
+
+// The heuristic trap_paths. It reads SWW_TRAP_PATHS.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"slices"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
+)
+
+// trapPaths refuses a request for a path in SWW_TRAP_PATHS: its path as a
+// path rule sees it, without the query, as sent or once percent-decoded, is one
+// of them. Such a request is a clear sign of attack, as a ban rule's match is:
+// it bans the client's netblock, or in observe mode raises the alert for the
+// ban it would have made. The ban's notes give the path as sent, and so does
+// its figure.
+type trapPaths struct{}
+
+func (trapPaths) name() string { return "trap_paths" }
+
+func (trapPaths) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
+	path := rules.Path(rq.in)
+	if !slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, path) &&
+		!slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, rules.DecodeOnce(path)) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	rq.attack = true
+
+	return &verdict{
+		action:  rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{TrapPath: path}),
+		figures: map[string]any{"path": path},
+	}
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package proxy_test
+package discriminator_test

 import (
 	"net/http"
@@ -14,14 +14,14 @@ import (
 // trapPaths is the setting's name, and trapPathList what the tests set it
 // to.
 const (
-	trapPaths    = "SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS"
+	trapPaths    = "SWW_TRAP_PATHS"
 	trapPathList = "/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php"
 )

 func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

-	const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
+	const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS

 	// A block rule for the same path: the trap path comes first.
 	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
@@ -38,12 +38,12 @@ func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
 		s.request(otherClient, path, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	}

-	// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
+	// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
 	s.request(allowed, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)

 	// The query is not part of the path.
 	line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x", http.StatusTooManyRequests,
-		requestlog.ActionBanned)
+		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line)

 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(7*24*time.Hour)) {
@@ -77,12 +77,22 @@ func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
 	}

 	// The next request is refused under the ban, and makes it permanent.
-	line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionPermanentlyBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != permanent {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
 	}
 }

+func TestTrapPathRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndPath(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{trapPaths: trapPathList})
+
+	line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
+	wantHeuristic(t, line, "trap_paths", `{"path": "/wp-login.php"}`)
+}
+
 func TestTrapPathMatchesThePathDecodedOnce(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -90,7 +100,8 @@ func TestTrapPathMatchesThePathDecodedOnce(t *testing.T) {

 	// %2577 decodes once to %77, not to w.
 	s.request(otherClient, "/%2577p-login.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.request(client, "/%77p-login.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.request(client, "/%77p-login.php", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)

 	// The ban's notes give the path as the client sent it.
 	got := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
@@ -104,10 +115,11 @@ func TestTrapPathsNeedNoRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {

 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		trapPaths:           trapPathList,
-		"SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED": "false",
+		"SWW_RULES_ENABLED": "false",
 	})

-	s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
 }

 func TestObserveModeLogsWhatATrapPathWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
@@ -119,7 +131,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatATrapPathWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
 	})

 	line := s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)

 	// No ban was made.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ const quietTime = 2 * time.Second
 // FileParams are what OpenFile needs.
 type FileParams struct {
 	// Path is the lookup database, the IPinfo Lite file in its .mmdb form
-	// (SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH).
+	// (SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH).
 	Path string
 	// Now tells the time, normally time.Now.
 	Now func() time.Time
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ type File struct {
 }

 // record is what the lookup database holds about a network, of the fields
-// smallwebwaf reads.
+// sww reads.
 type record struct {
 	ASN         string `maxminddb:"asn"`
 	ASName      string `maxminddb:"as_name"`
@@ -133,8 +133,11 @@ func (f *File) Watch(ctx context.Context) {
 	}

 	if err != nil {
-		f.params.ProcessLog.Error("cannot watch the lookup database for replacements",
-			"error", err.Error())
+		f.params.ProcessLog.Error(
+			"cannot watch the lookup database for replacements",
+			"error",
+			err.Error(),
+		)

 		return
 	}
@@ -194,7 +197,10 @@ func (f *File) readAgain() {
 		f.params.Alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
 			Event:  alerts.EventFileError,
 			Reason: kept,
-			Detail: map[string]any{"file": f.params.Path, "error": err.Error()},
+			Detail: map[string]any{
+				"file":  f.params.Path,
+				"error": err.Error(),
+			},
 		})
 		f.params.ProcessLog.Error(kept, "error", err.Error())

@@ -212,7 +218,11 @@ func (f *File) use(reader *maxminddb.Reader) {
 	f.lastRead = f.params.Now()
 	f.mu.Unlock()

-	f.params.ProcessLog.Info("read the lookup database", "file", f.params.Path)
+	f.params.ProcessLog.Info(
+		"read the lookup database",
+		"file",
+		f.params.Path,
+	)
 }

 // read reads the lookup database at path. The whole file is read into
@@ -221,12 +231,12 @@ func (f *File) use(reader *maxminddb.Reader) {
 func read(path string) (*maxminddb.Reader, error) {
 	data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // the file the admin names
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: %w", err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: %w", err)
 	}

 	reader, err := maxminddb.OpenBytes(data)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH %s is not a .mmdb file: %w", path, err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH %s is not a .mmdb file: %w", path, err)
 	}

 	return reader, nil
@@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ func TestFileThatCannotBeReadIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
 	writeFile(t, notDatabase, "not a lookup database\n")

 	for path, want := range map[string]string{
-		missing: "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: open " + missing +
+		missing: "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: open " + missing +
 			": no such file or directory",
-		notDatabase: "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + notDatabase +
+		notDatabase: "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + notDatabase +
 			" is not a .mmdb file: error opening database: invalid MaxMind DB file",
 	} {
 		_, err := OpenFile(FileParams{
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ func TestReplacementThatCannotBeReadLeavesTheFileInUseWithOneAlert(t *testing.T)
 			Reason: "the lookup database cannot be read, and the one read before stays in use",
 			Detail: map[string]any{
 				"file": path,
-				"error": "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + path + " is not a .mmdb file: " +
+				"error": "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + path + " is not a .mmdb file: " +
 					"error opening database: invalid MaxMind DB file",
 			},
 		})
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // Package lookup looks up each client's AS number and country, through
 // the GeoJS web service or in the lookup database, the IPinfo Lite file
-// SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names. GeoJS's answers are kept in memory, for at
+// SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names. GeoJS's answers are kept in memory, for at
 // most 100,000 clients and for 7 days each, and are written to
 // lookups.json and read from it by the state package.
 package lookup
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ type Params struct {
 	URL string
 	// Timeout is how long a request waits for its client's first answer,
 	// and how long a request to GeoJS may take before it is abandoned
-	// (SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT).
+	// (SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT).
 	Timeout time.Duration
 	// Wait is true when a setting needs each request's answer before the
 	// request goes on. Otherwise no request waits for one.
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ func New(params Params) *GeoJS {
 // own address for IPv4, and an address in the same place for an IPv6
 // netblock.
 func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
-	answer, asked := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client)
+	answer, asked := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client, g.wait)
 	if asked == nil {
 		return answer
 	}
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {

 	answer, found := g.kept(client)
 	if !found {
-		g.metrics.GeoJSUnanswered.Inc()
+		g.metrics.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc()
 	}

 	w, waiting := g.waiting[client]
@@ -209,6 +209,14 @@ func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
 	return answer
 }

+// LookUpWithoutWaiting is LookUp for a request that does not need the answer,
+// whatever Wait says: it returns the zero Answer at once when none is kept.
+func (g *GeoJS) LookUpWithoutWaiting(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
+	answer, _ := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client, false)
+
+	return answer
+}
+
 // Kept returns client's answer, if one is kept, without asking GeoJS.
 func (g *GeoJS) Kept(client netip.Prefix) (Answer, bool) {
 	g.mu.Lock()
@@ -263,9 +271,9 @@ func (g *GeoJS) Load(answers []Answer) {
 // answerOrWait returns client's kept answer if it has one. Otherwise it
 // puts the client among those waiting if there is room, has GeoJS asked
 // about them if it can be, and returns what to wait on for the answer, or
-// nil when there is nothing to wait for.
+// nil when there is nothing to wait for or mustWait is false.
 func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
-	ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix,
+	ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix, mustWait bool,
 ) (Answer, <-chan struct{}) {
 	g.mu.Lock()
 	defer g.mu.Unlock()
@@ -283,12 +291,12 @@ func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(

 	g.ask(ctx)

-	if !g.wait {
+	if !mustWait {
 		return Answer{}, nil // the answer is not needed before the request goes on
 	}

 	if w == nil {
-		g.metrics.GeoJSUnanswered.Inc()
+		g.metrics.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc()

 		return Answer{}, nil // too many clients wait already
 	}
@@ -299,7 +307,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
 	}

 	if w.late {
-		g.metrics.GeoJSUnanswered.Inc()
+		g.metrics.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer.Inc()

 		return Answer{}, nil
 	}
@@ -72,6 +72,39 @@ func TestKeptAnswerIsUsedFor7DaysThenAskedAgain(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }

+func TestLookUpWithoutWaitingAsksGeoJSAndGoesOnAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		geojs, clock, g := start()
+		client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+
+		// Wait is set, and GeoJS does not answer.
+		geojs.set(hanging)
+
+		began := time.Now()
+		answer := g.LookUpWithoutWaiting(t.Context(), client)
+
+		if waited := time.Since(began); waited != 0 || answer != (lookup.Answer{}) {
+			t.Errorf("got %+v after %s, want no answer at once", answer, waited)
+		}
+
+		waitForRequests(t, geojs, 1)
+		wantAsked(t, geojs, 0, "203.0.113.9")
+
+		// That request is abandoned, and has failed once this returns. GeoJS
+		// answers when it is asked again, and the answer is kept.
+		time.Sleep(timeout)
+		synctest.Wait()
+		geojs.set(answering)
+		waitForCountry(t, g, clock, client, germany)
+
+		if got := g.LookUpWithoutWaiting(t.Context(), client).Country; got != germany {
+			t.Errorf("the kept answer gives the country %q, want %q", got, germany)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
 func TestNewClientWaitsAtMostOneSecondThenCountsAsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()

@@ -123,8 +156,8 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheTimeoutSaysAndGeoJSIsAbandonedAfterIt(t *testing
 	t.Parallel()

 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
-		// A timeout longer than the default second, and a GeoJS that does
-		// not answer.
+		// A timeout longer than the default, and a GeoJS that does not
+		// answer.
 		const longerTimeout = 3 * time.Second

 		m := metrics.New(1, "app")
@@ -329,7 +362,7 @@ func TestWithoutWaitTheRequestGoesOnAtOnceAndTheAnswerIsGivenWhenItComes(
 		mu.Unlock()

 		wantCountry(t, g, client, germany)
-		wantUnanswered(t, m, 0)
+		wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t, m, 0)
 	})
 }

@@ -563,7 +596,7 @@ func TestClientsWithoutAnAnswerAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
 		// GeoJS fails, so the first client goes without an answer, and GeoJS
 		// is left alone for a second, which does not pass in this test.
 		wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
-		wantUnanswered(t, m, 1)
+		wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t, m, 1)

 		// Meanwhile each new client goes without one at once, while there is
 		// room for it among the 10,000 that may wait.
@@ -571,11 +604,11 @@ func TestClientsWithoutAnAnswerAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
 			wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
 		}

-		wantUnanswered(t, m, 10000)
+		wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t, m, 10000)

 		// One more, for which there is no room, goes without one too.
 		wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
-		wantUnanswered(t, m, 10001)
+		wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t, m, 10001)
 	})
 }

@@ -808,12 +841,12 @@ func wantAsked(t *testing.T, geojs *standIn, i int, want ...string) {
 	}
 }

-// wantUnanswered checks how many requests m counts as having gone without
-// an answer from GeoJS.
-func wantUnanswered(t *testing.T, m *metrics.Metrics, want float64) {
+// wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer checks how many requests m counts as having
+// gone without an answer from GeoJS.
+func wantRequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer(t *testing.T, m *metrics.Metrics, want float64) {
 	t.Helper()

-	got := testutil.ToFloat64(m.GeoJSUnanswered)
+	got := testutil.ToFloat64(m.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer)
 	if got != want {
 		t.Errorf("%v requests went without an answer, want %v", got, want)
 	}
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import (
 const fileMode = 0o600

 // Network is what a lookup database holds about a netblock, of the fields
-// smallwebwaf reads: its AS number, such as AS64496, the AS's name, and
+// sww reads: its AS number, such as AS64496, the AS's name, and
 // its country, such as DE.
 type Network struct {
 	ASN     string
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ type busiest struct {
 	requests      *prometheus.CounterVec
 	requestBytes  *prometheus.CounterVec
 	responseBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
-	// refused are, by country, the requests the country lists refused; nil
+	// refused are, by country, the requests the country list refused; nil
 	// by AS number.
 	refused *prometheus.CounterVec

@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ type busiest struct {
 // for the topN busiest countries.
 func newCountries(topN int) *busiest {
 	countries := newBusiest(topN, "country", "the client's country")
-	countries.refused = counterVec("smallwebwaf_country_list_refusals_total",
-		"Requests the country lists refused, by the client's country.",
+	countries.refused = counterVec("sww_country_list_refusals_total",
+		"Requests SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES refused, by the client's country.",
 		[]string{"country"})

 	return countries
@@ -61,11 +61,11 @@ func newBusiest(topN int, label, description string) *busiest {

 	return &busiest{
 		topN: topN,
-		requests: counterVec("smallwebwaf_"+label+"_requests_total",
+		requests: counterVec("sww_"+label+"_requests_total",
 			"Requests, by "+description+".", by),
-		requestBytes: counterVec("smallwebwaf_"+label+"_request_bytes_total",
+		requestBytes: counterVec("sww_"+label+"_request_bytes_total",
 			"Request body bytes, by "+description+".", by),
-		responseBytes: counterVec("smallwebwaf_"+label+"_response_bytes_total",
+		responseBytes: counterVec("sww_"+label+"_response_bytes_total",
 			"Response body bytes, by "+description+".", by),
 		seen: map[string]int64{},
 		top:  map[string]bool{},
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ func (b *busiest) Collect(ch chan<- prometheus.Metric) {
 }

 // vecs returns the metrics: by AS number, those of requests and bytes; by
-// country, the refusals by the country lists as well.
+// country, the refusals by the country list as well.
 func (b *busiest) vecs() []*prometheus.CounterVec {
 	vecs := []*prometheus.CounterVec{b.requests, b.requestBytes, b.responseBytes}
 	if b.refused != nil {
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
-// Package metrics keeps smallwebwaf's Prometheus metrics, as the "Metrics
-// endpoint" section of SPEC.md lists them, and serves them in the
-// Prometheus text format. No metric carries a client's address.
+// Package metrics keeps sww's Prometheus metrics, as
+// docs/metrics.md lists them, and serves them in the Prometheus text
+// format, as the "Metrics endpoint" section of SPEC.md requires. No
+// metric carries a client's address.
 package metrics

 import (
@@ -21,7 +22,7 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )

-// Metrics are smallwebwaf's metrics. They are safe for concurrent use.
+// Metrics are sww's metrics. They are safe for concurrent use.
 type Metrics struct {
 	// registry gives every metric registered with it the label instance.
 	registry prometheus.Registerer
@@ -34,9 +35,8 @@ type Metrics struct {
 	requestDuration    prometheus.Histogram
 	upstreamDuration   prometheus.Histogram
 	rateLimitHits      *prometheus.CounterVec
-	sizeAndTimeLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
 	offences           *prometheus.CounterVec
-	wafMatches           *prometheus.CounterVec
+	coreRuleSetMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
 	// ruleMatches are made by AddRules, and reputationHits by
 	// AddReputation.
 	ruleMatches    *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ type Metrics struct {
 	asns           *busiest

 	// GeoJSRequests are the requests to GeoJS, and GeoJSFailures those
-	// that failed. GeoJSUnanswered are the requests that needed their
-	// client's answer, for a setting that acts on it, and went on without
-	// it because GeoJS had not given it in time.
+	// that failed. RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer are the requests that needed
+	// their client's answer, for a setting that acts on it, and went on
+	// without it because GeoJS had not given it in time.
 	GeoJSRequests              prometheus.Counter
 	GeoJSFailures              prometheus.Counter
-	GeoJSUnanswered prometheus.Counter
+	RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer prometheus.Counter

 	stateFileWrites        *prometheus.CounterVec
 	stateFileWriteFailures *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ type Metrics struct {

 // New returns the metrics, with the Go runtime's and the process's own.
 // topN is how many countries and how many AS numbers get series of their
-// own (SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N). Every metric carries instanceName
-// (SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME) as its label instance.
+// own (SWW_METRICS_TOP_N). Every metric carries instanceName
+// (SWW_INSTANCE_NAME) as its label instance.
 //
 //nolint:funlen // a few lines for each metric, a list that grows with them
 func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
@@ -76,63 +76,60 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
 			prometheus.Labels{"instance": instanceName}, registry),
 		handler: promhttp.HandlerFor(registry, promhttp.HandlerOpts{}),
 		inFlight: prometheus.NewGauge(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight",
+			Name: "sww_requests_in_flight",
 			Help: "Requests under way.",
 		}),
-		requests: counterVec("smallwebwaf_requests_total",
+		requests: counterVec("sww_requests_total",
 			"Requests, by the class of their status and their action.", byStatus),
-		requestBytes: counterVec("smallwebwaf_request_bytes_total",
+		requestBytes: counterVec("sww_request_bytes_total",
 			"Request body bytes, by the class of the status and the action.",
 			byStatus),
-		responseBytes: counterVec("smallwebwaf_response_bytes_total",
+		responseBytes: counterVec("sww_response_bytes_total",
 			"Response body bytes, by the class of the status and the action.",
 			byStatus),
 		requestDuration: prometheus.NewHistogram(prometheus.HistogramOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_request_duration_seconds",
+			Name: "sww_request_duration_seconds",
 			Help: "How long requests took, from their arrival to their end.",
 		}),
 		upstreamDuration: prometheus.NewHistogram(prometheus.HistogramOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_upstream_duration_seconds",
+			Name: "sww_upstream_duration_seconds",
 			Help: "How long requests passed to the app took, from then to their end.",
 		}),
-		rateLimitHits: counterVec("smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total",
+		rateLimitHits: counterVec("sww_rate_limit_hits_total",
 			"Requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the error burst, by "+
 				"its window and its kind, requests, bytes or refusals.",
 			[]string{"window", "kind"}),
-		sizeAndTimeLimitHits: counterVec("smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total",
-			"Requests that passed a size or time limit, by its setting.",
-			[]string{"limit"}),
-		offences: counterVec("smallwebwaf_offences_total",
+		offences: counterVec("sww_offences_total",
 			"Offences, by kind.", []string{"kind"}),
-		wafMatches: counterVec("smallwebwaf_waf_matches_total",
-			"Requests that matched a rule of the Core Rule Set, by SWWAF_WAF_MODE "+
+		coreRuleSetMatches: counterVec("sww_core_rule_set_matches_total",
+			"Requests that matched a rule of the Core Rule Set, by SWW_WAF_MODE "+
 				"and the rule's id.", []string{"mode", "rule_id"}),
 		countries: newCountries(topN),
 		asns:      newASNs(topN),
 		GeoJSRequests: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_geojs_requests_total",
+			Name: "sww_geojs_requests_total",
 			Help: "Requests to GeoJS.",
 		}),
 		GeoJSFailures: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_geojs_failures_total",
+			Name: "sww_geojs_failures_total",
 			Help: "Requests to GeoJS that failed.",
 		}),
-		GeoJSUnanswered: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_geojs_unanswered_total",
+		RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
+			Name: "sww_requests_without_geojs_answer_total",
 			Help: "Requests that needed their client's answer from GeoJS and " +
 				"went on without it, because GeoJS had not given it in time.",
 		}),
-		stateFileWrites: counterVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_writes_total",
+		stateFileWrites: counterVec("sww_state_file_writes_total",
 			"Writes of each state file.", byFile),
-		stateFileWriteFailures: counterVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_write_failures_total",
+		stateFileWriteFailures: counterVec("sww_state_file_write_failures_total",
 			"Writes of each state file that failed.", byFile),
-		stateFileLastWrite: gaugeVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_last_write_timestamp_seconds",
+		stateFileLastWrite: gaugeVec("sww_state_file_last_write_timestamp_seconds",
 			"When each state file was last written, in seconds since 1970.", byFile),
-		stateFileSize: gaugeVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_size_bytes",
+		stateFileSize: gaugeVec("sww_state_file_size_bytes",
 			"The size of each state file, as it was last written.", byFile),
-		stateFileEditsTakenIn: counterVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_edits_taken_in_total",
+		stateFileEditsTakenIn: counterVec("sww_state_file_edits_taken_in_total",
 			"Edits of each state file taken in while running.", byFile),
-		stateFileEditsSetAside: counterVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_edits_set_aside_total",
+		stateFileEditsSetAside: counterVec("sww_state_file_edits_set_aside_total",
 			"Edits of each state file renamed to <name>.bad because they did not parse.",
 			byFile),
 	}
@@ -142,9 +139,9 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
 		collectors.NewProcessCollector(collectors.ProcessCollectorOpts{}),
 		m.inFlight, m.requests, m.requestBytes, m.responseBytes,
 		m.requestDuration, m.upstreamDuration,
-		m.rateLimitHits, m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits, m.offences, m.wafMatches,
+		m.rateLimitHits, m.offences, m.coreRuleSetMatches,
 		m.countries, m.asns,
-		m.GeoJSRequests, m.GeoJSFailures, m.GeoJSUnanswered,
+		m.GeoJSRequests, m.GeoJSFailures, m.RequestsWithoutGeoJSAnswer,
 		m.stateFileWrites, m.stateFileWriteFailures,
 		m.stateFileLastWrite, m.stateFileSize,
 		m.stateFileEditsTakenIn, m.stateFileEditsSetAside,
@@ -164,7 +161,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
 		bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin, bans.CauseCrowdSec,
 	} {
 		m.registry.MustRegister(prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name:        "smallwebwaf_bans_made_total",
+			Name:        "sww_bans_made_total",
 			Help:        "Bans made, by cause.",
 			ConstLabels: prometheus.Labels{"cause": cause},
 		}, func() float64 {
@@ -174,7 +171,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(

 	m.registry.MustRegister(
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_active_bans",
+			Name: "sww_active_bans",
 			Help: "Bans active now, the permanent ones included.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			active, _ := ledger.Count(now())
@@ -182,7 +179,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
 			return float64(active)
 		}),
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_permanent_bans",
+			Name: "sww_permanent_bans",
 			Help: "Permanent bans not lifted.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			_, permanent := ledger.Count(now())
@@ -190,7 +187,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
 			return float64(permanent)
 		}),
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_tracked_clients",
+			Name: "sww_tracked_clients",
 			Help: "Clients in the table of clients.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(limiter.Len())
@@ -203,13 +200,13 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
 // ruleFiles, read as the metrics are asked for. It is called once, before
 // RuleMatched.
 func (m *Metrics) AddRules(ruleFiles *rules.Files) {
-	m.ruleMatches = counterVec("smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total",
+	m.ruleMatches = counterVec("sww_rule_matches_total",
 		"Requests that matched a rule of the rule files, by its id and action.",
 		[]string{"rule_id", "action"})

 	m.registry.MustRegister(m.ruleMatches,
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_rules_loaded",
+			Name: "sww_rules_loaded",
 			Help: "Rules loaded from the rule files.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(ruleFiles.Len())
@@ -217,25 +214,25 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddRules(ruleFiles *rules.Files) {
 }

 // AddRemoteLog adds the metrics of sending the log lines to
-// SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, read from remote as the metrics are asked for: the
+// SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL, read from remote as the metrics are asked for: the
 // lines sent, those dropped, and those waiting in the buffer.
 func (m *Metrics) AddRemoteLog(remote *remotelog.Sender) {
 	m.registry.MustRegister(
 		prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_sent_total",
-			Help: "Log lines sent to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL.",
+			Name: "sww_remote_log_lines_sent_total",
+			Help: "Log lines sent to SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(remote.Sent())
 		}),
 		prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_dropped_total",
+			Name: "sww_remote_log_lines_dropped_total",
 			Help: "Log lines dropped: the oldest in a full buffer, and those " +
 				"whose sending failed.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(remote.Dropped())
 		}),
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_remote_log_buffer_depth",
+			Name: "sww_remote_log_lines_waiting",
 			Help: "Log lines in the buffer, waiting to be sent.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(remote.Depth())
@@ -251,13 +248,13 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddRemoteLog(remote *remotelog.Sender) {
 func (m *Metrics) AddLookupFile(lastRead func() time.Time, readFailures func() int) {
 	m.registry.MustRegister(
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_lookup_database_last_read_timestamp_seconds",
+			Name: "sww_lookup_database_last_read_timestamp_seconds",
 			Help: "When the lookup database in use was read, in seconds since 1970.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(lastRead().Unix())
 		}),
 		prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name: "smallwebwaf_lookup_database_read_failures_total",
+			Name: "sww_lookup_database_read_failures_total",
 			Help: "Replacements of the lookup database that could not be read.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(readFailures())
@@ -278,7 +275,7 @@ const sourceLabel = "source"
 // copy in use was fetched, and for a zone, the queries made and those that
 // failed. It is called once, before ReputationHit.
 func (m *Metrics) AddReputation(lists *reputation.Lists, dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL) {
-	m.reputationHits = counterVec("smallwebwaf_reputation_hits_total",
+	m.reputationHits = counterVec("sww_reputation_hits_total",
 		"Requests whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL "+
 			"zone or AbuseIPDB lists, by the list's URL, the zone, or abuseipdb.",
 		[]string{sourceLabel})
@@ -297,7 +294,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddReputation(lists *reputation.Lists, dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL
 		m.addReputationFailures(source, func() int { return lists.Failures(listURL) })
 		m.registry.MustRegister(
 			prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-				Name: "smallwebwaf_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds",
+				Name: "sww_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds",
 				Help: "When the copy of the list in use was fetched, in seconds since " +
 					"1970, or 0 while there is none.",
 				ConstLabels: source,
@@ -316,7 +313,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddReputation(lists *reputation.Lists, dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL
 // AddAbuseIPDB adds the metrics of AbuseIPDB, with the source abuseipdb,
 // read from abuseIPDB as the metrics are asked for: the checks made, those
 // that failed, and how many checks the day's budget has left. It is
-// called once, after AddReputation, while SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
+// called once, after AddReputation, while SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
 func (m *Metrics) AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
 	source := prometheus.Labels{sourceLabel: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource}

@@ -324,8 +321,8 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
 	m.addReputationFailures(source, abuseIPDB.Failures)
 	m.registry.MustRegister(
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name:        "smallwebwaf_reputation_daily_budget_remaining",
-			Help:        "Checks of the day's SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET not yet spent.",
+			Name:        "sww_reputation_daily_budget_remaining",
+			Help:        "Checks of the day's SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET not yet spent.",
 			ConstLabels: source,
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(abuseIPDB.BudgetLeft())
@@ -351,29 +348,29 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddAlerts(queue *alerts.Queue) {

 		m.registry.MustRegister(
 			prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-				Name:        "smallwebwaf_alerts_sent_total",
+				Name:        "sww_alerts_sent_total",
 				Help:        "Alerts the destination took.",
 				ConstLabels: destination,
 			}, func() float64 {
 				return float64(queue.Counts(name).Sent)
 			}),
 			prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-				Name:        "smallwebwaf_alerts_failed_total",
+				Name:        "sww_alert_send_failures_total",
 				Help:        "Requests to the destination that failed.",
 				ConstLabels: destination,
 			}, func() float64 {
-				return float64(queue.Counts(name).Failed)
+				return float64(queue.Counts(name).SendFailures)
 			}),
 			prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-				Name: "smallwebwaf_alerts_suppressed_total",
-				Help: "Alerts held back: repeats within SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN, and " +
-					"alerts past SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary.",
+				Name: "sww_alerts_suppressed_total",
+				Help: "Alerts held back: repeats within SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN, and " +
+					"alerts past SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary.",
 				ConstLabels: destination,
 			}, func() float64 {
 				return float64(queue.Suppressed())
 			}),
 			prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-				Name: "smallwebwaf_alerts_dropped_total",
+				Name: "sww_alerts_dropped_total",
 				Help: "Alerts dropped, the oldest first, from a full queue, and " +
 					"alerts given up as the destination refused them.",
 				ConstLabels: destination,
@@ -394,36 +391,26 @@ func (m *Metrics) RequestStarted() {
 	m.inFlight.Inc()
 }

-// RequestEnded counts a request that has ended, from its log line. limit
-// is the setting whose size or time limit the request passed, "" if none.
-// duration is how long the request took, and upstreamDuration how long it
-// took from when it was passed to the app, zero if it was not.
-func (m *Metrics) RequestEnded(
-	line *requestlog.Line, limit string, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
-) {
+// RequestEnded counts a request that has ended without being passed to the app,
+// from its log line. duration is how long the request took.
+func (m *Metrics) RequestEnded(line *requestlog.Line, duration time.Duration) {
 	m.inFlight.Dec()
+	m.count(line, duration, 0)
+}

-	class := statusClass(line.Status)
-	m.requests.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Inc()
-	m.requestBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.RequestBytes))
-	m.responseBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.ResponseBytes))
-	m.requestDuration.Observe(duration.Seconds())
+// RequestAllowed counts a question of rproxy's, answered allow, as no longer
+// under way. RequestReported counts the request it was about.
+func (m *Metrics) RequestAllowed() {
+	m.inFlight.Dec()
+}

-	if upstreamDuration > 0 {
-		m.upstreamDuration.Observe(upstreamDuration.Seconds())
-	}
-
-	if limit != "" {
-		m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits.WithLabelValues(limit).Inc()
-	}
-
-	if line.Country != "" {
-		m.countries.add(line.Country, line)
-	}
-
-	if line.ASN != "" {
-		m.asns.add(line.ASN, line)
-	}
+// RequestReported counts a request rproxy passed to the app, from what its
+// report says, which line holds: duration is how long the request took, and
+// upstreamDuration how long it took from when it was passed to the app.
+func (m *Metrics) RequestReported(
+	line *requestlog.Line, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
+) {
+	m.count(line, duration, upstreamDuration)
 }

 // LimitHit counts a request that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
@@ -439,9 +426,8 @@ func (m *Metrics) Offences(r ratelimit.Request) {
 	for kind, committed := range map[string]bool{
 		"limit":                    r.BrokeLimit,
 		"attack":                   r.Attack,
-		"rule_blocked":  r.RuleBlocked,
-		"waf_blocked":   r.WAFBlocked,
-		"token_refused": r.TokenRefused,
+		"blocked_by_block_rule":    r.BlockedByBlockRule,
+		"blocked_by_core_rule_set": r.BlockedByCoreRuleSet,
 	} {
 		if committed {
 			m.offences.WithLabelValues(kind).Inc()
@@ -455,10 +441,10 @@ func (m *Metrics) RuleMatched(id, action string) {
 	m.ruleMatches.WithLabelValues(id, action).Inc()
 }

-// WAFMatched counts a request that matched the Core Rule Set's rule id,
-// with SWWAF_WAF_MODE at mode.
-func (m *Metrics) WAFMatched(mode string, id int) {
-	m.wafMatches.WithLabelValues(mode, strconv.Itoa(id)).Inc()
+// CoreRuleSetMatched counts a request that matched the Core Rule Set's rule id,
+// with SWW_WAF_MODE at mode.
+func (m *Metrics) CoreRuleSetMatched(mode string, id int) {
+	m.coreRuleSetMatches.WithLabelValues(mode, strconv.Itoa(id)).Inc()
 }

 // StateFileWritten counts a write of the state file name, of size bytes,
@@ -481,7 +467,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) StateFileWritten(name string, size int, err error) {
 }

 // StateFileEditTakenIn counts an admin's edit of the state file name
-// taken in while smallwebwaf runs.
+// taken in while sww runs.
 func (m *Metrics) StateFileEditTakenIn(name string) {
 	m.stateFileEditsTakenIn.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()
 }
@@ -492,11 +478,35 @@ func (m *Metrics) StateFileEditSetAside(name string) {
 	m.stateFileEditsSetAside.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()
 }

+// count counts a request that has ended, as RequestEnded and RequestReported
+// describe.
+func (m *Metrics) count(
+	line *requestlog.Line, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
+) {
+	class := statusClass(line.Status)
+	m.requests.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Inc()
+	m.requestBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.RequestBytes))
+	m.responseBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.ResponseBytes))
+	m.requestDuration.Observe(duration.Seconds())
+
+	if upstreamDuration > 0 {
+		m.upstreamDuration.Observe(upstreamDuration.Seconds())
+	}
+
+	if line.Country != "" {
+		m.countries.add(line.Country, line)
+	}
+
+	if line.ASN != "" {
+		m.asns.add(line.ASN, line)
+	}
+}
+
 // addReputationQueries adds the counter of the queries to source, a DNSBL
 // zone, or of the checks of clients with AbuseIPDB, which count tells.
 func (m *Metrics) addReputationQueries(source prometheus.Labels, count func() int) {
 	m.registry.MustRegister(prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-		Name:        "smallwebwaf_reputation_queries_total",
+		Name:        "sww_reputation_queries_total",
 		Help:        "Queries to the DNSBL zone, or checks of clients with AbuseIPDB.",
 		ConstLabels: source,
 	}, func() float64 {
@@ -509,7 +519,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) addReputationQueries(source prometheus.Labels, count func() in
 // that failed, which count tells.
 func (m *Metrics) addReputationFailures(source prometheus.Labels, count func() int) {
 	m.registry.MustRegister(prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-		Name: "smallwebwaf_reputation_failures_total",
+		Name: "sww_reputation_failures_total",
 		Help: "Fetches of the list, queries to the DNSBL zone, or checks with " +
 			"AbuseIPDB, that failed.",
 		ConstLabels: source,
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
-package proxy_test
-
-import (
-	"encoding/json"
-	"net/http"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-const (
-	// trustLocalhost trusts the address every test connects from, and a
-	// network for proxies in front of it.
-	trustLocalhost = localhost + "/32,10.0.0.0/8"
-	// appHost is the host every test asks for.
-	appHost = "app.example"
-	// client is the client's address, as a proxy names it.
-	client = "203.0.113.9"
-	// forwardedFor is the header that lists the client and its proxies,
-	// and forwardedProto the one that gives the scheme the client used.
-	forwardedFor   = "X-Forwarded-For"
-	forwardedProto = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
-	// secure is the scheme a client reached traefik with, and plain the
-	// one smallwebwaf serves.
-	secure = "https"
-	plain  = "http"
-)
-
-// appHeaders is what the app tells about the headers it received.
-type appHeaders struct {
-	Host           string `json:"host"`
-	ForwardedFor   string `json:"forwardedFor"`
-	ForwardedHost  string `json:"forwardedHost"`
-	ForwardedProto string `json:"forwardedProto"`
-	RealIP         string `json:"realIp"`
-}
-
-// clientAddressCase is a request and what smallwebwaf makes of it.
-type clientAddressCase struct {
-	name       string
-	env        map[string]string
-	header     http.Header
-	wantClient string
-	wantApp    appHeaders
-}
-
-func TestClientAddressAndForwardedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for _, tc := range clientAddressCases() {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			got, line := requestWithHeaders(t, tc.env, tc.header)
-
-			tc.wantApp.Host = appHost
-			if got != tc.wantApp {
-				t.Errorf("app received %+v, want %+v", got, tc.wantApp)
-			}
-
-			if line.ClientIP != tc.wantClient || line.PeerIP != localhost {
-				t.Errorf("log line has client_ip %q and peer_ip %q, want %q and %q",
-					line.ClientIP, line.PeerIP, tc.wantClient, localhost)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// clientAddressCases are the requests TestClientAddressAndForwardedHeaders
-// sends, from 127.0.0.1, which the default trusted proxies leave out.
-func clientAddressCases() []clientAddressCase {
-	trusted := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
-	forged := http.Header{
-		forwardedFor:       {client},
-		"X-Forwarded-Host": {"forged.example"},
-		forwardedProto:     {secure},
-		"X-Real-Ip":        {client},
-	}
-	replaced := appHeaders{
-		ForwardedFor: localhost, ForwardedHost: appHost, ForwardedProto: plain,
-	}
-
-	return []clientAddressCase{{
-		name: "a peer outside the trusted proxies is the client, " +
-			"and its forwarded headers are replaced",
-		header: forged, wantClient: localhost, wantApp: replaced,
-	}, {
-		name:   "set but empty, the trusted proxies trust nothing",
-		env:    map[string]string{trustedProxies: ""},
-		header: forged, wantClient: localhost, wantApp: replaced,
-	}, {
-		name: "behind a trusted peer, the client is the first address " +
-			"outside the trusted proxies from the right",
-		env: trusted,
-		header: http.Header{
-			forwardedFor:       {"198.51.100.7, " + client + ", 10.0.0.2"},
-			"X-Forwarded-Host": {appHost},
-			forwardedProto:     {secure},
-			"X-Real-Ip":        {client},
-		},
-		wantClient: client,
-		wantApp: appHeaders{
-			ForwardedFor:  "198.51.100.7, " + client + ", 10.0.0.2, " + localhost,
-			ForwardedHost: appHost, ForwardedProto: secure, RealIP: client,
-		},
-	}, {
-		name:       "when every address is a trusted proxy, the leftmost is the client",
-		env:        trusted,
-		header:     http.Header{forwardedFor: {"10.0.0.5, 10.0.0.2"}},
-		wantClient: "10.0.0.5",
-		wantApp:    appHeaders{ForwardedFor: "10.0.0.5, 10.0.0.2, " + localhost},
-	}, {
-		name:       "with no header, a trusted peer is the client",
-		env:        trusted,
-		wantClient: localhost,
-		wantApp:    appHeaders{ForwardedFor: localhost},
-	}, {
-		name:       "an entry that is not an address ends the reading",
-		env:        trusted,
-		header:     http.Header{forwardedFor: {client + ", unknown, 10.0.0.2"}},
-		wantClient: "10.0.0.2",
-		wantApp: appHeaders{
-			ForwardedFor: client + ", unknown, 10.0.0.2, " + localhost,
-		},
-	}, {
-		name:       "several header lines are read as one list",
-		env:        trusted,
-		header:     http.Header{forwardedFor: {"2001:db8::7", "10.0.0.2"}},
-		wantClient: "2001:db8::7",
-		wantApp:    appHeaders{ForwardedFor: "2001:db8::7, 10.0.0.2, " + localhost},
-	}}
-}
-
-// requestWithHeaders sends a request for appHost with header through
-// smallwebwaf, with the settings in env, and returns the headers the app
-// received and the request's log line.
-func requestWithHeaders(
-	t *testing.T, env map[string]string, header http.Header,
-) (appHeaders, logLine) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(appHeaders{
-			Host:           r.Host,
-			ForwardedFor:   r.Header.Get(forwardedFor),
-			ForwardedHost:  r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"),
-			ForwardedProto: r.Header.Get(forwardedProto),
-			RealIP:         r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"),
-		})
-	})
-	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, env)
-
-	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
-	req.Host = appHost
-	req.Header = header.Clone()
-
-	answered := do(t, req)
-
-	var got appHeaders
-
-	err := json.Unmarshal(answered.body, &got)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("decode the app's answer %q: %v", answered.body, err)
-	}
-
-	return got, out.requestLine(t)
-}
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-package proxy
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"net/http"
-	"os"
-	"time"
-
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
-)
-
-// checkCoreRuleSet inspects the request with the Core Rule Set, unless
-// SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off or SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS exempts its path, as
-// pathExempt decides, and notes the rules it matched and its score in the
-// log line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
-// SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD is a match: it raises the waf_block alert,
-// and in block mode refuses the request, which is an offence its client's
-// history counts, and so returns ActionWAFBlocked. It returns "" for a
-// request it does not refuse, and for one whose body meets a size or time
-// limit while the Core Rule Set reads it, which it notes nothing of.
-func (rq *request) checkCoreRuleSet() string {
-	cfg := rq.h.config
-	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff || pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.WAFExemptPaths) {
-		return ""
-	}
-
-	start := time.Now()
-
-	result := rq.inspect()
-	if rq.refused.Load() != nil {
-		return "" // the refusal for that limit, which check returns
-	}
-
-	rq.line.DurationWAF = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(time.Since(start)))
-	rq.line.WAFRuleIDs = result.RuleIDs
-	rq.line.WAFScore = &result.Score
-
-	for _, id := range result.RuleIDs {
-		rq.h.metrics.WAFMatched(cfg.WAFMode, id)
-	}
-
-	threshold := cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold
-	if threshold == 0 || result.Score < threshold {
-		return ""
-	}
-
-	rq.alertWAFBlock(result)
-
-	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect {
-		return ""
-	}
-
-	rq.wafBlocked = true
-
-	return requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked
-}
-
-// inspect runs the Core Rule Set on the request, which reads the part of
-// its body it inspects within SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, and keeps that
-// part for the app. A client that runs out of time is refused with 408
-// here, and a body over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES with 413 as it is read;
-// check returns the refusal. A body that breaks off for any other reason
-// is passed on as far as it came, and the request to the app fails there,
-// as it would have without the Core Rule Set.
-func (rq *request) inspect() waf.Result {
-	if rq.body == nil {
-		// Nothing is read of no body, so nothing can go wrong reading it.
-		result, _, _ := rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(rq.in, rq.client, http.NoBody)
-
-		return result
-	}
-
-	_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(rq.clientRequestDeadline())
-	result, read, err := rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(rq.in, rq.client, rq.body)
-	// The timeouts that run while the request goes to the app take over.
-	_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{})
-
-	rq.body.readByCoreRuleSet = read
-
-	if errors.Is(err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded) {
-		rq.refuse(refusal{
-			status: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
-			action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
-			limit:  "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT",
-		})
-	}
-
-	return result
-}
-
-// alertWAFBlock raises the waf_block alert for the request, which the Core
-// Rule Set scored at result, at or over SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD. Its
-// detail gives the rule ids, the score, the method and the path with the
-// query, and, for a request that is not refused for it, the mode: detect,
-// or observe in observe mode.
-func (rq *request) alertWAFBlock(result waf.Result) {
-	detail := map[string]any{
-		"rule_ids": result.RuleIDs,
-		"score":    result.Score,
-		"method":   rq.in.Method,
-		"path":     rq.in.URL.RequestURI(),
-	}
-
-	switch {
-	case rq.h.config.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect:
-		detail["mode"] = config.WAFModeDetect
-	case rq.h.config.Observe:
-		detail["mode"] = "observe"
-	}
-
-	rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
-		Event:    alerts.EventWAFBlock,
-		Client:   rq.client,
-		Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
-		ASN:      rq.line.ASN,
-		ASName:   rq.line.ASName,
-		Country:  rq.line.Country,
-		Reason:   "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
-		Detail:   detail,
-	})
-}
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-package proxy
-
-import (
-	"slices"
-)
-
-// countryDenied reports whether the country lists refuse the request, by
-// the client's country as it was looked up. A client without a country,
-// or whose country cannot be found, is refused only by
-// SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
-func (rq *request) countryDenied() bool {
-	denied := rq.h.config.DeniedCountries
-	allowed := rq.h.config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries
-	country := rq.line.Country
-
-	if slices.Contains(denied, country) {
-		return true
-	}
-
-	return len(allowed) > 0 && !slices.Contains(allowed, country)
-}
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-package proxy_test
-
-import (
-	"net/http"
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"testing"
-
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
-)
-
-func TestHealthEndpointIsAnsweredBeforeAnyCheck(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-
-	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
-		calls.Add(1)
-	})
-	// With a limit of one request a minute, any request counted before
-	// the last one would have it refused.
-	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
-
-	const (
-		healthChecks = 3
-		contentType  = "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
-	)
-
-	for range healthChecks {
-		got := get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath)
-		wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
-
-		if string(got.body) != "ok\n" || got.header.Get("Content-Type") != contentType {
-			t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q with Content-Type %q, want ok "+
-				"with %q", got.body, got.header.Get("Content-Type"), contentType)
-		}
-	}
-
-	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusOK)
-
-	lines := out.requestLines(t, healthChecks+1)
-	for _, line := range lines[:healthChecks] {
-		wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
-
-		if line.ResponseContentType != contentType {
-			t.Errorf("health check's log line has response_content_type %q, "+
-				"want %q", line.ResponseContentType, contentType)
-		}
-	}
-
-	wantLine(t, lines[healthChecks], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-
-	if calls.Load() != 1 {
-		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
-	}
-}
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
-package proxy_test
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"errors"
-	"io"
-	"net/http"
-	"strconv"
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"testing"
-
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
-)
-
-// sizeLimit is the size limit the tests set, 1K as a setting.
-const (
-	sizeLimit        = 1 << 10
-	sizeLimitSetting = "1K"
-)
-
-func TestRequestBodyLimit(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		name string
-		size int
-		// announced sends the size in Content-Length; otherwise the body
-		// is sent in chunks with no length given.
-		announced bool
-		want      int
-		action    string
-		// refusedBeforeApp is a refusal before anything reaches the app.
-		// A body over the limit with no length given has already partly
-		// reached the app when it is refused.
-		refusedBeforeApp bool
-	}{
-		{"announced, over the limit", 2 * sizeLimit, true,
-			http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge, true},
-		{"announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, true,
-			http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, false},
-		{"not announced, over the limit", 4 * sizeLimit, false,
-			http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge, false},
-		{"not announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, false,
-			http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, false},
-	} {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			var calls atomic.Int32
-
-			app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-				calls.Add(1)
-
-				_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
-			})
-			addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
-				requestMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
-				metricsToken:    token,
-			})
-
-			var body io.Reader = bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, tc.size))
-			if !tc.announced {
-				body = io.MultiReader(body) // hides the length
-			}
-
-			wantStatus(t, do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/upload", body)),
-				tc.want)
-			wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), tc.want, tc.action)
-
-			hits := 0
-			if tc.action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge {
-				hits = 1
-			}
-
-			wantLimitHits(t, addr, requestMaxBytes, hits)
-
-			if tc.refusedBeforeApp && calls.Load() != 0 {
-				t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResponseBodyLimit(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		name string
-		size int
-		// announced sends the size in Content-Length; otherwise the body
-		// is sent in chunks with no length given.
-		announced bool
-		want      int
-		action    string
-		// received is how much of a body the client gets, and cutOff
-		// whether the connection is then cut.
-		received int
-		cutOff   bool
-	}{
-		{"announced, over the limit", 2 * sizeLimit, true, http.StatusBadGateway,
-			requestlog.ActionTooLarge, len("Bad Gateway\n"), false},
-		{"announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, true, http.StatusOK,
-			requestlog.ActionForward, sizeLimit, false},
-		{"not announced, over the limit", 4 * sizeLimit, false, http.StatusOK,
-			requestlog.ActionTooLarge, sizeLimit, true},
-		{"not announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, false, http.StatusOK,
-			requestlog.ActionForward, sizeLimit, false},
-	} {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-				answerWithSize(w, tc.size, tc.announced)
-			})
-			addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
-				responseMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
-				metricsToken:     token,
-			})
-
-			got := get(t, addr, "/download")
-			wantStatus(t, got, tc.want)
-
-			if len(got.body) != tc.received ||
-				errors.Is(got.err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) != tc.cutOff {
-				t.Errorf("client got %d bytes (%v), want %d",
-					len(got.body), got.err, tc.received)
-			}
-
-			line := out.requestLine(t)
-			wantLine(t, line, tc.want, tc.action)
-
-			if line.UpstreamStatus != http.StatusOK {
-				t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %d", line.UpstreamStatus)
-			}
-
-			hits := 0
-			if tc.action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge {
-				hits = 1
-			}
-
-			wantLimitHits(t, addr, responseMaxBytes, hits)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// answerWithSize answers with a body of size bytes, announced in
-// Content-Length or sent in chunks with no length given.
-func answerWithSize(w http.ResponseWriter, size int, announced bool) {
-	body := make([]byte, size)
-	if announced {
-		w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(size))
-		_, _ = w.Write(body)
-
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Sending part of it before the end keeps Go's server from working
-	// out the length.
-	_, _ = w.Write(body[:size/2])
-	_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
-	_, _ = w.Write(body[size/2:])
-}
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-package proxy
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/netip"
-
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
-)
-
-// The headers in which the app is passed the client's AS number and
-// country while SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes every header
-// name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so X-Client-ASN
-// arrives as X-Client-Asn, and Del removes a client's own whatever their
-// case; header names are not case-sensitive.
-const (
-	asnHeader     = "X-Client-Asn"
-	countryHeader = "X-Client-Country"
-)
-
-// lookUp looks up the client's AS number and country, in the lookup
-// database or through GeoJS, and notes them for the log line, unless
-// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off or the client is on a private, loopback or
-// link-local address, which no lookup can place. The lookup database
-// answers at once. With GeoJS, while a setting needs the answer, such as a
-// country list or a biased threshold, a new client's request waits for it.
-// ctx is the request's own context.
-func (rq *request) lookUp(ctx context.Context) {
-	if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "off" || !canBePlaced(rq.client) {
-		return
-	}
-
-	if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file" {
-		rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.lookupFile.LookUp(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
-	} else {
-		rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUp(ctx, rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
-	}
-
-	rq.lookedUp = true
-	rq.line.ASN = rq.lookupAnswer.ASN
-	rq.line.ASName = rq.lookupAnswer.ASName
-	rq.line.Country = rq.lookupAnswer.Country
-}
-
-// addLookup adds answer, an answer about a client from the lookup
-// database or GeoJS, to the client's history, and to the notes of the bans
-// on its netblock that have no AS number, AS name or country yet.
-func (h *handler) addLookup(answer lookup.Answer) {
-	h.limiter.AddLookup(answer.Client, answer.Answered,
-		answer.ASN, answer.ASName, answer.Country)
-	h.ledger.AddLookup(h.netblock(answer.Client.Addr()),
-		answer.ASN, answer.ASName, answer.Country)
-}
-
-// setLookupHeaders sets the headers in which the app is passed the
-// client's AS number and country, leaving out one that is unknown.
-func setLookupHeaders(header http.Header, asn, country string) {
-	if asn != "" {
-		header.Set(asnHeader, asn)
-	}
-
-	if country != "" {
-		header.Set(countryHeader, country)
-	}
-}
-
-// canBePlaced reports whether a lookup can place addr: private, loopback
-// and link-local addresses have no AS number or country.
-func canBePlaced(addr netip.Addr) bool {
-	return !addr.IsPrivate() && !addr.IsLoopback() && !addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast()
-}
@@ -1,545 +0,0 @@
-package proxy_test
-
-import (
-	"io"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"net/netip"
-	"strconv"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
-)
-
-const (
-	metricsToken = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
-	metricsTopN  = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N"
-	// token is the SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN the tests set, and bearer how a
-	// request carries it.
-	token  = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
-	bearer = "Bearer " + token
-)
-
-func TestMetricsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-
-	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
-		calls.Add(1)
-	})
-	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
-
-	// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
-	for i, authorization := range []string{bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
-		req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
-		if authorization != "" {
-			req.Header.Set("Authorization", authorization)
-		}
-
-		wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusNotFound)
-		wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], http.StatusNotFound,
-			requestlog.ActionAdmin)
-	}
-
-	if calls.Load() != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestMetricsNeedTheTokenAndOtherPathsAreNotFound(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-
-	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
-		calls.Add(1)
-	})
-	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
-
-	for i, tc := range []struct {
-		method, path, authorization string
-		status                      int
-	}{
-		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
-		{
-			http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(token),
-			http.StatusUnauthorized,
-		},
-		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "Basic " + token, http.StatusUnauthorized},
-		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusOK},
-		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "bearer " + token, http.StatusOK},
-		{http.MethodPost, proxy.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
-		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath + "/", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
-		{http.MethodGet, "/_smallwebwaf/bans", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
-		{http.MethodPost, proxy.HealthPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
-	} {
-		req := newRequest(t, tc.method, addr, tc.path, http.NoBody)
-		if tc.authorization != "" {
-			req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.authorization)
-		}
-
-		got := do(t, req)
-		wantStatus(t, got, tc.status)
-		wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], tc.status, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
-
-		if tc.status == http.StatusUnauthorized &&
-			got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
-			t.Errorf("%q was answered without WWW-Authenticate: Bearer",
-				tc.authorization)
-		}
-
-		if tc.status == http.StatusOK &&
-			!strings.Contains(string(got.body), "# TYPE smallwebwaf_requests_total counter") {
-			t.Errorf("the metrics are\n%s", got.body)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if calls.Load() != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestMetricsAreAskedForThroughTheChecks(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
-		metricsToken:       token,
-		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
-	})
-
-	// Asking for the metrics counts toward the client's limit of one
-	// request a minute, so its next request breaks it, and bans it. A
-	// banned client is refused the metrics too.
-	s.scrape(client)
-	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-	s.requestWithHeader(client, proxy.MetricsPath, "Authorization: "+bearer,
-		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-}
-
-func TestMetricsCountTheTraffic(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	arrived, release := make(chan struct{}), make(chan struct{})
-	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
-
-		if r.URL.Path == "/held" {
-			close(arrived)
-			<-release
-		}
-
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
-	})
-	releaseApp := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(release) })
-	t.Cleanup(releaseApp)
-
-	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
-
-	got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc")))
-	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
-	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_smallwebwaf/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
-	out.requestLines(t, 2)
-
-	forward := `{action="forward",instance="app",status_class="2xx"}`
-	notFound := `{action="admin",instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`
-
-	// The request for the metrics is itself under way.
-	metrics := scrape(t, addr)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_requests_total"+forward, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_requests_total"+notFound, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_request_bytes_total"+forward, 3)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_response_bytes_total"+forward, 5)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_response_bytes_total"+notFound,
-		float64(len("Not Found\n")))
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_request_duration_seconds_count{instance="app"}`, 2)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_upstream_duration_seconds_count{instance="app"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 1)
-	metric(t, metrics, `go_goroutines{instance="app"}`)
-	metric(t, metrics, `process_start_time_seconds{instance="app"}`)
-
-	// A request the app holds is under way until it ends.
-	httpClient := newClient(t)
-	held := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/held", http.NoBody)
-	ended := make(chan error, 1)
-
-	go func() {
-		res, err := httpClient.Do(held)
-		if err == nil {
-			err = readAnswer(res).err
-		}
-
-		ended <- err
-	}()
-
-	<-arrived
-	wantMetric(t, scrape(t, addr), `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 2)
-	releaseApp()
-
-	err := <-ended
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("held request: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	out.requestLines(t, 5)
-	wantMetric(t, scrape(t, addr), `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 1)
-}
-
-func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const (
-		scraper = "192.0.2.200" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
-		denied  = "192.0.2.50"  // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
-	)
-
-	s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
-		metricsToken:        token,
-		rateLimitPerMinute:  "1",
-		rateLimitExemptNets: scraper,
-		denyNets:            denied,
-		banResponse:         "close",
-		limitBanDuration:    "1h",
-		maxBanDuration:      "2h",
-	})
-
-	// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
-	s.get(denied, 0, requestlog.ActionDenied)
-
-	// A first broken limit bans for an hour.
-	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-
-	metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="denied",instance="app",status_class="none"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
-		`kind="requests",window="minute"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
-
-	clk.advance(time.Hour)
-	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), `smallwebwaf_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
-
-	// A limit broken again right after would ban for three hours, longer
-	// than SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
-	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-
-	metrics = s.scrape(scraper)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
-		`kind="requests",window="minute"}`, 2)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 2)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 2)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
-	// denied, client, and the scraper as of its earlier requests.
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_tracked_clients{instance="app"}`, 3)
-}
-
-func TestMetricsCountTheBansAnAdminMakes(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const scraper = "192.0.2.200" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
-
-	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
-		metricsToken:        token,
-		adminToken:          adminSecret,
-		rateLimitExemptNets: scraper,
-	})
-
-	const admins = `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="admin",instance="app"}`
-
-	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 0)
-
-	// As an admin's edit of bans.json that adds a ban is taken in.
-	server.Ledger.LoadEdit([]bans.Ban{{
-		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
-		Start:    clk.Now(),
-	}})
-
-	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 1)
-
-	// And a ban made through the endpoint.
-	s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK)
-	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 2)
-}
-
-func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const fromFR = "198.51.100.20"
-
-	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
-	})
-	env := map[string]string{
-		trustedProxies:  trustLocalhost,
-		metricsToken:    token,
-		metricsTopN:     "2",
-		deniedCountries: "kp",
-	}
-	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
-	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, time.Now, env)
-
-	// The answers are kept before the requests, so that none waits for
-	// GeoJS.
-	server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
-		keptAnswer(fromKP, "KP"), keptAnswer(fromDE, "DE"), keptAnswer(fromFR, "FR"),
-	})
-
-	lines := 0
-	send := func(from string, times, status int) {
-		t.Helper()
-
-		for range times {
-			req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc"))
-			req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, from)
-			wantStatus(t, do(t, req), status)
-
-			// Each is counted before the next is sent, so that the
-			// countries are ranked in the order sent.
-			lines++
-			out.requestLines(t, lines)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// With two countries of their own, the third is counted as other.
-	send(fromKP, 3, http.StatusForbidden)
-	send(fromDE, 2, http.StatusOK)
-	send(fromFR, 1, http.StatusOK)
-
-	metrics := scrape(t, addr)
-	lines++
-
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`, 2)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="other",instance="app"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_list_refusals_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_request_bytes_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 0)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_request_bytes_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`, 6)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_response_bytes_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`,
-		float64(3*len("Forbidden\n")))
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_response_bytes_total{country="other",instance="app"}`,
-		float64(len("hello")))
-	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="FR",instance="app"}`)
-
-	// Once FR is busier than DE, it takes DE's place: its series counts
-	// from then on, and DE's is gone.
-	send(fromFR, 3, http.StatusOK)
-
-	metrics = scrape(t, addr)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="FR",instance="app"}`, 2)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="other",instance="app"}`, 2)
-	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`)
-	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_country_request_bytes_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`)
-}
-
-func TestMetricsByASNumberKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
-	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
-		metricsToken: token,
-		metricsTopN:  "1",
-	})
-
-	// The answers are kept before the requests, so that GeoJS gives none
-	// of its own. Each client is in an AS of its own.
-	answer := func(addr, asn string) lookup.Answer {
-		return lookup.Answer{
-			Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32"), ASN: asn,
-			Answered: clk.Now(), Used: clk.Now(),
-		}
-	}
-	server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
-		answer(fromDE, "AS64501"), answer(fromKP, "AS64502"),
-	})
-
-	// With one AS number of its own, the other is counted as other. The
-	// metrics are asked for from a private address, which has no AS number.
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-
-	metrics := s.scrape("10.0.0.9")
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_asn_requests_total{asn="AS64501",instance="app"}`, 2)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_asn_requests_total{asn="other",instance="app"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_asn_request_bytes_total{asn="AS64501",instance="app"}`, 0)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_asn_response_bytes_total{asn="other",instance="app"}`, 0)
-	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
-		`smallwebwaf_asn_requests_total{asn="AS64502",instance="app"}`)
-}
-
-func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	geojs := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
-		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
-		}))
-	t.Cleanup(geojs.Close)
-
-	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
-	addr, _ := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, map[string]string{
-		trustedProxies:  trustLocalhost,
-		metricsToken:    token,
-		deniedCountries: "kp",
-	})
-
-	// GeoJS fails, so the client counts as coming from an unknown country,
-	// which SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES does not refuse.
-	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
-	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
-	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
-
-	// The client stops waiting for GeoJS after a second, so GeoJS's
-	// failure can come after its request has ended.
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
-	metrics := scrape(t, addr)
-
-	for metric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_geojs_failures_total{instance="app"}`) == 0 &&
-		time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		time.Sleep(pollInterval)
-
-		metrics = scrape(t, addr)
-	}
-
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_geojs_requests_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_geojs_failures_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_geojs_unanswered_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
-}
-
-// keptAnswer returns GeoJS's answer that the client at addr is in
-// country, given now.
-func keptAnswer(addr, country string) lookup.Answer {
-	now := time.Now()
-
-	return lookup.Answer{
-		Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32"), Country: country,
-		Answered: now, Used: now,
-	}
-}
-
-// scrape asks smallwebwaf at addr for the metrics, with the token, and
-// returns them.
-func scrape(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", bearer)
-
-	got := do(t, req)
-	if got.status != http.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("the metrics were answered %d", got.status)
-	}
-
-	return string(got.body)
-}
-
-// scrape asks for the metrics, with the token, from the client at from,
-// and returns them.
-func (s *sender) scrape(from string) string {
-	s.t.Helper()
-
-	_, metrics := s.requestWithHeader(from, proxy.MetricsPath, "Authorization: "+bearer,
-		http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
-
-	return metrics
-}
-
-// metric returns the value of series in metrics, which are in the
-// Prometheus text format. series is a name and its labels in the order of
-// their names, such as
-// smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}. It fails the
-// test if there is no such series.
-func metric(t *testing.T, metrics, series string) float64 {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	for line := range strings.Lines(metrics) {
-		value, found := strings.CutPrefix(strings.TrimSuffix(line, "\n"), series+" ")
-		if !found {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		number, err := strconv.ParseFloat(value, 64)
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("%s has the value %q", series, value)
-		}
-
-		return number
-	}
-
-	t.Fatalf("no series %s in the metrics:\n%s", series, metrics)
-
-	return 0
-}
-
-// wantMetric checks the value of series in metrics, as metric reads it.
-func wantMetric(t *testing.T, metrics, series string, want float64) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	got := metric(t, metrics, series)
-	if got != want {
-		t.Errorf("%s is %v, want %v", series, got, want)
-	}
-}
-
-// wantNoSeries checks that metrics have no series series.
-func wantNoSeries(t *testing.T, metrics, series string) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	if strings.Contains(metrics, "\n"+series+" ") {
-		t.Errorf("there is a series %s", series)
-	}
-}
-
-// wantLimitHits checks that the metrics of smallwebwaf at addr count hits
-// requests that passed the size or time limit of the setting limit, with
-// no series for it when hits is 0.
-func wantLimitHits(t *testing.T, addr, limit string, hits int) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	series := `smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total{instance="app",limit="` +
-		limit + `"}`
-	metrics := scrape(t, addr)
-
-	if hits == 0 {
-		wantNoSeries(t, metrics, series)
-
-		return
-	}
-
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, series, float64(hits))
-}
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
sneak	9e6abf8496	Name log fields, metrics and the Core Rule Set package for what they are (closes #192 ) check / check (push) Failing after 5m32s Details Log field, metric, action and event names now say what they count and, for timings, the unit. Package internal/waf is internal/coreruleset. Model: opus-5-5	2026-11-09 07:21:52 +00:00
clawbot	aede434f6a	Name request log actions so they say what they mean (closes #229 ) check / check (push) Successful in 6m30s Details The request log's `action` values now say what they mean, as sneak named them: `request_header_too_large`, `client_is_rate_limited`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and `client_denied`, with no aliases. `banned` splits into `temporarily_banned` and `permanently_banned`, by whether the ban runs out. When a permanent ban also covers a client, that ban is the one reported. Trips a reader: a request over a rate limit stays `client_is_rate_limited` even when the ban it makes is permanent. Disclosure: the offence key `rule_blocked` is renamed in `clients.json` too, so an existing file holding it stops the start and must be removed. Its `version` stays 1. Model: opus-5-5	2026-11-09 06:48:26 +01:00
clawbot	6850cb0e9f	Add asn= and prefix= tags from a routewatch instance (closes #204 ) check / check (push) Successful in 5m0s Details With `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` set, a new heuristic, `routewatch_tags`, adds `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>` to a request from what a routewatch instance answers about the client. New package `internal/routewatch` asks in the background, never on a request's path, and keeps answers 1 hour in memory. The request log gains `routewatch_tags_missing`, saying why a request has none. `prefix=` works in `SWW_TAG_DENY` and `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT`. Trips a reader: a client's first request has no routewatch tags, so `prefix=` refuses from its next request after the answer comes. Judgement call: with `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE=off` and `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` set, an `asn=` tag no longer stops the start. Model: opus-5-5	2026-11-09 05:47:34 +01:00
clawbot	d7c62f2854	Say which bytes the byte limits count, and what passing one does (closes #203 ) check / check (push) Failing after 3m48s Details sneak asked for every document to be audited for sentences that do not say what they mean. The byte limits now say which bytes count (response bodies, request bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says, WebSocket traffic included) and what passing one does. Other unclear or false sentences in `README.md`, `SPEC.md`, `EVALUATION.md` and `docs/` are rewritten. Documents only. `REPO_POLICIES.md` is shared policy text and stayed out. Model: fable-5-1 (first audit); opus-5-5 (rework)	2026-11-09 04:03:17 +01:00
clawbot	c66277b111	Request tags, with refusing and limits per tag (closes #175 ) check / check (push) Failing after 5m8s Details Each request gets tags, logged as `tags`: `asn=`, `country=`, one per `SWW_TAG_LISTS` list holding the client, `crowdsec`, `dnsbl=<zone>`, `abuseipdb` and `exploitsignature`. `SWW_TAG_DENY` refuses by tag and `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` lowers limits by tag. They replace `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT`, `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` and `SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES`, with no aliases. A tag in those settings that nothing configured can give stops the start. Judgement call: `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` stays, its entries counting like `asn=` tags. Judgement call: `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` also lowers byte limits, as the settings it replaces did. Trips a reader: `sww_country_list_refusals_total` now counts only `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` refusals. Model: opus-5-5	2026-11-09 03:30:49 +01:00
sneak	f6435b1a73	Add make publish: build the image on the Docker host and push it to the registry check / check (push) Successful in 3m23s Details `script/publish` runs `script/docker` against the Docker host and pushes the image to the registry under four tags: the UTC date, the short commit hash, the branch name and `latest`. It refuses a working tree with uncommitted changes, since the hash tag names a commit. Also carries sneak's `golines -m 77` line wrapping in three files, with no code change. Unverified: a real build on the Docker host and a real push from this commit. Deviation: sneak's FIXME comments are out, because the linter refuses them; they are #227, #228 and #229. Model: opus-5-5 Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>	2026-11-09 02:03:39 +01:00
clawbot	2349b2a081	discriminator: each decision heuristic is its own module (closes #195 ) check / check (push) Failing after 1m53s Details Each discriminator check is now a type in its own file behind one small interface, listed in `heuristics.go`. Adding a heuristic is one file and one line. Behaviour does not change. Refusal and ban log lines gain `heuristic` and `heuristic_figures`. A ban after the answer, by `refusal_limit` or `byte_limits`, logs `after_answer_heuristic` and its figures, so one line can name both. Deviation: four lists, not the planned three, so `refusal_limit` still bans at the decision. Rule suppressed: `//nolint:lll` on one struct tag. Model: opus-5-5	2026-11-09 01:14:24 +01:00
clawbot	42e06bf298	Quiet the update-alternatives man page warnings in the image build (closes #222 ) (#226 ) check / check (push) Successful in 5m24s Details xz-utils, which nix-bin depends on, links its man pages with update-alternatives when it installs, and the image's dpkg config drops man pages, so each link printed a warning. A config file re-includes only the man1 pages for this install; the same step deletes them, their dangling links in /etc/alternatives and the config file. No man page or package is added or removed. Model: deepseek-v4-pro	2026-11-07 15:21:18 +01:00
clawbot	beb503b233	Rename the program to sww and its deciding daemon to discriminator (closes #218 ) (#221 ) check / check (push) Failing after 1m34s Details	2026-11-07 06:51:06 +01:00
clawbot	2e2f6f7175	Core Rule Set: gitea's ordinary requests pass by default (#208 ) check / check (push) Successful in 3m29s Details	2026-11-07 05:21:22 +01:00
clawbot	7fed6b6d36	Remove what is about deploying behind Gitea (#210 ) check / check (push) Successful in 3m30s Details	2026-11-07 03:52:02 +01:00
sneak	f8676debda	Merge branch 'main' into next check / check (push) Successful in 5m27s Details	2026-11-07 02:52:20 +01:00
clawbot	a41d61e9ad	Install the image's Ubuntu packages from the normal mirrors (closes #190 ) check / check (push) Successful in 3m14s Details The image's `ca-certificates`, `nix-bin` and `runit` now come from Ubuntu's archive instead of a dated snapshot, whose service had failed image builds. apt fetches them over plain HTTP and checks each against the archive's signed package lists, so no CA certificates are borrowed from the Go image. The README, `SPEC.md` and `docs/image.md` say so; the amd64-only limit, which came from the removed hash check, is gone. Rule cut against: `REPO_POLICIES.md` pins every external reference by hash; sneak's ruling at sneak/prompts#72 (comment) allows Ubuntu's own package index. Model: deepseek-v4-pro (implementation), opus-5-5 (rework)	2026-11-06 19:15:28 +00:00
clawbot	21cac70b50	Lower the default request and byte limits (closes #193 ) check / check (push) Successful in 3m12s Details New defaults, as sneak approved: 120 requests a minute, 1,500 an hour and 6,000 a day; bytes off a minute, 50G an hour and 100G a day. The README, `SPEC.md`, `docs/settings.md` and `docs/gitea.md` give the new figures and reasoning, and point Actions runners and shared addresses at `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`. The README examples now hold against the new defaults. An Actions runner that is not exempted makes more requests an hour than the new limit and will be banned. Model: opus-5-5	2026-11-06 20:14:23 +01:00
clawbot	2ab57eb278	Install the image's Ubuntu packages from the normal mirrors (closes #190 ) check / check (push) Successful in 3m6s Details The image's `ca-certificates`, `nix-bin` and `runit` now come from Ubuntu's archive instead of a dated snapshot, whose service had failed image builds. apt fetches them over plain HTTP and checks each against the archive's signed package lists, so no CA certificates are borrowed from the Go image. The README, `SPEC.md` and `docs/image.md` say so; the amd64-only limit, which came from the removed hash check, is gone. Rule cut against: `REPO_POLICIES.md` pins every external reference by hash; sneak's ruling at sneak/prompts#72 (comment) allows Ubuntu's own package index. Model: deepseek-v4-pro (implementation), opus-5-5 (rework)	2026-11-06 20:14:18 +01:00
clawbot	a63b7e4d2d	Rename internal/proxy to internal/servewaf (closes #173 ) check / check (push) Successful in 3m44s Details The package passes nothing on since the one-process mode went: it answers rproxy's questions, takes its reports and answers servewaf's own endpoints. It is now named after the command it serves, with `git mv`, and its constructor is `servewaf.New`. `SPEC.md` and the other documents follow. No change of behaviour. Model: opus-5-5	2026-11-06 20:02:17 +01:00
clawbot	3cb41f27a8	deploy/gitea: Gitea behind traefik, rproxy and servewaf, with its test (closes #178 ) check / check (push) Successful in 3m50s Details A compose setup that runs gitea 1.27.3 behind traefik, rproxy and servewaf on one shared network with IPv4 and IPv6, and `script/gitea-setup` (`make gitea-setup`), which brings it up and checks that a page load, a push and a clone pass through rproxy and are checked by servewaf. Containers on the shared network skip servewaf's checks; the gateways do not. gitea gets a secret key made per install and has sign-up off. `docs/gitea.md` explains each setting. Judgement call: the Core Rule Set runs in `detect` mode here until #198 lands. Model: deepseek-v4-pro (implementation), opus-5-5 (rework)	2026-11-06 19:46:38 +01:00
clawbot	84a9190d2b	next into main check / check (push) Successful in 4m1s Details Merged by sneak's order of 6 November ("take the current state of smallwebwaf and get it on to main. i am going to deploy it soon in its alpha state"). Model: opus-5-5	2026-11-06 18:58:02 +01:00
clawbot	6deb9d7581	README: sections, compose examples, env var table (closes #188 ) (#189 ) check / check (push) Successful in 4m40s Details	2026-11-06 00:06:25 +01:00
clawbot	8632da556a	rproxy tests give a loaded host time before their limits run out (closes #185 ) (#186 ) check / check (push) Successful in 6m15s Details	2026-11-05 23:17:16 +01:00
clawbot	344ce13c96	rproxy and servewaf replace the one-process smallwebwaf (closes #172 , closes #165 ) check / check (push) Failing after 14m44s Details `smallwebwaf` with no command now prints the commands and exits with status 2. The image runs rproxy, or servewaf with SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND=servewaf. The passing-on code, its settings and its log fields and metric go. internal/proxy keeps the checks, answers, reports and own endpoints; its tests run through the real rproxy. The documents describe the pair. Judgement call: clients.json keeps token_refused, since state files refuse unknown fields. Deviation: script/gitea-requests sets SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS, to label requests. Partially verified: make example-app and make gitea-requests never built the image, as Ubuntu's snapshot service answered 5xx. Model: opus-5-5	2026-11-05 13:15:05 +01:00
clawbot	17c5dd2438	rproxy, the proxy in front of each app, asks servewaf and fails open (closes #171 ) check / check (push) Successful in 7m25s Details `smallwebwaf rproxy` reads the first 64 KiB of each body, asks servewaf over HTTP/1.1, and passes what servewaf allows to the app within its limits. Any other answer goes to the visitor as servewaf gave it. SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION decides only when servewaf cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. A method SPEC.md does not list gets 405. Duplication: internal/rproxy copies passing-on code from internal/proxy until #172 removes the originals. Rule suppressed: gosec G704 and G705; gosec at internal/smallwebwaf/rproxy_test.go:431; tagliatelle at internal/requestlog/requestlog.go:203; paralleltest on one test. Judgement call: an answer over 1 MiB, or with a status below 200, gets 502. Judgement call: every target not starting with one / gets 400. Model: opus-5-5	2026-11-05 06:32:08 +01:00
clawbot	4a4874ae2f	servewaf always answers rproxy well within its time limit (closes #182 ) check / check (push) Successful in 8m31s Details A question waits on GeoJS at most 800ms, the new default of SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT. In enforce mode it does not wait at all when it is over the header limits, on a fetched blocklist with deny, on the CrowdSec decision list, or over a whole rate limit. Not waiting never lowers a client's limit. Just before the Core Rule Set, servewaf refuses more than 50 cookies or 100 header fields with 431. Shared default changed: SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT also applies to smallwebwaf with no command. Judgement call: SWWAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT stays 2s, since no request waits on the DNS blocklists or AbuseIPDB. Model: opus-5-5	2026-11-05 05:48:50 +01:00
clawbot	2eeea136e8	servewaf answers rproxy's question about each request and takes its report (closes #170 ) check / check (push) Failing after 14m16s Details `smallwebwaf servewaf` runs today's checks on the visitor's request each question carries, answers rproxy, and passes nothing to an app. rproxy reports every request servewaf answered. A report counts an allowed request's bytes and writes servewaf's second log line. The table holds a copy of what a report needs, never the request, so a report cannot reach a request being handled. Judgement call: a question's body is read before any check; over 64 KiB gets 400. Judgement call: a report's bytes and durations have ceilings, so they cannot overflow. Judgement call: a `close` disposition for SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE=close. Model: opus-5-5	2026-11-05 00:32:08 +01:00
clawbot	718a2c94b2	Default request limits per minute, hour and day, sized for API use (closes #176 ) check / check (push) Failing after 17m45s Details The default request limits now suit programmatic use of an API, such as an automation fleet on another host, and still catch abusive bots: - per minute: 500, room for a fleet's busiest minute and a few first visits with an empty cache, and passed within seconds by a client firing as fast as it can; - per hour: 20000, passed by a client that keeps up 6 a second; - per day: 300000, passed by a scraper that keeps up 4 a second. The byte limits and ban lengths are unchanged. SPEC.md, README.md and docs/settings.md give the reasons; docs/gitea.md redoes the Actions runner sums. Judgement call: the docs/alerts.md ban example shows the minute limit. Model: opus-5-5	2026-11-04 23:02:39 +01:00
clawbot	fdabf4974b	Health check test uses addresses nothing can connect to (closes #158 ) check / check (push) Canceled after 0s Details TestHealthCheck closed the app's server, and later smallwebwaf, and expected connections to the freed ports to fail. Another test could take such a port in between, so the connection succeeded and the test failed. The failing app check now uses the multicast address 224.0.0.1, to which TCP cannot connect. The failing smallwebwaf check uses port 0, on which nothing listens. Neither result depends on other processes. The test now stops smallwebwaf after its last check, so that it exits before the test's temporary directories are removed. The code under test is unchanged. Model: opus-5-5	2026-10-27 21:00:16 +01:00
clawbot	a9dc59546b	New defaults for the request and byte limits (closes #161 ) check / check (push) Canceled after 0s Details The request limits and the hour and day byte limits now sit about twice above what 40 people busy with heavy web apps make together on one address: - requests: 6000 a minute, 100,000 an hour, 1,000,000 a day; - bytes: 20 GiB an hour, 200 GiB a day. The largest response drops from 5 GiB to 1 GiB. The minute byte limit of 4 GiB is sized to hold two of the largest responses with their requests. SPEC.md gives the new reasoning; README.md and the reference documents give the new figures. Model: opus-5-5	2026-10-27 19:28:09 +01:00
sneak	1bdf66cd21	Merge pull request 'next into main' (#160 ) from next into main check / check (push) Canceled after 0s Details Reviewed-on: #160	2026-10-26 13:11:04 +01:00
sneak	2ac2b671f6	Merge branch 'main' into next check / check (push) Canceled after 0s Details	2026-10-26 13:10:59 +01:00
clawbot	f408f42b28	SPEC, README and docs rewritten from scratch (closes #154 , closes #155 , closes #156 ) check / check (push) Canceled after 0s Details SPEC.md is the only place that says how smallwebwaf behaves and why; docs/ holds lists linking to it; the README is short and links to both. Passed independent review in round 8. Model: fable-5-1 (writing); opus-5-5 (review, merge)	2026-10-26 03:06:28 +01:00
sneak	acceecc7f8	Merge pull request 'Milestones 1 and 2: proxy with timeouts and size limits, rate limits, country lists and the image' (#40 ) from next into main check / check (push) Canceled after 0s Details Reviewed-on: #40	2026-10-22 19:51:30 +02:00