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Closes #27 Signatures are per-URL only — this PR adds explicit tests and documentation enforcing that HMAC-SHA256 signatures verify against exact URLs only. No suffix matching, wildcard matching, or partial matching is supported. ## What this does NOT touch **The host whitelist code (`whitelist.go`) is not modified.** This PR is exclusively about signature verification, per sneak's instructions on [issue #27](#27), [PR #32](#32), and [PR #35](#35). ## Changes ### `internal/imgcache/signature.go` - Added documentation comments on `Verify()` and `buildSignatureData()` explicitly specifying that signatures are exact-match only — no suffix, wildcard, or partial matching ### `internal/imgcache/signature_test.go` - **`TestSigner_Verify_ExactMatchOnly`**: 14 tamper cases verifying that modifying any signed component (host, path, query, dimensions, format) causes verification to fail. Host-specific cases include: - Parent domain (`example.com`) does not match subdomain signature (`cdn.example.com`) - Sibling subdomain (`images.example.com`) does not match - Deeper subdomain (`images.cdn.example.com`) does not match - Evil suffix domain (`cdn.example.com.evil.com`) does not match - Prefixed host (`evilcdn.example.com`) does not match - **`TestSigner_Sign_ExactHostInData`**: Verifies that suffix-related hosts (`cdn.example.com`, `example.com`, `images.example.com`, etc.) all produce distinct signatures ### `internal/imgcache/service_test.go` - **`TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch`**: Integration test through `ValidateRequest` verifying that a valid signature for `cdn.example.com` is rejected when presented with a different host (parent domain, sibling subdomain, deeper subdomain, evil suffix, prefixed host) ### `README.md` - Updated Signature Specification section to explicitly document exact-match-only semantics Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan> Reviewed-on: #40 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
150 lines
4.0 KiB
Go
150 lines
4.0 KiB
Go
package imgcache
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import (
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/url"
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"strconv"
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"time"
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)
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// Signature errors.
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var (
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ErrSignatureRequired = errors.New("signature required for non-whitelisted host")
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ErrSignatureInvalid = errors.New("invalid signature")
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ErrSignatureExpired = errors.New("signature has expired")
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ErrMissingExpiration = errors.New("signature expiration is required")
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)
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// Signer handles HMAC-SHA256 signature generation and verification.
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type Signer struct {
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secretKey []byte
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}
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// NewSigner creates a new Signer with the given secret key.
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func NewSigner(secretKey string) *Signer {
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return &Signer{
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secretKey: []byte(secretKey),
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}
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}
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// Sign generates an HMAC-SHA256 signature for the given image request.
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// The signature covers: host + path + query + width + height + format + expiration.
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func (s *Signer) Sign(req *ImageRequest) string {
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data := s.buildSignatureData(req)
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.secretKey)
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mac.Write([]byte(data))
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sig := mac.Sum(nil)
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return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig)
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}
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// Verify checks if the signature on the request is valid and not expired.
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// Signatures are exact-match only: every component of the signed data
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// (host, path, query, dimensions, format, expiration) must match exactly.
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// No suffix matching, wildcard matching, or partial matching is supported.
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// A signature for "cdn.example.com" will NOT verify for "example.com" or
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// "other.cdn.example.com", and vice versa.
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func (s *Signer) Verify(req *ImageRequest) error {
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// Check expiration first
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if req.Expires.IsZero() {
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return ErrMissingExpiration
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}
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if time.Now().After(req.Expires) {
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return ErrSignatureExpired
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}
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// Compute expected signature
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expected := s.Sign(req)
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// Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
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if !hmac.Equal([]byte(req.Signature), []byte(expected)) {
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return ErrSignatureInvalid
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}
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return nil
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}
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// buildSignatureData creates the string to be signed.
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// Format: "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration"
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// All components are used verbatim (exact match). No normalization,
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// suffix matching, or wildcard expansion is performed.
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func (s *Signer) buildSignatureData(req *ImageRequest) string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%d",
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req.SourceHost,
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req.SourcePath,
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req.SourceQuery,
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req.Size.Width,
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req.Size.Height,
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req.Format,
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req.Expires.Unix(),
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)
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}
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// GenerateSignedURL creates a complete URL with signature and expiration.
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// Returns the path portion that should be appended to the base URL.
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func (s *Signer) GenerateSignedURL(req *ImageRequest, ttl time.Duration) (path string, sig string, exp int64) {
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// Set expiration
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req.Expires = time.Now().Add(ttl)
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exp = req.Expires.Unix()
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// Generate signature
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sig = s.Sign(req)
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req.Signature = sig
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// Build the size component
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var sizeStr string
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if req.Size.OriginalSize() {
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sizeStr = "orig"
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} else {
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sizeStr = fmt.Sprintf("%dx%d", req.Size.Width, req.Size.Height)
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}
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// Build the path.
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// When a source query is present, it is embedded as a path segment
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// (e.g. /host/path?query/size.fmt) so that ParseImagePath can extract
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// it from the last-slash split. The "?" inside a path segment is
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// percent-encoded by clients but chi delivers it decoded, which is
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// exactly what the URL parser expects.
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if req.SourceQuery != "" {
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path = fmt.Sprintf("/v1/image/%s%s%%3F%s/%s.%s",
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req.SourceHost,
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req.SourcePath,
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url.PathEscape(req.SourceQuery),
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sizeStr,
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req.Format,
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)
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} else {
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path = fmt.Sprintf("/v1/image/%s%s/%s.%s",
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req.SourceHost,
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req.SourcePath,
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sizeStr,
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req.Format,
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)
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}
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return path, sig, exp
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}
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// ParseSignatureParams extracts signature and expiration from query parameters.
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func ParseSignatureParams(sig, expStr string) (signature string, expires time.Time, err error) {
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signature = sig
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if expStr == "" {
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return signature, time.Time{}, nil
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}
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expUnix, err := strconv.ParseInt(expStr, 10, 64)
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if err != nil {
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return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid expiration: %w", err)
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}
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expires = time.Unix(expUnix, 0)
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return signature, expires, nil
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}
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