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feat: validate configuration on startup, fail fast on bad config (closes #52) (#53)
closes #52

Implements startup configuration validation per the plan on #52. Two commits, TDD: the first commit adds the enforcement tests (red — six test functions fail against the lenient behavior) plus a mechanical extraction of `newFromSmartConfig` from `config.New` so construction is testable without fx; the second commit makes them green and carries the `TODO.md` bookkeeping.

## Behavior

- **No silent fallbacks**: a config value that is SET but unparseable or invalid aborts startup with an error naming the key and value. Defaults apply only to OMITTED keys. The old `getString`/`getInt`/`getBool` helpers swallowed every conversion error and returned the default; they are now strict. Fractional ports are rejected, not truncated (smartconfig's `GetInt` would have turned `8080.5` into `8080`).
- **Unknown keys abort**: unknown top-level keys and unknown `metrics` subkeys are fatal, each named in the error (`unknown config keys: whitelist_hosts`). The `env` section stays permitted because smartconfig consumes it for environment injection.
- **Malformed config file aborts**: a config file that exists at a standard location but fails to parse was previously logged as a warning and skipped (the server would start on defaults); it is now fatal.
- **Range/sanity checks**: `port` in 1-65535; `upstream_connections_per_host` at least 1; `signing_key` required, at least 32 characters (keyless mode was never implemented; the stale "leave empty" comment in `config.example.yml` is corrected); `allowlist_hosts` entries must be bare hostnames (leading-dot suffix patterns still allowed; schemes, paths, whitespace, non-string and empty entries rejected); `state_dir` non-empty and verified creatable+writable with a probe file before the listener binds; `sentry_dsn` must be a URL with scheme and host when set; `metrics.username`/`metrics.password` must be set together.

## Verification

- `make check` green on the branch head (all tests, golangci-lint 0 issues, fmt-check clean).
- End-to-end: `./bin/pixad` with `port: banana` exits 1 printing `config key "port": value "banana" is not an integer`; with `whitelist_hosts:` it exits 1 printing `unknown config keys: whitelist_hosts`.

## Notes for review

- `getStringSlice` keeps its lenient signature because the existing tests in `config_test.go` exercise it and modifying existing tests requires explicit approval. Strictness for `allowlist_hosts` is instead enforced up front on the raw value by `validateAllowlistHostsValue`, so nothing is silently skipped; extraction then reuses the existing parser. If you prefer the helper folded into a single strict function, that requires retargeting those three tests — happy to do that as a follow-up with approval.
- `TODO.md` here is edited against current `main`; PR #50 (merge-ready) edits adjacent lines, so whichever merges second will need a trivial rebase of `TODO.md` only.
- The README Configuration section lists keys that have never existed in the code (`access_control_allow_origin`, `upstream_fetch_timeout`, `upstream_max_response_size`, `downstream_timeout`). Under this change a config using them now fails fast instead of silently doing nothing — that is the intended behavior. Implementing them is already tracked as the P2 "add all configuration options from README" item in `TODO.md`.

Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #53
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-08-07 22:39:40 +02:00

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# Workflow
* branch (from `main`)
* do the work in Next Step
* move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps
* move the top item of Future Steps into Next Step
* commit (`TODO.md` changes in the same commit as the work)
* merge to `main` if the branch is not protected, otherwise open a PR
* push
# Status
pre-1.0. No git tags exist. Recent work extracted the internal/magic,
internal/allowlist, internal/httpfetcher, and internal/signature
packages. The gosec findings from the 2026-07-06 survey are resolved:
the last two open findings (G124, session cookie attributes in
internal/session) are fixed as of this change, so `make check` is green
on main.
# Next Step
P0: implement cache size management and eviction so the disk cannot
fill up
# Completed Steps
- 2026-08-07 validate configuration on startup, fail fast on bad
config (closes #52): a config value that is set but unparseable or
invalid aborts startup naming the key and value (defaults apply only
to omitted keys), unknown config keys abort startup, a malformed
config file aborts instead of being skipped, and `state_dir` is
verified creatable and writable before the listener binds
- 2026-08-07 manual test pass of the auth and encrypted URL flows
against a locally built and running `pixad` (built from `main` at
`6573b9d`, port 18099, local throwaway config); all six checks
passed, plus all nine tests in `scripts/manual-test.sh` (closes #49):
- [x] visit `/` and see the login form: HTTP 200, `Pixa - Login`
page with `name="key"` password form
- [x] wrong key shows an error: POST `/` with `key=wrong-key`
returned HTTP 200 login page containing "Invalid signing key"
- [x] correct signing key shows the generator form: POST `/`
returned HTTP 303 to `/` with
`Set-Cookie: pixa_session=...; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict`;
GET `/` with that cookie rendered `Pixa - URL Generator` with the
`/generate` form and logout link
- [x] a generated encrypted URL serves the image: POST `/generate`
(ttl=3600) produced a `/v1/e/<token>/img.jpeg` URL that returned
HTTP 200, `Content-Type: image/jpeg`, an 800x600 baseline JPEG of
61706 bytes
- [x] an expired URL (short TTL) returns 410: a ttl=1 URL fetched
after 3 s returned HTTP 410 Gone with
`{"error":"URL has expired","status":410,...}`
- [x] logout redirects back to login: GET `/logout` returned HTTP
303 to `/` with `Set-Cookie: pixa_session=; Max-Age=0`;
subsequent GET `/` rendered the login form again
- 2026-08-07 fix the two remaining gosec findings (G124 in
internal/session): session cookies now always carry
Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite=Strict on both the set and clear paths;
`make check` green (closes #47)
- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints,
Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
- 2026-04-07 extract magic byte detection into internal/magic (#42)
- 2026-03-25 extract allowlist package from internal/imgcache (#41)
- 2026-03-25 move schema_migrations table creation into 000.sql (#36)
- 2026-03-20 enforce and document exact-match-only signature
verification (#40)
- 2026-03-20 bound imageprocessor.Process input read to prevent
unbounded memory use (#37); consolidate appname into an
internal/globals constant (#34)
- 2026-03-18 parse version prefix from migration filenames (#33)
- 2026-03-15 QA audit fixes for 1.0/MVP readiness (#25)
- 2026-03-02 split Dockerfile with pre-built golangci-lint stage for
faster CI (#23)
- 2026-02-25 repo policy compliance: CI workflow, hash-pinned images,
golangci-lint and gosec fixes of that date (#14); arm64 Docker build
fix (#16)
- 2026-01-08 WebP and AVIF encoding support via govips (both former P0
image processing items, now done)
# Future Steps
- P1: implement blocked networks configuration to extend SSRF
protection
- P1: rate limit global concurrent upstream fetches to prevent
resource exhaustion
- P1: strip EXIF and other metadata from processed images (privacy)
- P2: security
- referer blacklist
- per-IP rate limiting
- per-origin rate limiting
- P2: HTTP response handling
- Last-Modified headers
- Vary header for content negotiation
- X-Request-ID propagation
- P2: auto format selection (format=auto based on Accept header)
- P2: configuration
- add all configuration options from README
- environment variable overrides
- YAML config file support
- P2: operational
- optional Sentry error reporting
- comprehensive request logging
- Prometheus performance metrics
- integration tests for the image proxy flow
- load tests to verify the 1k to 5k req/s target
- P2: documentation
- configuration options
- API endpoints
- deployment guide
- example nginx or caddy reverse proxy config