Files
pixa/internal/imgcache/urlparser.go
T
clawbot f8d40b89a7
check / check (push) Successful in 3m6s
Validate dimensions and fit mode on encrypted URLs (closes #62)
The encrypted /v1/e/ route used the decrypted payload unchecked, so a
token could request an over-limit size or an unknown fit mode; the
generator turned unparseable numbers into 0.

imgcache.ValidateDimension alone holds the MaxDimension bound and is
used by the path parser, by the new ValidateImageRequest (which adds
ValidateFitMode) and by the generator. Both image routes call
ValidateImageRequest, so each answers 400. The generator answers 400
naming the field for a width or height that is not a number or fails
that check, a quality that is not a number from 1 to 100, a ttl that is
not a number from 0 to the largest the expiry calculation can hold, or
an unknown fit. Empty quality is 85; empty ttl never expires. The
form's size inputs stop at 8192.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation); opus-5-5 (rework)
2026-09-28 15:24:32 +02:00

295 lines
7.2 KiB
Go

package imgcache
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// URL parsing errors.
var (
ErrInvalidPath = errors.New("invalid image path")
ErrMissingHost = errors.New("missing source host")
ErrMissingSize = errors.New("missing size specification")
ErrInvalidSize = errors.New("invalid size format")
ErrInvalidFormat = errors.New("invalid or unsupported format")
ErrDimensionTooLarge = errors.New("dimension exceeds maximum")
ErrPathTraversal = errors.New("path traversal detected")
)
// MaxDimension is the maximum allowed width or height.
const MaxDimension = 8192
// ValidateDimension checks one requested width or height; name ("width" or
// "height") appears in the error. 0 means "original size" and is valid.
func ValidateDimension(name string, value int) error {
if value < 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is negative", ErrInvalidSize, name)
}
if value > MaxDimension {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is above %d",
ErrDimensionTooLarge, name, MaxDimension)
}
return nil
}
// sizeFormatRegex matches patterns like "800x600.webp", "0x0.jpeg", "orig.png"
var sizeFormatRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^(\d+)x(\d+)\.(\w+)$|^(orig)\.(\w+)$`)
// ParsedURL contains the parsed components of an image proxy URL.
type ParsedURL struct {
// Host is the source origin host (e.g., "cdn.example.com")
Host string
// Path is the path on the origin (e.g., "/photos/cat.jpg")
Path string
// Query is the optional query string for the origin
Query string
// Size is the requested output dimensions
Size Size
// Format is the requested output format
Format ImageFormat
}
// ParseImagePath parses the path captured by chi's wildcard:
// <host>/<path>/<size>.<format>
// This is the primary entry point when using chi routing.
// Examples:
// - cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp
// - cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/0x0.jpeg
// - cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/orig.png
func ParseImagePath(path string) (*ParsedURL, error) {
// Strip leading slash if present (chi may include it)
path = strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/")
if path == "" {
return nil, ErrMissingHost
}
return parseImageComponents(path)
}
// ParseImageURL parses a full URL path like /v1/image/<host>/<path>/<size>.<format>
// Use ParseImagePath instead when working with chi's wildcard capture.
func ParseImageURL(urlPath string) (*ParsedURL, error) {
// Remove the /v1/image/ prefix
const prefix = "/v1/image/"
if !strings.HasPrefix(urlPath, prefix) {
return nil, ErrInvalidPath
}
remainder := strings.TrimPrefix(urlPath, prefix)
if remainder == "" {
return nil, ErrMissingHost
}
return parseImageComponents(remainder)
}
// parseImageComponents parses <host>/<path>/<size>.<format> structure.
func parseImageComponents(remainder string) (*ParsedURL, error) {
// Check for path traversal before any other processing
err := checkPathTraversal(remainder)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Find the last path segment which contains size.format
lastSlash := strings.LastIndex(remainder, "/")
if lastSlash == -1 {
return nil, ErrMissingSize
}
sizeFormat := remainder[lastSlash+1:]
hostAndPath := remainder[:lastSlash]
if hostAndPath == "" {
return nil, ErrMissingHost
}
// Parse size and format from the last segment
size, format, err := parseSizeFormat(sizeFormat)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Split host from path
// The first segment is the host, everything after is the path
firstSlash := strings.Index(hostAndPath, "/")
var host, path, query string
if firstSlash == -1 {
// No path, just host (unusual but valid)
host = hostAndPath
path = "/"
} else {
host = hostAndPath[:firstSlash]
path = hostAndPath[firstSlash:]
}
if host == "" {
return nil, ErrMissingHost
}
// Extract query string if present in path
if qIndex := strings.Index(path, "?"); qIndex != -1 {
query = path[qIndex+1:]
path = path[:qIndex]
}
// Ensure path starts with /
if !strings.HasPrefix(path, "/") {
path = "/" + path
}
return &ParsedURL{
Host: host,
Path: path,
Query: query,
Size: size,
Format: format,
}, nil
}
// checkPathTraversal detects path traversal attempts in a URL path.
// It checks for various attack vectors including:
// - Direct ../ sequences
// - URL-encoded variants (%2e%2e, %252e%252e)
// - Backslash variants (..\)
// - Null byte injection (%00)
func checkPathTraversal(path string) error {
// First, URL-decode the path to catch encoded attacks
// Decode multiple times to catch double-encoding
decoded := path
for range 3 {
newDecoded, err := url.PathUnescape(decoded)
if err != nil {
// Malformed encoding is suspicious
return ErrPathTraversal
}
if newDecoded == decoded {
break
}
decoded = newDecoded
}
// Normalize backslashes to forward slashes
normalized := strings.ReplaceAll(decoded, "\\", "/")
// Check for null bytes
if strings.Contains(normalized, "\x00") {
return ErrPathTraversal
}
// Check for parent directory traversal
// Look for "/.." or "../" patterns
if strings.Contains(normalized, "/../") ||
strings.Contains(normalized, "/..") ||
strings.HasPrefix(normalized, "../") ||
strings.HasSuffix(normalized, "/..") ||
normalized == ".." {
return ErrPathTraversal
}
// Also check for ".." as a path segment in the original path
// This catches cases where the path hasn't been normalized
for seg := range strings.SplitSeq(path, "/") {
// URL decode the segment
decodedSeg, _ := url.PathUnescape(seg)
decodedSeg = strings.ReplaceAll(decodedSeg, "\\", "/")
if decodedSeg == ".." {
return ErrPathTraversal
}
}
return nil
}
// parseSizeFormat parses strings like "800x600.webp" or "orig.png"
func parseSizeFormat(s string) (Size, ImageFormat, error) {
matches := sizeFormatRegex.FindStringSubmatch(s)
if matches == nil {
return Size{}, "", ErrInvalidSize
}
var (
size Size
formatStr string
)
if matches[4] == "orig" {
// "orig.format" pattern
size = Size{Width: 0, Height: 0}
formatStr = matches[5]
} else {
// "WxH.format" pattern
width, err := strconv.Atoi(matches[1])
if err != nil {
return Size{}, "", ErrInvalidSize
}
height, err := strconv.Atoi(matches[2])
if err != nil {
return Size{}, "", ErrInvalidSize
}
size = Size{Width: width, Height: height}
formatStr = matches[3]
}
err := ValidateDimension("width", size.Width)
if err != nil {
return Size{}, "", err
}
err = ValidateDimension("height", size.Height)
if err != nil {
return Size{}, "", err
}
format, err := parseFormat(formatStr)
if err != nil {
return Size{}, "", err
}
return size, format, nil
}
// parseFormat converts a format string to ImageFormat.
func parseFormat(s string) (ImageFormat, error) {
switch strings.ToLower(s) {
case "orig", "original":
return FormatOriginal, nil
case "jpg", "jpeg":
return FormatJPEG, nil
case "png":
return FormatPNG, nil
case "webp":
return FormatWebP, nil
case "avif":
return FormatAVIF, nil
case "gif":
return FormatGIF, nil
default:
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrInvalidFormat, s)
}
}
// ToImageRequest converts a ParsedURL to an ImageRequest.
func (p *ParsedURL) ToImageRequest() *ImageRequest {
return &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: p.Host,
SourcePath: p.Path,
SourceQuery: p.Query,
Size: p.Size,
Format: p.Format,
}
}