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closes #49 Records the P0 manual test pass in `TODO.md` per its Workflow section (checked-off results into Completed Steps; cache size management and eviction promoted to Next Step). `TODO.md` is the only changed file — no production code changes, as the issue requires. ## Test setup `pixad` built from `main` at `6573b9d` via `make build`, run on port 18099 with a throwaway local config (temp state dir, known `signing_key`, `allowlist_hosts` including `s3.sneak.cloud`), driven with curl using explicit cookie replay (session cookies are `Secure`/`HttpOnly`/`SameSite=Strict`). ## Results — all six checks PASS 1. **Login form**: GET `/` → HTTP 200, `Pixa - Login` page with `name="key"` password form. 2. **Wrong key error**: POST `/` with `key=wrong-key` → HTTP 200 login page containing "Invalid signing key". 3. **Generator form**: POST `/` with the correct signing key → HTTP 303 to `/` with `Set-Cookie: pixa_session=...; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict`; GET `/` with that cookie → `Pixa - URL Generator` with the `/generate` form and logout link. 4. **Encrypted URL serves image**: POST `/generate` (ttl=3600) produced a `/v1/e/<token>/img.jpeg` URL → HTTP 200, `Content-Type: image/jpeg`, 800x600 baseline JPEG, 61706 bytes. 5. **Expired URL → 410**: a ttl=1 URL fetched after 3 s → HTTP 410 Gone with `{"error":"URL has expired","status":410,...}`. 6. **Logout**: GET `/logout` → HTTP 303 to `/` with `Set-Cookie: pixa_session=; Max-Age=0`; subsequent GET `/` → login form again. Additionally, all nine checks in `scripts/manual-test.sh` passed against the same server instance. ## Verification `make check` green on the branch head (all tests, golangci-lint 0 issues, fmt-check clean) — the first fully green `make check` on a `main`-derived branch under the current linter, confirming the #47/#48 fix on merged `main`. Note for review: the test execution was performed this session; the adversarial re-review (independently re-running the six flows) is still pending and should happen before merge. Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin> Reviewed-on: #50 Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org> Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
106 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
106 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
# Workflow
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* branch (from `main`)
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* do the work in Next Step
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* move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps
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* move the top item of Future Steps into Next Step
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* commit (`TODO.md` changes in the same commit as the work)
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* merge to `main` if the branch is not protected, otherwise open a PR
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* push
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# Status
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pre-1.0. No git tags exist. Recent work extracted the internal/magic,
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internal/allowlist, internal/httpfetcher, and internal/signature
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packages. The gosec findings from the 2026-07-06 survey are resolved:
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the last two open findings (G124, session cookie attributes in
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internal/session) are fixed as of this change, so `make check` is green
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on main.
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# Next Step
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P0: implement cache size management and eviction so the disk cannot
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fill up
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# Completed Steps
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- 2026-08-07 manual test pass of the auth and encrypted URL flows
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against a locally built and running `pixad` (built from `main` at
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`6573b9d`, port 18099, local throwaway config); all six checks
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passed, plus all nine tests in `scripts/manual-test.sh` (closes #49):
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- [x] visit `/` and see the login form: HTTP 200, `Pixa - Login`
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page with `name="key"` password form
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- [x] wrong key shows an error: POST `/` with `key=wrong-key`
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returned HTTP 200 login page containing "Invalid signing key"
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- [x] correct signing key shows the generator form: POST `/`
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returned HTTP 303 to `/` with
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`Set-Cookie: pixa_session=...; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict`;
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GET `/` with that cookie rendered `Pixa - URL Generator` with the
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`/generate` form and logout link
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- [x] a generated encrypted URL serves the image: POST `/generate`
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(ttl=3600) produced a `/v1/e/<token>/img.jpeg` URL that returned
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HTTP 200, `Content-Type: image/jpeg`, an 800x600 baseline JPEG of
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61706 bytes
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- [x] an expired URL (short TTL) returns 410: a ttl=1 URL fetched
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after 3 s returned HTTP 410 Gone with
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`{"error":"URL has expired","status":410,...}`
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- [x] logout redirects back to login: GET `/logout` returned HTTP
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303 to `/` with `Set-Cookie: pixa_session=; Max-Age=0`;
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subsequent GET `/` rendered the login form again
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- 2026-08-07 fix the two remaining gosec findings (G124 in
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internal/session): session cookies now always carry
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Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite=Strict on both the set and clear paths;
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`make check` green (closes #47)
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- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints,
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Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
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- 2026-04-07 extract magic byte detection into internal/magic (#42)
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- 2026-03-25 extract allowlist package from internal/imgcache (#41)
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- 2026-03-25 move schema_migrations table creation into 000.sql (#36)
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- 2026-03-20 enforce and document exact-match-only signature
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verification (#40)
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- 2026-03-20 bound imageprocessor.Process input read to prevent
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unbounded memory use (#37); consolidate appname into an
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internal/globals constant (#34)
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- 2026-03-18 parse version prefix from migration filenames (#33)
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- 2026-03-15 QA audit fixes for 1.0/MVP readiness (#25)
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- 2026-03-02 split Dockerfile with pre-built golangci-lint stage for
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faster CI (#23)
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- 2026-02-25 repo policy compliance: CI workflow, hash-pinned images,
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golangci-lint and gosec fixes of that date (#14); arm64 Docker build
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fix (#16)
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- 2026-01-08 WebP and AVIF encoding support via govips (both former P0
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image processing items, now done)
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# Future Steps
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- P0: validate configuration on startup, fail fast on bad config
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- P1: implement blocked networks configuration to extend SSRF
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protection
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- P1: rate limit global concurrent upstream fetches to prevent
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resource exhaustion
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- P1: strip EXIF and other metadata from processed images (privacy)
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- P2: security
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- referer blacklist
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- per-IP rate limiting
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- per-origin rate limiting
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- P2: HTTP response handling
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- Last-Modified headers
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- Vary header for content negotiation
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- X-Request-ID propagation
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- P2: auto format selection (format=auto based on Accept header)
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- P2: configuration
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- add all configuration options from README
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- environment variable overrides
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- YAML config file support
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- P2: operational
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- optional Sentry error reporting
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- comprehensive request logging
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- Prometheus performance metrics
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- integration tests for the image proxy flow
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- load tests to verify the 1k to 5k req/s target
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- P2: documentation
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- configuration options
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- API endpoints
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- deployment guide
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- example nginx or caddy reverse proxy config
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