Files
pixa/internal/signature/signature.go
clawbot 6573b9d1ef
All checks were successful
check / check (push) Successful in 5s
refactor: extract signature package from imgcache (#46)
Extracts HMAC-SHA256 request signing out of `internal/imgcache/` into its own `internal/signature/` package, per the plan in [issue #39](#39).

This is one of the remaining "easily separable" extractions (`imageprocessor`, `allowlist`, `magic`, and `httpfetcher` already landed). Only the signer is moved here so the diff stays reviewable.

## What moved

From `internal/imgcache/signature.go` and its tests into `internal/signature/`:

- `Signer` type, its `New` constructor, `Sign`, `Verify`, `GenerateSignedURL`
- `ParseParams` (query-string signature/expiration parsing)
- Signature error sentinels

## One-way import edge

To keep the import edge one-way (`imgcache` depends on `signature`, never the reverse), the package defines a standalone `Request` type carrying just the fields the signature covers, instead of importing `imgcache.ImageRequest`. `imgcache` projects its `ImageRequest` onto `signature.Request` via a small unexported `signatureRequest` helper. This mirrors how the `magic` extraction defined its own `ImageFormat` type.

## Renames (no stuttering)

- `NewSigner` -> `signature.New`
- `ParseSignatureParams` -> `signature.ParseParams`
- `ErrSignatureRequired`/`Invalid`/`Expired` -> `signature.ErrRequired`/`Invalid`/`Expired`

The `ErrRequired` message is updated from "non-whitelisted host" to "non-allowlisted host" for inclusive terminology, consistent with the `allowlist` rename.

## Rework (post-review)

Three commits added after review feedback:

- `d69019b` — golden known-answer test pinning the exact HMAC signatures and signed URL paths for three fixed vectors (resized, resized+query, orig size), cross-validated against an independent HMAC implementation. Any change to the signed byte format now fails loudly.
- `43b9f1c` — whitelist→allowlist rename completed across `internal/imgcache` and `internal/handlers` (`ServiceConfig.Allowlist`, `Allowlist` interface, `IsAllowlisted`, test helpers and test names).
- `3dc1999` — one-pass config surface rename, no back-compat alias: YAML key `whitelist_hosts` → `allowlist_hosts`, `Config.WhitelistHosts` → `Config.AllowlistHosts`, `config.example.yml`, `scripts/manual-test.sh`, and `README.md` (which also documented a nonexistent `source_host_whitelist` key — now fixed to the real one).

## Behavior

Pure refactor apart from the config key rename above. The bytes fed to the HMAC are unchanged (`host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration`), so previously issued signatures remain valid — now enforced by the golden test. All existing tests move with the package. `script/cibuild` passes at head `3dc1999` (fmt-check, lint, test, build).

refs #39

Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org>
Reviewed-on: #46
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-08-07 17:44:00 +02:00

174 lines
4.8 KiB
Go

// Package signature provides HMAC-SHA256 signing and verification of image
// requests.
package signature
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"time"
)
// Signature errors.
var (
ErrRequired = errors.New("signature required for non-allowlisted host")
ErrInvalid = errors.New("invalid signature")
ErrExpired = errors.New("signature has expired")
ErrMissingExpiration = errors.New("signature expiration is required")
)
// Request carries the components an image request signature covers. It is a
// standalone type so that this package does not depend on imgcache, keeping
// the import edge one-way (imgcache depends on signature, never the reverse).
type Request struct {
// SourceHost is the origin host (e.g. "cdn.example.com").
SourceHost string
// SourcePath is the path on the origin (e.g. "/photos/cat.jpg").
SourcePath string
// SourceQuery is the optional query string for the origin URL.
SourceQuery string
// Width is the requested output width in pixels.
Width int
// Height is the requested output height in pixels.
Height int
// Format is the requested output format (e.g. "webp").
Format string
// Signature is the HMAC signature to verify.
Signature string
// Expires is the signature expiration timestamp.
Expires time.Time
}
// Signer handles HMAC-SHA256 signature generation and verification.
type Signer struct {
secretKey []byte
}
// New creates a new Signer with the given secret key.
func New(secretKey string) *Signer {
return &Signer{
secretKey: []byte(secretKey),
}
}
// Sign generates an HMAC-SHA256 signature for the given request.
// The signature covers: host + path + query + width + height + format + expiration.
func (s *Signer) Sign(req *Request) string {
data := s.buildSignatureData(req)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.secretKey)
mac.Write([]byte(data))
sig := mac.Sum(nil)
return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig)
}
// Verify checks if the signature on the request is valid and not expired.
// Signatures are exact-match only: every component of the signed data
// (host, path, query, dimensions, format, expiration) must match exactly.
// No suffix matching, wildcard matching, or partial matching is supported.
// A signature for "cdn.example.com" will NOT verify for "example.com" or
// "other.cdn.example.com", and vice versa.
func (s *Signer) Verify(req *Request) error {
// Check expiration first
if req.Expires.IsZero() {
return ErrMissingExpiration
}
if time.Now().After(req.Expires) {
return ErrExpired
}
// Compute expected signature
expected := s.Sign(req)
// Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
if !hmac.Equal([]byte(req.Signature), []byte(expected)) {
return ErrInvalid
}
return nil
}
// buildSignatureData creates the string to be signed.
// Format: "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration"
// All components are used verbatim (exact match). No normalization,
// suffix matching, or wildcard expansion is performed.
func (s *Signer) buildSignatureData(req *Request) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%d",
req.SourceHost,
req.SourcePath,
req.SourceQuery,
req.Width,
req.Height,
req.Format,
req.Expires.Unix(),
)
}
// GenerateSignedURL creates a complete URL with signature and expiration.
// Returns the path portion that should be appended to the base URL.
func (s *Signer) GenerateSignedURL(req *Request, ttl time.Duration) (path string, sig string, exp int64) {
// Set expiration
req.Expires = time.Now().Add(ttl)
exp = req.Expires.Unix()
// Generate signature
sig = s.Sign(req)
req.Signature = sig
// Build the size component
var sizeStr string
if req.Width == 0 && req.Height == 0 {
sizeStr = "orig"
} else {
sizeStr = fmt.Sprintf("%dx%d", req.Width, req.Height)
}
// Build the path.
// When a source query is present, it is embedded as a path segment
// (e.g. /host/path?query/size.fmt) so that the URL parser can extract
// it from the last-slash split. The "?" inside a path segment is
// percent-encoded by clients but chi delivers it decoded, which is
// exactly what the URL parser expects.
if req.SourceQuery != "" {
path = fmt.Sprintf("/v1/image/%s%s%%3F%s/%s.%s",
req.SourceHost,
req.SourcePath,
url.PathEscape(req.SourceQuery),
sizeStr,
req.Format,
)
} else {
path = fmt.Sprintf("/v1/image/%s%s/%s.%s",
req.SourceHost,
req.SourcePath,
sizeStr,
req.Format,
)
}
return path, sig, exp
}
// ParseParams extracts signature and expiration from query parameters.
func ParseParams(sig, expStr string) (parsed string, expires time.Time, err error) {
parsed = sig
if expStr == "" {
return parsed, time.Time{}, nil
}
expUnix, err := strconv.ParseInt(expStr, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid expiration: %w", err)
}
expires = time.Unix(expUnix, 0)
return parsed, expires, nil
}