check / check (push) Failing after 0s
Add a LimitBody middleware that caps the request body at MaxFormBytes (1 MiB) on POST / and POST /generate and rejects an oversized body with 413. It parses the form under the cap before the CSRF middleware, which reads its token from the body with PostFormValue and would otherwise see a truncated body as a missing token (403); a successful parse is cached, so the CSRF check and handler reuse it. Wired ahead of CSRF in SetupRoutes. This makes the limit explicit rather than resting on ParseForm's incidental 10 MB cap, which would silently vanish if a handler switched to io.ReadAll or multipart. Model: opus-4-8
8.1 KiB
8.1 KiB
Workflow
- branch per issue from
next - do the work in Next Step
- move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps
- move the top item of Future Steps into Next Step
- commit (
TODO.mdchanges in the same commit as the work) - open a PR based on
next - an independent reviewer who did not write the change gates it
- the manager squash-merges the PR into
nextonce review passes nextstays green and mergeable tomainat any time; only the owner mergesnextintomain, via the single milestone PR- push
Status
pre-1.0. No git tags exist. The 1.0.0 milestone is in progress; work
lands on next, and main receives only the milestone PR that the
owner merges. next is at the canonical golangci-lint v2.12.2 config
and is green. Recent work extracted the internal/magic,
internal/allowlist, internal/httpfetcher, and internal/signature
packages. The gosec findings from the 2026-07-06 survey are resolved.
The disk cache is now size-bounded with LRU eviction
(cache_max_bytes), closing the unbounded disk growth DoS vector.
Next Step
P1: implement blocked networks configuration to extend SSRF protection
Completed Steps
- 2026-09-21 http.Server hardening (closes #92): added
HTTPReadHeaderTimeout(10s, bounds the slowloris header dribble) andHTTPIdleTimeout(120s, bounds keep-alive reuse) alongside the existing timeouts and wired them onto the server; added aLimitBodymiddleware capping the two form POST bodies (POST /,POST /generate) atMaxFormBytes(1 MiB) and returning 413, applied ahead of the CSRF middleware so an oversized body is refused as 413 rather than being read as a missing CSRF token (403); leftWriteTimeoutat 60s unchanged - 2026-08-07 update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 with the canonical
.golangci.yml(v2 schema,default: allminus six disabled linters,lll88, tests included): bumped the pinnedgolangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2-alpineimage inDockerfileand the release-archive sha256 pins inscript/bootstrap; fixed the findings the stricter config surfaced (notablyparalleltest,wsl_v5,goconst,lll,noinlineerr,err113,errcheck,testpackage— white-box test files renamed to*_internal_test.go), including #55's code absorbed after it merged, iterating the pinned linter to0 issues.; no single finding total is substantiable, since golangci-lint'suniq-by-linereveals new findings on a line as others there are fixed — the documented re-measurements were 81 after the #53 merge and 149 after the #55 merge; three behavior changes, so not a pure no-op:Cache.StoreVariantnow takes acontext.Context(noctx), so a cancelled request skips its best-effort accounting row;MetadataStorage.Store's cleanup defer was dead onmainand leaked.tmp-*.jsonon failure, now fixed with explicit removals; and thesigning_keyvalidation error text gainedvalue too short:; the eviction loop's uncancellable context is deferred to #102 under a//nolint:contextcheck; three//nolint:tagliatelledirectives keep the snake_case JSON wire/disk formats unchanged;make checkgreen - 2026-08-07 implement cache size management and eviction (closes
#51): new
cache_max_bytesconfig key validated by the startup framework (explicit values used exactly with no floor,0disables the disk cache entirely, omitted defaults to max(75% of free space on the filesystem containing<state_dir>/cache/, 500 MiB), logged at startup); processed variants are now tracked in the database (a newvariant_contenttable and an LRU timestamp onsource_content) so total usage is two SUMs, never a directory scan on the hot path; a background goroutine evicts globally least-recently-used entries (variants and source blobs merged) to the limit, woken by a periodic ticker and by write-pressure notifications from stores; a source blob and ALL of itssource_metadatareferences are deleted in one transaction before the file is unlinked, so multi-referenced blobs are never removed while referenced and rows never point at deleted files; a startup and periodic reconciliation pass adopts untracked variant files, drops rows for missing files, removes unreachable source blobs, and sweeps stale temp files - 2026-08-07 validate configuration on startup, fail fast on bad
config (closes #52): a config value that is set but unparseable or
invalid aborts startup naming the key and value (defaults apply only
to omitted keys), unknown config keys abort startup, a malformed
config file aborts instead of being skipped, and
state_diris verified creatable and writable before the listener binds - 2026-08-07 manual test pass of the auth and encrypted URL flows
against a locally built and running
pixad(built frommainat6573b9d, port 18099, local throwaway config); all six checks passed, plus all nine tests inscripts/manual-test.sh(closes #49):- visit
/and see the login form: HTTP 200,Pixa - Loginpage withname="key"password form - wrong key shows an error: POST
/withkey=wrong-keyreturned HTTP 200 login page containing "Invalid signing key" - correct signing key shows the generator form: POST
/returned HTTP 303 to/withSet-Cookie: pixa_session=...; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict; GET/with that cookie renderedPixa - URL Generatorwith the/generateform and logout link - a generated encrypted URL serves the image: POST
/generate(ttl=3600) produced a/v1/e/<token>/img.jpegURL that returned HTTP 200,Content-Type: image/jpeg, an 800x600 baseline JPEG of 61706 bytes - an expired URL (short TTL) returns 410: a ttl=1 URL fetched
after 3 s returned HTTP 410 Gone with
{"error":"URL has expired","status":410,...} - logout redirects back to login: GET
/logoutreturned HTTP 303 to/withSet-Cookie: pixa_session=; Max-Age=0; subsequent GET/rendered the login form again
- visit
- 2026-08-07 fix the two remaining gosec findings (G124 in
internal/session): session cookies now always carry
Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite=Strict on both the set and clear paths;
make checkgreen (closes #47) - 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all:
script/entrypoints, Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section - 2026-04-07 extract magic byte detection into internal/magic (#42)
- 2026-03-25 extract allowlist package from internal/imgcache (#41)
- 2026-03-25 move schema_migrations table creation into 000.sql (#36)
- 2026-03-20 enforce and document exact-match-only signature verification (#40)
- 2026-03-20 bound imageprocessor.Process input read to prevent unbounded memory use (#37); consolidate appname into an internal/globals constant (#34)
- 2026-03-18 parse version prefix from migration filenames (#33)
- 2026-03-15 QA audit fixes for 1.0/MVP readiness (#25)
- 2026-03-02 split Dockerfile with pre-built golangci-lint stage for faster CI (#23)
- 2026-02-25 repo policy compliance: CI workflow, hash-pinned images, golangci-lint and gosec fixes of that date (#14); arm64 Docker build fix (#16)
- 2026-01-08 WebP and AVIF encoding support via govips (both former P0 image processing items, now done)
Future Steps
- P1: rate limit global concurrent upstream fetches to prevent resource exhaustion
- P1: strip EXIF and other metadata from processed images (privacy)
- P2: security
- referer blacklist
- per-IP rate limiting
- per-origin rate limiting
- P2: HTTP response handling
- Last-Modified headers
- Vary header for content negotiation
- X-Request-ID propagation
- P2: auto format selection (format=auto based on Accept header)
- P2: configuration
- add all configuration options from README
- environment variable overrides
- YAML config file support
- P2: operational
- optional Sentry error reporting
- comprehensive request logging
- Prometheus performance metrics
- integration tests for the image proxy flow
- load tests to verify the 1k to 5k req/s target
- P2: documentation
- configuration options
- API endpoints
- deployment guide
- example nginx or caddy reverse proxy config