pixa/TODO.md

# Workflow

* branch (from `main`)
* do the work in Next Step
* move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps
* move the top item of Future Steps into Next Step
* commit (`TODO.md` changes in the same commit as the work)
* merge to `main` if the branch is not protected, otherwise open a PR
* push

# Status

pre-1.0. No git tags exist. Recent work extracted the internal/magic,
internal/allowlist, internal/httpfetcher, and internal/signature
packages. The gosec findings from the 2026-07-06 survey are resolved
and `make check` is green on main. The disk cache is now size-bounded
with LRU eviction (`cache_max_bytes`), closing the unbounded disk
growth DoS vector.

# Next Step

P1: implement blocked networks configuration to extend SSRF protection

# Completed Steps

- 2026-08-07 implement cache size management and eviction (closes
  #51): new `cache_max_bytes` config key validated by the startup
  framework (explicit values used exactly with no floor, `0` disables
  the disk cache entirely, omitted defaults to max(75% of free space
  on the filesystem containing `<state_dir>/cache/`, 500 MiB), logged
  at startup); processed variants are now tracked in the database
  (migration 002 adds `variant_content` and an LRU timestamp on
  `source_content`) so total usage is two SUMs, never a directory scan
  on the hot path; a background goroutine evicts globally
  least-recently-used entries (variants and source blobs merged) to
  the limit, woken by a periodic ticker and by write-pressure
  notifications from stores; a source blob and ALL of its
  `source_metadata` references are deleted in one transaction before
  the file is unlinked, so multi-referenced blobs are never removed
  while referenced and rows never point at deleted files; a startup
  reconciliation pass adopts untracked variant files, drops rows for
  missing files, removes unreachable source blobs, and sweeps stale
  temp files
- 2026-08-07 validate configuration on startup, fail fast on bad
  config (closes #52): a config value that is set but unparseable or
  invalid aborts startup naming the key and value (defaults apply only
  to omitted keys), unknown config keys abort startup, a malformed
  config file aborts instead of being skipped, and `state_dir` is
  verified creatable and writable before the listener binds
- 2026-08-07 manual test pass of the auth and encrypted URL flows
  against a locally built and running `pixad` (built from `main` at
  `6573b9d`, port 18099, local throwaway config); all six checks
  passed, plus all nine tests in `scripts/manual-test.sh` (closes #49):
    - [x] visit `/` and see the login form: HTTP 200, `Pixa - Login`
      page with `name="key"` password form
    - [x] wrong key shows an error: POST `/` with `key=wrong-key`
      returned HTTP 200 login page containing "Invalid signing key"
    - [x] correct signing key shows the generator form: POST `/`
      returned HTTP 303 to `/` with
      `Set-Cookie: pixa_session=...; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict`;
      GET `/` with that cookie rendered `Pixa - URL Generator` with the
      `/generate` form and logout link
    - [x] a generated encrypted URL serves the image: POST `/generate`
      (ttl=3600) produced a `/v1/e/<token>/img.jpeg` URL that returned
      HTTP 200, `Content-Type: image/jpeg`, an 800x600 baseline JPEG of
      61706 bytes
    - [x] an expired URL (short TTL) returns 410: a ttl=1 URL fetched
      after 3 s returned HTTP 410 Gone with
      `{"error":"URL has expired","status":410,...}`
    - [x] logout redirects back to login: GET `/logout` returned HTTP
      303 to `/` with `Set-Cookie: pixa_session=; Max-Age=0`;
      subsequent GET `/` rendered the login form again
- 2026-08-07 fix the two remaining gosec findings (G124 in
  internal/session): session cookies now always carry
  Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite=Strict on both the set and clear paths;
  `make check` green (closes #47)
- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints,
  Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
- 2026-04-07 extract magic byte detection into internal/magic (#42)
- 2026-03-25 extract allowlist package from internal/imgcache (#41)
- 2026-03-25 move schema_migrations table creation into 000.sql (#36)
- 2026-03-20 enforce and document exact-match-only signature
  verification (#40)
- 2026-03-20 bound imageprocessor.Process input read to prevent
  unbounded memory use (#37); consolidate appname into an
  internal/globals constant (#34)
- 2026-03-18 parse version prefix from migration filenames (#33)
- 2026-03-15 QA audit fixes for 1.0/MVP readiness (#25)
- 2026-03-02 split Dockerfile with pre-built golangci-lint stage for
  faster CI (#23)
- 2026-02-25 repo policy compliance: CI workflow, hash-pinned images,
  golangci-lint and gosec fixes of that date (#14); arm64 Docker build
  fix (#16)
- 2026-01-08 WebP and AVIF encoding support via govips (both former P0
  image processing items, now done)

# Future Steps

- P1: rate limit global concurrent upstream fetches to prevent
  resource exhaustion
- P1: strip EXIF and other metadata from processed images (privacy)
- P2: security
    - referer blacklist
    - per-IP rate limiting
    - per-origin rate limiting
- P2: HTTP response handling
    - Last-Modified headers
    - Vary header for content negotiation
    - X-Request-ID propagation
- P2: auto format selection (format=auto based on Accept header)
- P2: configuration
    - add all configuration options from README
    - environment variable overrides
    - YAML config file support
- P2: operational
    - optional Sentry error reporting
    - comprehensive request logging
    - Prometheus performance metrics
    - integration tests for the image proxy flow
    - load tests to verify the 1k to 5k req/s target
- P2: documentation
    - configuration options
    - API endpoints
    - deployment guide
    - example nginx or caddy reverse proxy config