The encrypted /v1/e/ route built its image request straight from the
decrypted payload, so a token could request an over-limit dimension
(reaching libvips and exhausting memory) or an unknown fit mode
(surfacing as a 500 from the processor). The token generator discarded
every strconv.Atoi error, silently turning non-numeric width, height,
quality, or ttl into 0 and applying no upper bound on dimensions.
Add a shared ValidateImageRequest in internal/imgcache enforcing the
MaxDimension bound and ValidateFitMode, and apply it on both the plain
image route and the encrypted route so both reject an over-limit size or
an unrecognized fit mode with 400. The generator now parses each numeric
field explicitly and returns 400 naming the field for non-numeric or
out-of-range input, with width and height bounds-checked so an unusable
token cannot be minted.
Model: opus-4-8
Failing tests for the missing validation on the encrypted-URL path and
the token generator: an encrypted token carrying an over-limit dimension
or an unrecognized fit mode must be rejected with 400, and POST /generate
with a non-numeric or over-limit width must return 400 rather than
minting a token. Also covers the shared imgcache validator directly.
Model: opus-4-8