Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak ac5db758ff Move the TODO.md entry for the negative cache cleanup to the top
check / check (push) Waiting to run
The rebase onto next left it below the entries next gained since.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 12:17:03 +00:00
sneak 288bbfbe4a Test that CleanExpired removes more than one batch of expired rows
TestCleanExpiredRemovesMoreThanOneBatch stores one expired negative
cache row more than a batch holds and calls CleanExpired alone, so a
CleanExpired that stops after its first batch fails it.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 12:16:27 +00:00
sneak 581c5e0872 Delete expired negative cache rows in batches
CleanExpired deletes at most 1000 expired rows per statement and starts
no further statement once its context ends, so a request on the one
database connection waits behind one batch at most.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 12:16:27 +00:00
sneak 4834e2444c Test that expired negative cache rows are deleted in batches
One statement deletes one batch and no more, CleanExpired removes the
rest, and it deletes nothing once its context has ended.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 12:16:27 +00:00
sneak 47246d1d1c Remove expired negative cache rows in the eviction loop (closes #244)
A negative cache row was deleted only when its source URL was requested
again after it expired, and CleanExpired was never called, so a client
asking for a new missing path each time grew the database without
limit. The eviction goroutine now calls CleanExpired at startup and on
every periodic tick, so a row stays at most NegativeTTL plus one
interval. The goroutine also starts with the disk cache disabled, where
reconciliation and eviction already do nothing, since the negative
cache is used either way.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 12:16:27 +00:00
sneak 22c0a50fdc Test that the eviction loop removes expired negative cache rows
A failed fetch stored in the negative cache must be removed by the
eviction loop once it has expired, although its URL is never requested
again, with the disk cache enabled and disabled; a row that has not
expired stays. Fails until the fix for
#244 lands.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 12:16:27 +00:00
clawbot 2790125cb2 Serve a cached variant while its source URL is in the negative cache (closes #245)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
Get checked the negative cache before the variant cache, so after one
failed fetch of a source every variant of it answered 502 for five
minutes, also one on disk or one that could be made from the cached
source. The check now sits at the start of fetchAndProcess, which runs
only when no cached source can be used. A refusal from the negative
cache now counts as a miss.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 13:45:25 +02:00
clawbot c23585dd6d Lower-case the image URL's host and require a signature for a port (closes #246)
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With `cdn.example.com` allowlisted, other letter cases and a host with a port also passed the allowlist; each spelling was fetched and cached on its own with its own per-host connection limit, and a port let an unsigned URL reach any port of the host.

The image URL parser now lower-cases the host and refuses one holding `@` with 400. A host followed by `:`, with or without a port (read as Go's URL parser reads it, unbracketed IPv6 included), never counts as allowlisted, so it needs a signature. The host is signed lower-cased, as the URL writes it, so a signature made over an upper-case spelling is refused with 401.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 12:31:14 +02:00
clawbot 5d1e3ea871 Escape : and % in the signed and cached path and query (closes #247)
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The signed data and the cache key joined host, path and query with ":" and no escaping, so path /a:b with no query and path /a with query b: gave the same string: a URL signed for https://h/a:b verified for https://h/a?b:, and the two shared a cached image. Both now write each % in the path and the query as %25 and each : as %3A before joining them. The host never holds / and the path always starts with /, so the joined string reads back one way only. A path and query holding neither character are signed and keyed as before, so the existing known-answer vectors and the README example are unchanged; new vectors cover the escaped cases. Signature Specification in README.md states the escaping.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 09:37:01 +02:00
clawbot 761ade2e36 Accept a chunked upstream body of exactly the maximum size (closes #248)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
Once upstream_max_response_size bytes were read, the fetcher refused the next read without looking for the end of the body. Go's HTTP client returns the end of a body sent with a Content-Length together with its last bytes, but the end of a chunked body can come in a later read, so a chunked body of exactly the limit was refused after it was downloaded whole and the image routes answered 500. Once the limit is used up, the fetcher now reads one more byte: if the body has ended it is accepted, and if there is more it is refused with ErrResponseTooLarge.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 07:44:09 +02:00
clawbot 88e1b1cdfa Allowlist no host in the example config (closes #249)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
The example config allowlisted github.com and user-images.githubusercontent.com, where anyone can put an image, so a deployment set up as Getting Started says served every image there to anyone without a signature. The example now allowlists nothing and shows one commented entry under example.com. README.md says in Getting Started and in "Running under upaas" that every image on an allowlisted host is served without a signature, so an allowlisted host must be one the operator controls. A new test loads the example config and fails if it allowlists any host.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 06:26:23 +02:00
18 changed files with 1026 additions and 59 deletions
+26 -7
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,11 @@ make docker
docker run -p 8080:8080 -e PIXA_SIGNING_KEY="$(openssl rand -base64 32)" pixa:latest
```
The example config allowlists no host (`allowlist_hosts`), so pixa serves an
image only for a signed or encrypted URL. Every image on an allowlisted host is
served to anyone without a signature, at any size and in any format, so
allowlist only hosts you control, where nobody else can put images.
A container takes its settings from environment variables (see Configuration
below for the list). Only `PIXA_SIGNING_KEY` is required; if it is unset the
container exits at startup naming the variable. Everything else has a built-in
@@ -115,7 +120,9 @@ What the [upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas) app for pixa needs:
- `PIXA_SIGNING_KEY` (required): secret for signed and encrypted URLs and
login, 32+ characters, for example from `openssl rand -base64 32`
- `PIXA_ALLOWLIST_HOSTS`: upstream hosts served without a signature,
comma-separated
comma-separated; default none. Every image on a listed host is served to
anyone without a signature, so list only hosts you control, where nobody
else can put images.
- `PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES`: disk cache limit in bytes; `0` disables it;
default 75% of (free space + what the cache holds)
- the rest are in the table under Configuration below
@@ -193,9 +200,10 @@ path under `/v1/` answers 200, in maintenance mode too.
`image_requests_per_minute` (below); 415 when the upstream answers with a
`Content-Type` that is not one of the source formats (below), or with an image
whose first bytes libvips reads as another format; 502 when the upstream
answered with an error status, and for 5 minutes after that for the same
source URL; 503 when pixa is busy or in maintenance mode; 500 for any other
failure.
answered with an error status, and for 5 minutes after that for an image of
the same source URL that pixa can neither serve from its cache nor make from
the source image still in its cache; 503 when pixa is busy or in maintenance
mode; 500 for any other failure.
- `GET` or `HEAD` `/v1/e/<token>/<name>` — an image through an encrypted URL
(see Encrypted URLs). Needs: nothing but the URL. Answers: 200; 304 when
`If-None-Match` matches the image's `ETag`; 400 for a token that does not
@@ -411,9 +419,14 @@ HMAC-SHA256(secret, "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration:quality:fit"
Where:
- `host` — source origin hostname (e.g. `cdn.example.com`)
- `path` — source path (e.g. `/photos/cat.jpg`)
- `query` — source query string, empty string if none
- `host` — source host as the URL writes it up to the first `/`, in lower case,
keeping an IPv6 address's brackets and any `:` and port after it (e.g.
`cdn.example.com`, `cdn.example.com:8443`, `[2001:db8::1]:8443`)
- `path` — source path (e.g. `/photos/cat.jpg`), with each `%` written as `%25`
and each `:` as `%3A`, so `/photos/a:b.jpg` is signed as `/photos/a%3Ab.jpg`
- `query` — source query string, empty string if none, with `%` and `:` written
as in `path`; neither then holds a `:`, so path `/a:b` with no query and path
`/a` with query `b:` are signed differently
- `width` — requested width in pixels, `0` for original
- `height` — requested height in pixels, `0` for original
- `format` — output format, one of those listed under Routes, with `original`
@@ -463,6 +476,12 @@ entry that is neither a host name (letters, digits, hyphens, underscores and
dots, with at most one leading dot) nor an IP address, such as one with a port
or a `*.` wildcard, aborts startup.
pixa lower-cases the host of a `/v1/image/` URL before anything else uses it, so
`CDN.Example.com` is matched, fetched, cached and counted against
`upstream_connections_per_host` as `cdn.example.com`. Such a URL whose host has
a port, as in `cdn.example.com:8443`, or a `:` with no port, needs a signature
even when the host is allowlisted. A host holding `@` is refused with 400.
### Configuration
Every setting can be given as an environment variable, in a YAML config file
+57
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,63 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
# Completed Steps
- 2026-10-15 expired negative cache rows are removed on a schedule (closes
#244): the row of a failed fetch, which makes pixa answer 502 for that source
URL for 5 minutes, was deleted only when the same URL was requested again
after that, so a client asking for a new missing path each time added rows
that stayed for good. The eviction goroutine now calls `CleanExpired` at
startup and on each periodic tick, every 5 minutes in pixad, so a row stays at
most about 10 minutes. `CleanExpired` deletes at most 1000 rows per statement,
so a request waits behind 1000 deletions at most, however many rows have
expired. The goroutine runs with the disk cache disabled
(`cache_max_bytes: 0`) too, where it does nothing else, as the negative cache
is used either way.
- 2026-10-15 a cached variant is served while its source URL is in the negative
cache (closes #245): `Get` checked the negative cache before the variant
cache, so once a fetch of the source failed, as one does when another variant
misses after the source was evicted and the upstream is down, every variant of
that source answered 502 for 5 minutes, also one on disk or one that could be
made from the cached source. The negative cache is now checked only just
before a fetch from the upstream, so a cached variant is served and a variant
not in the cache is made from the cached source when there is one. `README.md`
says so under `/v1/image/`. A refusal from the negative cache now counts as a
miss, as any other request that misses the variant cache does.
- 2026-10-15 the host of a `/v1/image/` URL is lower-cased, and one with a port
needs a signature (closes #246): with `cdn.example.com` allowlisted,
`CDN.Example.com` and `cdn.example.com:8443` passed the allowlist too, and
each spelling was fetched and cached on its own and had connections of its own
under `upstream_connections_per_host`. The image URL parser now lower-cases
the host and refuses one holding `@`, which a URL reads as a user name and
password, with 400. A host with a port, or with a `:` and no port, needs a
signature even when it is allowlisted. That is checked in the image service,
not in `allowlist.IsAllowed`, which also matches `referer_blocklist`, where a
`Referer` is blocked whatever its port. A URL is signed over its host as it
writes it, in lower case, with any IPv6 brackets, `:` and port kept.
- 2026-10-15 a `:` in the source path or query no longer moves where the path
ends and the query begins (closes #247): the signed data and the cache key
joined host, path and query with `:` and no escaping, so a URL signed for
`https://h/a:b` verified for `https://h/a?b:`; the two also shared a cache
key, and whichever was fetched first was served for both. In both, the path
and the query now have each `%` written as `%25` and each `:` as `%3A`; a path
and query holding neither are signed and keyed as before. Signature
Specification in `README.md` says so.
- 2026-10-15 the example config allowlists no host (closes #249): it allowlisted
`github.com` and `user-images.githubusercontent.com`, where anyone can put an
image, so a deployment set up as Getting Started says served those images to
anyone without a signature, at any size and in any format.
`configs/config.example.yml` now leaves `allowlist_hosts` out, with one
commented entry under `example.com`. Getting Started and "Running under upaas"
in `README.md` say that every image on an allowlisted host is served without a
signature, so an allowlisted host must be one the operator controls.
- 2026-10-15 a chunked upstream body of exactly `upstream_max_response_size`
bytes is accepted (closes #248): once the limit was used up, the fetcher's
next read refused the body without looking for its end. Go's HTTP client
returns the end of a body sent with a `Content-Length` together with its last
bytes, but the end of a chunked body can come in a later read, so such a body
was refused after it had been downloaded whole, and the image routes
answered 500. Once the limit is used up, the fetcher now reads one more byte:
if the body has ended it is accepted, and if there is more it is refused with
`ErrResponseTooLarge`, as before.
- 2026-10-13 `fit=outside` no longer makes an output above 8192 on a side
(closes #257): it scales the image to cover the requested size, and the side
scaled past that size was held to no maximum, so `1x8192?fit=outside` of a
+5 -6
View File
@@ -45,15 +45,14 @@ state_dir: ./data
signing_key: "CHANGE_ME_generate_with_openssl_rand_base64_32"
# Hosts that don't require signatures (default: none)
# Every image on an allowlisted host is served to anyone without a
# signature, at any size and in any format, so list only hosts you
# control, where nobody else can put images.
# Use "." prefix for wildcard subdomain matching (e.g., ".example.com" matches "cdn.example.com")
# An entry that is neither a host name nor an IP address (IPv6 without
# brackets), such as one with a port or a "*." wildcard, aborts startup.
allowlist_hosts:
- s3.sneak.cloud
- static.sneak.cloud
- sneak.berlin
- github.com
- user-images.githubusercontent.com
# allowlist_hosts:
# - images.example.com
# Hosts whose pages may not show pixa's images, written as for
# allowlist_hosts. A request to /v1/image/ or /v1/e/ whose Referer header
+26
View File
@@ -92,6 +92,32 @@ func TestGetStringSlice_Empty(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestExampleConfigAllowlistsNoHost loads configs/config.example.yml
// with a real signing key, as Getting Started in README.md has it copied
// and edited, and checks that it allowlists no host: every image on an
// allowlisted host is served to anyone without a signature.
func TestExampleConfigAllowlistsNoHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PIXA_SIGNING_KEY", validTestSigningKey)
examplePath := filepath.Join("..", "..", "configs", "config.example.yml")
sc, err := loadTestConfig(examplePath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to load %s: %v", examplePath, err)
}
c, err := newFromSmartConfig(sc)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s is not a valid config: %v", examplePath, err)
}
t.Logf("allowlist_hosts in %s: %v", examplePath, c.AllowlistHosts)
if len(c.AllowlistHosts) != 0 {
t.Errorf("%s allowlists %v, want no host", examplePath, c.AllowlistHosts)
}
}
// loadTestConfig is a helper to load a config file for testing.
func loadTestConfig(path string) (*smartconfig.Config, error) {
return smartconfig.NewFromConfigPath(path)
+2 -1
View File
@@ -124,7 +124,8 @@ func (s *Handlers) initImageService() error {
s.imgCache = cache
// Background eviction: startup reconciliation, then periodic and
// write-pressure passes. No-op when the disk cache is disabled.
// write-pressure passes, and the removal of expired negative cache
// rows, which is all it does when the disk cache is disabled.
cache.StartEviction(imgcache.DefaultEvictionInterval)
// Writes the counts requests could not write by their deadline
+134
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
@@ -297,6 +298,139 @@ func TestFetchMaxResponseSizeEnforced(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// fetchWithMaxResponseSize serves handler as the fake upstream and fetches
// its /image route with MaxResponseSize set to maxResponseSize.
func fetchWithMaxResponseSize(
t *testing.T,
maxResponseSize int64,
handler http.HandlerFunc,
) *FetchResult {
t.Helper()
srv := httptest.NewServer(handler)
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
cfg := DefaultConfig()
cfg.MaxResponseSize = maxResponseSize
f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, cfg)
res := fetchImage(t, f, "/image")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = res.Content.Close() })
return res
}
// TestFetchContentLengthBodyAtMaxResponseSize checks that a body sent with a
// Content-Length is read whole at exactly MaxResponseSize bytes and refused
// at one byte more.
func TestFetchContentLengthBodyAtMaxResponseSize(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const maxResponseSize = 8
for _, tc := range []struct {
size int
wantErr error
}{
{maxResponseSize, nil},
{maxResponseSize + 1, ErrResponseTooLarge},
} {
t.Run(strconv.Itoa(tc.size)+" bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := strings.Repeat("x", tc.size)
res := fetchWithMaxResponseSize(t, maxResponseSize,
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentTypeJPEG)
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(tc.size))
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, body)
})
if res.ContentLength != int64(tc.size) {
t.Fatalf("ContentLength = %d, want %d", res.ContentLength, tc.size)
}
data, err := io.ReadAll(res.Content)
t.Logf("body of %d bytes: read %d, error %v", tc.size, len(data), err)
if !errors.Is(err, tc.wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("read error = %v, want %v", err, tc.wantErr)
}
if err == nil && string(data) != body {
t.Errorf("read %q, want %q", data, body)
}
})
}
}
// TestFetchChunkedBodyAtMaxResponseSize checks that a chunked body is read
// whole at exactly MaxResponseSize bytes and refused at one byte more. The
// upstream sends the end of the body only once the test has read
// MaxResponseSize bytes, so the read after them comes before the end of the
// body has arrived, as it can from a real upstream.
func TestFetchChunkedBodyAtMaxResponseSize(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const maxResponseSize = 8
for _, tc := range []struct {
size int
wantErr error
}{
{maxResponseSize, nil},
{maxResponseSize + 1, ErrResponseTooLarge},
} {
t.Run(strconv.Itoa(tc.size)+" bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := strings.Repeat("x", tc.size)
endBody := make(chan struct{})
res := fetchWithMaxResponseSize(t, maxResponseSize,
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentTypeJPEG)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, body)
// With no Content-Length, flushing sends the body
// chunked; its end is sent when the handler returns.
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
select {
case <-endBody:
case <-r.Context().Done():
}
})
if res.ContentLength != -1 {
t.Fatalf("ContentLength = %d, want -1 (chunked)", res.ContentLength)
}
head := make([]byte, maxResponseSize)
_, err := io.ReadFull(res.Content, head)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read the first %d bytes: %v", maxResponseSize, err)
}
close(endBody)
rest, err := io.ReadAll(res.Content)
data := string(head) + string(rest)
t.Logf("body of %d bytes: read %d, error %v", tc.size, len(data), err)
if !errors.Is(err, tc.wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("read error = %v, want %v", err, tc.wantErr)
}
if err == nil && data != body {
t.Errorf("read %q, want %q", data, body)
}
})
}
}
func TestFetchSemaphoreReleasedOnError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+21 -2
View File
@@ -660,14 +660,33 @@ func dialSSRFSafe(
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w to %s", errConnectFailed, host)
}
// limitedReader wraps a reader and limits the number of bytes read.
// limitedReader wraps a reader and refuses a body longer than remaining
// bytes with ErrResponseTooLarge. remaining goes below 0 once the body is
// found to be longer.
type limitedReader struct {
reader io.Reader
remaining int64
}
// Read reads at most the remaining bytes. Once they are read, it reads one
// more byte to tell the end of the body from more data: at the end it
// returns the wrapped reader's error, io.EOF; with more data it returns
// ErrResponseTooLarge, as does every later Read.
func (r *limitedReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
if r.remaining <= 0 {
if r.remaining < 0 {
return 0, ErrResponseTooLarge
}
if r.remaining == 0 {
var extra [1]byte
n, err := r.reader.Read(extra[:])
r.remaining -= int64(n)
if n == 0 {
return 0, err
}
return 0, ErrResponseTooLarge
}
+52 -11
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ const httpStatusOK = 200
// variant not among them is served as before, reading its .meta file.
const metaCacheSize = 10000
// cleanExpiredBatchSize is the most expired negative cache rows one
// statement of CleanExpired deletes. Each batch is a statement of its
// own, so a request waits behind one batch at most, however many rows
// have expired.
const cleanExpiredBatchSize = 1000
// CacheConfig holds cache configuration.
type CacheConfig struct {
StateDir string
@@ -50,8 +56,9 @@ type CacheConfig struct {
// DisableDiskCache turns the disk cache off entirely: no cache
// directories are created, lookups always miss, stores are
// no-ops, and no eviction machinery runs. The config layer sets
// this when the operator configures cache_max_bytes: 0.
// no-ops, and the eviction goroutine only removes the expired
// negative cache rows. The config layer sets this when the
// operator configures cache_max_bytes: 0.
DisableDiskCache bool
// Logger receives accounting and eviction log output. A nil
@@ -482,17 +489,27 @@ func (c *Cache) GetSourceContent(
return c.srcContent.LoadWithSize(contentHash)
}
// CleanExpired removes expired entries from the cache.
// CleanExpired removes the negative cache rows past their expiry, one
// batch per statement, until none is left. Once ctx ends it starts no
// further batch and returns ctx's error. The eviction goroutine calls it
// at startup and on every periodic tick, so a row stays about
// NegativeTTL plus one eviction interval, whether or not its URL is
// requested again.
func (c *Cache) CleanExpired(ctx context.Context) error {
// Clean expired negative cache entries
_, err := c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
DELETE FROM negative_cache WHERE expires_at < CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
`)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to clean negative cache: %w", err)
}
for {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return ctx.Err()
}
return nil
deleted, err := c.cleanExpiredBatch(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if deleted < cleanExpiredBatchSize {
return nil
}
}
}
// Stats returns cache statistics.
@@ -756,3 +773,27 @@ func (c *Cache) checkNegativeCache(
return true, nil
}
// cleanExpiredBatch deletes up to cleanExpiredBatchSize negative cache
// rows past their expiry in one statement, and returns how many it
// deleted. DELETE ... LIMIT needs a SQLite build option, so the subquery
// picks the rows.
func (c *Cache) cleanExpiredBatch(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
result, err := c.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
DELETE FROM negative_cache WHERE id IN (
SELECT id FROM negative_cache
WHERE expires_at < CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
LIMIT ?
)
`, cleanExpiredBatchSize)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to clean negative cache: %w", err)
}
deleted, err := result.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to count cleaned negative cache rows: %w", err)
}
return deleted, nil
}
+25 -7
View File
@@ -437,14 +437,16 @@ func (c *Cache) notifyWritePressure() {
}
// StartEviction launches the background eviction goroutine, which
// reconciles the database accounting with the cache directories at
// startup and again on every periodic tick thereafter, and evicts to
// the configured limit on the given periodic interval and on
// write-pressure notifications. It is a no-op on a disabled cache or
// when already started. The goroutine outlives the caller, so it runs
// with its own context, which StopEviction cancels.
// reconciles the database accounting with the cache directories and
// removes the expired negative cache rows at startup and again on every
// periodic tick thereafter, and evicts to the configured limit on the
// given periodic interval and on write-pressure notifications. On a
// disabled cache it only removes the expired negative cache rows, as
// the negative cache is used either way. It is a no-op when already
// started. The goroutine outlives the caller, so it runs with its own
// context, which StopEviction cancels.
func (c *Cache) StartEviction(interval time.Duration) {
if c.disabled || c.evictionCancel != nil {
if c.evictionCancel != nil {
return
}
@@ -480,6 +482,7 @@ func (c *Cache) evictionLoop(ctx context.Context, interval time.Duration) {
defer close(c.evictionDone)
c.runReconciliationPass(ctx)
c.runCleanExpired(ctx)
c.runEvictionPass(ctx)
ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
@@ -500,6 +503,7 @@ func (c *Cache) evictionLoop(ctx context.Context, interval time.Duration) {
// unaccounted for to one interval, on a process that is
// already running this loop regardless.
c.runReconciliationPass(ctx)
c.runCleanExpired(ctx)
case <-c.evictionPressure:
}
@@ -535,6 +539,20 @@ func (c *Cache) runReconciliationPass(ctx context.Context) {
}
}
// runCleanExpired runs CleanExpired, logging a failure instead of
// propagating it (the loop must keep running). It does nothing once ctx
// is cancelled.
func (c *Cache) runCleanExpired(ctx context.Context) {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return
}
err := c.CleanExpired(ctx)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("negative cache cleanup failed", "error", err)
}
}
// reconcileAccounting synchronizes the database size accounting with
// the actual contents of the cache directories. It runs at startup and
// again on every periodic eviction tick thereafter, off the request
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package imgcache
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strconv"
"testing"
"time"
)
@@ -94,6 +95,307 @@ func TestNegativeCache_Expired(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestService_Get_ServesCachedVariantOfNegativeCachedURL caches a variant of
// the test photo, then keeps a failed fetch of the photo's URL in the negative
// cache, as a failed fetch for another variant does once the source has been
// evicted. The cached variant is still served, and a variant not in the cache
// is made from the cached source. Once the source is evicted, a variant not in
// the cache needs a fetch and is refused.
func TestService_Get_ServesCachedVariantOfNegativeCachedURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
resp, err := svc.Get(t.Context(), photoVariant(fixtures, 85, FitCover))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get() first request error = %v", err)
}
_ = resp.Content.Close()
err = svc.cache.StoreNegative(t.Context(), photoVariant(fixtures, 85, FitCover),
httpStatusBadGateway, "upstream answered 503")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StoreNegative() error = %v", err)
}
resp, err = svc.Get(t.Context(), photoVariant(fixtures, 85, FitCover))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get() of the cached variant error = %v", err)
}
_ = resp.Content.Close()
if resp.CacheStatus != CacheHit {
t.Errorf("cached variant CacheStatus = %q, want %q",
resp.CacheStatus, CacheHit)
}
resp, err = svc.Get(t.Context(), photoVariant(fixtures, 40, FitCover))
t.Logf("Get() of a variant made from the cached source: error = %v", err)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Get() of a variant made from the cached source error = %v", err)
}
_ = resp.Content.Close()
contentHash, _, err := svc.cache.LookupSource(t.Context(),
photoVariant(fixtures, 85, FitCover))
if err != nil || contentHash == "" {
t.Fatalf("LookupSource() = %q, %v, want the cached source", contentHash, err)
}
err = svc.cache.evictSourceBlob(t.Context(), contentHash)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("evictSourceBlob() error = %v", err)
}
_, err = svc.Get(t.Context(), photoVariant(fixtures, 60, FitCover))
t.Logf("Get() of a variant whose source was evicted: error = %v", err)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrNegativeCached) {
t.Errorf("Get() of a variant whose source was evicted error = %v, want %v",
err, ErrNegativeCached)
}
}
// TestEvictionLoopRemovesExpiredNegativeCacheRows stores a failed fetch
// that expires a second later and starts the eviction loop with a short
// interval: a later tick must remove its row although its URL is never
// requested again, and must keep a row that has not expired. It runs
// with the disk cache enabled and disabled, as the negative cache is
// used either way.
func TestEvictionLoopRemovesExpiredNegativeCacheRows(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
disableDiskCache bool
}{
{name: "disk cache enabled", disableDiskCache: false},
{name: "disk cache disabled", disableDiskCache: true},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, err := NewCache(evictionTestDB(t), CacheConfig{
StateDir: t.TempDir(),
NegativeTTL: time.Second,
DisableDiskCache: tt.disableDiskCache,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create cache: %v", err)
}
expired := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: testHostExample, SourcePath: "/gone.jpg",
}
err = cache.StoreNegative(t.Context(), expired, 404, "not found")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StoreNegative failed: %v", err)
}
const notExpiredPath = "/later.jpg"
_, err = cache.db.ExecContext(t.Context(), `
INSERT INTO negative_cache
(source_host, source_path, status_code, expires_at)
VALUES (?, ?, 404, datetime('now', '+1 hour'))
`, testHostExample, notExpiredPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to insert a row that has not expired: %v", err)
}
started := time.Now()
cache.StartEviction(100 * time.Millisecond)
defer func() { _ = cache.StopEviction(t.Context()) }()
for negativeCacheRowCount(t, cache, expired.SourcePath) > 0 {
if time.Since(started) > 10*time.Second {
t.Fatal("the expired row is still in negative_cache")
}
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
}
t.Logf("the expired row was removed %s after the loop started",
time.Since(started))
if negativeCacheRowCount(t, cache, notExpiredPath) != 1 {
t.Error("the row that has not expired was removed")
}
})
}
}
// negativeCacheRowCount returns how many negative_cache rows hold
// sourcePath.
func negativeCacheRowCount(tb testing.TB, cache *Cache, sourcePath string) int {
tb.Helper()
var count int
err := cache.db.QueryRowContext(tb.Context(),
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM negative_cache WHERE source_path = ?`,
sourcePath,
).Scan(&count)
if err != nil {
tb.Fatalf("failed to count negative_cache rows: %v", err)
}
return count
}
// TestCleanExpiredDeletesInBatches stores one expired negative cache row
// more than one batch holds, and one row that has not expired. One
// statement must delete one batch and no more, so a request waits behind
// one batch at most; CleanExpired must then remove the expired row left
// over and keep the row that has not expired.
func TestCleanExpiredDeletesInBatches(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, err := NewCache(evictionTestDB(t), CacheConfig{StateDir: t.TempDir()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create cache: %v", err)
}
ctx := t.Context()
insertExpiredNegativeCacheRows(t, cache, cleanExpiredBatchSize+1)
const notExpiredPath = "/later.jpg"
_, err = cache.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO negative_cache
(source_host, source_path, status_code, expires_at)
VALUES (?, ?, 404, datetime('now', '+1 hour'))
`, testHostExample, notExpiredPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to insert a row that has not expired: %v", err)
}
deleted, err := cache.cleanExpiredBatch(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cleanExpiredBatch failed: %v", err)
}
t.Logf("one statement deleted %d of %d expired rows",
deleted, cleanExpiredBatchSize+1)
if deleted != cleanExpiredBatchSize {
t.Errorf("one statement deleted %d rows, want %d",
deleted, cleanExpiredBatchSize)
}
err = cache.CleanExpired(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CleanExpired failed: %v", err)
}
if count := negativeCacheTableRowCount(t, cache); count != 1 {
t.Errorf("negative_cache holds %d rows after CleanExpired, want 1", count)
}
if negativeCacheRowCount(t, cache, notExpiredPath) != 1 {
t.Error("the row that has not expired was removed")
}
}
// TestCleanExpiredRemovesMoreThanOneBatch stores one expired negative
// cache row more than one batch holds and calls CleanExpired once: it
// must remove them all, so it fails if CleanExpired stops after its
// first batch.
func TestCleanExpiredRemovesMoreThanOneBatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, err := NewCache(evictionTestDB(t), CacheConfig{StateDir: t.TempDir()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create cache: %v", err)
}
insertExpiredNegativeCacheRows(t, cache, cleanExpiredBatchSize+1)
before := negativeCacheTableRowCount(t, cache)
err = cache.CleanExpired(t.Context())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CleanExpired failed: %v", err)
}
after := negativeCacheTableRowCount(t, cache)
t.Logf("CleanExpired removed %d of %d expired rows, %d per batch",
before-after, before, cleanExpiredBatchSize)
if after != 0 {
t.Errorf("negative_cache holds %d rows after CleanExpired, want 0", after)
}
}
// TestCleanExpiredStopsOnceContextEnds runs CleanExpired with a context
// that has already ended: it must return the context's error and delete
// no row.
func TestCleanExpiredStopsOnceContextEnds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, err := NewCache(evictionTestDB(t), CacheConfig{StateDir: t.TempDir()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create cache: %v", err)
}
insertExpiredNegativeCacheRows(t, cache, 1)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
cancel()
err = cache.CleanExpired(ctx)
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Errorf("CleanExpired() error = %v, want context.Canceled", err)
}
if count := negativeCacheTableRowCount(t, cache); count != 1 {
t.Errorf("negative_cache holds %d rows, want the expired row kept", count)
}
}
// insertExpiredNegativeCacheRows inserts count negative_cache rows that
// expired an hour ago, each for a different source path.
func insertExpiredNegativeCacheRows(t *testing.T, cache *Cache, count int) {
t.Helper()
for i := range count {
_, err := cache.db.ExecContext(t.Context(), `
INSERT INTO negative_cache
(source_host, source_path, status_code, expires_at)
VALUES (?, ?, 404, datetime('now', '-1 hour'))
`, testHostExample, "/expired/"+strconv.Itoa(i)+".jpg")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to insert an expired row: %v", err)
}
}
}
// negativeCacheTableRowCount returns how many rows negative_cache holds.
func negativeCacheTableRowCount(tb testing.TB, cache *Cache) int {
tb.Helper()
var count int
err := cache.db.QueryRowContext(tb.Context(),
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM negative_cache`,
).Scan(&count)
if err != nil {
tb.Fatalf("failed to count negative_cache rows: %v", err)
}
return count
}
func TestService_Get_ReturnsErrorForNegativeCachedURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+31 -17
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"net/url"
"runtime/debug"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
@@ -129,25 +130,13 @@ func NewService(cfg *ServiceConfig) (*Service, error) {
var ErrNegativeCached = errors.New("request is in negative cache (recently failed)")
// Get retrieves a processed image, fetching and processing if necessary.
// While its source URL is in the negative cache, a cached variant is still
// served and a variant not in the cache is still made from a cached source;
// only a request that needs the source fetched is refused.
func (s *Service) Get(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) (*ImageResponse, error) {
// Propagate AllowHTTP setting to the request
req.AllowHTTP = s.allowHTTP
// Check negative cache first - skip fetching for recently-failed URLs
negHit, err := s.cache.checkNegativeCache(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
s.log.Warn("negative cache check failed", "error", err)
}
if negHit {
s.log.Debug("negative cache hit",
"host", req.SourceHost,
"path", req.SourcePath,
)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", httpfetcher.ErrUpstreamError, ErrNegativeCached)
}
// Check variant cache first (disk only, no DB)
result, err := s.cache.Lookup(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
@@ -218,7 +207,16 @@ func (s *Service) ValidateRequest(req *ImageRequest) error {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid source URL: %w", err)
}
if s.allowlist.IsAllowed(parsedURL) {
// An allowlist entry names no port, so a host followed by ":", with or
// without a port, needs a signature. The port is read from the parsed
// URL, as the fetcher reads it: in an IPv6 address written without
// brackets, such as 2001:db8::1:8443, it is what follows the last ":".
// This is checked here and not in allowlist.IsAllowed, which also matches
// referer_blocklist, where a Referer must be blocked whatever its port.
hostHasPort := parsedURL.Port() != "" ||
strings.HasSuffix(parsedURL.Host, ":")
if !hostHasPort && s.allowlist.IsAllowed(parsedURL) {
return nil
}
@@ -423,12 +421,28 @@ func (s *Service) processFromSourceOrFetch(
// fetchAndProcess fetches from upstream, processes, and caches the result.
// It counts the fetch with the bytes read from upstream, including when
// reading the response or a later step fails.
// reading the response or a later step fails. It fetches nothing while the
// source URL is in the negative cache.
func (s *Service) fetchAndProcess(
ctx context.Context,
req *ImageRequest,
cacheKey VariantKey,
) (*processedVariant, error) {
// Check negative cache - skip fetching for recently-failed URLs
negHit, err := s.cache.checkNegativeCache(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
s.log.Warn("negative cache check failed", "error", err)
}
if negHit {
s.log.Debug("negative cache hit",
"host", req.SourceHost,
"path", req.SourcePath,
)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", httpfetcher.ErrUpstreamError, ErrNegativeCached)
}
// Fetch from upstream
sourceURL := req.SourceURL()
@@ -250,6 +250,97 @@ func TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestService_ValidateRequest_HostWithPortNeedsSignature verifies that a host
// followed by a port, or by a colon with no port, matches no allowlist entry,
// so that a request for it without a signature is refused, while the same
// host with no port is allowlisted.
func TestService_ValidateRequest_HostWithPortNeedsSignature(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, _ := SetupTestService(t,
WithSigningKey(testSigningKey),
WithAllowlist(testHostCDN, "203.0.113.5", "2001:db8::1"),
)
tests := []struct {
host string
allowlisted bool
}{
{testHostCDN, true},
{"cdn.example.com:8443", false},
{"cdn.example.com:443", false},
{"cdn.example.com:", false},
{"203.0.113.5", true},
{"203.0.113.5:8080", false},
{"[2001:db8::1]", true},
{"[2001:db8::1]:8443", false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.host, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: tt.host,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
t.Logf("ValidateRequest() for host %q with no signature: %v",
tt.host, err)
if allowlisted := err == nil; allowlisted != tt.allowlisted {
t.Errorf("host %q served without a signature = %v, want %v",
tt.host, allowlisted, tt.allowlisted)
}
})
}
}
// TestService_ValidateRequest_UnbracketedIPv6PortNeedsSignature verifies that
// an allowlisted IPv6 address written without brackets and followed by a
// port, or by a colon with no port, needs a signature. Go's URL parser, which
// the fetcher uses, reads 2001:db8::1:8443 as the host 2001:db8::1 with the
// port 8443.
func TestService_ValidateRequest_UnbracketedIPv6PortNeedsSignature(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
svc, _ := SetupTestService(t,
WithSigningKey(testSigningKey),
WithAllowlist("2001:db8::1"),
)
for _, host := range []string{"2001:db8::1:8443", "2001:db8::1:"} {
t.Run(host, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: host,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
t.Logf("ValidateRequest() for host %q with no signature: %v",
host, err)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("host %q served without a signature, want refused",
host)
}
})
}
}
func TestService_Get_InvalidFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+13 -2
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
)
@@ -371,11 +372,13 @@ func HashPath(path string) PathHash {
// CacheKey generates a unique key for a request variant.
// Format: sha256(host:path:query:width:height:format:quality:fit_mode)
// The path and query go through escapePercentAndColon, so that a ":" in
// either cannot be taken for the one between them.
func CacheKey(req *ImageRequest) VariantKey {
data := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%d:%s",
req.SourceHost,
req.SourcePath,
req.SourceQuery,
escapePercentAndColon(req.SourcePath),
escapePercentAndColon(req.SourceQuery),
req.Size.Width,
req.Size.Height,
req.Format,
@@ -387,6 +390,14 @@ func CacheKey(req *ImageRequest) VariantKey {
return VariantKey(hex.EncodeToString(h[:]))
}
// escapePercentAndColon returns s with each "%" written as "%25" and each
// ":" as "%3A", so that the result holds no ":".
func escapePercentAndColon(s string) string {
s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "%", "%25")
return strings.ReplaceAll(s, ":", "%3A")
}
// VariantStorage handles key-based file storage for processed image variants.
// Files are stored at: <basedir>/<ab>/<cd>/<cache_key>
// Metadata is stored at: <basedir>/<ab>/<cd>/<cache_key>.meta
@@ -407,6 +407,62 @@ func TestCacheKey(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestCacheKey_ColonOrPercentInPathOrQuery checks that two different source
// URLs whose path or query holds ":" or "%" get different keys.
func TestCacheKey_ColonOrPercentInPathOrQuery(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []struct {
name string
path1, query1 string
path2, query2 string
}{
{
name: "colon moved from path to query",
path1: "/a:b", query1: "",
path2: "/a", query2: "b:",
},
{
name: "colon in path and its percent-encoding",
path1: "/a:b", query1: "",
path2: "/a%3Ab", query2: "",
},
}
for _, tt := range cases {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
key1 := CacheKey(&ImageRequest{
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: tt.path1,
SourceQuery: tt.query1,
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
})
key2 := CacheKey(&ImageRequest{
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: tt.path2,
SourceQuery: tt.query2,
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
})
t.Logf("CacheKey() of path %q query %q = %s", tt.path1, tt.query1, key1)
t.Logf("CacheKey() of path %q query %q = %s", tt.path2, tt.query2, key2)
if key1 == key2 {
t.Errorf("CacheKey() gave path %q query %q and path %q query %q "+
"the same key", tt.path1, tt.query1, tt.path2, tt.query2)
}
})
}
}
// TestVariantStorage_StoreLogsFailedMetaWrite verifies that a .meta write
// that fails is logged at warn and the store still succeeds.
func TestVariantStorage_StoreLogsFailedMetaWrite(t *testing.T) {
+12
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
var (
ErrInvalidPath = errors.New("invalid image path")
ErrMissingHost = errors.New("missing source host")
ErrInvalidHost = errors.New("invalid source host")
ErrMissingSize = errors.New("missing size specification")
ErrInvalidSize = errors.New("invalid size format")
ErrInvalidFormat = errors.New("invalid or unsupported format")
@@ -143,6 +144,17 @@ func parseImageComponents(remainder string) (*ParsedURL, error) {
return nil, ErrMissingHost
}
// A URL reads what comes before "@" as a user name and password, and the
// rest as the host
if strings.Contains(host, "@") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q holds @", ErrInvalidHost, host)
}
// Host names do not depend on letter case, so the allowlist, the upstream
// connection limits, the cache and the signature see one spelling of each
// host
host = strings.ToLower(host)
// Extract query string if present in path
if qIndex := strings.Index(path, "?"); qIndex != -1 {
query = path[qIndex+1:]
@@ -234,6 +234,49 @@ func TestParseImagePath(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestParseImagePath_LowerCasesHost verifies that the host is lower-cased, so
// that every spelling of its letter case is the same host to the allowlist,
// the upstream connection limits and the cache, and that the path keeps its
// case.
func TestParseImagePath_LowerCasesHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := ParseImagePath("CDN.Example.COM/Photos/Cat.jpg/800x600.webp")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseImagePath() error = %v", err)
}
t.Logf("parsed host %q, path %q", got.Host, got.Path)
if got.Host != testHostCDN {
t.Errorf("Host = %q, want %q", got.Host, testHostCDN)
}
if got.Path != "/Photos/Cat.jpg" {
t.Errorf("Path = %q, want %q", got.Path, "/Photos/Cat.jpg")
}
}
// TestParseImagePath_RefusesUserinfo verifies that a host holding "@" is
// refused: a URL reads what comes before the "@" as a user name and password
// and the rest as the host.
func TestParseImagePath_RefusesUserinfo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, input := range []string{
"user@cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp",
"user:password@cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp",
} {
got, err := ParseImagePath(input)
t.Logf("ParseImagePath(%q) = %+v, error = %v", input, got, err)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidHost) {
t.Errorf("ParseImagePath(%q) error = %v, want %v",
input, err, ErrInvalidHost)
}
}
}
func TestParsedURL_ToImageRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+113
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
package signature_test
import (
"errors"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/signature"
)
// TestSigner_Verify_ColonCannotMovePathQueryBoundary checks that a URL
// signed for path "/a:b" with no query does not verify for path "/a" with
// query "b:", a different resource on the same host.
func TestSigner_Verify_ColonCannotMovePathQueryBoundary(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
signer := signature.New(goldenSigningKey)
signed := &signature.Request{
SourceHost: testHost,
SourcePath: "/a:b",
Width: 800,
Height: 600,
Format: testFormatWebP,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: testFitCover,
Expires: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour),
}
signed.Signature = signer.Sign(signed)
replayed := *signed
replayed.SourcePath = "/a"
replayed.SourceQuery = "b:"
t.Logf("signature for path %q query %q: %s",
signed.SourcePath, signed.SourceQuery, signed.Signature)
t.Logf("signature for path %q query %q: %s",
replayed.SourcePath, replayed.SourceQuery, signer.Sign(&replayed))
err := signer.Verify(&replayed)
if !errors.Is(err, signature.ErrInvalid) {
t.Errorf("Verify() of path %q query %q with the signature for "+
"path %q = %v, want %v",
replayed.SourcePath, replayed.SourceQuery, signed.SourcePath,
err, signature.ErrInvalid)
}
}
// TestSigner_EscapedGoldenVectors pins the signature of requests whose path
// or query holds ":" or "%", which are signed with "%" written as "%25" and
// ":" as "%3A". The expected values were computed once, outside pixa, from
// the signed data in each comment.
func TestSigner_EscapedGoldenVectors(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
signer := signature.New(goldenSigningKey)
vectors := []struct {
name string
path string
query string
wantSignature string
}{
{
name: "colon in path",
path: "/photos/a:b.jpg",
// Signed data:
// "cdn.example.com:/photos/a%3Ab.jpg::800:600:webp:1704067200:85:cover"
wantSignature: "WnEpZ7bQp1Zvw8WDatlj2vu-4wYKWE3BFBizV8m__6k=",
},
{
name: "colon in query",
path: testPath,
query: "t=1:2",
// Signed data:
// "cdn.example.com:/photos/cat.jpg:t=1%3A2:800:600:webp:1704067200:85:cover"
wantSignature: "85kRoN8hhr4cCUkEUjNvUsvVYKjYYfWdeffx5TjJjqA=",
},
{
name: "percent in path and query",
path: "/photos/a%20b.jpg",
query: "q=50%",
// Signed data:
// "cdn.example.com:/photos/a%2520b.jpg:q=50%25:800:600:webp:1704067200:85:cover"
wantSignature: "MjDiiRdgXMrsjqPMsENtD4aG1hp1e-a6zy67vKTX4CQ=",
},
}
for _, tt := range vectors {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &signature.Request{
SourceHost: testHost,
SourcePath: tt.path,
SourceQuery: tt.query,
Width: 800,
Height: 600,
Format: testFormatWebP,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: testFitCover,
Expires: time.Unix(goldenExpiresUnix, 0),
}
gotSignature := signer.Sign(req)
t.Logf("Sign() of path %q query %q = %s", tt.path, tt.query, gotSignature)
if gotSignature != tt.wantSignature {
t.Errorf("Sign() = %q, want %q", gotSignature, tt.wantSignature)
}
})
}
}
+17 -6
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
@@ -154,15 +155,17 @@ func (s *Signer) GenerateSignedURL(
// buildSignatureData creates the string to be signed.
// Format: "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration:quality:fit"
// All components are used verbatim (exact match). No normalization,
// suffix matching, or wildcard expansion is performed. Quality and fit
// are the effective transform values, so replaying a signed URL with a
// different quality or fit mode fails verification.
// The path and query go through escapePercentAndColon, so that a ":" in
// either cannot be taken for the one between them; every other component
// is used verbatim. No normalization, suffix matching, or wildcard
// expansion is performed. Quality and fit are the effective transform
// values, so replaying a signed URL with a different quality or fit mode
// fails verification.
func (s *Signer) buildSignatureData(req *Request) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%d:%d:%s",
req.SourceHost,
req.SourcePath,
req.SourceQuery,
escapePercentAndColon(req.SourcePath),
escapePercentAndColon(req.SourceQuery),
req.Width,
req.Height,
req.Format,
@@ -172,6 +175,14 @@ func (s *Signer) buildSignatureData(req *Request) string {
)
}
// escapePercentAndColon returns s with each "%" written as "%25" and each
// ":" as "%3A", so that the result holds no ":".
func escapePercentAndColon(s string) string {
s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "%", "%25")
return strings.ReplaceAll(s, ":", "%3A")
}
// ParseParams extracts signature and expiration from query parameters.
func ParseParams(sig, expStr string) (string, time.Time, error) {
if expStr == "" {