Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak c38f495260 Keep the metrics entry at the top of Completed Steps
check / check (push) Waiting to run
The rebase onto next placed the entry for this change below the one
next gained meanwhile; the TODO.md workflow puts a finished step at
the top.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 10:39:12 +00:00
sneak bf4ae21974 Label requests for a subrouter's own path unmatched in metrics
For /v1 and /v1/, the path the image subrouter is mounted at, chi's
Find answers that path as the pattern without asking the subrouter,
which chi hands the request as / and which has no route there, so the
router answers 404. routePattern now asks the subrouter mounted there
whether it has a route for /, and labels the request "unmatched" when
it has none.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 10:38:40 +00:00
sneak 358f01a2a4 Test that metrics label requests for /v1 and /v1/ unmatched
No route answers /v1 or /v1/, the path the image subrouter is mounted
at, and the router answers both with 404, yet the metrics middleware
labels them "/v1" and "/v1/". The test now sends both and expects them
counted under "unmatched". It fails.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 10:38:40 +00:00
sneak 6ca43e26d7 Label request metrics by route, not by path (closes #254)
The metrics middleware gave the handler label each request's path, so
every new path added series that were never removed, and /metrics
listed encrypted URL tokens. The label is now the pattern of the chi
route the request matches, or "unmatched" for one that matches none.
The metrics library takes the label before calling the handler, so the
middleware asks the router with chi's Find which route matches.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 10:38:40 +00:00
sneak 75ce7a9ea8 Test that metrics label requests by route, not path
The new test sends two paths one route answers and three requests no
route answers through the metrics middleware, and expects the handler
label to hold the route's pattern and "unmatched". It fails: the label
is each request's path, so every new path adds series.

TestMetricsRecordsServedRequest serves its request outside any router,
so it now expects handler="unmatched" where it expected the path
handler="/test", as the owner approved in
#254 (comment).

Middleware gets a metricsRegistry field, nil being Prometheus' default
registry, so the new test can register with a registry of its own:
TestMetricsRecordsServedRequest registers with the default one.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 10:38:40 +00:00
clawbot c23585dd6d Lower-case the image URL's host and require a signature for a port (closes #246)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
With `cdn.example.com` allowlisted, other letter cases and a host with a port also passed the allowlist; each spelling was fetched and cached on its own with its own per-host connection limit, and a port let an unsigned URL reach any port of the host.

The image URL parser now lower-cases the host and refuses one holding `@` with 400. A host followed by `:`, with or without a port (read as Go's URL parser reads it, unbracketed IPv6 included), never counts as allowlisted, so it needs a signature. The host is signed lower-cased, as the URL writes it, so a signature made over an upper-case spelling is refused with 401.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 12:31:14 +02:00
clawbot 5d1e3ea871 Escape : and % in the signed and cached path and query (closes #247)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
The signed data and the cache key joined host, path and query with ":" and no escaping, so path /a:b with no query and path /a with query b: gave the same string: a URL signed for https://h/a:b verified for https://h/a?b:, and the two shared a cached image. Both now write each % in the path and the query as %25 and each : as %3A before joining them. The host never holds / and the path always starts with /, so the joined string reads back one way only. A path and query holding neither character are signed and keyed as before, so the existing known-answer vectors and the README example are unchanged; new vectors cover the escaped cases. Signature Specification in README.md states the escaping.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 09:37:01 +02:00
clawbot 761ade2e36 Accept a chunked upstream body of exactly the maximum size (closes #248)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
Once upstream_max_response_size bytes were read, the fetcher refused the next read without looking for the end of the body. Go's HTTP client returns the end of a body sent with a Content-Length together with its last bytes, but the end of a chunked body can come in a later read, so a chunked body of exactly the limit was refused after it was downloaded whole and the image routes answered 500. Once the limit is used up, the fetcher now reads one more byte: if the body has ended it is accepted, and if there is more it is refused with ErrResponseTooLarge.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 07:44:09 +02:00
clawbot 88e1b1cdfa Allowlist no host in the example config (closes #249)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
The example config allowlisted github.com and user-images.githubusercontent.com, where anyone can put an image, so a deployment set up as Getting Started says served every image there to anyone without a signature. The example now allowlists nothing and shows one commented entry under example.com. README.md says in Getting Started and in "Running under upaas" that every image on an allowlisted host is served without a signature, so an allowlisted host must be one the operator controls. A new test loads the example config and fails if it allowlists any host.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 06:26:23 +02:00
clawbot afb5dc5d0d Refuse a fit=outside size whose output exceeds the maximum (closes #257)
check / check (push) Successful in 15m51s
fit=outside scales the source to cover the requested size, and the side
scaled past it was held to no maximum: 1x8192?fit=outside of a 3000x600
source was resized to 40960x8192 and encoded. resize now refuses such an
output with ErrOutputTooLarge before resizing, so both image routes answer
it 400 with the error a size with one side 0 already gets. The other fit
modes make the requested size or one within it. README.md and TODO.md
say so.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-13 10:44:45 +02:00
clawbot d8760c40a1 Refuse a size whose computed side exceeds the maximum (closes #241)
check / check (push) Successful in 14m47s
A side given as 0 is computed from the source's proportions, and
nothing held it to 8192: 0x8192 of a 3000x600 source was resized to
40960x8192 and encoded. Process now refuses such a size with
ErrOutputTooLarge once it knows the source's dimensions, before the
resize and the encode, and both image routes answer it 400 with the
JSON error body. It is a processing error, not a failed fetch, so it
is never negative-cached. imgcache.MaxDimension is now
imageprocessor.MaxOutputDimension, so the request limit and the output
limit are one value. README.md says it under Routes and Encrypted URLs.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-13 09:44:44 +02:00
23 changed files with 1192 additions and 42 deletions
+34 -6
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,11 @@ make docker
docker run -p 8080:8080 -e PIXA_SIGNING_KEY="$(openssl rand -base64 32)" pixa:latest
```
The example config allowlists no host (`allowlist_hosts`), so pixa serves an
image only for a signed or encrypted URL. Every image on an allowlisted host is
served to anyone without a signature, at any size and in any format, so
allowlist only hosts you control, where nobody else can put images.
A container takes its settings from environment variables (see Configuration
below for the list). Only `PIXA_SIGNING_KEY` is required; if it is unset the
container exits at startup naming the variable. Everything else has a built-in
@@ -115,7 +120,9 @@ What the [upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas) app for pixa needs:
- `PIXA_SIGNING_KEY` (required): secret for signed and encrypted URLs and
login, 32+ characters, for example from `openssl rand -base64 32`
- `PIXA_ALLOWLIST_HOSTS`: upstream hosts served without a signature,
comma-separated
comma-separated; default none. Every image on a listed host is served to
anyone without a signature, so list only hosts you control, where nobody
else can put images.
- `PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES`: disk cache limit in bytes; `0` disables it;
default 75% of (free space + what the cache holds)
- the rest are in the table under Configuration below
@@ -263,6 +270,12 @@ once, is refused with 400.
both optional (values under Signature Specification). Both are part of what is
cached, so each value of either is a separate cached image.
A size with one side `0` has that side scaled to keep the source's proportions,
and is refused with 400 when that side would come out above 8192, the most
either side may be; so is a size with `fit=outside`, which scales the image to
cover the size and so past it on one side, when that side would come out
above 8192.
The source image may be JPEG, PNG, GIF, WebP, AVIF or JPEG XL. The upstream's
`Content-Type` must name its format, and the image's first bytes must match it.
An upstream answering with any other `Content-Type`, SVG included, is refused
@@ -345,7 +358,8 @@ nor change what it asks for.
(`POST /generate`). The format is JPEG XL unless another is chosen; a form
sent with an empty format, or none, also makes a JPEG XL URL. Width and
height both empty or `0` keep the original size; if only one of them is empty
or `0`, that side is scaled to keep the image's proportions.
or `0`, that side is scaled to keep the image's proportions. A URL whose
scaled side would come out above 8192 answers 400.
3. The page shows the URL, `https://<host>/v1/e/<token>/img.<format>`, and when
it expires. `<host>` is the host the page was opened on, and the URL starts
with `http` instead while `debug` is on. The name after the token is ignored
@@ -404,9 +418,14 @@ HMAC-SHA256(secret, "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration:quality:fit"
Where:
- `host` — source origin hostname (e.g. `cdn.example.com`)
- `path` — source path (e.g. `/photos/cat.jpg`)
- `query` — source query string, empty string if none
- `host` — source host as the URL writes it up to the first `/`, in lower case,
keeping an IPv6 address's brackets and any `:` and port after it (e.g.
`cdn.example.com`, `cdn.example.com:8443`, `[2001:db8::1]:8443`)
- `path` — source path (e.g. `/photos/cat.jpg`), with each `%` written as `%25`
and each `:` as `%3A`, so `/photos/a:b.jpg` is signed as `/photos/a%3Ab.jpg`
- `query` — source query string, empty string if none, with `%` and `:` written
as in `path`; neither then holds a `:`, so path `/a:b` with no query and path
`/a` with query `b:` are signed differently
- `width` — requested width in pixels, `0` for original
- `height` — requested height in pixels, `0` for original
- `format` — output format, one of those listed under Routes, with `original`
@@ -456,6 +475,12 @@ entry that is neither a host name (letters, digits, hyphens, underscores and
dots, with at most one leading dot) nor an IP address, such as one with a port
or a `*.` wildcard, aborts startup.
pixa lower-cases the host of a `/v1/image/` URL before anything else uses it, so
`CDN.Example.com` is matched, fetched, cached and counted against
`upstream_connections_per_host` as `cdn.example.com`. Such a URL whose host has
a port, as in `cdn.example.com:8443`, or a `:` with no port, needs a signature
even when the host is allowlisted. A host holding `@` is refused with 400.
### Configuration
Every setting can be given as an environment variable, in a YAML config file
@@ -614,7 +639,10 @@ See `configs/config.example.yml` for all options with defaults.
- **Metrics**: Prometheus, at `/metrics`: generic HTTP request metrics
(duration, response size, requests in flight) and the Go runtime and process
metrics; requests are measured and `/metrics` is served only when
`metrics.username` and `metrics.password` are set
`metrics.username` and `metrics.password` are set. A request's `handler` label
is the pattern of the route it matches, such as `/v1/image/*`, never its path.
Requests that match no route share the label `unmatched`: those the router
answers 404 or 405, and CORS preflights
- **Logging**: stdlib slog
## Entrypoints
+61
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,67 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
# Completed Steps
- 2026-10-15 the request metrics are labelled by route, not by path (closes
#254): their `handler` label was each request's path, so every new path, a 404
or an encrypted URL, added series to the Prometheus registry that were never
removed, and `/metrics` listed every encrypted URL's token. The label is now
the pattern of the chi route the request matches, such as `/v1/image/*`, or
`unmatched` for a request that matches none: one the router answers 404 or
405, or a CORS preflight. The metrics library takes the label before the
request is routed, so the metrics middleware asks the router which route
matches.
- 2026-10-15 the host of a `/v1/image/` URL is lower-cased, and one with a port
needs a signature (closes #246): with `cdn.example.com` allowlisted,
`CDN.Example.com` and `cdn.example.com:8443` passed the allowlist too, and
each spelling was fetched and cached on its own and had connections of its own
under `upstream_connections_per_host`. The image URL parser now lower-cases
the host and refuses one holding `@`, which a URL reads as a user name and
password, with 400. A host with a port, or with a `:` and no port, needs a
signature even when it is allowlisted. That is checked in the image service,
not in `allowlist.IsAllowed`, which also matches `referer_blocklist`, where a
`Referer` is blocked whatever its port. A URL is signed over its host as it
writes it, in lower case, with any IPv6 brackets, `:` and port kept.
- 2026-10-15 a `:` in the source path or query no longer moves where the path
ends and the query begins (closes #247): the signed data and the cache key
joined host, path and query with `:` and no escaping, so a URL signed for
`https://h/a:b` verified for `https://h/a?b:`; the two also shared a cache
key, and whichever was fetched first was served for both. In both, the path
and the query now have each `%` written as `%25` and each `:` as `%3A`; a path
and query holding neither are signed and keyed as before. Signature
Specification in `README.md` says so.
- 2026-10-15 the example config allowlists no host (closes #249): it allowlisted
`github.com` and `user-images.githubusercontent.com`, where anyone can put an
image, so a deployment set up as Getting Started says served those images to
anyone without a signature, at any size and in any format.
`configs/config.example.yml` now leaves `allowlist_hosts` out, with one
commented entry under `example.com`. Getting Started and "Running under upaas"
in `README.md` say that every image on an allowlisted host is served without a
signature, so an allowlisted host must be one the operator controls.
- 2026-10-15 a chunked upstream body of exactly `upstream_max_response_size`
bytes is accepted (closes #248): once the limit was used up, the fetcher's
next read refused the body without looking for its end. Go's HTTP client
returns the end of a body sent with a `Content-Length` together with its last
bytes, but the end of a chunked body can come in a later read, so such a body
was refused after it had been downloaded whole, and the image routes
answered 500. Once the limit is used up, the fetcher now reads one more byte:
if the body has ended it is accepted, and if there is more it is refused with
`ErrResponseTooLarge`, as before.
- 2026-10-13 `fit=outside` no longer makes an output above 8192 on a side
(closes #257): it scales the image to cover the requested size, and the side
scaled past that size was held to no maximum, so `1x8192?fit=outside` of a
3000x600 source was resized to 40960x8192 and encoded. The image processor now
refuses such a size with `ErrOutputTooLarge` before resizing, and both image
routes answer it 400, as for a size with one side `0`. The other fit modes
make the requested size or one within it, so none can go above 8192.
- 2026-10-13 a size with one side `0` no longer makes an output above 8192 on a
side (closes #241): that side is computed from the source's proportions, and
nothing held it to the 8192 a requested side is held to, so `0x8192` of a
3000x600 source was resized to 40960x8192 and encoded. The image processor now
refuses such a size with `ErrOutputTooLarge` once it knows the source's
dimensions, before resizing, and both image routes answer it 400 with the JSON
error body. The refusal is not cached as a failed fetch, so the same source is
still served at other sizes. `imgcache.MaxDimension` is now the image
processor's `MaxOutputDimension`, so the two cannot differ.
- 2026-10-13 the unused cache lifetime is removed (closes #69):
`CacheConfig.CacheTTL`, which pixad set to `DefaultCacheTTL` (24 hours), was
never read, so cached images never expired. The field and the constant are
+5 -6
View File
@@ -45,15 +45,14 @@ state_dir: ./data
signing_key: "CHANGE_ME_generate_with_openssl_rand_base64_32"
# Hosts that don't require signatures (default: none)
# Every image on an allowlisted host is served to anyone without a
# signature, at any size and in any format, so list only hosts you
# control, where nobody else can put images.
# Use "." prefix for wildcard subdomain matching (e.g., ".example.com" matches "cdn.example.com")
# An entry that is neither a host name nor an IP address (IPv6 without
# brackets), such as one with a port or a "*." wildcard, aborts startup.
allowlist_hosts:
- s3.sneak.cloud
- static.sneak.cloud
- sneak.berlin
- github.com
- user-images.githubusercontent.com
# allowlist_hosts:
# - images.example.com
# Hosts whose pages may not show pixa's images, written as for
# allowlist_hosts. A request to /v1/image/ or /v1/e/ whose Referer header
+26
View File
@@ -92,6 +92,32 @@ func TestGetStringSlice_Empty(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestExampleConfigAllowlistsNoHost loads configs/config.example.yml
// with a real signing key, as Getting Started in README.md has it copied
// and edited, and checks that it allowlists no host: every image on an
// allowlisted host is served to anyone without a signature.
func TestExampleConfigAllowlistsNoHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PIXA_SIGNING_KEY", validTestSigningKey)
examplePath := filepath.Join("..", "..", "configs", "config.example.yml")
sc, err := loadTestConfig(examplePath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to load %s: %v", examplePath, err)
}
c, err := newFromSmartConfig(sc)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s is not a valid config: %v", examplePath, err)
}
t.Logf("allowlist_hosts in %s: %v", examplePath, c.AllowlistHosts)
if len(c.AllowlistHosts) != 0 {
t.Errorf("%s allowlists %v, want no host", examplePath, c.AllowlistHosts)
}
}
// loadTestConfig is a helper to load a config file for testing.
func loadTestConfig(path string) (*smartconfig.Config, error) {
return smartconfig.NewFromConfigPath(path)
+8
View File
@@ -255,6 +255,14 @@ func (s *Handlers) respondImageError(
return
}
if errors.Is(err, imageprocessor.ErrOutputTooLarge) {
s.respondError(w, fmt.Sprintf("size too large for the source: the side "+
"computed from its proportions is above %d",
imageprocessor.MaxOutputDimension), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
s.respondError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
+4
View File
@@ -165,6 +165,10 @@ func (s *Handlers) handleImageError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
errors.Is(err, imageprocessor.ErrUnsupportedInputFormat):
s.respondError(w, "unsupported source format",
http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType)
case errors.Is(err, imageprocessor.ErrOutputTooLarge):
s.respondError(w, fmt.Sprintf("size too large for the source: the side "+
"computed from its proportions is above %d",
imageprocessor.MaxOutputDimension), http.StatusBadRequest)
default:
s.log.Error("image request failed", "error", err)
s.respondError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+134
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
@@ -297,6 +298,139 @@ func TestFetchMaxResponseSizeEnforced(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// fetchWithMaxResponseSize serves handler as the fake upstream and fetches
// its /image route with MaxResponseSize set to maxResponseSize.
func fetchWithMaxResponseSize(
t *testing.T,
maxResponseSize int64,
handler http.HandlerFunc,
) *FetchResult {
t.Helper()
srv := httptest.NewServer(handler)
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
cfg := DefaultConfig()
cfg.MaxResponseSize = maxResponseSize
f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, cfg)
res := fetchImage(t, f, "/image")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = res.Content.Close() })
return res
}
// TestFetchContentLengthBodyAtMaxResponseSize checks that a body sent with a
// Content-Length is read whole at exactly MaxResponseSize bytes and refused
// at one byte more.
func TestFetchContentLengthBodyAtMaxResponseSize(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const maxResponseSize = 8
for _, tc := range []struct {
size int
wantErr error
}{
{maxResponseSize, nil},
{maxResponseSize + 1, ErrResponseTooLarge},
} {
t.Run(strconv.Itoa(tc.size)+" bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := strings.Repeat("x", tc.size)
res := fetchWithMaxResponseSize(t, maxResponseSize,
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentTypeJPEG)
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(tc.size))
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, body)
})
if res.ContentLength != int64(tc.size) {
t.Fatalf("ContentLength = %d, want %d", res.ContentLength, tc.size)
}
data, err := io.ReadAll(res.Content)
t.Logf("body of %d bytes: read %d, error %v", tc.size, len(data), err)
if !errors.Is(err, tc.wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("read error = %v, want %v", err, tc.wantErr)
}
if err == nil && string(data) != body {
t.Errorf("read %q, want %q", data, body)
}
})
}
}
// TestFetchChunkedBodyAtMaxResponseSize checks that a chunked body is read
// whole at exactly MaxResponseSize bytes and refused at one byte more. The
// upstream sends the end of the body only once the test has read
// MaxResponseSize bytes, so the read after them comes before the end of the
// body has arrived, as it can from a real upstream.
func TestFetchChunkedBodyAtMaxResponseSize(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const maxResponseSize = 8
for _, tc := range []struct {
size int
wantErr error
}{
{maxResponseSize, nil},
{maxResponseSize + 1, ErrResponseTooLarge},
} {
t.Run(strconv.Itoa(tc.size)+" bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := strings.Repeat("x", tc.size)
endBody := make(chan struct{})
res := fetchWithMaxResponseSize(t, maxResponseSize,
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentTypeJPEG)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, body)
// With no Content-Length, flushing sends the body
// chunked; its end is sent when the handler returns.
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
select {
case <-endBody:
case <-r.Context().Done():
}
})
if res.ContentLength != -1 {
t.Fatalf("ContentLength = %d, want -1 (chunked)", res.ContentLength)
}
head := make([]byte, maxResponseSize)
_, err := io.ReadFull(res.Content, head)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read the first %d bytes: %v", maxResponseSize, err)
}
close(endBody)
rest, err := io.ReadAll(res.Content)
data := string(head) + string(rest)
t.Logf("body of %d bytes: read %d, error %v", tc.size, len(data), err)
if !errors.Is(err, tc.wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("read error = %v, want %v", err, tc.wantErr)
}
if err == nil && data != body {
t.Errorf("read %q, want %q", data, body)
}
})
}
}
func TestFetchSemaphoreReleasedOnError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+21 -2
View File
@@ -660,14 +660,33 @@ func dialSSRFSafe(
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w to %s", errConnectFailed, host)
}
// limitedReader wraps a reader and limits the number of bytes read.
// limitedReader wraps a reader and refuses a body longer than remaining
// bytes with ErrResponseTooLarge. remaining goes below 0 once the body is
// found to be longer.
type limitedReader struct {
reader io.Reader
remaining int64
}
// Read reads at most the remaining bytes. Once they are read, it reads one
// more byte to tell the end of the body from more data: at the end it
// returns the wrapped reader's error, io.EOF; with more data it returns
// ErrResponseTooLarge, as does every later Read.
func (r *limitedReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
if r.remaining <= 0 {
if r.remaining < 0 {
return 0, ErrResponseTooLarge
}
if r.remaining == 0 {
var extra [1]byte
n, err := r.reader.Read(extra[:])
r.remaining -= int64(n)
if n == 0 {
return 0, err
}
return 0, ErrResponseTooLarge
}
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
package imageprocessor
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"testing"
)
// TestImageProcessor_RefusesComputedSideAboveMaximum verifies that a size
// with one side 0, which Process computes from the input's proportions, is
// served when that side comes out at MaxOutputDimension and refused with
// ErrOutputTooLarge when it would be above. A 4096x1 or 1x4096 input given
// 2 for its short side has 8192 for its long side.
func TestImageProcessor_RefusesComputedSideAboveMaximum(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
inputWidth, inputHeight int
size Size
wantErr error
}{
{"width at the maximum", 4096, 1, Size{Height: 2}, nil},
{"width above the maximum", 4096, 1, Size{Height: 3}, ErrOutputTooLarge},
{"height at the maximum", 1, 4096, Size{Width: 2}, nil},
{"height above the maximum", 1, 4096, Size{Width: 3}, ErrOutputTooLarge},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
input := createTestJPEG(t, tt.inputWidth, tt.inputHeight)
result, err := New(Params{}).Process(t.Context(),
bytes.NewReader(input),
&Request{Size: tt.size, Format: FormatJPEG, FitMode: FitCover})
if result != nil {
t.Logf("Process() made %dx%d", result.Width, result.Height)
if max(result.Width, result.Height) != MaxOutputDimension {
t.Errorf("Process() made %dx%d, want a side of %d",
result.Width, result.Height, MaxOutputDimension)
}
}
if !errors.Is(err, tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("Process() error = %v, want %v", err, tt.wantErr)
}
})
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
package imageprocessor
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"testing"
)
// TestImageProcessor_RefusesFitOutsideAboveMaximum verifies that FitOutside,
// which scales the input to cover the requested size and so past it on one
// side, is refused with ErrOutputTooLarge when that side would come out above
// MaxOutputDimension, and otherwise makes the scaled size. A 1024x256 or
// 256x1024 input scaled by 8 has 8192 for its long side.
func TestImageProcessor_RefusesFitOutsideAboveMaximum(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
inputWidth, inputHeight int
size Size
// wantWidth and wantHeight are the output's, 0 for a refusal
wantWidth, wantHeight int
}{
{"width above the maximum", 3000, 600, Size{Width: 1, Height: 8192}, 0, 0},
{"height above the maximum", 600, 3000, Size{Width: 8192, Height: 1}, 0, 0},
{"width at the maximum", 1024, 256, Size{Width: 1, Height: 2048}, 8192, 2048},
{"height at the maximum", 256, 1024, Size{Width: 2048, Height: 1}, 2048, 8192},
{"within the maximum", 3000, 600, Size{Width: 1, Height: 1200}, 6000, 1200},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
input := createTestJPEG(t, tt.inputWidth, tt.inputHeight)
result, err := New(Params{}).Process(t.Context(),
bytes.NewReader(input),
&Request{Size: tt.size, Format: FormatJPEG, FitMode: FitOutside})
if result != nil {
t.Logf("Process() made %dx%d", result.Width, result.Height)
}
if tt.wantWidth == 0 {
if !errors.Is(err, ErrOutputTooLarge) {
t.Errorf("Process() error = %v, want %v", err, ErrOutputTooLarge)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
if result.Width != tt.wantWidth || result.Height != tt.wantHeight {
t.Errorf("Process() made %dx%d, want %dx%d",
result.Width, result.Height, tt.wantWidth, tt.wantHeight)
}
})
}
}
+42 -13
View File
@@ -133,6 +133,16 @@ var ErrInputTooLarge = errors.New("input image dimensions exceed maximum")
// configured byte limit.
var ErrInputDataTooLarge = errors.New("input data exceeds maximum allowed size")
// MaxOutputDimension is the maximum width or height of an output image, and
// so of a requested size (imgcache.MaxDimension).
const MaxOutputDimension = 8192
// ErrOutputTooLarge is returned, before resizing, when the output would have a
// side above MaxOutputDimension: the side of a size with one side 0, computed
// from the input's proportions, or with FitOutside, the side scaled past the
// requested size.
var ErrOutputTooLarge = errors.New("output image dimensions exceed maximum")
// ErrUnsupportedOutputFormat is returned when the requested output format is
// not supported.
var ErrUnsupportedOutputFormat = errors.New("unsupported output format")
@@ -259,8 +269,11 @@ func (p *ImageProcessor) Process(
return nil, ErrInputTooLarge
}
// Determine target dimensions
targetWidth, targetHeight := targetDimensions(req.Size, origWidth, origHeight)
// Determine target dimensions; too large ones are refused before resizing
targetWidth, targetHeight, err := targetDimensions(req.Size, origWidth, origHeight)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Resize if needed
if targetWidth != origWidth || targetHeight != origHeight {
@@ -296,21 +309,29 @@ func (p *ImageProcessor) Process(
// targetDimensions calculates the output dimensions for a requested size,
// scaling proportionally when only one dimension is given and keeping the
// original dimensions when both are zero.
func targetDimensions(size Size, origWidth, origHeight int) (int, int) {
// original dimensions when both are zero. A side scaled proportionally can
// come out above MaxOutputDimension, which is ErrOutputTooLarge.
func targetDimensions(size Size, origWidth, origHeight int) (int, int, error) {
width, height := size.Width, size.Height
switch {
case size.Width == 0 && size.Height == 0:
case width == 0 && height == 0:
// Both are 0: keep original size
return origWidth, origHeight
case size.Width == 0:
return origWidth, origHeight, nil
case width == 0:
// Only height specified: calculate width proportionally
return origWidth * size.Height / origHeight, size.Height
case size.Height == 0:
width = origWidth * height / origHeight
case height == 0:
// Only width specified: calculate height proportionally
return size.Width, origHeight * size.Width / origWidth
default:
return size.Width, size.Height
height = origHeight * width / origWidth
}
if width > MaxOutputDimension || height > MaxOutputDimension {
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: %dx%d is above %d", ErrOutputTooLarge,
width, height, MaxOutputDimension)
}
return width, height, nil
}
// MIME types for the supported image formats.
@@ -441,7 +462,9 @@ func (p *ImageProcessor) detectFormat(imageType vips.ImageType) string {
}
}
// resize resizes the image according to the fit mode.
// resize resizes the image according to the fit mode. With FitOutside one
// side can come out larger than requested; when it would be above
// MaxOutputDimension, resize returns ErrOutputTooLarge without resizing.
func (p *ImageProcessor) resize(
img *vips.ImageRef, width, height int, fit FitMode,
) error {
@@ -489,6 +512,12 @@ func (p *ImageProcessor) resize(
newW := int(float64(imgW) * scale)
newH := int(float64(imgH) * scale)
// The dimension that exceeds the target is held to the maximum too
if newW > MaxOutputDimension || newH > MaxOutputDimension {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %dx%d is above %d", ErrOutputTooLarge,
newW, newH, MaxOutputDimension)
}
return img.Thumbnail(newW, newH, vips.InterestingNone)
default:
+11 -1
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"net/url"
"runtime/debug"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
@@ -218,7 +219,16 @@ func (s *Service) ValidateRequest(req *ImageRequest) error {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid source URL: %w", err)
}
if s.allowlist.IsAllowed(parsedURL) {
// An allowlist entry names no port, so a host followed by ":", with or
// without a port, needs a signature. The port is read from the parsed
// URL, as the fetcher reads it: in an IPv6 address written without
// brackets, such as 2001:db8::1:8443, it is what follows the last ":".
// This is checked here and not in allowlist.IsAllowed, which also matches
// referer_blocklist, where a Referer must be blocked whatever its port.
hostHasPort := parsedURL.Port() != "" ||
strings.HasSuffix(parsedURL.Host, ":")
if !hostHasPort && s.allowlist.IsAllowed(parsedURL) {
return nil
}
@@ -250,6 +250,97 @@ func TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestService_ValidateRequest_HostWithPortNeedsSignature verifies that a host
// followed by a port, or by a colon with no port, matches no allowlist entry,
// so that a request for it without a signature is refused, while the same
// host with no port is allowlisted.
func TestService_ValidateRequest_HostWithPortNeedsSignature(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, _ := SetupTestService(t,
WithSigningKey(testSigningKey),
WithAllowlist(testHostCDN, "203.0.113.5", "2001:db8::1"),
)
tests := []struct {
host string
allowlisted bool
}{
{testHostCDN, true},
{"cdn.example.com:8443", false},
{"cdn.example.com:443", false},
{"cdn.example.com:", false},
{"203.0.113.5", true},
{"203.0.113.5:8080", false},
{"[2001:db8::1]", true},
{"[2001:db8::1]:8443", false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.host, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: tt.host,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
t.Logf("ValidateRequest() for host %q with no signature: %v",
tt.host, err)
if allowlisted := err == nil; allowlisted != tt.allowlisted {
t.Errorf("host %q served without a signature = %v, want %v",
tt.host, allowlisted, tt.allowlisted)
}
})
}
}
// TestService_ValidateRequest_UnbracketedIPv6PortNeedsSignature verifies that
// an allowlisted IPv6 address written without brackets and followed by a
// port, or by a colon with no port, needs a signature. Go's URL parser, which
// the fetcher uses, reads 2001:db8::1:8443 as the host 2001:db8::1 with the
// port 8443.
func TestService_ValidateRequest_UnbracketedIPv6PortNeedsSignature(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
svc, _ := SetupTestService(t,
WithSigningKey(testSigningKey),
WithAllowlist("2001:db8::1"),
)
for _, host := range []string{"2001:db8::1:8443", "2001:db8::1:"} {
t.Run(host, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: host,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
t.Logf("ValidateRequest() for host %q with no signature: %v",
host, err)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("host %q served without a signature, want refused",
host)
}
})
}
}
func TestService_Get_InvalidFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+13 -2
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
)
@@ -371,11 +372,13 @@ func HashPath(path string) PathHash {
// CacheKey generates a unique key for a request variant.
// Format: sha256(host:path:query:width:height:format:quality:fit_mode)
// The path and query go through escapePercentAndColon, so that a ":" in
// either cannot be taken for the one between them.
func CacheKey(req *ImageRequest) VariantKey {
data := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%d:%s",
req.SourceHost,
req.SourcePath,
req.SourceQuery,
escapePercentAndColon(req.SourcePath),
escapePercentAndColon(req.SourceQuery),
req.Size.Width,
req.Size.Height,
req.Format,
@@ -387,6 +390,14 @@ func CacheKey(req *ImageRequest) VariantKey {
return VariantKey(hex.EncodeToString(h[:]))
}
// escapePercentAndColon returns s with each "%" written as "%25" and each
// ":" as "%3A", so that the result holds no ":".
func escapePercentAndColon(s string) string {
s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "%", "%25")
return strings.ReplaceAll(s, ":", "%3A")
}
// VariantStorage handles key-based file storage for processed image variants.
// Files are stored at: <basedir>/<ab>/<cd>/<cache_key>
// Metadata is stored at: <basedir>/<ab>/<cd>/<cache_key>.meta
@@ -407,6 +407,62 @@ func TestCacheKey(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestCacheKey_ColonOrPercentInPathOrQuery checks that two different source
// URLs whose path or query holds ":" or "%" get different keys.
func TestCacheKey_ColonOrPercentInPathOrQuery(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []struct {
name string
path1, query1 string
path2, query2 string
}{
{
name: "colon moved from path to query",
path1: "/a:b", query1: "",
path2: "/a", query2: "b:",
},
{
name: "colon in path and its percent-encoding",
path1: "/a:b", query1: "",
path2: "/a%3Ab", query2: "",
},
}
for _, tt := range cases {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
key1 := CacheKey(&ImageRequest{
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: tt.path1,
SourceQuery: tt.query1,
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
})
key2 := CacheKey(&ImageRequest{
SourceHost: testHostCDN,
SourcePath: tt.path2,
SourceQuery: tt.query2,
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
})
t.Logf("CacheKey() of path %q query %q = %s", tt.path1, tt.query1, key1)
t.Logf("CacheKey() of path %q query %q = %s", tt.path2, tt.query2, key2)
if key1 == key2 {
t.Errorf("CacheKey() gave path %q query %q and path %q query %q "+
"the same key", tt.path1, tt.query1, tt.path2, tt.query2)
}
})
}
}
// TestVariantStorage_StoreLogsFailedMetaWrite verifies that a .meta write
// that fails is logged at warn and the store still succeeds.
func TestVariantStorage_StoreLogsFailedMetaWrite(t *testing.T) {
+17 -2
View File
@@ -7,12 +7,15 @@ import (
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imageprocessor"
)
// URL parsing errors.
var (
ErrInvalidPath = errors.New("invalid image path")
ErrMissingHost = errors.New("missing source host")
ErrInvalidHost = errors.New("invalid source host")
ErrMissingSize = errors.New("missing size specification")
ErrInvalidSize = errors.New("invalid size format")
ErrInvalidFormat = errors.New("invalid or unsupported format")
@@ -20,8 +23,9 @@ var (
ErrPathTraversal = errors.New("path traversal detected")
)
// MaxDimension is the maximum allowed width or height.
const MaxDimension = 8192
// MaxDimension is the maximum allowed width or height, the same as the image
// processor's maximum for an output image.
const MaxDimension = imageprocessor.MaxOutputDimension
// ValidateDimension checks one requested width or height; name ("width" or
// "height") appears in the error. 0 means "original size" and is valid.
@@ -140,6 +144,17 @@ func parseImageComponents(remainder string) (*ParsedURL, error) {
return nil, ErrMissingHost
}
// A URL reads what comes before "@" as a user name and password, and the
// rest as the host
if strings.Contains(host, "@") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q holds @", ErrInvalidHost, host)
}
// Host names do not depend on letter case, so the allowlist, the upstream
// connection limits, the cache and the signature see one spelling of each
// host
host = strings.ToLower(host)
// Extract query string if present in path
if qIndex := strings.Index(path, "?"); qIndex != -1 {
query = path[qIndex+1:]
@@ -234,6 +234,49 @@ func TestParseImagePath(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestParseImagePath_LowerCasesHost verifies that the host is lower-cased, so
// that every spelling of its letter case is the same host to the allowlist,
// the upstream connection limits and the cache, and that the path keeps its
// case.
func TestParseImagePath_LowerCasesHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := ParseImagePath("CDN.Example.COM/Photos/Cat.jpg/800x600.webp")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseImagePath() error = %v", err)
}
t.Logf("parsed host %q, path %q", got.Host, got.Path)
if got.Host != testHostCDN {
t.Errorf("Host = %q, want %q", got.Host, testHostCDN)
}
if got.Path != "/Photos/Cat.jpg" {
t.Errorf("Path = %q, want %q", got.Path, "/Photos/Cat.jpg")
}
}
// TestParseImagePath_RefusesUserinfo verifies that a host holding "@" is
// refused: a URL reads what comes before the "@" as a user name and password
// and the rest as the host.
func TestParseImagePath_RefusesUserinfo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, input := range []string{
"user@cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp",
"user:password@cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp",
} {
got, err := ParseImagePath(input)
t.Logf("ParseImagePath(%q) = %+v, error = %v", input, got, err)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidHost) {
t.Errorf("ParseImagePath(%q) error = %v, want %v",
input, err, ErrInvalidHost)
}
}
}
func TestParsedURL_ToImageRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+54 -3
View File
@@ -8,12 +8,15 @@ import (
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"regexp"
"strings"
"time"
basicauth "github.com/99designs/basicauth-go"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
"github.com/go-chi/cors"
"github.com/go-chi/httprate"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
metrics "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/metrics/prometheus"
ghmm "github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/middleware"
"github.com/slok/go-http-metrics/middleware/std"
@@ -63,6 +66,10 @@ type Middleware struct {
log *slog.Logger
config *config.Config
clientIP *clientip.Resolver
// metricsRegistry is the registry Metrics registers its metrics with.
// nil is Prometheus' default registry, the one /metrics serves.
metricsRegistry prometheus.Registerer
}
// New creates a new Middleware instance.
@@ -209,17 +216,61 @@ func (s *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
})
}
// Metrics returns a Prometheus metrics middleware.
// Metrics returns a Prometheus metrics middleware. Its handler label is the
// pattern of the chi route a request matches, such as /v1/image/*, or
// "unmatched" for a request that matches none, so the routes fix how many
// values the label has. It is never the path, with which any client could
// add series to the registry without limit.
func (s *Middleware) Metrics() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
mdlw := ghmm.New(ghmm.Config{
Recorder: metrics.NewRecorder(metrics.Config{}),
Recorder: metrics.NewRecorder(metrics.Config{
Registry: s.metricsRegistry,
}),
})
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return std.Handler("", mdlw, next)
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
std.Handler(routePattern(r), mdlw, next).ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// routePattern returns the pattern of the chi route r matches, or
// "unmatched" when it matches none or is not served by a chi router. The
// metrics library takes the label before the request is routed, so the
// router is asked which route matches, with the path it routes on:
// r.URL.RawPath when set, else r.URL.Path.
func routePattern(r *http.Request) string {
pattern := ""
rctx := chi.RouteContext(r.Context())
if rctx != nil {
path := r.URL.RawPath
if path == "" {
path = r.URL.Path
}
pattern = rctx.Routes.Find(chi.NewRouteContext(), r.Method, path)
// For the path a subrouter is mounted at, such as /v1 or /v1/, Find
// answers that path without asking the subrouter, which chi hands
// the request as /.
for _, route := range rctx.Routes.Routes() {
if route.SubRoutes != nil &&
route.Pattern == strings.TrimSuffix(pattern, "/")+"/*" &&
!route.SubRoutes.Match(chi.NewRouteContext(), r.Method, "/") {
pattern = ""
}
}
}
if pattern == "" {
return "unmatched"
}
return pattern
}
// MetricsAuth returns a basic auth middleware for the metrics endpoint.
func (s *Middleware) MetricsAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return basicauth.New(
@@ -3,12 +3,15 @@ package middleware
import (
"bytes"
"log/slog"
"maps"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/config"
@@ -198,7 +201,7 @@ func TestMetricsRecordsServedRequest(t *testing.T) {
// The line /metrics shows once one GET /test has been served.
const want = `http_request_duration_seconds_count{` +
`code="200",handler="/test",method="GET",service=""} 1`
`code="200",handler="unmatched",method="GET",service=""} 1`
mw := &Middleware{log: slog.Default(), config: &config.Config{}}
@@ -220,6 +223,86 @@ func TestMetricsRecordsServedRequest(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestMetricsLabelsRequestsByRoute checks that the metrics middleware labels
// each request with the pattern of the route that answers it, never with its
// path: two paths one route answers share that route's pattern, and requests
// no route answers, a 404 or a 405, share "unmatched", among them requests for
// the path the subrouter is mounted at, /v1 and /v1/. With a label per path,
// any client could add series to the registry without limit. The middleware
// registers with a registry of its own here, as another test in this package
// registers with Prometheus' default registry, which can be done only once.
func TestMetricsLabelsRequestsByRoute(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
registry := prometheus.NewRegistry()
mw := &Middleware{
log: slog.Default(),
config: &config.Config{},
metricsRegistry: registry,
}
// The image route is in a subrouter, as in pixa's router.
router := chi.NewRouter()
router.Use(mw.Metrics())
router.Route("/v1", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/image/*", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
})
for _, req := range []struct{ method, path string }{
{http.MethodGet, "/v1/image/a.example.com/one.jpg/1x1.png"},
{http.MethodGet, "/v1/image/b.example.com/two.jpg/1x1.png"},
{http.MethodGet, "/no-such-route"},
{http.MethodGet, "/v1/no-such-route"},
{http.MethodGet, "/v1"},
{http.MethodGet, "/v1/"},
{http.MethodPost, "/v1/image/a.example.com/one.jpg/1x1.png"},
} {
router.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), req.method, req.path, nil))
}
got := requestCountsByHandler(t, registry)
t.Logf("requests counted by handler label: %v", got)
want := map[string]uint64{"/v1/image/*": 2, "unmatched": 5}
if !maps.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("requests counted by handler label = %v, want %v", got, want)
}
}
// requestCountsByHandler returns how many requests the request duration
// histogram in registry counted under each value of its handler label.
func requestCountsByHandler(
t *testing.T, registry *prometheus.Registry,
) map[string]uint64 {
t.Helper()
families, err := registry.Gather()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("registry.Gather() error = %v", err)
}
counts := map[string]uint64{}
for _, family := range families {
if family.GetName() != "http_request_duration_seconds" {
continue
}
for _, metric := range family.GetMetric() {
for _, label := range metric.GetLabel() {
if label.GetName() == "handler" {
counts[label.GetValue()] += metric.GetHistogram().GetSampleCount()
}
}
}
}
return counts
}
// TestLoggingLeavesOutSubmittedSigningKey checks that a login, a POST /
// whose form carries the signing key, leaves no trace of the key in the
// request's log line.
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
package server
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"image/jpeg"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
)
// TestImageProxyRefusesComputedSideAboveMaximum requests sizes of a 3000x600
// and a 600x3000 PNG through both image routes. A size with one side 0, whose
// side computed from the source's proportions would be above 8192, is refused
// with 400 and the JSON error body. The sizes after those refusals are served
// as before, which also shows that a refusal is not cached as a failed fetch of
// the source: orig, a size with both sides given, and a size with one side 0
// whose computed side stays within 8192.
func TestImageProxyRefusesComputedSideAboveMaximum(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The upstream paths of the two sources
const (
widePath = "/wide.png"
tallPath = "/tall.png"
)
wide := encodeTestPNG(t, 3000, 600)
tall := encodeTestPNG(t, 600, 3000)
upstream := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "image/png")
if r.URL.Path == tallPath {
_, _ = w.Write(tall)
return
}
_, _ = w.Write(wide)
}))
t.Cleanup(upstream.Close)
s, _, _ := startImageProxy(t, upstream)
generator, err := encurl.NewGenerator(testSigningKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encurl.NewGenerator: %v", err)
}
tests := []struct {
path string
// size is the size of the /v1/image/ URL, and width and height are
// those of the encrypted URL
size string
width, height int
// wantWidth and wantHeight are the served image's, 0 for a refusal
wantWidth, wantHeight int
}{
{widePath, "0x8192", 0, 8192, 0, 0},
{tallPath, "8192x0", 8192, 0, 0, 0},
{widePath, "orig", 0, 0, 3000, 600},
{widePath, "300x200", 300, 200, 300, 200},
{widePath, "0x300", 0, 300, 1500, 300},
{tallPath, "300x0", 300, 0, 300, 1500},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
token, err := generator.Generate(&encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: upstreamHost, SourcePath: tt.path,
Width: tt.width, Height: tt.height, Format: imgcache.FormatJPEG,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encurl Generate: %v", err)
}
for _, target := range []string{
"/v1/image/" + upstreamHost + tt.path + "/" + tt.size + ".jpeg",
"/v1/e/" + token + "/img.jpg",
} {
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, target, nil))
t.Logf("GET %s: %d, Content-Type %s",
target, rec.Code, rec.Header().Get("Content-Type"))
if tt.wantWidth == 0 {
checkSizeRefused(t, rec)
} else {
checkServedSize(t, rec, tt.wantWidth, tt.wantHeight)
}
}
}
}
// checkSizeRefused checks that rec answers 400 with the JSON error body that
// refuses a size whose side computed from the source's proportions is above
// 8192.
func checkSizeRefused(t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) {
t.Helper()
const wantError = "size too large for the source: " +
"the side computed from its proportions is above 8192"
var body struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
Status int `json:"status"`
}
err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &body)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("status %d, body is not JSON: %v", rec.Code, err)
return
}
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || body.Status != http.StatusBadRequest ||
body.Error != wantError {
t.Errorf("status %d, body %+v, want %d and the error %q",
rec.Code, body, http.StatusBadRequest, wantError)
}
}
// checkServedSize checks that rec answers 200 with a JPEG of wantWidth by
// wantHeight.
func checkServedSize(
t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, wantWidth, wantHeight int,
) {
t.Helper()
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("status %d, want %d; body %s",
rec.Code, http.StatusOK, rec.Body.String())
return
}
served, err := jpeg.DecodeConfig(bytes.NewReader(rec.Body.Bytes()))
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("decoding the served JPEG: %v", err)
return
}
if served.Width != wantWidth || served.Height != wantHeight {
t.Errorf("served %dx%d, want %dx%d",
served.Width, served.Height, wantWidth, wantHeight)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
package server
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
)
// TestImageProxyRefusesFitOutsideAboveMaximum requests sizes with fit=outside
// through both image routes. fit=outside scales the source to cover the size,
// and so past it on one side: a size for which that side would be above 8192
// is refused with 400 and the JSON error body, whether it is the width or the
// height, and a size for which it stays within 8192 is served at the scaled
// size.
func TestImageProxyRefusesFitOutsideAboveMaximum(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The upstream paths of the sources
const (
widePath = "/wide.png"
rowPath = "/row.png"
columnPath = "/column.png"
)
sources := map[string][]byte{
widePath: encodeTestPNG(t, 3000, 600),
rowPath: encodeTestPNG(t, 8192, 1),
columnPath: encodeTestPNG(t, 1, 8192),
}
upstream := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "image/png")
_, _ = w.Write(sources[r.URL.Path])
}))
t.Cleanup(upstream.Close)
s, _, _ := startImageProxy(t, upstream)
generator, err := encurl.NewGenerator(testSigningKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encurl.NewGenerator: %v", err)
}
tests := []struct {
path string
width, height int
// wantWidth and wantHeight are the served image's, 0 for a refusal
wantWidth, wantHeight int
}{
{widePath, 1, 8192, 0, 0},
{rowPath, 1, 8192, 0, 0},
{columnPath, 8192, 1, 0, 0},
{widePath, 1, 1200, 6000, 1200},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
token, err := generator.Generate(&encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: upstreamHost, SourcePath: tt.path,
Width: tt.width, Height: tt.height, Format: imgcache.FormatJPEG,
FitMode: imgcache.FitOutside,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encurl Generate: %v", err)
}
size := fmt.Sprintf("%dx%d", tt.width, tt.height)
for _, target := range []string{
"/v1/image/" + upstreamHost + tt.path + "/" + size +
".jpeg?fit=outside",
"/v1/e/" + token + "/img.jpg",
} {
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, target, nil))
t.Logf("GET %s: %d, Content-Type %s",
target, rec.Code, rec.Header().Get("Content-Type"))
if tt.wantWidth == 0 {
checkSizeRefused(t, rec)
} else {
checkServedSize(t, rec, tt.wantWidth, tt.wantHeight)
}
}
}
}
+113
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
package signature_test
import (
"errors"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/signature"
)
// TestSigner_Verify_ColonCannotMovePathQueryBoundary checks that a URL
// signed for path "/a:b" with no query does not verify for path "/a" with
// query "b:", a different resource on the same host.
func TestSigner_Verify_ColonCannotMovePathQueryBoundary(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
signer := signature.New(goldenSigningKey)
signed := &signature.Request{
SourceHost: testHost,
SourcePath: "/a:b",
Width: 800,
Height: 600,
Format: testFormatWebP,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: testFitCover,
Expires: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour),
}
signed.Signature = signer.Sign(signed)
replayed := *signed
replayed.SourcePath = "/a"
replayed.SourceQuery = "b:"
t.Logf("signature for path %q query %q: %s",
signed.SourcePath, signed.SourceQuery, signed.Signature)
t.Logf("signature for path %q query %q: %s",
replayed.SourcePath, replayed.SourceQuery, signer.Sign(&replayed))
err := signer.Verify(&replayed)
if !errors.Is(err, signature.ErrInvalid) {
t.Errorf("Verify() of path %q query %q with the signature for "+
"path %q = %v, want %v",
replayed.SourcePath, replayed.SourceQuery, signed.SourcePath,
err, signature.ErrInvalid)
}
}
// TestSigner_EscapedGoldenVectors pins the signature of requests whose path
// or query holds ":" or "%", which are signed with "%" written as "%25" and
// ":" as "%3A". The expected values were computed once, outside pixa, from
// the signed data in each comment.
func TestSigner_EscapedGoldenVectors(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
signer := signature.New(goldenSigningKey)
vectors := []struct {
name string
path string
query string
wantSignature string
}{
{
name: "colon in path",
path: "/photos/a:b.jpg",
// Signed data:
// "cdn.example.com:/photos/a%3Ab.jpg::800:600:webp:1704067200:85:cover"
wantSignature: "WnEpZ7bQp1Zvw8WDatlj2vu-4wYKWE3BFBizV8m__6k=",
},
{
name: "colon in query",
path: testPath,
query: "t=1:2",
// Signed data:
// "cdn.example.com:/photos/cat.jpg:t=1%3A2:800:600:webp:1704067200:85:cover"
wantSignature: "85kRoN8hhr4cCUkEUjNvUsvVYKjYYfWdeffx5TjJjqA=",
},
{
name: "percent in path and query",
path: "/photos/a%20b.jpg",
query: "q=50%",
// Signed data:
// "cdn.example.com:/photos/a%2520b.jpg:q=50%25:800:600:webp:1704067200:85:cover"
wantSignature: "MjDiiRdgXMrsjqPMsENtD4aG1hp1e-a6zy67vKTX4CQ=",
},
}
for _, tt := range vectors {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &signature.Request{
SourceHost: testHost,
SourcePath: tt.path,
SourceQuery: tt.query,
Width: 800,
Height: 600,
Format: testFormatWebP,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: testFitCover,
Expires: time.Unix(goldenExpiresUnix, 0),
}
gotSignature := signer.Sign(req)
t.Logf("Sign() of path %q query %q = %s", tt.path, tt.query, gotSignature)
if gotSignature != tt.wantSignature {
t.Errorf("Sign() = %q, want %q", gotSignature, tt.wantSignature)
}
})
}
}
+17 -6
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
@@ -154,15 +155,17 @@ func (s *Signer) GenerateSignedURL(
// buildSignatureData creates the string to be signed.
// Format: "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration:quality:fit"
// All components are used verbatim (exact match). No normalization,
// suffix matching, or wildcard expansion is performed. Quality and fit
// are the effective transform values, so replaying a signed URL with a
// different quality or fit mode fails verification.
// The path and query go through escapePercentAndColon, so that a ":" in
// either cannot be taken for the one between them; every other component
// is used verbatim. No normalization, suffix matching, or wildcard
// expansion is performed. Quality and fit are the effective transform
// values, so replaying a signed URL with a different quality or fit mode
// fails verification.
func (s *Signer) buildSignatureData(req *Request) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%d:%d:%s",
req.SourceHost,
req.SourcePath,
req.SourceQuery,
escapePercentAndColon(req.SourcePath),
escapePercentAndColon(req.SourceQuery),
req.Width,
req.Height,
req.Format,
@@ -172,6 +175,14 @@ func (s *Signer) buildSignatureData(req *Request) string {
)
}
// escapePercentAndColon returns s with each "%" written as "%25" and each
// ":" as "%3A", so that the result holds no ":".
func escapePercentAndColon(s string) string {
s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "%", "%25")
return strings.ReplaceAll(s, ":", "%3A")
}
// ParseParams extracts signature and expiration from query parameters.
func ParseParams(sig, expStr string) (string, time.Time, error) {
if expStr == "" {