3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 0e9949afbc Test blocked_networks on both forms of an IPv6 source host holding IPv4
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
Both image routes: [::203.0.113.5] must answer 403 when blocked_networks
lists ::/96, and [::ffff:203.0.113.5] when it lists ::ffff:0:0/96 or
203.0.113.0/24. The ::/96 and ::ffff:0:0/96 cases fail on this branch:
isBlockedIP matches such an address only by the IPv4 address it holds.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-16 04:06:52 +00:00
sneak 294474a2cd Refuse local-use NAT64 addresses, and IPv4-compatible ones in blocked_networks (closes #299)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
64:ff9b:1::/48 joins the built-in blocked ranges next to 64:ff9b::/96.
isBlockedIP now reads an address in ::/96 as the IPv4 address in its
last four bytes before matching blocked_networks, as it already unmapped
the ::ffff: form. The reading isPrivateIP gained for ::/96 moved into
ipv4CompatibleToIPv4, which both call.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-16 03:43:55 +00:00
sneak 04d9a6bf37 Test the local-use NAT64 range and blocked_networks on IPv6 source hosts
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
Both image routes, with the fetcher pixad builds from the config:
[64:ff9b:1::a00:1] must answer 403, and [::203.0.113.5] must answer 403
when blocked_networks lists 203.0.113.0/24 and must not be refused when
the list is empty. The first two fail on next: both addresses are
fetched.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-16 03:40:53 +00:00
4 changed files with 157 additions and 13 deletions
+9
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,15 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
# Completed Steps
- 2026-10-16 P1 security bug: the check that keeps pixa from fetching internal
addresses refuses the local-use NAT64 range (`64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) as it
refuses `64:ff9b::/96`, and matches an IPv6 address in the IPv4-compatible
form (`::/96`) against `blocked_networks` by the IPv4 address it holds, as it
already matched the mapped form (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) (closes #299). A source
host such as `[64:ff9b:1::a00:1]` was fetched, which on a network that runs
NAT64 on that range reaches the IPv4 address it holds, here `10.0.0.1`; and
with `203.0.113.0/24` in `blocked_networks`, `[::ffff:203.0.113.5]` was
refused but `[::203.0.113.5]` was fetched. Both now answer 403.
- 2026-10-16 P1 security bug: the check that keeps pixa from fetching internal
addresses judges an IPv6 address in the IPv4-compatible form (`::/96`), such
as `::127.0.0.1` or `::10.0.0.1`, by the IPv4 address in its last four bytes
+25 -13
View File
@@ -59,15 +59,17 @@ const (
// builtinBlockedPrefixes are internal or special-use ranges that Go's
// net.IP predicates (IsPrivate, IsLinkLocalUnicast, and the like) do not
// already cover. They are always blocked, in addition to any
// operator-supplied networks. IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses are unmapped
// before matching, so these IPv4 ranges are caught in both forms.
// operator-supplied networks. IPv4-mapped and IPv4-compatible IPv6
// addresses are read as the IPv4 address they hold before matching, so
// these IPv4 ranges are caught in all three forms.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // immutable built-in blocklist
var builtinBlockedPrefixes = []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10"), // RFC 6598 CGNAT / carrier-grade NAT
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.0.0/24"), // RFC 6890 IETF protocol assignments
netip.MustParsePrefix("198.18.0.0/15"), // RFC 2544 benchmarking range
netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b::/96"), // RFC 6052 NAT64 (maps onto IPv4)
netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10"), // RFC 6598 CGNAT / carrier-grade NAT
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.0.0/24"), // RFC 6890 IETF protocol assignments
netip.MustParsePrefix("198.18.0.0/15"), // RFC 2544 benchmarking range
netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b::/96"), // RFC 6052 NAT64 (maps onto IPv4)
netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b:1::/48"), // RFC 8215 local-use NAT64 (maps onto IPv4)
}
// Fetcher errors.
@@ -543,12 +545,8 @@ func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return true
}
// An IPv4-compatible IPv6 address (in ::/96, such as ::127.0.0.1) holds
// an IPv4 address in its last four bytes and is judged as that address
if addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip); ok &&
netip.MustParsePrefix("::/96").Contains(addr) {
return isPrivateIP(ip[12:])
}
// An IPv4-compatible IPv6 address is judged as the IPv4 address it holds
ip = ipv4CompatibleToIPv4(ip)
// Check for loopback
if ip.IsLoopback() {
@@ -607,7 +605,9 @@ func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP, blocked []netip.Prefix) bool {
return true
}
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
// An IPv4-compatible or IPv4-mapped IPv6 address is matched as the IPv4
// address it holds
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ipv4CompatibleToIPv4(ip))
if !ok {
return true
}
@@ -619,6 +619,18 @@ func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP, blocked []netip.Prefix) bool {
})
}
// ipv4CompatibleToIPv4 returns the IPv4 address that an IPv4-compatible IPv6
// address (in ::/96, such as ::127.0.0.1) holds in its last four bytes, and
// any other address unchanged.
func ipv4CompatibleToIPv4(ip net.IP) net.IP {
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
if ok && netip.MustParsePrefix("::/96").Contains(addr) {
return ip[12:]
}
return ip
}
// ssrfSafeDialer validates IP addresses against the built-in blocked ranges
// before connecting. New wraps dialSSRFSafe with the operator-supplied
// blocklist; this entry point enforces the built-in ranges alone.
@@ -14,10 +14,12 @@ import (
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
@@ -183,6 +185,57 @@ func startImageProxy(
return s, db.DB(), stateDir
}
// startImageProxyWithBlockedNetworks starts the components pixad's fx app
// builds, from a config with a fresh state directory and blockedNetworks as
// blocked_networks. Unlike startImageProxy it provides no upstream fetcher, so
// the handlers build the one pixad uses, which checks every address it
// connects to against the built-in blocked ranges and blocked_networks. It
// returns the server with its routes.
func startImageProxyWithBlockedNetworks(
t *testing.T, blockedNetworks []netip.Prefix,
) *Server {
t.Helper()
stateDir := t.TempDir()
cfg := &config.Config{
SigningKey: testSigningKey,
StateDir: stateDir,
DBURL: "file:" + filepath.Join(stateDir, "state.sqlite3"),
BlockedNetworks: blockedNetworks,
// A fetch that gets past the checks and finds nothing at the address
// fails within this time at the latest.
UpstreamFetchTimeout: 2 * time.Second,
// With no connection slots, the fetch would fail before connecting.
UpstreamConnections: config.DefaultUpstreamConnections,
DownstreamTimeout: config.DefaultDownstreamTimeout,
}
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
mw *middleware.Middleware
)
app := fxtest.New(t,
fx.Supply(cfg),
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
database.New,
healthcheck.New,
handlers.New,
middleware.New,
),
fx.Populate(&h, &mw),
)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
s := &Server{config: cfg, mw: mw, h: h}
s.SetupRoutes()
return s
}
// getImage sends a GET for target to s and fails unless it answers 200.
func getImage(t *testing.T, s *Server, target string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package server
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"slices"
@@ -586,3 +587,72 @@ func TestImageRoutesRefuseIPv6SourceHostHoldingInternalIPv4Address(t *testing.T)
t.Errorf("upstream received %q, want no request", got)
}
}
// TestImageRoutesCheckIPv4AddressInIPv6SourceHost requests ipv6SourcePath on
// IPv6 source hosts that hold an IPv4 address, through a /v1/image/ URL with a
// signature and through an encrypted URL, with the fetcher pixad uses.
// [64:ff9b:1::a00:1], in the local-use NAT64 range (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215),
// answers 403. [::203.0.113.5] and [::ffff:203.0.113.5] hold a public IPv4
// address in the IPv4-compatible form (::/96) and in the IPv4-mapped form
// (::ffff:0:0/96). Each answers 403 when blocked_networks lists
// 203.0.113.0/24, and when it lists the range of its own form. When
// blocked_networks is empty [::203.0.113.5] is not refused: the fetcher tries
// to connect to it, finds nothing there, and the request fails with another
// status.
func TestImageRoutesCheckIPv4AddressInIPv6SourceHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
sourceHost string
blockedNetworks []netip.Prefix
wantForbidden bool
}{
{"local-use NAT64 form of 10.0.0.1", "[64:ff9b:1::a00:1]", nil, true},
{"IPv4-compatible form of an address in blocked_networks",
"[::203.0.113.5]",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")}, true},
{"IPv4-compatible form with ::/96 in blocked_networks",
"[::203.0.113.5]",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("::/96")}, true},
{"IPv4-mapped form of an address in blocked_networks",
"[::ffff:203.0.113.5]",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")}, true},
{"IPv4-mapped form with ::ffff:0:0/96 in blocked_networks",
"[::ffff:203.0.113.5]",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("::ffff:0:0/96")}, true},
{"IPv4-compatible form of an address with blocked_networks empty",
"[::203.0.113.5]", nil, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
imageURLs := map[string]string{
"image URL with a signature": signedImageURL(t, tt.sourceHost),
"encrypted URL": encryptedImageURL(t, tt.sourceHost),
}
for route, imageURL := range imageURLs {
t.Run(tt.name+" "+route, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startImageProxyWithBlockedNetworks(t, tt.blockedNetworks)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, imageURL, nil))
t.Logf("GET %s: %d", imageURL, rec.Code)
forbidden := rec.Code == http.StatusForbidden
if tt.wantForbidden && !forbidden {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d; body %s",
rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Body.String())
}
if !tt.wantForbidden && forbidden {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want any other status; body %s",
rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
})
}
}
}