4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot
49398c1f0f Change schema_migrations version from TEXT to INTEGER
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2026-03-19 23:07:06 -07:00
clawbot
2074571a87 Move bootstrap migration INSERT into 000.sql
Per review: the SQL file should be self-contained. 000.sql now
includes both the CREATE TABLE and the INSERT OR IGNORE for recording
its own version. Removed the separate INSERT from Go code in
bootstrapMigrationsTable().
2026-03-19 23:07:06 -07:00
clawbot
2cabd48a8a Remove backwards compat code: no installed base pre-1.0
- Simplify bootstrapMigrationsTable to just check table existence and
  apply 000.sql if missing — no legacy DB detection
- Remove ensureBootstrapVersionRecorded (legacy backfill path)
- Remove applyBootstrapMigration (separate helper, now inlined)
- Remove TestBootstrapMigrationsTable_ExistingTableBackwardsCompat
- Simplify 000.sql header comment
2026-03-19 23:07:06 -07:00
user
48926747a0 Move schema_migrations table creation from Go code into 000.sql
The schema_migrations table definition now lives in
internal/database/schema/000.sql instead of being hardcoded as an
inline SQL string in database.go. A bootstrap step checks
sqlite_master for the table and applies 000.sql when it is missing.
Existing databases that already have the table (created by older
inline code) get version 000 back-filled so the normal migration
loop skips the file.

Also deduplicates the migration logic: both the Database.runMigrations
method and the exported ApplyMigrations helper now delegate to a single
applyMigrations function.

Adds database_test.go with tests for fresh migration, idempotency,
bootstrap on a fresh DB, and backwards compatibility with legacy DBs.
2026-03-19 23:07:06 -07:00
9 changed files with 36 additions and 309 deletions

View File

@@ -67,10 +67,7 @@ hosts require an HMAC-SHA256 signature.
#### Signature Specification
Signatures use HMAC-SHA256 and include an expiration timestamp to
prevent replay attacks. Signatures are **exact match only**: every
component (host, path, query, dimensions, format, expiration) must
match exactly what was signed. No suffix matching, wildcard matching,
or partial matching is supported.
prevent replay attacks.
**Signed data format** (colon-separated):

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
// Package magic detects image formats from magic bytes and validates
// content against declared MIME types.
package magic
package imgcache
import (
"bytes"
@@ -29,20 +27,6 @@ const (
MIMETypeSVG = MIMEType("image/svg+xml")
)
// ImageFormat represents supported output image formats.
// This mirrors the type in imgcache to avoid circular imports.
type ImageFormat string
// Supported image output formats.
const (
FormatOriginal ImageFormat = "orig"
FormatJPEG ImageFormat = "jpeg"
FormatPNG ImageFormat = "png"
FormatWebP ImageFormat = "webp"
FormatAVIF ImageFormat = "avif"
FormatGIF ImageFormat = "gif"
)
// MinMagicBytes is the minimum number of bytes needed to detect format.
const MinMagicBytes = 12
@@ -205,7 +189,7 @@ func PeekAndValidate(r io.Reader, declaredType string) (io.Reader, error) {
return io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(buf), r), nil
}
// MIMEToImageFormat converts a MIME type to an ImageFormat.
// MIMEToImageFormat converts a MIME type to our ImageFormat type.
func MIMEToImageFormat(mimeType string) (ImageFormat, bool) {
normalized := normalizeMIMEType(mimeType)
switch MIMEType(normalized) {
@@ -224,7 +208,7 @@ func MIMEToImageFormat(mimeType string) (ImageFormat, bool) {
}
}
// ImageFormatToMIME converts an ImageFormat to a MIME type string.
// ImageFormatToMIME converts our ImageFormat to a MIME type string.
func ImageFormatToMIME(format ImageFormat) string {
switch format {
case FormatJPEG:

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package magic
package imgcache
import (
"bytes"

View File

@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/allowlist"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imageprocessor"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/magic"
)
// Service implements the ImageCache interface, orchestrating cache, fetcher, and processor.
@@ -22,7 +20,7 @@ type Service struct {
fetcher Fetcher
processor *imageprocessor.ImageProcessor
signer *Signer
allowlist *allowlist.HostAllowList
whitelist *HostWhitelist
log *slog.Logger
allowHTTP bool
maxResponseSize int64
@@ -87,7 +85,7 @@ func NewService(cfg *ServiceConfig) (*Service, error) {
fetcher: fetcher,
processor: imageprocessor.New(imageprocessor.Params{MaxInputBytes: maxResponseSize}),
signer: signer,
allowlist: allowlist.New(cfg.Whitelist),
whitelist: NewHostWhitelist(cfg.Whitelist),
log: log,
allowHTTP: allowHTTP,
maxResponseSize: maxResponseSize,
@@ -278,7 +276,7 @@ func (s *Service) fetchAndProcess(
)
// Validate magic bytes match content type
if err := magic.ValidateMagicBytes(sourceData, fetchResult.ContentType); err != nil {
if err := ValidateMagicBytes(sourceData, fetchResult.ContentType); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("content validation failed: %w", err)
}
@@ -383,7 +381,7 @@ func (s *Service) Stats(ctx context.Context) (*CacheStats, error) {
// ValidateRequest validates the request signature if required.
func (s *Service) ValidateRequest(req *ImageRequest) error {
// Check if host is allowed (no signature required)
// Check if host is whitelisted (no signature required)
sourceURL := req.SourceURL()
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(sourceURL)
@@ -391,11 +389,11 @@ func (s *Service) ValidateRequest(req *ImageRequest) error {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid source URL: %w", err)
}
if s.allowlist.IsAllowed(parsedURL) {
if s.whitelist.IsWhitelisted(parsedURL) {
return nil
}
// Signature required for non-allowed hosts
// Signature required for non-whitelisted hosts
return s.signer.Verify(req)
}

View File

@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ import (
"io"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/magic"
)
func TestService_Get_WhitelistedHost(t *testing.T) {
@@ -153,74 +151,6 @@ func TestService_Get_NonWhitelistedHost_InvalidSignature(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch verifies that
// ValidateRequest enforces exact host matching for signatures. A
// signature for one host must not verify for a different host, even
// if they share a domain suffix.
func TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch(t *testing.T) {
signingKey := "test-signing-key-must-be-32-chars"
svc, _ := SetupTestService(t,
WithSigningKey(signingKey),
WithNoWhitelist(),
)
signer := NewSigner(signingKey)
// Sign a request for "cdn.example.com"
signedReq := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
Expires: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
}
signedReq.Signature = signer.Sign(signedReq)
// The original request should pass validation
t.Run("exact host passes", func(t *testing.T) {
err := svc.ValidateRequest(signedReq)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateRequest() exact host failed: %v", err)
}
})
// Try to reuse the signature with different hosts
tests := []struct {
name string
host string
}{
{"parent domain", "example.com"},
{"sibling subdomain", "images.example.com"},
{"deeper subdomain", "a.cdn.example.com"},
{"evil suffix domain", "cdn.example.com.evil.com"},
{"prefixed host", "evilcdn.example.com"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name+" rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: tt.host,
SourcePath: signedReq.SourcePath,
SourceQuery: signedReq.SourceQuery,
Size: signedReq.Size,
Format: signedReq.Format,
Quality: signedReq.Quality,
FitMode: signedReq.FitMode,
Expires: signedReq.Expires,
Signature: signedReq.Signature,
}
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateRequest() should reject signature for host %q (signed for %q)",
tt.host, signedReq.SourceHost)
}
})
}
}
func TestService_Get_InvalidFile(t *testing.T) {
svc, fixtures := SetupTestService(t)
ctx := context.Background()
@@ -317,17 +247,17 @@ func TestService_Get_FormatConversion(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("failed to read response: %v", err)
}
detectedMIME, err := magic.DetectFormat(data)
detectedMIME, err := DetectFormat(data)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to detect format: %v", err)
}
expectedFormat, ok := magic.MIMEToImageFormat(tt.wantMIME)
expectedFormat, ok := MIMEToImageFormat(tt.wantMIME)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("unknown format for MIME type: %s", tt.wantMIME)
}
detectedFormat, ok := magic.MIMEToImageFormat(string(detectedMIME))
detectedFormat, ok := MIMEToImageFormat(string(detectedMIME))
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("unknown format for detected MIME type: %s", detectedMIME)
}

View File

@@ -43,11 +43,6 @@ func (s *Signer) Sign(req *ImageRequest) string {
}
// Verify checks if the signature on the request is valid and not expired.
// Signatures are exact-match only: every component of the signed data
// (host, path, query, dimensions, format, expiration) must match exactly.
// No suffix matching, wildcard matching, or partial matching is supported.
// A signature for "cdn.example.com" will NOT verify for "example.com" or
// "other.cdn.example.com", and vice versa.
func (s *Signer) Verify(req *ImageRequest) error {
// Check expiration first
if req.Expires.IsZero() {
@@ -71,8 +66,6 @@ func (s *Signer) Verify(req *ImageRequest) error {
// buildSignatureData creates the string to be signed.
// Format: "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration"
// All components are used verbatim (exact match). No normalization,
// suffix matching, or wildcard expansion is performed.
func (s *Signer) buildSignatureData(req *ImageRequest) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%d",
req.SourceHost,

View File

@@ -152,178 +152,6 @@ func TestSigner_Verify(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestSigner_Verify_ExactMatchOnly verifies that signatures enforce exact
// matching on every URL component. No suffix matching, wildcard matching,
// or partial matching is supported.
func TestSigner_Verify_ExactMatchOnly(t *testing.T) {
signer := NewSigner("test-secret-key")
// Base request that we'll sign, then tamper with individual fields.
baseReq := func() *ImageRequest {
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceQuery: "token=abc",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Expires: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour),
}
req.Signature = signer.Sign(req)
return req
}
tests := []struct {
name string
tamper func(req *ImageRequest)
}{
{
name: "parent domain does not match subdomain",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
// Signed for cdn.example.com, try example.com
req.SourceHost = "example.com"
},
},
{
name: "subdomain does not match parent domain",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
// Signed for cdn.example.com, try images.cdn.example.com
req.SourceHost = "images.cdn.example.com"
},
},
{
name: "sibling subdomain does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
// Signed for cdn.example.com, try images.example.com
req.SourceHost = "images.example.com"
},
},
{
name: "host with suffix appended does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
// Signed for cdn.example.com, try cdn.example.com.evil.com
req.SourceHost = "cdn.example.com.evil.com"
},
},
{
name: "host with prefix does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
// Signed for cdn.example.com, try evilcdn.example.com
req.SourceHost = "evilcdn.example.com"
},
},
{
name: "different path does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.SourcePath = "/photos/dog.jpg"
},
},
{
name: "path suffix does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.SourcePath = "/photos/cat.jpg/extra"
},
},
{
name: "path prefix does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.SourcePath = "/other/photos/cat.jpg"
},
},
{
name: "different query does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.SourceQuery = "token=xyz"
},
},
{
name: "added query does not match empty query",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.SourceQuery = "extra=1"
},
},
{
name: "removed query does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.SourceQuery = ""
},
},
{
name: "different width does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.Size.Width = 801
},
},
{
name: "different height does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.Size.Height = 601
},
},
{
name: "different format does not match",
tamper: func(req *ImageRequest) {
req.Format = FormatPNG
},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
req := baseReq()
tt.tamper(req)
err := signer.Verify(req)
if err != ErrSignatureInvalid {
t.Errorf("Verify() = %v, want %v", err, ErrSignatureInvalid)
}
})
}
// Verify the unmodified base request still passes
t.Run("unmodified request passes", func(t *testing.T) {
req := baseReq()
if err := signer.Verify(req); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Verify() unmodified request failed: %v", err)
}
})
}
// TestSigner_Sign_ExactHostInData verifies that Sign uses the exact host
// string in the signature data, producing different signatures for
// suffix-related hosts.
func TestSigner_Sign_ExactHostInData(t *testing.T) {
signer := NewSigner("test-secret-key")
hosts := []string{
"cdn.example.com",
"example.com",
"images.example.com",
"images.cdn.example.com",
"cdn.example.com.evil.com",
}
sigs := make(map[string]string)
for _, host := range hosts {
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: host,
SourcePath: "/photos/cat.jpg",
SourceQuery: "",
Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600},
Format: FormatWebP,
Expires: time.Unix(1704067200, 0),
}
sig := signer.Sign(req)
if existing, ok := sigs[sig]; ok {
t.Errorf("hosts %q and %q produced the same signature", existing, host)
}
sigs[sig] = host
}
}
func TestSigner_DifferentKeys(t *testing.T) {
signer1 := NewSigner("secret-key-1")
signer2 := NewSigner("secret-key-2")

View File

@@ -1,26 +1,25 @@
// Package allowlist provides host-based URL allow-listing for the image proxy.
package allowlist
package imgcache
import (
"net/url"
"strings"
)
// HostAllowList checks whether source hosts are permitted.
type HostAllowList struct {
// HostWhitelist implements the Whitelist interface for checking allowed source hosts.
type HostWhitelist struct {
// exactHosts contains hosts that must match exactly (e.g., "cdn.example.com")
exactHosts map[string]struct{}
// suffixHosts contains domain suffixes to match (e.g., ".example.com" matches "cdn.example.com")
suffixHosts []string
}
// New creates a HostAllowList from a list of host patterns.
// NewHostWhitelist creates a whitelist from a list of host patterns.
// Patterns starting with "." are treated as suffix matches.
// Examples:
// - "cdn.example.com" - exact match only
// - ".example.com" - matches cdn.example.com, images.example.com, etc.
func New(patterns []string) *HostAllowList {
w := &HostAllowList{
func NewHostWhitelist(patterns []string) *HostWhitelist {
w := &HostWhitelist{
exactHosts: make(map[string]struct{}),
suffixHosts: make([]string, 0),
}
@@ -41,8 +40,8 @@ func New(patterns []string) *HostAllowList {
return w
}
// IsAllowed checks if a URL's host is in the allow list.
func (w *HostAllowList) IsAllowed(u *url.URL) bool {
// IsWhitelisted checks if a URL's host is in the whitelist.
func (w *HostWhitelist) IsWhitelisted(u *url.URL) bool {
if u == nil {
return false
}
@@ -72,12 +71,12 @@ func (w *HostAllowList) IsAllowed(u *url.URL) bool {
return false
}
// IsEmpty returns true if the allow list has no entries.
func (w *HostAllowList) IsEmpty() bool {
// IsEmpty returns true if the whitelist has no entries.
func (w *HostWhitelist) IsEmpty() bool {
return len(w.exactHosts) == 0 && len(w.suffixHosts) == 0
}
// Count returns the total number of allow list entries.
func (w *HostAllowList) Count() int {
// Count returns the total number of whitelist entries.
func (w *HostWhitelist) Count() int {
return len(w.exactHosts) + len(w.suffixHosts)
}

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
package allowlist_test
package imgcache
import (
"net/url"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/allowlist"
)
func TestHostAllowList_IsAllowed(t *testing.T) {
func TestHostWhitelist_IsWhitelisted(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
patterns []string
@@ -69,7 +67,7 @@ func TestHostAllowList_IsAllowed(t *testing.T) {
want: true,
},
{
name: "empty allow list",
name: "empty whitelist",
patterns: []string{},
testURL: "https://cdn.example.com/image.jpg",
want: false,
@@ -96,7 +94,7 @@ func TestHostAllowList_IsAllowed(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
w := allowlist.New(tt.patterns)
w := NewHostWhitelist(tt.patterns)
var u *url.URL
if tt.testURL != "" {
@@ -107,15 +105,15 @@ func TestHostAllowList_IsAllowed(t *testing.T) {
}
}
got := w.IsAllowed(u)
got := w.IsWhitelisted(u)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("IsAllowed() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
t.Errorf("IsWhitelisted() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestHostAllowList_IsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
func TestHostWhitelist_IsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
patterns []string
@@ -145,7 +143,7 @@ func TestHostAllowList_IsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
w := allowlist.New(tt.patterns)
w := NewHostWhitelist(tt.patterns)
if got := w.IsEmpty(); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("IsEmpty() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
}
@@ -153,7 +151,7 @@ func TestHostAllowList_IsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestHostAllowList_Count(t *testing.T) {
func TestHostWhitelist_Count(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
patterns []string
@@ -183,7 +181,7 @@ func TestHostAllowList_Count(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
w := allowlist.New(tt.patterns)
w := NewHostWhitelist(tt.patterns)
if got := w.Count(); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("Count() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
}