Read the source host's port from the parsed URL (part of #246)

net.SplitHostPort fails on an IPv6 address written without brackets,
so with 2001:db8::1 allowlisted, 2001:db8::1:8443 and 2001:db8::1:
counted as having no port and were served without a signature, though
the fetcher connects to port 8443. ValidateRequest now takes a host to
have a port when the parsed URL's Port() is set or the host ends in
":", as Go's URL parser and so the fetcher read it.

Model: opus-5-5

README.md

@@ -123,11 +123,8 @@ What the [upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas) app for pixa needs:
       comma-separated; default none. Every image on a listed host is served to
       anyone without a signature, so list only hosts you control, where nobody
       else can put images.
-    - `PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES`: disk cache limit in bytes; `0` disables it. Set
-      it: the volume is a directory on the host's filesystem, shared with the
-      host and every other app, and the default, 75% of the sum of that
-      filesystem's free space and what the cache holds, lets the cache grow to
-      three quarters of the space they all have left.
+    - `PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES`: disk cache limit in bytes; `0` disables it;
+      default 75% of (free space + what the cache holds)
     - the rest are in the table under Configuration below
 - **Health check:** the image's `HEALTHCHECK` requests
   `/.well-known/healthcheck.json`. upaas reads the container's health 60 seconds
@@ -421,7 +418,8 @@ HMAC-SHA256(secret, "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration:quality:fit"
 
 Where:
 
-- `host` — source origin hostname (e.g. `cdn.example.com`)
+- `host` — source origin hostname in lower case, whatever its case in the URL,
+  followed by `:` and the port when the URL has one (e.g. `cdn.example.com`)
 - `path` — source path (e.g. `/photos/cat.jpg`)
 - `query` — source query string, empty string if none
 - `width` — requested width in pixels, `0` for original
@@ -473,6 +471,12 @@ entry that is neither a host name (letters, digits, hyphens, underscores and
 dots, with at most one leading dot) nor an IP address, such as one with a port
 or a `*.` wildcard, aborts startup.
 
+pixa lower-cases the host of a `/v1/image/` URL before anything else uses it, so
+`CDN.Example.com` is matched, fetched, cached and counted against
+`upstream_connections_per_host` as `cdn.example.com`. Such a URL whose host has
+a port, as in `cdn.example.com:8443`, or a `:` with no port, needs a signature
+even when the host is allowlisted. A host holding `@` is refused with 400.
+
 ### Configuration
 
 Every setting can be given as an environment variable, in a YAML config file

TODO.md

@@ -30,12 +30,6 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
 
 # Completed Steps
 
-- 2026-10-15 "Running under upaas" in `README.md` tells the operator to set
-  `PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES` (closes #251): it listed the variable as optional, but
-  under upaas the volume is a directory on the host's filesystem, so the
-  default, 75% of that filesystem's free space plus what the cache holds, let
-  one pixa take three quarters of the space the host and every other app had
-  left. The section now says so. The default is unchanged.
 - 2026-10-15 the example config allowlists no host (closes #249): it allowlisted
   `github.com` and `user-images.githubusercontent.com`, where anyone can put an
   image, so a deployment set up as Getting Started says served those images to
@@ -44,15 +38,17 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
   commented entry under `example.com`. Getting Started and "Running under upaas"
   in `README.md` say that every image on an allowlisted host is served without a
   signature, so an allowlisted host must be one the operator controls.
-- 2026-10-15 a chunked upstream body of exactly `upstream_max_response_size`
-  bytes is accepted (closes #248): once the limit was used up, the fetcher's
-  next read refused the body without looking for its end. Go's HTTP client
-  returns the end of a body sent with a `Content-Length` together with its last
-  bytes, but the end of a chunked body can come in a later read, so such a body
-  was refused after it had been downloaded whole, and the image routes
-  answered 500. Once the limit is used up, the fetcher now reads one more byte:
-  if the body has ended it is accepted, and if there is more it is refused with
-  `ErrResponseTooLarge`, as before.
+- 2026-10-15 the host of a `/v1/image/` URL is lower-cased, and one with a port
+  needs a signature (closes #246): with `cdn.example.com` allowlisted,
+  `CDN.Example.com` and `cdn.example.com:8443` passed the allowlist too, and
+  each spelling was fetched and cached on its own and had connections of its own
+  under `upstream_connections_per_host`. The image URL parser now lower-cases
+  the host and refuses one holding `@`, which a URL reads as a user name and
+  password, with 400. A host with a port, or with a `:` and no port, needs a
+  signature even when it is allowlisted. That is checked in the image service,
+  not in `allowlist.IsAllowed`, which also matches `referer_blocklist`, where a
+  `Referer` is blocked whatever its port. A URL is signed over the lower-cased
+  host.
 - 2026-10-13 `fit=outside` no longer makes an output above 8192 on a side
   (closes #257): it scales the image to cover the requested size, and the side
   scaled past that size was held to no maximum, so `1x8192?fit=outside` of a

internal/httpfetcher/fetch_internal_test.go

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"slices"
-	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
@@ -298,139 +297,6 @@ func TestFetchMaxResponseSizeEnforced(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// fetchWithMaxResponseSize serves handler as the fake upstream and fetches
-// its /image route with MaxResponseSize set to maxResponseSize.
-func fetchWithMaxResponseSize(
-	t *testing.T,
-	maxResponseSize int64,
-	handler http.HandlerFunc,
-) *FetchResult {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	srv := httptest.NewServer(handler)
-	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
-
-	cfg := DefaultConfig()
-	cfg.MaxResponseSize = maxResponseSize
-
-	f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, cfg)
-
-	res := fetchImage(t, f, "/image")
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = res.Content.Close() })
-
-	return res
-}
-
-// TestFetchContentLengthBodyAtMaxResponseSize checks that a body sent with a
-// Content-Length is read whole at exactly MaxResponseSize bytes and refused
-// at one byte more.
-func TestFetchContentLengthBodyAtMaxResponseSize(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const maxResponseSize = 8
-
-	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		size    int
-		wantErr error
-	}{
-		{maxResponseSize, nil},
-		{maxResponseSize + 1, ErrResponseTooLarge},
-	} {
-		t.Run(strconv.Itoa(tc.size)+" bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			body := strings.Repeat("x", tc.size)
-
-			res := fetchWithMaxResponseSize(t, maxResponseSize,
-				func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-					w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentTypeJPEG)
-					w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(tc.size))
-					_, _ = io.WriteString(w, body)
-				})
-
-			if res.ContentLength != int64(tc.size) {
-				t.Fatalf("ContentLength = %d, want %d", res.ContentLength, tc.size)
-			}
-
-			data, err := io.ReadAll(res.Content)
-			t.Logf("body of %d bytes: read %d, error %v", tc.size, len(data), err)
-
-			if !errors.Is(err, tc.wantErr) {
-				t.Fatalf("read error = %v, want %v", err, tc.wantErr)
-			}
-
-			if err == nil && string(data) != body {
-				t.Errorf("read %q, want %q", data, body)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestFetchChunkedBodyAtMaxResponseSize checks that a chunked body is read
-// whole at exactly MaxResponseSize bytes and refused at one byte more. The
-// upstream sends the end of the body only once the test has read
-// MaxResponseSize bytes, so the read after them comes before the end of the
-// body has arrived, as it can from a real upstream.
-func TestFetchChunkedBodyAtMaxResponseSize(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	const maxResponseSize = 8
-
-	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		size    int
-		wantErr error
-	}{
-		{maxResponseSize, nil},
-		{maxResponseSize + 1, ErrResponseTooLarge},
-	} {
-		t.Run(strconv.Itoa(tc.size)+" bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			body := strings.Repeat("x", tc.size)
-			endBody := make(chan struct{})
-
-			res := fetchWithMaxResponseSize(t, maxResponseSize,
-				func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-					w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentTypeJPEG)
-					_, _ = io.WriteString(w, body)
-					// With no Content-Length, flushing sends the body
-					// chunked; its end is sent when the handler returns.
-					_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
-
-					select {
-					case <-endBody:
-					case <-r.Context().Done():
-					}
-				})
-
-			if res.ContentLength != -1 {
-				t.Fatalf("ContentLength = %d, want -1 (chunked)", res.ContentLength)
-			}
-
-			head := make([]byte, maxResponseSize)
-
-			_, err := io.ReadFull(res.Content, head)
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("read the first %d bytes: %v", maxResponseSize, err)
-			}
-
-			close(endBody)
-
-			rest, err := io.ReadAll(res.Content)
-			data := string(head) + string(rest)
-			t.Logf("body of %d bytes: read %d, error %v", tc.size, len(data), err)
-
-			if !errors.Is(err, tc.wantErr) {
-				t.Fatalf("read error = %v, want %v", err, tc.wantErr)
-			}
-
-			if err == nil && data != body {
-				t.Errorf("read %q, want %q", data, body)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
 func TestFetchSemaphoreReleasedOnError(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 

internal/httpfetcher/httpfetcher.go

@@ -660,33 +660,14 @@ func dialSSRFSafe(
 	return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w to %s", errConnectFailed, host)
 }
 
-// limitedReader wraps a reader and refuses a body longer than remaining
-// bytes with ErrResponseTooLarge. remaining goes below 0 once the body is
-// found to be longer.
+// limitedReader wraps a reader and limits the number of bytes read.
 type limitedReader struct {
 	reader    io.Reader
 	remaining int64
 }
 
-// Read reads at most the remaining bytes. Once they are read, it reads one
-// more byte to tell the end of the body from more data: at the end it
-// returns the wrapped reader's error, io.EOF; with more data it returns
-// ErrResponseTooLarge, as does every later Read.
 func (r *limitedReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
-	if r.remaining < 0 {
-		return 0, ErrResponseTooLarge
-	}
-
-	if r.remaining == 0 {
-		var extra [1]byte
-
-		n, err := r.reader.Read(extra[:])
-		r.remaining -= int64(n)
-
-		if n == 0 {
-			return 0, err
-		}
-
+	if r.remaining <= 0 {
 		return 0, ErrResponseTooLarge
 	}
 

internal/imgcache/service.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/url"
 	"runtime/debug"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
@@ -218,7 +219,16 @@ func (s *Service) ValidateRequest(req *ImageRequest) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("invalid source URL: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	if s.allowlist.IsAllowed(parsedURL) {
+	// An allowlist entry names no port, so a host followed by ":", with or
+	// without a port, needs a signature. The port is read from the parsed
+	// URL, as the fetcher reads it: in an IPv6 address written without
+	// brackets, such as 2001:db8::1:8443, it is what follows the last ":".
+	// This is checked here and not in allowlist.IsAllowed, which also matches
+	// referer_blocklist, where a Referer must be blocked whatever its port.
+	hostHasPort := parsedURL.Port() != "" ||
+		strings.HasSuffix(parsedURL.Host, ":")
+
+	if !hostHasPort && s.allowlist.IsAllowed(parsedURL) {
 		return nil
 	}
 

internal/imgcache/service_internal_test.go

@@ -250,6 +250,97 @@ func TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestService_ValidateRequest_HostWithPortNeedsSignature verifies that a host
+// followed by a port, or by a colon with no port, matches no allowlist entry,
+// so that a request for it without a signature is refused, while the same
+// host with no port is allowlisted.
+func TestService_ValidateRequest_HostWithPortNeedsSignature(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	svc, _ := SetupTestService(t,
+		WithSigningKey(testSigningKey),
+		WithAllowlist(testHostCDN, "203.0.113.5", "2001:db8::1"),
+	)
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		host        string
+		allowlisted bool
+	}{
+		{testHostCDN, true},
+		{"cdn.example.com:8443", false},
+		{"cdn.example.com:443", false},
+		{"cdn.example.com:", false},
+		{"203.0.113.5", true},
+		{"203.0.113.5:8080", false},
+		{"[2001:db8::1]", true},
+		{"[2001:db8::1]:8443", false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.host, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			req := &ImageRequest{
+				SourceHost: tt.host,
+				SourcePath: testPathCat,
+				Size:       Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
+				Format:     FormatJPEG,
+				Quality:    85,
+				FitMode:    FitCover,
+			}
+
+			err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
+			t.Logf("ValidateRequest() for host %q with no signature: %v",
+				tt.host, err)
+
+			if allowlisted := err == nil; allowlisted != tt.allowlisted {
+				t.Errorf("host %q served without a signature = %v, want %v",
+					tt.host, allowlisted, tt.allowlisted)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestService_ValidateRequest_UnbracketedIPv6PortNeedsSignature verifies that
+// an allowlisted IPv6 address written without brackets and followed by a
+// port, or by a colon with no port, needs a signature. Go's URL parser, which
+// the fetcher uses, reads 2001:db8::1:8443 as the host 2001:db8::1 with the
+// port 8443.
+func TestService_ValidateRequest_UnbracketedIPv6PortNeedsSignature(
+	t *testing.T,
+) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	svc, _ := SetupTestService(t,
+		WithSigningKey(testSigningKey),
+		WithAllowlist("2001:db8::1"),
+	)
+
+	for _, host := range []string{"2001:db8::1:8443", "2001:db8::1:"} {
+		t.Run(host, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			req := &ImageRequest{
+				SourceHost: host,
+				SourcePath: testPathCat,
+				Size:       Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
+				Format:     FormatJPEG,
+				Quality:    85,
+				FitMode:    FitCover,
+			}
+
+			err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
+			t.Logf("ValidateRequest() for host %q with no signature: %v",
+				host, err)
+
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Errorf("host %q served without a signature, want refused",
+					host)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestService_Get_InvalidFile(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 

internal/imgcache/urlparser.go

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
 var (
 	ErrInvalidPath       = errors.New("invalid image path")
 	ErrMissingHost       = errors.New("missing source host")
+	ErrInvalidHost       = errors.New("invalid source host")
 	ErrMissingSize       = errors.New("missing size specification")
 	ErrInvalidSize       = errors.New("invalid size format")
 	ErrInvalidFormat     = errors.New("invalid or unsupported format")
@@ -143,6 +144,16 @@ func parseImageComponents(remainder string) (*ParsedURL, error) {
 		return nil, ErrMissingHost
 	}
 
+	// A URL reads what comes before "@" as a user name and password, and the
+	// rest as the host
+	if strings.Contains(host, "@") {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q holds @", ErrInvalidHost, host)
+	}
+
+	// Host names do not depend on letter case, so the allowlist, the upstream
+	// connection limits and the cache see one spelling of each host
+	host = strings.ToLower(host)
+
 	// Extract query string if present in path
 	if qIndex := strings.Index(path, "?"); qIndex != -1 {
 		query = path[qIndex+1:]

internal/imgcache/urlparser_internal_test.go

@@ -234,6 +234,49 @@ func TestParseImagePath(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestParseImagePath_LowerCasesHost verifies that the host is lower-cased, so
+// that every spelling of its letter case is the same host to the allowlist,
+// the upstream connection limits and the cache, and that the path keeps its
+// case.
+func TestParseImagePath_LowerCasesHost(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	got, err := ParseImagePath("CDN.Example.COM/Photos/Cat.jpg/800x600.webp")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ParseImagePath() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Logf("parsed host %q, path %q", got.Host, got.Path)
+
+	if got.Host != testHostCDN {
+		t.Errorf("Host = %q, want %q", got.Host, testHostCDN)
+	}
+
+	if got.Path != "/Photos/Cat.jpg" {
+		t.Errorf("Path = %q, want %q", got.Path, "/Photos/Cat.jpg")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestParseImagePath_RefusesUserinfo verifies that a host holding "@" is
+// refused: a URL reads what comes before the "@" as a user name and password
+// and the rest as the host.
+func TestParseImagePath_RefusesUserinfo(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, input := range []string{
+		"user@cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp",
+		"user:password@cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp",
+	} {
+		got, err := ParseImagePath(input)
+		t.Logf("ParseImagePath(%q) = %+v, error = %v", input, got, err)
+
+		if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidHost) {
+			t.Errorf("ParseImagePath(%q) error = %v, want %v",
+				input, err, ErrInvalidHost)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func TestParsedURL_ToImageRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()