Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 4350b1657c Tell upaas operators to set the cache size limit (closes #251)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
"Running under upaas" listed PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES as optional. Under
upaas the volume is a directory on the host's filesystem. The default,
75% of the sum of that filesystem's free space and what the cache
holds, and at least 500 MiB, lets one pixa take three quarters or more
of the space the host and every other app have left, and all of it
when that is 500 MiB or less. The section now says to set it and why.
The default is unchanged.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 08:10:39 +00:00
6 changed files with 15 additions and 177 deletions
+7 -10
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@@ -123,8 +123,12 @@ What the [upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas) app for pixa needs:
comma-separated; default none. Every image on a listed host is served to comma-separated; default none. Every image on a listed host is served to
anyone without a signature, so list only hosts you control, where nobody anyone without a signature, so list only hosts you control, where nobody
else can put images. else can put images.
- `PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES`: disk cache limit in bytes; `0` disables it; - `PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES`: disk cache limit in bytes; `0` disables it. Set
default 75% of (free space + what the cache holds) it: the volume is a directory on the host's filesystem, shared with the
host and every other app. The default is 75% of the sum of that
filesystem's free space and what the cache holds, and at least 500 MiB, so
the cache can grow to three quarters or more of the space they all have
left, and to all of it when that is 500 MiB or less.
- the rest are in the table under Configuration below - the rest are in the table under Configuration below
- **Health check:** the image's `HEALTHCHECK` requests - **Health check:** the image's `HEALTHCHECK` requests
`/.well-known/healthcheck.json`. upaas reads the container's health 60 seconds `/.well-known/healthcheck.json`. upaas reads the container's health 60 seconds
@@ -418,8 +422,7 @@ HMAC-SHA256(secret, "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration:quality:fit"
Where: Where:
- `host` — source origin hostname in lower case, whatever its case in the URL, - `host` — source origin hostname (e.g. `cdn.example.com`)
followed by `:` and the port when the URL has one (e.g. `cdn.example.com`)
- `path` — source path (e.g. `/photos/cat.jpg`), with each `%` written as `%25` - `path` — source path (e.g. `/photos/cat.jpg`), with each `%` written as `%25`
and each `:` as `%3A`, so `/photos/a:b.jpg` is signed as `/photos/a%3Ab.jpg` and each `:` as `%3A`, so `/photos/a:b.jpg` is signed as `/photos/a%3Ab.jpg`
- `query` — source query string, empty string if none, with `%` and `:` written - `query` — source query string, empty string if none, with `%` and `:` written
@@ -474,12 +477,6 @@ entry that is neither a host name (letters, digits, hyphens, underscores and
dots, with at most one leading dot) nor an IP address, such as one with a port dots, with at most one leading dot) nor an IP address, such as one with a port
or a `*.` wildcard, aborts startup. or a `*.` wildcard, aborts startup.
pixa lower-cases the host of a `/v1/image/` URL before anything else uses it, so
`CDN.Example.com` is matched, fetched, cached and counted against
`upstream_connections_per_host` as `cdn.example.com`. Such a URL whose host has
a port, as in `cdn.example.com:8443`, or a `:` with no port, needs a signature
even when the host is allowlisted. A host holding `@` is refused with 400.
### Configuration ### Configuration
Every setting can be given as an environment variable, in a YAML config file Every setting can be given as an environment variable, in a YAML config file
+7 -11
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@@ -30,17 +30,13 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
# Completed Steps # Completed Steps
- 2026-10-15 the host of a `/v1/image/` URL is lower-cased, and one with a port - 2026-10-15 "Running under upaas" in `README.md` tells the operator to set
needs a signature (closes #246): with `cdn.example.com` allowlisted, `PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES` (closes #251): it listed the variable as optional, but
`CDN.Example.com` and `cdn.example.com:8443` passed the allowlist too, and under upaas the volume is a directory on the host's filesystem. The default,
each spelling was fetched and cached on its own and had connections of its own 75% of the sum of that filesystem's free space and what the cache holds, and
under `upstream_connections_per_host`. The image URL parser now lower-cases at least 500 MiB, let one pixa take three quarters or more of the space the
the host and refuses one holding `@`, which a URL reads as a user name and host and every other app had left, and all of it when that was 500 MiB or
password, with 400. A host with a port, or with a `:` and no port, needs a less. The section now says so. The default is unchanged.
signature even when it is allowlisted. That is checked in the image service,
not in `allowlist.IsAllowed`, which also matches `referer_blocklist`, where a
`Referer` is blocked whatever its port. A URL is signed over the lower-cased
host.
- 2026-10-15 a `:` in the source path or query no longer moves where the path - 2026-10-15 a `:` in the source path or query no longer moves where the path
ends and the query begins (closes #247): the signed data and the cache key ends and the query begins (closes #247): the signed data and the cache key
joined host, path and query with `:` and no escaping, so a URL signed for joined host, path and query with `:` and no escaping, so a URL signed for
+1 -11
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@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
"log/slog" "log/slog"
"net/url" "net/url"
"runtime/debug" "runtime/debug"
"strings"
"time" "time"
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize" "github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
@@ -219,16 +218,7 @@ func (s *Service) ValidateRequest(req *ImageRequest) error {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid source URL: %w", err) return fmt.Errorf("invalid source URL: %w", err)
} }
// An allowlist entry names no port, so a host followed by ":", with or if s.allowlist.IsAllowed(parsedURL) {
// without a port, needs a signature. The port is read from the parsed
// URL, as the fetcher reads it: in an IPv6 address written without
// brackets, such as 2001:db8::1:8443, it is what follows the last ":".
// This is checked here and not in allowlist.IsAllowed, which also matches
// referer_blocklist, where a Referer must be blocked whatever its port.
hostHasPort := parsedURL.Port() != "" ||
strings.HasSuffix(parsedURL.Host, ":")
if !hostHasPort && s.allowlist.IsAllowed(parsedURL) {
return nil return nil
} }
@@ -250,97 +250,6 @@ func TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
// TestService_ValidateRequest_HostWithPortNeedsSignature verifies that a host
// followed by a port, or by a colon with no port, matches no allowlist entry,
// so that a request for it without a signature is refused, while the same
// host with no port is allowlisted.
func TestService_ValidateRequest_HostWithPortNeedsSignature(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
svc, _ := SetupTestService(t,
WithSigningKey(testSigningKey),
WithAllowlist(testHostCDN, "203.0.113.5", "2001:db8::1"),
)
tests := []struct {
host string
allowlisted bool
}{
{testHostCDN, true},
{"cdn.example.com:8443", false},
{"cdn.example.com:443", false},
{"cdn.example.com:", false},
{"203.0.113.5", true},
{"203.0.113.5:8080", false},
{"[2001:db8::1]", true},
{"[2001:db8::1]:8443", false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.host, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: tt.host,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
t.Logf("ValidateRequest() for host %q with no signature: %v",
tt.host, err)
if allowlisted := err == nil; allowlisted != tt.allowlisted {
t.Errorf("host %q served without a signature = %v, want %v",
tt.host, allowlisted, tt.allowlisted)
}
})
}
}
// TestService_ValidateRequest_UnbracketedIPv6PortNeedsSignature verifies that
// an allowlisted IPv6 address written without brackets and followed by a
// port, or by a colon with no port, needs a signature. Go's URL parser, which
// the fetcher uses, reads 2001:db8::1:8443 as the host 2001:db8::1 with the
// port 8443.
func TestService_ValidateRequest_UnbracketedIPv6PortNeedsSignature(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
svc, _ := SetupTestService(t,
WithSigningKey(testSigningKey),
WithAllowlist("2001:db8::1"),
)
for _, host := range []string{"2001:db8::1:8443", "2001:db8::1:"} {
t.Run(host, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
req := &ImageRequest{
SourceHost: host,
SourcePath: testPathCat,
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: FormatJPEG,
Quality: 85,
FitMode: FitCover,
}
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
t.Logf("ValidateRequest() for host %q with no signature: %v",
host, err)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("host %q served without a signature, want refused",
host)
}
})
}
}
func TestService_Get_InvalidFile(t *testing.T) { func TestService_Get_InvalidFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
-11
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@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import (
var ( var (
ErrInvalidPath = errors.New("invalid image path") ErrInvalidPath = errors.New("invalid image path")
ErrMissingHost = errors.New("missing source host") ErrMissingHost = errors.New("missing source host")
ErrInvalidHost = errors.New("invalid source host")
ErrMissingSize = errors.New("missing size specification") ErrMissingSize = errors.New("missing size specification")
ErrInvalidSize = errors.New("invalid size format") ErrInvalidSize = errors.New("invalid size format")
ErrInvalidFormat = errors.New("invalid or unsupported format") ErrInvalidFormat = errors.New("invalid or unsupported format")
@@ -144,16 +143,6 @@ func parseImageComponents(remainder string) (*ParsedURL, error) {
return nil, ErrMissingHost return nil, ErrMissingHost
} }
// A URL reads what comes before "@" as a user name and password, and the
// rest as the host
if strings.Contains(host, "@") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q holds @", ErrInvalidHost, host)
}
// Host names do not depend on letter case, so the allowlist, the upstream
// connection limits and the cache see one spelling of each host
host = strings.ToLower(host)
// Extract query string if present in path // Extract query string if present in path
if qIndex := strings.Index(path, "?"); qIndex != -1 { if qIndex := strings.Index(path, "?"); qIndex != -1 {
query = path[qIndex+1:] query = path[qIndex+1:]
@@ -234,49 +234,6 @@ func TestParseImagePath(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
// TestParseImagePath_LowerCasesHost verifies that the host is lower-cased, so
// that every spelling of its letter case is the same host to the allowlist,
// the upstream connection limits and the cache, and that the path keeps its
// case.
func TestParseImagePath_LowerCasesHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got, err := ParseImagePath("CDN.Example.COM/Photos/Cat.jpg/800x600.webp")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseImagePath() error = %v", err)
}
t.Logf("parsed host %q, path %q", got.Host, got.Path)
if got.Host != testHostCDN {
t.Errorf("Host = %q, want %q", got.Host, testHostCDN)
}
if got.Path != "/Photos/Cat.jpg" {
t.Errorf("Path = %q, want %q", got.Path, "/Photos/Cat.jpg")
}
}
// TestParseImagePath_RefusesUserinfo verifies that a host holding "@" is
// refused: a URL reads what comes before the "@" as a user name and password
// and the rest as the host.
func TestParseImagePath_RefusesUserinfo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, input := range []string{
"user@cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp",
"user:password@cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp",
} {
got, err := ParseImagePath(input)
t.Logf("ParseImagePath(%q) = %+v, error = %v", input, got, err)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidHost) {
t.Errorf("ParseImagePath(%q) error = %v, want %v",
input, err, ErrInvalidHost)
}
}
}
func TestParsedURL_ToImageRequest(t *testing.T) { func TestParsedURL_ToImageRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()