Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot d98d4dc119 Test a fetch whose context ends waiting for a shared connection
check / check (push) Successful in 11m43s
A fetch from a host with nothing open waits for the connection shared by
all hosts, and its context ends long before the wait timeout; once every
response is closed, no semaphore may be left in hostSems.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-04 03:47:37 +00:00
clawbot c9867d801a Remove idle host semaphores and delete .meta with its variant (closes #87)
Each upstream host's semaphore now counts the fetches holding or waiting
for one of its slots, and is removed from hostSems when the last of them
gives its slot back or stops waiting, so a long-running pixad no longer
keeps one semaphore per host it ever fetched from. The semLen test helper
reads hostSems directly, as getHostSemaphore now counts its caller.

VariantStorage.Delete removes the variant's .meta file too, a missing one
not being an error; DeleteWithMeta, which eviction called for that, is
gone.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-04 03:43:09 +00:00
clawbot 96be48f127 Test that idle host semaphores and .meta files are removed
New tests, failing before the fix: fetches from many hosts, and fetches
that end without a connection, must leave no semaphore in hostSems once
they finish; VariantStorage.Delete must remove the variant's .meta file,
and must succeed when that file is already missing.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-04 03:42:53 +00:00
34 changed files with 477 additions and 2242 deletions
+22 -217
View File
@@ -34,66 +34,6 @@ else has a built-in default. A config file mounted at `/etc/pixa/config.yml`
is optional: it is read when present, and an environment variable wins over
the same setting in it.
## Deployment
pixa listens on plain HTTP and runs behind a reverse proxy that terminates TLS.
[`configs/Caddyfile`](configs/Caddyfile) is an example for Caddy, chosen because
it is the smallest correct one: Caddy gets the TLS certificate itself and does
everything in this list without further settings. The reverse proxy must:
- terminate TLS, as the login and generator pages work only over HTTPS (see
Routes);
- pass the `Host`, `Origin` and `Referer` headers on unchanged, as pixa refuses
a form from those pages unless `Origin` or `Referer` names the host in `Host`,
and builds encrypted URLs from `Host`;
- set `X-Forwarded-For` to the client's address, with `trusted_proxies` set to
the address pixa sees the proxy's requests come from, so the login limit
counts each client by its own address (see `trusted_proxies` under
Configuration);
- wait for pixa's answer for at least `downstream_timeout` (default `60s`), the
longest pixa takes to fetch, convert and send an image.
It may also refuse `/metrics`, as the example does, so that only a scraper that
reaches pixa directly can read it; pixa itself asks for the metrics username and
password there.
pixa does the rest itself: it checks signatures and encrypted URLs, applies the
allowlist, refuses upstream hosts with private or local addresses, limits login
attempts, upstream response size and image dimensions, and sends the security
headers, `Strict-Transport-Security` included, with every response.
The state directory (`state_dir`, `/var/lib/pixa` in the container) holds the
database and the disk cache:
- It needs a persistent volume: without one, every restart starts with an empty
cache. In the container, the startup script gives the directory to the user
pixa runs as (uid 65532) and sets its mode to `750`; outside it, that user
must be able to write the directory.
- `cache_max_bytes` limits the source and transformed images together. The
database, the metadata files, the `.meta` file beside each transformed image
and files still being written come on top, and eviction runs in the
background, so the cache can pass the limit for a while: leave room on the
volume beyond it.
- Set `cache_max_bytes` for a lasting deployment. Its default, worked out each
time pixa starts, is 75% of the sum of the space free on the volume and the
space the cached images already take, so a restart keeps the limit the cache
had, but anything else that fills or frees space on the volume moves it.
A load balancer's health check can request `/.well-known/healthcheck.json`,
which answers 200 whenever pixa is running, in maintenance mode too (see
`maintenance_mode`).
On SIGTERM or SIGINT pixa stops accepting connections, gives the requests in
progress and the images being processed 5 seconds to finish, and exits: with 0,
or with 1 when images were still being processed after those 5 seconds or
another part of pixa failed to stop. A request not finished by then is cut off.
`docker stop` waits 10 seconds before it kills the container.
Outside Docker, pixa needs libvips (the image has 8.15) and libheif to run, as
it uses libvips through CGO; building it also needs their development files,
`pkg-config` and a C compiler. `script/bootstrap` installs all of these with
nix, apt, brew or apk.
## Running under upaas
What the [upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas) app for pixa needs:
@@ -109,7 +49,7 @@ What the [upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas) app for pixa needs:
- `PIXA_ALLOWLIST_HOSTS`: upstream hosts served without a signature,
comma-separated
- `PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES`: disk cache limit in bytes; `0` disables it;
default 75% of (free space + what the cache holds)
default 75% of free space
- the rest are in the table under Configuration below
- **Health check:** the image's `HEALTHCHECK` requests
`/.well-known/healthcheck.json`. upaas reads the container's health 60
@@ -131,17 +71,13 @@ prevent abuse, and allowlisted source hosts for open access.
### Storage
- **Source content**:
`<state_dir>/cache/sources/<ab>/<cd>/<sha256 of source content>`
`<statedir>/cache/src-content/<ab>/<cd>/<sha256 of source content>`
- **Source metadata**:
`<state_dir>/cache/metadata/<hostname>/<sha256 of path and query>.json`
(host, path and query, content hash, upstream status and headers, fetch time)
- **Database**: `<state_dir>/state.sqlite3` (SQLite)
- **Transformed images**:
`<state_dir>/cache/variants/<ab>/<cd>/<sha256 of host, path, query, size, format, quality and fit>`,
each with a `.meta` file beside it holding its content type
`<ab>` and `<cd>` are the first and second pairs of characters of the file's
name.
`<statedir>/cache/src-metadata/<hostname>/<sha256 of path>.json`
(fetch time, original headers, request, content hash)
- **Database**: `<statedir>/state.sqlite3` (SQLite)
- **Output documents**:
`<statedir>/cache/dst-content/<ab>/<cd>/<sha256 of output content>`
Multiple source paths may reference the same content blob; the
database tracks references rather than using filesystem refcounting.
@@ -152,96 +88,17 @@ the metadata file stored beside it.
### Routes
pixa answers these routes; any other path answers 404. A path in this list asked
with a method the list does not give answers 405, except `/static/<file>`, which
answers any method as it answers `GET`. A browser's CORS preflight request
(`OPTIONS` with `Origin` and `Access-Control-Request-Method` headers) to any
path under `/v1/` answers 200, in maintenance mode too.
- `GET /` — the login page, or the URL generator page with a login session
(see Encrypted URLs). Needs: nothing. Answers: 200.
- `POST /` — log in with the signing key typed into the login page. Needs: the
login page's form (below). Answers: 303 to `/` with a login session cookie
that lasts 30 days for the right key; 200 with the login page and an error for
a wrong key; 429 over the login limit (below).
- `POST /generate` — make an encrypted URL from the generator page's form.
Needs: a login session and the generator page's form (below); without a login
session it answers 303 to `/`. Answers: 200 with the page showing the URL; 400
with the page naming a field that is not valid; 500 when the URL cannot be
made.
- `GET /logout` — end the login session. Needs: nothing. Answers: 303 to `/`.
- `GET` or `HEAD` `/v1/image/<host>/<path>/<size>.<format>` — an image, fetched,
resized and converted (below). Needs: a signature, unless the host is
allowlisted (see Source Hosts). Answers: 200; 304 when `If-None-Match` matches
the image's `ETag`; 400 for a URL or parameter that is not valid; 401 for a
missing or wrong signature, a missing `exp` or an `exp` in the past; 403 when
the upstream host, or a host it redirects to, is `localhost`, ends in
`.localhost` or `.local`, or has an address in a blocked network (see
`blocked_networks`); 502 when the upstream answered with an error status, and
for 5 minutes after that for the same source URL; 503 when pixa is busy or in
maintenance mode; 500 for any other failure.
- `GET` or `HEAD` `/v1/e/<token>/<name>` — an image through an encrypted URL
(see Encrypted URLs). Needs: nothing but the URL. Answers: 200; 304 when
`If-None-Match` matches the image's `ETag`; 400 for a token that does not
decrypt, or that asks for a size or fit that is not valid; 410 once it has
expired; 504 when the upstream has not sent its response headers within
`upstream_fetch_timeout`, but 500 when that time runs out while the image
itself is still arriving; 403, 502, 503 and 500 as for `/v1/image/`.
- `GET /robots.txt` — asks every crawler to stay away (`Disallow: /`). Needs:
nothing. Answers: 200.
- `GET /.well-known/healthcheck.json` — JSON with `status` (`ok`), `now`,
`uptime_seconds`, `uptime_human`, `version`, `appname` and
`maintenance_mode`. Needs: nothing. Answers: 200, always.
- `GET /static/<file>` — the script the login and generator pages load. Needs:
nothing. Answers: 200, or 404 for a file that does not exist.
- `GET /metrics` — Prometheus metrics (see Architecture). Needs: HTTP basic
authentication with `metrics.username` and `metrics.password`. Answers: 200;
401 without them; 404 when they are not set, as the route then does not exist.
Every response carries an `X-Request-ID` header holding the request's ID, which
a client can quote when reporting a problem: the request's own `X-Request-ID`,
as a reverse proxy in front of pixa may send, when it is at most 64 letters,
digits, `-`, `_` or `.`; otherwise a random one pixa makes for the request,
which tells nothing about the machine or the other requests. pixa's log line for
the request carries the same ID as `request_id`, and so do the lines it logs
when it fetches, converts and serves an image; the fetch sends it to the
upstream host as `X-Request-ID`.
Both `POST` routes accept only a form that pixa's own page served: the page puts
a token in the form and sets a cookie to match, and a request without both is
refused with 403, so another site cannot submit the form from a visitor's
browser. The login and generator pages are meant to be opened over HTTPS: while
`debug` is off, a form sent from a page opened over plain HTTP is refused with
403, and while it is on, so is one sent from a page opened over HTTPS. Plain
HTTP is for development on the browser's own machine: the login session cookie
is always marked `Secure`, and over plain HTTP a browser keeps such a cookie
only for its own machine (`localhost`), if at all. A form is also refused with
403 when the page's host is not the `Host` header pixa receives, so a reverse
proxy in front of pixa must pass that header on unchanged. A form body over
1 MiB is refused with 413. The image routes answer the errors listed for them
with JSON holding `error`, `status` and `timestamp`.
An image URL has this form:
```
/v1/image/<host>/<path>/<size>.<format>?sig=<signature>&exp=<expiration>&q=<quality>&fit=<fit>
/v1/image/<host>/<path>/<size>.<format>?sig=<signature>&exp=<expiration>
```
Images are only fetched from origins using TLS with valid certificates, unless
`allow_http` is set: then pixa fetches every image over plain HTTP, which is for
testing only.
Images are only fetched from origins using TLS with valid certificates.
A request whose query string cannot be decoded, or gives any parameter more
than once, is refused with 400.
- `<format>`: one of `orig` (or `original`), `jpeg` (or `jpg`), `png`, `webp`,
`avif`, `gif`
- `<format>`: one of `orig`, `png`, `jpeg`, `webp`
- `<size>`: `orig` or `<width>x<height>` (e.g. `800x600`)
- `sig` and `exp`: the signature and its expiry, needed unless the host is
allowlisted (see Signature Specification)
- `q` and `fit`: the output quality and how the image is fitted to `<size>`,
both optional (values under Signature Specification). Both are part of what
is cached, so each value of either is a separate cached image.
An image is served with `Cache-Control: public, max-age=<seconds>, immutable`.
When the URL has an expiry (an `exp`, or the TTL of an encrypted URL),
@@ -256,9 +113,7 @@ source) and one transcode: the first request does the work, and the others wait
for its image or its error, holding no upstream connection or processing slot
of their own. A waiting request stops waiting when its own client goes away.
The work goes on for the others even if the first request's client goes away,
until that request's `downstream_timeout` ends. The shared fetch sends the first
request's ID upstream, and the lines logged for the fetch and the transcode
carry that ID.
until that request's `downstream_timeout` ends.
The login form (`POST /`) is limited to 5 attempts per minute per client
address, counting an IPv6 client by its /64; an attempt over the limit is
@@ -277,39 +132,6 @@ its own `X-Forwarded-For`, whether it connects directly or through the proxy,
because its own address is trusted too. Setting `trusted_proxies` to only the
address pixa sees for requests that come through the proxy closes this.
### Encrypted URLs
An encrypted URL is an image URL made on pixa's own web page by someone who
knows the signing key. It works for any upstream host, allowlisted or not,
without a signature, and whoever gets it can neither read the source URL from it
nor change what it asks for.
1. Open `/` in a browser over HTTPS (or over plain HTTP while `debug` is on, see
Routes) and log in with the signing key (`signing_key`). The login session
lasts 30 days, or until `/logout`.
2. On the generator page, give the source image's URL, the width and height, the
format, quality and fit, and how long the URL lasts, then submit the form
(`POST /generate`). Width and height both empty or `0` keep the original
size; if only one of them is empty or `0`, that side is scaled to keep the
image's proportions.
3. The page shows the URL, `https://<host>/v1/e/<token>/img.<format>`, and when
it expires. `<host>` is the host the page was opened on, and the URL starts
with `http` instead while `debug` is on. The name after the token is ignored
and only gives the URL a file extension, `jpg` for `orig`.
The token holds the source's host, path and query and the size, format,
quality, fit and expiry, encrypted with a key derived from `signing_key`. The
source URL's scheme is not kept: the image is fetched like any other (see
Routes), and the blocked networks still apply.
How long the URL lasts is chosen on the page, from 1 minute to 1 year, or
never. The expiry is fixed in the token when the URL is made and cannot be
changed or revoked afterwards. Until then the image is served with a `max-age`
that ends at the expiry (see Routes); after it the URL answers 410
`URL has expired`. A URL made to last forever stops working only when
`signing_key` changes: changing it makes every encrypted URL already handed out
answer 400, and ends every login session.
### Image Metadata
pixa decodes and re-encodes every image it serves, and removes all metadata from
@@ -351,8 +173,7 @@ Where:
- `query` — source query string, empty string if none
- `width` — requested width in pixels, `0` for original
- `height` — requested height in pixels, `0` for original
- `format` — output format, one of those listed under Routes, with `original`
signed as `orig` and `jpg` as `jpeg`
- `format` — output format (jpeg, png, webp, avif, gif, orig)
- `expiration` — the URL's `exp` query parameter, the Unix timestamp when
the signature expires; a request whose `exp` is not a whole number, an
empty `exp=` included, is refused with 400
@@ -408,24 +229,13 @@ startup naming it, as an unknown config key does. The one other accepted
name is `PIXA_CONFIG_PATH`, the config file's path (like `--config`). The
variables set by the file's `env:` section are checked the same way.
pixa reads at most one config file: the one given with `--config` (or `-c`),
otherwise the one `PIXA_CONFIG_PATH` names, otherwise the first of these that
pixa finds: `/etc/pixa/config.yml`, `/etc/pixa/config.yaml`,
`~/.config/pixa/config.yml`, `~/.config/pixa/config.yaml`, then `config.yml`
and `config.yaml` in the working directory. A named file that does not exist,
cannot be read or does not parse aborts startup. Of the files pixa looks for on
its own, one it finds but cannot read or parse aborts startup; one it cannot
find, for any reason, is passed over without a message, even when the file is
there in a directory pixa may not enter. With no file, pixa uses the environment
and the defaults.
| Variable | Config key | Meaning |
| ------------------------------------ | ------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `PIXA_SIGNING_KEY` | `signing_key` | Required: secret for signed and encrypted URLs and login, 32+ characters |
| `PORT` | `port` | Port to listen on; default `8080` |
| `PIXA_STATE_DIR` | `state_dir` | Directory for the database and the disk cache; default `/var/lib/pixa` |
| `PIXA_DB_URL` | `db_url` | SQLite database URL; default `state.sqlite3` in the state directory |
| `PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES` | `cache_max_bytes` | Disk cache limit in bytes; `0` disables it; default 75% of (free + cached) |
| `PIXA_CACHE_MAX_BYTES` | `cache_max_bytes` | Disk cache limit in bytes; `0` disables it; default 75% of free space |
| `PIXA_ALLOWLIST_HOSTS` | `allowlist_hosts` | Upstream hosts served without a signature |
| `PIXA_BLOCKED_NETWORKS` | `blocked_networks` | CIDR ranges never fetched from, on top of the built-in ones |
| `PIXA_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `trusted_proxies` | CIDR ranges of proxies whose `X-Forwarded-For` is believed; default RFC 1918 |
@@ -490,10 +300,8 @@ Key settings in more detail:
each), so keep it longer than `upstream_fetch_timeout` plus 20 seconds
- `signing_key` — HMAC secret for URL signatures
- `cache_max_bytes` — disk cache size limit in bytes; `0` disables the
disk cache entirely; omitted defaults to 75% of the sum of the free space on
the filesystem containing `<state_dir>/cache/` and the bytes of source and
transformed images the cache already holds, worked out at startup (minimum
500 MiB)
disk cache entirely; omitted defaults to 75% of the free space on
the filesystem containing `<state_dir>/cache/` (minimum 500 MiB)
- `upstream_connections` — the most connections to upstream hosts at once, all
hosts together, on top of `upstream_connections_per_host`; default `64`. A
fetch holds its connection until its image has been processed. A fetch that
@@ -506,12 +314,12 @@ Key settings in more detail:
seconds for one to free up; if none does, and `downstream_timeout` has not
ended first, it is answered 503 the same way
- `maintenance_mode` — while `true`, the image routes (`/v1/image/` and
`/v1/e/`) answer every request for an image with 503, a `Retry-After` header
and a JSON error body. The health check (`/.well-known/healthcheck.json`)
still answers 200 and reports `"maintenance_mode": true`. It stays 200
because the image's Docker `HEALTHCHECK` requests it: a 503 there would make
the container unhealthy, and upaas marks a deploy failed when its container
is unhealthy. The login and URL generator pages and `/metrics` keep working
`/v1/e/`) answer every request with 503, a `Retry-After` header and a JSON
error body. The health check (`/.well-known/healthcheck.json`) still answers
200 and reports `"maintenance_mode": true`. It stays 200 because the image's
Docker `HEALTHCHECK` requests it: a 503 there would make the container
unhealthy, and upaas marks a deploy failed when its container is unhealthy.
The login and URL generator pages and `/metrics` keep working
See `config.example.yml` for all options with defaults.
@@ -522,10 +330,7 @@ See `config.example.yml` for all options with defaults.
- **Image processing**: govips (CGO wrapper for libvips)
- **Database**: SQLite via modernc.org/sqlite
- **Static assets**: embedded via `//go:embed`
- **Metrics**: Prometheus, at `/metrics`: generic HTTP request metrics
(duration, response size, requests in flight) and the Go runtime and process
metrics; requests are measured and `/metrics` is served only when
`metrics.username` and `metrics.password` are set
- **Metrics**: Prometheus
- **Logging**: stdlib slog
## Entrypoints
+6 -85
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@@ -29,83 +29,6 @@ P2: security: referer blacklist
# Completed Steps
- 2026-10-04 the default `cache_max_bytes` no longer shrinks as the cache fills
(closes #184): for an omitted key, the cache works out the limit when it
opens, after the database is open, as 75% of the sum of the free space on the
filesystem containing `<state_dir>/cache/` and what the cache already holds by
its own size accounting, at least 500 MiB, so a cache filled to its limit
keeps that limit across a restart. The computation and its tests moved from
`internal/config` to `internal/imgcache`; the config only records whether the
key was set.
- 2026-10-04 deployment guide and example Caddy config (closes #89):
"Deployment" in `README.md` says what the reverse proxy in front of pixa must
do (terminate TLS; pass `Host`, `Origin` and `Referer` on unchanged; set
`X-Forwarded-For`, with `trusted_proxies` to match; wait at least
`downstream_timeout`; optionally refuse `/metrics`) and what pixa does itself,
that the state directory needs a persistent volume and what `cache_max_bytes`
counts, the health check for a load balancer, what a stop does and its exit
codes, and what running outside Docker needs; `configs/Caddyfile` is the
example, checked with `caddy validate`.
- 2026-10-04 the metrics basic auth, CORS preflight, request logging and
metrics recording have tests (closes #79): `MetricsAuth` on its own answers
401 with a challenge without credentials or with a wrong username or password
and lets the configured ones through; a preflight request gets `*` for any
origin when `access_control_allow_origin` is `*` and no
`Access-Control-Allow-Origin` from another origin than the configured one; a
`POST /` carrying the signing key leaves no trace of it in the request log
line, and the login handler's own log lines leave out the submitted key; the
metrics middleware on its own records a request it served, and the router
records nothing while no metrics username is set. Not tested: that the router
puts the basic auth in front of `/metrics` and records requests when a
metrics username is set. Only one test per package can set up `/metrics`, and
in `internal/server` that is `TestMaintenanceModeKeepsOtherRoutes`, which
needs the owner's approval to change; #180 holds it. Tests only; the basic
auth library already compares the password in constant time.
- 2026-10-04 the image route's signature check and error answers are tested
(closes #76): new tests in `internal/handlers`, with no network, check the
status and JSON error body for a missing, wrong, unpadded, upper-case or
expired signature on a host not on the allowlist, or a valid one sent for
its parent domain, a sibling host, a subdomain or the host with another
domain appended (401), an unparseable path (400), `localhost` as the
upstream host (403) and an upstream error (502); that an allowlisted host is
served without a signature, another host only with a valid one; and the
answers of `/robots.txt` and the health check. No code changes.
- 2026-10-04 request IDs returned and passed on, and `/v1/e/` revalidates
(closes #84): pixa's own `RequestID` middleware, in place of chi's, gives each
request an ID, its own `X-Request-ID` when that is at most 64 letters, digits,
`-`, `_` or `.` and a random one otherwise, stores it where chi's did and
sends it back as `X-Request-ID` on every response; the upstream fetch sends
that ID, and the "upstream fetched", "image converted" and "image served" log
lines carry it as `request_id`, a fetch shared by several requests carrying
the first request's; `/v1/e/` sets `ETag`, answers a matching `If-None-Match`
with 304 and is routed for `HEAD`, the `ETag` and 304 code being
`notModified`, which `/v1/image/` calls too; its token checks moved unchanged
into `parseImageEncRequest` to keep `HandleImageEnc` within the line limit; no
`Vary` is added, as no response depends on a request header except the image
routes' CORS headers, for which `go-chi/cors` already sends `Vary: Origin`;
`Vary: Accept` is left to #88.
- 2026-10-04 routes, encrypted URLs and config file documented (closes #75):
"Routes" in `README.md` lists every route with its method, purpose, what it
needs and the status codes it answers with, and says `q` and `fit` are part
of what is cached; "Encrypted URLs" covers logging in, making one on the
generator page, how long it lasts and the 410 once it has expired;
"Configuration" gives the order in which pixa looks for its config file;
`config.example.yml` lists `db_url` and `env` and gives every key's default;
`scripts/manual-test.sh` is left to #97.
- 2026-10-04 shutdown stops cache eviction in progress (closes #102):
`StartEviction` runs the eviction goroutine with its own context, which
`StopEviction` cancels, so a pass in progress stops at its next database
call, file, row or eviction candidate instead of running to completion, and
no pass starts after it, so a stop logs at most one warning;
`StopEviction` takes a context and, when that context ends before the
goroutine exits, stops waiting and returns its error; the handlers' stop hook
passes fx's stop context, so an eviction still running when fx's stop
deadline ends fails the stop and makes the exit code 1.
- 2026-10-04 dead code in `internal/imgcache` is gone (closes #73): `Purge`,
which only returned an error and which nothing called, is no longer part of
the `ImageCache` interface or `Service`; the `SignatureValidator`,
`Allowlist` and `Storage` interfaces, which nothing implemented or used, are
deleted. Nothing else changes.
- 2026-10-04 upstream host semaphores and variant `.meta` files no longer
outlive their use (closes #87): the fetcher counts the fetches holding or
waiting for a slot of each upstream host's semaphore and removes the host's
@@ -113,14 +36,6 @@ P2: security: referer blacklist
semaphore each until restart; `VariantStorage.Delete` removes the variant's
`.meta` file along with it, a missing `.meta` file not being an error, and
`DeleteWithMeta`, which eviction called for that, is gone.
- 2026-10-04 `README.md` matches the code (closes #74): "Storage" names the
cache directories pixa uses (`cache/sources`, `cache/metadata`,
`cache/variants`) and how files are named in each, and the comments in
`001_schema.sql` name the same paths; the routes and the signature section
list the same output formats, `jpg` and `original` included; the TLS
sentence names `allow_http` as its exception; "Metrics" says only generic
HTTP and Go runtime metrics exist, measured and served only when the metrics
username and password are set.
- 2026-10-03 shutdown sets the exit code and waits for image processing
(closes #86): fx alone handles SIGINT and SIGTERM, and the server's own
signal handler is gone; fx's `Run` in `cmd/pixad` exits with the shutdown's
@@ -493,6 +408,7 @@ P2: security: referer blacklist
- P2: HTTP response handling
- Last-Modified headers
- Vary header for content negotiation
- X-Request-ID propagation
- P2: auto format selection (format=auto based on Accept header)
- P2: configuration
- YAML config file support
@@ -502,3 +418,8 @@ P2: security: referer blacklist
- Prometheus performance metrics
- integration tests for the image proxy flow
- load tests to verify the 1k to 5k req/s target
- P2: documentation
- configuration options
- API endpoints
- deployment guide
- example nginx or caddy reverse proxy config
+11 -30
View File
@@ -12,38 +12,27 @@
# Durations are Go duration strings such as 30s or 2m and must be
# positive; a bare number has no unit and aborts startup. Sizes are a
# whole number of bytes.
#
# A key left out takes the default its comment gives.
# Port to listen on (default: 8080)
# Server settings
port: 8080
# Debug logging and plain-HTTP local development (default: false)
debug: false
# While true, the image routes (/v1/image/ and /v1/e/) answer every request
# for an image with 503 and a Retry-After header. The health check keeps
# answering 200 and reports maintenance_mode as true. It stays 200 because
# the image's Docker HEALTHCHECK requests it: a 503 there would make the
# container unhealthy, and upaas marks a deploy failed when its container is
# unhealthy. (default: false)
# with 503 and a Retry-After header. The health check keeps answering 200 and
# reports maintenance_mode as true. It stays 200 because the image's Docker
# HEALTHCHECK requests it: a 503 there would make the container unhealthy, and
# upaas marks a deploy failed when its container is unhealthy.
maintenance_mode: false
# Data directory for SQLite database and cache files
# (default: /var/lib/pixa)
state_dir: ./data
# SQLite database URL (default:
# file:<state_dir>/state.sqlite3?_journal_mode=WAL). An empty value aborts
# startup; leave the key out to use the default.
# db_url: "file:./data/state.sqlite3?_journal_mode=WAL"
# Image proxy settings
# HMAC signing key for URL signatures (required, at least 32 characters)
# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
signing_key: "CHANGE_ME_generate_with_openssl_rand_base64_32"
# Hosts that don't require signatures (default: none)
# Hosts that don't require signatures
# Use "." prefix for wildcard subdomain matching (e.g., ".example.com" matches "cdn.example.com")
allowlist_hosts:
- s3.sneak.cloud
@@ -56,7 +45,7 @@ allowlist_hosts:
# SSRF protection. These are added to the always-enforced built-in ranges
# (loopback, RFC 1918 private, link-local, CGNAT, benchmark, NAT64, and
# similar), never replacing them. Each entry must be a valid CIDR in IPv4
# or IPv6 form; an invalid entry aborts startup. (default: none)
# or IPv6 form; an invalid entry aborts startup.
# blocked_networks:
# - 100.64.0.0/10
# - 2001:db8::/32
@@ -83,7 +72,6 @@ allowlist_hosts:
# - 2001:db8::/32
# Allow HTTP upstream (only for testing, always use HTTPS in production)
# (default: false)
allow_http: false
# Maximum concurrent connections per upstream host (default: 20)
@@ -128,22 +116,15 @@ access_control_allow_origin: "*"
# Maximum disk cache size in bytes. Explicit values are used exactly as
# given; 0 disables the disk cache entirely (every request fetches and
# processes uncached). When omitted, the default is 75% of the sum of
# the free space on the filesystem containing <state_dir>/cache/ and
# the bytes of images the cache already holds, worked out at startup,
# processes uncached). When omitted, the default is 75% of the free
# space on the filesystem containing <state_dir>/cache/ at startup,
# with a minimum of 500 MiB.
# cache_max_bytes: 10737418240
# Sentry DSN for error reporting (default: empty, which turns it off)
# Sentry error reporting (optional)
sentry_dsn: ""
# Username and password for /metrics, set together (default: unset). Metrics
# are measured and /metrics is served only when both are set.
# Metrics endpoint authentication (optional)
# metrics:
# username: "admin"
# password: "secret"
# Environment variables set while this file loads, as described at the top
# (default: none)
# env:
# PIXA_DEBUG: "true"
-17
View File
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
# Example Caddy config for running pixa behind Caddy; see "Deployment" in
# README.md. Replace images.example.com with pixa's public host name, and
# 127.0.0.1:8080 with the address Caddy reaches pixa on.
#
# Caddy gets and renews the TLS certificate for the host name, passes the
# Host, Origin and Referer headers on unchanged, sets X-Forwarded-For to the
# client's address, and waits for pixa's answer with no time limit of its
# own, so pixa's downstream_timeout is what ends a slow request.
images.example.com
# pixa asks for metrics.username and metrics.password on /metrics. This
# line also keeps it off the public address, for a scraper that reaches
# pixa directly; remove it to read /metrics through Caddy.
respond /metrics 404
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8080
+154 -13
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,26 @@
package config
import (
"errors"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// Static errors returned by the stub free-space probes below.
var (
errTestStatfsFailed = errors.New("statfs failed")
errTestProbeNotExpected = errors.New("probe must not be called")
)
// discardLogger returns a logger that swallows all output, for tests
// that exercise code paths which log.
func discardLogger() *slog.Logger {
return slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
}
// TestCacheMaxBytesExplicitValueUsedWithoutFloor verifies that an
// explicitly configured cache_max_bytes value is used exactly as
// given: the 500 MiB floor applies only to the computed default, never
@@ -135,30 +151,155 @@ func TestCacheMaxBytesInvalidValuesAbortStartup(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestCacheMaxBytesExplicitIsRecorded verifies that an omitted
// cache_max_bytes is recorded as not explicit, so the cache works out
// the default when it opens, and that an explicit zero is recorded as
// explicit, so it disables the disk cache instead.
func TestCacheMaxBytesExplicitIsRecorded(t *testing.T) {
// TestComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytesUses75PercentOfFreeSpace verifies the
// computed default is 75% of the probed free space when that exceeds
// the floor.
func TestComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytesUses75PercentOfFreeSpace(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
signingKeyLine := "signing_key: " + validTestSigningKey + "\n"
// 4 GiB free -> 3 GiB default.
probe := func(string) (uint64, error) { return 4294967296, nil }
omitted, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine)
got, err := ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes(t.TempDir(), probe)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes returned error: %v", err)
}
if got != 3221225472 {
t.Errorf("ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes = %d, want 3221225472 (75%% of 4 GiB)",
got)
}
}
// TestComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytesAppliesFloorToComputedDefault
// verifies that when 75% of free space is below 500 MiB, the computed
// default is floored at DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor.
func TestComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytesAppliesFloorToComputedDefault(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []struct {
name string
freeBytes uint64
}{
{name: "100 MiB free", freeBytes: 104857600},
{name: "zero free", freeBytes: 0},
{name: "just below floor threshold", freeBytes: 699050665},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
probe := func(string) (uint64, error) { return tc.freeBytes, nil }
got, err := ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes(t.TempDir(), probe)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes returned error: %v", err)
}
if got != DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor {
t.Errorf("ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes = %d, want floor %d",
got, DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor)
}
})
}
}
// TestComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytesPropagatesProbeError verifies that a
// failing free-space probe produces an error naming the config key,
// instead of a silently wrong default.
func TestComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytesPropagatesProbeError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
probe := func(string) (uint64, error) { return 0, errTestStatfsFailed }
_, err := ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes(t.TempDir(), probe)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("probe failure must produce an error, got nil")
}
t.Logf("got expected error: %v", err)
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), keyCacheMaxBytes) {
t.Errorf("error %q does not name the config key cache_max_bytes", err.Error())
}
}
// TestResolveCacheMaxBytesComputesDefaultWhenOmitted verifies that an
// omitted cache_max_bytes key resolves to the computed default, that
// the probe is pointed at <state_dir>/cache/ (which must be created
// first so statfs measures the right filesystem), and that the result
// lands on the Config.
func TestResolveCacheMaxBytesComputesDefaultWhenOmitted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, "signing_key: "+validTestSigningKey+"\n")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("minimal config should be valid, got error: %v", err)
}
if omitted.CacheMaxBytesExplicit {
t.Error("omitted cache_max_bytes recorded as explicit")
c.StateDir = t.TempDir()
wantCacheDir := filepath.Join(c.StateDir, "cache")
var probedPath string
// 4 GiB free -> 3 GiB default.
probe := func(path string) (uint64, error) {
probedPath = path
return 4294967296, nil
}
zero, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+"cache_max_bytes: 0\n")
err = c.resolveCacheMaxBytes(discardLogger(), probe)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cache_max_bytes: 0 must be accepted, got error: %v", err)
t.Fatalf("resolveCacheMaxBytes returned error: %v", err)
}
if !zero.CacheMaxBytesExplicit {
t.Error("cache_max_bytes: 0 not recorded as explicit")
if c.CacheMaxBytes != 3221225472 {
t.Errorf("CacheMaxBytes = %d, want computed default 3221225472",
c.CacheMaxBytes)
}
if probedPath != wantCacheDir {
t.Errorf("free space probed at %q, want cache directory %q",
probedPath, wantCacheDir)
}
info, err := os.Stat(wantCacheDir)
if err != nil || !info.IsDir() {
t.Errorf("cache directory %q was not created before probing: info=%v err=%v",
wantCacheDir, info, err)
}
}
// TestResolveCacheMaxBytesDoesNotOverrideExplicitValue verifies that
// an explicitly configured value survives resolution untouched and
// that the free-space probe is never consulted for it.
func TestResolveCacheMaxBytesDoesNotOverrideExplicitValue(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := "signing_key: " + validTestSigningKey + "\ncache_max_bytes: 1024\n"
c, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("explicit cache_max_bytes must be accepted, got error: %v", err)
}
c.StateDir = t.TempDir()
probe := func(string) (uint64, error) {
t.Error("free-space probe must not be consulted for explicit values")
return 0, errTestProbeNotExpected
}
err = c.resolveCacheMaxBytes(discardLogger(), probe)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("resolveCacheMaxBytes returned error: %v", err)
}
if c.CacheMaxBytes != 1024 {
t.Errorf("CacheMaxBytes = %d, want explicit 1024 (no floor, no recompute)",
c.CacheMaxBytes)
}
}
+116
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
package config
import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"math"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"syscall"
)
// DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor is the minimum computed default for the
// cache_max_bytes setting: 500 MiB. The floor applies only to the
// computed default (when the key is omitted from the configuration),
// never to explicitly configured values.
const DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor int64 = 524288000
// cacheDirPerms is the permission mode for the cache directory created
// before probing free space, matching the state directory permissions.
const cacheDirPerms = 0o750
// freeSpaceFractionNumerator and freeSpaceFractionDenominator express
// the 75% share of free space used for the computed default limit as
// integer arithmetic (dividing before multiplying avoids overflow).
const (
freeSpaceFractionNumerator uint64 = 3
freeSpaceFractionDenominator uint64 = 4
)
// FreeSpaceProbeFunc reports the number of free bytes available on the
// filesystem containing path. It is a function type so tests can
// inject a fake probe instead of depending on the host disk.
type FreeSpaceProbeFunc func(path string) (uint64, error)
// defaultFreeSpaceProbe reports free filesystem bytes via statfs on
// the given path, as available to unprivileged processes.
func defaultFreeSpaceProbe(path string) (uint64, error) {
var stat syscall.Statfs_t
err := syscall.Statfs(path, &stat)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if stat.Bsize < 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w %d for %q", errNegativeBlockSize, stat.Bsize, path)
}
blockSize := uint64(stat.Bsize)
return stat.Bavail * blockSize, nil
}
// ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes returns the default cache size limit for
// the filesystem containing cacheDir: 75% of the free bytes reported
// by probe, with a floor of DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor.
func ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes(
cacheDir string, probe FreeSpaceProbeFunc,
) (int64, error) {
freeBytes, err := probe(cacheDir)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("config key %q: cannot determine free space for %q: %w",
"cache_max_bytes", cacheDir, err)
}
computed := freeBytes / freeSpaceFractionDenominator * freeSpaceFractionNumerator
computed = min(computed, math.MaxInt64)
// gosec cannot see that min() above bounds computed, so it reads
// this conversion as potentially overflowing. It cannot: computed is
// at most math.MaxInt64 on every path here.
//nolint:gosec // G115: clamped to MaxInt64 by min above
limit := int64(computed)
limit = max(limit, DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor)
return limit, nil
}
// resolveCacheMaxBytes finalizes CacheMaxBytes after state_dir
// validation: an explicitly configured value is kept as-is (no floor
// applies), while an omitted key receives the computed default based
// on free space in <state_dir>/cache/. The cache directory is created
// first so statfs measures the filesystem that will actually hold the
// cache. The effective limit is logged either way.
func (c *Config) resolveCacheMaxBytes(
log *slog.Logger, probe FreeSpaceProbeFunc,
) error {
if !c.cacheMaxBytesExplicit {
cacheDir := filepath.Join(c.StateDir, "cache")
err := os.MkdirAll(cacheDir, cacheDirPerms)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("config key %q: cannot create cache directory %q: %w",
keyCacheMaxBytes, cacheDir, err)
}
limit, err := ComputeDefaultCacheMaxBytes(cacheDir, probe)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.CacheMaxBytes = limit
log.Info("computed default cache size limit from free space",
"cache_max_bytes", limit,
"cache_dir", cacheDir,
)
}
log.Info("effective cache size limit",
"cache_max_bytes", c.CacheMaxBytes,
"cache_disabled", c.CacheMaxBytes == 0,
)
return nil
}
+17 -19
View File
@@ -91,7 +91,9 @@ var (
errMustBeSetTogether = errors.New("must be set together")
errMustNotBeNegative = errors.New("must not be negative")
errOverflowsInt64 = errors.New("overflows a 64-bit integer")
errValueNull = errors.New(
errNegativeBlockSize = errors.New(
"statfs reported negative block size")
errValueNull = errors.New(
"value is null; omit the key entirely to use the default")
errValuesNull = errors.New(
"value is null; omit a key entirely to use its default")
@@ -169,16 +171,16 @@ type Config struct {
// CacheMaxBytes is the disk cache size limit in bytes. Zero
// disables the disk cache entirely. When cache_max_bytes is
// omitted from the configuration, this is zero and
// CacheMaxBytesExplicit is false.
// omitted from the configuration, this holds the computed default
// (75% of free space on the filesystem containing
// <state_dir>/cache/, floored at DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor).
CacheMaxBytes int64
// CacheMaxBytesExplicit records whether cache_max_bytes was
// cacheMaxBytesExplicit records whether cache_max_bytes was
// explicitly set, in the environment or the configuration file.
// Explicit values are used exactly as given; for an omitted key the
// cache works out the default limit when it opens (see
// imgcache.CacheConfig.UseDefaultMaxBytes).
CacheMaxBytesExplicit bool
// Explicit values are used exactly as given; only an omitted key
// gets the computed default (and its floor) in resolveCacheMaxBytes.
cacheMaxBytesExplicit bool
}
// New creates a new Config instance from the environment and the
@@ -215,13 +217,9 @@ func New(_ fx.Lifecycle, params Params) (*Config, error) {
return nil, err
}
// An omitted cache_max_bytes is worked out and logged when the
// cache opens.
if c.CacheMaxBytesExplicit {
log.Info("effective cache size limit",
"cache_max_bytes", c.CacheMaxBytes,
"cache_disabled", c.CacheMaxBytes == 0,
)
err = c.resolveCacheMaxBytes(log, defaultFreeSpaceProbe)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if c.Debug {
@@ -300,11 +298,11 @@ func newFromSmartConfig(sc *smartconfig.Config) (*Config, error) {
TrustedProxies: trustedProxies,
}
// The default for an omitted cache_max_bytes is worked out when
// the cache opens; here we only record whether the operator set
// the key explicitly.
// The computed default for cache_max_bytes needs a validated
// state_dir, so it is resolved later (resolveCacheMaxBytes); here
// we only record whether the operator set the key explicitly.
if _, present := lookupValue(sc, keyCacheMaxBytes); present {
c.CacheMaxBytesExplicit = true
c.cacheMaxBytesExplicit = true
}
// Build DBURL from StateDir if not explicitly set. The derived URL
+1 -1
View File
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ func TestEnvironmentSetsEveryKey(t *testing.T) {
UpstreamConnections: 10,
MaxConcurrentProcessing: 3,
CacheMaxBytes: 1024,
CacheMaxBytesExplicit: true,
cacheMaxBytesExplicit: true,
BlockedNetworks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")},
TrustedProxies: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.0/24")},
AccessControlAllowOrigin: "https://app.example.com",
+3 -4
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
-- Creates all tables for the pixa caching image proxy
-- Source content blobs
-- Files stored at: cache/sources/<ab>/<cd>/<sha256>
-- Files stored at: cache/src-content/<ab>/<cd>/<sha256>
-- last_accessed_at is NULL until the first LRU touch; eviction falls
-- back to fetched_at for rows that have never been touched.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS source_content (
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_source_content_last_accessed
ON source_content(last_accessed_at);
-- Source URL metadata - maps URLs to content hashes
-- JSON stored at: cache/metadata/<hostname>/<path_hash>.json
-- JSON stored at: cache/src-metadata/<hostname>/<path_hash>.json
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS source_metadata (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
source_host TEXT NOT NULL,
@@ -56,8 +56,7 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_variant_content_last_accessed
ON variant_content(last_accessed_at);
-- Output/transformed content blobs
-- Not written: transformed images are stored in cache/variants and
-- tracked in variant_content above.
-- Files stored at: cache/dst-content/<ab>/<cd>/<sha256>
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS output_content (
content_hash TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
content_type TEXT NOT NULL,
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"bytes"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/session"
)
// TestLoginLogLeavesOutSubmittedKey verifies that the log lines for a
// failed and for a successful login do not contain the submitted key.
func TestLoginLogLeavesOutSubmittedKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const wrongKey = "wrong-signing-key-fedcba9876543210"
var buf bytes.Buffer
sessMgr, err := session.NewManager(testSigningKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session.NewManager() error = %v", err)
}
h := &Handlers{
log: slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, nil)),
config: &config.Config{SigningKey: testSigningKey},
sessMgr: sessMgr,
}
submittedKeys := []string{wrongKey, testSigningKey}
for _, key := range submittedKeys {
form := url.Values{loginKeyField: {key}}
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodPost, "/",
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
h.handleLoginPost(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
}
for _, msg := range []string{"failed login attempt", "successful login"} {
if !strings.Contains(buf.String(), msg) {
t.Fatalf("log missing %q; got %q", msg, buf.String())
}
}
for _, key := range submittedKeys {
if strings.Contains(buf.String(), key) {
t.Errorf("log contains submitted key %q; got %q", key, buf.String())
}
}
}
+19 -14
View File
@@ -58,16 +58,23 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params Params) (*Handlers, error) {
}
lc.Append(fx.Hook{
//nolint:contextcheck // the eviction loop outlives OnStart; OnStop cancels it
// The eviction goroutine must outlive OnStart, so it cannot
// inherit this hook's context. It makes its own instead, which
// leaves it uncancellable: an in-flight pass runs to completion
// during OnStop regardless of the shutdown deadline. Making the
// loop cancellable changes shutdown semantics and is tracked
// separately in issue #102, rather than being folded into the
// lint-conformance change that surfaced it.
//nolint:contextcheck // see issue #102
OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
return s.initImageService()
},
OnStop: func(ctx context.Context) error {
if s.imgCache == nil {
return nil
OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
if s.imgCache != nil {
s.imgCache.StopEviction()
}
return s.imgCache.StopEviction(ctx)
return nil
},
})
@@ -83,16 +90,14 @@ func (s *Handlers) WaitForProcessing(ctx context.Context) int {
// initImageService initializes the image cache and service.
func (s *Handlers) initImageService() error {
// Create the cache. cache_max_bytes: 0 disables the disk cache
// entirely; any other value is the eviction limit in bytes; when
// it is omitted, the cache works out the default limit itself.
// entirely; any other value is the eviction limit in bytes.
cache, err := imgcache.NewCache(s.db.DB(), imgcache.CacheConfig{
StateDir: s.config.StateDir,
CacheTTL: imgcache.DefaultCacheTTL,
NegativeTTL: imgcache.DefaultNegativeTTL,
MaxBytes: s.config.CacheMaxBytes,
UseDefaultMaxBytes: !s.config.CacheMaxBytesExplicit,
DisableDiskCache: s.config.CacheMaxBytesExplicit && s.config.CacheMaxBytes == 0,
Logger: s.log,
StateDir: s.config.StateDir,
CacheTTL: imgcache.DefaultCacheTTL,
NegativeTTL: imgcache.DefaultNegativeTTL,
MaxBytes: s.config.CacheMaxBytes,
DisableDiskCache: s.config.CacheMaxBytes == 0,
Logger: s.log,
})
if err != nil {
return err
+11 -23
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imageprocessor"
@@ -248,25 +247,6 @@ func cacheControl(expires time.Time) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("public, max-age=%d, immutable", int64(maxAge/time.Second))
}
// notModified sets the ETag header to etag and, when the request's
// If-None-Match is that ETag, answers 304 Not Modified. It reports whether it
// answered. An empty etag sets no header and never answers.
func notModified(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, etag string) bool {
if etag == "" {
return false
}
w.Header().Set("ETag", etag)
if r.Header.Get("If-None-Match") != etag {
return false
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotModified)
return true
}
// writeImageResponse writes headers and streams the image content,
// handling conditional and HEAD requests.
func (s *Handlers) writeImageResponse(
@@ -285,8 +265,17 @@ func (s *Handlers) writeImageResponse(
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", cacheControl(req.Expires))
w.Header().Set("X-Pixa-Cache", string(resp.CacheStatus))
if notModified(w, r, resp.ETag) {
return
if resp.ETag != "" {
w.Header().Set("ETag", resp.ETag)
// Check for conditional request (If-None-Match)
if ifNoneMatch := r.Header.Get("If-None-Match"); ifNoneMatch != "" {
if ifNoneMatch == resp.ETag {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotModified)
return
}
}
}
// Handle HEAD request - return headers only
@@ -309,7 +298,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) writeImageResponse(
// Log cache status and timing after serving
duration := time.Since(startTime)
s.log.Info("image served",
"request_id", middleware.GetReqID(r.Context()),
"cache_key", cacheKey,
"cache_status", resp.CacheStatus,
"duration_ms", duration.Milliseconds(),
@@ -23,10 +23,8 @@ const photoPath = "/images/photo.jpg"
// newSignedHostServer returns a router for both image routes, and the Handlers
// behind it, whose fetcher serves a JPEG at photoPath on signedHost. signedHost
// is not on the allowlist, so a /v1/image/ URL for it is served only with a
// valid signature. The handlers and the image service log to log.
func newSignedHostServer(
t *testing.T, log *slog.Logger,
) (*Handlers, http.Handler) {
// valid signature.
func newSignedHostServer(t *testing.T) (*Handlers, http.Handler) {
t.Helper()
cache, err := imgcache.NewCache(setupTestDB(t), imgcache.CacheConfig{
@@ -46,7 +44,6 @@ func newSignedHostServer(
signedHost + photoPath: &fstest.MapFile{Data: jpegData},
}),
SigningKey: testSigningKey,
Logger: log,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("imgcache.NewService() error = %v", err)
@@ -58,7 +55,7 @@ func newSignedHostServer(
}
h := &Handlers{
log: log,
log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
imgSvc: svc,
encGen: encGen,
}
@@ -106,7 +103,7 @@ func getMaxAge(t *testing.T, srv http.Handler, target string) int {
func TestHandleImage_SignedURL_MaxAgeEndsAtExp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, srv := newSignedHostServer(t, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
h, srv := newSignedHostServer(t)
signedURL, err := h.imgSvc.GenerateSignedURL("", &imgcache.ImageRequest{
SourceHost: signedHost,
@@ -182,7 +179,7 @@ func TestHandleImageEnc_MaxAge(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, srv := newSignedHostServer(t, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
h, srv := newSignedHostServer(t)
token, err := h.encGen.Generate(&encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: signedHost,
@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"image/color"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"testing/fstest"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/signature"
)
// allowlistedHost is the only host on the allowlist of the image route
// newImageRoute builds.
const allowlistedHost = "allowed.example.com"
// newImageRoute returns the image route of a Handlers whose service fetches
// with fetcher and checks signatures with testSigningKey.
func newImageRoute(t *testing.T, fetcher httpfetcher.Fetcher) http.Handler {
t.Helper()
cache, err := imgcache.NewCache(setupTestDB(t), imgcache.CacheConfig{
StateDir: t.TempDir(),
CacheTTL: time.Hour,
NegativeTTL: 5 * time.Minute,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create cache: %v", err)
}
svc, err := imgcache.NewService(&imgcache.ServiceConfig{
Cache: cache,
Fetcher: fetcher,
SigningKey: testSigningKey,
Allowlist: []string{allowlistedHost},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create service: %v", err)
}
h := &Handlers{imgSvc: svc, log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)}
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/v1/image/*", h.HandleImage())
return r
}
// newPhotoFetcher returns a mock fetcher that serves a JPEG at photoPath on
// each of hosts, and answers any other URL with an upstream error.
func newPhotoFetcher(t *testing.T, hosts ...string) *httpfetcher.MockFetcher {
t.Helper()
photo := &fstest.MapFile{
Data: generateTestJPEG(t, 100, 100, color.RGBA{255, 0, 0, 255}),
}
files := fstest.MapFS{}
for _, host := range hosts {
files[host+photoPath] = photo
}
return httpfetcher.NewMock(files)
}
// photoURL returns the image route URL of photoPath on host, as a 50x50 JPEG.
func photoURL(host string) string {
return "/v1/image/" + host + photoPath + "/50x50.jpeg"
}
// photoURLWithSig returns photoURL(host) with sig and expires as its sig and
// exp.
func photoURLWithSig(host, sig string, expires time.Time) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s?sig=%s&exp=%d", photoURL(host), sig, expires.Unix())
}
// photoSignature returns the signature of photoURL(host) at the default
// quality and fit, made with key and expiring at expires.
func photoSignature(key, host string, expires time.Time) string {
return signature.New(key).Sign(&signature.Request{
SourceHost: host,
SourcePath: photoPath,
Width: 50,
Height: 50,
Format: string(imgcache.FormatJPEG),
Quality: 85,
FitMode: string(imgcache.FitCover),
Expires: expires,
})
}
// sendGet sends a GET for target to route and returns the response.
func sendGet(
t *testing.T, route http.Handler, target string,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, target, nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
route.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
t.Logf("GET %s: %d", target, rec.Code)
return rec
}
// checkErrorBody checks that rec has status wantStatus and the JSON error body
// the image route sends: wantError, wantStatus and the time in RFC 3339.
func checkErrorBody(
t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, wantStatus int, wantError string,
) {
t.Helper()
if rec.Code != wantStatus {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, wantStatus)
}
if ct := rec.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/json" {
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want application/json", ct)
}
var body struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
Status int `json:"status"`
Timestamp string `json:"timestamp"`
}
err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response body: %v", err)
}
if body.Error != wantError || body.Status != wantStatus {
t.Errorf("body error and status = %q %d, want %q %d",
body.Error, body.Status, wantError, wantStatus)
}
_, err = time.Parse(time.RFC3339, body.Timestamp)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("body timestamp: %v", err)
}
}
// TestHandleImage_ErrorAnswers checks the status and the JSON error body the
// image route answers each request below with. The JPEG at photoPath exists on
// signedHost and on each host below that differs from it, so a request refused
// with 401 would otherwise be served.
func TestHandleImage_ErrorAnswers(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A signature for signedHost must not verify for any of these.
parentHost := "example.com"
siblingHost := "other.example.com"
subdomainHost := "img." + signedHost
appendedHost := signedHost + ".example.net"
photos := newPhotoFetcher(t,
signedHost, parentHost, siblingHost, subdomainHost, appendedHost)
// The real fetcher refuses localhost before any lookup or connection.
realFetcher := httpfetcher.New(httpfetcher.DefaultConfig())
exp := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
expired := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
sig := photoSignature(testSigningKey, signedHost, exp)
otherKeySig := photoSignature("another-signing-key", signedHost, exp)
expiredSig := photoSignature(testSigningKey, signedHost, expired)
localhostSig := photoSignature(testSigningKey, "localhost", exp)
// The error every request refused for its signature gets.
const unauthorized = "unauthorized"
tests := []struct {
name string
fetcher httpfetcher.Fetcher
target string
wantStatus int
wantError string
}{
{"no sig or exp", photos, photoURL(signedHost),
http.StatusUnauthorized, unauthorized},
{"exp but no sig", photos,
fmt.Sprintf("%s?exp=%d", photoURL(signedHost), exp.Unix()),
http.StatusUnauthorized, unauthorized},
{"sig made with another key", photos,
photoURLWithSig(signedHost, otherKeySig, exp),
http.StatusUnauthorized, unauthorized},
{"sig without its = padding", photos,
photoURLWithSig(signedHost, strings.TrimRight(sig, "="), exp),
http.StatusUnauthorized, unauthorized},
{"sig in upper case", photos,
photoURLWithSig(signedHost, strings.ToUpper(sig), exp),
http.StatusUnauthorized, unauthorized},
{"expired sig", photos, photoURLWithSig(signedHost, expiredSig, expired),
http.StatusUnauthorized, unauthorized},
{"sig sent for the parent domain", photos,
photoURLWithSig(parentHost, sig, exp),
http.StatusUnauthorized, unauthorized},
{"sig sent for a sibling host", photos,
photoURLWithSig(siblingHost, sig, exp),
http.StatusUnauthorized, unauthorized},
{"sig sent for a subdomain", photos,
photoURLWithSig(subdomainHost, sig, exp),
http.StatusUnauthorized, unauthorized},
{"sig sent with another domain appended", photos,
photoURLWithSig(appendedHost, sig, exp),
http.StatusUnauthorized, unauthorized},
{"unparseable path", photos,
"/v1/image/" + allowlistedHost + photoPath + "/big.jpeg",
http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid image URL: invalid size format"},
{"blocked upstream address", realFetcher,
photoURLWithSig("localhost", localhostSig, exp),
http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden"},
{"upstream error", photos,
"/v1/image/" + allowlistedHost + "/images/missing.jpg/50x50.jpeg",
http.StatusBadGateway, "upstream error"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rec := sendGet(t, newImageRoute(t, tt.fetcher), tt.target)
checkErrorBody(t, rec, tt.wantStatus, tt.wantError)
})
}
}
// TestHandleImage_AllowlistOrSignature checks that the image route serves an
// image without a signature for a host on the allowlist only, and for another
// host only with a valid signature.
func TestHandleImage_AllowlistOrSignature(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
photos := newPhotoFetcher(t, allowlistedHost, signedHost)
exp := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
sig := photoSignature(testSigningKey, signedHost, exp)
tests := []struct {
name string
target string
wantStatus int
}{
{"allowlisted host, no sig", photoURL(allowlistedHost), http.StatusOK},
{"other host, no sig", photoURL(signedHost), http.StatusUnauthorized},
{"other host, valid sig", photoURLWithSig(signedHost, sig, exp),
http.StatusOK},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rec := sendGet(t, newImageRoute(t, photos), tt.target)
if rec.Code != tt.wantStatus {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, tt.wantStatus)
}
})
}
}
+37 -65
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
@@ -25,8 +24,43 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleImageEnc() http.HandlerFunc {
ctx := r.Context()
start := time.Now()
req, ok := s.parseImageEncRequest(w, r)
if !ok {
// Extract token from URL
token := chi.URLParam(r, "token")
if token == "" {
s.respondError(w, "missing token", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Decrypt and validate the payload
payload, err := s.encGen.Parse(token)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, encurl.ErrExpired) {
s.log.Debug("encrypted URL expired", "error", err)
s.respondError(w, "URL has expired", http.StatusGone)
return
}
s.log.Debug("failed to decrypt URL", "error", err)
s.respondError(w, "invalid encrypted URL", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Convert payload to ImageRequest
req := payload.ToImageRequest()
// Apply the same dimension and fit-mode bounds as the plain image
// route: a sealed payload is trusted for its origin, not for staying
// within limits, so an over-limit size or unknown fit mode is a 400
// here rather than an out-of-memory or a 500 from the processor.
err = imgcache.ValidateImageRequest(req)
if err != nil {
s.log.Debug("encrypted URL failed validation", "error", err)
s.respondError(w, "invalid encrypted URL: "+err.Error(),
http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
@@ -60,17 +94,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleImageEnc() http.HandlerFunc {
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", cacheControl(req.Expires))
w.Header().Set("X-Pixa-Cache", string(resp.CacheStatus))
if notModified(w, r, resp.ETag) {
return
}
// A HEAD request gets the headers only
if r.Method == http.MethodHead {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
// Stream the response
written, err := io.Copy(w, resp.Content)
if err != nil {
@@ -82,7 +105,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleImageEnc() http.HandlerFunc {
// Log completion
duration := time.Since(start)
s.log.Info("image served",
"request_id", middleware.GetReqID(ctx),
"cache_key", imgcache.CacheKey(req),
"host", req.SourceHost,
"path", req.SourcePath,
@@ -94,56 +116,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleImageEnc() http.HandlerFunc {
}
}
// parseImageEncRequest decrypts the token of an encrypted image URL into an
// ImageRequest and checks it. On a token that is missing, does not decrypt,
// has expired or asks for something not valid, it writes an error response
// and returns false.
func (s *Handlers) parseImageEncRequest(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
) (*imgcache.ImageRequest, bool) {
// Extract token from URL
token := chi.URLParam(r, "token")
if token == "" {
s.respondError(w, "missing token", http.StatusBadRequest)
return nil, false
}
// Decrypt and validate the payload
payload, err := s.encGen.Parse(token)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, encurl.ErrExpired) {
s.log.Debug("encrypted URL expired", "error", err)
s.respondError(w, "URL has expired", http.StatusGone)
return nil, false
}
s.log.Debug("failed to decrypt URL", "error", err)
s.respondError(w, "invalid encrypted URL", http.StatusBadRequest)
return nil, false
}
// Convert payload to ImageRequest
req := payload.ToImageRequest()
// Apply the same dimension and fit-mode bounds as the plain image
// route: a sealed payload is trusted for its origin, not for staying
// within limits, so an over-limit size or unknown fit mode is a 400
// here rather than an out-of-memory or a 500 from the processor.
err = imgcache.ValidateImageRequest(req)
if err != nil {
s.log.Debug("encrypted URL failed validation", "error", err)
s.respondError(w, "invalid encrypted URL: "+err.Error(),
http.StatusBadRequest)
return nil, false
}
return req, true
}
// handleImageError converts image service errors to HTTP responses.
func (s *Handlers) handleImageError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
switch {
@@ -96,70 +96,3 @@ func TestHandleImageEnc_InvalidFitMode_Returns400(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
}
// TestHandleImageEnc_IfNoneMatch_Returns304 verifies that an image served
// through an encrypted URL carries an ETag, and that a request whose
// If-None-Match is that ETag is answered 304 Not Modified with no body.
func TestHandleImageEnc_IfNoneMatch_Returns304(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, srv := newSignedHostServer(t, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
target := encPhotoURL(t, h)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, target, nil))
etag := rec.Header().Get("ETag")
t.Logf("GET: %d, ETag %q", rec.Code, etag)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || etag == "" {
t.Fatalf("GET: status = %d, ETag = %q, want %d and an ETag",
rec.Code, etag, http.StatusOK)
}
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, target, nil)
req.Header.Set("If-None-Match", etag)
rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
t.Logf("GET with If-None-Match: %d, %d body bytes", rec.Code, rec.Body.Len())
if rec.Code != http.StatusNotModified || rec.Body.Len() != 0 {
t.Errorf("status = %d with %d body bytes, want %d with none",
rec.Code, rec.Body.Len(), http.StatusNotModified)
}
}
// TestHandleImageEnc_HEAD_ReturnsHeadersOnly verifies that HEAD on an
// encrypted URL is answered 200 with the headers GET sends and no body.
func TestHandleImageEnc_HEAD_ReturnsHeadersOnly(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, _ := newSignedHostServer(t, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Head("/v1/e/{token}/*", h.HandleImageEnc())
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodHead, encPhotoURL(t, h), nil))
t.Logf("HEAD: %d, headers %v, %d body bytes",
rec.Code, rec.Header(), rec.Body.Len())
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
for _, name := range []string{
"Content-Type", "Content-Length", "Cache-Control", "ETag",
} {
if rec.Header().Get(name) == "" {
t.Errorf("HEAD response has no %s", name)
}
}
if rec.Body.Len() != 0 {
t.Errorf("HEAD response body has %d bytes, want none", rec.Body.Len())
}
}
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
)
// signedPhotoURL returns a signed /v1/image/ URL, valid for a minute, for the
// JPEG at photoPath on signedHost at 50x50, made with h's image service.
func signedPhotoURL(t *testing.T, h *Handlers) string {
t.Helper()
signedURL, err := h.imgSvc.GenerateSignedURL("", &imgcache.ImageRequest{
SourceHost: signedHost,
SourcePath: photoPath,
Size: imgcache.Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
Format: imgcache.FormatJPEG,
}, time.Minute)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateSignedURL() error = %v", err)
}
return signedURL
}
// encPhotoURL returns an encrypted /v1/e/ URL, which never expires, for the
// JPEG at photoPath on signedHost at 50x50, made with h's generator.
func encPhotoURL(t *testing.T, h *Handlers) string {
t.Helper()
token, err := h.encGen.Generate(&encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: signedHost,
SourcePath: photoPath,
Width: 50,
Height: 50,
Format: imgcache.FormatJPEG,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Generate() error = %v", err)
}
return "/v1/e/" + token + "/img.jpg"
}
// requestIDByMessage reads the JSON log lines in logs and returns the
// request_id of each line, by its message.
func requestIDByMessage(t *testing.T, logs io.Reader) map[string]string {
t.Helper()
logged := make(map[string]string)
dec := json.NewDecoder(logs)
for dec.More() {
var line map[string]any
err := dec.Decode(&line)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding log line: %v", err)
}
msg, _ := line["msg"].(string)
requestID, _ := line["request_id"].(string)
logged[msg] = requestID
}
return logged
}
// TestImageLogLinesCarryRequestID verifies that the lines logged when an image
// is fetched, converted and served through either image route carry the
// request's ID as request_id, as the request log line does, so they can be
// found from it.
func TestImageLogLinesCarryRequestID(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const requestID = "test-request-id"
imageURLs := map[string]func(*testing.T, *Handlers) string{
"/v1/image/": signedPhotoURL,
"/v1/e/": encPhotoURL,
}
for route, imageURL := range imageURLs {
t.Run(route, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var logs bytes.Buffer
h, srv := newSignedHostServer(t,
slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logs, nil)))
ctx := context.WithValue(t.Context(),
middleware.RequestIDKey, requestID)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
ctx, http.MethodGet, imageURL(t, h), nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
t.Logf("logged:\n%s", logs.String())
logged := requestIDByMessage(t, &logs)
for _, msg := range []string{
"upstream fetched", "image converted", "image served",
} {
got, ok := logged[msg]
if !ok {
t.Errorf("no %q line logged", msg)
} else if got != requestID {
t.Errorf("%q line has request_id %q, want %q",
msg, got, requestID)
}
}
})
}
}
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"testing"
"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/globals"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/healthcheck"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/logger"
)
// TestHandleRobotsTxt checks that /robots.txt asks every crawler to stay off
// the whole site.
func TestHandleRobotsTxt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h := &Handlers{log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)}
rec := sendGet(t, h.HandleRobotsTxt(), "/robots.txt")
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
if ct := rec.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "text/plain" {
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want text/plain", ct)
}
want := "User-agent: *\nDisallow: /\n"
if rec.Body.String() != want {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", rec.Body.String(), want)
}
}
// TestHandleHealthCheck checks that the health check answers 200 with status
// ok, the app's name and version, now, uptime_seconds, uptime_human and
// maintenance_mode, which is true here: the health check stays 200 while
// maintenance mode is on.
func TestHandleHealthCheck(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
lc := fxtest.NewLifecycle(t)
log, err := logger.New(lc, logger.Params{Globals: &globals.Globals{}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("logger.New() error = %v", err)
}
hc, err := healthcheck.New(lc, healthcheck.Params{
Globals: &globals.Globals{Appname: "pixad", Version: "v1.2.3"},
Config: &config.Config{MaintenanceMode: true},
Logger: log,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("healthcheck.New() error = %v", err)
}
h := &Handlers{hc: hc, log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)}
rec := sendGet(t, h.HandleHealthCheck(), "/.well-known/healthcheck.json")
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
if ct := rec.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/json" {
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want application/json", ct)
}
var body map[string]any
err = json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response body: %v", err)
}
if body["status"] != "ok" || body["appname"] != "pixad" ||
body["version"] != "v1.2.3" || body["maintenance_mode"] != true {
t.Errorf("body = %v, want status ok, appname pixad, version v1.2.3 "+
"and maintenance_mode true", body)
}
for _, key := range []string{"now", "uptime_seconds", "uptime_human"} {
if _, ok := body[key]; !ok {
t.Errorf("body = %v, has no %s", body, key)
}
}
}
-9
View File
@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@ import (
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)
// Fetcher configuration constants.
@@ -269,13 +267,6 @@ func (f *HTTPFetcher) Fetch(ctx context.Context, url string) (*FetchResult, erro
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", f.config.UserAgent)
req.Header.Set("Accept", strings.Join(f.config.AllowedContentTypes, ", "))
// The ID of the request this fetch serves, so the fetch can be found in
// the upstream host's logs
requestID := middleware.GetReqID(ctx)
if requestID != "" {
req.Header.Set(middleware.RequestIDHeader, requestID)
}
// Use httptrace to capture connection details
var remoteAddr string
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
package httpfetcher
import (
"context"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)
// TestFetchSendsRequestID verifies that a fetch sends the ID of the request
// it serves, which the RequestID middleware stores in the request context,
// to the upstream host as X-Request-Id, so the fetch can be found in that
// host's logs.
func TestFetchSendsRequestID(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const requestID = "test-request-id"
received := make(chan string, 1)
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
received <- r.Header.Get("X-Request-Id")
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentTypeJPEG)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, imagePayload)
}))
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
f, _ := newServerFetcher(t, srv, nil)
ctx := context.WithValue(testContext(t), middleware.RequestIDKey, requestID)
res, err := f.Fetch(ctx, upstreamURL("/image"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Fetch() error = %v", err)
}
_ = res.Content.Close()
got := <-received
t.Logf("upstream received X-Request-Id %q", got)
if got != requestID {
t.Errorf("upstream X-Request-Id = %q, want %q", got, requestID)
}
}
+8 -25
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"io"
"log/slog"
"path/filepath"
"sync"
"time"
lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2"
@@ -37,16 +38,11 @@ type CacheConfig struct {
NegativeTTL time.Duration
// MaxBytes is the disk cache size limit in bytes that eviction
// enforces. Zero means no limit is enforced (no eviction).
// enforces. Zero means no limit is enforced (no eviction). The
// config layer supplies the computed default when the operator
// omits cache_max_bytes.
MaxBytes int64
// UseDefaultMaxBytes makes NewCache replace MaxBytes with the
// default limit: 75% of the sum of the space free on the filesystem
// holding the cache and the bytes the cache already holds, at least
// DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor. The config layer sets this when the
// operator omits cache_max_bytes.
UseDefaultMaxBytes bool
// DisableDiskCache turns the disk cache off entirely: no cache
// directories are created, lookups always miss, stores are
// no-ops, and no eviction machinery runs. The config layer sets
@@ -73,11 +69,11 @@ type Cache struct {
// Eviction machinery. The channels are created in NewCache so
// stores can signal write pressure without racing StartEviction.
// evictionCancel, set by StartEviction, cancels the eviction
// goroutine's context.
evictionPressure chan struct{}
evictionStop chan struct{}
evictionDone chan struct{}
evictionCancel context.CancelFunc
evictionStarted bool
evictionStopOnce sync.Once
// metaCache holds the content types of the variants most recently
// stored or served, so a hit does not read the variant's .meta file.
@@ -116,6 +112,7 @@ func NewCache(db *sql.DB, config CacheConfig) (*Cache, error) {
log: log,
disabled: config.DisableDiskCache,
evictionPressure: make(chan struct{}, 1),
evictionStop: make(chan struct{}),
evictionDone: make(chan struct{}),
metaCache: metaCache,
contentLocks: newContentLock(),
@@ -150,20 +147,6 @@ func NewCache(db *sql.DB, config CacheConfig) (*Cache, error) {
c.variants = variants
c.srcMetadata = srcMetadata
if config.UseDefaultMaxBytes {
limit, err := c.computeDefaultMaxBytes(context.Background(), defaultFreeSpaceProbe)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c.config.MaxBytes = limit
log.Info("computed default cache size limit from free space and cache contents",
"cache_max_bytes", limit,
"cache_dir", filepath.Join(config.StateDir, "cache"),
)
}
return c, nil
}
-89
View File
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
package imgcache
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math"
"path/filepath"
"syscall"
)
// DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor is the minimum computed default for the
// cache_max_bytes setting: 500 MiB. The floor applies only to the
// computed default (when the key is omitted from the configuration),
// never to explicitly configured values.
const DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor int64 = 524288000
// freeSpaceFractionNumerator and freeSpaceFractionDenominator express
// the 75% share used for the computed default limit as integer
// arithmetic (dividing before multiplying avoids overflow).
const (
freeSpaceFractionNumerator uint64 = 3
freeSpaceFractionDenominator uint64 = 4
)
var errNegativeBlockSize = errors.New("statfs reported negative block size")
// FreeSpaceProbeFunc reports the number of free bytes available on the
// filesystem containing path. It is a function type so tests can
// inject a fake probe instead of depending on the host disk.
type FreeSpaceProbeFunc func(path string) (uint64, error)
// defaultFreeSpaceProbe reports free filesystem bytes via statfs on
// the given path, as available to unprivileged processes.
func defaultFreeSpaceProbe(path string) (uint64, error) {
var stat syscall.Statfs_t
err := syscall.Statfs(path, &stat)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if stat.Bsize < 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w %d for %q", errNegativeBlockSize, stat.Bsize, path)
}
blockSize := uint64(stat.Bsize)
return stat.Bavail * blockSize, nil
}
// computeDefaultMaxBytes returns the default cache size limit: 75% of
// the sum of the free bytes probe reports for <state_dir>/cache/ and
// the bytes the cache already holds, with a floor of
// DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor. Counting what the cache holds keeps the
// limit from shrinking as the cache fills.
func (c *Cache) computeDefaultMaxBytes(
ctx context.Context, probe FreeSpaceProbeFunc,
) (int64, error) {
cacheDir := filepath.Join(c.config.StateDir, "cache")
freeBytes, err := probe(cacheDir)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"default cache_max_bytes: cannot determine free space for %q: %w",
cacheDir, err)
}
usedBytes, err := c.UsageBytes(ctx)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
// Both terms are at most math.MaxInt64, so the sum cannot overflow.
//nolint:gosec // G115: UsageBytes sums file sizes, never negative
spaceBytes := min(freeBytes, math.MaxInt64) + uint64(usedBytes)
computed := spaceBytes / freeSpaceFractionDenominator * freeSpaceFractionNumerator
computed = min(computed, math.MaxInt64)
// gosec cannot see that min() above bounds computed, so it reads
// this conversion as potentially overflowing. It cannot: computed is
// at most math.MaxInt64 on every path here.
//nolint:gosec // G115: clamped to MaxInt64 by min above
limit := int64(computed)
limit = max(limit, DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor)
return limit, nil
}
@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
package imgcache
import (
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// errTestStatfsFailed is returned by the failing free-space probe below.
var errTestStatfsFailed = errors.New("statfs failed")
// TestComputeDefaultMaxBytesCountsWhatTheCacheHolds verifies that the
// default limit is 75% of the free space plus what the cache already
// holds, so a cache filled to its limit keeps that limit across a
// restart instead of shrinking to 75% of the space left free.
func TestComputeDefaultMaxBytesCountsWhatTheCacheHolds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
// Empty cache, 4 GiB free -> 3 GiB default.
got, err := cache.computeDefaultMaxBytes(t.Context(),
func(string) (uint64, error) { return 4294967296, nil })
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("computeDefaultMaxBytes returned error: %v", err)
}
if got != 3221225472 {
t.Errorf("default for an empty cache = %d, want 3221225472 (75%% of 4 GiB)",
got)
}
// The cache now holds those 3 GiB, which leaves 1 GiB free.
_, err = cache.db.ExecContext(t.Context(),
`INSERT INTO variant_content (cache_key, size_bytes, content_type)
VALUES (?, ?, ?)`,
string(testVariantKeyOne), 3221225472, testContentTypeWebP,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to insert variant accounting row: %v", err)
}
got, err = cache.computeDefaultMaxBytes(t.Context(),
func(string) (uint64, error) { return 1073741824, nil })
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("computeDefaultMaxBytes returned error: %v", err)
}
if got != 3221225472 {
t.Errorf("default for a cache holding 3 GiB with 1 GiB free = %d, "+
"want 3221225472 (75%% of 1 GiB + 3 GiB)", got)
}
}
// TestComputeDefaultMaxBytesAppliesFloor verifies that when 75% of the
// free space plus what the cache holds is below 500 MiB, the default
// is floored at DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor.
func TestComputeDefaultMaxBytesAppliesFloor(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []struct {
name string
freeBytes uint64
}{
{name: "100 MiB free", freeBytes: 104857600},
{name: "zero free", freeBytes: 0},
{name: "just below floor threshold", freeBytes: 699050665},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
got, err := cache.computeDefaultMaxBytes(t.Context(),
func(string) (uint64, error) { return tc.freeBytes, nil })
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("computeDefaultMaxBytes returned error: %v", err)
}
if got != DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor {
t.Errorf("computeDefaultMaxBytes = %d, want floor %d",
got, DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor)
}
})
}
}
// TestComputeDefaultMaxBytesPropagatesProbeError verifies that a
// failing free-space probe produces an error naming cache_max_bytes,
// instead of a silently wrong default.
func TestComputeDefaultMaxBytesPropagatesProbeError(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
_, err := cache.computeDefaultMaxBytes(t.Context(),
func(string) (uint64, error) { return 0, errTestStatfsFailed })
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("probe failure must produce an error, got nil")
}
t.Logf("got expected error: %v", err)
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cache_max_bytes") {
t.Errorf("error %q does not name cache_max_bytes", err.Error())
}
}
// TestComputeDefaultMaxBytesProbesTheCacheDirectory verifies that the
// probe is pointed at <state_dir>/cache/ and that the directory exists
// by then, so statfs measures the filesystem that holds the cache.
func TestComputeDefaultMaxBytesProbesTheCacheDirectory(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, stateDir := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
wantCacheDir := filepath.Join(stateDir, "cache")
var probedPath string
_, err := cache.computeDefaultMaxBytes(t.Context(),
func(path string) (uint64, error) {
probedPath = path
info, err := os.Stat(path)
if err != nil || !info.IsDir() {
t.Errorf("cache directory %q missing when probed: info=%v err=%v",
path, info, err)
}
return 4294967296, nil
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("computeDefaultMaxBytes returned error: %v", err)
}
if probedPath != wantCacheDir {
t.Errorf("free space probed at %q, want cache directory %q",
probedPath, wantCacheDir)
}
}
// TestNewCacheUsesDefaultMaxBytesOnlyWhenAsked verifies that NewCache
// replaces MaxBytes with the computed default when UseDefaultMaxBytes
// is set, and keeps MaxBytes as given otherwise.
func TestNewCacheUsesDefaultMaxBytesOnlyWhenAsked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
withDefault, err := NewCache(evictionTestDB(t), CacheConfig{
StateDir: t.TempDir(),
MaxBytes: 1024,
UseDefaultMaxBytes: true,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewCache with UseDefaultMaxBytes failed: %v", err)
}
if withDefault.config.MaxBytes < DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor {
t.Errorf("MaxBytes with UseDefaultMaxBytes = %d, want the default, "+
"at least %d", withDefault.config.MaxBytes, DefaultCacheMaxBytesFloor)
}
explicit, err := NewCache(evictionTestDB(t), CacheConfig{
StateDir: t.TempDir(),
MaxBytes: 1024,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewCache failed: %v", err)
}
if explicit.config.MaxBytes != 1024 {
t.Errorf("MaxBytes without UseDefaultMaxBytes = %d, want 1024",
explicit.config.MaxBytes)
}
}
+23 -64
View File
@@ -117,10 +117,7 @@ func (c *Cache) EvictToLimit(ctx context.Context) error {
// evictBatch fetches one batch of LRU candidates across variants and
// source blobs and evicts them oldest-first until excessBytes are
// freed or the batch is exhausted. It returns the bytes freed. A
// candidate that fails once ctx is cancelled (every one started after
// that fails at its first database call) ends the batch with ctx's
// error, without a warning.
// freed or the batch is exhausted. It returns the bytes freed.
func (c *Cache) evictBatch(ctx context.Context, excessBytes int64) (int64, error) {
candidates, err := c.evictionCandidates(ctx)
if err != nil {
@@ -136,10 +133,6 @@ func (c *Cache) evictBatch(ctx context.Context, excessBytes int64) (int64, error
err := c.evictCandidate(ctx, candidate)
if err != nil {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return freed, ctx.Err()
}
c.log.Warn("failed to evict cache entry",
"cache_key", candidate.cacheKey,
"content_hash", candidate.contentHash,
@@ -431,44 +424,37 @@ func (c *Cache) notifyWritePressure() {
// startup and again on every periodic tick thereafter, and evicts to
// the configured limit on the given periodic interval and on
// write-pressure notifications. It is a no-op on a disabled cache or
// when already started. The goroutine outlives the caller, so it runs
// with its own context, which StopEviction cancels.
// when already started.
func (c *Cache) StartEviction(interval time.Duration) {
if c.disabled || c.evictionCancel != nil {
if c.disabled || c.evictionStarted {
return
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
c.evictionCancel = cancel
c.evictionStarted = true
go c.evictionLoop(ctx, interval)
go c.evictionLoop(interval)
}
// StopEviction cancels the background eviction goroutine, which
// interrupts a pass in progress, and waits for it to exit or for ctx to
// end, whichever comes first. In the second case it returns an error
// wrapping ctx's error. It is safe to call when eviction was never
// started, and safe to call more than once.
func (c *Cache) StopEviction(ctx context.Context) error {
if c.evictionCancel == nil {
return nil
// StopEviction stops the background eviction goroutine and waits for
// it to exit. It is safe to call when eviction was never started, and
// safe to call more than once.
func (c *Cache) StopEviction() {
if !c.evictionStarted {
return
}
c.evictionCancel()
select {
case <-c.evictionDone:
return nil
case <-ctx.Done():
return fmt.Errorf("cache eviction still running: %w", ctx.Err())
}
c.evictionStopOnce.Do(func() {
close(c.evictionStop)
<-c.evictionDone
})
}
// evictionLoop is the body of the background eviction goroutine. It
// returns when ctx is cancelled, and starts no pass after that.
func (c *Cache) evictionLoop(ctx context.Context, interval time.Duration) {
// evictionLoop is the body of the background eviction goroutine.
func (c *Cache) evictionLoop(interval time.Duration) {
defer close(c.evictionDone)
ctx := context.Background()
c.runReconciliationPass(ctx)
c.runEvictionPass(ctx)
@@ -477,7 +463,7 @@ func (c *Cache) evictionLoop(ctx context.Context, interval time.Duration) {
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
case <-c.evictionStop:
return
case <-ticker.C:
// Reconciliation walks the cache directories, so it only
@@ -498,13 +484,8 @@ func (c *Cache) evictionLoop(ctx context.Context, interval time.Duration) {
}
// runEvictionPass runs one eviction pass, logging failures instead of
// propagating them (the loop must keep running). It does nothing once
// ctx is cancelled.
// propagating them (the loop must keep running).
func (c *Cache) runEvictionPass(ctx context.Context) {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return
}
err := c.EvictToLimit(ctx)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("cache eviction pass failed", "error", err)
@@ -512,13 +493,8 @@ func (c *Cache) runEvictionPass(ctx context.Context) {
}
// runReconciliationPass runs one reconciliation pass, logging failures
// instead of propagating them (the loop must keep running). It does
// nothing once ctx is cancelled.
// instead of propagating them (the loop must keep running).
func (c *Cache) runReconciliationPass(ctx context.Context) {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return
}
err := c.reconcileAccounting(ctx)
if err != nil {
c.log.Warn("cache accounting reconciliation failed", "error", err)
@@ -535,8 +511,7 @@ func (c *Cache) runReconciliationPass(ctx context.Context) {
// know (and rows whose files are gone), and sweeps stale temp files
// left behind by crashed writes. Running it periodically, not just
// once, bounds how long such drift can accumulate unaccounted for on a
// long-running process to one eviction interval. Once ctx is cancelled,
// it stops at the next file or row and returns ctx's error.
// long-running process to one eviction interval.
func (c *Cache) reconcileAccounting(ctx context.Context) error {
if c.disabled {
return nil
@@ -571,10 +546,6 @@ func (c *Cache) reconcileVariantFiles(ctx context.Context) error {
return filepath.WalkDir(
c.variants.baseDir,
func(path string, entry fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return ctx.Err()
}
if err != nil || entry.IsDir() {
return err
}
@@ -663,10 +634,6 @@ func (c *Cache) reconcileVariantRows(ctx context.Context) error {
}
for _, key := range keys {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return ctx.Err()
}
if c.variants.Exists(key) {
continue
}
@@ -732,10 +699,6 @@ func (c *Cache) reconcileSourceFiles(ctx context.Context) error {
return filepath.WalkDir(
c.srcContent.baseDir,
func(path string, entry fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return ctx.Err()
}
if err != nil || entry.IsDir() {
return err
}
@@ -797,10 +760,6 @@ func (c *Cache) reconcileSourceRows(ctx context.Context) error {
}
for _, hash := range hashes {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return ctx.Err()
}
if c.srcContent.Exists(hash) {
continue
}
+4 -243
View File
@@ -4,12 +4,9 @@ import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"errors"
"io/fs"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -660,7 +657,7 @@ func TestEvictionRunsUnderWritePressure(t *testing.T) {
// An interval far longer than the test ensures only write
// pressure can trigger eviction here.
cache.StartEviction(time.Hour)
defer func() { _ = cache.StopEviction(t.Context()) }()
defer cache.StopEviction()
keys := []VariantKey{
testVariantKeyOne, testVariantKeyTwo, testVariantKeyThree,
@@ -693,7 +690,7 @@ func TestEvictionRunsOnPeriodicSchedule(t *testing.T) {
// write-pressure notification fires and only the periodic ticker
// can trigger eviction.
cache.StartEviction(100 * time.Millisecond)
defer func() { _ = cache.StopEviction(t.Context()) }()
defer cache.StopEviction()
keys := []VariantKey{
testVariantKeyOne, testVariantKeyTwo, testVariantKeyThree,
@@ -754,7 +751,7 @@ func TestStartEvictionReconcilesAccountingWithDisk(t *testing.T) {
}
cache.StartEviction(time.Hour)
defer func() { _ = cache.StopEviction(t.Context()) }()
defer cache.StopEviction()
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
@@ -811,7 +808,7 @@ func TestPeriodicReconciliationAdoptsFileThatAppearsAfterStartup(t *testing.T) {
const interval = 100 * time.Millisecond
cache.StartEviction(interval)
defer func() { _ = cache.StopEviction(t.Context()) }()
defer cache.StopEviction()
// Let startup reconciliation run and settle on an empty cache
// before introducing the untracked file, so the adoption we assert
@@ -865,242 +862,6 @@ func TestPeriodicReconciliationAdoptsFileThatAppearsAfterStartup(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestStopEvictionInterruptsPassInProgress holds the test database's
// only connection, so the startup reconciliation pass waits for it, and
// checks that StopEviction stops that pass instead of waiting for the
// connection to come free, and that the stop logs one warning: the
// interrupted reconciliation's, with no eviction pass started after it.
func TestStopEvictionInterruptsPassInProgress(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
var logBuf bytes.Buffer
cache.log = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logBuf, nil))
conn, err := cache.db.Conn(t.Context())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to take the database connection: %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = conn.Close() }()
cache.StartEviction(time.Hour)
// The pass is in progress once it waits for the connection.
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for cache.db.Stats().WaitCount == 0 {
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatal("the reconciliation pass never waited for the database")
}
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
err = cache.StopEviction(ctx)
t.Logf("StopEviction() error = %v", err)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StopEviction() error = %v, want nil: the pass waiting for "+
"the database did not stop", err)
}
t.Logf("log output: %s", logBuf.String())
warnings := strings.Count(logBuf.String(), `"level":"WARN"`)
if warnings != 1 {
t.Errorf("the stop logged %d warnings, want 1", warnings)
}
}
// TestEvictToLimitStopsAtNextCandidateOnceCancelled cancels the context
// while the oldest of three source blobs is being evicted, and checks that
// EvictToLimit then returns context.Canceled without evicting the other
// two or logging a warning for either of them.
func TestEvictToLimitStopsAtNextCandidateOnceCancelled(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1)
var logBuf bytes.Buffer
cache.log = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logBuf, nil))
hashes := []ContentHash{
storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache, "cancel.example.com", "/a.jpg",
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x61}, 1000)),
storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache, "cancel.example.com", "/b.jpg",
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x62}, 1000)),
storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache, "cancel.example.com", "/c.jpg",
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x63}, 1000)),
}
base := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
for i, hash := range hashes {
setSourceLastAccessed(t, cache, hash, base.Add(time.Duration(i)*time.Minute))
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer cancel()
cache.evictSourceBlobTestHook = func(ContentHash) { cancel() }
err := cache.EvictToLimit(ctx)
t.Logf("EvictToLimit() error = %v", err)
t.Logf("log output: %s", logBuf.String())
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Errorf("EvictToLimit() error = %v, want context.Canceled", err)
}
if cache.srcContent.Exists(hashes[0]) {
t.Errorf("source blob %s, evicted when the context was cancelled, "+
"is still on disk", hashes[0])
}
for _, hash := range hashes[1:] {
if !cache.srcContent.Exists(hash) {
t.Errorf("source blob %s was evicted after the context was cancelled", hash)
}
}
if strings.Contains(logBuf.String(), `"level":"WARN"`) {
t.Errorf("EvictToLimit logged a warning after the context was cancelled")
}
assertNoDanglingReferences(t, cache)
}
// TestStopEvictionReturnsWhenItsContextEnds pauses an eviction pass where
// cancellation cannot reach it, after a source blob's rows are deleted and
// before its file is removed, and checks that StopEviction returns its
// context's error when that context ends instead of waiting for the pass.
// Once the pass goes on, the goroutine exits and no row points at a
// missing file.
func TestStopEvictionReturnsWhenItsContextEnds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1)
paused := make(chan struct{})
resume := make(chan struct{})
cache.evictSourceBlobTestHook = func(ContentHash) {
close(paused)
<-resume
}
hash := storeEvictionTestSource(t, cache, "stop.example.com", "/a.jpg",
bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x61}, 1000))
cache.StartEviction(time.Hour)
select {
case <-paused:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("the eviction pass never reached the source blob")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 50*time.Millisecond)
defer cancel()
err := cache.StopEviction(ctx)
t.Logf("StopEviction() error = %v", err)
if !errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
t.Errorf("StopEviction() error = %v, want context.DeadlineExceeded", err)
}
close(resume)
err = cache.StopEviction(t.Context())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second StopEviction() error = %v, want nil", err)
}
assertNoDanglingReferences(t, cache)
if cache.srcContent.Exists(hash) {
t.Errorf("source blob %s is still on disk after its rows were deleted", hash)
}
}
// TestReconciliationWalksStopOnceCancelled checks that both directory
// walks of a reconciliation pass return the context's error once it is
// cancelled, leaving in place a stale temp file they would otherwise
// remove.
func TestReconciliationWalksStopOnceCancelled(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
cancel()
staleTime := time.Now().Add(-2 * staleTempFileAge)
walks := map[string]func(context.Context) error{
cache.variants.baseDir: cache.reconcileVariantFiles,
cache.srcContent.baseDir: cache.reconcileSourceFiles,
}
for dir, walk := range walks {
tempFile := filepath.Join(dir, tempFilePrefix+"stale")
err := os.WriteFile(tempFile, []byte("partial"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write temp file: %v", err)
}
err = os.Chtimes(tempFile, staleTime, staleTime)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to backdate temp file: %v", err)
}
err = walk(ctx)
t.Logf("walk of %s: error = %v", dir, err)
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Errorf("walk of %s: error = %v, want context.Canceled", dir, err)
}
_, err = os.Stat(tempFile)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("walk of %s went on after cancellation: %v", dir, err)
}
}
}
// TestReconciliationPassLogsNoWarningOnceCancelled checks that a
// reconciliation pass run with an already cancelled context logs no
// warning, so a periodic tick the loop takes after a stop adds no
// warning to the one from the pass the stop interrupted.
func TestReconciliationPassLogsNoWarningOnceCancelled(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cache, _ := newEvictionTestCache(t, 1<<30)
var logBuf bytes.Buffer
cache.log = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logBuf, nil))
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
cancel()
cache.runReconciliationPass(ctx)
t.Logf("log output: %s", logBuf.String())
if strings.Contains(logBuf.String(), `"level":"WARN"`) {
t.Errorf("runReconciliationPass logged a warning with a cancelled context")
}
}
// TestEvictSourceBlobExcludesConcurrentStoreOfIdenticalContent exercises
// the exact TOCTOU window between evictSourceBlob's row-deletion
// transaction commit and its content file unlink: a concurrent
+30
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"net/url"
"time"
)
@@ -153,6 +154,9 @@ type ImageCache interface {
// Warm pre-fetches and caches an image without returning it
Warm(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) error
// Purge removes a cached image
Purge(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) error
// Stats returns cache statistics
Stats(ctx context.Context) (*CacheStats, error)
}
@@ -172,3 +176,29 @@ type CacheStats struct {
// HitRate is HitCount / (HitCount + MissCount)
HitRate float64
}
// SignatureValidator validates request signatures
type SignatureValidator interface {
// Validate checks if the signature is valid for the request
Validate(req *ImageRequest) error
// Generate creates a signature for a request
Generate(req *ImageRequest) string
}
// Allowlist checks if a URL is allowlisted (no signature required)
type Allowlist interface {
// IsAllowlisted returns true if the URL doesn't require a signature
IsAllowlisted(u *url.URL) bool
}
// Storage handles persistent storage of cached content
type Storage interface {
// Store saves content and returns its hash
Store(ctx context.Context, content io.Reader) (hash string, err error)
// Load retrieves content by hash
Load(ctx context.Context, hash string) (io.ReadCloser, error)
// Delete removes content by hash
Delete(ctx context.Context, hash string) error
// Exists checks if content exists
Exists(ctx context.Context, hash string) (bool, error)
}
+9 -6
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
"github.com/getsentry/sentry-go"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
"golang.org/x/sync/singleflight"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/allowlist"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
@@ -57,10 +56,11 @@ type ServiceConfig struct {
Logger *slog.Logger
}
// Static errors for service construction.
// Static errors for service construction and unimplemented operations.
var (
errCacheRequired = errors.New("cache is required")
errSigningKeyRequired = errors.New("signing key is required")
errCacheRequired = errors.New("cache is required")
errSigningKeyRequired = errors.New("signing key is required")
errPurgeNotImplemented = errors.New("purge not implemented")
)
// NewService creates a new image service.
@@ -189,6 +189,11 @@ func (s *Service) Warm(ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest) error {
return err
}
// Purge removes a cached image. Purging is not implemented yet.
func (s *Service) Purge(_ context.Context, _ *ImageRequest) error {
return errPurgeNotImplemented
}
// Stats returns cache statistics.
func (s *Service) Stats(ctx context.Context) (*CacheStats, error) {
return s.cache.Stats(ctx)
@@ -462,7 +467,6 @@ func (s *Service) fetchAndProcess(
// Log upstream fetch details
s.log.Info("upstream fetched",
"request_id", middleware.GetReqID(ctx),
"host", req.SourceHost,
"path", req.SourcePath,
"bytes", fetchBytes,
@@ -547,7 +551,6 @@ func (s *Service) processAndStore(
}
s.log.Info("image converted",
"request_id", middleware.GetReqID(ctx),
"host", req.SourceHost,
"path", req.SourcePath,
"src_format", processResult.InputFormat,
-29
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,9 @@
package middleware
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"regexp"
"time"
basicauth "github.com/99designs/basicauth-go"
@@ -118,32 +115,6 @@ func (s *Middleware) RateLimit(
})
}
// requestIDPattern is what a request's own X-Request-Id must look like to be
// kept as its ID: 1 to 64 letters, digits, '-', '_' or '.'.
var requestIDPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,64}$`)
// RequestID returns a middleware that gives each request an ID and sends it as
// the X-Request-Id response header, so a client can quote it when reporting a
// problem. The ID is the request's own X-Request-Id when that matches
// requestIDPattern, and otherwise a random one, which tells nothing about the
// machine or the traffic. It is stored in the request context under chi's
// RequestIDKey, where the logging middleware, the handlers and the upstream
// fetch read it.
func (s *Middleware) RequestID() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id := r.Header.Get(middleware.RequestIDHeader)
if !requestIDPattern.MatchString(id) {
id = rand.Text()
}
w.Header().Set(middleware.RequestIDHeader, id)
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), middleware.RequestIDKey, id)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
}
type loggingResponseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
@@ -1,16 +1,11 @@
package middleware
import (
"bytes"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/config"
)
@@ -61,203 +56,6 @@ func TestCORSAnswersWithConfiguredOrigin(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestCORSAnswersPreflightWithConfiguredOrigin checks that the CORS
// middleware answers a preflight request, which the CORS library handles
// apart from other requests, the same way: "*" lets any origin read
// responses and a single origin lets only that origin read them.
func TestCORSAnswersPreflightWithConfiguredOrigin(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const appOrigin = "https://app.example.com"
cases := []struct {
configured string
requestOrigin string
want string
}{
{"*", "https://any.example.com", "*"},
{appOrigin, appOrigin, appOrigin},
{appOrigin, "https://other.example.com", ""},
}
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
for _, tc := range cases {
mw := &Middleware{
log: slog.Default(),
config: &config.Config{AccessControlAllowOrigin: tc.configured},
}
handler := mw.CORS()(testHandler)
// An OPTIONS request naming the method it asks about is the
// preflight a browser sends before some cross-origin requests.
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodOptions, "/v1/image/example.com/a.jpg/1x1.png", nil)
req.Header.Set("Origin", tc.requestOrigin)
req.Header.Set("Access-Control-Request-Method", http.MethodGet)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
got := rec.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("configured %q, preflight from %q: "+
"Access-Control-Allow-Origin = %q, want %q",
tc.configured, tc.requestOrigin, got, tc.want)
}
}
}
// TestMetricsAuthRequiresConfiguredCredentials checks that MetricsAuth on
// its own answers 401 with a challenge to a request without credentials or
// with a wrong username or password, and lets a request with the configured
// username and password through. That the router puts it in front of
// /metrics is not tested.
func TestMetricsAuthRequiresConfiguredCredentials(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
username = "metricsuser"
password = "metricspass"
challenge = `Basic realm="metrics"`
)
// An empty username stands for a request sent without credentials.
cases := []struct {
name string
username string
password string
wantReached bool
}{
{"no credentials", "", "", false},
{"wrong username", "someone", password, false},
{"wrong password", username, "wrongpass", false},
{"configured credentials", username, password, true},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mw := &Middleware{
log: slog.Default(),
config: &config.Config{
MetricsUsername: username,
MetricsPassword: password,
},
}
reached := false
handler := mw.MetricsAuth()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
reached = true
}))
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/metrics", nil)
if tc.username != "" {
req.SetBasicAuth(tc.username, tc.password)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if reached != tc.wantReached {
t.Fatalf("request reached /metrics = %v, want %v",
reached, tc.wantReached)
}
if tc.wantReached {
return
}
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusUnauthorized)
}
if got := rec.Header().Get("WWW-Authenticate"); got != challenge {
t.Errorf("WWW-Authenticate = %q, want %q", got, challenge)
}
})
}
}
// TestMetricsRecordsServedRequest checks that the metrics middleware
// records a request it served, so /metrics reports it. It is the only test
// in this package that sets up the metrics middleware, which registers with
// the process-wide Prometheus registry and can do so only once.
func TestMetricsRecordsServedRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The line /metrics shows once one GET /test has been served.
const want = `http_request_duration_seconds_count{` +
`code="200",handler="/test",method="GET",service=""} 1`
mw := &Middleware{log: slog.Default(), config: &config.Config{}}
handler := mw.Metrics()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/test", nil))
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
promhttp.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/metrics", nil))
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), want) {
t.Errorf("/metrics does not report the GET /test served; "+
"want the line %q in:\n%s", want, rec.Body.String())
}
}
// TestLoggingLeavesOutSubmittedSigningKey checks that a login, a POST /
// whose form carries the signing key, leaves no trace of the key in the
// request's log line.
func TestLoggingLeavesOutSubmittedSigningKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const signingKey = "test-signing-key-0123456789abcdef"
var buf bytes.Buffer
mw := newTestMiddleware(t, &buf)
// The handler reads the key from the form, as the login handler does.
handler := mw.Logging()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if got := r.FormValue("key"); got != signingKey {
t.Errorf("key in form = %q, want %q", got, signingKey)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusSeeOther)
}))
form := url.Values{"key": {signingKey}}
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodPost, "/",
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
if !strings.Contains(buf.String(), `"method":"POST"`) {
t.Fatalf("no log line for the request; got %q", buf.String())
}
if strings.Contains(buf.String(), signingKey) {
t.Errorf("log output contains the signing key; got %q", buf.String())
}
}
func TestSecurityHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
package middleware
import (
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/config"
)
// sendRequestID sends a request through the RequestID middleware, carrying
// incoming as its X-Request-Id unless that is empty. It returns the ID the
// next handler found in the request context, which the upstream fetch sends
// and the log lines carry, and the X-Request-Id of the response.
func sendRequestID(t *testing.T, incoming string) (string, string) {
t.Helper()
mw := &Middleware{log: slog.Default(), config: &config.Config{}}
var inContext string
handler := mw.RequestID()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
inContext = middleware.GetReqID(r.Context())
}))
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
if incoming != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Request-Id", incoming)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
return inContext, rec.Header().Get("X-Request-Id")
}
// TestRequestIDKeepsShortPlainID verifies that a request's own X-Request-Id of
// at most 64 letters, digits, '-', '_' or '.' is kept as its ID.
func TestRequestIDKeepsShortPlainID(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, incoming := range []string{
"client-request-id",
"A1_b2.c3-d4",
strings.Repeat("a", 64),
} {
inContext, inResponse := sendRequestID(t, incoming)
if inContext != incoming || inResponse != incoming {
t.Errorf("incoming %q: context has %q, response %q, want both %q",
incoming, inContext, inResponse, incoming)
}
}
}
// TestRequestIDReplacesLongOrUnusualID verifies that a request's own
// X-Request-Id that is over 64 characters or holds anything but letters,
// digits, '-', '_' or '.' is neither sent back nor sent upstream: the request
// gets a fresh ID instead.
func TestRequestIDReplacesLongOrUnusualID(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, incoming := range []string{
strings.Repeat("a", 65),
strings.Repeat("a", 9000),
"has space",
"a/b",
"a,b",
"<script>",
"ünicode",
} {
inContext, inResponse := sendRequestID(t, incoming)
t.Logf("incoming %.20q: made up %q", incoming, inResponse)
if inResponse == "" || inResponse == incoming {
t.Errorf("incoming %.20q: response has %q, want a fresh ID",
incoming, inResponse)
}
if inContext != inResponse {
t.Errorf("incoming %.20q: context has %q, want the response's %q",
incoming, inContext, inResponse)
}
}
}
// TestRequestIDMadeUpTellsNothing verifies that the ID made up for a request
// that sent none differs for every request and does not hold the host name.
func TestRequestIDMadeUpTellsNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
hostname, err := os.Hostname()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("os.Hostname() error = %v", err)
}
firstInContext, first := sendRequestID(t, "")
_, second := sendRequestID(t, "")
t.Logf("host %q, made up %q and %q", hostname, first, second)
if first == "" || first == second {
t.Errorf("made up %q and %q, want two different IDs", first, second)
}
if firstInContext != first {
t.Errorf("context has %q, want the response's %q", firstInContext, first)
}
if strings.Contains(first, hostname) {
t.Errorf("made-up ID %q holds the host name %q", first, hostname)
}
}
-32
View File
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
)
// TestNoMetricsRecordedWithoutMetricsUsername checks that with no metrics
// username set the router records nothing about the requests it serves.
// /metrics is not served then, so the process-wide Prometheus registry is
// read directly. TestMaintenanceModeKeepsOtherRoutes records into the same
// registry, but never a GET /robots.txt.
func TestNoMetricsRecordedWithoutMetricsUsername(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newTestServer(t)
s.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/robots.txt", nil))
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
promhttp.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/metrics", nil))
if strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), `handler="/robots.txt"`) {
t.Errorf("with no metrics username GET /robots.txt was recorded:\n%s",
rec.Body.String())
}
}
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
// requestIDHeader is the header that carries a request's ID.
const requestIDHeader = "X-Request-Id"
// TestResponsesCarryRequestID verifies that every response, whatever its route
// and status, carries the request's ID as X-Request-Id, so a client can quote
// it when reporting a problem: one pixa made up when the request brought none,
// and the request's own X-Request-Id when it brought one.
func TestResponsesCarryRequestID(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const clientRequestID = "client-request-id"
s := newTestServer(t)
paths := []string{
"/robots.txt",
"/no-such-path",
unsignedImagePath,
encryptedImagePath,
}
for _, path := range paths {
t.Run(path, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, path, nil))
t.Logf("status %d, %s %q",
rec.Code, requestIDHeader, rec.Header().Get(requestIDHeader))
if rec.Header().Get(requestIDHeader) == "" {
t.Errorf("response has no %s", requestIDHeader)
}
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, path, nil)
req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, clientRequestID)
rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
s.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
got := rec.Header().Get(requestIDHeader)
if got != clientRequestID {
t.Errorf("%s = %q, want the request's own %q",
requestIDHeader, got, clientRequestID)
}
})
}
}
+1 -2
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
s.router = chi.NewRouter()
s.router.Use(middleware.Recoverer)
s.router.Use(s.mw.RequestID())
s.router.Use(middleware.RequestID)
s.router.Use(s.mw.ClientIP())
s.router.Use(s.mw.SecurityHeaders())
s.router.Use(s.mw.Logging())
@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ func (s *Server) SetupRoutes() {
// The trailing filename (e.g., /img.jpg) is ignored but helps
// browsers with content type
r.Get("/e/{token}/*", s.h.HandleImageEnc())
r.Head("/e/{token}/*", s.h.HandleImageEnc())
})
})
-27
View File
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
// TestEncryptedImageRouteAnswersHEAD verifies that HEAD on the encrypted image
// route reaches its handler, as GET does, instead of being answered 405 Method
// Not Allowed. The handler refuses a token it cannot decrypt with 400, so that
// status shows the request got through.
func TestEncryptedImageRouteAnswersHEAD(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := newTestServer(t)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodHead, encryptedImagePath, nil))
t.Logf("status %d", rec.Code)
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d from the encrypted image handler",
rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
}