Service.Warm, the ImageCache interface, both GenerateSignedURL methods,
signature.ParseParams, three functions of internal/magic, the image
processor's lists of supported formats, IsEmpty and Count of the
allowlist, ssrfSafeDialer, CacheStale, ErrCacheMiss, ErrNegativeCache,
ImageResponse.LastModified and VariantStorage.Load had no caller outside
tests. They are gone, with the tests that tested only them.
The handlers tests sign their image URLs with generateSignedURL, a test
helper that builds the URL as the removed generator did. The SSRF dialer
tests call dialSSRFSafe with no operator blocklist, which is all
ssrfSafeDialer did. ParseImageURL, MIMEToImageFormat, ContentStorage.Store
and CleanExpired stay, as pixa calls them.
Model: opus-5-5
The new package internal/imagerequest holds the request type, its two
parts Source and Transform, the Format and Fit types, the dimension and
fit checks, the /v1/image/ path parsing and the variant key; it imports
no other package of pixa. imgcache.ParsedURL, imgcache.ImageRequest,
signature.Request, imageprocessor.Request, the second Size, format and
fit types and the conversions between them are gone. The image
processor takes a Transform only. encurl keeps a private struct with the
token's short CBOR field names. VariantKey moves with the function that
makes it. Tests follow the moved and renamed code; the tests of the
removed conversions go with them.
Model: opus-5-5
The check that keeps pixa from fetching internal addresses let through
64:ff9b:1::/48, the local-use NAT64 range, and matched an address in the
IPv4-compatible form (::/96) against blocked_networks only as IPv6, so
::203.0.113.5 passed with 203.0.113.0/24 listed. The local-use NAT64
range is now blocked next to 64:ff9b::/96, and an address in ::/96 is
refused when blocked_networks holds it as written or the IPv4 address it
holds. The mapped form stays matched as IPv4 only, as Go keeps plain
IPv4 addresses in that form; README.md says so.
Model: opus-5-5
The check that keeps pixa from fetching internal addresses read an
IPv6 address as IPv4 only in the mapped form (::ffff:a.b.c.d), so the
IPv4-compatible form, such as ::127.0.0.1, was judged as IPv6 and
passed. An address in ::/96 is now judged by the IPv4 address it holds,
so one holding a private, loopback or link-local address is refused on
both image routes before any upstream request. The NAT64 range
64:ff9b::/96 stays blocked whole, as it was on next.
Model: opus-5-5
The fetcher took the host from the source URL and stripped a port with
net.SplitHostPort, which fails when there is no port, so a bracketed
IPv6 host such as [2001:db8::a] kept its brackets, its name lookup
failed, and the request answered 500. validateURL now takes the host
with url.URL.Hostname(), which drops the brackets and any port, so such
a host is fetched like one with a port, through /v1/image/ and through
an encrypted URL, and a private IPv6 address is still refused.
Model: opus-5-5
The generator page passed the source host and path into the encrypted
URL as entered, so a host spelled in another letter case, or a source
with no path against the same source with /, made separate cache keys
and fetched one upstream image twice. The page now lower-cases the
source host, as /v1/image/ does, and writes an empty source path as /,
before it builds the encrypted URL. The checks the page gained for
#288 still hold.
Model: opus-5-5
The source URL was built by joining the decoded path and query as
text, so a space in the query reached the upstream raw and failed with
502, 100%25.png made a URL Go could not parse and answered 401, and
%20 and %2520 fetched the same path under different cache keys. The
source URL is now built with net/url, so each decoded path and query is
one upstream request matching its signature and cache key; the query
encodes the characters a browser encodes, ' included. The generator page
compares what pixa would fetch with the URL as entered, and answers 400
with the URL to use when they differ, or for a user name and password
or a .. segment.
Model: opus-5-5
sneak
clawbot