A login session was a cookie with nothing kept on the server, so
logging out removed it from one browser and a copy kept working for 30
days. The session manager now keeps a random value in the database,
made when it has none and replaced by each logout; a session carries
the value current at its login and is refused once it has changed. The
logout check compares no time, so the host's clock cannot block a
login, and losing the state directory ends every login session.
Logging out is now a POST with the CSRF token, sent by a form on the
generator page.
Model: opus-5-5
A new handler test makes a URL on the generator page with a ttl of one
second, checks that /v1/e/ serves it at once, waits two seconds and
checks that it then answers 410. The expiry is kept in whole seconds,
so two seconds is the longest a one-second ttl can take to pass. Test
only.
Model: opus-5-5
New handler tests in internal/handlers, with no network: GET / shows the
login form without a session; a wrong key shows it again with an error and
sets no session cookie; the right key answers 303 with a session cookie
marked Secure, HttpOnly and SameSite=Strict, with which GET / shows the
generator page; GET /logout empties the cookie with Max-Age=0; POST
/generate without a session answers 303 to /; /v1/e/ serves a valid
token's image, answers 410 for an expired token and 400 for one changed,
cut short or made with another signing key; a URL made on the generator
page is served by /v1/e/. No code changes.
Model: opus-5-5