Check the origin's host and port; cap the size at 1 GiB (closes #61)

access_control_allow_origin now needs a host name (ASCII letters,
digits, hyphens, dots) or an IP address, and a port, when given, from 1
to 65535, read with net/url, net/netip and strconv. Two hosts, an empty
port, no host, a bad port or a non-ASCII host name abort startup, as a
* inside the value already did.

upstream_max_response_size above 1 GiB aborts startup: the image
processor reads one byte past the limit, which wrapped negative at the
largest 64-bit value, and a response is held whole in memory.
config.example.yml states the maximum.

Model: opus-5-5

TODO.md

@@ -36,9 +36,11 @@ exhaustion
   `upstream_fetch_timeout` (default `30s`), `upstream_max_response_size`
   (default 50 MiB) and `downstream_timeout` (default `60s`, both the
   server's write timeout and the per-request timeout); each has a
-  `PIXA_` variable; durations are positive Go duration strings, sizes a
-  whole number of bytes; an invalid value aborts startup naming the key
-  and the value; documented in `config.example.yml` and `README.md`.
+  `PIXA_` variable; durations are positive Go duration strings, the size a
+  whole number of bytes up to 1 GiB, the origin `*` or one scheme, host
+  name or IP address and optional port; an invalid value aborts startup
+  naming the key and the value; documented in `config.example.yml` and
+  `README.md`.
 - 2026-09-28 strip metadata from processed images (closes #82): every output is
   exported with govips' `StripMetadata`, so it carries no EXIF, XMP, IPTC or ICC
   profile; the image is first turned upright with `AutoRotate` (before sizes are

config.example.yml

@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ upstream_connections_per_host: 20
 # Time allowed for one fetch from an upstream host (default: 30s)
 upstream_fetch_timeout: 30s
 
-# Largest upstream response accepted, in bytes (default: 52428800, 50 MiB)
+# Largest upstream response accepted, in bytes, at most 1073741824
+# (1 GiB) (default: 52428800, 50 MiB)
 upstream_max_response_size: 52428800
 
 # Time allowed for answering one client request, the upstream fetch

internal/config/config.go

@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ var (
 	errEmptyEntry        = errors.New("contains an empty entry")
 	errNotAValidURL      = errors.New("not a valid URL")
 	errPortOutOfRange    = errors.New("outside the valid port range")
+	errSizeOutOfRange    = errors.New("outside the accepted range")
 	errTooFewConnections = errors.New("must be at least 1")
 	errValueTooShort     = errors.New("value too short")
 	errPlaceholderKey    = errors.New(
@@ -578,10 +579,9 @@ func (c *Config) validate() error {
 			settingName(keyCacheMaxBytes), c.CacheMaxBytes, errMustNotBeNegative)
 	}
 
-	if c.UpstreamMaxResponseSize <= 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%s: value %d %w",
-			settingName(keyUpstreamMaxResponseSize), c.UpstreamMaxResponseSize,
-			errMustBePositive)
+	err = c.validateUpstreamMaxResponseSize()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
 	}
 
 	for _, host := range c.AllowlistHosts {
@@ -608,29 +608,82 @@ func (c *Config) validate() error {
 	return c.validateAccessControlAllowOrigin()
 }
 
+// validateUpstreamMaxResponseSize checks that upstream_max_response_size
+// is from 1 byte to 1 GiB. An upstream response is read whole into
+// memory, and the image processor reads one byte past this limit, which
+// must not overflow.
+func (c *Config) validateUpstreamMaxResponseSize() error {
+	const maxUpstreamMaxResponseSize = 1 << 30 // 1 GiB
+	if c.UpstreamMaxResponseSize < 1 ||
+		c.UpstreamMaxResponseSize > maxUpstreamMaxResponseSize {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s: value %d is %w 1-%d",
+			settingName(keyUpstreamMaxResponseSize), c.UpstreamMaxResponseSize,
+			errSizeOutOfRange, maxUpstreamMaxResponseSize)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
 // validateAccessControlAllowOrigin checks that access_control_allow_origin
-// is "*" or one origin, a scheme and host with nothing after them, as
-// browsers send it in the Origin header. Anything else, such as a bare
-// hostname or a trailing slash, would match no request. An origin with a
-// "*" inside, such as https://*example.com, is refused because the CORS
-// middleware reads that "*" as a pattern and would let other sites read
-// responses.
+// is "*" or one origin as browsers send it in the Origin header: a scheme,
+// a host name or IP address, and optionally a port from 1 to 65535, with
+// nothing after them. Anything else, such as a bare hostname or a trailing
+// slash, would match no request. A "*" is not allowed in a host name, so
+// https://*example.com is refused; the CORS middleware would read that
+// "*" as a pattern and let other sites read responses.
 func (c *Config) validateAccessControlAllowOrigin() error {
 	origin := c.AccessControlAllowOrigin
 	if origin == "*" {
 		return nil
 	}
 
+	errOrigin := fmt.Errorf("%s: value %q is %w",
+		settingName(keyAccessControlAllowOrigin), origin, errNotAnOrigin)
+
+	// url.Parse accepts an empty port, as in https://example.com:, and
+	// then reports no port, so a trailing colon is refused here.
 	parsed, err := url.Parse(origin)
-	if err != nil || parsed.Host == "" || parsed.Scheme+"://"+parsed.Host != origin ||
-		strings.Contains(origin, "*") {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%s: value %q is %w",
-			settingName(keyAccessControlAllowOrigin), origin, errNotAnOrigin)
+	if err != nil || parsed.Scheme+"://"+parsed.Host != origin ||
+		strings.HasSuffix(origin, ":") {
+		return errOrigin
+	}
+
+	host := parsed.Hostname()
+
+	_, err = netip.ParseAddr(host)
+	if err != nil && !isHostName(host) {
+		return errOrigin
+	}
+
+	// A port is a 16-bit number, and 0 is not a port a browser sends.
+	if parsed.Port() != "" {
+		port, err := strconv.ParseUint(parsed.Port(), 10, 16)
+		if err != nil || port == 0 {
+			return errOrigin
+		}
 	}
 
 	return nil
 }
 
+// isHostName reports whether host is not empty and has only ASCII
+// letters, digits, hyphens and dots.
+func isHostName(host string) bool {
+	if host == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	for _, r := range host {
+		isLetterOrDigit := 'a' <= r && r <= 'z' || 'A' <= r && r <= 'Z' ||
+			'0' <= r && r <= '9'
+		if !isLetterOrDigit && r != '-' && r != '.' {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true
+}
+
 // validateAllowlistHost checks that an allowlist_hosts entry is a bare
 // hostname, optionally with a leading dot for suffix matching. URLs,
 // paths, and whitespace indicate a misconfigured entry. An entry with