5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot
6f8ba5f5ae refactor: 30-day defaults for all expiry settings
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- QUEUE_MAX_AGE: 48h -> 30 days (per-client queue entry expiry)
- MESSAGE_MAX_AGE: replaces count-based MAX_HISTORY with time-based
  30-day message expiry
- SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT: 24h -> 30 days

All expiry is now time-based (30 days) as requested.

Closes #40
2026-03-10 03:47:43 -07:00
clawbot
c05ceec0c2 fix: remove PruneOrphanedMessages to preserve history within MAX_HISTORY
PruneOrphanedMessages deleted messages that lost their client_queues
references after PruneOldQueueEntries ran, even when those messages
were within the MAX_HISTORY limit. This made MAX_HISTORY meaningless
for low-traffic channels.

RotateChannelMessages already caps messages per target. Queue pruning
handles client_queues growth. Orphan cleanup is redundant.

Closes #40
2026-03-10 03:47:43 -07:00
user
62e462d732 feat: implement queue pruning and message rotation
Enforce QUEUE_MAX_AGE and MAX_HISTORY config values that previously
existed but were not applied. The existing cleanup loop now also:

- Prunes client_queues entries older than QUEUE_MAX_AGE (default 48h)
- Rotates messages per target (channel/DM) beyond MAX_HISTORY (default 10000)
- Removes orphaned messages no longer referenced by any client queue

closes #40
2026-03-10 03:47:43 -07:00
c07f94a432 Remove dead Auth() middleware method (#68)
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Remove the unused `Auth()` method from `internal/middleware/middleware.go`.

This method only logged "AUTH: before request" and passed through to the next handler — it performed no actual authentication. It was never referenced anywhere in the codebase; authentication is handled per-handler via `requireAuth` in the handlers package.

closes #38

<!-- session: agent:sdlc-manager:subagent:629a7621-ec4b-49af-b7e8-03141664d682 -->

Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan>
Reviewed-on: #68
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-03-10 11:41:43 +01:00
a98e0ca349 feat: add Content-Security-Policy middleware (#64)
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Add CSP header to all HTTP responses for defense-in-depth against XSS.

The policy restricts all resource loading to same-origin and disables dangerous features (object embeds, framing, base tag injection). The embedded SPA requires no inline scripts or inline style attributes (Preact applies styles programmatically via DOM properties), so a strict policy without `unsafe-inline` works correctly.

**Directives:**
- `default-src 'self'` — baseline same-origin restriction
- `script-src 'self'` — same-origin scripts only
- `style-src 'self'` — same-origin stylesheets only
- `connect-src 'self'` — same-origin fetch/XHR only
- `img-src 'self'` — same-origin images only
- `font-src 'self'` — same-origin fonts only
- `object-src 'none'` — no plugin content
- `frame-ancestors 'none'` — prevent clickjacking
- `base-uri 'self'` — prevent base tag injection
- `form-action 'self'` — restrict form submissions

closes #41

Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Reviewed-on: #64
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-03-10 11:20:15 +01:00
6 changed files with 149 additions and 42 deletions

View File

@@ -249,8 +249,8 @@ Key properties:
- **Ordered**: Queue entries have monotonically increasing IDs. Messages are
always delivered in order within a client's queue.
- **No delivery/read receipts** for channel messages. DM receipts are planned.
- **Queue depth**: Server-configurable via `QUEUE_MAX_AGE`. Default is 48
hours. Entries older than this are pruned.
- **Queue depth**: Server-configurable via `QUEUE_MAX_AGE`. Default is 30
days. Entries older than this are pruned.
### Long-Polling
@@ -1624,6 +1624,10 @@ authenticity.
termination.
- **CORS**: The server allows all origins by default (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`).
Restrict this in production via reverse proxy configuration if needed.
- **Content-Security-Policy**: The server sets a strict CSP header on all
responses, restricting resource loading to same-origin and disabling
dangerous features (object embeds, framing, base tag injection). The
embedded SPA works without `'unsafe-inline'` for scripts or styles.
---
@@ -1784,14 +1788,14 @@ skew issues) and simpler than UUIDs (integer comparison vs. string comparison).
### Data Lifecycle
- **Messages**: Stored indefinitely in the current implementation. Rotation
per `MAX_HISTORY` is planned.
- **Queue entries**: Stored until pruned. Pruning by `QUEUE_MAX_AGE` is
planned.
- **Messages**: Pruned automatically when older than `MESSAGE_MAX_AGE`
(default 30 days).
- **Queue entries**: Pruned automatically when older than `QUEUE_MAX_AGE`
(default 30 days).
- **Channels**: Deleted when the last member leaves (ephemeral).
- **Users/sessions**: Deleted on `QUIT` or `POST /api/v1/logout`. Idle
sessions are automatically expired after `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` (default
24h) — the server runs a background cleanup loop that parts idle users
30 days) — the server runs a background cleanup loop that parts idle users
from all channels, broadcasts QUIT, and releases their nicks.
---
@@ -1808,9 +1812,9 @@ directory is also loaded automatically via
| `PORT` | int | `8080` | HTTP listen port |
| `DBURL` | string | `file:///var/lib/neoirc/state.db?_journal_mode=WAL` | SQLite connection string. For file-based: `file:///path/to/db.db?_journal_mode=WAL`. For in-memory (testing): `file::memory:?cache=shared`. |
| `DEBUG` | bool | `false` | Enable debug logging (verbose request/response logging) |
| `MAX_HISTORY` | int | `10000` | Maximum messages retained per channel before rotation (planned) |
| `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` | string | `24h` | Session idle timeout as a Go duration string (e.g. `24h`, `30m`). Sessions with no activity for this long are expired and the nick is released. |
| `QUEUE_MAX_AGE` | int | `172800` | Maximum age of client queue entries in seconds (48h). Entries older than this are pruned (planned). |
| `MESSAGE_MAX_AGE` | int | `2592000` | Maximum age of messages in seconds (30 days). Messages older than this are pruned. |
| `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` | string | `720h` | Session idle timeout as a Go duration string (e.g. `720h`, `24h`). Sessions with no activity for this long are expired and the nick is released. Default is 30 days. |
| `QUEUE_MAX_AGE` | int | `2592000` | Maximum age of client queue entries in seconds (30 days). Entries older than this are pruned. |
| `MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE` | int | `4096` | Maximum message body size in bytes (planned enforcement) |
| `LONG_POLL_TIMEOUT`| int | `15` | Default long-poll timeout in seconds (client can override via query param, server caps at 30) |
| `MOTD` | string | `""` | Message of the day, shown to clients via `GET /api/v1/server` |
@@ -1829,7 +1833,7 @@ SERVER_NAME=My NeoIRC Server
MOTD=Welcome! Be excellent to each other.
DEBUG=false
DBURL=file:///var/lib/neoirc/state.db?_journal_mode=WAL
SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT=24h
SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT=720h
```
---
@@ -2224,8 +2228,8 @@ GET /api/v1/challenge
### Post-MVP (Planned)
- [ ] **Hashcash proof-of-work** for session creation (abuse prevention)
- [ ] **Queue pruning** — delete old queue entries per `QUEUE_MAX_AGE`
- [ ] **Message rotation** — enforce `MAX_HISTORY` per channel
- [x] **Queue pruning** — delete old queue entries per `QUEUE_MAX_AGE`
- [x] **Message rotation** — prune messages older than `MESSAGE_MAX_AGE`
- [ ] **Channel modes** — enforce `+i`, `+m`, `+s`, `+t`, `+n`
- [ ] **User channel modes** — `+o` (operator), `+v` (voice)
- [x] **MODE command** — query channel and user modes (set not yet implemented)

View File

@@ -38,8 +38,9 @@ type Config struct {
MetricsUsername string
Port int
SentryDSN string
MaxHistory int
MessageMaxAge int
MaxMessageSize int
QueueMaxAge int
MOTD string
ServerName string
FederationKey string
@@ -68,12 +69,13 @@ func New(
viper.SetDefault("SENTRY_DSN", "")
viper.SetDefault("METRICS_USERNAME", "")
viper.SetDefault("METRICS_PASSWORD", "")
viper.SetDefault("MAX_HISTORY", "10000")
viper.SetDefault("MESSAGE_MAX_AGE", "2592000")
viper.SetDefault("MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE", "4096")
viper.SetDefault("QUEUE_MAX_AGE", "2592000")
viper.SetDefault("MOTD", defaultMOTD)
viper.SetDefault("SERVER_NAME", "")
viper.SetDefault("FEDERATION_KEY", "")
viper.SetDefault("SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT", "24h")
viper.SetDefault("SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT", "720h")
err := viper.ReadInConfig()
if err != nil {
@@ -92,8 +94,9 @@ func New(
MaintenanceMode: viper.GetBool("MAINTENANCE_MODE"),
MetricsUsername: viper.GetString("METRICS_USERNAME"),
MetricsPassword: viper.GetString("METRICS_PASSWORD"),
MaxHistory: viper.GetInt("MAX_HISTORY"),
MessageMaxAge: viper.GetInt("MESSAGE_MAX_AGE"),
MaxMessageSize: viper.GetInt("MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE"),
QueueMaxAge: viper.GetInt("QUEUE_MAX_AGE"),
MOTD: viper.GetString("MOTD"),
ServerName: viper.GetString("SERVER_NAME"),
FederationKey: viper.GetString("FEDERATION_KEY"),

View File

@@ -1096,3 +1096,45 @@ func (database *Database) GetSessionCreatedAt(
return createdAt, nil
}
// PruneOldQueueEntries deletes client_queues rows older
// than cutoff and returns the number of rows removed.
func (database *Database) PruneOldQueueEntries(
ctx context.Context,
cutoff time.Time,
) (int64, error) {
res, err := database.conn.ExecContext(ctx,
"DELETE FROM client_queues WHERE created_at < ?",
cutoff,
)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"prune old queue entries: %w", err,
)
}
deleted, _ := res.RowsAffected()
return deleted, nil
}
// PruneOldMessages deletes messages older than cutoff and
// returns the number of rows removed.
func (database *Database) PruneOldMessages(
ctx context.Context,
cutoff time.Time,
) (int64, error) {
res, err := database.conn.ExecContext(ctx,
"DELETE FROM messages WHERE created_at < ?",
cutoff,
)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf(
"prune old messages: %w", err,
)
}
deleted, _ := res.RowsAffected()
return deleted, nil
}

View File

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ type Params struct {
Healthcheck *healthcheck.Healthcheck
}
const defaultIdleTimeout = 24 * time.Hour
const defaultIdleTimeout = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
// Handlers manages HTTP request handling.
type Handlers struct {
@@ -200,4 +200,52 @@ func (hdlr *Handlers) runCleanup(
"deleted", deleted,
)
}
hdlr.pruneQueuesAndMessages(ctx)
}
// pruneQueuesAndMessages removes old client_queues entries
// per QUEUE_MAX_AGE and prunes messages per MESSAGE_MAX_AGE.
func (hdlr *Handlers) pruneQueuesAndMessages(
ctx context.Context,
) {
queueMaxAge := hdlr.params.Config.QueueMaxAge
if queueMaxAge > 0 {
queueCutoff := time.Now().Add(
-time.Duration(queueMaxAge) * time.Second,
)
pruned, err := hdlr.params.Database.
PruneOldQueueEntries(ctx, queueCutoff)
if err != nil {
hdlr.log.Error(
"queue pruning failed", "error", err,
)
} else if pruned > 0 {
hdlr.log.Info(
"pruned old queue entries",
"deleted", pruned,
)
}
}
messageMaxAge := hdlr.params.Config.MessageMaxAge
if messageMaxAge > 0 {
msgCutoff := time.Now().Add(
-time.Duration(messageMaxAge) * time.Second,
)
pruned, err := hdlr.params.Database.
PruneOldMessages(ctx, msgCutoff)
if err != nil {
hdlr.log.Error(
"message pruning failed", "error", err,
)
} else if pruned > 0 {
hdlr.log.Info(
"pruned old messages",
"deleted", pruned,
)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -142,20 +142,6 @@ func (mware *Middleware) CORS() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
})
}
// Auth returns middleware that performs authentication.
func (mware *Middleware) Auth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(
func(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
) {
mware.log.Info("AUTH: before request")
next.ServeHTTP(writer, request)
})
}
}
// Metrics returns middleware that records HTTP metrics.
func (mware *Middleware) Metrics() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
metricsMiddleware := ghmm.New(ghmm.Config{ //nolint:exhaustruct // optional fields
@@ -180,3 +166,36 @@ func (mware *Middleware) MetricsAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
},
)
}
// cspPolicy is the Content-Security-Policy header value applied to all
// responses. The embedded SPA loads scripts and styles from same-origin
// files only (no inline scripts or inline style attributes), so a strict
// policy works without 'unsafe-inline'.
const cspPolicy = "default-src 'self'; " +
"script-src 'self'; " +
"style-src 'self'; " +
"connect-src 'self'; " +
"img-src 'self'; " +
"font-src 'self'; " +
"object-src 'none'; " +
"frame-ancestors 'none'; " +
"base-uri 'self'; " +
"form-action 'self'"
// CSP returns middleware that sets the Content-Security-Policy header on
// every response for defense-in-depth against XSS.
func (mware *Middleware) CSP() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(
func(
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
) {
writer.Header().Set(
"Content-Security-Policy",
cspPolicy,
)
next.ServeHTTP(writer, request)
})
}
}

View File

@@ -16,11 +16,6 @@ import (
const routeTimeout = 60 * time.Second
// cspHeader is the Content-Security-Policy applied to the embedded web SPA.
// The SPA loads external scripts and stylesheets from the same origin only;
// all API communication uses same-origin fetch (no WebSockets).
const cspHeader = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'"
// SetupRoutes configures the HTTP routes and middleware.
func (srv *Server) SetupRoutes() {
srv.router = chi.NewRouter()
@@ -34,6 +29,7 @@ func (srv *Server) SetupRoutes() {
}
srv.router.Use(srv.mw.CORS())
srv.router.Use(srv.mw.CSP())
srv.router.Use(middleware.Timeout(routeTimeout))
if srv.sentryEnabled {
@@ -138,11 +134,6 @@ func (srv *Server) setupSPA() {
writer http.ResponseWriter,
request *http.Request,
) {
writer.Header().Set(
"Content-Security-Policy",
cspHeader,
)
readFS, ok := distFS.(fs.ReadFileFS)
if !ok {
fileServer.ServeHTTP(writer, request)