Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot a72f301fe1 fix: the bundled token list names tokens on Ethereum Mainnet only (closes #632)
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bundledToken(address, chainId) in tokenList.js answers only for Ethereum
Mainnet's chain id. Every reader of TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS now goes through it,
with the chain id of the transaction, balance or history entry it draws.
The token sources the screens build carry that chain id. The Uniswap
decoder sets the transaction's chain id on them. fetchTokenBalances()
takes the chain id of the network it asks about.

isSpoofedSymbol() takes the chain id of the token's network. It checks the
bundled list's symbols only on Ethereum Mainnet. The native asset's labels
stay reserved on every network.

Eighteen existing tests and three shared test helpers read the bundled
list without naming a network. Each now names Ethereum Mainnet.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-27 20:14:25 +00:00
clawbot 8998d6c661 fix: a refresh asked for while another runs is no longer dropped (closes #581)
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doRefreshAndRender() returned at once when a refresh was already running. An import asks for a refresh after its address scan, and that request was dropped when it came during a refresh, so the addresses the scan found showed 0.0000 until the next ten-second refresh. A request made through ctx while a refresh runs now leads to one more refresh once the running one ends, however many such requests came in. A tick of the ten-second timer during a refresh is still dropped, so the wallet asks the node no more often than before.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-27 20:14:09 +01:00
clawbot 08e47c39ad fix: a network switch in Settings keeps another page's token on the network it was added on (closes #692)
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A network switch in Settings filed under the new network a token or fraud contract that another page stored since this page's last save, because the switch's save writes only the fields this page changed. Before the switch, onChainSwitch() now takes the stored tracked tokens into the page's own list with takeStoredTrackedTokens(), matched by contract address, so a token either page added or removed stays as that page left it. The switch then files that list under the previous network. When the stored record is on another network, no tokens are taken. Fraud contracts are cleared on every switch, as before.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-27 18:05:01 +01:00
clawbot 7ba0a5ff75 fix: TransactionDetail drops a Blockscout answer for another transaction (closes #675)
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TransactionDetail asks Blockscout for its transaction without waiting for the answer. If the user pressed Back and opened another transaction before Blockscout answered, the second screen showed the first transaction's block, network details, decoded details and raw data. loadFullTxDetails() now drops the answer once TransactionDetail shows another transaction; the same hash on another network counts as another transaction. An answer that lands while Settings is up is still drawn. Every failed request is still logged.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-27 15:30:40 +01:00
clawbot cd5951a4f8 fix: Settings never shows "Saved." for a URL the input no longer shows (closes #695)
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The RPC and Blockscout "Save" buttons in Settings now store nothing when the input no longer shows the URL that was checked. When another page changes the network, "Use Blockscout" or "Check recipients on Etherscan", this page draws Settings again, and a redraw during the check puts this page's URL back in the input. Before this change, the typed URL was then stored and "Saved." appeared. A save refused because the input changed shows "The URL was not saved because it was changed during the check." A user's own edit during the check refuses the save too.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-27 14:34:50 +01:00
clawbot bcdffa56a4 fix: Settings stores the URL on screen when another page stored a different one (closes #688)
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The RPC and Blockscout "Save" buttons in Settings now set the URL in the stored record, inside the save. Before this change, the save wrote only fields that differed from what the page last saved. If another page stored a different URL for the same network, a "Save" of the URL this page loaded left the other page's URL stored, and the flash still read "Saved.". The save still refuses a URL when the active network is no longer the one Settings showed.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-27 12:36:48 +01:00
clawbot c0a3a02418 fix: a network switch in Settings leaves no balance from the previous network stored (closes #653)
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A network switch in Settings could leave the previous network's balance in the stored record. The switch clears the page's balances inside its save, but the save writes only fields the page changed since its last save. When the page had last saved "0" for an address, the cleared "0" was no change, so a balance the background's refresh stored meanwhile stayed under the new network. The switch's save now always writes the cleared balances and the time of the last balance refresh. Every other field merges as before.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-27 10:14:06 +01:00
clawbot f550d8c8d2 fix: a zero-minimum balance check never sets the output side (closes #649)
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A BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20 of the sender with a zero minimum, or one the router lets fail, no longer sets Token Out or the minimum. Before, it set both whenever the output side held no minimum, so after an UNWRAP_WETH that drops the minimum, a zero check of USDC named USDC as Token Out, a token the swap did not pay. A check with a positive minimum, not allowed to fail, sets the output side as before. Two existing tests that expected the wrong token are corrected, and README states the rule.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-27 08:57:59 +01:00
clawbot fc6cffcaba fix: a Permit2 transfer of the zero address never reads as ETH (closes #685)
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A PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM of the zero address read Token moved: ETH, with an ETH figure, though Permit2 moves no ETH. Such a move now names the zero address as its token on Token moved and Token moved into the router, and gives its amount in base units on Moved from the sender and Paid to. The zero-address check from the permit lines is now one function, permit2TokenInfo(), shared by the move lines. A V4 step of ETH that states no amount still gets its own lines beside such a move, so no line about ETH leaving is dropped.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-27 07:53:05 +01:00
clawbot 5615b08760 fix: Settings refuses an endpoint URL whose network changed before it was stored (closes #663)
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The RPC and Blockscout "Save" buttons in Settings now store a URL only for the network that Settings showed when "Save" was tapped. The URL is set inside the save, under the lock, so the popup cannot follow a network switch saved elsewhere between setting it and writing it. If that network is no longer active on the page or in the stored record, the save is refused and the flash reads "The URL was not saved because the network changed." "Saved." appears only for a stored URL. The RPC check compares the node's chain id with the network shown at the tap.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-27 07:27:15 +01:00
clawbot ec6b6b57a3 fix: a V4 SETTLE of ETH paid from the router reads as moved from the sender (closes #682)
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V4Router pays a SETTLE of ETH from the router's own ETH, whichever payer it names, and the router holds the transaction's value. A V4 SETTLE of ETH that names the router as payer now counts as ETH the user pays. With no ETH left in the router by an earlier step, it reads as a SETTLE the user pays. When an earlier step left ETH there, it gets lines of its own reading Up to and the amount. When the amount is not known, as for CONTRACT_BALANCE, its Moved from the sender line reads Unknown (could not be decoded). No line now shows less ETH than such a SETTLE can take.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-27 06:49:37 +01:00
34 changed files with 2375 additions and 332 deletions
+149 -137
View File
@@ -1188,11 +1188,12 @@ The wallet takes the `decimals` from these sources, in this order
"Use Blockscout" is on (`tokenSourcesByChainId()` in
`src/popup/views/helpers.js`).
The token's name comes from the same sources. While "Use Blockscout" is off, a
token gets a line under it when the bundled list and the tracked tokens lack its
name or decimals. The line says "Blockscout's report of your balances is not
used to name this token, because "Use Blockscout" is off in Settings." These
screens show the line:
The token's name comes from the same sources. The bundled token list is used
only for a token on Ethereum Mainnet. While "Use Blockscout" is off, a token
gets a line under it when the bundled list and the tracked tokens lack its name
or decimals. The line says "Blockscout's report of your balances is not used to
name this token, because "Use Blockscout" is off in Settings." These screens
show the line:
- TxApproval and SignApproval
- WaitTx, SuccessTx and ErrorTx, which follow TxApproval
@@ -1277,22 +1278,18 @@ see Transaction Decoding), do not always read as a number. They can read:
step pays nothing itself and swaps whatever an earlier step sent to the pair,
so the calldata states no quantity. A V3 exact-in `amountIn` of zero has no
such meaning and is shown as a zero.
- `None (no minimum guaranteed)`: the swap's `Min. received` line, when the
minimum it shows is zero, whether a V2, V3 or V4 swap's minimum or a
`BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step's `minBalance`. Before
[#359](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/359), a zero `minBalance`
read `0.0000` when the token's scale was known. The router passes a balance
check whenever the balance is at least `minBalance`, so a zero `minBalance`
guarantees nothing: it sets `Token Out` and `Min. received` only when the
output side holds no minimum, not even a zero one, at the point the check is
reached, and otherwise leaves the current token and figure in place. A nonzero
`minBalance` sets both lines, as a swap step does. Only a check of the
transaction's sender's own balance sets either line; a check of any other
address sets neither (see Transaction Decoding). A `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step
that the router lets fail without reverting the transaction (see Transaction
Decoding) guarantees nothing either, whatever its `minBalance`, and is read as
one whose `minBalance` is zero. A minimum stated by a V4 swap step the router
lets fail is likewise read as zero.
- `None (no minimum guaranteed)`: the swap's `Min. received` line, when it shows
a V2, V3 or V4 swap's minimum of zero. The router passes a
`BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step whenever the balance is at least `minBalance`, so a
zero `minBalance` guarantees nothing. A check with a zero `minBalance` sets
neither `Token Out` nor `Min. received`. A nonzero `minBalance` sets both
lines, as a swap step does. Only a check of the transaction's sender's own
balance sets either line; a check of any other address sets neither (see
Transaction Decoding). A `BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20` step that the router lets fail
without reverting the transaction (see Transaction Decoding) guarantees
nothing either, whatever its `minBalance`, and is read as one whose
`minBalance` is zero. A minimum stated by a V4 swap step the router lets fail
is likewise read as zero.
The swap's `Token In` and `Token Out` lines name a currency, not an amount; each
reads `Unknown (not named in the calldata)` when the decoder found no token for
@@ -1477,20 +1474,20 @@ tracked.
A tracked token is shown when its balance is nonzero, and any other ERC-20 when
its balance is nonzero and it is in the bundled known-token list or has 1,000 or
more holders. A token claiming a symbol from the bundled list from any other
contract address is always dropped, tracked or not, and so is any token claiming
a symbol that belongs to the native asset and therefore has no legitimate
contract at all (`"ETH"`, and every network's `nativeCurrency`, such as
`"SepoliaETH"`, on every network). That filter is unconditional — the "Hide
tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders" setting governs the transaction history
and the send-screen token selector, not this list. A token's holder count is
unknown when the explorer reports none, or reports anything other than a whole
number written in digits alone, such as `1,000` or `1e3` (`parseHoldersCount()`
in `src/shared/holders.js`). This list does not take an unknown count as 1,000
or more, so such a token is shown only when it is on the bundled list or
tracked. Every nonzero holding of a token shown is stored exactly, however
small, but a holding below 0.000001 is left out of the balance lists, the
send-screen token selector, the address total and the remove-address warning
more holders. On Ethereum Mainnet, a token that claims a bundled token's symbol
from another contract is always dropped, tracked or not. On every network, a
token claiming a label of the native asset is always dropped. Those labels are
`"ETH"` and each network's `nativeCurrency`, such as `"SepoliaETH"`. The balance
list applies all three rules whatever the settings say. The "Hide tokens with
fewer than 1,000 holders" setting governs only the transaction history and the
send-screen token selector. A token's holder count is unknown when the explorer
reports none, or reports anything other than a whole number written in digits
alone, such as `1,000` or `1e3` (`parseHoldersCount()` in
`src/shared/holders.js`). This list does not take an unknown count as 1,000 or
more, so such a token is shown only when it is on the bundled list or tracked.
Every nonzero holding of a token shown is stored exactly, however small, but a
holding below 0.000001 is left out of the balance lists, the send-screen token
selector, the address total and the remove-address warning
(`isBelowOneMillionth()` in `src/shared/amountDisplay.js`). The Send and
confirmation screens show it when its token is the one being sent. Tracked
tokens with a zero balance are listed as well while "Show tracked tokens with
@@ -2281,6 +2278,11 @@ view would leave a wallet one click from deletion.
- Endpoint URL input + "Save" button. "Save" asks the URL for `/stats`
and saves the URL only if that request succeeds. The request carries
no user data and is made whether or not "Use Blockscout" is ticked.
- If the network changes before either "Save" stores its URL, the URL is not
saved and a flash message says so
- Either "Save" stores its URL only if the input still shows that URL when
the endpoint answers. Otherwise a flash message says that the URL was not
saved
- Etherscan:
- "Check recipients on Etherscan" checkbox, unticked until the user
ticks it
@@ -3197,26 +3199,25 @@ indexes it as a real token transfer.
Ethereum mainnet ERC-20s taken from the CoinGecko API, with decimals verified
on-chain and addresses EIP-55 checksummed; `TOKENS` in
`src/shared/tokenList.js` is the authoritative set. It is bundled at build
time and only changes when that file is regenerated. Any token transfer
claiming a symbol from this list (e.g. "ETH", "USDT", "USDC") but originating
from an unrecognized contract address is identified as a spoof and filtered
from display. The fake "Ethereum" token in the attack above used symbol "ETH"
from contract `0xD05339f9Ea5ab9d9F03B9d57F671d2abD1F55c82`, which does not
match the known WETH contract — so it would be caught by this check. Detecting
a spoof is also what adds a contract to the fraud contract blocklist below;
that is the only thing that populates it. In the transaction history the check
is the "Hide fake tokens impersonating a known symbol" setting, on by default;
with it off, spoofed transfers are shown and no new blocklist entries are
learned from them. The send-screen token selector and the balance list apply
the same check unconditionally, because they decide which tokens the user can
act on and what the user believes they own rather than what the history
displays. All three surfaces read the rule from `src/shared/symbolSpoof.js`,
so they cannot answer the question differently. A symbol the list maps to no
contract at all — the native asset's labels: `"ETH"` and every network's
`nativeCurrency`, such as `"SepoliaETH"`, on every network — may be borne by
no contract, so every ERC-20 claiming it is a spoof on all three. The user's
real ETH balance is not an ERC-20 and is read over RPC, so the rule never sees
it.
time and only changes when that file is regenerated. On Ethereum Mainnet, a
token that claims a symbol from this list, such as "USDT" or "USDC", is a
spoof unless its contract is the listed one. The wallet hides it. The fake
"Ethereum" token in the attack above used symbol "ETH" from contract
`0xD05339f9Ea5ab9d9F03B9d57F671d2abD1F55c82`. No contract may bear "ETH", so
that token is a spoof. Detecting a spoof is also what adds a contract to the
fraud contract blocklist below; that is the only thing that populates it. In
the transaction history the check is the "Hide fake tokens impersonating a
known symbol" setting, on by default; with it off, spoofed transfers are shown
and no new blocklist entries are learned from them. The send-screen token
selector and the balance list apply the same check unconditionally, because
they decide which tokens the user can act on and what the user believes they
own rather than what the history displays. All three surfaces read the rule
from `src/shared/symbolSpoof.js`, so they cannot answer the question
differently. A symbol the list maps to no contract at all — the native asset's
labels: `"ETH"` and every network's `nativeCurrency`, such as `"SepoliaETH"`,
on every network — may be borne by no contract, so every ERC-20 claiming it is
a spoof on all three. The user's real ETH balance is not an ERC-20 and is read
over RPC, so the rule never sees it.
- **Low-holder token filtering**: Token transfers from ERC-20 contracts with
fewer than 1,000 holders are hidden from transaction history by default.
@@ -3395,7 +3396,8 @@ Currently supported:
`Balance Check (of another address)`. A check whose input does not decode,
such as one whose owner word has a nonzero top byte (the router reads the
owner from the word's last 20 bytes), likewise sets neither, and it is listed
as `Balance Check (could not be decoded)`. When a swap step, `TAKE` or
as `Balance Check (could not be decoded)`. A check with a zero `minBalance`
sets neither `Token Out` nor the minimum. When a swap step, `TAKE` or
`TAKE_PORTION` pays the router any token, the swap's output or another, a
`WRAP_ETH` pays it WETH, or an `UNWRAP_WETH` into the router turns WETH a step
paid it into ETH, that token stays in the router unless a later step pays out
@@ -3477,91 +3479,101 @@ Currently supported:
of any amount but `OPEN_DELTA` pays that amount, and a `SETTLE` of
`OPEN_DELTA` or a `SETTLE_ALL` pays what the step owes, as above. So a V4 step
that swaps 400 USDT, with a `SETTLE` of 5,000 USDT paid by the user and the
rest taken to another address, reads `5000.0000 USDT`. A later step paid from
the router spends what the router holds and takes nothing, and so does a V2
exact-in whose `amountIn` is `ALREADY_PAID`. A later take of `Token In` is
added to the total while both are quantities: a V3 exact-in of 600 USDT and a
V2 exact-in of 400 USDT, both paid by the user, read `1000.0000 USDT`. When
the decoder does not know a take's amount, the total is not known and there is
no `Amount` line. A `PERMIT2_PERMIT` names `Token In` only when its amount,
`Unlimited` included, stands as the `Amount` figure in place of the total,
which it does only in the plain shape of Uniswap's own routes: it comes before
the step that sets the input side, it is the only `PERMIT2_PERMIT` in the
transaction and there is no `PERMIT2_PERMIT_BATCH`, its spender is the router,
the router may not let it fail, no step before it takes its token, a
`PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM` of it included, or a token the decoder does not know,
and the decoder reads every step after it in full. Permit2 then lets the
router take no more of the token than that amount, so the permit covers every
take of it. A step before the permit takes under whatever allowance the router
already had, so it may take more than the permit's amount, which would then
read lower than what leaves the user's wallet: a `PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM` of
2,000 USDT into the router, then a permit of 600 USDT to the router and a V3
exact-in of 2,000 USDT paid from the router, read `Amount 2000.0000 USDT`. A
later permit or batch may raise what Permit2 lets the router take, and so may
a step the decoder does not read in full: a command the decoder does not read
(listed at the end of this section), a step whose input it cannot read, in
whole or in part, and a step it fails on. Every other `PERMIT2_PERMIT`, before
the step that sets the input side or after it, leaves `Token In` and the
`Amount` line as they read with no permit, unless it lets a spender other than
the router take `Token In` (see below): a permit of 5,000 DAI to another
address and then a V3 exact-in of 600 USDT read `Swap USDT → USDC` with
`Amount 600.0000 USDT`, and so do that exact-in and then a permit of 5,000 DAI
to the router. A permit on the zero address never stands as the `Amount`
figure, because Permit2 has no allowance of ETH. When a permit's amount stands
and the step that sets the input side spends a token other than the permit's,
or one the decoder does not know, that step's amount gets lines of its own,
unless it states no amount and the user pays it none of its input token. Each
take the total does not count gives three lines after the `Amount` line (after
`Token In` when there is none): one of a token other than `Token In`; one of
`Token In` after an amount that is not a quantity (a V4 open delta,
`ALREADY_PAID`, which keep their wording on the `Amount` line, or no stated
amount, as of a V4 exact-out step); and one whose amount the decoder does not
know. When there is no `Amount` line, each take the total counts gets them
too, so that every amount the decoder reads is shown: the amount the step that
sets the input side states, when it is a quantity and the user pays that step
(a V2 or V3 step whose `payerIsUser` is true, a V4 step the user pays some of
its input token, or a `WRAP_ETH`, whose ETH comes from the transaction's
value), and each later take of `Token In` added to it. A step that sets the
input side and is paid from the router takes nothing from the user's wallet
and gets none. A `PERMIT2_PERMIT` the decoder cannot read, then V3 exact-ins
of 600 USDT and 400 DAI paid by the user, give lines for both amounts. When
the step that sets the input side states no amount, the user pays it some of
its input token, and there is no `Amount` line, that step gets them too
whenever another take's lines give a figure, or a `PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM` of
its token gives one, on the lines below or, into the router, on its `Paid to`
line, so that figure cannot read as all that leaves. When it states no amount
and the user pays it none of its input token, as when the router pays it, that
step takes none of that token from the user's wallet and never gets them, with
a permit or without. They come in step order, except that the step that sets
the input side comes first when it has them, followed, when there is no
`Amount` line, by the other takes the total counts: `Moved from the sender`,
its amount, worded as the `Amount` line words one, or
`Unknown (could not be decoded)` when the decoder does not know it;
`Token moved`, giving the token's address as the `Token In` line does; and
`Moved to`, which reads `The swap step that spends it`. A token the decoder
does not know gives the `Moved from the sender` line alone. A step may also
take from the user's wallet what the decoder did not read: a V4 step whose
input or one of whose `SETTLE`s or `SETTLE_ALL`s it cannot read, which the
router still runs; a V2 or V3 exact-in or exact-out step or a
`PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM` whose input it cannot read, such as a V3 step whose
path is shorter than one token address or has bytes after its last hop; every
`PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM_BATCH`; every `EXECUTE_SUB_PLAN`, wherever it stands;
and every step it fails on. Each such step gives one `Moved from the sender`
line among those, reading `Unknown (could not be decoded)`. That line, or any
line for a token the decoder does not know, leaves no `Amount` line, whose
figure might be too low, and such a step before a `PERMIT2_PERMIT` keeps the
permit's amount from standing. Then each `PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM` but one into
the router, in step order, gives three lines: `Moved from the sender`, the
amount it moves, for example `1000000.0000 USDT`; `Token moved`, giving the
token's address as the `Token In` line does; and `Moved to`, which reads
rest taken to another address, reads `5000.0000 USDT`. A later step that pays
an ERC-20 token from the router takes none of that token from the user's
wallet. A V2 exact-in whose `amountIn` is `ALREADY_PAID` takes nothing either.
A V4 `SETTLE` of ETH paid from the router still takes from the user's wallet,
since the router holds the transaction's value. When the decoder does not know
the amount of such a `SETTLE`, as for `CONTRACT_BALANCE`, that `SETTLE` counts
as a later step's take. When an earlier step left ETH in the router, that ETH
may pay part of a `SETTLE` of ETH paid from the router. That `SETTLE` then
gets lines of its own, with `Up to` before its amount. A later take of
`Token In` that only the user's wallet pays is added to the total while both
are quantities: a V3 exact-in of 600 USDT and a V2 exact-in of 400 USDT, both
paid by the user, read `1000.0000 USDT`. When the decoder does not know a
take's amount, the total is not known and there is no `Amount` line. A
`PERMIT2_PERMIT` names `Token In` only when its amount, `Unlimited` included,
stands as the `Amount` figure in place of the total, which it does only in the
plain shape of Uniswap's own routes: it comes before the step that sets the
input side, it is the only `PERMIT2_PERMIT` in the transaction and there is no
`PERMIT2_PERMIT_BATCH`, its spender is the router, the router may not let it
fail, no step before it takes its token, a `PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM` of it
included, or a token the decoder does not know, and the decoder reads every
step after it in full. Permit2 then lets the router take no more of the token
than that amount, so the permit covers every take of it. A step before the
permit takes under whatever allowance the router already had, so it may take
more than the permit's amount, which would then read lower than what leaves
the user's wallet: a `PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM` of 2,000 USDT into the router,
then a permit of 600 USDT to the router and a V3 exact-in of 2,000 USDT paid
from the router, read `Amount 2000.0000 USDT`. A later permit or batch may
raise what Permit2 lets the router take, and so may a step the decoder does
not read in full: a command the decoder does not read (listed at the end of
this section), a step whose input it cannot read, in whole or in part, and a
step it fails on. Every other `PERMIT2_PERMIT`, before the step that sets the
input side or after it, leaves `Token In` and the `Amount` line as they read
with no permit, unless it lets a spender other than the router take `Token In`
(see below): a permit of 5,000 DAI to another address and then a V3 exact-in
of 600 USDT read `Swap USDT → USDC` with `Amount 600.0000 USDT`, and so do
that exact-in and then a permit of 5,000 DAI to the router. A permit on the
zero address never stands as the `Amount` figure, because Permit2 has no
allowance of ETH. When a permit's amount stands and the step that sets the
input side spends a token other than the permit's, or one the decoder does not
know, that step's amount gets lines of its own, unless it states no amount and
the user pays it none of its input token. Each take the total does not count
gives three lines after the `Amount` line (after `Token In` when there is
none): one of a token other than `Token In`; one of `Token In` after an amount
that is not a quantity (a V4 open delta, `ALREADY_PAID`, which keep their
wording on the `Amount` line, or no stated amount, as of a V4 exact-out step);
an ETH take whose line reads `Up to` (see above); and one whose amount the
decoder does not know. When there is no `Amount` line, each take the total
counts gets them too, so that every amount the decoder reads is shown: the
amount the step that sets the input side states, when it is a quantity and the
user pays that step (a V2 or V3 step whose `payerIsUser` is true, a V4 step
the user pays some of its input token, or a `WRAP_ETH`, whose ETH comes from
the transaction's value), and each later take of `Token In` added to it. A
step that sets the input side gets none when the user pays it none of its
input token. A `PERMIT2_PERMIT` the decoder cannot read, then V3 exact-ins of
600 USDT and 400 DAI paid by the user, give lines for both amounts. When the
step that sets the input side states no amount, the user pays it some of its
input token, and there is no `Amount` line, that step gets them too whenever
another take's lines give a figure, or a `PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM` of its token
gives one, on the lines below or, into the router, on its `Paid to` line, so
that figure cannot read as all that leaves. When it states no amount and the
user pays it none of its input token, that step never gets them, with a permit
or without. They come in step order, except that the step that sets the input
side comes first when it has them, followed, when there is no `Amount` line,
by the other takes the total counts: `Moved from the sender`, its amount,
worded as the `Amount` line words one, or `Unknown (could not be decoded)`
when the decoder does not know it; `Token moved`, giving the token's address
as the `Token In` line does; and `Moved to`, which reads
`The swap step that spends it`. A token the decoder does not know gives the
`Moved from the sender` line alone. A step may also take from the user's
wallet what the decoder did not read: a V4 step whose input or one of whose
`SETTLE`s or `SETTLE_ALL`s it cannot read, which the router still runs; a V2
or V3 exact-in or exact-out step or a `PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM` whose input it
cannot read, such as a V3 step whose path is shorter than one token address or
has bytes after its last hop; every `PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM_BATCH`; every
`EXECUTE_SUB_PLAN`, wherever it stands; and every step it fails on. Each such
step gives one `Moved from the sender` line among those, reading
`Unknown (could not be decoded)`. That line, or any line for a token the
decoder does not know, leaves no `Amount` line, whose figure might be too low,
and such a step before a `PERMIT2_PERMIT` keeps the permit's amount from
standing. Then each `PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM` but one into the router, in step
order, gives three lines: `Moved from the sender`, the amount it moves, for
example `1000000.0000 USDT`; `Token moved`, giving the token's address as the
`Token In` line does; and `Moved to`, which reads
`The V2 pair the next swap spends` for a hop and `The sender` for `address(1)`
on every router but `UniversalRouterV1`, and otherwise gives the address. A
move into the router needs none of them, because its `Paid to` line and
`Token moved into the router` line already give the amount, the token and
where it goes, and so its amount is shown once. Every `PERMIT2_PERMIT` whose
amount does not stand as the `Amount` figure, before the step that sets the
input side or after it, gives three lines, in step order, after those for each
`PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM`: `Permit2 allowance`, its amount, for example
where it goes, and so its amount is shown once. For a move of the zero
address, `Moved from the sender` gives the amount in base units and
`Token moved` gives the zero address. For such a move into the router, the
`Paid to` line gives the amount in base units and
`Token moved into the router` gives the zero address. Every `PERMIT2_PERMIT`
whose amount does not stand as the `Amount` figure, before the step that sets
the input side or after it, gives three lines, in step order, after those for
each `PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM`: `Permit2 allowance`, its amount, for example
`5000.0000 DAI`, or `Unlimited` for Permit2's maximum; `Allowance token`,
giving the token's address as the `Token In` line does; and
`Allowance spender`, the address it lets take the token. Only a permit whose
+9 -7
View File
@@ -377,13 +377,15 @@ point-in-time snapshot of the highest-market-cap Ethereum mainnet ERC-20s, fixed
at build time and updated only when a new release ships a newer snapshot. If a
transaction or balance claims to involve a known symbol (like "ETH" or "USDT")
but comes from an unrecognized contract, it is identified as a spoof and hidden.
In your transaction history this is the "Hide fake tokens impersonating a known
symbol" setting, which you can switch off; doing so also stops new entries being
added to the fraud contract blocklist below, since detecting a spoof is what
fills it. The send token list always applies the check. Your balances apply it
too, with one exception: a token claiming the symbol "ETH" is not filtered
there, so a fake "ETH" token can still show up in your balance list even though
it is hidden from your transaction history and from the send token list.
On Sepolia, only "ETH" and "SepoliaETH" count as known symbols, because the
bundled list holds Ethereum Mainnet tokens. In your transaction history the
check is the "Hide fake tokens impersonating a known symbol" setting, which you
can switch off; doing so also stops new entries being added to the fraud
contract blocklist below, since detecting a spoof is what fills it. The send
token list always applies the check. Your balances apply it too, with one
exception: a token claiming the symbol "ETH" is not filtered there, so a fake
"ETH" token can still show up in your balance list even though it is hidden from
your transaction history and from the send token list.
**Low-holder token filtering.** Tokens with fewer than 1,000 holders are hidden
from transaction history and the send token list, and are left out of your
+27 -10
View File
@@ -65,7 +65,14 @@ function renderWalletList() {
const pageClosed = new AbortController();
window.addEventListener("pagehide", () => pageClosed.abort());
// While a refresh runs, a request through ctx is not dropped. The request sets
// refreshAgain, and one more refresh runs once the running one ends. Several
// requests in that time lead to one more refresh, not several. An import asks
// for a refresh after its address scan. A refresh already running does not
// have the addresses the scan found
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/581).
let refreshInFlight = false;
let refreshAgain = false;
// The ten-second refresh startRefresh() starts, stopped when the popup moves to
// the recovery screen: there is no profile left to refresh.
@@ -89,7 +96,10 @@ let refreshTimer = null;
// user turned "Use Blockscout" off. So the save drops every token the user has
// not tracked if the stored setting is off by then.
async function doRefreshAndRender() {
if (refreshInFlight) return;
if (refreshInFlight) {
refreshAgain = true;
return;
}
refreshInFlight = true;
try {
await followStoredSettings();
@@ -132,28 +142,35 @@ async function doRefreshAndRender() {
});
renderWalletList();
} catch (e) {
// Every call site fires this and walks away — the boot below, the ten
// second interval, and eight views through ctx — so it must never
// reject: an unhandled rejection is not a report of anything. The save
// inside it reports its own failure through onSaveFailure() (see
// src/shared/state.js); what is left here is a failed network round
// trip, which the next tick retries.
// No caller waits for this function, so it must never reject. An
// unhandled rejection reports nothing. The save inside it reports its
// own failure through onSaveFailure() (see src/shared/state.js); what
// is left here is a failed network round trip, which the next tick
// retries.
log.errorf("popup: background refresh failed:", e);
} finally {
refreshInFlight = false;
}
if (refreshAgain) {
refreshAgain = false;
doRefreshAndRender();
}
}
// Refreshes now and every ten seconds from then on. Called once a wallet
// exists: by init() when the popup opens with one, and by AddWallet when it
// adds one, which in a popup that opened on Welcome is the first
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/530). With the refresh already
// running it starts no second one, and on the recovery screen it does nothing.
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/530). With the ten-second
// refresh already started, it starts no second one. On the recovery screen it
// does nothing.
function startRefresh() {
if (!$("view-state-recovery").classList.contains("hidden")) return;
doRefreshAndRender();
if (refreshTimer === null) {
refreshTimer = setInterval(doRefreshAndRender, 10000);
// A tick that finds a refresh running is dropped.
refreshTimer = setInterval(() => {
if (!refreshInFlight) return doRefreshAndRender();
}, 10000);
}
}
+4 -2
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ const {
timeAgo,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, saveState, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS, resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { bundledToken, resolveSymbol } = require("../../shared/tokenList");
const { formatUsd, getPrice } = require("../../shared/prices");
const {
fetchRecentTransactions,
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ function show() {
// Determine token symbol and balance
let symbol, amount, price;
const knownToken = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(tokenId.toLowerCase());
const chainId = currentNetwork().chainId;
const knownToken = bundledToken(tokenId, chainId);
if (tokenId === "ETH") {
symbol = nativeCurrency();
amount = parseFloat(addr.balance || "0");
@@ -65,6 +66,7 @@ function show() {
tokenId,
addr.tokenBalances,
state.trackedTokens,
chainId,
);
// null when the scale is unknown: no quantity to show, and none to
// price. balanceLine() states that rather than printing 0.0000.
+5 -2
View File
@@ -313,14 +313,17 @@ function nativeCurrency() {
// The wallets' balances hold what Blockscout reported for each token. So the
// wallets are returned only while "Use Blockscout" is on.
function tokenSourcesByChainId(chainId) {
const net = chainId ? networkByChainId(chainId) : currentNetwork();
const chainIdOrActive = chainId || currentNetwork().chainId;
const net = networkByChainId(chainIdOrActive);
if (net && net.id === state.networkId) {
return {
chainId: chainIdOrActive,
trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
wallets: state.useBlockscout ? state.wallets : [],
};
}
return {
chainId: chainIdOrActive,
trackedTokens: (net && state.networkTrackedTokens[net.id]) || [],
wallets: [],
};
@@ -351,7 +354,7 @@ function blockscoutOffTokenNoteHtml(token, chainId) {
// The symbol shown for a token line, from these sources in order:
//
// - the bundled list
// - the bundled list, for a token on Ethereum Mainnet
// - the tokens the user tracks
// - the explorer's report, while "Use Blockscout" is on
//
+6 -2
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ const {
goBack,
tokenSourcesByChainId,
} = require("./helpers");
const { state, currentAddress } = require("../../shared/state");
const { state, currentAddress, currentNetwork } = require("../../shared/state");
let ctx;
const { getProvider } = require("../../shared/balances");
const { resolveTokenDecimals } = require("../../shared/approvalAmount");
@@ -154,7 +154,9 @@ function renderSendTokenSelect(addr) {
// out. Its token's own screen can still send it: there
// state.selectedToken picks the token, not this list.
if (isBelowOneMillionth(t.balance)) continue;
if (isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address)) continue;
if (isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address, currentNetwork().chainId)) {
continue;
}
if (fraudSet.has(t.address.toLowerCase())) continue;
// An unknown holder count does not withhold a token the user holds:
// only a count the explorer actually reported as below the threshold
@@ -230,6 +232,7 @@ function updateSendBalance() {
token,
addr.tokenBalances,
state.trackedTokens,
currentNetwork().chainId,
);
// A null balance is a holding whose scale is unknown. Saying a figure
// for it would be a claim about the amount, so it reads as the
@@ -385,6 +388,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
token,
addr.tokenBalances,
state.trackedTokens,
currentNetwork().chainId,
);
({ tokenDecimals } = tokenBalanceAndDecimals(addr, token));
}
+55 -7
View File
@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@ let ctx;
let versionClickCount = 0;
let versionClickTimer = null;
// The network that Settings was last drawn for. A follow of a switch saved
// elsewhere sets `state` to the new network first. Settings is drawn again only
// once the follow's write returns. So both "Save" buttons take this network,
// not the one in `state`.
let shownNetwork = null;
// One row per site origin, however many addresses it appears under, each with
// an [x] that hands it to onRemove.
function renderSiteList(containerId, origins, onRemove) {
@@ -199,6 +205,7 @@ function renderWalletListSettings() {
}
function show() {
shownNetwork = currentNetwork();
$("settings-rpc").value = state.rpcUrl;
$("settings-blockscout").value = state.blockscoutUrl;
$("settings-network").value = state.networkId;
@@ -306,6 +313,7 @@ function showNewSettings() {
state.checkRecipientsOnEtherscan;
if (state.currentView === "settings") {
markViewRendered("settings");
shownNetwork = currentNetwork();
$("settings-network").value = state.networkId;
$("settings-rpc").value = state.rpcUrl;
$("settings-blockscout").value = state.blockscoutUrl;
@@ -319,6 +327,48 @@ function showNewSettings() {
updateDebugBanner(state.currentView);
}
// Saves `url` as `field` ("rpcUrl" or "blockscoutUrl") of the network
// `networkId`, the one that Settings showed when the user tapped "Save". The
// URL is set in `state` inside the save, holding the lock. So the page cannot
// follow a switch saved elsewhere (followStoredSettings() in
// src/popup/index.js) between setting the URL and writing it. If the active
// network is no longer `networkId`, on this page or in the stored record,
// nothing is saved. The flash message then says that the network changed.
//
// The save writes only the fields that differ from what this page last saved.
// Another page may have stored a different URL since then. So `url` is set in
// the stored record too. "Saved." then means that the stored record holds
// `url`.
//
// `input` is the id of the input that the user typed `url` in. When another
// page changes the network, "Use Blockscout" or "Check recipients on
// Etherscan", this page draws Settings again. A redraw during the endpoint
// check puts the URL from `state` back in the input. So if the input no longer
// shows `url`, nothing is saved. The flash message then says that the URL was
// changed during the check. The save compares the input and sets `url` in
// `state` in one step. So a redraw after the comparison shows `url`.
async function saveEndpoint(field, input, url, networkId) {
let refused = false;
let inputChanged = false;
await saveState((stored) => {
refused =
state.networkId !== networkId || stored.networkId !== networkId;
inputChanged = $(input).value.trim() !== url;
if (refused || inputChanged) return false;
state[field] = url;
stored[field] = url;
});
if (refused) {
showFlash("The URL was not saved because the network changed.");
} else if (inputChanged) {
showFlash(
"The URL was not saved because it was changed during the check.",
);
} else {
showFlash("Saved.");
}
}
function init(_ctx) {
ctx = _ctx;
deleteWallet.init(ctx);
@@ -330,6 +380,8 @@ function init(_ctx) {
showFlash("Please enter an RPC URL.");
return;
}
// The URL is for the network that Settings shows when "Save" is tapped.
const net = shownNetwork;
showFlash("Testing endpoint...");
try {
const resp = await debugFetch(url, {
@@ -348,7 +400,6 @@ function init(_ctx) {
showFlash("Endpoint returned an error.");
return;
}
const net = currentNetwork();
if (json.result !== net.chainId) {
showFlash("Wrong network: expected " + net.name + ".");
return;
@@ -364,9 +415,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
showFlash("Could not reach endpoint.");
return;
}
state.rpcUrl = url;
await saveState();
showFlash("Saved.");
await saveEndpoint("rpcUrl", "settings-rpc", url, net.id);
});
$("btn-save-blockscout").addEventListener("click", async () => {
@@ -375,6 +424,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
showFlash("Please enter a Blockscout API URL.");
return;
}
const net = shownNetwork;
showFlash("Testing endpoint...");
try {
const resp = await debugFetch(url + "/stats");
@@ -389,9 +439,7 @@ function init(_ctx) {
showFlash("Could not reach endpoint.");
return;
}
state.blockscoutUrl = url;
await saveState();
showFlash("Saved.");
await saveEndpoint("blockscoutUrl", "settings-blockscout", url, net.id);
});
// Each change is made inside the save, holding the lock. So
+12
View File
@@ -311,10 +311,21 @@ function populateOnChainDetails(txData, chainId) {
}
}
// Whether TransactionDetail still holds the transaction with `txHash` on
// `chainId`. Opening another transaction replaces the one TransactionDetail
// holds. A visit to Settings does not.
function holdsTransaction(txHash, chainId) {
const tx = state.viewData.tx;
return tx?.hash === txHash && tx?.chainId === chainId;
}
// Reads the block, network details and calldata from Blockscout, and decodes
// the calldata. While the stored "Use Blockscout" is off, Blockscout is not
// asked. An answer that lands after the setting went off is dropped
// (src/shared/storedSettings.js). Either way none of them is shown.
//
// Blockscout can answer after the user has opened another transaction. That
// answer is dropped.
async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, chainId) {
if (!(await storedSettingIsOn("useBlockscout"))) return;
const section = $("tx-detail-calldata-section");
@@ -333,6 +344,7 @@ async function loadFullTxDetails(txHash, chainId) {
if (!resp.ok) return;
const txData = await resp.json();
if (!(await storedSettingIsOn("useBlockscout"))) return;
if (!holdsTransaction(txHash, chainId)) return;
// Populate on-chain detail fields (block, nonce, gas, fee)
populateOnChainDetails(txData, chainId);
+13 -10
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
// string, and a token the user added by hand carries whatever lookupTokenInfo()
// got back, so the accepted types are enumerated rather than coerced.
const { toDecimals } = require("./transferAmount");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
const { bundledToken } = require("./tokenList");
const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
// Every decimals the explorer reported for this contract, across all the
@@ -53,12 +53,14 @@ function explorerDecimals(lower, wallets) {
}
// The decimals to render a token amount with, or null when nothing knows.
// `sources` is { trackedTokens, wallets }, both shaped as they are on `state`.
// `sources` is { chainId, trackedTokens, wallets }. `chainId` is the chain id
// of the token's network. The bundled list is read only when that network is
// Ethereum Mainnet. `trackedTokens` and `wallets` are shaped as on `state`.
function resolveTokenDecimals(tokenAddress, sources) {
const lower = (tokenAddress || "").toLowerCase();
if (!lower) return null;
const bundled = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(lower);
const bundled = bundledToken(lower, sources && sources.chainId);
if (bundled) {
const d = toDecimals(bundled.decimals);
if (d !== null) return d;
@@ -100,18 +102,19 @@ function explorerSymbol(lower, wallets) {
// explorer reported: the same sources and the same precedence
// resolveTokenDecimals() uses, so a token's name and its scale are drawn from
// the same place and the two can no longer disagree about which sources they
// trust. `sources` is { trackedTokens, wallets }, shaped as on `state`.
// trust. `sources` is as for resolveTokenDecimals().
//
// A tracked or explorer-reported symbol is attacker-influenced text, so it is
// held to the spoof rule (symbolSpoof.js): a candidate that wears a bundled or
// native ticker from a contract not entitled to it is refused and the next
// source tried, so resolving a symbol never becomes a new way to claim a known
// ticker. The bundled list is the wallet's own data and is trusted as it is.
// held to the spoof rule (symbolSpoof.js): a candidate that the rule calls a
// spoof is refused and the next source tried, so resolving a symbol never
// becomes a new way to claim a known ticker. The bundled list is the wallet's
// own data and is trusted as it is.
function resolveTokenSymbol(tokenAddress, sources) {
const lower = (tokenAddress || "").toLowerCase();
if (!lower) return null;
const bundled = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(lower);
const chainId = sources && sources.chainId;
const bundled = bundledToken(lower, chainId);
if (bundled && bundled.symbol) return bundled.symbol;
const tracked = ((sources && sources.trackedTokens) || []).find(
@@ -123,7 +126,7 @@ function resolveTokenSymbol(tokenAddress, sources) {
if (reported) candidates.push(reported);
for (const symbol of candidates) {
if (!isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, tokenAddress)) return symbol;
if (!isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, tokenAddress, chainId)) return symbol;
}
return null;
}
+20 -7
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const { ERC20_ABI } = require("./constants");
const { NETWORKS } = require("./networks");
const { log, debugFetch, urlOrigin } = require("./log");
const { deriveAddressFromXpub } = require("./wallet");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
const { bundledToken } = require("./tokenList");
const { LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD, parseHoldersCount } = require("./holders");
const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
const { toDecimals } = require("./transferAmount");
@@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ function rawUnits(value) {
// balance is read through the RPC endpoint instead, and its row here gives that
// entry its holder count and `decimals` (fetchTrackedTokenBalances()).
//
// `chainId` is the chain id of the network `blockscoutUrl` serves. The known
// token list is used only when that network is Ethereum Mainnet.
//
// `decimals` and `balance` are each null when the answer is unknown, the same
// way `holders` already is. Absence is never filled in here: this is the
// upstream of every screen that displays a token amount, so a value invented
@@ -117,6 +120,7 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(
address,
blockscoutUrl,
trackedTokens,
chainId,
signal,
) {
if (!(await storedSettingIsOn("useBlockscout"))) return [];
@@ -175,7 +179,10 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(
// either way: copying another source into it would make
// explorerDecimals()'s disagreement check compare something other
// than explorer values.
const known = resolveTokenDecimals(tokenAddr, { trackedTokens });
const known = resolveTokenDecimals(tokenAddr, {
chainId,
trackedTokens,
});
const scale = known !== null ? known : decimals;
// null is a holding of an amount that cannot be stated, which is
// not the same as a holding of zero, and must never render as one.
@@ -191,7 +198,7 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(
// through to the views, where the two low-holder filters treat
// an unknown count as "do not judge" rather than as zero.
const holders = parseHoldersCount(item.token.holders_count);
const isKnown = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.has(tokenAddr);
const isKnown = bundledToken(tokenAddr, chainId) !== null;
const isTracked = trackedSet.has(tokenAddr);
const hasEnoughHolders = holders >= LOW_HOLDER_THRESHOLD;
@@ -202,7 +209,9 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(
// Every row here is an ERC-20 the explorer reported, so it has a
// contract address; the native ETH balance is fetched over RPC in
// refreshBalances and never passes through this loop.
if (isSpoofedSymbol(item.token.symbol, tokenAddr)) continue;
if (isSpoofedSymbol(item.token.symbol, tokenAddr, chainId)) {
continue;
}
balances.push({
address: item.token.address_hash,
@@ -249,17 +258,18 @@ async function fetchTokenBalances(
// zero from the tracked list. A token whose symbol the spoof rule refuses gets
// no entry either, as in fetchTokenBalances().
//
// `signal` is as for fetchTokenBalances().
// `chainId` and `signal` are as for fetchTokenBalances().
async function fetchTrackedTokenBalances(
provider,
address,
trackedTokens,
previous,
explorerRequest,
chainId,
signal,
) {
const listed = trackedTokens.filter(
(token) => !isSpoofedSymbol(token.symbol, token.address),
(token) => !isSpoofedSymbol(token.symbol, token.address, chainId),
);
// Each token's balanceOf answer, or null where it failed.
const balances = await Promise.all(
@@ -301,7 +311,7 @@ async function fetchTrackedTokenBalances(
if (raw === 0n) return;
const entry = entryIn(reported);
const decimals = entry ? entry.decimals : null;
const known = resolveTokenDecimals(lower, { trackedTokens });
const known = resolveTokenDecimals(lower, { chainId, trackedTokens });
const scale = known !== null ? known : decimals;
rows.push({
address: token.address,
@@ -330,6 +340,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
) {
log.debugf("refreshBalances start, rpc:", urlOrigin(rpcUrl));
const provider = getProvider(rpcUrl, networkId);
const { chainId } = requireNetworkId(networkId);
const tracked = trackedTokens || [];
const trackedSet = new Set(tracked.map((t) => t.address.toLowerCase()));
const updates = [];
@@ -393,6 +404,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
addr.address,
blockscoutUrl,
tracked,
chainId,
signal,
);
updates.push(
@@ -403,6 +415,7 @@ async function refreshBalances(
tracked,
previous,
explorerRequest,
chainId,
signal,
),
explorerRequest,
+33 -2
View File
@@ -47,12 +47,43 @@ function clearPopupCaches() {
// lock, so it is never switched while a follow of a switch saved elsewhere
// waits for the lock (followStoredSettings() in src/popup/index.js): that
// follow runs first, and this switch is made after it.
//
// The save writes only the fields that differ from what this page last saved.
// When this page last saved a balance of "0", clearing that balance is no
// change. So the switch also resets these fields in the stored record:
//
// - every address's balance and token balances;
// - the time of the last balance refresh;
// - the fraud contracts.
//
// A balance or a fraud contract that the background or another page stored
// since this page's last save is then not kept under the new network
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/653,
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/692).
//
// Before the switch, `state` takes the tracked tokens that another page stored
// since this page's last save (takeStoredTrackedTokens() in state.js). The
// switch then puts them away under the previous network, the network they were
// added on. When the stored record is on another network, a switch saved
// elsewhere has not reached this page yet. The stored record's tokens are then
// that network's, and none are taken.
async function onChainSwitch(newNetworkId) {
const { state, saveState } = require("./state");
const { state, saveState, takeStoredTrackedTokens } = require("./state");
let net = null;
await saveState(() => {
await saveState((stored) => {
if (state.networkId === newNetworkId) return false;
if (stored.networkId === state.networkId) {
takeStoredTrackedTokens(stored);
}
net = applyChainSwitchFields(state, newNetworkId);
stored.lastBalanceRefresh = 0;
stored.fraudContracts = [];
for (const wallet of stored.wallets) {
for (const addr of wallet.addresses) {
addr.balance = "0";
addr.tokenBalances = [];
}
}
clearPopupCaches();
});
return net;
+37 -9
View File
@@ -125,11 +125,12 @@ function currentNetwork() {
return networkById(state.networkId);
}
// The persisted fields as this page held them when its last loadState()
// finished, or when its last successful saveState() began, with any network
// switch saved elsewhere that this page has taken since (takeStoredNetwork()).
// saveState() diffs the live state against this to find only the fields THIS
// page changed since.
// `baseline` holds the persisted fields as this page held them when its last
// loadState() finished, or when its last successful saveState() began.
// takeStoredNetwork() and takeStoredTrackedTokens() also write into it what
// this page has taken from the stored record since then. saveState() diffs the
// live state against `baseline` to find only the fields THIS page changed
// since.
//
// Deep-cloned, not a reference: callers mutate persisted objects and arrays
// in place (state.wallets.push(...)), and a reference baseline would mutate
@@ -442,8 +443,10 @@ function mergeNetworkEndpoints(base, ours, theirs) {
// milder than the other two.
//
// Every other persisted field stays a whole-field diff:
// `trackedTokens`/`fraudContracts`/`viewStack` are arrays of scalars with no
// per-element identity to merge by; `networkTrackedTokens` is diffed whole like
// `fraudContracts`/`viewStack` are arrays of scalars with no per-element
// identity to merge by; a save diffs `trackedTokens` whole, and a switch in
// Settings first merges that list by contract address
// (takeStoredTrackedTokens()); `networkTrackedTokens` is diffed whole like
// `trackedTokens` and `networkId`, the two fields a network switch moves
// together with it; `tokenHolderCache` is a map shaped like the ones above,
// but nothing in src/ ever writes an entry into it — it is only ever reset
@@ -591,8 +594,10 @@ function reportSaveFailure(err) {
//
// `beforeWrite`, when given, is called inside the lock with the stored record
// as just read, before this page's state is compared against it. It may change
// `state`, and this save writes that change. When it returns false, nothing is
// written; any other return lets the save go ahead.
// `state`, and this save writes that change. It may also change the stored
// record. A field that this page did not change is then written as
// `beforeWrite` left it. When it returns false, nothing is written; any other
// return lets the save go ahead.
function saveState(beforeWrite) {
const turn = withLock("autistmask", () => saveStateOnce(beforeWrite));
// Every failed save is reported, whether or not the caller awaited this
@@ -613,6 +618,28 @@ function takeStoredNetwork(stored) {
copyChainSwitchFields(baseline, structuredClone(stored));
}
// Give this page the tracked tokens of `stored`, a record on this page's
// network that a save of this page has just read (onChainSwitch() in
// src/shared/chainSwitch.js calls this from `beforeWrite`):
//
// - A token that another page tracked or removed since this page's last save
// is tracked or removed in `state` too.
// - A token that this page tracked or removed since then stays as this page
// has it.
//
// `baseline` takes the stored list, so the save stores the list in `state`
// whenever the two differ.
function takeStoredTrackedTokens(stored) {
rawState.trackedTokens = mergeListByIdentity(
baseline.trackedTokens,
rawState.trackedTokens,
stored.trackedTokens,
(token) => token.address.toLowerCase(),
(base, ours) => ours,
);
baseline.trackedTokens = structuredClone(stored.trackedTokens);
}
// Rejects with StateUnusableError for a stored record this build cannot make
// sense of. Nothing is assigned and `loaded` stays false in that case, so a
// caller that ignores the rejection gets StateNotLoadedError on the first
@@ -659,6 +686,7 @@ module.exports = {
saveState,
onSaveFailure,
takeStoredNetwork,
takeStoredTrackedTokens,
loadState,
currentAddress,
currentNetwork,
+11 -3
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
// them hid the other one's holders' money (issue #276). Membership, not
// equality, is therefore the question — but it is the same question, asked of
// a table that can now state the truth. Every address in a set is one the
// wallet ships as a real token; a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
// wallet ships as a real token on Ethereum Mainnet. On mainnet, a contract
// outside the set is still a spoof.
//
// The symbol is attacker-controlled — it is whatever the ERC-20 contract
// returns — so the lookup is done on a normalized form (issue #260): the
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@
// since that is what the user acts on.
const { KNOWN_SYMBOLS } = require("./tokenList");
const { NETWORKS } = require("./networks");
// Ethereum addresses are case-insensitive: EIP-55 mixed case is a checksum
// over the address, not part of its identity.
@@ -93,18 +95,24 @@ function normalizeSymbol(symbol) {
}
// True when a token bearing `symbol` from contract `contractAddress` is
// impersonating a known symbol.
// impersonating a known symbol. `chainId` is the chain id of the token's
// network.
//
// The native asset's labels are known symbols on every network. The bundled
// list's symbols are known symbols only on Ethereum Mainnet, because the list
// holds mainnet contracts.
//
// An empty contract address is the native asset, which is never a spoof:
// this is what keeps the user's real ETH out of the rule, and it holds for
// any symbol that becomes null-mapped later, not just for ETH.
function isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, contractAddress) {
function isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, contractAddress, chainId) {
const contract = normalizeAddress(contractAddress);
if (!contract) return false;
const sym = normalizeSymbol(symbol);
if (!KNOWN_SYMBOLS.has(sym)) return false;
const legit = KNOWN_SYMBOLS.get(sym);
if (legit === null) return true;
if (chainId !== NETWORKS.mainnet.chainId) return false;
return !legit.has(contract);
}
+16 -4
View File
@@ -3953,6 +3953,15 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.set(t.address.toLowerCase(), t);
}
// The bundled list's entry for the contract at `address` on the network with
// chain id `chainId`, or null. The list holds Ethereum Mainnet contracts only.
// A contract at the same address on another network is another token, so any
// other chain id gets null.
function bundledToken(address, chainId) {
if (chainId !== NETWORKS.mainnet.chainId) return null;
return TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get((address || "").toLowerCase()) || null;
}
// Build a map of symbol (uppercased) -> the set of contract addresses
// (lowercased) that legitimately bear it. Used for spoofed-symbol detection.
// "ETH" maps to null: the native asset has no contract, so no contract may
@@ -3969,7 +3978,8 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
// hides from the balance list, the history and the send selector at its own
// address, so the user cannot spend it (issue #276). Naming every address
// that bears the symbol is the only shape that says what is true; it does not
// loosen the rule, because a contract outside the set is still a spoof.
// loosen the rule. On Ethereum Mainnet, a contract outside the set is still a
// spoof.
const KNOWN_SYMBOLS = new Map();
KNOWN_SYMBOLS.set("ETH", null);
for (const network of Object.values(NETWORKS)) {
@@ -3988,14 +3998,15 @@ for (const t of TOKENS) {
}
}
// Resolve a token symbol from multiple sources, never returning "?".
function resolveSymbol(tokenAddress, tokenBalances, trackedTokens) {
// Resolve a token symbol from multiple sources, never returning "?". The token
// is a contract on the network with chain id `chainId`.
function resolveSymbol(tokenAddress, tokenBalances, trackedTokens, chainId) {
const lower = (tokenAddress || "").toLowerCase();
const tb = (tokenBalances || []).find(
(t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === lower,
);
if (tb && tb.symbol) return tb.symbol;
const known = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(lower);
const known = bundledToken(lower, chainId);
if (known && known.symbol) return known.symbol;
const tracked = (trackedTokens || []).find(
(t) => t.address.toLowerCase() === lower,
@@ -4012,5 +4023,6 @@ module.exports = {
USD_PRICE_FEEDS,
PRICE_FEED_BY_ADDRESS,
getTopTokens,
bundledToken,
resolveSymbol,
};
+6 -3
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
const { formatEther, formatUnits } = require("ethers");
const { log, debugFetch } = require("./log");
const { TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS } = require("./tokenList");
const { bundledToken } = require("./tokenList");
const { parseHoldersCount, isLowHolderCount } = require("./holders");
const { isSpoofedSymbol } = require("./symbolSpoof");
const { nativeCurrencyByChainId } = require("./networks");
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ function parseTx(tx, addrLower, chainId) {
let direction = normalizeAddress(from) === addrLower ? "sent" : "received";
let directionLabel = direction === "sent" ? "Sent" : "Received";
if (toIsContract && method && method !== "transfer") {
const token = TOKEN_BY_ADDRESS.get(normalizeAddress(to));
const token = bundledToken(to, chainId);
if (token) {
symbol = token.symbol;
}
@@ -317,7 +317,10 @@ function filterTransactions(txs, filters = {}) {
const contract = normalizeAddress(tx.contractAddress);
// Filter spoofed known symbols and record the fraud contract
if (hideSpoofed && isSpoofedSymbol(tx.symbol, tx.contractAddress)) {
if (
hideSpoofed &&
isSpoofedSymbol(tx.symbol, tx.contractAddress, tx.chainId)
) {
if (contract && !fraudSet.has(contract)) {
fraudSet.add(contract);
newFraud.push(contract);
+134 -79
View File
@@ -452,8 +452,8 @@ const ADDRESS_THIS = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000002";
// `decimals` is null when nothing knows this token's scale. It is not
// defaulted to 18: the swap lines land on the same approval screen as the
// ERC-20 line, and a scale guessed there is what showed a 1,000 USDT swap as
// 0.000000000001. `sources` is { trackedTokens, wallets }, shaped as they are
// on `state`; resolveTokenDecimals() reads the bundled list, then those.
// 0.000000000001. `sources` is as for resolveTokenDecimals(), which reads the
// bundled list on Ethereum Mainnet, then the tracked tokens and the wallets.
//
// A null `address` means UNDETERMINED — the calldata named no currency for
// that side — and is refused rather than named. It is not native ETH: Uniswap
@@ -479,6 +479,17 @@ function tokenInfo(address, sources) {
};
}
// The token of a Permit2 allowance or of a PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM, in the
// shape tokenInfo() gives. Permit2 has no allowance of ETH and moves no ETH.
// The zero address there reads as a token nothing knows: its amount in base
// units, and the zero address as its token.
function permit2TokenInfo(address, sources) {
if (address === "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000") {
return { symbol: null, decimals: null, address };
}
return tokenInfo(address, sources);
}
// A swap amount line. With a scale it is the token quantity; with none it is
// the base-unit integer with the unknown scale stated, the same refusal the
// ERC-20 amount line makes, so the screen has one way of saying it. `display`
@@ -497,16 +508,18 @@ function amountText(raw, info) {
// The line giving a moved token, or the token of a permit, under `label`, in
// the shape of the Token In line, so the screens show it as they show that
// one. ETH has no address.
function tokenMovedLine(label, token, sources) {
const info = tokenInfo(token, sources);
// one. `info` is what tokenInfo() or permit2TokenInfo() gives for the token.
// ETH has no address.
function tokenMovedLine(label, info) {
if (!present(info.address)) {
return { label, value: info.symbol };
}
return {
label,
value: info.symbol ? info.symbol + " (" + token + ")" : token,
address: token,
value: info.symbol
? info.symbol + " (" + info.address + ")"
: info.address,
address: info.address,
isToken: true,
};
}
@@ -1227,6 +1240,9 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
const release = routerRelease(toAddress, chainId);
if (release === null) return null;
const { commandTypeMask, commands, allowRevert } = release;
// The swap's tokens are contracts on the network with `chainId`, so they
// are named and scaled for that network.
const tokenSources = { ...sources, chainId };
try {
const parsed = ROUTER_IFACE.parseTransaction({ data });
if (!parsed) return null;
@@ -1240,9 +1256,10 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
let inputEstablished = false;
// Whether the user pays the step that set the input side: a V2 or V3
// swap step with `payerIsUser` true, a V4 step the user pays some of
// its input currency (see decodeV4Swap()), or a WRAP_ETH, whose ETH
// comes from the transaction's value. A step paid from the router
// takes nothing from the sender.
// its input currency (see paidByUser in the loop), or a WRAP_ETH,
// whose ETH comes from the transaction's value. A step that pays an
// ERC-20 token from the router takes none of that token from the
// sender.
let inputPaidByUser = false;
// The last PERMIT2_PERMIT this decoder read before a step set the
// input side, or null (see permitStands after the loop).
@@ -1338,7 +1355,9 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
// What the steps take from the sender beyond the amount of the step
// that sets the input side, as { token, amount }, in step order.
// After the loop each joins the Amount line or gets lines of its own
// (see permitStands).
// (see permitStands). A take with `atMost` set may take less than
// `amount`: it never joins the Amount line, and its line reads
// "Up to" and the amount.
const userPaid = [];
// A swap step the user pays for (`payerIsUser` true) takes `amount`
// of `token` from the sender. A V2 exact-in of ALREADY_PAID takes
@@ -1613,13 +1632,13 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
} else {
// The router passes this check whenever the owner
// holds at least minBalance, so a zero one guarantees
// nothing and does not replace a minimum an earlier
// step stated. A check the router lets fail guarantees
// nothing either, so it is read as a zero one. Any
// nothing. A check the router lets fail guarantees
// nothing either, so it is read as a zero one. A zero
// check sets neither Token Out nor the minimum. Any
// other minBalance sets the output side as a swap
// does. It pays nobody.
// does. The check pays nobody.
const minBalance = allowedToFail ? 0n : b.minBalance;
if (!(minBalance === 0n && present(minOutput))) {
if (minBalance !== 0n) {
setOutput(i, b.token, minBalance, []);
}
keepsRouterWeth = true;
@@ -1815,6 +1834,41 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
} else if (command === "V4_SWAP") {
const v4 = decodeV4Swap(inputs[i]);
const inputSetBefore = inputEstablished;
// V4Router pays a SETTLE of ETH from the router's own
// ETH, whichever payer the SETTLE names. The router holds
// the transaction's value, and any ETH an earlier step
// left it (see heldByRouter). So the user also pays a
// SETTLE of ETH that names the router as payer. The user
// pays all of its amount when the router holds no other
// ETH, and up to its amount otherwise. CONTRACT_BALANCE
// pays all the router holds, an amount the calldata does
// not state.
const routerHeldEth = heldByRouter.has(
"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
);
const ethFromRouter = (v4?.settledFromRouter ?? [])
.filter(
(s) =>
s.currency ===
"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
)
.map((s) => ({
currency: s.currency,
amount:
s.amount === CONTRACT_BALANCE ? null : s.amount,
}));
// What the user pays the step: what decodeV4Swap() says,
// and the ETH of each SETTLE from the router of a known
// amount when the router holds no other ETH.
const paidByUser = v4
? v4.paidByUser.concat(
routerHeldEth
? []
: ethFromRouter.filter((s) =>
present(s.amount),
),
)
: [];
if (v4) {
// Each SETTLE paid from the router spends the amount
// decodeV4Swap() says it pays.
@@ -1845,10 +1899,10 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
commandNames[i] += " (could not be decoded)";
}
// The step's amount, if it sets the input side: what the
// user pays it of its input currency (see
// decodeV4Swap()), or, when the user pays none of it,
// what its swap actions spend of it, whoever pays that.
const paidIn = v4?.paidByUser.find(
// user pays it of its input currency, or, when the user
// pays none of it, what its swap actions spend of it,
// whoever pays that.
const paidIn = paidByUser.find(
(p) => p.currency === v4.tokenIn,
);
const amountIn = paidIn ? paidIn.amount : v4?.amountIn;
@@ -1902,10 +1956,24 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
// router still runs it.
const setInputHere = inputEstablished && !inputSetBefore;
if (setInputHere) inputPaidByUser = paidIn !== undefined;
if (v4) {
for (const p of v4.paidByUser) {
if (setInputHere && p === paidIn) continue;
addUserPaid(p.currency, p.amount);
for (const p of paidByUser) {
if (setInputHere && p === paidIn) continue;
addUserPaid(p.currency, p.amount);
}
// A SETTLE of ETH from the router that `paidByUser` leaves
// out is a take of its own, even on the step that sets
// the input side. Either this decoder does not know its
// amount, or ETH an earlier step left in the router may
// pay part of that amount (see userPaid).
for (const p of ethFromRouter) {
if (!present(p.amount)) {
addUserPaid(p.currency, null);
} else if (routerHeldEth) {
userPaid.push({
token: p.currency,
amount: p.amount,
atMost: true,
});
}
}
if (!v4 || v4.settleUnread) {
@@ -2013,10 +2081,10 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
// The total is what the steps take of Token In: the amount of the
// step that set the input side, with each later take of that token
// added to it while both are quantities. A take that cannot be added,
// being of another token or coming after an amount that is not a
// quantity (a V4 open delta, ALREADY_PAID, or none stated), gets
// lines of its own. One whose amount is not known also leaves the
// total unknown, with no figure.
// being of another token, coming after an amount that is not a
// quantity (a V4 open delta, ALREADY_PAID, or none stated), or having
// `atMost` set, gets lines of its own. One whose amount is not known
// also leaves the total unknown, with no figure.
//
// A PERMIT2_PERMIT names Token In only when its amount stands as the
// Amount figure in place of the total, which it does only in the
@@ -2060,14 +2128,14 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
let total = null;
// The takes from the sender that `total` adds up, each a quantity, as
// { token, amount }. When there is no Amount line, each gets lines of
// its own (see below). The amount of a step that set the input side
// and is paid from the router counts in `total` but is not among them.
// its own (see below). The amount of the step that set the input side
// counts in `total` whoever pays that step. That amount is among them
// only when the user pays the step (see inputPaidByUser).
const inTotal = [];
// Whether the step that set the input side counts as a take from the
// sender, which may get lines of its own. The amount it stated counts
// whoever pays it. Stating none, it counts only when the user pays it
// some of its input token: paid from the router, it takes nothing
// from the sender.
// some of its input token.
const hasFirstTake =
inputEstablished && (present(inputAmount) || inputPaidByUser);
// The take of the step that set the input side, when the total
@@ -2093,7 +2161,8 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
if (
ofTokenIn &&
typeof total === "bigint" &&
typeof t.amount === "bigint"
typeof t.amount === "bigint" &&
!t.atMost
) {
total += t.amount;
inTotal.push(t);
@@ -2142,11 +2211,11 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
// Any other output keeps its own token and figure: a swap that pays
// its WETH to the user and then unwraps receives WETH, and one that
// buys USDC and then unwraps the WETH it did not spend receives USDC.
const inInfo = tokenInfo(inputToken, sources);
const inInfo = tokenInfo(inputToken, tokenSources);
const outInfo =
outputUnwrapped || (hasUnwrapWeth && !outputEstablished)
? { symbol: "ETH", decimals: 18, address: null }
: tokenInfo(outputToken, sources);
: tokenInfo(outputToken, tokenSources);
const inSymbol = inInfo.symbol;
const outSymbol = outInfo.symbol;
@@ -2196,8 +2265,9 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
// V2's already-paid zero, neither of which is a quantity at all (see
// OPEN_DELTA and ALREADY_PAID), and an unbounded permit. Those two
// tests come first — the sentinels are not bigints and cannot be
// compared with one.
const spentText = (amount, info) => {
// compared with one. `atMost` marks an amount that is only the most a
// take may be (see userPaid).
const spentText = (amount, info, atMost) => {
if (amount === OPEN_DELTA) {
return { raw: OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT, display: OPEN_DELTA_AMOUNT };
}
@@ -2210,7 +2280,7 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
if (amount >= MAX_UINT160) {
return { raw: "Unlimited", display: "Unlimited" };
}
if (hasV2OrV3ExactOut) {
if (hasV2OrV3ExactOut || atMost) {
// A V2 or V3 exact-out swap spends at most this figure,
// whichever steps gave it (an amountInMax, the WRAP_ETH of a
// swap paid in ETH, a permit, or several steps' total), so it
@@ -2270,11 +2340,20 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
details.push({
label: "Moved from the sender",
value: present(s.amount)
? spentText(s.amount, tokenInfo(s.token, sources)).display
? spentText(
s.amount,
tokenInfo(s.token, tokenSources),
s.atMost,
).display
: UNDECODED_CURRENCY,
});
if (present(s.token)) {
details.push(tokenMovedLine("Token moved", s.token, sources));
details.push(
tokenMovedLine(
"Token moved",
tokenInfo(s.token, tokenSources),
),
);
details.push({
label: "Moved to",
value: "The swap step that spends it",
@@ -2285,12 +2364,12 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
// What each PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM moves: its amount, its token and
// where it goes, an address on a line of its own.
for (const m of movedFromSender) {
const info = permit2TokenInfo(m.token, tokenSources);
details.push({
label: "Moved from the sender",
value: amountText(m.amount, tokenInfo(m.token, sources))
.display,
value: amountText(m.amount, info).display,
});
details.push(tokenMovedLine("Token moved", m.token, sources));
details.push(tokenMovedLine("Token moved", info));
details.push(
present(m.to)
? { label: "Moved to", value: m.to }
@@ -2320,36 +2399,15 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
});
continue;
}
// Permit2 has no allowance of ETH. An allowance of the zero
// address reads as one of a token nothing knows: its amount in
// base units, and the zero address as its token.
if (p.token === "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000") {
details.push({
label: "Permit2 allowance",
value:
p.amount >= MAX_UINT160
? "Unlimited"
: unknownDecimalsAmount(p.amount),
});
details.push({
label: "Allowance token",
value: p.token,
address: p.token,
isToken: true,
});
} else {
details.push({
label: "Permit2 allowance",
value:
p.amount >= MAX_UINT160
? "Unlimited"
: amountText(p.amount, tokenInfo(p.token, sources))
.display,
});
details.push(
tokenMovedLine("Allowance token", p.token, sources),
);
}
const info = permit2TokenInfo(p.token, tokenSources);
details.push({
label: "Permit2 allowance",
value:
p.amount >= MAX_UINT160
? "Unlimited"
: amountText(p.amount, info).display,
});
details.push(tokenMovedLine("Allowance token", info));
details.push({
label: "Allowance spender",
value: p.spender,
@@ -2407,7 +2465,7 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
paidTo.push({ label: "Paid to", value: PAID_TO_BRIDGE });
}
for (const m of movedIntoRouter) {
const info = tokenInfo(m.token, sources);
const info = permit2TokenInfo(m.token, tokenSources);
paidTo.push({
label: "Paid to",
value:
@@ -2415,9 +2473,7 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
amountText(m.amount, info).display +
" from the sender (later steps may not spend all of it)",
});
paidTo.push(
tokenMovedLine("Token moved into the router", m.token, sources),
);
paidTo.push(tokenMovedLine("Token moved into the router", info));
}
if (outputHeld) {
paidTo.push({ label: "Paid to", value: STAYS_IN_ROUTER });
@@ -2434,8 +2490,7 @@ function decode(data, toAddress, chainId, sources, fromAddress) {
paidTo.push(
tokenMovedLine(
"Token moved into the router",
getAddress(token),
sources,
tokenInfo(getAddress(token), tokenSources),
),
);
}
+5 -2
View File
@@ -90,9 +90,11 @@ beforeEach(() => {
});
describe("resolveTokenDecimals", () => {
// The bundled list is read only for a token on Ethereum Mainnet.
test("prefers the bundled list", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [{ address: USDC, symbol: "USDC", decimals: 2 }];
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(USDC, state)).toBe(6);
const sources = { chainId: "0x1", trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens };
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(USDC, sources)).toBe(6);
});
test("reads a token the user tracks", () => {
@@ -124,7 +126,8 @@ describe("resolveTokenDecimals", () => {
// answers 0 is used rather than fallen past like the unusable entry above.
test("uses a bundled scale of zero", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [{ address: SLP, symbol: "SLP", decimals: 18 }];
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(SLP, state)).toBe(0);
const sources = { chainId: "0x1", trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens };
expect(resolveTokenDecimals(SLP, sources)).toBe(0);
});
test("uses a tracked scale of zero", () => {
+169
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
// The approval screen for a site's Sepolia transfer of the contract at USDC's
// mainnet address, while Sepolia is active.
//
// The bundled token list holds Ethereum Mainnet contracts. The contract at the
// same address on Sepolia is another token, but the screen named it USDC and
// scaled its amount at USDC's decimals
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/632). The bundled list now names
// a token only on Ethereum Mainnet. The same screen for a mainnet transfer of
// USDC, while Sepolia is active, still names USDC.
//
// Driven through the real approval screen, against the minimal DOM stub
// tests/approvalTokenNetwork.test.js uses.
globalThis.chrome = {
storage: { local: { get: async () => ({}), set: async () => {} } },
};
const { Interface } = require("ethers");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const { NETWORKS } = require("../src/shared/networks");
const approval = require("../src/popup/views/approval");
const FROM = "0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266";
const RECIPIENT = "0x711e691962E5c054b78071C789A0C8CE657377aD";
// USDC's address on Ethereum Mainnet, where the bundled list names it.
const USDC = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
// FROM sends 1234500000 base units to RECIPIENT.
const TRANSFER_DATA = new Interface([
"function transfer(address to, uint256 amount)",
]).encodeFunctionData("transfer", [RECIPIENT, 1234500000n]);
function makeElement(id) {
const classes = new Set();
const el = {
id,
textContent: "",
value: "",
innerHTML: "",
disabled: false,
style: {},
dataset: {},
listeners: {},
classList: {
add: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.add(n)),
remove: (...names) => names.forEach((n) => classes.delete(n)),
contains: (n) => classes.has(n),
toggle: (n, force) => {
const on = force === undefined ? !classes.has(n) : force;
if (on) classes.add(n);
else classes.delete(n);
return on;
},
},
addEventListener: (name, fn) => {
el.listeners[name] = el.listeners[name] || [];
el.listeners[name].push(fn);
},
querySelectorAll: () => [],
appendChild: () => {},
};
// Views reach for .parentElement to hide whole sections.
Object.defineProperty(el, "parentElement", {
get: () => node(id + "-parent"),
});
return el;
}
function makeDocument() {
const els = new Map();
return {
getElementById(id) {
// The debug banner is created on demand by helpers.js; absent
// is the state a non-debug, non-testnet popup is in.
if (id === "debug-banner") return null;
if (!els.has(id)) els.set(id, makeElement(id));
return els.get(id);
},
createElement: () => makeElement("created"),
body: { prepend: () => {} },
};
}
function node(id) {
return globalThis.document.getElementById(id);
}
// One line of the decoded details: its label and what is drawn under it.
function decodedLine(label) {
return node("approve-tx-decoded-details")
.innerHTML.split('<div class="mb-2">')
.find((line) =>
line.startsWith(`<div class="text-muted">${label}</div>`),
);
}
// Open the approval screen, with Sepolia active, for the site's transaction
// sending TRANSFER_DATA to the contract at USDC's address on the network with
// chain id `chainId`.
async function showTransfer(chainId) {
globalThis.document = makeDocument();
globalThis.window = { location: { search: "" }, close: () => {} };
globalThis.chrome.runtime = {
connect: () => ({ postMessage: () => {} }),
sendMessage: (msg, reply) => {
if (!reply) return;
reply({
type: "tx",
origin: "https://dapp.example",
isPhishingDomain: false,
approvedFrom: FROM,
approvedTx: {
type: 2,
from: FROM,
chainId,
nonce: "0x7",
gasLimit: "0x30d40",
maxPriorityFeePerGas: "0x3b9aca00",
maxFeePerGas: "0x77359400",
to: USDC,
value: "0x0",
data: TRANSFER_DATA,
accessList: [],
},
});
},
};
state.networkId = "sepolia";
state.trackedTokens = [];
state.networkTrackedTokens = {};
state.activeAddress = FROM;
state.wallets = [
{
type: "hd",
name: "Wallet 1",
xpub: "xpub-wallet-1",
encryptedSecret: "encrypted-secret-1",
nextIndex: 1,
addresses: [
{ address: FROM, index: 0, balance: "0", tokenBalances: [] },
],
},
];
state.currentView = null;
approval.init({});
await approval.show(1);
}
test("names no token, and states the amount in base units", async () => {
await showTransfer(NETWORKS.sepolia.chainId);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("approve-tx");
expect(node("approve-tx-to").innerHTML).not.toContain("USDC");
expect(decodedLine("Token")).toContain(
'<div class="font-bold">Unknown token</div>',
);
expect(decodedLine("Amount")).toContain(
'<div class="font-bold">1234500000 base units (decimals unknown)</div>',
);
});
// A transaction is named for its own network, not the active one.
test("a mainnet transfer of USDC is still named and scaled as USDC", async () => {
await showTransfer(NETWORKS.mainnet.chainId);
expect(state.currentView).toBe("approve-tx");
expect(decodedLine("Token")).toContain('<div class="font-bold">USDC</div>');
expect(decodedLine("Amount")).toContain(
'<div class="font-bold">1234.5000 USDC</div>',
);
});
+51
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@
// approved a site's request, which changes only the stored record. Driven
// through the real popup over a stored profile on Ethereum Mainnet. The same
// refresh in the background is in tests/backgroundStateIsolation.test.js.
//
// The last test covers a balance refresh by the background that is saved while
// a switch in Settings waits for the lock
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/653).
const {
bootPopup,
@@ -159,3 +163,50 @@ test("a refresh that returns after the background switched the network writes no
expectNothingStored(page);
});
// The background's refresh saves Ethereum Mainnet's balances while the switch
// in Settings waits for the lock. This page last saved a balance of "0" and no
// token balances, the values that the switch sets.
test("a background refresh saved while a switch in Settings waits for the lock leaves none of its balances stored", async () => {
const profile = unversionedValidProfile();
profile.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = "0";
const page = await bootPopup(profile);
expect(page.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
const background = require("../src/background/state");
await page.click("btn-settings");
// The background takes the lock first and holds it until the test calls
// `letGo()`. It then saves balances as backgroundRefresh() in
// src/background/index.js does.
let letGo;
const refreshSave = background.updateState(async (fresh) => {
await new Promise((resolve) => {
letGo = resolve;
});
fresh.wallets[0].addresses[0].balance = "7.0";
fresh.wallets[0].addresses[0].tokenBalances = [
{
address: TOKEN_ADDRESS,
name: "Test Token",
symbol: "TST",
decimals: 18,
balance: "5.0",
holders: null,
},
];
fresh.lastBalanceRefresh = Date.now();
});
await page.settle();
const select = page.node("settings-network");
select.value = "sepolia";
const switching = Promise.all(select.listeners.change.map((fn) => fn()));
await page.settle();
letGo();
await refreshSave;
await switching;
await page.settle();
expectNothingStored(page);
});
+81
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
// The token screen, the Send screen and the confirmation screen for the
// contract at USDC's mainnet address. No address holds it and the user does
// not track it, so only the bundled token list can name it.
//
// The bundled token list holds Ethereum Mainnet contracts, so these screens
// name the token from it on Ethereum Mainnet only
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/632). Driven through the real
// popup over a stored profile.
const {
bootPopup,
cleanupPopup,
unversionedValidProfile,
} = require("./support/popupBoot");
const USDC = "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48";
const RECIPIENT = "0x711e691962E5c054b78071C789A0C8CE657377aD";
afterEach(() => {
cleanupPopup();
});
// The popup reopened onto AddressToken for USDC's address, on `networkId`.
function bootOnToken(networkId) {
return bootPopup(
unversionedValidProfile({
networkId,
currentView: "address-token",
viewStack: ["main", "address"],
selectedWallet: 0,
selectedAddress: 0,
selectedToken: USDC,
}),
);
}
// AddressToken's Send, then Review for 1 token to RECIPIENT.
async function reviewSend(boot) {
await boot.click("btn-address-token-send");
expect(boot.visibleViews()).toEqual(["send"]);
boot.node("send-to").value = RECIPIENT;
boot.node("send-amount").value = "1";
await boot.click("btn-send-review");
expect(boot.visibleViews()).toEqual(["confirm-tx"]);
}
describe("on Ethereum Mainnet, the bundled list names the token", () => {
test("on the token screen", async () => {
const boot = await bootOnToken("mainnet");
expect(boot.visibleViews()).toEqual(["address-token"]);
expect(boot.text("address-token-title")).toContain("USDC");
const info = boot.node("address-token-contract-info").innerHTML;
expect(info).toContain(
'<span class="text-muted">Decimals:</span> 6</div>',
);
});
test("on the Send screen and the confirmation screen", async () => {
const boot = await bootOnToken("mainnet");
await reviewSend(boot);
expect(boot.text("send-balance")).toContain("USDC");
expect(boot.text("confirm-amount")).toContain("USDC");
});
});
describe("with Sepolia active, the bundled list does not name the token", () => {
test("on the token screen", async () => {
const boot = await bootOnToken("sepolia");
expect(boot.visibleViews()).toEqual(["address-token"]);
expect(boot.text("address-token-title")).not.toContain("USDC");
const info = boot.node("address-token-contract-info").innerHTML;
expect(info).not.toContain("Decimals:");
});
test("on the Send screen and the confirmation screen", async () => {
const boot = await bootOnToken("sepolia");
await reviewSend(boot);
expect(boot.text("send-balance")).not.toContain("USDC");
expect(boot.text("confirm-amount")).not.toContain("USDC");
});
});
+3 -1
View File
@@ -111,13 +111,15 @@ function respondWith(items) {
}
// Fetch and place the result exactly where refreshBalances() places it, so the
// approval screens read what a real refresh would have left on state.
// approval screens read what a real refresh on Ethereum Mainnet would have
// left on state.
async function fetchOnto(items, trackedTokens = []) {
respondWith(items);
const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(
HOLDER,
BLOCKSCOUT,
trackedTokens,
"0x1",
);
state.trackedTokens = trackedTokens;
state.wallets = [
+7 -1
View File
@@ -192,7 +192,13 @@ describe("the balance-list spam gate", () => {
},
}),
]);
const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, []);
// On Ethereum Mainnet, the only network the known-token list covers.
const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(
HOLDER,
BLOCKSCOUT,
[],
"0x1",
);
expect(balances).toHaveLength(1);
expect(balances[0].holders).toBeNull();
});
+265
View File
@@ -253,6 +253,271 @@ test("a switch back in Settings after a follow whose write failed is stored", as
expect(told.at(-1).chainId).toBe(NETWORKS.mainnet.chainId);
});
// The user saves an endpoint URL in Settings on Ethereum Mainnet. Before the
// URL is stored, the background saves a switch to Sepolia. Another write holds
// the lock, so the popup's follow of that switch and the URL's save both wait
// for the lock. Either may take it first. The URL is stored for neither
// network. The flash message says that the network changed.
test.each([
{ button: "btn-save-rpc", field: "settings-rpc", first: "follow" },
{ button: "btn-save-rpc", field: "settings-rpc", first: "save" },
{
button: "btn-save-blockscout",
field: "settings-blockscout",
first: "follow",
},
{
button: "btn-save-blockscout",
field: "settings-blockscout",
first: "save",
},
])(
"$button saves nothing when the network changes before the URL is stored ($first first)",
async ({ button, field, first }) => {
const page = await bootOnAddress();
await page.click("btn-settings");
// This answer passes both endpoint checks. The RPC check reads
// Ethereum Mainnet's chain id from it. The Blockscout check reads `ok`.
globalThis.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
json: async () => ({ result: NETWORKS.mainnet.chainId }),
});
const url = "https://own-node.example.invalid";
let releaseLock;
const lockHeld = navigator.locks.request(
"autistmask",
() =>
new Promise((resolve) => {
releaseLock = resolve;
}),
);
// The click handler runs until its save waits for the lock.
const tapSave = async () => {
page.node(field).value = url;
const saving = page.node(button).listeners.click.map((fn) => fn());
await page.settle();
return saving;
};
let saving;
if (first === "save") saving = await tapSave();
await backgroundSwitch(page, "sepolia");
if (first === "follow") saving = await tapSave();
releaseLock();
await lockHeld;
await Promise.all(saving);
await page.settle();
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
expect(state.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
expect(JSON.stringify(page.storage.read("autistmask"))).not.toContain(
url,
);
expect(page.text("flash-msg")).toBe(
"The URL was not saved because the network changed.",
);
},
);
// The popup's follow of the background's switch to Sepolia has set `state` to
// Sepolia. The follow's write has not returned yet, so Settings still shows
// Ethereum Mainnet. The user taps "Save" there. The URL is for Ethereum
// Mainnet, so the save stores the URL for neither network.
test.each([
{ button: "btn-save-rpc", field: "settings-rpc" },
{ button: "btn-save-blockscout", field: "settings-blockscout" },
])(
"$button saves nothing when tapped while the follow's write waits",
async ({ button, field }) => {
const page = await bootOnAddress();
await page.click("btn-settings");
// This answer passes both endpoint checks on Ethereum Mainnet.
globalThis.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
json: async () => ({ result: NETWORKS.mainnet.chainId }),
});
const url = "https://own-node.example.invalid";
const { set } = page.storage.local;
const write = set.getMockImplementation();
let releaseWrite;
const writeHeld = new Promise((resolve) => {
releaseWrite = resolve;
});
// The background's write lands; the next, the follow's, waits.
set.mockImplementationOnce(write).mockImplementationOnce(
async (items) => {
await writeHeld;
await write(items);
},
);
await backgroundSwitch(page, "sepolia");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
expect(state.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
expect(page.value("settings-network")).toBe("mainnet");
page.node(field).value = url;
const saving = page.node(button).listeners.click.map((fn) => fn());
await page.settle();
releaseWrite();
await Promise.all(saving);
await page.settle();
expect(JSON.stringify(page.storage.read("autistmask"))).not.toContain(
url,
);
expect(page.text("flash-msg")).toBe(
"The URL was not saved because the network changed.",
);
},
);
// The user taps the RPC "Save" on Ethereum Mainnet. While the check waits for
// the node's answer, the popup follows the background's switch to Sepolia. The
// node answers with Sepolia's chain id. So the check refuses the node for
// Ethereum Mainnet, and nothing is stored.
test("the RPC check compares the answer with the network at the tap", async () => {
const page = await bootOnAddress();
await page.click("btn-settings");
let answer;
globalThis.fetch.mockReturnValue(
new Promise((resolve) => {
answer = resolve;
}),
);
const url = "https://sepolia-node.example.invalid";
page.node("settings-rpc").value = url;
const saving = page.node("btn-save-rpc").listeners.click.map((fn) => fn());
await page.settle();
await backgroundSwitch(page, "sepolia");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
expect(state.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
answer({ json: async () => ({ result: NETWORKS.sepolia.chainId }) });
await Promise.all(saving);
await page.settle();
expect(JSON.stringify(page.storage.read("autistmask"))).not.toContain(url);
expect(page.text("flash-msg")).toBe(
"Wrong network: expected Ethereum Mainnet.",
);
});
// The user taps the Blockscout "Save" on Ethereum Mainnet. While the check
// waits for Blockscout's answer, the popup follows the background's switch to
// Sepolia. The URL is for Ethereum Mainnet, so nothing is stored.
test("the Blockscout save is for the network at the tap", async () => {
const page = await bootOnAddress();
await page.click("btn-settings");
let answer;
globalThis.fetch.mockReturnValue(
new Promise((resolve) => {
answer = resolve;
}),
);
const url = "https://own-explorer.example.invalid/api/v2";
page.node("settings-blockscout").value = url;
const saving = page
.node("btn-save-blockscout")
.listeners.click.map((fn) => fn());
await page.settle();
await backgroundSwitch(page, "sepolia");
expect(page.value("settings-network")).toBe("sepolia");
answer({ ok: true });
await Promise.all(saving);
await page.settle();
expect(JSON.stringify(page.storage.read("autistmask"))).not.toContain(url);
expect(page.text("flash-msg")).toBe(
"The URL was not saved because the network changed.",
);
});
// Settings is open when the network changes to Sepolia. The popup follows the
// background's switch, or the user picks Sepolia in the network selector. Each
// "Save" after the switch stores its URL for Sepolia.
test.each([
["a follow", (page) => backgroundSwitch(page, "sepolia")],
[
"the network selector",
async (page) => {
const select = page.node("settings-network");
select.value = "sepolia";
for (const fn of select.listeners.change) await fn();
await page.settle();
},
],
])(
"after a switch to Sepolia by %s, Settings saves each URL for Sepolia",
async (_how, switchToSepolia) => {
const page = await bootOnAddress();
await page.click("btn-settings");
await switchToSepolia(page);
// This answer passes both endpoint checks on Sepolia. The RPC check
// reads Sepolia's chain id from it. The Blockscout check reads `ok`.
globalThis.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
json: async () => ({ result: NETWORKS.sepolia.chainId }),
});
const rpcUrl = "https://own-node.example.invalid";
const blockscoutUrl = "https://own-explorer.example.invalid/api/v2";
page.node("settings-rpc").value = rpcUrl;
await page.click("btn-save-rpc");
expect(page.text("flash-msg")).toBe("Saved.");
page.node("settings-blockscout").value = blockscoutUrl;
await page.click("btn-save-blockscout");
expect(page.text("flash-msg")).toBe("Saved.");
const stored = page.storage.read("autistmask");
expect(stored.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
expect(stored.rpcUrl).toBe(rpcUrl);
expect(stored.blockscoutUrl).toBe(blockscoutUrl);
},
);
// The user picks Sepolia in Settings, but the switch's write fails. The page is
// then on Sepolia, while Settings was last drawn for Ethereum Mainnet. A "Save"
// after the failed switch stores nothing for either network.
test.each([
{ button: "btn-save-rpc", field: "settings-rpc" },
{ button: "btn-save-blockscout", field: "settings-blockscout" },
])(
"$button saves nothing after a switch in Settings whose write failed",
async ({ button, field }) => {
const page = await bootOnAddress();
await page.click("btn-settings");
page.storage.local.set.mockRejectedValueOnce(
new Error("quota exceeded"),
);
const select = page.node("settings-network");
select.value = "sepolia";
for (const fn of select.listeners.change) {
await expect(fn()).rejects.toThrow("quota exceeded");
}
await page.settle();
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
expect(state.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
// This answer passes both endpoint checks on Ethereum Mainnet.
globalThis.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
json: async () => ({ result: NETWORKS.mainnet.chainId }),
});
const url = "https://own-node.example.invalid";
page.node(field).value = url;
await page.click(button);
expect(JSON.stringify(page.storage.read("autistmask"))).not.toContain(
url,
);
expect(page.text("flash-msg")).toBe(
"The URL was not saved because the network changed.",
);
},
);
// Such as one a newer build wrote, which this build cannot read. Nothing reads
// or writes the stored record for it: the popup's next save finds it, as
// before.
+157
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
// While a refresh runs, a request through ctx is not dropped. One more refresh
// runs once the running one ends, however many were asked for in that time
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/581). A tick of the ten-second
// timer that finds a refresh running is dropped. Each test boots the real popup
// over a stored profile and holds the ten-second refresh open. `readChain()`
// sets each address's balance from `CHAIN`, as the real `refreshBalances()`
// sets it from the node.
const {
bootPopup,
cleanupPopup,
unversionedValidProfile,
ADDRESS,
} = require("./support/popupBoot");
const {
hdWalletFromMnemonic,
deriveAddressFromXpub,
} = require("../src/shared/wallet");
const PHRASE =
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon " +
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about";
const PASSWORD = "correct horse battery staple";
// The first two addresses of PHRASE, both used on the chain.
const { xpub, firstAddress } = hdWalletFromMnemonic(PHRASE);
const SECOND_ADDRESS = deriveAddressFromXpub(xpub, 1);
// The ETH balance the chain holds for each address, in ether.
const CHAIN = {
[ADDRESS]: "1.5",
[firstAddress]: "2.0",
[SECOND_ADDRESS]: "3.0",
};
afterEach(() => {
cleanupPopup();
});
// The balance stand-in for a refresh that returns.
async function readChain(wallets) {
for (const wallet of wallets) {
for (const addr of wallet.addresses) {
addr.balance = CHAIN[addr.address];
}
}
}
// Boots the popup over a profile with one wallet. From then on,
// `refreshBalances()` never returns unless the test answers it. So an unwanted
// refresh is counted once and then waits, instead of starting more.
async function boot() {
const page = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
expect(page.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
const { refreshBalances } = require("../src/shared/balances");
refreshBalances.mockImplementation(() => new Promise(() => {}));
return { page, refreshBalances };
}
// Starts the ten-second refresh and holds it open until finish() is called.
// The held refresh then writes the chain's balances. finish() resolves once
// the held refresh has saved them and drawn Home. The one refresh after the
// held one also returns.
async function holdRefresh(page) {
const { refreshBalances } = require("../src/shared/balances");
let answer;
refreshBalances
.mockImplementationOnce(async (wallets) => {
await new Promise((resolve) => {
answer = resolve;
});
await readChain(wallets);
})
.mockImplementationOnce(readChain);
const ticking = page.tick();
await page.settle();
return {
finish: async () => {
answer();
await ticking;
},
};
}
// Imports PHRASE on AddWallet. Its address scan finds the phrase's first two
// addresses.
async function importPhrase(page) {
const { scanForAddresses } = require("../src/shared/balances");
scanForAddresses.mockImplementationOnce(async () => ({
addresses: [
{ address: firstAddress, index: 0 },
{ address: SECOND_ADDRESS, index: 1 },
],
nextIndex: 2,
}));
await page.click("btn-add-wallet-bottom");
await page.click("tab-mnemonic");
page.node("wallet-mnemonic").value = PHRASE;
page.node("add-wallet-password").value = PASSWORD;
page.node("add-wallet-password-confirm").value = PASSWORD;
await page.click("btn-add-wallet-confirm");
}
// Imports the private key `key` on AddWallet.
async function importKey(page, key) {
await page.click("btn-add-wallet-bottom");
await page.click("tab-privkey");
page.node("import-private-key").value = key;
page.node("add-wallet-password").value = PASSWORD;
page.node("add-wallet-password-confirm").value = PASSWORD;
await page.click("btn-add-wallet-confirm");
}
test("addresses that an import finds during a refresh show their balances once one more refresh returns", async () => {
const { page } = await boot();
const refresh = await holdRefresh(page);
await importPhrase(page);
expect(page.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
expect(page.text("flash-msg")).toBe("Found 2 addresses.");
await refresh.finish();
await page.settle();
const list = page.node("wallet-list").innerHTML;
expect(list).toContain("<span>2.0000</span>");
expect(list).toContain("<span>3.0000</span>");
});
test("several requests during a refresh lead to exactly one more refresh", async () => {
const { page, refreshBalances } = await boot();
const refresh = await holdRefresh(page);
const calls = refreshBalances.mock.calls.length;
await importKey(page, "0x" + "11".repeat(32));
await importKey(page, "0x" + "22".repeat(32));
await importPhrase(page);
expect(refreshBalances).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(calls);
await refresh.finish();
await page.settle();
expect(refreshBalances).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(calls + 1);
});
test("a tick of the ten-second timer during a refresh starts no other refresh", async () => {
const { page, refreshBalances } = await boot();
const refresh = await holdRefresh(page);
const calls = refreshBalances.mock.calls.length;
await page.tick();
await refresh.finish();
await page.settle();
expect(refreshBalances).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(calls);
});
+17 -3
View File
@@ -67,13 +67,15 @@ beforeEach(() => {
});
describe("resolveTokenSymbol", () => {
// The bundled list is read only for a token on Ethereum Mainnet.
test("reads the bundled list", () => {
expect(resolveTokenSymbol(USDC, state)).toBe("USDC");
expect(resolveTokenSymbol(USDC, { chainId: "0x1" })).toBe("USDC");
});
test("prefers the bundled list over a tracked entry", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [{ address: USDC, symbol: "NOTUSDC" }];
expect(resolveTokenSymbol(USDC, state)).toBe("USDC");
const sources = { chainId: "0x1", trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens };
expect(resolveTokenSymbol(USDC, sources)).toBe("USDC");
});
test("reads a token the user tracks", () => {
@@ -104,7 +106,19 @@ describe("resolveTokenSymbol", () => {
test("rejects a tracked entry claiming a bundled ticker it is not", () => {
// NOVEL_TOKEN is not the real USDC contract, so it may not wear USDC.
state.trackedTokens = [{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "USDC" }];
expect(resolveTokenSymbol(NOVEL_TOKEN, state)).toBeNull();
const sources = { chainId: "0x1", trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens };
expect(resolveTokenSymbol(NOVEL_TOKEN, sources)).toBeNull();
});
// The bundled list holds mainnet contracts, so on Sepolia any contract may
// carry one of its symbols.
test("on Sepolia, reads a tracked entry carrying a bundled ticker", () => {
state.trackedTokens = [{ address: NOVEL_TOKEN, symbol: "USDC" }];
const sources = {
chainId: "0xaa36a7",
trackedTokens: state.trackedTokens,
};
expect(resolveTokenSymbol(NOVEL_TOKEN, sources)).toBe("USDC");
});
test("rejects an explorer entry claiming the native ETH ticker", () => {
+169
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
// Another page stores a different RPC or Blockscout URL for the same network.
// Then the user taps "Save" in Settings on this page, on the URL that this page
// loaded. The URL on screen is stored, and the flash message reads "Saved."
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/688). Driven through the real
// popup over a stored profile on Ethereum Mainnet.
const {
bootPopup,
cleanupPopup,
unversionedValidProfile,
} = require("./support/popupBoot");
const { NETWORKS } = require("../src/shared/networks");
afterEach(() => {
cleanupPopup();
});
test.each([
{ button: "btn-save-rpc", input: "settings-rpc", field: "rpcUrl" },
{
button: "btn-save-blockscout",
input: "settings-blockscout",
field: "blockscoutUrl",
},
])(
"$button stores the URL on screen after another page stored a different one",
async ({ button, input, field }) => {
const page = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
await page.click("btn-settings");
const url = page.value(input);
// This write sends this page no storage change event.
page.storage.write("autistmask", {
...page.storage.read("autistmask"),
[field]: "https://other-page.example.invalid",
});
// This answer passes both endpoint checks on Ethereum Mainnet. The RPC
// check reads Ethereum Mainnet's chain id from it. The Blockscout check
// reads `ok`.
globalThis.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
json: async () => ({ result: NETWORKS.mainnet.chainId }),
});
await page.click(button);
expect(page.storage.read("autistmask")[field]).toBe(url);
expect(page.text("flash-msg")).toBe("Saved.");
},
);
// The user types a URL in Settings and taps "Save". While the check waits for
// the endpoint's answer, another page turns "Use Blockscout" on. This page
// follows that change and draws Settings again, with the stored URL in the
// input. The check then passes. The typed URL is not stored. The flash message
// says that the URL was changed during the check
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/695).
test.each([
{ button: "btn-save-rpc", input: "settings-rpc", field: "rpcUrl" },
{
button: "btn-save-blockscout",
input: "settings-blockscout",
field: "blockscoutUrl",
},
])(
"$button stores nothing when Settings is drawn again during the check",
async ({ button, input, field }) => {
const page = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
await page.click("btn-settings");
const storedUrl = page.value(input);
let answer;
globalThis.fetch.mockReturnValue(
new Promise((resolve) => {
answer = resolve;
}),
);
page.node(input).value = "https://typed.example.invalid";
const saving = page.node(button).listeners.click.map((fn) => fn());
await page.settle();
// The browser announces this write to this page.
await page.storage.local.set({
autistmask: {
...page.storage.read("autistmask"),
useBlockscout: true,
},
});
await page.settle();
expect(page.node("settings-use-blockscout").checked).toBe(true);
// This answer passes both endpoint checks on Ethereum Mainnet.
answer({
ok: true,
json: async () => ({ result: NETWORKS.mainnet.chainId }),
});
await Promise.all(saving);
await page.settle();
expect(page.storage.read("autistmask")[field]).toBe(storedUrl);
expect(page.value(input)).toBe(storedUrl);
expect(page.text("flash-msg")).toBe(
"The URL was not saved because it was changed during the check.",
);
},
);
// As above, but another write holds the lock. So this page's follow of the
// change to "Use Blockscout" waits for the lock. The endpoint answers while the
// input still shows the typed URL. The save then asks for the lock, after the
// follow did. So the follow draws Settings again before the save compares the
// input.
test.each([
{ button: "btn-save-rpc", input: "settings-rpc", field: "rpcUrl" },
{
button: "btn-save-blockscout",
input: "settings-blockscout",
field: "blockscoutUrl",
},
])(
"$button stores nothing when Settings is drawn again while the save waits for the lock",
async ({ button, input, field }) => {
const page = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
await page.click("btn-settings");
const storedUrl = page.value(input);
let answer;
globalThis.fetch.mockReturnValue(
new Promise((resolve) => {
answer = resolve;
}),
);
const typedUrl = "https://typed.example.invalid";
page.node(input).value = typedUrl;
const saving = page.node(button).listeners.click.map((fn) => fn());
await page.settle();
let releaseLock;
const lockHeld = navigator.locks.request(
"autistmask",
() =>
new Promise((resolve) => {
releaseLock = resolve;
}),
);
// The browser announces this write to this page.
await page.storage.local.set({
autistmask: {
...page.storage.read("autistmask"),
useBlockscout: true,
},
});
await page.settle();
// This answer passes both endpoint checks on Ethereum Mainnet.
answer({
ok: true,
json: async () => ({ result: NETWORKS.mainnet.chainId }),
});
await page.settle();
expect(page.value(input)).toBe(typedUrl);
releaseLock();
await lockHeld;
await Promise.all(saving);
await page.settle();
expect(page.node("settings-use-blockscout").checked).toBe(true);
expect(page.storage.read("autistmask")[field]).toBe(storedUrl);
expect(page.value(input)).toBe(storedUrl);
expect(page.text("flash-msg")).toBe(
"The URL was not saved because it was changed during the check.",
);
},
);
+110 -16
View File
@@ -72,6 +72,11 @@ const {
const { renderSendTokenSelect } = require("../src/popup/views/send");
const { state } = require("../src/shared/state");
const { debugFetch } = require("../src/shared/log");
const { NETWORKS } = require("../src/shared/networks");
// The bundled list's symbols are known symbols only on Ethereum Mainnet.
const MAINNET = NETWORKS.mainnet.chainId;
const SEPOLIA = NETWORKS.sepolia.chainId;
// The fake "Ethereum" token with symbol "ETH" from the attack documented in
// README.md, given a holder count high enough to clear every other filter so
@@ -116,14 +121,29 @@ describe("the shared rule", () => {
});
test("a known symbol from its own contract is not a spoof", () => {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("USDC", USDC_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("usdc", USDC_CONTRACT.toUpperCase())).toBe(
false,
);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("USDC", USDC_CONTRACT, MAINNET)).toBe(false);
expect(
isSpoofedSymbol("usdc", USDC_CONTRACT.toUpperCase(), MAINNET),
).toBe(false);
});
test("a known symbol from another contract is a spoof", () => {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("USDC", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("USDC", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT, MAINNET)).toBe(true);
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/632: the bundled list holds
// mainnet contracts, so on Sepolia any contract may carry one of its
// symbols.
test("on Sepolia, a bundled symbol from any contract is not a spoof", () => {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("USDC", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT, SEPOLIA)).toBe(false);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("USDC", USDC_CONTRACT, SEPOLIA)).toBe(false);
});
test("on Sepolia, the native asset's labels are still reserved", () => {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("ETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT, SEPOLIA)).toBe(true);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("SepoliaETH", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT, SEPOLIA)).toBe(
true,
);
});
test("a symbol that is not in the table is not judged here", () => {
@@ -164,7 +184,9 @@ describe("the shared rule: symbols that render as a known symbol", () => {
test("ASCII padding does not buy a pass", () => {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(" ETH ", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol("\tETH\n", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(" usdc ", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(" usdc ", FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT, MAINNET)).toBe(
true,
);
});
test("non-breaking and other Unicode spaces do not either", () => {
@@ -243,7 +265,9 @@ describe("the shared rule: symbols that render as a known symbol", () => {
test("compatibility forms fold onto the symbol they imitate", () => {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(FULLWIDTH_ETH, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(FULLWIDTH_USDC, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
expect(
isSpoofedSymbol(FULLWIDTH_USDC, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT, MAINNET),
).toBe(true);
});
// The two knowingly open classes, asserted here so that the boundary is
@@ -271,8 +295,10 @@ describe("the shared rule: symbols that render as a known symbol", () => {
});
test("a genuine contract still bears its own padded symbol", () => {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(" USDC ", USDC_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(ZWSP + "WETH", WETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(false);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(" USDC ", USDC_CONTRACT, MAINNET)).toBe(false);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(ZWSP + "WETH", WETH_CONTRACT, MAINNET)).toBe(
false,
);
});
// Normalization must not invent a match. Interior ASCII whitespace is
@@ -296,7 +322,7 @@ describe("the shared rule: symbols that render as a known symbol", () => {
expect(symbol).toMatch(/^[!-~]+$/);
if (addresses === null) continue;
for (const address of addresses) {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address)).toBe(false);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address, MAINNET)).toBe(false);
}
}
});
@@ -317,7 +343,7 @@ describe("the shared rule: symbols that render as a known symbol", () => {
describe("the shipped token list", () => {
test("no bundled token is filtered at its own address", () => {
const filtered = TOKENS.filter((t) =>
isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address),
isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address, MAINNET),
).map((t) => t.symbol + " @ " + t.address);
expect(filtered).toEqual([]);
});
@@ -360,7 +386,9 @@ describe("the shipped token list", () => {
expect(shared.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
for (const [, list] of shared) {
for (const t of list) {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address)).toBe(false);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(t.symbol, t.address, MAINNET)).toBe(
false,
);
}
}
});
@@ -404,7 +432,7 @@ describe("the shipped token list", () => {
[...addresses].sort(),
);
for (const address of addresses) {
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address)).toBe(false);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, address, MAINNET)).toBe(false);
}
}
});
@@ -421,7 +449,9 @@ describe("the shipped token list", () => {
}
for (const [symbol, list] of bySymbol) {
if (list.length < 2) continue;
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT)).toBe(true);
expect(isSpoofedSymbol(symbol, FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT, MAINNET)).toBe(
true,
);
}
});
});
@@ -506,10 +536,40 @@ describe("surface 2: the Send token selector", () => {
}
beforeEach(() => {
state.networkId = "mainnet";
state.fraudContracts = [];
state.hideLowHolderTokens = true;
});
afterAll(() => {
state.networkId = "mainnet";
});
// A token reporting USDC's symbol from another contract.
function otherUsdc() {
return {
address: FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT,
symbol: "USDC",
decimals: 6,
balance: "12.5",
holders: 900000,
};
}
test("a bundled symbol from another contract is not selectable", () => {
render([otherUsdc()]);
expect(select.children).toEqual([]);
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/632: the bundled list holds
// mainnet contracts, so on Sepolia any contract may carry its symbols.
test("with Sepolia active, a bundled symbol from another contract is selectable", () => {
state.networkId = "sepolia";
render([otherUsdc()]);
expect(select.children).toHaveLength(1);
expect(select.children[0].value).toBe(FAKE_ETH_CONTRACT);
});
test("a fake ETH token is not selectable", () => {
render([
{
@@ -627,7 +687,12 @@ describe("surface 3: the balance list", () => {
decimals: "6",
}),
]);
const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, []);
const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(
HOLDER,
BLOCKSCOUT,
[],
MAINNET,
);
expect(balances).toHaveLength(1);
expect(balances[0].symbol).toBe(" USDC ");
});
@@ -641,11 +706,40 @@ describe("surface 3: the balance list", () => {
decimals: "6",
}),
]);
const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, []);
const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(
HOLDER,
BLOCKSCOUT,
[],
MAINNET,
);
expect(balances).toHaveLength(1);
expect(balances[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/632: the bundled list holds
// mainnet contracts, so on Sepolia any contract may carry its symbols.
test("a bundled symbol from another contract is listed on Sepolia only", async () => {
respondWith([fakeEthItem({ symbol: "USDC", decimals: "6" })]);
expect(
await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [], MAINNET),
).toEqual([]);
const sepolia = await fetchTokenBalances(
HOLDER,
BLOCKSCOUT,
[],
SEPOLIA,
);
expect(sepolia).toHaveLength(1);
expect(sepolia[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
});
test("a fake ETH token is filtered on Sepolia too", async () => {
respondWith([fakeEthItem()]);
expect(
await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [], SEPOLIA),
).toEqual([]);
});
// The trap in this change: the user's real ETH balance is not an ERC-20
// and is fetched over RPC in refreshBalances, so it never passes through
// this loop at all. An explorer row that is not an ERC-20 is dropped
+75 -2
View File
@@ -133,13 +133,13 @@ function trackedRow(balance, decimals = null, holders = null) {
};
}
async function refresh(addresses, trackedTokens) {
async function refresh(addresses, trackedTokens, networkId = "mainnet") {
await refreshBalances(
[{ addresses }],
RPC_URL,
EXPLORER_URL,
trackedTokens,
"mainnet",
networkId,
new AbortController().signal,
);
return addresses;
@@ -307,3 +307,76 @@ test("a tracked token wearing a known symbol from another contract is not listed
);
expect(first.tokenBalances).toEqual([]);
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/632: the bundled list holds
// Ethereum Mainnet contracts. A token outside the tracked tokens with an
// unknown holder count is listed only when the bundled list names it.
test("an untracked bundled token with an unknown holder count is listed on Ethereum Mainnet only", async () => {
explorerRows = [explorerRow(USDC, "USDC", 5000000, null)];
const [mainnet] = await refresh(
[{ address: FIRST, tokenBalances: [] }],
[],
);
expect(mainnet.tokenBalances).toEqual([
{
address: USDC,
name: "USDC",
symbol: "USDC",
decimals: 6,
balance: "5.0",
holders: null,
},
]);
const [sepolia] = await refresh(
[{ address: FIRST, tokenBalances: [] }],
[],
"sepolia",
);
expect(sepolia.tokenBalances).toEqual([]);
});
test("a tracked token at a bundled token's address takes the bundled scale on Ethereum Mainnet only", async () => {
holdings[USDC] = { [FIRST]: 5000000n };
// The tracked entry records no decimals, and Blockscout fails.
const tracked = [
{ address: USDC, symbol: "USDC", name: "USD Coin", decimals: null },
];
const row = (balance) => ({
address: USDC,
name: "USD Coin",
symbol: "USDC",
decimals: null,
balance: balance,
holders: null,
});
const [mainnet] = await refresh(
[{ address: FIRST, tokenBalances: [] }],
tracked,
);
expect(mainnet.tokenBalances).toEqual([row("5.0")]);
const [sepolia] = await refresh(
[{ address: FIRST, tokenBalances: [] }],
tracked,
"sepolia",
);
expect(sepolia.tokenBalances).toEqual([row(null)]);
});
test("with Sepolia active, a tracked token wearing a bundled symbol from another contract is listed", async () => {
holdings[OTHER] = { [FIRST]: 5000000n };
const [first] = await refresh(
[{ address: FIRST, tokenBalances: [] }],
[{ address: OTHER, symbol: "USDC", name: "Other", decimals: 6 }],
"sepolia",
);
expect(first.tokenBalances).toEqual([
{
address: OTHER,
name: "Other",
symbol: "USDC",
decimals: null,
balance: "5.0",
holders: null,
},
]);
});
+161
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
// a contract lookup that answers after one. Driven through the real popup over
// a stored profile; the same switch made by the background is in
// tests/coldWorkerChainSwitch.test.js.
//
// The tests of what another page stored before a switch in Settings cover a
// fraud contract too (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/692).
const {
bootPopup,
@@ -177,6 +180,164 @@ test("a token added by contract address on Sepolia is tracked on Sepolia only",
expect(onSepolia).not.toContain("DAI");
});
// Another popup page tracks DAI on Ethereum Mainnet after this page's last
// save. The switch to Sepolia puts DAI away under Ethereum Mainnet.
test("a token another page tracked before a switch in Settings stays tracked on Ethereum Mainnet", async () => {
const boot = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
expect(boot.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
boot.storage.write("autistmask", {
...boot.storage.read("autistmask"),
trackedTokens: [MAINNET_TOKEN],
});
await boot.click("btn-settings");
await chooseNetwork(boot, "sepolia");
const stored = boot.storage.read("autistmask");
expect(stored.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
expect(stored.trackedTokens).toEqual([]);
expect(stored.networkTrackedTokens.mainnet).toEqual([MAINNET_TOKEN]);
});
// Another popup page stops tracking DAI on Ethereum Mainnet after this page's
// last save. This page still holds DAI. The switch to Sepolia does not store
// DAI under Ethereum Mainnet again.
test("a token another page removed before a switch in Settings stays removed", async () => {
const boot = await bootPopup(
unversionedValidProfile({ trackedTokens: [MAINNET_TOKEN] }),
);
expect(boot.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
boot.storage.write("autistmask", {
...boot.storage.read("autistmask"),
trackedTokens: [],
});
await boot.click("btn-settings");
await chooseNetwork(boot, "sepolia");
const stored = boot.storage.read("autistmask");
expect(stored.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
expect(stored.trackedTokens).toEqual([]);
expect(stored.networkTrackedTokens.mainnet).toEqual([]);
});
// Another popup page removes DAI after this page's last save. That page then
// adds DAI again, typing the contract address in lower case. The two pages'
// entries for DAI match, because contract addresses are compared ignoring
// letter case. The switch to Sepolia keeps this page's entry under Ethereum
// Mainnet.
test("a token another page added again with a lower-case address keeps this page's entry", async () => {
const boot = await bootPopup(
unversionedValidProfile({ trackedTokens: [MAINNET_TOKEN] }),
);
expect(boot.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
boot.storage.write("autistmask", {
...boot.storage.read("autistmask"),
trackedTokens: [
{ ...MAINNET_TOKEN, address: MAINNET_TOKEN.address.toLowerCase() },
],
});
await boot.click("btn-settings");
await chooseNetwork(boot, "sepolia");
const stored = boot.storage.read("autistmask");
expect(stored.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
expect(stored.networkTrackedTokens.mainnet).toEqual([MAINNET_TOKEN]);
});
// Another popup page saves a switch to Sepolia after this page's last save.
// TST is tracked on Sepolia. This page has not taken that switch yet. A switch
// to Sepolia in this page's Settings keeps TST off Ethereum Mainnet's list.
test("a token tracked on Sepolia when another page switched there is not tracked on Ethereum Mainnet", async () => {
const boot = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
expect(boot.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
await boot.click("btn-settings");
boot.storage.write("autistmask", {
...boot.storage.read("autistmask"),
networkId: "sepolia",
trackedTokens: [SEPOLIA_TOKEN],
});
await chooseNetwork(boot, "sepolia");
const stored = boot.storage.read("autistmask");
expect(stored.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
expect(stored.trackedTokens).toEqual([SEPOLIA_TOKEN]);
expect(stored.networkTrackedTokens.mainnet).toEqual([]);
});
// Another popup page records a fraud contract on Ethereum Mainnet after this
// page's last save. The switch to Sepolia drops that fraud contract, as the
// switch drops this page's own.
test("a fraud contract another page recorded before a switch in Settings is not kept on Sepolia", async () => {
const boot = await bootPopup(unversionedValidProfile());
expect(boot.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
boot.storage.write("autistmask", {
...boot.storage.read("autistmask"),
fraudContracts: [NEW_TOKEN_ADDRESS],
});
await boot.click("btn-settings");
await chooseNetwork(boot, "sepolia");
const stored = boot.storage.read("autistmask");
expect(stored.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
expect(stored.fraudContracts).toEqual([]);
});
// The contract lookup on SettingsAddToken answers on Ethereum Mainnet while the
// switch to Sepolia waits for the lock. The page adds the token to Ethereum
// Mainnet's list. The switch then keeps that list for Ethereum Mainnet.
test("a token added while a switch in Settings waits for the lock stays tracked on Ethereum Mainnet", async () => {
const boot = await bootOnAddToken("mainnet");
expect(boot.pageErrors).toEqual([]);
const { lookupTokenInfo } = require("../src/shared/balances");
let answer;
lookupTokenInfo.mockImplementationOnce(
() =>
new Promise((resolve) => {
answer = resolve;
}),
);
boot.node("settings-addtoken-address").value = NEW_TOKEN_ADDRESS;
const adding = boot.click("btn-settings-addtoken-manual");
await boot.click("btn-settings");
// Another write holds the lock, so the switch's save waits for it.
let releaseLock;
const lockHeld = navigator.locks.request(
"autistmask",
() =>
new Promise((resolve) => {
releaseLock = resolve;
}),
);
const select = boot.node("settings-network");
select.value = "sepolia";
const switching = Promise.all(select.listeners.change.map((fn) => fn()));
await boot.settle();
answer({ symbol: "NEW", decimals: 18, name: "New Token" });
await boot.settle();
releaseLock();
await lockHeld;
await switching;
await adding;
const stored = boot.storage.read("autistmask");
expect(stored.networkId).toBe("sepolia");
expect(stored.trackedTokens).toEqual([]);
expect(stored.networkTrackedTokens.mainnet).toEqual([
{
address: NEW_TOKEN_ADDRESS,
symbol: "NEW",
decimals: 18,
name: "New Token",
},
]);
});
describe("Back after a switch from the Settings gear", () => {
test("SettingsAddToken no longer offers the common tokens", async () => {
const boot = await bootOnAddToken("mainnet");
+202
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
// TransactionDetail shows only details that Blockscout gave for the
// transaction on screen (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/675).
//
// The screen asks Blockscout for its transaction and does not wait for the
// answer. So the user can press Back and open another transaction before
// Blockscout answers for the first. The first answer must then fill nothing on
// the second transaction's screen. An answer that lands while Settings is up
// must still fill TransactionDetail.
//
// Driven through the real popup over a stored profile
// (tests/support/popupBoot.js). Each transaction is opened as a history screen
// opens it: the current screen is pushed, then transactionDetail.show() draws
// the transaction.
"use strict";
const {
bootPopup,
cleanupPopup,
unversionedValidProfile,
ADDRESS,
} = require("./support/popupBoot");
const MAINNET_BLOCKSCOUT = "https://eth.blockscout.com/api/v2";
const SEPOLIA_BLOCKSCOUT = "https://eth-sepolia.blockscout.com/api/v2";
const RECIPIENT = "0x2222222222222222222222222222222222222222";
// A history entry for a send of 1 `symbol` from ADDRESS to RECIPIENT, on the
// network with `chainId`.
function historyEntry(hash, chainId, symbol) {
return {
hash,
from: ADDRESS,
to: RECIPIENT,
value: "1.0000",
exactValue: "1.0",
symbol,
timestamp: 1790000000,
isError: false,
direction: "sent",
directionLabel: "Sent",
contractAddress: null,
chainId,
};
}
const FIRST = historyEntry("0x" + "aa".repeat(32), "0x1", "ETH");
const SECOND = historyEntry("0x" + "bb".repeat(32), "0x1", "ETH");
// A transaction on Sepolia with the same hash as FIRST.
const FIRST_ON_SEPOLIA = historyEntry(FIRST.hash, "0xaa36a7", "SepoliaETH");
// The URL that asks Blockscout for `entry`, on the network it was sent on.
function requestUrl(entry) {
const blockscout =
entry.chainId === "0x1" ? MAINNET_BLOCKSCOUT : SEPOLIA_BLOCKSCOUT;
return blockscout + "/transactions/" + entry.hash;
}
// What Blockscout reports for each transaction, by the URL that asks for it.
const ANSWERS = {
[requestUrl(FIRST)]: {
block_number: 21000001,
nonce: 4441,
fee: { value: "21000000000000" },
raw_input: "0x11111111",
method: "firstMethod",
},
[requestUrl(SECOND)]: {
block_number: 21000002,
nonce: 4442,
fee: { value: "42000000000000" },
raw_input: "0x22222222",
method: "secondMethod",
},
[requestUrl(FIRST_ON_SEPOLIA)]: {
block_number: 21000003,
nonce: 4443,
fee: { value: "63000000000000" },
raw_input: "0x33333333",
method: "sepoliaMethod",
},
};
// The text each answer puts on screen: its block, nonce, fee, method name and
// raw data. No text from one answer appears in another.
const FIRST_SHOWN = [
"21000001",
"4441",
"0.000021 ETH",
"firstMethod",
"0x11111111",
];
const SECOND_SHOWN = [
"21000002",
"4442",
"0.000042 ETH",
"secondMethod",
"0x22222222",
];
const FIRST_ON_SEPOLIA_SHOWN = [
"21000003",
"4443",
"0.000063 SepoliaETH",
"sepoliaMethod",
"0x33333333",
];
// Everything drawn in the fields that Blockscout's answer fills.
function drawnDetails(page) {
return [
"tx-detail-block",
"tx-detail-nonce",
"tx-detail-fee",
"tx-detail-calldata-action",
"tx-detail-rawdata",
]
.map((id) => page.node(id).innerHTML + page.node(id).textContent)
.join("\n");
}
// Opens `entry` on TransactionDetail, as a history screen does.
function open(entry) {
require("../src/popup/views/helpers").pushCurrentView();
require("../src/popup/views/transactionDetail").show(entry);
}
// The URLs of every request to Blockscout so far, in order.
function requestedUrls() {
return globalThis.fetch.mock.calls.map(([url]) => url);
}
// Boots the popup on Home with "Use Blockscout" on. Blockscout answers every
// request at once from ANSWERS, except the request for `held`. Returns the
// page and answer(), which lets the answer for `held` land.
async function bootWithHeldRequest(held) {
const page = await bootPopup(
unversionedValidProfile({ useBlockscout: true }),
);
let answer;
const heldAnswer = new Promise((resolve) => {
answer = resolve;
});
globalThis.fetch = jest.fn(async (url) => {
if (url === requestUrl(held)) await heldAnswer;
return { ok: true, status: 200, json: async () => ANSWERS[url] };
});
return { page, answer: () => answer() };
}
// The user opens `first`, whose request to Blockscout is held. Then the user
// presses Back and opens `second`. Then the answer for `first` lands. Returns
// the page.
async function firstAnswerLandsOnSecond(first, second) {
const { page, answer } = await bootWithHeldRequest(first);
open(first);
await page.settle();
await page.click("btn-tx-back");
expect(page.visibleViews()).toEqual(["main"]);
open(second);
await page.settle();
expect(requestedUrls()).toEqual([requestUrl(first), requestUrl(second)]);
answer();
await page.settle();
expect(page.visibleViews()).toEqual(["transaction"]);
return page;
}
afterEach(() => {
cleanupPopup();
});
test("an answer for the first transaction that lands on the second one's screen fills nothing", async () => {
const page = await firstAnswerLandsOnSecond(FIRST, SECOND);
const drawn = drawnDetails(page);
for (const text of SECOND_SHOWN) expect(drawn).toContain(text);
for (const text of FIRST_SHOWN) expect(drawn).not.toContain(text);
});
test("an answer for a hash on mainnet that lands on the same hash's screen on Sepolia fills nothing", async () => {
const page = await firstAnswerLandsOnSecond(FIRST, FIRST_ON_SEPOLIA);
const drawn = drawnDetails(page);
for (const text of FIRST_ON_SEPOLIA_SHOWN) expect(drawn).toContain(text);
for (const text of FIRST_SHOWN) expect(drawn).not.toContain(text);
});
test("an answer that lands while Settings is up still fills TransactionDetail", async () => {
const { page, answer } = await bootWithHeldRequest(FIRST);
open(FIRST);
await page.settle();
await page.click("btn-settings");
expect(page.visibleViews()).toEqual(["settings"]);
answer();
await page.settle();
await page.click("btn-settings");
expect(page.visibleViews()).toEqual(["transaction"]);
expect(requestedUrls()).toEqual([requestUrl(FIRST)]);
const drawn = drawnDetails(page);
for (const text of FIRST_SHOWN) expect(drawn).toContain(text);
});
+62
View File
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ function tokenTx(overrides = {}) {
isError: false,
contractAddress: USDC_CONTRACT,
holders: 3500000,
chainId: "0x1",
...overrides,
};
}
@@ -259,6 +260,32 @@ describe("known-symbol spoof verification", () => {
expect(result.newFraudContracts).toEqual([NOVEL_SPAM_CONTRACT]);
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/632: the bundled list holds
// mainnet contracts, so its symbols are not known symbols on Sepolia.
test("on Sepolia, a bundled symbol from another contract is kept", () => {
const sepoliaToken = tokenTx({
symbol: "USDC",
contractAddress: NOVEL_SPAM_CONTRACT,
holders: 5000000,
chainId: "0xaa36a7",
});
const result = filterTransactions([sepoliaToken], filters());
expect(result.transactions).toEqual([sepoliaToken]);
expect(result.newFraudContracts).toEqual([]);
});
test('on Sepolia, "ETH" as an ERC-20 is still spoofed', () => {
const fakeEth = tokenTx({
symbol: "ETH",
contractAddress: NOVEL_SPAM_CONTRACT,
holders: 5000000,
chainId: "0xaa36a7",
});
expect(filterTransactions([fakeEth], filters()).transactions).toEqual(
[],
);
});
test("the genuine contract for that symbol is not spoofed", () => {
const genuine = tokenTx();
const result = filterTransactions([genuine], filters());
@@ -1495,6 +1522,41 @@ describe("fetchRecentTransactions merge and dedup", () => {
expect(mainnet[0].chainId).toBe("0x1");
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/632: the bundled token list
// names a contract only on Ethereum Mainnet. On Sepolia, a call to the
// contract at USDC's mainnet address is labelled with the network's native
// currency. A call to any contract the wallet does not name gets that label.
test("a contract call on Sepolia is not named by the bundled list", async () => {
respondWith(
[
{
hash: "0x" + "b".repeat(64),
block_number: 21000095,
timestamp: TS,
from: { hash: VICTIM },
to: { hash: USDC_CONTRACT, is_contract: true },
value: "0",
method: "approve",
status: "ok",
},
],
[],
);
const sepolia = await fetchRecentTransactions(
VICTIM,
BLOCKSCOUT,
"0xaa36a7",
);
expect(sepolia[0].directionLabel).toBe("Approve");
expect(sepolia[0].symbol).toBe("SepoliaETH");
const mainnet = await fetchRecentTransactions(
VICTIM,
BLOCKSCOUT,
"0x1",
);
expect(mainnet[0].symbol).toBe("USDC");
});
test("the fake token transfer survives fetching and is then filtered", async () => {
respondWith(
[],
+212 -7
View File
@@ -3439,6 +3439,205 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
]);
});
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/685 — Permit2 moves no
// ETH, so a PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM of the zero address reads as a move
// of a token nothing knows. On next at ec6b6b5 its lines read ETH,
// with an ETH figure.
describe("a PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM of the zero address", () => {
const MOVED_AMOUNT =
"1000000000000000000 base units (decimals unknown)";
test("to another address names the address", () => {
const result = decodeSteps(
[0x00, 0x02],
[V3_600, transfer(ZERO_ADDR, OTHER_ADDR, ONE_WETH)],
);
expect(linesBetweenTokens(result)).toEqual([
["Amount", "600.0000 USDT"],
["Moved from the sender", MOVED_AMOUNT],
["Token moved", ZERO_ADDR],
["Moved to", OTHER_ADDR],
]);
expect(detail(result, "Token moved").address).toBe(ZERO_ADDR);
});
test("into the router names the address", () => {
const result = decodeSteps(
[0x02, 0x00],
[transfer(ZERO_ADDR, ROUTER_ADDR, ONE_WETH), V3_600],
);
expect(detail(result, "Paid to").value).toBe(
"The router, " +
MOVED_AMOUNT +
" from the sender (later steps may not spend all of it)",
);
expect(detail(result, "Token moved into the router")).toEqual({
label: "Token moved into the router",
value: ZERO_ADDR,
address: ZERO_ADDR,
isToken: true,
});
});
// The V4 step's SETTLE names the user as payer and states no
// amount. The step's lines say that the ETH amount is not known.
test("after a V4 exact-out step of ETH, also shows that the ETH amount is not known", () => {
const v4EthExactOut = encodeV4Swap(
new Uint8Array([
V4_SWAP_EXACT_OUT_SINGLE_ID,
V4_SETTLE_ID,
V4_TAKE_ALL_ID,
]),
[
encodeV4ExactOutSingle(
ZERO_ADDR,
USDC_ADDR,
590000000n,
ONE_WETH,
),
encodeV4Settle(ZERO_ADDR),
encodeV4TakeAll(USDC_ADDR, 0n),
],
);
const result = decodeSteps(
[0x10, 0x02],
[v4EthExactOut, transfer(ZERO_ADDR, OTHER_ADDR, ONE_WETH)],
);
expect(detail(result, "Token In").value).toBe("ETH (native)");
expect(linesBetweenTokens(result)).toEqual([
["Moved from the sender", UNDECODED],
["Token moved", "ETH"],
["Moved to", "The swap step that spends it"],
["Moved from the sender", MOVED_AMOUNT],
["Token moved", ZERO_ADDR],
["Moved to", OTHER_ADDR],
]);
});
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/682 — V4 pays a SETTLE
// of ETH from the router's own ETH, whichever payer the SETTLE names,
// and the router holds the transaction's value. On next at 36b2002 a
// SETTLE of 1 ETH that names the router as payer gave no ETH line.
describe("a V4 SETTLE of ETH that names the router as payer", () => {
const ONE_ETH = 1000000000000000000n;
// A V4 swap of `amount` of ETH for USDC. The SETTLE names the
// router as payer.
const v4EthFromRouter = (amount) =>
encodeV4Swap(
new Uint8Array([
V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE_ID,
V4_SETTLE_ID,
V4_TAKE_ALL_ID,
]),
[
encodeV4ExactInSingle(ZERO_ADDR, USDC_ADDR, amount, 1n),
settle(ZERO_ADDR, amount, false),
encodeV4TakeAll(USDC_ADDR, 1n),
],
);
test("after a V3 exact-in of 600 USDT, shows the 1 ETH moved from the sender", () => {
const result = decodeSteps(
[0x00, 0x10],
[V3_600, v4EthFromRouter(ONE_ETH)],
);
expect(linesBetweenTokens(result)).toEqual([
["Amount", "600.0000 USDT"],
["Moved from the sender", "1.0000 ETH"],
["Token moved", "ETH"],
["Moved to", "The swap step that spends it"],
]);
});
// The UNWRAP_WETH leaves ETH in the router. The SETTLE may spend
// that ETH before the transaction's value.
test("after an UNWRAP_WETH into the router, shows at most 1 ETH moved from the sender", () => {
const result = decodeSteps(
[0x00, 0x0c, 0x10],
[
encodeV3SwapExactIn(ROUTER_ADDR, USDT_600, 1n, [
USDT_ADDR,
WETH_ADDR,
]),
encodeWrapEth(ROUTER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH, same encoding
v4EthFromRouter(ONE_ETH),
],
);
expect(linesBetweenTokens(result)).toEqual([
["Amount", "600.0000 USDT"],
["Moved from the sender", "Up to 1.0000 ETH"],
["Token moved", "ETH"],
["Moved to", "The swap step that spends it"],
]);
});
test("after a WRAP_ETH of 0.5 ETH, adds the SETTLE's 0.5 ETH to the Amount line", () => {
const result = decodeSteps(
[0x0b, 0x10],
[
encodeWrapEth(ROUTER_ADDR, ONE_ETH / 2n),
v4EthFromRouter(ONE_ETH / 2n),
],
);
expect(linesBetweenTokens(result)).toEqual([
["Amount", "1.0000 ETH"],
]);
});
// The WRAP_ETH sets Token In to ETH, and the UNWRAP_WETH leaves
// ETH in the router. The SETTLE may spend that ETH before the
// transaction's value, so its 1 ETH never joins the Amount line.
test("after a WRAP_ETH and an UNWRAP_WETH into the router, keeps the Amount line and shows at most 1 ETH moved from the sender", () => {
const result = decodeSteps(
[0x0b, 0x0c, 0x10],
[
encodeWrapEth(ROUTER_ADDR, ONE_ETH / 2n),
encodeWrapEth(ROUTER_ADDR, 0n), // UNWRAP_WETH, same encoding
v4EthFromRouter(ONE_ETH),
],
);
expect(linesBetweenTokens(result)).toEqual([
["Amount", "0.5000 ETH"],
["Moved from the sender", "Up to 1.0000 ETH"],
["Token moved", "ETH"],
["Moved to", "The swap step that spends it"],
]);
});
// A SETTLE of CONTRACT_BALANCE pays all the router holds, an
// amount the calldata does not state.
test("of CONTRACT_BALANCE, on the step that sets the input side, shows an unknown amount moved from the sender", () => {
const result = decodeSteps(
[0x10],
[
encodeV4Swap(
new Uint8Array([
V4_SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE_ID,
V4_SETTLE_ID,
V4_TAKE_ALL_ID,
]),
[
encodeV4ExactInSingle(
ZERO_ADDR,
USDC_ADDR,
ONE_ETH,
1n,
),
settle(ZERO_ADDR, 2n ** 255n, false), // CONTRACT_BALANCE
encodeV4TakeAll(USDC_ADDR, 1n),
],
),
],
);
expect(linesBetweenTokens(result)).toEqual([
["Moved from the sender", UNDECODED],
["Token moved", "ETH"],
["Moved to", "The swap step that spends it"],
]);
});
});
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/359 — the output half, in
@@ -4181,10 +4380,9 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("2.0000 USDC");
});
// With no minimum stated before it, a zero balance check is what sets the
// output side, and it guarantees nothing. No step pays anyone, so the
// minimum is not said to be received.
test("a zero balance check with no earlier minimum states no minimum", () => {
// A zero balance check sets neither Token Out nor the minimum. The route
// pays only the WRAP_ETH's WETH, to the router, where it stays.
test("a zero balance check after a WRAP_ETH into the router names no output token and no minimum", () => {
const data = buildExecute(
solidityPacked(["uint8", "uint8"], [0x0b, 0x0e]),
[
@@ -4197,9 +4395,16 @@ describe("uniswap decoder", () => {
const result = uniswap.decode(data, ROUTER_ADDR, "0x1", {}, USER_ADDR);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toContain("USDT");
expect(detail(result, "Min. paid out").value).toBe(
"None (no minimum guaranteed)",
expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe(
"Unknown (not named in the calldata)",
);
expect(detail(result, "Min. paid out")).toBeUndefined();
expect(detail(result, "Min. received")).toBeUndefined();
expect(detail(result, "Paid to").value).toBe(
"The router, where it stays (no later step pays it out)",
);
expect(detail(result, "Token moved into the router").address).toBe(
WETH_ADDR,
);
});
+89 -14
View File
@@ -688,6 +688,62 @@ describe("an UNWRAP_WETH makes the output ETH only when the router holds it", ()
]);
});
// The same route, then a balance check of the sender's USDC with a zero
// minimum. The check guarantees nothing, so Token Out stays ETH
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/649).
test("the same route, then a zero balance check of USDC, still reads as ETH with no minimum", () => {
const result = decode(
execute(
v4Swap(
SWAP_USDT_FOR_WETH,
SETTLE_USDT,
take(WETH, MSG_SENDER, (ONE_WETH * 6n) / 10n),
take(WETH, ADDRESS_THIS),
),
unwrapWeth(MSG_SENDER),
balanceCheck(USDC, 0n),
),
);
expect(result.name).toBe("Swap USDT → ETH");
expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe("ETH");
expect(labels(result)).toEqual([
"Protocol",
"Token In",
"Amount",
"Token Out",
"Steps",
"Deadline",
]);
});
// A PERMIT2_TRANSFER_FROM moves the sender's WETH into the router. An
// UNWRAP_WETH pays that WETH to the user as ETH. A zero balance check of
// USDC sets neither Token Out nor the minimum, before the UNWRAP_WETH or
// after it (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/649).
test.each([
{
kind: "before the UNWRAP_WETH",
steps: [balanceCheck(USDC, 0n), unwrapWeth(MSG_SENDER)],
},
{
kind: "after the UNWRAP_WETH",
steps: [unwrapWeth(MSG_SENDER), balanceCheck(USDC, 0n)],
},
])(
"WETH moved into the router and unwrapped, with a zero balance check of USDC $kind, reads as ETH with no minimum",
({ steps }) => {
const result = decode(
execute(
permit2TransferFrom(WETH, ADDRESS_THIS, ONE_WETH),
...steps,
),
);
expect(detail(result, "Token Out").value).toBe("ETH");
expect(detail(result, "Min. received")).toBeUndefined();
expect(detail(result, "Min. paid out")).toBeUndefined();
},
);
// A TAKE the decoder cannot read may pay part of the WETH to the user.
test("one V4 step paying WETH to the router beside a TAKE that cannot be read, then an UNWRAP_WETH, reads as ETH with no minimum", () => {
const result = decode(
@@ -1661,9 +1717,18 @@ describe("any token left in the router is not received", () => {
),
min: "1990.0000 USDC",
},
{
kind: "a swap paying WETH to the router, an UNWRAP_WETH into the router, then a V4 swap settling all the ETH from the router",
data: execute(
])("$kind reads as a swap paid to the user", ({ data, min }) => {
const result = decode(data);
expect(labels(result)).toEqual(PAID_TO_USER);
expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe(min);
});
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/AutistMask/issues/682 — the SETTLE spends all
// the router's ETH, the transaction's value included, so the sender pays
// an amount the calldata does not state.
test("a swap paying WETH to the router, an UNWRAP_WETH into the router, then a V4 swap settling all the ETH from the router reads as a swap paid to the user", () => {
const result = decode(
execute(
swapToWeth(ADDRESS_THIS),
unwrapWeth(ADDRESS_THIS),
v4Swap(
@@ -1672,12 +1737,23 @@ describe("any token left in the router is not received", () => {
takeAll(USDC),
),
),
min: "1990.0000 USDC",
},
])("$kind reads as a swap paid to the user", ({ data, min }) => {
const result = decode(data);
expect(labels(result)).toEqual(PAID_TO_USER);
expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe(min);
);
expect(labels(result)).toEqual([
"Protocol",
"Token In",
"Amount",
"Moved from the sender",
"Token moved",
"Moved to",
"Token Out",
"Min. received",
"Steps",
"Deadline",
]);
expect(detail(result, "Moved from the sender").value).toBe(
"Unknown (could not be decoded)",
);
expect(detail(result, "Min. received").value).toBe("1990.0000 USDC");
});
});
@@ -2800,17 +2876,16 @@ describe("the allow-revert flag", () => {
},
);
test("a BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20 with the flag, and no minimum before it, states none", () => {
test("a BALANCE_CHECK_ERC20 with the flag, and no minimum before it, names no output token and no minimum", () => {
const check = balanceCheck(WETH, ONE_WETH);
expect(detail(decode(execute(check)), "Min. paid out").value).toBe(
"1.0000 WETH",
);
const withFlag = decode(execute(flagged(check)));
expect(detail(withFlag, "Token Out").address).toBe(WETH);
expect(detail(withFlag, "Min. paid out").value).toBe(
"None (no minimum guaranteed)",
);
expect(detail(withFlag, "Token Out").value).toBe(UNNAMED);
expect(detail(withFlag, "Min. paid out")).toBeUndefined();
expect(detail(withFlag, "Min. received")).toBeUndefined();
});
// Only the routers from UniversalRouterV2 on let a PERMIT2_PERMIT fail.
+3 -2
View File
@@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ function row(token = {}, value = FIVE_WETH) {
}
// Fetch the explorer's rows through the real fetcher and put them exactly where
// refreshBalances() puts them. The node reports the holding the explorer does.
// refreshBalances() puts them on Ethereum Mainnet. The node reports the holding
// the explorer does.
async function fetchOnto(items) {
mockProvider.tokenUnits = BigInt(items[0].value);
debugFetch.mockImplementation(async () => ({
@@ -176,7 +177,7 @@ async function fetchOnto(items) {
statusText: "OK",
json: async () => items,
}));
const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, []);
const balances = await fetchTokenBalances(HOLDER, BLOCKSCOUT, [], "0x1");
state.wallets = [
{
name: "Wallet 1",