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mailinabox/management/status_checks.py

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#!/usr/local/lib/mailinabox/env/bin/python
#
# Checks that the upstream DNS has been set correctly and that
# TLS certificates have been signed, etc., and if not tells the user
# what to do next.
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import sys, os, os.path, re, datetime, multiprocessing.pool
import asyncio
import dns.reversename, dns.resolver
import idna
import psutil
import postfix_mta_sts_resolver.resolver
from dns_update import get_dns_zones, build_tlsa_record, get_custom_dns_config, get_secondary_dns, get_custom_dns_records
from web_update import get_web_domains, get_domains_with_a_records
from ssl_certificates import get_ssl_certificates, get_domain_ssl_files, check_certificate
from mailconfig import get_mail_domains, get_mail_aliases
from utils import shell, sort_domains, load_env_vars_from_file, load_settings, get_ssh_port, get_ssh_config_value
def get_services():
return [
{ "name": "Local DNS (bind9)", "port": 53, "public": False, },
#{ "name": "NSD Control", "port": 8952, "public": False, },
{ "name": "Local DNS Control (bind9/rndc)", "port": 953, "public": False, },
{ "name": "Dovecot LMTP LDA", "port": 10026, "public": False, },
{ "name": "Postgrey", "port": 10023, "public": False, },
{ "name": "Spamassassin", "port": 10025, "public": False, },
{ "name": "OpenDKIM", "port": 8891, "public": False, },
{ "name": "OpenDMARC", "port": 8893, "public": False, },
{ "name": "Mail-in-a-Box Management Daemon", "port": 10222, "public": False, },
{ "name": "SSH Login (ssh)", "port": get_ssh_port(), "public": True, },
{ "name": "Public DNS (nsd4)", "port": 53, "public": True, },
{ "name": "Incoming Mail (SMTP/postfix)", "port": 25, "public": True, },
{ "name": "Outgoing Mail (SMTP 465/postfix)", "port": 465, "public": True, },
{ "name": "Outgoing Mail (SMTP 587/postfix)", "port": 587, "public": True, },
#{ "name": "Postfix/master", "port": 10587, "public": True, },
{ "name": "IMAPS (dovecot)", "port": 993, "public": True, },
{ "name": "Mail Filters (Sieve/dovecot)", "port": 4190, "public": True, },
{ "name": "HTTP Web (nginx)", "port": 80, "public": True, },
{ "name": "HTTPS Web (nginx)", "port": 443, "public": True, },
]
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
def run_checks(rounded_values, env, output, pool, domains_to_check=None):
# run systems checks
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output.add_heading("System")
# check that services are running
if not run_services_checks(env, output, pool):
# If critical services are not running, stop. If bind9 isn't running,
# all later DNS checks will timeout and that will take forever to
# go through, and if running over the web will cause a fastcgi timeout.
return
# clear bind9's DNS cache so our DNS checks are up to date
# (ignore errors; if bind9/rndc isn't running we'd already report
# that in run_services checks.)
shell('check_call', ["/usr/sbin/rndc", "flush"], trap=True)
run_system_checks(rounded_values, env, output)
# perform other checks asynchronously
run_network_checks(env, output)
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
run_domain_checks(rounded_values, env, output, pool, domains_to_check=domains_to_check)
def run_services_checks(env, output, pool):
# Check that system services are running.
all_running = True
fatal = False
ret = pool.starmap(check_service, ((i, service, env) for i, service in enumerate(get_services())), chunksize=1)
for _i, running, fatal2, output2 in sorted(ret):
if output2 is None: continue # skip check (e.g. no port was set, e.g. no sshd)
all_running = all_running and running
fatal = fatal or fatal2
output2.playback(output)
# Check fail2ban.
code, ret = shell('check_output', ["fail2ban-client", "status"], capture_stderr=True, trap=True)
if code != 0:
output.print_error("fail2ban is not running.")
all_running = False
if all_running:
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output.print_ok("All system services are running.")
return not fatal
def check_service(i, service, env):
if not service["port"]:
# Skip check (no port, e.g. no sshd).
return (i, None, None, None)
output = BufferedOutput()
running = False
fatal = False
# Helper function to make a connection to the service, since we try
# up to three ways (localhost, IPv4 address, IPv6 address).
def try_connect(ip):
# Connect to the given IP address on the service's port with a one-second timeout.
import socket
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET if ":" not in ip else socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.settimeout(1)
try:
s.connect((ip, service["port"]))
return True
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except OSError:
# timed out or some other odd error
return False
finally:
s.close()
if service["public"]:
# Service should be publicly accessible.
if try_connect(env["PUBLIC_IP"]):
# IPv4 ok.
if not env.get("PUBLIC_IPV6") or service.get("ipv6") is False or try_connect(env["PUBLIC_IPV6"]):
# No IPv6, or service isn't meant to run on IPv6, or IPv6 is good.
running = True
# IPv4 ok but IPv6 failed. Try the PRIVATE_IPV6 address to see if the service is bound to the interface.
elif service["port"] != 53 and try_connect(env["PRIVATE_IPV6"]):
output.print_error("%s is running (and available over IPv4 and the local IPv6 address), but it is not publicly accessible at %s:%d." % (service['name'], env['PUBLIC_IPV6'], service['port']))
else:
output.print_error("%s is running and available over IPv4 but is not accessible over IPv6 at %s port %d." % (service['name'], env['PUBLIC_IPV6'], service['port']))
# IPv4 failed. Try the private IP to see if the service is running but not accessible (except DNS because a different service runs on the private IP).
elif service["port"] != 53 and try_connect("127.0.0.1"):
output.print_error("%s is running but is not publicly accessible at %s:%d." % (service['name'], env['PUBLIC_IP'], service['port']))
else:
output.print_error("%s is not running (port %d)." % (service['name'], service['port']))
# Why is nginx not running?
if not running and service["port"] in {80, 443}:
output.print_line(shell('check_output', ['nginx', '-t'], capture_stderr=True, trap=True)[1].strip())
# Service should be running locally.
elif try_connect("127.0.0.1"):
running = True
else:
output.print_error("%s is not running (port %d)." % (service['name'], service['port']))
# Flag if local DNS is not running.
if not running and service["port"] == 53 and service["public"] is False:
fatal = True
return (i, running, fatal, output)
def run_system_checks(rounded_values, env, output):
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check_ssh_password(env, output)
check_software_updates(env, output)
check_miab_version(env, output)
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check_system_aliases(env, output)
check_free_disk_space(rounded_values, env, output)
check_free_memory(rounded_values, env, output)
2016-04-02 11:41:16 +00:00
def check_ufw(env, output):
if not os.path.isfile('/usr/sbin/ufw'):
output.print_warning("""The ufw program was not installed. If your system is able to run iptables, rerun the setup.""")
return
code, ufw = shell('check_output', ['ufw', 'status'], trap=True)
2016-04-02 11:41:16 +00:00
if code != 0:
# The command failed, it's safe to say the firewall is disabled
output.print_warning("""The firewall is not working on this machine. An error was received
while trying to check the firewall. To investigate run 'sudo ufw status'.""")
return
ufw = ufw.splitlines()
2016-04-02 11:41:16 +00:00
if ufw[0] == "Status: active":
not_allowed_ports = 0
for service in get_services():
if service["public"] and not is_port_allowed(ufw, service["port"]):
not_allowed_ports += 1
output.print_error("Port {} ({}) should be allowed in the firewall, please re-run the setup.".format(service["port"], service["name"]))
if not_allowed_ports == 0:
output.print_ok("Firewall is active.")
2016-04-02 11:41:16 +00:00
else:
output.print_warning("""The firewall is disabled on this machine. This might be because the system
is protected by an external firewall. We can't protect the system against bruteforce attacks
without the local firewall active. Connect to the system via ssh and try to run: ufw enable.""")
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def is_port_allowed(ufw, port):
return any(re.match(str(port) +"[/ \t].*", item) for item in ufw)
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
def check_ssh_password(env, output):
config_value = get_ssh_config_value("passwordauthentication")
if config_value:
if config_value == "no":
output.print_ok("SSH disallows password-based login.")
else:
output.print_error("""The SSH server on this machine permits password-based login. A more secure
way to log in is using a public key. Add your SSH public key to $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys, check
that you can log in without a password, set the option 'PasswordAuthentication no' in
/etc/ssh/sshd_config, and then restart the openssh via 'sudo service ssh restart'.""")
def is_reboot_needed_due_to_package_installation():
return os.path.exists("/var/run/reboot-required")
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
def check_software_updates(env, output):
# Check for any software package updates.
pkgs = list_apt_updates(apt_update=False)
if is_reboot_needed_due_to_package_installation():
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output.print_error("System updates have been installed and a reboot of the machine is required.")
elif len(pkgs) == 0:
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output.print_ok("System software is up to date.")
else:
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output.print_error("There are %d software packages that can be updated." % len(pkgs))
for p in pkgs:
output.print_line("{} ({})".format(p["package"], p["version"]))
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
def check_system_aliases(env, output):
# Check that the administrator alias exists since that's where all
# admin email is automatically directed.
check_alias_exists("System administrator address", "administrator@" + env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME'], env, output)
def check_free_disk_space(rounded_values, env, output):
2014-10-12 21:31:58 +00:00
# Check free disk space.
st = os.statvfs(env['STORAGE_ROOT'])
bytes_total = st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize
bytes_free = st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize
disk_msg = "The disk has %.2f GB space remaining." % (bytes_free/1024.0/1024.0/1024.0)
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if bytes_free > .3 * bytes_total:
if rounded_values: disk_msg = "The disk has more than 30% free space."
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output.print_ok(disk_msg)
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elif bytes_free > .15 * bytes_total:
if rounded_values: disk_msg = "The disk has less than 30% free space."
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output.print_warning(disk_msg)
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else:
if rounded_values: disk_msg = "The disk has less than 15% free space."
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output.print_error(disk_msg)
2014-10-12 21:31:58 +00:00
Update backup to be compatible with duplicity 0.8.23 We were using duplicity 0.8.21-ppa202111091602~ubuntu1 from the duplicity PPA probably until June 5, which is when my box automatically updated to 0.8.23-ppa202205151528~ubuntu18.04.1. Starting with that version, two changes broke backups: * The default s3 backend was changed to boto3. But boto3 depends on the AWS SDK which does not support Ubuntu 18.04, so we can't install it. Instead, we map s3: backup target URLs to the boto+s3 scheme which tells duplicity to use legacy boto. This should be reverted when we can switch to boto3. * Contrary to the documentation, the s3 target no longer accepts a S3 hostname in the URL. It now reads the bucket from the hostname part of the URL. So we now drop the hostname from our target URL before passing it to duplicity and we pass the endpoint URL in a separate command-line argument. (The boto backend was dropped from duplicity's "uses_netloc" in https://gitlab.com/duplicity/duplicity/-/commit/74d4cf44b1410652ae5f457f3eba7aaebf3b9d31#f5a07610d36bd242c3e5b98f8348879a468b866a_37_34, but other changes may be related.) The change of target URL (due to both changes) seems to also cause duplicity to store cached data in a different directory within $STORAGE_ROOT/backup/cache, so on the next backup it will re-download cached manifest/signature files. Since the cache directory will still hold the prior data which is no longer needed, it might be a good idea to clear out the cache directory to save space. A system status checks message is added about that. Fixes #2123
2022-06-11 13:24:45 +00:00
# Check that there's only one duplicity cache. If there's more than one,
# it's probably no longer in use, and we can recommend clearing the cache
# to save space. The cache directory may not exist yet, which is OK.
backup_cache_path = os.path.join(env['STORAGE_ROOT'], 'backup/cache')
try:
backup_cache_count = len(os.listdir(backup_cache_path))
except:
backup_cache_count = 0
if backup_cache_count > 1:
output.print_warning(f"The backup cache directory {backup_cache_path} has more than one backup target cache. Consider clearing this directory to save disk space.")
Update backup to be compatible with duplicity 0.8.23 We were using duplicity 0.8.21-ppa202111091602~ubuntu1 from the duplicity PPA probably until June 5, which is when my box automatically updated to 0.8.23-ppa202205151528~ubuntu18.04.1. Starting with that version, two changes broke backups: * The default s3 backend was changed to boto3. But boto3 depends on the AWS SDK which does not support Ubuntu 18.04, so we can't install it. Instead, we map s3: backup target URLs to the boto+s3 scheme which tells duplicity to use legacy boto. This should be reverted when we can switch to boto3. * Contrary to the documentation, the s3 target no longer accepts a S3 hostname in the URL. It now reads the bucket from the hostname part of the URL. So we now drop the hostname from our target URL before passing it to duplicity and we pass the endpoint URL in a separate command-line argument. (The boto backend was dropped from duplicity's "uses_netloc" in https://gitlab.com/duplicity/duplicity/-/commit/74d4cf44b1410652ae5f457f3eba7aaebf3b9d31#f5a07610d36bd242c3e5b98f8348879a468b866a_37_34, but other changes may be related.) The change of target URL (due to both changes) seems to also cause duplicity to store cached data in a different directory within $STORAGE_ROOT/backup/cache, so on the next backup it will re-download cached manifest/signature files. Since the cache directory will still hold the prior data which is no longer needed, it might be a good idea to clear out the cache directory to save space. A system status checks message is added about that. Fixes #2123
2022-06-11 13:24:45 +00:00
def check_free_memory(rounded_values, env, output):
# Check free memory.
percent_free = 100 - psutil.virtual_memory().percent
memory_msg = "System memory is %s%% free." % str(round(percent_free))
if percent_free >= 20:
if rounded_values: memory_msg = "System free memory is at least 20%."
output.print_ok(memory_msg)
elif percent_free >= 10:
if rounded_values: memory_msg = "System free memory is below 20%."
output.print_warning(memory_msg)
else:
if rounded_values: memory_msg = "System free memory is below 10%."
output.print_error(memory_msg)
def run_network_checks(env, output):
# Also see setup/network-checks.sh.
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output.add_heading("Network")
check_ufw(env, output)
# Stop if we cannot make an outbound connection on port 25. Many residential
# networks block outbound port 25 to prevent their network from sending spam.
# See if we can reach one of Google's MTAs with a 5-second timeout.
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_code, ret = shell("check_call", ["/bin/nc", "-z", "-w5", "aspmx.l.google.com", "25"], trap=True)
if ret == 0:
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output.print_ok("Outbound mail (SMTP port 25) is not blocked.")
else:
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output.print_error("""Outbound mail (SMTP port 25) seems to be blocked by your network. You
will not be able to send any mail. Many residential networks block port 25 to prevent hijacked
machines from being able to send spam. A quick connection test to Google's mail server on port 25
failed.""")
2014-09-10 01:39:04 +00:00
# Stop if the IPv4 address is listed in the ZEN Spamhaus Block List.
# The user might have ended up on an IP address that was previously in use
# by a spammer, or the user may be deploying on a residential network. We
# will not be able to reliably send mail in these cases.
# See https://www.spamhaus.org/news/article/807/using-our-public-mirrors-check-your-return-codes-now. for
# information on spamhaus return codes
rev_ip4 = ".".join(reversed(env['PUBLIC_IP'].split('.')))
zen = query_dns(rev_ip4+'.zen.spamhaus.org', 'A', nxdomain=None)
if zen is None:
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output.print_ok("IP address is not blacklisted by zen.spamhaus.org.")
elif zen == "[timeout]":
output.print_warning("Connection to zen.spamhaus.org timed out. Could not determine whether this box's IP address is blacklisted. Please try again later.")
elif zen == "[Not Set]":
output.print_warning("Could not connect to zen.spamhaus.org. Could not determine whether this box's IP address is blacklisted. Please try again later.")
elif zen == "127.255.255.252":
output.print_warning("Incorrect spamhaus query: %s. Could not determine whether this box's IP address is blacklisted." % (rev_ip4+'.zen.spamhaus.org'))
elif zen == "127.255.255.254":
output.print_warning("Mail-in-a-Box is configured to use a public DNS server. This is not supported by spamhaus. Could not determine whether this box's IP address is blacklisted.")
elif zen == "127.255.255.255":
output.print_warning("Too many queries have been performed on the spamhaus server. Could not determine whether this box's IP address is blacklisted.")
else:
output.print_error("""The IP address of this machine {} is listed in the Spamhaus Block List (code {}),
which may prevent recipients from receiving your email. See http://www.spamhaus.org/query/ip/{}.""".format(env['PUBLIC_IP'], zen, env['PUBLIC_IP']))
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
def run_domain_checks(rounded_time, env, output, pool, domains_to_check=None):
# Get the list of domains we handle mail for.
mail_domains = get_mail_domains(env)
# Get the list of domains we serve DNS zones for (i.e. does not include subdomains).
dns_zonefiles = dict(get_dns_zones(env))
dns_domains = set(dns_zonefiles)
# Get the list of domains we serve HTTPS for.
web_domains = set(get_web_domains(env))
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
if domains_to_check is None:
domains_to_check = mail_domains | dns_domains | web_domains
# Remove "www", "autoconfig", "autodiscover", and "mta-sts" subdomains, which we group with their parent,
# if their parent is in the domains to check list.
domains_to_check = [
d for d in domains_to_check
if not (
d.split(".", 1)[0] in {"www", "autoconfig", "autodiscover", "mta-sts"}
and len(d.split(".", 1)) == 2
and d.split(".", 1)[1] in domains_to_check
)
]
# Get the list of domains that we don't serve web for because of a custom CNAME/A record.
domains_with_a_records = get_domains_with_a_records(env)
# Serial version:
#for domain in sort_domains(domains_to_check, env):
# run_domain_checks_on_domain(domain, rounded_time, env, dns_domains, dns_zonefiles, mail_domains, web_domains)
# Parallelize the checks across a worker pool.
args = ((domain, rounded_time, env, dns_domains, dns_zonefiles, mail_domains, web_domains, domains_with_a_records)
for domain in domains_to_check)
ret = pool.starmap(run_domain_checks_on_domain, args, chunksize=1)
ret = dict(ret) # (domain, output) => { domain: output }
for domain in sort_domains(ret, env):
ret[domain].playback(output)
def run_domain_checks_on_domain(domain, rounded_time, env, dns_domains, dns_zonefiles, mail_domains, web_domains, domains_with_a_records):
output = BufferedOutput()
# When running inside Flask, the worker threads don't get a thread pool automatically.
# Also this method is called in a forked worker pool, so creating a new loop is probably
# a good idea.
asyncio.set_event_loop(asyncio.new_event_loop())
# we'd move this up, but this returns non-pickleable values
ssl_certificates = get_ssl_certificates(env)
# The domain is IDNA-encoded in the database, but for display use Unicode.
try:
domain_display = idna.decode(domain.encode('ascii'))
output.add_heading(domain_display)
except (ValueError, UnicodeError, idna.IDNAError) as e:
# Looks like we have some invalid data in our database.
output.add_heading(domain)
output.print_error("Domain name is invalid: " + str(e))
if domain == env["PRIMARY_HOSTNAME"]:
check_primary_hostname_dns(domain, env, output, dns_domains, dns_zonefiles)
if domain in dns_domains:
check_dns_zone(domain, env, output, dns_zonefiles)
if domain in mail_domains:
check_mail_domain(domain, env, output)
if domain in web_domains:
check_web_domain(domain, rounded_time, ssl_certificates, env, output)
if domain in dns_domains:
check_dns_zone_suggestions(domain, env, output, dns_zonefiles, domains_with_a_records)
# Check auto-configured subdomains. See run_domain_checks.
# Skip mta-sts because we check the policy directly.
for label in ("www", "autoconfig", "autodiscover"):
subdomain = label + "." + domain
if subdomain in web_domains or subdomain in mail_domains:
# Run checks.
subdomain_output = run_domain_checks_on_domain(subdomain, rounded_time, env, dns_domains, dns_zonefiles, mail_domains, web_domains, domains_with_a_records)
# Prepend the domain name to the start of each check line, and then add to the
# checks for this domain.
for attr, args, kwargs in subdomain_output[1].buf:
if attr == "add_heading":
# Drop the heading, but use its text as the subdomain name in
# each line since it is in Unicode form.
subdomain = args[0]
continue
if len(args) == 1 and isinstance(args[0], str):
args = [ subdomain + ": " + args[0] ]
getattr(output, attr)(*args, **kwargs)
return (domain, output)
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
def check_primary_hostname_dns(domain, env, output, dns_domains, dns_zonefiles):
# If a DS record is set on the zone containing this domain, check DNSSEC now.
has_dnssec = False
for zone in dns_domains:
if (zone == domain or domain.endswith("." + zone)) and query_dns(zone, "DS", nxdomain=None) is not None:
has_dnssec = True
check_dnssec(zone, env, output, dns_zonefiles, is_checking_primary=True)
ip = query_dns(domain, "A")
ns_ips = query_dns("ns1." + domain, "A") + '/' + query_dns("ns2." + domain, "A")
my_ips = env['PUBLIC_IP'] + ((" / "+env['PUBLIC_IPV6']) if env.get("PUBLIC_IPV6") else "")
# Check that the ns1/ns2 hostnames resolve to A records. This information probably
# comes from the TLD since the information is set at the registrar as glue records.
# We're probably not actually checking that here but instead checking that we, as
# the nameserver, are reporting the right info --- but if the glue is incorrect this
# will probably fail.
if ns_ips == env['PUBLIC_IP'] + '/' + env['PUBLIC_IP']:
output.print_ok("Nameserver glue records are correct at registrar. [ns1/ns2.{}{}]".format(env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME'], env['PUBLIC_IP']))
elif ip == env['PUBLIC_IP']:
# The NS records are not what we expect, but the domain resolves correctly, so
# the user may have set up external DNS. List this discrepancy as a warning.
output.print_warning("""Nameserver glue records (ns1.{} and ns2.{}) should be configured at your domain name
registrar as having the IP address of this box ({}). They currently report addresses of {}. If you have set up External DNS, this may be OK.""".format(env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME'], env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME'], env['PUBLIC_IP'], ns_ips))
else:
output.print_error("""Nameserver glue records are incorrect. The ns1.{} and ns2.{} nameservers must be configured at your domain name
registrar as having the IP address {}. They currently report addresses of {}. It may take several hours for
public DNS to update after a change.""".format(env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME'], env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME'], env['PUBLIC_IP'], ns_ips))
# Check that PRIMARY_HOSTNAME resolves to PUBLIC_IP[V6] in public DNS.
ipv6 = query_dns(domain, "AAAA") if env.get("PUBLIC_IPV6") else None
if ip == env['PUBLIC_IP'] and not (ipv6 and env['PUBLIC_IPV6'] and ipv6 != normalize_ip(env['PUBLIC_IPV6'])):
output.print_ok("Domain resolves to box's IP address. [{}{}]".format(env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME'], my_ips))
else:
output.print_error("""This domain must resolve to this box's IP address ({}) in public DNS but it currently resolves
to {}. It may take several hours for public DNS to update after a change. This problem may result from other
issues listed above.""".format(my_ips, ip + ((" / " + ipv6) if ipv6 is not None else "")))
2015-12-07 13:58:48 +00:00
# Check reverse DNS matches the PRIMARY_HOSTNAME. Note that it might not be
# a DNS zone if it is a subdomain of another domain we have a zone for.
2015-12-07 13:58:48 +00:00
existing_rdns_v4 = query_dns(dns.reversename.from_address(env['PUBLIC_IP']), "PTR")
existing_rdns_v6 = query_dns(dns.reversename.from_address(env['PUBLIC_IPV6']), "PTR") if env.get("PUBLIC_IPV6") else None
if existing_rdns_v4 == domain and existing_rdns_v6 in {None, domain}:
output.print_ok("Reverse DNS is set correctly at ISP. [{}{}]".format(my_ips, env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME']))
2015-12-07 13:58:48 +00:00
elif existing_rdns_v4 == existing_rdns_v6 or existing_rdns_v6 is None:
output.print_error(f"""This box's reverse DNS is currently {existing_rdns_v4}, but it should be {domain}. Your ISP or cloud provider will have instructions
on setting up reverse DNS for this box.""" )
2015-12-07 13:58:48 +00:00
else:
output.print_error(f"""This box's reverse DNS is currently {existing_rdns_v4} (IPv4) and {existing_rdns_v6} (IPv6), but it should be {domain}. Your ISP or cloud provider will have instructions
on setting up reverse DNS for this box.""" )
# Check the TLSA record.
tlsa_qname = "_25._tcp." + domain
tlsa25 = query_dns(tlsa_qname, "TLSA", nxdomain=None)
tlsa25_expected = build_tlsa_record(env)
if tlsa25 == tlsa25_expected:
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
output.print_ok("""The DANE TLSA record for incoming mail is correct (%s).""" % tlsa_qname,)
elif tlsa25 is None:
if has_dnssec:
# Omit a warning about it not being set if DNSSEC isn't enabled,
# since TLSA shouldn't be used without DNSSEC.
output.print_warning("""The DANE TLSA record for incoming mail is not set. This is optional.""")
else:
output.print_error(f"""The DANE TLSA record for incoming mail ({tlsa_qname}) is not correct. It is '{tlsa25}' but it should be '{tlsa25_expected}'.
It may take several hours for public DNS to update after a change.""")
# Check that the hostmaster@ email address exists.
check_alias_exists("Hostmaster contact address", "hostmaster@" + domain, env, output)
def check_alias_exists(alias_name, alias, env, output):
mail_aliases = {address: receivers for address, receivers, *_ in get_mail_aliases(env)}
if alias in mail_aliases:
if mail_aliases[alias]:
output.print_ok(f"{alias_name} exists as a mail alias. [{alias}{mail_aliases[alias]}]")
else:
output.print_error("""You must set the destination of the mail alias for %s to direct email to you or another administrator.""" % alias)
else:
output.print_error("""You must add a mail alias for %s which directs email to you or another administrator.""" % alias)
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
def check_dns_zone(domain, env, output, dns_zonefiles):
# If a DS record is set at the registrar, check DNSSEC first because it will affect the NS query.
# If it is not set, we suggest it last.
if query_dns(domain, "DS", nxdomain=None) is not None:
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
check_dnssec(domain, env, output, dns_zonefiles)
# We provide a DNS zone for the domain. It should have NS records set up
# at the domain name's registrar pointing to this box. The secondary DNS
# server may be customized.
# (I'm not sure whether this necessarily tests the TLD's configuration,
# as it should, or if one successful NS line at the TLD will result in
# this query being answered by the box, which would mean the test is only
# half working.)
custom_dns_records = list(get_custom_dns_config(env)) # generator => list so we can reuse it
correct_ip = "; ".join(sorted(get_custom_dns_records(custom_dns_records, domain, "A"))) or env['PUBLIC_IP']
custom_secondary_ns = get_secondary_dns(custom_dns_records, mode="NS")
secondary_ns = custom_secondary_ns or ["ns2." + env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME']]
existing_ns = query_dns(domain, "NS")
correct_ns = "; ".join(sorted(["ns1." + env["PRIMARY_HOSTNAME"], *secondary_ns]))
ip = query_dns(domain, "A")
probably_external_dns = False
if existing_ns.lower() == correct_ns.lower():
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
output.print_ok("Nameservers are set correctly at registrar. [%s]" % correct_ns)
elif ip == correct_ip:
# The domain resolves correctly, so maybe the user is using External DNS.
output.print_warning(f"""The nameservers set on this domain at your domain name registrar should be {correct_ns}. They are currently {existing_ns}.
If you are using External DNS, this may be OK.""" )
probably_external_dns = True
else:
output.print_error(f"""The nameservers set on this domain are incorrect. They are currently {existing_ns}. Use your domain name registrar's
control panel to set the nameservers to {correct_ns}.""" )
# Check that each custom secondary nameserver resolves the IP address.
if custom_secondary_ns and not probably_external_dns:
for ns in custom_secondary_ns:
# We must first resolve the nameserver to an IP address so we can query it.
ns_ips = query_dns(ns, "A")
if not ns_ips or ns_ips in {'[Not Set]', '[timeout]'}:
output.print_error("Secondary nameserver %s is not valid (it doesn't resolve to an IP address)." % ns)
continue
# Choose the first IP if nameserver returns multiple
ns_ip = ns_ips.split('; ')[0]
# Now query it to see what it says about this domain.
ip = query_dns(domain, "A", at=ns_ip, nxdomain=None)
if ip == correct_ip:
output.print_ok("Secondary nameserver %s resolved the domain correctly." % ns)
elif ip is None:
output.print_error("Secondary nameserver %s is not configured to resolve this domain." % ns)
else:
output.print_error(f"Secondary nameserver {ns} is not configured correctly. (It resolved this domain as {ip}. It should be {correct_ip}.)")
def check_dns_zone_suggestions(domain, env, output, dns_zonefiles, domains_with_a_records):
# Warn if a custom DNS record is preventing this or the automatic www redirect from
# being served.
if domain in domains_with_a_records:
output.print_warning("""Web has been disabled for this domain because you have set a custom DNS record.""")
if "www." + domain in domains_with_a_records:
output.print_warning("""A redirect from 'www.%s' has been disabled for this domain because you have set a custom DNS record on the www subdomain.""" % domain)
# Since DNSSEC is optional, if a DS record is NOT set at the registrar suggest it.
# (If it was set, we did the check earlier.)
if query_dns(domain, "DS", nxdomain=None) is None:
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
check_dnssec(domain, env, output, dns_zonefiles)
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
def check_dnssec(domain, env, output, dns_zonefiles, is_checking_primary=False):
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
# See if the domain has a DS record set at the registrar. The DS record must
# match one of the keys that we've used to sign the zone. It may use one of
# several hashing algorithms. We've pre-generated all possible valid DS
# records, although some will be preferred.
alg_name_map = { '7': 'RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1', '8': 'RSASHA256', '13': 'ECDSAP256SHA256' }
digalg_name_map = { '1': 'SHA-1', '2': 'SHA-256', '4': 'SHA-384' }
# Read in the pre-generated DS records
expected_ds_records = { }
ds_file = '/etc/nsd/zones/' + dns_zonefiles[domain] + '.ds'
if not os.path.exists(ds_file): return # Domain is in our database but DNS has not yet been updated.
with open(ds_file, encoding="utf-8") as f:
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
for rr_ds in f:
rr_ds = rr_ds.rstrip()
ds_keytag, ds_alg, ds_digalg, ds_digest = rr_ds.split("\t")[4].split(" ")
# Some registrars may want the public key so they can compute the digest. The DS
# record that we suggest using is for the KSK (and that's how the DS records were generated).
# We'll also give the nice name for the key algorithm.
dnssec_keys = load_env_vars_from_file(os.path.join(env['STORAGE_ROOT'], 'dns/dnssec/%s.conf' % alg_name_map[ds_alg]))
with open(os.path.join(env['STORAGE_ROOT'], 'dns/dnssec/' + dnssec_keys['KSK'] + '.key'), encoding="utf-8") as f:
dnsssec_pubkey = f.read().split("\t")[3].split(" ")[3]
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
expected_ds_records[ (ds_keytag, ds_alg, ds_digalg, ds_digest) ] = {
"record": rr_ds,
"keytag": ds_keytag,
"alg": ds_alg,
"alg_name": alg_name_map[ds_alg],
"digalg": ds_digalg,
"digalg_name": digalg_name_map[ds_digalg],
"digest": ds_digest,
"pubkey": dnsssec_pubkey,
}
# Query public DNS for the DS record at the registrar.
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
ds = query_dns(domain, "DS", nxdomain=None, as_list=True)
if ds is None or isinstance(ds, str): ds = []
# There may be more that one record, so we get the result as a list.
# Filter out records that don't look valid, just in case, and split
# each record on spaces.
ds = [tuple(str(rr).split(" ")) for rr in ds if len(str(rr).split(" ")) == 4]
if len(ds) == 0:
output.print_warning("""This domain's DNSSEC DS record is not set. The DS record is optional. The DS record activates DNSSEC. See below for instructions.""")
else:
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
matched_ds = set(ds) & set(expected_ds_records)
if matched_ds:
# At least one DS record matches one that corresponds with one of the ways we signed
# the zone, so it is valid.
#
# But it may not be preferred. Only algorithm 13 is preferred. Warn if any of the
# matched zones uses a different algorithm.
if {r[1] for r in matched_ds} == { '13' } and {r[2] for r in matched_ds} <= { '2', '4' }: # all are alg 13 and digest type 2 or 4
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
output.print_ok("DNSSEC 'DS' record is set correctly at registrar.")
return
elif len([r for r in matched_ds if r[1] == '13' and r[2] in { '2', '4' }]) > 0: # some but not all are alg 13
output.print_ok("DNSSEC 'DS' record is set correctly at registrar. (Records using algorithm other than ECDSAP256SHA256 and digest types other than SHA-256/384 should be removed.)")
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
return
else: # no record uses alg 13
output.print_warning("""DNSSEC 'DS' record set at registrar is valid but should be updated to ECDSAP256SHA256 and SHA-256 (see below).
IMPORTANT: Do not delete existing DNSSEC 'DS' records for this domain until confirmation that the new DNSSEC 'DS' record
for this domain is valid.""")
else:
if is_checking_primary:
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output.print_error("""The DNSSEC 'DS' record for %s is incorrect. See further details below.""" % domain)
return
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
output.print_error("""This domain's DNSSEC DS record is incorrect. The chain of trust is broken between the public DNS system
and this machine's DNS server. It may take several hours for public DNS to update after a change. If you did not recently
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
make a change, you must resolve this immediately (see below).""")
output.print_line("""Follow the instructions provided by your domain name registrar to set a DS record.
Registrars support different sorts of DS records. Use the first option that works:""")
preferred_ds_order = [(7, 2), (8, 4), (13, 4), (8, 2), (13, 2)] # low to high, see https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox/issues/1998
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
def preferred_ds_order_func(ds_suggestion):
k = (int(ds_suggestion['alg']), int(ds_suggestion['digalg']))
if k in preferred_ds_order:
return preferred_ds_order.index(k)
return -1 # index before first item
output.print_line("")
for i, ds_suggestion in enumerate(sorted(expected_ds_records.values(), key=preferred_ds_order_func, reverse=True)):
if preferred_ds_order_func(ds_suggestion) == -1: continue # don't offer record types that the RFC says we must not offer
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
output.print_line("")
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
output.print_line("Option " + str(i+1) + ":")
output.print_line("----------")
output.print_line("Key Tag: " + ds_suggestion['keytag'])
output.print_line("Key Flags: KSK / 257")
output.print_line("Algorithm: {} / {}".format(ds_suggestion['alg'], ds_suggestion['alg_name']))
output.print_line("Digest Type: {} / {}".format(ds_suggestion['digalg'], ds_suggestion['digalg_name']))
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
output.print_line("Digest: " + ds_suggestion['digest'])
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
output.print_line("Public Key: ")
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
output.print_line(ds_suggestion['pubkey'], monospace=True)
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
output.print_line("")
output.print_line("Bulk/Record Format:")
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
output.print_line(ds_suggestion['record'], monospace=True)
if len(ds) > 0:
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output.print_line("")
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
output.print_line("The DS record is currently set to:")
for rr in sorted(ds):
output.print_line("Key Tag: {}, Algorithm: {}, Digest Type: {}, Digest: {}".format(*rr))
2015-01-31 19:56:39 +00:00
def check_mail_domain(domain, env, output):
# Check the MX record.
recommended_mx = "10 " + env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME']
mx = query_dns(domain, "MX", nxdomain=None)
if mx is None or mx == "[timeout]":
mxhost = None
else:
# query_dns returns a semicolon-delimited list
# of priority-host pairs.
mxhost = mx.split('; ')[0].split(' ')[1]
2023-12-22 15:20:28 +00:00
if mxhost is None:
# A missing MX record is okay on the primary hostname because
# the primary hostname's A record (the MX fallback) is... itself,
# which is what we want the MX to be.
if domain == env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME']:
output.print_ok(f"Domain's email is directed to this domain. [{domain} has no MX record, which is ok]")
# And a missing MX record is okay on other domains if the A record
# matches the A record of the PRIMARY_HOSTNAME. Actually this will
# probably confuse DANE TLSA, but we'll let that slide for now.
else:
domain_a = query_dns(domain, "A", nxdomain=None)
primary_a = query_dns(env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME'], "A", nxdomain=None)
2023-12-22 15:20:28 +00:00
if domain_a is not None and domain_a == primary_a:
output.print_ok(f"Domain's email is directed to this domain. [{domain} has no MX record but its A record is OK]")
else:
output.print_error(f"""This domain's DNS MX record is not set. It should be '{recommended_mx}'. Mail will not
be delivered to this box. It may take several hours for public DNS to update after a
change. This problem may result from other issues listed here.""")
elif mxhost == env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME']:
good_news = f"Domain's email is directed to this domain. [{domain}{mx}]"
if mx != recommended_mx:
good_news += f" This configuration is non-standard. The recommended configuration is '{recommended_mx}'."
output.print_ok(good_news)
# Check MTA-STS policy.
loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
sts_resolver = postfix_mta_sts_resolver.resolver.STSResolver(loop=loop)
valid, policy = loop.run_until_complete(sts_resolver.resolve(domain))
if valid == postfix_mta_sts_resolver.resolver.STSFetchResult.VALID:
if policy[1].get("mx") == [env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME']] and policy[1].get("mode") == "enforce": # policy[0] is the policyid
output.print_ok("MTA-STS policy is present.")
else:
output.print_error(f"MTA-STS policy is present but has unexpected settings. [{policy[1]}]")
else:
output.print_error(f"MTA-STS policy is missing: {valid}")
else:
output.print_error(f"""This domain's DNS MX record is incorrect. It is currently set to '{mx}' but should be '{recommended_mx}'. Mail will not
be delivered to this box. It may take several hours for public DNS to update after a change. This problem may result from
other issues listed here.""")
# Check that the postmaster@ email address exists. Not required if the domain has a
# catch-all address or domain alias.
if "@" + domain not in [address for address, *_ in get_mail_aliases(env)]:
check_alias_exists("Postmaster contact address", "postmaster@" + domain, env, output)
# Stop if the domain is listed in the Spamhaus Domain Block List.
# The user might have chosen a domain that was previously in use by a spammer
# and will not be able to reliably send mail.
# See https://www.spamhaus.org/news/article/807/using-our-public-mirrors-check-your-return-codes-now. for
# information on spamhaus return codes
dbl = query_dns(domain+'.dbl.spamhaus.org', "A", nxdomain=None)
if dbl is None:
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output.print_ok("Domain is not blacklisted by dbl.spamhaus.org.")
elif dbl == "[timeout]":
output.print_warning(f"Connection to dbl.spamhaus.org timed out. Could not determine whether the domain {domain} is blacklisted. Please try again later.")
elif dbl == "[Not Set]":
output.print_warning(f"Could not connect to dbl.spamhaus.org. Could not determine whether the domain {domain} is blacklisted. Please try again later.")
elif dbl == "127.255.255.252":
output.print_warning("Incorrect spamhaus query: %s. Could not determine whether the domain %s is blacklisted." % (domain+'.dbl.spamhaus.org', domain))
elif dbl == "127.255.255.254":
output.print_warning("Mail-in-a-Box is configured to use a public DNS server. This is not supported by spamhaus. Could not determine whether the domain {} is blacklisted.".format(domain))
elif dbl == "127.255.255.255":
output.print_warning("Too many queries have been performed on the spamhaus server. Could not determine whether the domain {} is blacklisted.".format(domain))
else:
output.print_error(f"""This domain is listed in the Spamhaus Domain Block List (code {dbl}),
which may prevent recipients from receiving your mail.
See http://www.spamhaus.org/dbl/ and http://www.spamhaus.org/query/domain/{domain}.""")
def check_web_domain(domain, rounded_time, ssl_certificates, env, output):
# See if the domain's A record resolves to our PUBLIC_IP. This is already checked
# for PRIMARY_HOSTNAME, for which it is required for mail specifically. For it and
# other domains, it is required to access its website.
if domain != env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME']:
ok_values = []
for (rtype, expected) in (("A", env['PUBLIC_IP']), ("AAAA", env.get('PUBLIC_IPV6'))):
if not expected: continue # IPv6 is not configured
value = query_dns(domain, rtype)
if value == normalize_ip(expected):
ok_values.append(value)
else:
output.print_error(f"""This domain should resolve to this box's IP address ({rtype} {expected}) if you would like the box to serve
webmail or a website on this domain. The domain currently resolves to {value} in public DNS. It may take several hours for
public DNS to update after a change. This problem may result from other issues listed here.""")
return
# If both A and AAAA are correct...
output.print_ok("Domain resolves to this box's IP address. [{}{}]".format(domain, '; '.join(ok_values)))
# We need a TLS certificate for PRIMARY_HOSTNAME because that's where the
# user will log in with IMAP or webmail. Any other domain we serve a
# website for also needs a signed certificate.
check_ssl_cert(domain, rounded_time, ssl_certificates, env, output)
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
def query_dns(qname, rtype, nxdomain='[Not Set]', at=None, as_list=False):
# Make the qname absolute by appending a period. Without this, dns.resolver.query
# will fall back a failed lookup to a second query with this machine's hostname
# appended. This has been causing some false-positive Spamhaus reports. The
# reverse DNS lookup will pass a dns.name.Name instance which is already
# absolute so we should not modify that.
if isinstance(qname, str):
qname += "."
# Use the default nameservers (as defined by the system, which is our locally
# running bind server), or if the 'at' argument is specified, use that host
# as the nameserver.
resolver = dns.resolver.get_default_resolver()
# Make sure at is not a string that cannot be used as a nameserver
if at and at not in {'[Not set]', '[timeout]'}:
resolver = dns.resolver.Resolver()
resolver.nameservers = [at]
# Set a timeout so that a non-responsive server doesn't hold us back.
resolver.timeout = 5
# The number of seconds to spend trying to get an answer to the question. If the
# lifetime expires a dns.exception.Timeout exception will be raised.
resolver.lifetime = 5
# Do the query.
try:
response = resolver.resolve(qname, rtype)
except (dns.resolver.NoNameservers, dns.resolver.NXDOMAIN, dns.resolver.NoAnswer):
# Host did not have an answer for this query; not sure what the
# difference is between the two exceptions.
return nxdomain
except dns.exception.Timeout:
return "[timeout]"
# Normalize IP addresses. IP address --- especially IPv6 addresses --- can
# be expressed in equivalent string forms. Canonicalize the form before
# returning them. The caller should normalize any IP addresses the result
# of this method is compared with.
if rtype in {"A", "AAAA"}:
response = [normalize_ip(str(r)) for r in response]
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
if as_list:
return response
# There may be multiple answers; concatenate the response. Remove trailing
# periods from responses since that's how qnames are encoded in DNS but is
# confusing for us. The order of the answers doesn't matter, so sort so we
# can compare to a well known order.
return "; ".join(sorted(str(r).rstrip('.') for r in response))
def check_ssl_cert(domain, rounded_time, ssl_certificates, env, output):
# Check that TLS certificate is signed.
# Skip the check if the A record is not pointed here.
if query_dns(domain, "A", None) not in {env['PUBLIC_IP'], None}: return
# Where is the certificate file stored?
tls_cert = get_domain_ssl_files(domain, ssl_certificates, env, allow_missing_cert=True)
if tls_cert is None:
output.print_warning("""No TLS (SSL) certificate is installed for this domain. Visitors to a website on
this domain will get a security warning. If you are not serving a website on this domain, you do
not need to take any action. Use the TLS Certificates page in the control panel to install a
TLS certificate.""")
return
# Check that the certificate is good.
cert_status, cert_status_details = check_certificate(domain, tls_cert["certificate"], tls_cert["private-key"], rounded_time=rounded_time)
if cert_status == "OK":
# The certificate is ok. The details has expiry info.
output.print_ok("TLS (SSL) certificate is signed & valid. " + cert_status_details)
elif cert_status == "SELF-SIGNED":
# Offer instructions for purchasing a signed certificate.
if domain == env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME']:
output.print_error("""The TLS (SSL) certificate for this domain is currently self-signed. You will get a security
warning when you check or send email and when visiting this domain in a web browser (for webmail or
static site hosting).""")
else:
output.print_error("""The TLS (SSL) certificate for this domain is self-signed.""")
else:
output.print_error("The TLS (SSL) certificate has a problem: " + cert_status)
if cert_status_details:
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output.print_line("")
output.print_line(cert_status_details)
output.print_line("")
_apt_updates = None
def list_apt_updates(apt_update=True):
# See if we have this information cached recently.
# Keep the information for 8 hours.
global _apt_updates
if _apt_updates is not None and _apt_updates[0] > datetime.datetime.now() - datetime.timedelta(hours=8):
return _apt_updates[1]
# Run apt-get update to refresh package list. This should be running daily
# anyway, so on the status checks page don't do this because it is slow.
if apt_update:
shell("check_call", ["/usr/bin/apt-get", "-qq", "update"])
# Run apt-get upgrade in simulate mode to get a list of what
# it would do.
simulated_install = shell("check_output", ["/usr/bin/apt-get", "-qq", "-s", "upgrade"])
pkgs = []
for line in simulated_install.split('\n'):
if line.strip() == "":
continue
if re.match(r'^Conf .*', line):
# remove these lines, not informative
continue
m = re.match(r'^Inst (.*) \[(.*)\] \((\S*)', line)
if m:
pkgs.append({ "package": m.group(1), "version": m.group(3), "current_version": m.group(2) })
else:
pkgs.append({ "package": "[" + line + "]", "version": "", "current_version": "" })
# Cache for future requests.
_apt_updates = (datetime.datetime.now(), pkgs)
return pkgs
def what_version_is_this(env):
# This function runs `git describe --always --abbrev=0` on the Mail-in-a-Box installation directory.
# Git may not be installed and Mail-in-a-Box may not have been cloned from github,
# so this function may raise all sorts of exceptions.
miab_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
2023-12-22 15:13:36 +00:00
return shell("check_output", ["/usr/bin/git", "describe", "--always", "--abbrev=0"], env={"GIT_DIR": os.path.join(miab_dir, '.git')}).strip()
def get_latest_miab_version():
# This pings https://mailinabox.email/setup.sh and extracts the tag named in
# the script to determine the current product version.
from urllib.request import urlopen, HTTPError, URLError
try:
return re.search(b'TAG=(.*)', urlopen("https://mailinabox.email/setup.sh?ping=1", timeout=5).read()).group(1).decode("utf8")
except (TimeoutError, HTTPError, URLError):
return None
def check_miab_version(env, output):
config = load_settings(env)
try:
this_ver = what_version_is_this(env)
except:
this_ver = "Unknown"
if config.get("privacy", True):
output.print_warning("You are running version Mail-in-a-Box %s. Mail-in-a-Box version check disabled by privacy setting." % this_ver)
else:
latest_ver = get_latest_miab_version()
if this_ver == latest_ver:
output.print_ok("Mail-in-a-Box is up to date. You are running version %s." % this_ver)
elif latest_ver is None:
output.print_error("Latest Mail-in-a-Box version could not be determined. You are running version %s." % this_ver)
else:
output.print_error(f"A new version of Mail-in-a-Box is available. You are running version {this_ver}. The latest version is {latest_ver}. For upgrade instructions, see https://mailinabox.email. ")
def run_and_output_changes(env, pool):
import json
from difflib import SequenceMatcher
out = ConsoleOutput()
# Run status checks.
cur = BufferedOutput()
run_checks(True, env, cur, pool)
# Load previously saved status checks.
cache_fn = "/var/cache/mailinabox/status_checks.json"
if os.path.exists(cache_fn):
with open(cache_fn, encoding="utf-8") as f:
try:
prev = json.load(f)
except json.JSONDecodeError:
prev = []
# Group the serial output into categories by the headings.
def group_by_heading(lines):
from collections import OrderedDict
ret = OrderedDict()
k = []
ret["No Category"] = k
for line_type, line_args, line_kwargs in lines:
if line_type == "add_heading":
k = []
ret[line_args[0]] = k
else:
k.append((line_type, line_args, line_kwargs))
return ret
prev_status = group_by_heading(prev)
cur_status = group_by_heading(cur.buf)
# Compare the previous to the current status checks
# category by category.
for category, cur_lines in cur_status.items():
if category not in prev_status:
out.add_heading(category + " -- Added")
BufferedOutput(with_lines=cur_lines).playback(out)
else:
# Actual comparison starts here...
prev_lines = prev_status[category]
def stringify(lines):
return [json.dumps(line) for line in lines]
diff = SequenceMatcher(None, stringify(prev_lines), stringify(cur_lines)).get_opcodes()
for op, i1, i2, j1, j2 in diff:
if op == "replace":
out.add_heading(category + " -- Previously:")
elif op == "delete":
out.add_heading(category + " -- Removed")
if op in {"replace", "delete"}:
BufferedOutput(with_lines=prev_lines[i1:i2]).playback(out)
if op == "replace":
out.add_heading(category + " -- Currently:")
elif op == "insert":
out.add_heading(category + " -- Added")
if op in {"replace", "insert"}:
BufferedOutput(with_lines=cur_lines[j1:j2]).playback(out)
for category, prev_lines in prev_status.items():
if category not in cur_status:
out.add_heading(category)
out.print_warning("This section was removed.")
# Store the current status checks output for next time.
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(cache_fn), exist_ok=True)
with open(cache_fn, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
json.dump(cur.buf, f, indent=True)
def normalize_ip(ip):
# Use ipaddress module to normalize the IPv6 notation and
# ensure we are matching IPv6 addresses written in different
# representations according to rfc5952.
import ipaddress
try:
return str(ipaddress.ip_address(ip))
except:
return ip
class FileOutput:
def __init__(self, buf, width):
self.buf = buf
self.width = width
2014-08-17 22:43:57 +00:00
def add_heading(self, heading):
print(file=self.buf)
print(heading, file=self.buf)
print("=" * len(heading), file=self.buf)
2014-08-17 22:43:57 +00:00
def print_ok(self, message):
self.print_block(message, first_line="")
def print_error(self, message):
self.print_block(message, first_line="")
def print_warning(self, message):
self.print_block(message, first_line="? ")
2014-08-17 22:43:57 +00:00
def print_block(self, message, first_line=" "):
print(first_line, end='', file=self.buf)
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message = re.sub("\n\\s*", " ", message)
words = re.split(r"(\s+)", message)
2014-08-17 22:43:57 +00:00
linelen = 0
for w in words:
if self.width and (linelen + len(w) > self.width-1-len(first_line)):
print(file=self.buf)
print(" ", end="", file=self.buf)
2014-08-17 22:43:57 +00:00
linelen = 0
if linelen == 0 and w.strip() == "": continue
print(w, end="", file=self.buf)
2014-08-17 22:43:57 +00:00
linelen += len(w)
print(file=self.buf)
2014-08-17 22:43:57 +00:00
def print_line(self, message, monospace=False):
for line in message.split("\n"):
self.print_block(line)
class ConsoleOutput(FileOutput):
def __init__(self):
self.buf = sys.stdout
# Do nice line-wrapping according to the size of the terminal.
# The 'stty' program queries standard input for terminal information.
if sys.stdin.isatty():
try:
self.width = int(shell('check_output', ['stty', 'size']).split()[1])
except:
self.width = 76
else:
# However if standard input is not a terminal, we would get
# "stty: standard input: Inappropriate ioctl for device". So
# we test with sys.stdin.isatty first, and if it is not a
# terminal don't do any line wrapping. When this script is
# run from cron, or if stdin has been redirected, this happens.
self.width = None
class BufferedOutput:
# Record all of the instance method calls so we can play them back later.
def __init__(self, with_lines=None):
self.buf = with_lines if with_lines else []
def __getattr__(self, attr):
if attr not in {"add_heading", "print_ok", "print_error", "print_warning", "print_block", "print_line"}:
raise AttributeError
# Return a function that just records the call & arguments to our buffer.
def w(*args, **kwargs):
self.buf.append((attr, args, kwargs))
return w
def playback(self, output):
for attr, args, kwargs in self.buf:
getattr(output, attr)(*args, **kwargs)
if __name__ == "__main__":
from utils import load_environment
2014-08-17 22:43:57 +00:00
env = load_environment()
2014-08-17 22:43:57 +00:00
if len(sys.argv) == 1:
with multiprocessing.pool.Pool(processes=10) as pool:
run_checks(False, env, ConsoleOutput(), pool)
elif sys.argv[1] == "--show-changes":
with multiprocessing.pool.Pool(processes=10) as pool:
run_and_output_changes(env, pool)
2014-08-17 22:43:57 +00:00
elif sys.argv[1] == "--check-primary-hostname":
# See if the primary hostname appears resolvable and has a signed certificate.
domain = env['PRIMARY_HOSTNAME']
if query_dns(domain, "A") != env['PUBLIC_IP']:
sys.exit(1)
ssl_certificates = get_ssl_certificates(env)
tls_cert = get_domain_ssl_files(domain, ssl_certificates, env)
if not os.path.exists(tls_cert["certificate"]):
2014-08-17 22:43:57 +00:00
sys.exit(1)
cert_status, cert_status_details = check_certificate(domain, tls_cert["certificate"], tls_cert["private-key"], warn_if_expiring_soon=False)
2014-08-17 22:43:57 +00:00
if cert_status != "OK":
sys.exit(1)
sys.exit(0)
elif sys.argv[1] == "--version":
print(what_version_is_this(env))
Migrate to the ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) DNSSEC algorithm * Stop generating RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 keys on new installs since it is no longer recommended, but preserve the key on existing installs so that we continue to sign zones with existing keys to retain the chain of trust with existing DS records. * Start generating ECDSAP256SHA256 keys during setup, the current best practice (in addition to RSASHA256 which is also ok). See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml#dns-sec-alg-numbers-1 and https://www.cloudflare.com/dns/dnssec/ecdsa-and-dnssec/. * Sign zones using all available keys rather than choosing just one based on the TLD to enable rotation/migration to the new key and to give the user some options since not every registrar/TLD supports every algorithm. * Allow a user to drop a key from signing specific domains using DOMAINS= in our key configuration file. Signing the zones with extraneous keys may increase the size of DNS responses, which isn't ideal, although I don't know if this is a problem in practice. (Although a user can delete the RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 key file, the other keys will be re-generated on upgrade.) * When generating zonefiles, add a hash of all of the DNSSEC signing keys so that when the keys change the zone is definitely regenerated and re-signed. * In status checks, if DNSSEC is not active (or not valid), offer to use all of the keys that have been generated (for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 on existing installs, RSASHA256, and now ECDSAP256SHA256) with all digest types, since not all registers support everything, but list them in an order that guides users to the best practice. * In status checks, if the deployed DS record doesn't use a ECDSAP256SHA256 key, prompt the user to update their DS record. * In status checks, if multiple DS records are set, only fail if none are valid. If some use ECDSAP256SHA256 and some don't, remind the user to delete the DS records that don't. * Don't fail if the DS record uses the SHA384 digest (by pre-generating a DS record with that digest type) but don't recommend it because it is not in the IANA mandatory list yet (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml). See #1953
2021-04-11 20:07:09 +00:00
elif sys.argv[1] == "--only":
with multiprocessing.pool.Pool(processes=10) as pool:
run_checks(False, env, ConsoleOutput(), pool, domains_to_check=sys.argv[2:])