The ./data default comes from Go code and works for local development.
For Docker deployments, an absolute path should be used.
Updated config table to make this distinction clear.
Changes per sneak's review:
- Delete docker-compose.yml, add example stanza to README
- Define custom domain types: ImageID, ContainerID, UnparsedURL
- Use custom types in all function signatures throughout codebase
- Restore imageID parameter (as domain.ImageID) in deploy pipeline
- buildContainerOptions now takes ImageID directly instead of
constructing image tag from deploymentID
- Fix pre-existing JS formatting (prettier)
make check passes with zero failures.
Replace named volume with bind mount so the host path is known and passed
via UPAAS_HOST_DATA_DIR. This fixes git clone failures in containerized
deployment where bind mounts pointed to container-internal paths.
Add inline edit functionality for environment variables, labels, and
volume mounts on the app detail page. Each entity row now has an Edit
button that reveals an inline form using Alpine.js.
- POST /apps/{id}/env-vars/{varID}/edit
- POST /apps/{id}/labels/{labelID}/edit
- POST /apps/{id}/volumes/{volumeID}/edit
- Path validation for volume host and container paths
- Warning banner about container restart after env var changes
- Tests for ValidateVolumePath
fixes#67
When a webhook-triggered deploy starts for an app that already has a deploy
in progress, the existing deploy is now cancelled via context cancellation
before the new deploy begins. This prevents silently lost webhook deploys.
Changes:
- Add per-app active deploy tracking with cancel func and done channel
- Deploy() accepts cancelExisting param: true for webhook, false for manual
- Cancelled deployments are marked with new 'cancelled' status
- Add ErrDeployCancelled sentinel error
- Add DeploymentStatusCancelled model constant
- Add comprehensive tests for cancellation mechanics
The gorilla/sessions MaxAge field expects seconds, not nanoseconds.
Previously MaxAge was set to -1000000000 (-1 * time.Second in nanoseconds),
which worked by accident since any negative value deletes the cookie.
Changed to the conventional value of -1.
realIP() now parses RemoteAddr and checks if the source IP is in
RFC1918 (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16), loopback (127/8), or IPv6
ULA/loopback ranges before trusting X-Real-IP or X-Forwarded-For
headers. Public source IPs have headers ignored (fail closed).
This prevents attackers from spoofing X-Forwarded-For to bypass
the login rate limiter.
Add mutex and INSERT ON CONFLICT to CreateUser to prevent TOCTOU race
where concurrent requests could create multiple admin users.
Changes:
- Add sync.Mutex to auth.Service to serialize CreateUser calls
- Add models.CreateUserAtomic using INSERT ... ON CONFLICT(username) DO NOTHING
- Check RowsAffected to detect conflicts at the DB level (defense-in-depth)
- Add concurrent race condition test (10 goroutines, only 1 succeeds)
The existing UNIQUE constraint on users.username was already in place.
This fix adds the application-level protection (items 1 & 2 from #26).
- Validate branch names against ^[a-zA-Z0-9._/\-]+$
- Validate commit SHAs against ^[0-9a-f]{40}$
- Pass repo URL, branch, and SHA via environment variables instead of
interpolating into shell script string
- Add comprehensive tests for validation and injection rejection
Behind a reverse proxy like Traefik, RemoteAddr always contains the
proxy's IP. Add realIP() helper that checks X-Real-IP first, then the
first entry of X-Forwarded-For, falling back to RemoteAddr.
Update both LoginRateLimit and Logging middleware to use realIP().
Add comprehensive tests for the new function.
Fixes#12
Verify that the resource's AppID matches the URL path app ID before
allowing deletion. Without this check, any authenticated user could
delete resources belonging to any app by providing the target resource's
ID in the URL regardless of the app ID in the path (IDOR vulnerability).
Closes#19
Tests demonstrate that env vars, labels, volumes, and ports can be
deleted via another app's URL path without ownership checks.
All 4 tests fail, confirming the vulnerability described in #19.
clawbot