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base: sneak/smallwebwaf:3911b1611cf46a07fc1b9ccf1759c69cbc81acfd
sneak/smallwebwaf:main sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-211-viper-config sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-204-routewatch-tags sneak/smallwebwaf:next sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-220-apps-by-hostname sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-216-oci-labels sneak/smallwebwaf:readme-rewrite-155
sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc2 sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc1
..
compare: sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-211-viper-config
sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-211-viper-config sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-204-routewatch-tags sneak/smallwebwaf:next sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-220-apps-by-hostname sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-216-oci-labels sneak/smallwebwaf:main sneak/smallwebwaf:readme-rewrite-155
sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc2 sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc1
3 Commits
3911b1611c .. issue-211-viper-config
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 18b9e8e2fa Read every setting through viper and rename the settings (closes #211)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
Details 
Every setting of discriminator and rproxy is read through viper, in place
of the os.LookupEnv function Main passed down. NewViper turns AutomaticEnv
and AllowEmptyEnv on, so a setting that is set but empty reads as set. A
setting may also be given as a file, the _FILE form, which rproxy's
settings now have too; rproxy still writes nothing to disk.

The settings are renamed. Discriminator's take the prefix SWW_WAF_,
rproxy's take SWW_RPROXY_, and the shared SWW_COMMAND keeps SWW_. The Core
Rule Set's settings take SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ rather than SWW_WAF_WAF_.

Model: deepseek-v4-pro (first version); opus-5-5 (rework)
 2026-11-09 03:18:44 +00:00
clawbot d7c62f2854 Say which bytes the byte limits count, and what passing one does (closes #203)
check / check (push) In progress
Details 
sneak asked for every document to be audited for sentences that do not say what they mean. The byte limits now say which bytes count (response bodies, request bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says, WebSocket traffic included) and what passing one does. Other unclear or false sentences in `README.md`, `SPEC.md`, `EVALUATION.md` and `docs/` are rewritten.

Documents only. `REPO_POLICIES.md` is shared policy text and stayed out.

Model: fable-5-1 (first audit); opus-5-5 (rework)
 2026-11-09 04:03:17 +01:00
clawbot c66277b111 Request tags, with refusing and limits per tag (closes #175)
check / check (push) Failing after 5m8s
Details 
Each request gets tags, logged as `tags`: `asn=`, `country=`, one per `SWW_TAG_LISTS` list holding the client, `crowdsec`, `dnsbl=<zone>`, `abuseipdb` and `exploitsignature`. `SWW_TAG_DENY` refuses by tag and `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` lowers limits by tag. They replace `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT`, `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` and `SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES`, with no aliases. A tag in those settings that nothing configured can give stops the start.

Judgement call: `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` stays, its entries counting like `asn=` tags.
Judgement call: `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` also lowers byte limits, as the settings it replaces did.
Trips a reader: `sww_country_list_refusals_total` now counts only `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` refusals.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-11-09 03:30:49 +01:00
108 changed files with 3436 additions and 2250 deletions
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Dockerfile
+2 -2
View File
@@ -184,12 +184,12 @@ RUN groupadd --system --gid 65532 sww \
--gid sww --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin \
sww
# The state files' directory, SWW_STATE_DIR by default, where a volume
# The state files' directory, SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR by default, where a volume
# is mounted to keep them across deploys. The run script gives it to the
# sww user at each start of discriminator.
RUN mkdir /var/lib/sww
# The default rule file, in SWW_RULES_DIR by default, where a Dockerfile
# The default rule file, in SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR by default, where a Dockerfile
# built FROM this image can copy rule files of its own beside it.
COPY share/rules.d/00-default.rules /etc/sww/rules.d/00-default.rules
EVALUATION.md
+30 -19
View File
@@ -24,14 +24,19 @@ configured only by environment variables, that provides:
## Verdict
Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8 (scaling limits by AS
number or country) or R4's alerts on bytes transferred, and the tools that come
closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML or a web UI.
The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar; `SPEC.md` in this
directory begins that spec. The sidecar reuses the mature parts of the surveyed
field as libraries and data sources (Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set for
attack detection, DNSBLs, AbuseIPDB, optionally a CrowdSec decision feed)
instead of reimplementing them.
Nothing existing is suitable. No surveyed tool meets R8, which asks for limits
scaled by AS number or country. None meets R4's alerts on bytes transferred. The
tools that come closest on the rest fail R10: they need several containers, YAML
or a web UI. The recommendation is to build a small single-binary sidecar;
`SPEC.md` in this directory begins that spec.
The sidecar reuses the mature parts of the surveyed field instead of
reimplementing them. It takes these as libraries and data sources:
- Coraza and the OWASP Core Rule Set, for attack detection
- DNSBLs
- AbuseIPDB
- optionally, a CrowdSec decision feed
Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
@@ -45,13 +50,16 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
external blacklist URLs, optional CrowdSec), R7 partly (AS number used for
blacklist and whitelist decisions), R9 (ModSecurity with the Core Rule
Set, or Coraza plugin), env-var settings.
- Fails: R8 (AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a
limit), R4 (no alerts on request-count or byte thresholds in the free
edition; reporting is a paid feature), R5 escalation, and R10's plain
sidecar: since 1.6 it needs a `bunkerweb` container plus a `bw-scheduler`
container and a database, or the all-in-one image that bundles nginx,
scheduler, UI and Redis in one container. It is designed as the proxy in
front of many sites, not as a sidecar for one app. AGPL-3.0.
- Fails:
- R8: AS number and country can only allow or deny, never scale a limit.
- R4: no alerts on request-count or byte thresholds in the free edition;
reporting is a paid feature.
- R5: no escalation for repeat offenders.
- R10: since 1.6 it is not one plain sidecar. It needs a `bunkerweb`
container, a `bw-scheduler` container and a database, or the
all-in-one image that bundles nginx, the scheduler, the UI and Redis.
- It is designed as the proxy in front of many sites, not as a sidecar for
one app. AGPL-3.0.
- Unverified: whether several rates (minute, hour, day) can be stacked on
the same URL pattern; the documented design is one rate per URL pattern.
- CrowdSec is the strongest detection and ban engine, but it is not a proxy.
@@ -66,10 +74,13 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
listed AS numbers is possible, but each is a hand-written YAML scenario,
it reacts after the fact by banning, and it is not an inline limiter that
answers 429.
- Fails: R10 (needs the security engine container with persistent state, log
acquisition from traefik, a bouncer such as the traefik plugin, and YAML
for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications), R4's alerts on
bytes.
- Fails:
- R10, because it needs:
- the security engine container with persistent state
- log acquisition from traefik
- a bouncer such as the traefik plugin
- YAML for acquisition, profiles, scenarios and notifications
- R4's alerts on bytes.
- CrowdSec plus traefik's own `rateLimit` middleware is the best combination
with no new code. It gives inline limiting (one window per middleware, keyed
by IP, with `sourceCriterion` exclusions), bans with escalation, alerts and
README.md
+218 -198
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ shipped in one image, with two commands that do this together:
- `sww rproxy` is a small reverse proxy in front of one app. traefik routes to
it. It asks `discriminator` about each request, passes the allowed ones to the
app, and passes the app's answers back. It keeps nothing and never touches
disk.
app, and passes the app's answers back. It keeps nothing between requests and
writes nothing to disk.
- `sww discriminator` decides. It runs the checks and keeps the bans, the
counters and each client's history. One `discriminator` serves many sites: a
client banned through one site is refused on all of them, and its requests on
@@ -91,8 +91,9 @@ the app accepts connections, whether or not `discriminator` answers; in
The usual setup is three containers on one private network:
- the app;
- `rproxy`, in front of the app, which traefik routes to: `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND`
names `discriminator` and `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` names the app;
- `rproxy`, in front of the app, which traefik routes to:
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` names `discriminator` and `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`
names the app;
- `discriminator`, with `SWW_COMMAND=discriminator` and a volume at
`/var/lib/sww` for its state files.
@@ -101,8 +102,8 @@ Point traefik's labels at port 8080 of `rproxy`
of the app or of `discriminator`. Anything on that network can reach the app
around `rproxy`, and can ask `discriminator` questions, so the network holds
only what you trust. Each further app adds its own container and its own
`rproxy`, whose `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` names the same `discriminator`. The "Smallest
setup" example below shows this shape.
`rproxy`, whose `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` names the same `discriminator`. The
"Smallest setup" example below shows this shape.
### `rproxy` in the app's container
@@ -115,7 +116,7 @@ by digest, and adds:
- the packages the app needs, from the nixpkgs in the image;
- a user for the app;
- a `run` script that starts the app listening on `127.0.0.1:8081`, the default
of `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`.
of `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`.
```dockerfile
# The smallwebwaf image, pinned by digest.
@@ -151,8 +152,8 @@ main "$@"
Leave `ENTRYPOINT` and `USER` out of the app's `Dockerfile`. The image's own
entrypoint starts `rproxy` and the app side by side, each as its own user. Run
the app's image with `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` set. `deploy/example-app` is such an
app, and the "`rproxy` beside the app" example below runs one.
the app's image with `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` set. `deploy/example-app` is such
an app, and the "`rproxy` beside the app" example below runs one.
The app sees the headers traefik sent, with traefik's address added to
`X-Forwarded-For`, from a TCP peer that is `rproxy`. So the app must trust
@@ -172,12 +173,12 @@ does.
`https://<site>/_sww/healthz` answers `ok`. `discriminator`'s log lines about
the request have `"action":"forward"`.
- To see a refusal without banning yourself, run `discriminator` with
`SWW_MODE=observe` and ask for `/.env`. The request reaches the app.
`SWW_WAF_MODE=observe` and ask for `/.env`. The request reaches the app.
`discriminator`'s log lines have `"would_action":"banned"` and
`"rule_ids":["env-file"]`. A ban you get in `enforce` mode is lifted as
"Clients and bans" below describes.
- With `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` set, this answers with the metrics, from a host on
`discriminator`'s network:
- With `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` set, this answers with the metrics, from a host
on `discriminator`'s network:
`curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" http://discriminator:8080/_sww/metrics`.
- `make example-app` builds the image and an app on it, runs them, and checks
the whole exchange (see "Entrypoints").
@@ -185,18 +186,18 @@ does.
## Configuration
Every setting is an environment variable, read once at start; changing one means
restarting the container. `rproxy` reads only the `SWRP_` settings, and
`discriminator` only the `SWW_` ones. Every setting but `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` has a
default, chosen for a service on the open internet. A setting that needs an
account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
restarting the container. `rproxy` reads only the `SWW_RPROXY_` settings, and
`discriminator` only the `SWW_WAF_` ones. Every setting but
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` has a default, chosen for a service on the open
internet. A setting that needs an account, a key, a token or an alert
destination stays off until you give one.
- Any `SWW_` setting can be given as a file instead, for secrets and long lists:
`SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE` names the file that holds `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN`. The file's
contents are the value, less one newline at the end. Setting both forms stops
the start. `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` and
`SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` already name a file, so they have no
`_FILE` form. `SWW_COMMAND` cannot be given as a file. No `SWRP_` setting has
one, since `rproxy` never touches disk.
- Any `SWW_WAF_` or `SWW_RPROXY_` setting can be given as a file instead, for
secrets and long lists: `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE` names the file that holds
`SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN`. The file's contents are the value, less one newline at
the end. Setting both forms stops the start. `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE`
and `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` already name a file, so they have
no `_FILE` form. `SWW_COMMAND` cannot be given as a file.
- A duration is Go's syntax, with `d` for days: `90s`, `15m`, `24h`, `7d`.
- A size is a number of bytes with an optional `K`, `M` or `G`, in powers of
1024: `512K`, `100M`, `5G`.
@@ -212,130 +213,131 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
setting takes it.
- The byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count only body bytes: the
app's response bodies, the visitors' request bodies, or both, as
`SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted. What the visitor sent over
a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted. What the visitor sent
over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response
bytes.
- An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the
variable and what is wrong with the value. The settings in effect are logged
on one line at start, with tokens, keys and webhook paths shown as `********`.
Every setting the code reads, with its default:
| Variable | Default | What it does |
| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `502`, or cut off once it has started. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
| `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
| `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse. |
| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`: response bodies, request bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`: response bodies, request bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`: response bodies, request bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A limit broken again within this time after the last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
| `SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES` | empty | Countries whose clients are refused, such as `cn,ru`. |
| `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | AS numbers whose clients get a percentage of every request and byte limit, such as `AS14061:50,AS16276:25`. |
| `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | The same by country, such as `cn:25`. |
| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT`. |
| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT`. |
| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; where it and `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` both give a percentage, the lower applies. |
| `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
| `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
| `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
| `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
| `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
| `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
| `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
| `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
| `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
| `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
| `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
| `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
| `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
| `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
| `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. |
| Variable | Default | What it does |
| -------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
| `SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
| `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
| `SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
| `SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
| `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
| `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
| `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
| `SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
| `SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
| `SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
| `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
| `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
| `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
| `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
| `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
| `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WAF_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. |
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
@@ -362,8 +364,8 @@ services:
rproxy:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://discriminator:8080
SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:8081
SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND: http://discriminator:8080
SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:8081
ports:
- "8080:8080"
@@ -398,8 +400,8 @@ services:
rproxy:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://discriminator:8080
SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:8081
SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND: http://discriminator:8080
SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL: http://app:8081
ports:
- "8080:8080"
@@ -408,23 +410,22 @@ services:
environment:
SWW_COMMAND: discriminator
# Monitoring skips every check.
SWW_ALLOW_NETS: 192.0.2.10
SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS: 192.0.2.10
# The office and the automation host are never rate limited.
SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS: 203.0.113.0/24,198.51.100.7
SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS: 203.0.113.0/24,198.51.100.7
# A netblock that sends nothing wanted.
SWW_DENY_NETS: 198.51.100.128/25
SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS: 198.51.100.128/25
# Tighter limits for everyone else: a small static site.
SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE: "60"
SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR: "600"
SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY: "3000"
SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE: "60"
SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR: "600"
SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY: "3000"
# Hosting networks and one country get a share of those limits.
SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT: AS14061:50,AS16276:25
SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT: cn:25
SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT: asn=14061:50,asn=16276:25,country=CN:25
# Paths only scanners ask for; one request bans the client.
SWW_TRAP_PATHS: /wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php
SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS: /wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php
# Answer a refused client with 429 rather than 403.
SWW_BAN_RESPONSE: "429"
SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION: 30m
SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE: "429"
SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION: 30m
volumes:
- discriminator-state:/var/lib/sww
@@ -450,9 +451,9 @@ services:
# A Dockerfile built FROM the smallwebwaf image, with rproxy inside.
build: ./app
environment:
SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://discriminator:8080
SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND: http://discriminator:8080
# Answer 503 rather than pass a request on while discriminator is down.
SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION: deny
SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION: deny
ports:
- "8080:8080"
@@ -460,16 +461,16 @@ services:
image: smallwebwaf
environment:
SWW_COMMAND: discriminator
SWW_INSTANCE_NAME: fsn1/discriminator
SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME: fsn1/discriminator
# Refuse nothing yet; log what enforce mode would have done.
SWW_MODE: observe
SWW_WAF_MODE: observe
# Look addresses up in a local IPinfo Lite database, never GeoJS.
SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE: file
SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH: /var/lib/ipinfo/ipinfo_lite.mmdb
SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE: file
SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH: /var/lib/ipinfo/ipinfo_lite.mmdb
# Alerts to an ntfy topic, with its token read from a file.
SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL: https://ntfy.example/smallwebwaf
SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN_FILE: /etc/sww/tokens/ntfy
SWW_ALERT_EVENTS: ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,source_failure,file_error
SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL: https://ntfy.example/smallwebwaf
SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN_FILE: /etc/sww/tokens/ntfy
SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS: ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,source_failure,file_error
volumes:
- discriminator-state:/var/lib/sww
- /srv/ipinfo:/var/lib/ipinfo:ro
@@ -506,47 +507,51 @@ of the request reaches the app.
1. The health check, `GET /_sww/healthz`, is answered at once.
2. The visitor's address is worked out from `X-Forwarded-For`, believed only
from `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES`. `rproxy` sends `discriminator` the request as
the visitor sent it, with the first 64 KiB of its body.
from `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES`. `rproxy` sends `discriminator` the request
as the visitor sent it, with the first 64 KiB of its body.
`discriminator` takes the checks:
3. The static lists, `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` and `SWW_DENY_NETS`.
4. The bans.
5. The lookup of the client's AS number and country.
6. The country lists.
7. The reputation sources.
8. The client's limit percentage, from its AS number, its country or a
reputation hit.
9. The rate limits.
10. The trap paths.
11. The rule files.
12. The header limits, and then the Core Rule Set.
13. A path under `/_sww/` is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that
3. The tag lists.
4. The static lists, `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` and `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS`.
5. The bans.
6. The lookup of the client's AS number and country.
7. The country list.
8. The reputation sources.
9. The tag refusals of `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY`.
10. The client's limit percentage, from its tags, its AS number, its country or
a reputation hit.
11. The rate limits.
12. The trap paths.
13. The rule files.
14. The header limits, and then the Core Rule Set.
15. The tag refusals again, so that `exploitsignature` can refuse too.
16. A path under `/_sww/` is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that
prefix.
`rproxy` takes the rest, with `discriminator` counting at the end:
14. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
15. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `discriminator` a report with the status
17. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
18. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `discriminator` a report with the status
and the body bytes each way. For an allowed request, `discriminator` counts
the bytes `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names toward the byte limits, bans the client if
they take it past one, and adds the request to the client's history.
the bytes `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` names toward the byte limits, bans the
client if they take it past one, and adds the request to the client's
history.
A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a Core
Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has false
positives; such refusals count toward `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` instead. A
request over the header limits of step 12 is answered `431`, and bans nobody
either. `rproxy` itself answers `405` to a method it does not pass on, and the
status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a
Core Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has
false positives; such refusals count toward `SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`
instead. A request over the header limits of step 14 is answered `431`, and bans
nobody either. `rproxy` itself answers `405` to a method it does not pass on,
and the status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
### Clients and bans
- A client is one IPv4 address or one IPv6 netblock of `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX`,
since one abuser usually controls a whole /64.
- A client is one IPv4 address or one IPv6 netblock of
`SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX`, since one abuser usually controls a whole /64.
- Each limit is counted over a sliding window with a few integers per client.
The table of clients and the table of bans each have a bound
(`SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, `SWW_MAX_BANS`), so memory is bounded too.
(`SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`), so memory is bounded too.
- A ban refuses every request from its netblock until it ends. Requests refused
under a ban count toward no limit. A permanent ban ends only when an admin
lifts it.
@@ -555,19 +560,34 @@ status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
bans. An admin adds, keeps or lifts a ban by editing `bans.json` or through
the ban endpoints (see [`docs/admin-endpoints.md`](docs/admin-endpoints.md)).
### Request tags
Each request gets tags from what `discriminator` knows of its client, written in
the `tags` field of its log line:
- `asn=<number>` and `country=<code>`, from the lookup;
- one tag per list of `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` that holds the client, such as
`torexit` or `vpn=mullvad`;
- `crowdsec`, `dnsbl=<zone>` and `abuseipdb`, when that reputation source lists
the client;
- `exploitsignature`, when a rule file or the Core Rule Set matched the request.
`SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` refuses requests by tag, and `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT`
lowers a client's limits by tag. See "Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md).
### Attack detection
- The Core Rule Set reads the method, the URL with its query string, and the
headers of every request, and no body unless `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` is set. In
front of a code forge, bodies carry what people write and publish, which the
rules take for attacks.
headers of every request, and no body unless
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is set. In front of a code forge, bodies
carry what people write and publish, which the rules take for attacks.
- `smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set in eight ways so that it lets ordinary
requests to a code forge through, such as git over HTTP and sign-in through
Git Credential Manager. On gitea's own paths, its searches, file names and
branch names get through too. No setting undoes the changes; "Attack
detection" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists them.
- `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` switches single rules off for an app's own
fields or paths.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` switches single rules off for an app's
own fields or paths.
- Rule files are plain text, one rule to a line, edited by hand and read again
while `discriminator` runs. The image ships one file of probes no real visitor
sends (see [`docs/rules.md`](docs/rules.md)).
@@ -575,7 +595,7 @@ status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
### State files
`discriminator` keeps everything in memory, and the five JSON files in
`SWW_STATE_DIR` hold a copy: `bans.json`, `clients.json`, `lookups.json`,
`SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` hold a copy: `bans.json`, `clients.json`, `lookups.json`,
`reputation.json` and `alerts.json`. Each is written whole, to a temporary file
renamed over the real one, so a crash leaves a complete file. `discriminator`
notices a file edited on disk and takes the edit in; an edit that does not parse
SPEC.md
+470 -410
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
docs/admin-endpoints.md
+7 -7
View File
@@ -5,16 +5,16 @@ The endpoints under `/_sww/`, what each takes and what each answers.
"Admin endpoints" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how their tokens work.
- `GET /_sww/healthz`: `200` and `ok`, to anyone.
- `GET /_sww/metrics`: the metrics, for `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` (see
- `GET /_sww/metrics`: the metrics, for `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` (see
[`metrics.md`](metrics.md)).
- `GET /_sww/bans`: every ban held, under `bans`, each as `bans.json` lists it.
Needs `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN`, as do the three below.
Needs `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN`, as do the three below.
- `POST /_sww/bans`: bans a netblock. The body is a JSON object of `netblock`,
`duration` and, if you like, `reason`. `netblock` is a netblock such as
`203.0.113.0/24`, or a client's address, which bans its IPv4 netblock
(`SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX`) or its IPv6 group. `duration` is a duration such
as `1h` or `7d`, or `permanent`. A bad body is answered `400`, saying what is
wrong:
(`SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX`) or its IPv6 group. `duration` is a duration
such as `1h` or `7d`, or `permanent`. A bad body is answered `400`, saying
what is wrong:
- one that is not such an object, or has another field;
- one longer than 4 KiB;
- one that names an IPv4-mapped netblock, or an address with a zone.
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## Examples
With `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` set, the token in `$TOKEN`, and `discriminator` reached
as `discriminator:8080` on its network:
With `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` set, the token in `$TOKEN`, and `discriminator`
reached as `discriminator:8080` on its network:
```sh
# Every ban.
docs/alerts.md
+4 -4
View File
@@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ on one line:
}
```
- `instance`: `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME`. `time`: when the alert was raised. `event`:
one of the events above.
- `instance`: `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME`. `time`: when the alert was raised.
`event`: one of the events above.
- `host`: the site of the request that raised the alert, since one
`discriminator` serves many sites. It is left out of `source_failure`,
`file_error` and `summary`.
@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ Slack gets the title in bold and the text below it, with `&`, `<` and `>`
escaped. ntfy gets the text as the message, with these headers:
- `Title`: the title;
- `Authorization`: the token, as `Bearer <token>`, while `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN`
is set;
- `Authorization`: the token, as `Bearer <token>`, while
`SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` is set;
- `Priority` and `Tags`: by event, as listed below.
The priority and tag by event:
docs/metrics.md
+2 -2
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
`honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
Every `sww_*request_bytes_total` and `sww_*response_bytes_total` series counts
body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says.
body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says.
## Traffic
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says.
## Countries and AS numbers
For the `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` busiest of each, the rest as `other`:
For the `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N` busiest of each, the rest as `other`:
- `sww_country_requests_total`, `sww_country_request_bytes_total`,
`sww_country_response_bytes_total` and `sww_country_list_refusals_total`, by
docs/request-log.md
+17 -12
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- `time`: when `discriminator` had read the question's body, RFC 3339 with
milliseconds, in UTC. The `report` line gives the same time as the `decision`
line.
- `instance`: `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME`.
- `instance`: `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME`.
- `client_ip`: the visitor's address, as `rproxy` worked it out.
- `method`, `path` and `query`: the visitor's request.
- `scheme`: how the visitor reached `rproxy` or the trusted proxy in front of
@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- GeoJS had not answered by the time `discriminator` answered.
- `content_type`: the visitor's `Content-Type`.
- `content_length`: the body length the visitor announced.
- `request_headers`: the headers listed in `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS`, by name in
lower case.
- `request_headers`: the headers listed in `SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS`, by
name in lower case.
- `has_authorization` and `has_cookie`: true when the request had those headers.
Their values are never logged.
@@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- `action`: what was done:
- `forward`: answered `allow`, so that `rproxy` passes it to the app;
- `denied`: refused for `SWW_DENY_NETS`, or for a reputation source with the
action `deny`;
- `denied`: refused for `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS`, for a reputation source with
the action `deny`, or for a tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY`;
- `banned`: refused under a ban, or for a `ban` rule, a trap path or a
CrowdSec decision, each of which bans the client;
- `country_denied`, `rate_limited`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`:
@@ -112,20 +112,23 @@ Every one of these lines has:
is left out when none did.
- `heuristic_figures`: an object of the figures that heuristic acted on. Each
heuristic and its figures:
- `deny_nets`: `netblock`, the entry of `SWW_DENY_NETS` the client is in;
- `deny_nets`: `netblock`, the entry of `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` the client is
in;
- `active_ban`: `netblock`, the ban's netblock, and `ban_expires`;
- `countries`: `country`, and `setting`, the country list that refused it;
- `tag_deny`: `tag`, the tag of `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` the request carries;
- `blocklists`: `lists`, the blocklist URLs that list the client;
- `crowdsec`: `scenario`, the decision's scenario, and `expires`, when the
decision ends;
- `dnsbl`: `zones`, the DNS blocklist zones that list the client, their keys
masked;
- `abuseipdb`: `score`, and `min_score`, `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE`;
- `abuseipdb`: `score`, and `min_score`, `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE`;
- `rate_limits`: `window`, `count` and `limit`;
- `trap_paths`: `path`, the trap path asked for;
- `rule_files`: `rule_id` and `rule_action`, of the rule that refused it;
- `header_limits`: `fields`, `fields_limit`, `cookies` and `cookies_limit`;
- `core_rule_set`: `score`, and `threshold`, `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD`;
- `core_rule_set`: `score`, and `threshold`,
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD`;
- `refusal_limit`: `window`, `count` and `limit`, of the error burst;
- `byte_limits`: `window`, `count` and `limit`, the count in bytes.
- `after_answer_heuristic`: the heuristic that banned the client after
@@ -145,7 +148,7 @@ Every one of these lines has:
holds:
- `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests;
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: the body bytes
`SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names, in that window.
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` names, in that window.
A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes counted for an allowed request and its
@@ -170,6 +173,8 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- the CrowdSec decision list's URL;
- DNS blocklist zones;
- `abuseipdb`.
- `tags`: the request's tags, sorted, left out when it has none. Each tag and
where it comes from is under "Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md).
- `offence`: `limit`, for a request that broke a limit.
- `ban_expires`: when the client's ban ends, for a request that made one or was
refused under one: a time, or `permanent`.
@@ -222,13 +227,13 @@ these meanings where they differ:
sooner. It includes the wait for `discriminator`.
- `duration_response`: milliseconds from then until the end of the answer.
- `disposition`: what was done with the request: `allow`, `deny` or `close`. It
is `discriminator`'s answer, or the value of `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION`. It is
left out when:
is `discriminator`'s answer, or the value of `SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION`.
It is left out when:
- `discriminator` was not asked, as for the health check;
- the visitor went away while `discriminator` was being asked;
- `discriminator`'s answer had no valid `X-Sww-Disposition`;
- `rproxy` could not pass on `discriminator`'s answer, and answered `502`.
- `default_disposition`: `true` when `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` gave
- `default_disposition`: `true` when `SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` gave
`disposition`, and otherwise left out.
For example:
docs/settings.md
+267 -225
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ Every setting, its default and the values it takes, in the groups of "Settings"
in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md). That section gives the conventions, the settings
that take `off`, the `_FILE` form, and what each group does and why.
The settings that start with `SWW_` are `discriminator`'s. Those that start with
`SWRP_` are `rproxy`'s, and are under "`rproxy`" below. `SWW_COMMAND` chooses
between the two (see "The image's command" below).
The settings that start with `SWW_WAF_` are `discriminator`'s. Those that start
with `SWW_RPROXY_` are `rproxy`'s, and are under "`rproxy`" below. `SWW_COMMAND`
chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## Forms of values
@@ -28,97 +28,98 @@ between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## Core
- `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `discriminator` listens: `:` and a
port, such as `:9000`. Leave the host out (see "Ports" in
- `SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `discriminator` listens: `:`
and a port, such as `:9000`. Leave the host out (see "Ports" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` (default: the container's host name): the `instance` name
in each line `discriminator` logs, and in each alert and metric, such as
- `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` (default: the container's host name): the `instance`
name in each line `discriminator` logs, and in each alert and metric, such as
`fsn1/discriminator`. Valid UTF-8. No control character while
`SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` is set. 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a
space while `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set and `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` is not.
- `SWW_MODE` (default `enforce`): `enforce` or `observe`.
- `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` (default `64`): the prefix length of an IPv6 client's
group, from 32 to 128.
- `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` (default `20000`): the most clients kept, a whole
number above zero.
- `SWW_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): how many of its own bans `discriminator`
`SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` is set. 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a
space while `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set and `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME`
is not.
- `SWW_WAF_MODE` (default `enforce`): `enforce` or `observe`.
- `SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` (default `64`): the prefix length of an IPv6
client's group, from 32 to 128.
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` (default `20000`): the most clients kept, a
whole number above zero.
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): how many of its own bans `discriminator`
keeps, a whole number above zero.
## Tokens
- `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for the ban endpoints and
- `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for the ban endpoints and
`/_sww/clients/<ip>`. At least 32 characters.
- `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for `/_sww/metrics`. At least
32 characters.
- `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for `/_sww/metrics`. At
least 32 characters.
## State files
- `SWW_STATE_DIR` (default `/var/lib/sww`): the directory of the state files, an
absolute path that exists and can be written.
- `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` (default `10s`): how long `bans.json` waits to be
- `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` (default `/var/lib/sww`): the directory of the state
files, an absolute path that exists and can be written.
- `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` (default `10s`): how long `bans.json` waits to be
written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. A duration.
- `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` (default `15m`): how often every state file is
written. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` (default `15m`): how often every state file
is written. A duration.
## Logging
- `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` (default `info`): the least severe of `discriminator`'s own
messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`.
- `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` (default
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL` (default `info`): the least severe of `discriminator`'s
own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`.
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` (default
`accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range`): the
request headers recorded in the log line, in either case. `Host` and
`Transfer-Encoding` are refused; the host is the field `host`.
- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` (default unset): a syslog server that also gets every
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` (default unset): a syslog server that also gets every
line written to stdout: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://`,
each with a host and a port and nothing more.
- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` (default unset): a file of PEM certificates that
a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own.
A file that cannot be read, or holds no certificate, is refused.
- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` (default `10000`): the most lines held while they wait
to be sent, a whole number above zero.
- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` (default `local0`): the syslog facility: `kern`,
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` (default unset): a file of PEM certificates
that a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's
own. A file that cannot be read, or holds no certificate, is refused.
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` (default `10000`): the most lines held while they
wait to be sent, a whole number above zero.
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` (default `local0`): the syslog facility: `kern`,
`user`, `mail`, `daemon`, `auth`, `syslog`, `lpr`, `news`, `uucp`, `cron`,
`authpriv`, `ftp`, or `local0` to `local7`.
- `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` (default: `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME`): the app name in each
syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space.
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` (default: `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME`): the app name
in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space.
## Metrics
- `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` (default `50`): how many AS numbers and how many countries
get series of their own. A whole number above zero.
- `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N` (default `50`): how many AS numbers and how many
countries get series of their own. A whole number above zero.
## Static lists
- `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` (default empty): netblocks you trust, such as your monitoring
(see step 3 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are
- `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` (default empty): netblocks you trust, such as your
monitoring (see step 4 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are
exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits.
- `SWW_DENY_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are refused (see step
3 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are refused (see
step 4 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## Request rate limits, per client
The request past one of these limits is refused, and the client is banned.
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a
client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
- `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests
a client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
person opening two pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files each.
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `1500`): the most requests a client may
- `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `1500`): the most requests a client may
make in an hour. A count or `off`. It is the main limit against scrapers. A
person reading a site for an hour, a page every 20 seconds, makes about 900. A
scraper making one request every 2 seconds makes 1,800 an hour, more than the
limit.
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `6000`): the most requests a client may make
in a day. A count or `off`. The default is four hours at the hour limit. A
scraper making one request every 10 seconds makes 8,640 a day, more than the
- `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `6000`): the most requests a client may
make in a day. A count or `off`. The default is four hours at the hour limit.
A scraper making one request every 10 seconds makes 8,640 a day, more than the
limit.
- A CI runner asks its code forge for work all day and can pass the limits. Put
the runners' addresses in `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`. Do the same for a
the runners' addresses in `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`. Do the same for a
network where many people share one address, such as an office.
- Counting cannot catch a client that stays under all three limits (see "Request
rate limits, per client" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes exempt from rate
limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`.
- `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes exempt from
rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`.
## Byte limits, per client
@@ -128,191 +129,231 @@ counted for a request and its response are added to the client's total once the
response has ended. The request that takes a client's total past a limit is not
cut off; the client is banned.
- `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
(default `50G`) and `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes
counted for a client in each window, a size or `off`: response bodies, request
bodies or both, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says. The request that passes the limit
is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends.
- `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): what the byte limits and the byte anomaly
thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the
visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket
counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
- `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`),
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `50G`) and
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes counted for a
client in each window, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes
count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the
limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends.
- `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): what the byte limits and the byte
anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`,
the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a
WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
## Lookup of AS number and country
- `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` (default `geojs`): `geojs`, `file` or `off`. `off` stops
the start while a setting that needs a lookup is set:
- the two country lists;
- `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`;
- the four biased threshold lists and `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`;
- `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` below `100`;
- `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` (default `geojs`): `geojs`, `file` or `off`. `off`
stops the start while a setting that needs a lookup is set:
- `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES`;
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`;
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` or `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` naming an `asn=` or
`country=` tag;
- the two byte percentage lists and `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`;
- `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` below `100`;
- an anomaly threshold per AS number.
- `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` (default empty): the IPinfo Lite database file, in its
`.mmdb` form, for `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file`.
- `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` (default `800ms`): how long a request waits for its
- `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` (default empty): the IPinfo Lite database file, in
its `.mmdb` form, for `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file`.
- `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` (default `800ms`): how long a request waits for its
client's first answer from GeoJS, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. A
duration; never `off`.
- `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` (default `false`): `true` has `rproxy` pass the app
the client's AS number in `X-Client-ASN` and its country in
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` (default `false`): `true` has `rproxy` pass the
app the client's AS number in `X-Client-ASN` and its country in
`X-Client-Country`.
## Country lists
## Country list
- `SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): countries whose clients are refused,
such as `cn,ru,kp`.
- `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): when set, the only
countries whose clients get through, such as `us,de`. A country on both lists
stops the start.
- `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): when set, the only
countries whose clients get through, such as `us,de`. A country whose
`country=` tag is in `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` stops the start.
## Request tags
Every request gets tags from what `discriminator` knows of its client. See
"Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md).
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` (default empty): address lists that each add a tag, as
`name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. A name is the
tag, and may hold `=`, such as `vpn=mullvad`. Each list is an `http` or
`https` URL fetched like a blocklist. A name or URL listed twice is refused.
So is a URL that is also in `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS`,
`SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`, or the CrowdSec decision list.
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` (default empty): tags whose requests are refused, such as
`torexit,country=CN`. A tag listed twice, an `asn=` tag without a number, or a
`country=` tag without a country, is refused.
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default empty): tags that lower a client's
limits, as tag and percentage pairs, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`. A
percentage is from `1` to `99`, of every rate limit and byte limit. The lowest
percentage among a client's tags applies. A tag listed twice is refused. So is
`exploitsignature`: a request gets that tag after the rate limits have counted
it.
`SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` and `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` accept tags in either case. A
tag that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
- a name in `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS`;
- an `asn=` or `country=` tag;
- a `dnsbl=` tag of a zone in `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES`, in lower case, with a key
masked as the `reputation` field shows it;
- `abuseipdb`, while `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` is set;
- `exploitsignature`, in `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` only, while `SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED`
is `true`, or while neither `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` nor
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` is `off`.
`crowdsec` stops the start in both settings, because a CrowdSec decision refuses
the request first.
## Biased thresholds
- `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default empty): a list of AS numbers, each with `:`
and a percentage, such as `AS14061:50,AS16276:50,AS45102:25`. An AS number
listed twice is refused.
- `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default empty): the same by country, such as
`cn:25,ru:50`.
- `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` and `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` (default empty): the
same, for the byte limits alone.
- `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default `100`): the percentage for a client the
lookup cannot place.
- `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` (default unset): the `http` or `https` URL of a
text file with one AS number and percentage on each line, such as
`AS64496:50`. A URL that is also in `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` is refused.
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` and `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` (default
empty): a percentage of the byte limits alone, for the AS numbers or countries
listed, such as `AS14061:50` or `cn:25`. It takes the place of the percentage
`SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` gives their `asn=` or `country=` tag. An AS number
or country listed twice is refused.
- `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default `100`): the percentage for a client
the lookup cannot place.
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` (default unset): the `http` or `https` URL of
a text file with one AS number and percentage on each line, such as
`AS64496:50`. Each entry counts like an `asn=` tag in
`SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT`. A URL that is also in `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` is
refused.
## Attack detection
- `SWW_RULES_DIR` (default `/etc/sww/rules.d`): the directory of the rule files.
- `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` (default `true`): `false` reads no rule file.
- `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` (default empty): paths only scanners ask for, such as
- `SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR` (default `/etc/sww/rules.d`): the directory of the rule
files.
- `SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED` (default `true`): `false` reads no rule file.
- `SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS` (default empty): paths only scanners ask for, such as
`/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`. Each starts with `/` and holds no `?`.
- `SWW_WAF_MODE` (default `block`): `off`, `detect` or `block`.
- `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` (default `1`): the Core Rule Set's paranoia level,
from 1 to 4.
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` (default `5`): the score at which a request is a
match. A whole number above zero, or `off`.
- `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` (default
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` (default `block`): `off`, `detect` or `block`.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL` (default `1`): the Core Rule Set's
paranoia level, from 1 to 4.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` (default `5`): the score at which a
request is a match. A whole number above zero, or `off`.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES` (default
`920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140`): the ids of Core Rule Set rules
to switch off. Each a whole number above zero. An id from 900000 to 900999 is
refused: those are the rules that set the Core Rule Set up, and
`smallwebwaf`'s own.
- `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes the Core Rule Set does
not inspect.
- `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` (default `off`): `off`, or how much of a request body the
Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `64K`. A question carries no more of a
body than 64 KiB, and the Core Rule Set reads at most 64 KiB less one byte of
it, whatever the value (see "The answer" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` (default unset): a file of Core Rule Set
exclusions, written as Coraza directives. It is loaded before the Core Rule
Set's rules, so it holds only `SecAction` and `SecRule` lines that exclude
with `ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById` or `ctl:ruleRemoveById`. A file that cannot be
read or does not parse stops the start, whatever `SWW_WAF_MODE` is. So does a
file that names a number from 900000 to 900999 outside a comment, alone or in
a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may get
in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes the Core
Rule Set does not inspect.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` (default `off`): `off`, or how much of a
request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `64K`. A question
carries no more of a body than 64 KiB, and the Core Rule Set reads at most 64
KiB less one byte of it, whatever the value (see "The answer" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` (default unset): a file of Core Rule
Set exclusions, written as Coraza directives. It is loaded before the Core
Rule Set's rules, so it holds only `SecAction` and `SecRule` lines that
exclude with `ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById` or `ctl:ruleRemoveById`. A file that
cannot be read or does not parse stops the start, whatever
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` is. So does a file that names a number from
900000 to 900999 outside a comment, alone or in a range. So does a directive
that removes or changes rules as the file loads, such as `SecRuleRemoveById`,
since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
- `SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may
get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or
`off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
## Ban lengths, response and scope
- `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` (default `403`): `403`, `429` or `close`.
- `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` (default `1h`): the ban for a first broken limit. A
duration.
- `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` (default `24h`): the time after a ban ends
- `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE` (default `403`): `403`, `429` or `close`.
- `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` (default `1h`): the ban for a first broken limit.
A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` (default `24h`): the time after a ban ends
within which breaking a limit again lengthens the next ban. A duration.
- `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the longest ban for a broken limit; one
that would be longer is permanent. A duration.
- `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the ban for a first clear sign of
attack. A duration.
- `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` (default `32`): how much a ban on an IPv4 client
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the longest ban for a broken limit;
one that would be longer is permanent. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the ban for a first clear sign
of attack. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` (default `32`): how much a ban on an IPv4 client
covers: the prefix length of its netblock, from 0 to 32.
## Reputation
- `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` (default empty): blocklists to fetch, such as
- `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` (default empty): blocklists to fetch, such as
`https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. Each an `http` or `https` URL
without a user or a fragment. A URL listed twice is refused.
- `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` (default `24h`): how long a list waits after its last
try before it is fetched again. A duration of `1h` or more.
- `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` (default `deny`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`.
- `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` (default empty): the DNS blocklists to ask, such as
- `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` (default `24h`): how long a list waits after its
last try before it is fetched again. A duration of `1h` or more.
- `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` (default `deny`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or
`log`.
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES` (default empty): the DNS blocklists to ask, such as
`dnsbl.dronebl.org`. Each a DNS name of at most 189 characters. A Spamhaus
zone carries its key, as in `<key>.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net`. A zone listed twice
is refused, whatever its case or key.
- `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` (default unset): the resolver to ask the zones through,
such as `192.0.2.53` or `[2001:db8::53]:5353`. An IP address with an optional
port, 53 when none is given. Unset, the host's resolver is used.
- `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` (default unset): the key of your AbuseIPDB account. A
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER` (default unset): the resolver to ask the zones
through, such as `192.0.2.53` or `[2001:db8::53]:5353`. An IP address with an
optional port, 53 when none is given. Unset, the host's resolver is used.
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` (default unset): the key of your AbuseIPDB account. A
control character in it is refused.
- `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` (default `75`): the least abuse confidence score,
from 0 to 100, that is a hit.
- `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` (default `900`): the most checks made in a day, a
whole number above zero. AbuseIPDB's free accounts may make 1,000.
- `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` (default unset): the local API of a CrowdSec engine
you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`. An `http` or `https` URL without a
user or a fragment; its decision list is at `v1/decisions` under it. Set
without the key, it is refused. So is a decision list URL that is also in
`SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS`, or that is `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`.
- `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` (default unset): the key the engine gave for
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` (default `75`): the least abuse confidence
score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit.
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` (default `900`): the most checks made in a
day, a whole number above zero. AbuseIPDB's free accounts may make 1,000.
- `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` (default unset): the local API of a CrowdSec
engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`. An `http` or `https` URL
without a user or a fragment; its decision list is at `v1/decisions` under it.
Set without the key, it is refused. So is a decision list URL that is also in
`SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS`, or that is `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`.
- `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` (default unset): the key the engine gave for
`smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it. Set without the
URL, it is refused.
- `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` (default `limit:25`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or
- `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION` (default `limit:25`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or
`log`, for DNS blocklist and AbuseIPDB hits.
- `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` (default `24h`): how long a zone's verdict or
- `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` (default `24h`): how long a zone's verdict or
AbuseIPDB's score is used. A duration.
- `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` (default `2s`): how long a query to a zone or a check
with AbuseIPDB may take. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` (default `2s`): how long a query to a zone or a
check with AbuseIPDB may take. A duration.
## Alerting
- `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the webhook that receives each alert
as a JSON object. An `http` or `https` URL without a user or a fragment.
- `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` (default empty): headers sent with each post, such
as `Authorization:Bearer 0123456789abcdef`. A list of name, `:` and value. A
value cannot hold a comma.
- `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the Slack incoming webhook that
receives each alert as a message, checked as the webhook URL is.
- `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` (default unset): the ntfy topic that receives each alert,
as the topic's full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`, checked as the
webhook URL is.
- `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` (default unset): an ntfy access token. A control
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the webhook that receives each
alert as a JSON object. An `http` or `https` URL without a user or a fragment.
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` (default empty): headers sent with each post,
such as `Authorization:Bearer 0123456789abcdef`. A list of name, `:` and
value. A value cannot hold a comma.
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the Slack incoming webhook
that receives each alert as a message, checked as the webhook URL is.
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` (default unset): the ntfy topic that receives each
alert, as the topic's full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`, checked
as the webhook URL is.
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` (default unset): an ntfy access token. A control
character in it is refused.
- `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` (default
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS` (default
`ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error`):
the event types alerts are sent for, from those in [`alerts.md`](alerts.md)
but `summary`. Any other name is refused.
- `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` (default `15m`): how long after an alert is sent its
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` (default `15m`): how long after an alert is sent its
repeats are held back. A duration or `off`.
- `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` (default `60`): the most alerts sent in an hour. A
whole number above zero, or `off`.
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` (default `60`): the most alerts sent in an hour.
A whole number above zero, or `off`.
## Anomaly thresholds
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most body bytes
counted in a minute and in an hour. The bytes are those `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` names.
Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by default. The four
counted in a minute and in an hour. The bytes are those `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT`
names. Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by default. The four
thresholds per client are:
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`;
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`;
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`;
- `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR`.
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`;
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`;
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`;
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR`.
The other scopes' names have another prefix before the same four endings, such
as `REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`:
- `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_...`: per netblock around a client. Two settings give the
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_...`: per netblock around a client. Two settings give the
netblock's length:
- `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` (default `24`, from 0 to 32) for an IPv4
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` (default `24`, from 0 to 32) for an IPv4
client;
- `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` (default `48`, from 0 to 128) for an IPv6
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` (default `48`, from 0 to 128) for an IPv6
client.
- `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_...`: per AS number.
- `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_...`: the whole service.
- `SWW_WATCH_...`: each netblock in `SWW_WATCH_NETS`, as a whole.
`SWW_WATCH_NETS` (default empty) is a list of name, `=` and netblock, such as
`office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. An item without `=` or a
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_...`: per AS number.
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_...`: the whole service.
- `SWW_WAF_WATCH_...`: each netblock in `SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS`, as a whole.
`SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS` (default empty) is a list of name, `=` and netblock, such
as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. An item without `=` or a
name, or with a bad netblock, is refused. So is a name used twice.
## Settings given as files
@@ -333,7 +374,7 @@ Then mount its directory into the container read-only, and name the file:
docker run \
-v /srv/app/tokens:/etc/sww/tokens:ro \
-e SWW_COMMAND=discriminator \
-e SWW_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE=/etc/sww/tokens/metrics \
-e SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE=/etc/sww/tokens/metrics \
...
```
@@ -357,51 +398,52 @@ A few limits are fixed rather than settings:
## `discriminator`'s answer and `rproxy`'s wait
`SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` is the longest a question waits on an outside source. Keep
it well under `rproxy`'s `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, as the default is. No question waits
for `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT`, since the DNS blocklists and AbuseIPDB are asked
in the background (see "Answering in time" under "`discriminator`" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
`SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` is the longest a question waits on an outside source.
Keep it well under `rproxy`'s `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`, as the default is. No
question waits for `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT`, since the DNS blocklists and
AbuseIPDB are asked in the background (see "Answering in time" under
"`discriminator`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## `rproxy`
`sww rproxy` reads the settings below and no others. They are read once at
start, and an invalid value stops the start. None can be given as a file, since
`rproxy` never touches disk. "`rproxy`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says what
they do.
start, and an invalid value stops the start. Any can be given as a file, as a
`SWW_WAF_` setting can. "`rproxy`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says what they do.
A time here is a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as `2000`.
- `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` (required, no default): `discriminator`'s URL. An `http` or
`https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more. `rproxy`
speaks HTTP/1.1 to it.
- `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long `rproxy` waits for
- `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` (required, no default): `discriminator`'s URL. An
`http` or `https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more.
`rproxy` speaks HTTP/1.1 to it.
- `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long `rproxy` waits for
`discriminator`'s answer, to a question and to a report. A time; never `off`.
- `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` (default `allow`): what is done with a request when
`discriminator` cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not
answer within `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`. `allow` passes it to the app, and `deny`
answers `503`. It does not apply to an answer `discriminator` gives, such as
an error.
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` (default `100M`): the largest request body. A size or
`off`.
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` (default `1G`): the largest response body. A size or
`off`.
- `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` (default `60000`): how long the visitor may take to
send its request line and headers. It then also bounds, from the end of the
headers, the time until the app has been sent the whole request. A time or
`off`.
- `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` (default `1800000`): how long the answer may take,
from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor. A time or
`off`.
- `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `rproxy` listens, such as `:9000`.
- `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` (default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`): the app. An `http` or
`https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more.
- `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` (default `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`):
the netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` is believed. Set but empty, it trusts
nothing. A client outside these netblocks cannot claim another address. Where
other containers reach `rproxy` directly, or visitors on a private network
reach traefik, they can name another address in the header. Narrowing the
setting to traefik's own network closes that gap.
- `SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` (default `allow`): what is done with a
request when `discriminator` cannot be connected to, does not answer at all,
or does not answer within `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`. `allow` passes it to the
app, and `deny` answers `503`. It does not apply to an answer `discriminator`
gives, such as an error.
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` (default `100M`): the largest request body. A
size or `off`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` (default `1G`): the largest response body. A
size or `off`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` (default `60000`): how long the visitor may
take to send its request line and headers. It then also bounds, from the end
of the headers, the time until the app has been sent the whole request. A time
or `off`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` (default `1800000`): how long the answer may
take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor. A
time or `off`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `rproxy` listens, such as
`:9000`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` (default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`): the app. An
`http` or `https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more.
- `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` (default
`10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`): the netblocks whose
`X-Forwarded-For` is believed. Set but empty, it trusts nothing. A client
outside these netblocks cannot claim another address. Where other containers
reach `rproxy` directly, or visitors on a private network reach traefik, they
can name another address in the header. Narrowing the setting to traefik's own
network closes that gap.
## The image's command
@@ -413,14 +455,14 @@ check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator` (see "Deployment" in
Nothing reads these names any more:
- `SWW_UPSTREAM_URL` is `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`.
- `SWW_TRUSTED_PROXIES` is `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
- `SWW_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` is `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE`.
- `SWW_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` is `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE`.
- `SWW_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` are
`SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
- `SWW_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` are
`SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
- `SWW_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES` have no
setting. `rproxy` closes a kept-open connection idle for 120 seconds, and
takes a request line and headers of at most 32 KiB.
- `SWW_WAF_UPSTREAM_URL` is `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`.
- `SWW_WAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES` is `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
- `SWW_WAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` is `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE`.
- `SWW_WAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` is `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE`.
- `SWW_WAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_WAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` are
`SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
- `SWW_WAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_WAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` are
`SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
- `SWW_WAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_WAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES`
have no setting. `rproxy` closes a kept-open connection idle for 120 seconds,
and takes a request line and headers of at most 32 KiB.
docs/state-files.md
+8 -8
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
# State files
The five JSON files in `SWW_STATE_DIR`, and what each holds. "Persistent state"
in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how they are written, read and edited. Each has
a top-level `version` of 1.
The five JSON files in `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR`, and what each holds. "Persistent
state" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how they are written, read and edited.
Each has a top-level `version` of 1.
## `bans.json`
Active and past bans: every ban an admin made, and up to `SWW_MAX_BANS` of those
`discriminator` made. Per entry:
Active and past bans: every ban an admin made, and up to `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` of
those `discriminator` made. Per entry:
- `netblock`, `start` and `expires` (`null` for a permanent ban);
- `cause`: `attack`, `limit`, `admin` or `crowdsec`;
@@ -93,10 +93,10 @@ GeoJS answers, one per line:
## Sizes
- `clients.json`: about 1 KiB per client, about 20 MiB at the default
`SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`. Written every 15 minutes, that is under 2 GiB of
disk writes a day.
`SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`. Written every 15 minutes, that is under 2 GiB
of disk writes a day.
- `bans.json`: about 1.2 KiB per ban, at most about 2.5 KiB, so about 6 MiB at
the default `SWW_MAX_BANS`. Written every 15 minutes, a full file comes to
the default `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`. Written every 15 minutes, a full file comes to
about 600 MiB of writes a day, and a hundred new bans a day add about 600 MiB
more.
- `lookups.json`: about 150 bytes per answer, under 1.5 GiB of writes a day when
go.mod
+10
View File
@@ -10,12 +10,14 @@ require (
github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0
github.com/oschwald/maxminddb-golang/v2 v2.7.0
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1
github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0
)
require (
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect
github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3 // indirect
github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.4.0 // indirect
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5 // indirect
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2 // indirect
github.com/gotnospirit/makeplural v0.0.0-20180622080156-a5f48d94d976 // indirect
@@ -25,14 +27,22 @@ require (
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 // indirect
github.com/magefile/mage v1.17.0 // indirect
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 // indirect
github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.2.4 // indirect
github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20250424160509-463d218d4745 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 // indirect
github.com/sagikazarmark/locafero v0.11.0 // indirect
github.com/sourcegraph/conc v0.3.1-0.20240121214520-5f936abd7ae8 // indirect
github.com/spf13/afero v1.15.0 // indirect
github.com/spf13/cast v1.10.0 // indirect
github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.10 // indirect
github.com/subosito/gotenv v1.6.0 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1 // indirect
github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3 // indirect
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5 // indirect
go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba // indirect
golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0 // indirect
go.sum
+24
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,12 @@ github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3 h1:NhbXKRfRpqKzBMzv8zpCcnjyEw7BCVhBO
github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3/go.mod h1:Ik/+w3UmTWH9yn366RgS9D95K3y7Atb5m/H/gXzzPCk=
github.com/foxcpp/go-mockdns v1.2.0 h1:omK3OrHRD1IWJz1FuFBCFquhXslXoF17OvBS6JPzZF0=
github.com/foxcpp/go-mockdns v1.2.0/go.mod h1:IhLeSFGed3mJIAXPH2aiRQB+kqz7oqu8ld2qVbOu7Wk=
github.com/frankban/quicktest v1.14.6 h1:7Xjx+VpznH+oBnejlPUj8oUpdxnVs4f8XU8WnHkI4W8=
github.com/frankban/quicktest v1.14.6/go.mod h1:4ptaffx2x8+WTWXmUCuVU6aPUX1/Mz7zb5vbUoiM6w0=
github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1 h1:b0/UzAf9yR5rhf3RPm9gf3ehBPpf0oZKIjtpKrx59Ho=
github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1/go.mod h1:TLheqan6HD6GBK6PrDWyDPBaEV8LspOxvPSjC+bVfgo=
github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.4.0 h1:EBsztssimR/CONLSZZ04E8qAkxNYq4Qp9LvH92wZUgs=
github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.4.0/go.mod h1:oJDH3BJKyqBA2TXFhDsKDGDTlndYOZ6rGS0BRZIxGhM=
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5 h1:Fq85nIqj+gXn/S5ahsiTlK3TmC85qgirsdTP/+DeaC4=
github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5/go.mod h1:oq7eo15ShAhp70Anwd5lgX2pLfOS3QCiwU/PULtXL6M=
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2 h1:PmFC1S6h8ljIz6gMRBopkjP1TVT7xuwrButHID66PoM=
@@ -34,6 +38,10 @@ github.com/kaptinlin/jsonschema v0.4.6 h1:vOSFg5tjmfkOdKg+D6Oo4fVOM/pActWu/ntkPs
github.com/kaptinlin/jsonschema v0.4.6/go.mod h1:1DUd7r5SdyB2ZnMtyB7uLv64dE3zTFTiYytDCd+AEL0=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1 h1:VsB4HPswih7mmZ8WleSFQ75c/Ui1M4trX5oAsJnhSlk=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1/go.mod h1:cwPg85FWrGar70rWktvGQj8/hthj3wpl0PGDogxkrSQ=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1 h1:flRD4NNwYAUpkphVc1HcthR4KEIFJ65n8Mw5qdRn3LE=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1/go.mod h1:hoEshYVHaxMs3cyo3Yncou5ZscifuDolrwPKZanG3xk=
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 h1:5Nx0Ya0ZqY2ygV366QzturHI13Jq95ApcVaJBhpS+AY=
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0/go.mod h1:eLer722TekiGuMkidMxC/pM04lWEeraHUUmBw8l2grE=
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 h1:RPNrshWIDI6G2gRW9EHilWtl7Z6Sb1BR0xunSBf0SNc=
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0/go.mod h1:9/0rRGxNHcop5bhtWyNeEfOS8JIWk580+fNqagV/RAw=
github.com/magefile/mage v1.17.0 h1:dS4tkq997Ism03akafC8509iqDjeE7TNTexI25Y7sXM=
@@ -58,8 +66,24 @@ github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 h1:1HvjP4D5oL3t8RsPlwxA9onvvStjtIHYE5XuuwOi
github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1/go.mod h1:VdFUQDMZK3VLkurFUVhia6uys/0suUp86TJz5qbJRhc=
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 h1:GljZCt+zSTS+NZq88cyQ1LjZ+RCHp3uVuabBWA5+OJI=
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1/go.mod h1:aB55Cww9pdSJVHk0hUf0inxWyyjPogFIjmHKYgMKmtY=
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.9.0 h1:73kH8U+JUqXU8lRuOHeVHaa/SZPifC7BkcraZVejAe8=
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.9.0/go.mod h1:WtVeX8xhTBvf0smdhujwtBcq4Qrzq/fJaraNFVN+nFs=
github.com/sagikazarmark/locafero v0.11.0 h1:1iurJgmM9G3PA/I+wWYIOw/5SyBtxapeHDcg+AAIFXc=
github.com/sagikazarmark/locafero v0.11.0/go.mod h1:nVIGvgyzw595SUSUE6tvCp3YYTeHs15MvlmU87WwIik=
github.com/sourcegraph/conc v0.3.1-0.20240121214520-5f936abd7ae8 h1:+jumHNA0Wrelhe64i8F6HNlS8pkoyMv5sreGx2Ry5Rw=
github.com/sourcegraph/conc v0.3.1-0.20240121214520-5f936abd7ae8/go.mod h1:3n1Cwaq1E1/1lhQhtRK2ts/ZwZEhjcQeJQ1RuC6Q/8U=
github.com/spf13/afero v1.15.0 h1:b/YBCLWAJdFWJTN9cLhiXXcD7mzKn9Dm86dNnfyQw1I=
github.com/spf13/afero v1.15.0/go.mod h1:NC2ByUVxtQs4b3sIUphxK0NioZnmxgyCrfzeuq8lxMg=
github.com/spf13/cast v1.10.0 h1:h2x0u2shc1QuLHfxi+cTJvs30+ZAHOGRic8uyGTDWxY=
github.com/spf13/cast v1.10.0/go.mod h1:jNfB8QC9IA6ZuY2ZjDp0KtFO2LZZlg4S/7bzP6qqeHo=
github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.10 h1:4EBh2KAYBwaONj6b2Ye1GiHfwjqyROoF4RwYO+vPwFk=
github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.10/go.mod h1:McXfInJRrz4CZXVZOBLb0bTZqETkiAhM9Iw0y3An2Bg=
github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0 h1:x5S+0EU27Lbphp4UKm1C+1oQO+rKx36vfCoaVebLFSU=
github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0/go.mod h1:P0lhsswPGWD/1lZJ9ny3fYnVqxiegrlNrEmgLjbTCAY=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1 h1:EuwCh5fleGS7H32xRwO3wRGT7DxrDhLAT6FF8MpWDWE=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1/go.mod h1:MDEgiDPPsNp5cuIrHPPCyornHKgEVbtFUmoNlxoYthg=
github.com/subosito/gotenv v1.6.0 h1:9NlTDc1FTs4qu0DDq7AEtTPNw6SVm7uBMsUCUjABIf8=
github.com/subosito/gotenv v1.6.0/go.mod h1:Dk4QP5c2W3ibzajGcXpNraDfq2IrhjMIvMSWPKKo0FU=
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0 h1:FIDeeyB800efLX89e5a8Y0BNH+LOngJyGrIWxG2FKQY=
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0/go.mod h1:/wbyibRr2FHMks5tjHJ5F8dMZh3AcwJEMf5vlfC0lxk=
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 h1:+Ho715JplO36QYgwN9PGYNhgZvoUSc9X2c80KVTi+GA=
internal/alerts/alerts.go
+30 -30
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
// Package alerts sends alerts on bans, on traffic over an anomaly
// threshold, on a source that fails and on a file with an error to each
// destination set: to the webhook
// SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names, each as one JSON object, as "The JSON
// SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names, each as one JSON object, as "The JSON
// object" in docs/alerts.md describes, to the Slack incoming
// webhook SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names, as a message, and to the
// ntfy topic SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL names. A repeat within
// SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN is held back, and so is an alert past
// SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary. The others wait in a
// webhook SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names, as a message, and to the
// ntfy topic SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL names. A repeat within
// SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN is held back, and so is an alert past
// SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary. The others wait in a
// bounded queue of each destination's own, so that a destination that is
// slow or unreachable holds up neither the others nor any request. The
// state is written to alerts.json and read from it by the state package.
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ import (
"time"
)
// The events an alert is for, as SWW_ALERT_EVENTS names them.
// The events an alert is for, as SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS names them.
const (
// EventBan is a ban sww made.
EventBan = "ban"
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ const (
// threshold.
EventAnomaly = "anomaly"
// EventWAFBlock is a request the Core Rule Set scored at or over
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, refused in block mode, let through in
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, refused in block mode, let through in
// detect mode.
EventWAFBlock = "waf_block"
// EventReputationHit is a request whose client a blocklist, the
@@ -61,14 +61,14 @@ const (
// cannot be read, or a state file that cannot be written.
EventFileError = "file_error"
// EventSummary is the summary sent as an hour ends: of the alerts held
// back in it past SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, and of the repeats held
// back in it past SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, and of the repeats held
// back by the cooldowns dropped as it ends, which no alert let through
// has given. It is sent with SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR off too, for
// those repeats. SWW_ALERT_EVENTS does not name it.
// has given. It is sent with SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR off too, for
// those repeats. SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS does not name it.
EventSummary = "summary"
)
// Events returns every event SWW_ALERT_EVENTS can name, which is its
// Events returns every event SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS can name, which is its
// default.
func Events() []string {
return []string{
@@ -80,12 +80,12 @@ func Events() []string {
// The destinations alerts are sent to, as the metrics and alerts.json
// name them.
const (
// DestinationWebhook is the webhook SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names.
// DestinationWebhook is the webhook SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names.
DestinationWebhook = "webhook"
// DestinationSlack is the Slack incoming webhook
// SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names.
// SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names.
DestinationSlack = "slack"
// DestinationNtfy is the ntfy topic SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL names.
// DestinationNtfy is the ntfy topic SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL names.
DestinationNtfy = "ntfy"
)
@@ -121,26 +121,26 @@ var (
// NtfyURL set, no alert is sent.
type Params struct {
// WebhookURL is where each alert is posted as JSON
// (SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset. WebhookHeaders
// are sent with each (SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS).
// (SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset. WebhookHeaders
// are sent with each (SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS).
WebhookURL *url.URL
WebhookHeaders http.Header
// SlackURL is the Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a
// message (SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset.
// message (SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset.
SlackURL *url.URL
// NtfyURL is the ntfy topic each alert is published to
// (SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL), nil while it is unset. NtfyToken, unless
// empty, is sent with each as a bearer token (SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN).
// (SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL), nil while it is unset. NtfyToken, unless
// empty, is sent with each as a bearer token (SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN).
NtfyURL *url.URL
NtfyToken string
// Events are the events alerts are sent for (SWW_ALERT_EVENTS).
// Events are the events alerts are sent for (SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS).
Events []string
// Cooldown is how long a repeat of an alert is held back
// (SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN), 0 for no time. MaxPerHour is the most alerts
// sent in an hour (SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR), 0 for no limit.
// (SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN), 0 for no time. MaxPerHour is the most alerts
// sent in an hour (SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR), 0 for no limit.
Cooldown time.Duration
MaxPerHour int
// Instance is SWW_INSTANCE_NAME, which every alert gives.
// Instance is SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME, which every alert gives.
Instance string
// Now tells the time of an alert, normally time.Now in UTC.
Now func() time.Time
@@ -301,17 +301,17 @@ func New(params Params) *Queue {
}
if params.WebhookURL != nil {
q.addDestination(DestinationWebhook, "SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL",
q.addDestination(DestinationWebhook, "SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL",
params.WebhookURL, q.webhookMessage)
}
if params.SlackURL != nil {
q.addDestination(DestinationSlack, "SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL",
q.addDestination(DestinationSlack, "SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL",
params.SlackURL, slackMessage)
}
if params.NtfyURL != nil {
q.addDestination(DestinationNtfy, "SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL",
q.addDestination(DestinationNtfy, "SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL",
params.NtfyURL, q.ntfyMessage)
}
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ func New(params Params) *Queue {
}
// Raise sends alert, which names its event and what is particular to it,
// unless no destination is set or SWW_ALERT_EVENTS leaves its event
// unless no destination is set or SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS leaves its event
// out. It gives alert the instance and the time. An alert that repeats
// the last one let through less than Cooldown before is held back and
// counted. The next one let through gives that count, unless an hour of
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ func (q *Queue) Raise(alert Alert) {
}
// WouldSend reports whether Raise would let an alert for event on
// netblock through now: a destination is set, SWW_ALERT_EVENTS chooses
// netblock through now: a destination is set, SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS chooses
// event, no alert for event on netblock was let through less than
// Cooldown before, and fewer than MaxPerHour alerts have been let through
// in the hour under way. Unlike Raise, it counts nothing.
@@ -606,13 +606,13 @@ func (q *Queue) endHour(now time.Time) {
if heldBack > 0 {
reasons = append(reasons, fmt.Sprintf("%d alerts held back in the hour from %s, "+
"past the %d an hour SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows", heldBack,
"past the %d an hour SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows", heldBack,
q.hour.Start.Format(time.RFC3339), q.params.MaxPerHour))
}
if repeats > 0 {
reasons = append(reasons, fmt.Sprintf("%d repeats held back by "+
"SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives", repeats))
"SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives", repeats))
}
if len(reasons) > 0 {
internal/alerts/alerts_test.go
+11 -11
View File
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ func TestWouldSendOnlyForTheChosenEvents(t *testing.T) {
if q.WouldSend(alerts.EventBan, netblock(1)) ||
q.WouldSend(alerts.EventPermanentBan, netblock(1)) {
t.Error("a ban alert would be sent, though SWW_ALERT_EVENTS leaves it out")
t.Error("a ban alert would be sent, though SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS leaves it out")
}
if !q.WouldSend(alerts.EventFileError, netip.Prefix{}) {
@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ func TestWouldSendWithOnlySlackOrOnlyNtfySet(t *testing.T) {
onlyNtfy.NtfyURL = parseURL(ntfyURL)
for setting, params := range map[string]alerts.Params{
"SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL": onlySlack,
"SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL": onlyNtfy,
"SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL": onlySlack,
"SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL": onlyNtfy,
} {
if !alerts.New(params).WouldSend(alerts.EventBan, netblock(1)) {
t.Errorf("a ban alert would not be sent with only %s set", setting)
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ func TestAlertsPastTheHourlyLimitAreRolledIntoOneSummary(t *testing.T) {
"as_name": "",
"country": "",
"reason": "3 alerts held back in the hour from 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z, " +
"past the 2 an hour SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows",
"past the 2 an hour SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows",
"detail": map[string]any{
"hour": started,
"count": float64(3),
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ func TestFailedRequestIsSentAgainWithBackoff(t *testing.T) {
wantCounts(t, q, 0, int64(len(want)), 0, 0)
if !strings.Contains(log.String(),
`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) {
`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) {
t.Errorf("process log %q names no failure", log.String())
}
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ func TestRefusedAlertIsGivenUpAndTheNextSent(t *testing.T) {
wantCounts(t, q, 1, 3, 0, 1)
if !strings.Contains(log.String(),
`"msg":"gave up an alert SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL refused"`) {
`"msg":"gave up an alert SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL refused"`) {
t.Errorf("process log %q names no alert given up", log.String())
}
})
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ func TestFailedRequestIsLoggedWithoutTheURL(t *testing.T) {
logged := log.String()
if !strings.Contains(logged,
`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
strings.Contains(logged, "alerts.example") || strings.Contains(logged, "team=ops") {
t.Errorf("process log %q names no failure, or names the URL", logged)
}
@@ -782,8 +782,8 @@ func TestSlackAndNtfyAreSentTheSummaryAndTheRepeatsHeldBack(t *testing.T) {
}
const summary = "1 alerts held back in the hour from 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z, " +
"past the 1 an hour SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows; 1 repeats held back " +
"by SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives\nsuppressed repeats: 1"
"past the 1 an hour SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows; 1 repeats held back " +
"by SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives\nsuppressed repeats: 1"
wantSlackMessage(t, slack[1], "*"+instance+": summary*\n"+summary)
wantNtfyMessage(t, ntfy[1], instance+": summary", "default bar_chart", summary)
@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ func TestDestinationThatDoesNotAnswerHoldsUpNeitherOther(t *testing.T) {
logged := log.String()
if !strings.Contains(logged,
`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
strings.Contains(logged, "hooks.slack.example") ||
strings.Contains(logged, "T0123") {
t.Errorf("process log %q names no failure, or names the URL", logged)
@@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ type eventMessage struct {
title, priorityAndTag, text string
}
// anAlertForEachEvent returns an alert for each event SWW_ALERT_EVENTS
// anAlertForEachEvent returns an alert for each event SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS
// names, the first in observe mode, each with its message.
func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
return []eventMessage{
internal/anomaly/anomaly.go
+12 -12
View File
@@ -28,16 +28,16 @@ const maxCounters = 20000
// alerts name them.
const (
// ScopeClient is one client: an IPv4 address, or an IPv6 netblock of
// SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX.
// SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX.
ScopeClient = "client"
// ScopeNet is the netblock around a client, SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX
// or SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX long.
// ScopeNet is the netblock around a client, SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX
// or SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX long.
ScopeNet = "net"
// ScopeASN is an AS number.
ScopeASN = "asn"
// ScopeTotal is the whole service.
ScopeTotal = "total"
// ScopeWatch is a named netblock of SWW_WATCH_NETS.
// ScopeWatch is a named netblock of SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS.
ScopeWatch = "watch"
)
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ type Thresholds struct {
BytesPerHour int64
}
// NamedNetblock is a netblock SWW_WATCH_NETS names.
// NamedNetblock is a netblock SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS names.
type NamedNetblock struct {
Name string
Netblock netip.Prefix
@@ -70,14 +70,14 @@ type NamedNetblock struct {
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
// The thresholds of each scope: SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_*,
// SWW_ANOMALY_NET_*, SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_*, SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_* and
// SWW_WATCH_*.
// The thresholds of each scope: SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_*,
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_*, SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_*, SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_* and
// SWW_WAF_WATCH_*.
Client, Net, ASN, Total, Watch Thresholds
// NetV4Prefix and NetV6Prefix are the lengths of the netblock around a
// client (SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX and SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX).
// client (SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX and SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX).
NetV4Prefix, NetV6Prefix int
// NamedNetblocks are SWW_WATCH_NETS.
// NamedNetblocks are SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS.
NamedNetblocks []NamedNetblock
// Alerts receive the anomaly alerts.
Alerts *alerts.Queue
@@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ type Request struct {
Host string
// Client is the client's address, and ClientGroup the client it is
// counted as: its IPv4 address, or the IPv6 netblock of
// SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX its address is in.
// SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX its address is in.
Client netip.Addr
ClientGroup netip.Prefix
// ASN, ASName and Country are the client's as looked up, each "" when
// unknown.
ASN, ASName, Country string
// Bytes are the request's bytes, as SWW_BYTES_COUNT counts them.
// Bytes are the request's bytes, as SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT counts them.
Bytes int64
}
internal/bans/bans.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ type Notes struct {
LimitPercentSetting string `json:"limit_percent_setting,omitempty"`
// RuleID and Target are, for a ban for a clear sign of attack, the id
// of the rule file rule that matched, and its target; TrapPath is, for
// one for a request for a path in SWW_TRAP_PATHS, that path as the
// one for a request for a path in SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS, that path as the
// client sent it.
RuleID string `json:"rule_id,omitempty"`
Target string `json:"target,omitempty"`
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ type Ledger struct {
// v4Lengths and v6Lengths are the lengths of the IPv4 and IPv6
// netblocks that have been banned. Check looks for a ban at each of
// them, so that a ban read from bans.json refuses every client in its
// netblock even when it was made with another SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX,
// netblock even when it was made with another SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX,
// or another length of an IPv6 client's netblock.
v4Lengths, v6Lengths []int
}
internal/config/config.go
+572 -273
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
internal/config/config_test.go
+385 -185
View File
@@ -17,105 +17,108 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config/configtest"
)
// The settings, by name.
const (
listenAddr = "SWW_LISTEN_ADDR"
mode = "SWW_MODE"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWW_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWW_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerHour = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
bytesLimitPerHour = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
bytesLimitPerDay = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
bytesCount = "SWW_BYTES_COUNT"
lookupSource = "SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
deniedCountries = "SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
allowedCountries = "SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
asnLimitPercent = "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
countryLimitPercent = "SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnBytesPercent = "SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
countryBytesPercent = "SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
unknownLimitPercent = "SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnLimitPercentURL = "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"
blocklistURLs = "SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS"
blocklistRefresh = "SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH"
blocklistAction = "SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"
dnsblZones = "SWW_DNSBL_ZONES"
dnsblResolver = "SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER"
abuseIPDBKey = "SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
abuseIPDBMinScore = "SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE"
abuseIPDBDailyBudget = "SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET"
reputationAction = "SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION"
reputationCacheTTL = "SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL"
reputationTimeout = "SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT"
crowdSecURL = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
banResponse = "SWW_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
attackBanDuration = "SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWW_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
stateDir = "SWW_STATE_DIR"
stateWriteDelay = "SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY"
stateCounterInterval = "SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL"
adminToken = "SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsToken = "SWW_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsTopN = "SWW_METRICS_TOP_N"
instanceName = "SWW_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
logLevel = "SWW_LOG_LEVEL"
rulesDir = "SWW_RULES_DIR"
rulesEnabled = "SWW_RULES_ENABLED"
wafMode = "SWW_WAF_MODE"
wafParanoiaLevel = "SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL"
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
exclusionsFile = "SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"
trapPaths = "SWW_TRAP_PATHS"
errorBurstThreshold = "SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
logRemoteURL = "SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL"
logRemoteTLSCAFile = "SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"
logRemoteBuffer = "SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER"
logRemoteFacility = "SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY"
logRemoteAppName = "SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME"
alertWebhookURL = "SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertWebhookHeaders = "SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS"
alertSlackWebhookURL = "SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertNtfyURL = "SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL"
alertNtfyToken = "SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
alertEvents = "SWW_ALERT_EVENTS"
alertCooldown = "SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN"
alertMaxPerHour = "SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
watchNets = "SWW_WATCH_NETS"
listenAddr = "SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR"
mode = "SWW_WAF_MODE"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerHour = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
bytesLimitPerHour = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
bytesLimitPerDay = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
bytesCount = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT"
lookupSource = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
allowedCountries = "SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
tagLists = "SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS"
tagDeny = "SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY"
tagLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnBytesPercent = "SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
countryBytesPercent = "SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
unknownLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnLimitPercentURL = "SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"
blocklistURLs = "SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS"
blocklistRefresh = "SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH"
blocklistAction = "SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"
dnsblZones = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES"
dnsblResolver = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER"
abuseIPDBKey = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
abuseIPDBMinScore = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE"
abuseIPDBDailyBudget = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET"
reputationAction = "SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION"
reputationCacheTTL = "SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL"
reputationTimeout = "SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT"
crowdSecURL = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
banResponse = "SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
attackBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
stateDir = "SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR"
stateWriteDelay = "SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY"
stateCounterInterval = "SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL"
adminToken = "SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsToken = "SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsTopN = "SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N"
instanceName = "SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
logLevel = "SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL"
rulesDir = "SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR"
rulesEnabled = "SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED"
wafMode = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE"
wafParanoiaLevel = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL"
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT"
exclusionsFile = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"
trapPaths = "SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS"
errorBurstThreshold = "SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
logRemoteURL = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"
logRemoteTLSCAFile = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"
logRemoteBuffer = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER"
logRemoteFacility = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY"
logRemoteAppName = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME"
alertWebhookURL = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertWebhookHeaders = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS"
alertSlackWebhookURL = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertNtfyURL = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL"
alertNtfyToken = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
alertEvents = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS"
alertCooldown = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN"
alertMaxPerHour = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
watchNets = "SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS"
)
// The anomaly thresholds: each of the prefixes below, which name a scope,
// followed by each of the four ends.
const (
anomalyClient = "SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
anomalyNet = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_"
anomalyASN = "SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_"
anomalyTotal = "SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
watch = "SWW_WATCH_"
anomalyClient = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
anomalyNet = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_"
anomalyASN = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_"
anomalyTotal = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
watch = "SWW_WAF_WATCH_"
requestsPerMinute = "REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE"
requestsPerHour = "REQUESTS_PER_HOUR"
@@ -156,21 +159,21 @@ func loggedAnomalyDefaults() map[string]string {
return logged
}
// defaultAlertEvents is the default of SWW_ALERT_EVENTS, and
// defaultAlertCooldown that of SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN.
// defaultAlertEvents is the default of SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS, and
// defaultAlertCooldown that of SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN.
const (
defaultAlertEvents = "ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit," +
"source_failure,file_error"
defaultAlertCooldown = "15m"
)
// defaultReputationCacheTTL is the default of SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL.
// defaultReputationCacheTTL is the default of SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL.
const defaultReputationCacheTTL = "24h"
// defaultWAFDisabledRules is the default of SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES.
// defaultWAFDisabledRules is the default of SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES.
const defaultWAFDisabledRules = "920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140"
// defaultLogRequestHeaders is the default of SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS.
// defaultLogRequestHeaders is the default of SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS.
const defaultLogRequestHeaders = "accept,accept-language,accept-encoding," +
"content-type,origin,range"
@@ -195,8 +198,8 @@ const (
otherToken = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
)
// instance is an SWW_INSTANCE_NAME that is a valid app name too, and
// remoteURL an SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL, for the tests that send the lines.
// instance is an SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME that is a valid app name too, and
// remoteURL an SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, for the tests that send the lines.
const (
instance = "fsn1app1/blog"
remoteURL = "syslog+udp://192.0.2.1:514"
@@ -208,7 +211,10 @@ const off = "off"
// enabled is true, as a setting's value.
const enabled = "true"
// defaultLookupSource is the default of SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE, and
// disabled is false, as a setting's value.
const disabled = "false"
// defaultLookupSource is the default of SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE, and
// fileSource the source that is the lookup database.
const (
defaultLookupSource = "geojs"
@@ -218,18 +224,16 @@ const (
// environment is a set of environment variables, for FromEnvironment.
type environment map[string]string
// lookupEnv reads one of the variables, as os.LookupEnv does.
func (e environment) lookupEnv(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := e[name]
return value, ok
// viper returns a viper holding each of the variables.
func (e environment) viper() *viper.Viper {
return configtest.Viper(e)
}
// fromEnvironment reads the settings from env, which must be valid.
func fromEnvironment(t *testing.T, env environment) *config.Config {
t.Helper()
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(env.lookupEnv)
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(env.viper())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", env, err)
}
@@ -274,9 +278,13 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.AllowNets)
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets)
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.DenyNets)
wantCountries(t, deniedCountries, cfg.DeniedCountries)
wantCountries(t, allowedCountries, cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries)
if len(cfg.TagLists) != 0 || len(cfg.TagDeny) != 0 || len(cfg.TagLimitPercent) != 0 {
t.Errorf("tag settings %v, %v and %v by default, want all empty",
cfg.TagLists, cfg.TagDeny, cfg.TagLimitPercent)
}
hostname, err := os.Hostname()
if err != nil || hostname == "" || cfg.InstanceName != hostname {
t.Errorf("%s is %q, want the host's name %q (%v)", instanceName,
@@ -327,7 +335,6 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
rateLimitPerMinute: "60",
rateLimitPerHour: "600",
rateLimitPerDay: "6000",
deniedCountries: "cn, RU,kp,Xk",
allowedCountries: "de",
banResponse: "429",
limitBanDuration: "15m",
@@ -342,7 +349,7 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
metricsToken: token,
metricsTopN: "10",
rulesDir: "/srv/waf-rules",
rulesEnabled: "false",
rulesEnabled: disabled,
})
wantSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
@@ -370,7 +377,6 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.AllowNets, "192.0.2.7/32")
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets, "2001:db8::/48", "10.9.8.7/32")
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.DenyNets, "198.51.100.0/24")
wantCountries(t, deniedCountries, cfg.DeniedCountries, "CN", "RU", "KP", "XK")
wantCountries(t, allowedCountries, cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries, "DE")
}
@@ -456,7 +462,7 @@ func TestPathPrefixNotStartingWithSlashStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(
environment{rateLimitExemptPaths: "/favicon.ico,assets/"}.lookupEnv)
environment{rateLimitExemptPaths: "/favicon.ico,assets/"}.viper())
want := rateLimitExemptPaths + `: "assets/" is not a path prefix ` +
`starting with /, such as /assets/`
@@ -511,7 +517,7 @@ func TestInvalidTrapPathOrErrorBurstThresholdStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -640,7 +646,7 @@ func TestInvalidCoreRuleSetSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -765,7 +771,7 @@ func TestInvalidRemoteLogSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{logRemoteAppName, ""}, {logRemoteAppName, "my app"},
{logRemoteAppName, "gitéa"}, {logRemoteAppName, strings.Repeat("a", 49)},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), tc.name+": ") {
t.Errorf("%s=%q: error %v, want one naming it", tc.name, tc.value, err)
}
@@ -782,7 +788,7 @@ func TestRemoteLogCAFileWithoutCertificateStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", caFile, err)
}
_, err = config.FromEnvironment(environment{logRemoteTLSCAFile: caFile}.lookupEnv)
_, err = config.FromEnvironment(environment{logRemoteTLSCAFile: caFile}.viper())
want := logRemoteTLSCAFile + `: "` + caFile + `" holds no PEM certificate`
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -797,7 +803,7 @@ func TestInstanceNameNotAnAppNameStopsTheStartOnlyWhileSending(t *testing.T) {
sending := environment{logRemoteURL: remoteURL, instanceName: spaced}
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(sending.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(sending.viper())
want := logRemoteAppName + `: is unset, and ` + instanceName +
` "fsn1 app1", its default, is not 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters ` +
@@ -827,7 +833,7 @@ func TestAppNameSetStopsTheStartWhileSending(t *testing.T) {
logRemoteURL: remoteURL,
instanceName: instance,
logRemoteAppName: "my app",
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want := logRemoteAppName + `: "my app" is not 1 to 48 printable ASCII ` +
`characters without a space, such as blog`
@@ -958,7 +964,7 @@ func TestWebhookHeadersAreLoggedMaskedAndNeverShown(t *testing.T) {
// An item that is not a header is named by its place, not shown.
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
alertWebhookHeaders: "X-Team:ops," + secret,
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want := alertWebhookHeaders + ": item 2 is not a header name followed by : " +
"and the header's value, such as Authorization:Bearer <token>"
@@ -995,7 +1001,7 @@ func TestWebhookURLIsLoggedWithoutItsPathOrQueryAndNeverShown(t *testing.T) {
"ftp://hooks.example/services/" + secret,
"https://hooks.example/services/%zz" + secret,
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{alertWebhookURL: value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{alertWebhookURL: value}.viper())
want := alertWebhookURL + ": is not an http or https URL without a user or " +
"a fragment, such as https://alerts.example/sww"
@@ -1046,7 +1052,7 @@ func TestNtfyTokenWithAControlCharacterStopsTheStartWithoutShowingIt(t *testing.
"set": {alertNtfyToken: token + "\r"},
"in a file": {alertNtfyToken + "_FILE": writeFile(t, token+"\r\n")},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(env.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(env.viper())
want := alertNtfyToken + ": holds a control character, such as the " +
"carriage return of a Windows line end"
@@ -1063,7 +1069,7 @@ func TestInstanceNameWithAControlCharacterStopsTheStartOnlyWithNtfySet(t *testin
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
instanceName: name, alertNtfyURL: "https://ntfy.example/sww-alerts",
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want := instanceName + `: "fsn1app1\r" holds a control character, such as the ` +
`carriage return of a Windows line end, and is sent to ntfy in a header ` +
@@ -1088,7 +1094,7 @@ func TestInstanceNameNotUTF8StopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
"set": {instanceName: latin1},
"in a file": {instanceName + "_FILE": writeFile(t, latin1+"\n")},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(env.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(env.viper())
want := instanceName + `: "caf\xe9" is not valid UTF-8`
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1097,15 +1103,16 @@ func TestInstanceNameNotUTF8StopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCodeOnBothCountryListsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
func TestCodeInAllowedCountriesAndTagDenyStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
deniedCountries: "cn,ru",
tagDeny: "country=cn,country=ru",
allowedCountries: "de,RU",
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ru on both country lists was accepted")
t.Fatal("ru in SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES and " +
"SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY was accepted")
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), allowedCountries+": ") ||
@@ -1165,7 +1172,7 @@ func TestLookupDBPathGoesWithTheFileSourceAlone(t *testing.T) {
lookupDBPath + ": is set while " + lookupSource + " is off; only file reads it",
},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(tc.env.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(tc.env.viper())
if err == nil || err.Error() != tc.want {
t.Errorf("settings %v: error %v, want %s", tc.env, err, tc.want)
}
@@ -1176,12 +1183,11 @@ func TestSettingNeedingLookupsStopsTheStartWhileTheyAreOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for name, value := range map[string]string{
deniedCountries: "kp",
allowedCountries: "de",
addLookupHeaders: enabled,
tagDeny: "country=KP",
tagLimitPercent: "asn=64496:50",
asnLimitPercentURL: asnURL,
asnLimitPercent: "AS64496:50",
countryLimitPercent: "cn:25",
asnBytesPercent: "AS64496:50",
countryBytesPercent: "cn:25",
unknownLimitPercent: "99",
@@ -1195,7 +1201,7 @@ func TestSettingNeedingLookupsStopsTheStartWhileTheyAreOff(t *testing.T) {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
lookupSource: off, name: value,
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), name+": ") ||
!strings.Contains(err.Error(), lookupSource+" is off") {
t.Errorf("error %v, want one naming %s and %s", err, name, lookupSource)
@@ -1204,12 +1210,13 @@ func TestSettingNeedingLookupsStopsTheStartWhileTheyAreOff(t *testing.T) {
}
// Set empty, the lists need nothing looked up, and nor does
// SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT at 100, which lowers no limit, an anomaly
// threshold per AS number that is off, any other anomaly threshold, or
// a blocklist.
// SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT at 100, which lowers no limit, a tag the
// lookup does not give, an anomaly threshold per AS number that is off,
// any other anomaly threshold, or a blocklist.
env := environment{
lookupSource: off, deniedCountries: "", allowedCountries: "",
asnLimitPercent: "", countryLimitPercent: "", asnBytesPercent: "",
lookupSource: off, allowedCountries: "", asnBytesPercent: "",
tagLists: "torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt,vpn=https://example.com/vpn.txt",
tagDeny: torExitTag, tagLimitPercent: "vpn:50",
countryBytesPercent: "", unknownLimitPercent: "100", asnLimitPercentURL: "",
blocklistURLs: dropURL,
}
@@ -1345,7 +1352,7 @@ func TestInvalidAnomalySettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1355,34 +1362,194 @@ func TestInvalidAnomalySettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// torExitTag, zenTag and exploitTag are tags these tests name.
const (
torExitTag = "torexit"
zenTag = "dnsbl=zen.example"
exploitTag = "exploitsignature"
)
func TestTagSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const torURL = "https://example.com/tor.txt"
// Names and tags in either case, an AS number with leading zeros, and a
// name holding a =.
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{
tagLists: "TorExit=" + torURL +
", vpn=mullvad=https://example.com/mullvad.txt",
dnsblZones: "Zen.example",
tagDeny: "TorExit, Country=kp, asn=014061",
tagLimitPercent: "vpn=mullvad :50, asn=014061:25, COUNTRY=cn:1, dnsbl=zen.example:99",
})
wantLists := []config.TagList{
{Name: torExitTag, URL: torURL},
{Name: "vpn=mullvad", URL: "https://example.com/mullvad.txt"},
}
if !slices.Equal(cfg.TagLists, wantLists) {
t.Errorf("%s gave %+v, want %+v", tagLists, cfg.TagLists, wantLists)
}
wantDeny := []string{torExitTag, "country=KP", "asn=14061"}
if !slices.Equal(cfg.TagDeny, wantDeny) {
t.Errorf("%s gave %v, want %v", tagDeny, cfg.TagDeny, wantDeny)
}
wantPercents := map[string]int64{
"vpn=mullvad": 50, "asn=14061": 25, "country=CN": 1, zenTag: 99,
}
if !maps.Equal(cfg.TagLimitPercent, wantPercents) {
t.Errorf("%s gave %v, want %v", tagLimitPercent, cfg.TagLimitPercent, wantPercents)
}
}
func TestTagThatNoRequestCanGetIsToldApartFromOneItCan(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
list = "torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt"
key = "abc123"
zone = key + ".xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
masked = "********.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
)
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env environment
want string // "" is accepted
}{
{"a list's name", environment{tagLists: list, tagDeny: torExitTag}, ""},
{
"a mistyped list's name", environment{tagLists: list, tagDeny: "torexti"},
`"torexti"`,
},
{"a masked zone", environment{dnsblZones: zone, tagDeny: "dnsbl=" + masked}, ""},
{
"a zone with its key", environment{dnsblZones: zone, tagDeny: "dnsbl=" + zone},
masked,
},
{"another zone", environment{dnsblZones: zone, tagDeny: zenTag}, zenTag},
{
"abuseipdb with a key",
environment{abuseIPDBKey: "k", tagLimitPercent: "abuseipdb:50"}, "",
},
{"crowdsec, though a list has its name", environment{
tagLists: "crowdsec=https://example.com/c.txt", tagDeny: "crowdsec",
}, `"crowdsec" cannot be used`},
{exploitTag, environment{tagDeny: exploitTag}, ""},
{
exploitTag + " with rule files off",
environment{tagDeny: exploitTag, rulesEnabled: disabled}, "",
},
{
exploitTag + " with the Core Rule Set off",
environment{tagDeny: exploitTag, wafMode: off}, "",
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(tc.env.viper())
switch {
case tc.want == "" && err != nil:
t.Errorf("error %v, want none", err)
case tc.want != "" && (err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.want)):
t.Errorf("error %v, want one holding %s", err, tc.want)
case err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), key):
t.Errorf("error %v shows the zone's key", err)
}
})
}
}
func TestErrorOfATagSettingLeavesOutAZoneKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
tag = "dnsbl=" + spamhaus
emptyItem = "has an empty item in its list"
twice = `"` + spamhausMasked + `" is listed twice`
)
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value, want string }{
{tagDeny, tag + "," + tag, twice},
{tagDeny, tag + ",,", emptyItem},
{
tagLimitPercent, tag,
`"` + spamhausMasked + `" is not a tag, : and a percentage, ` +
"such as vpn:50 or asn=14061:25",
},
{
tagLimitPercent, "50:" + tag,
`"` + spamhausMasked + `" is not a percentage from 1 to 99`,
},
{tagLimitPercent, tag + ":50," + tag + " :25", twice},
{tagLimitPercent, tag + ":50,,", emptyItem},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("%s=%s gave the error %v, want %s", tc.name, tc.value, err, want)
}
}
}
func TestTagListURLFetchedAsAnotherListStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const lapi = "http://172.17.0.1:8080"
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, listURL string
env environment
}{
{"a blocklist", dropURL, environment{blocklistURLs: dropURL}},
{"the file of AS:percent lines", asnURL, environment{asnLimitPercentURL: asnURL}},
{
"the CrowdSec decision list", lapi + "/v1/decisions",
environment{"SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL": lapi, "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY": "key"},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tc.env[tagLists] = "dup=" + tc.listURL
want := tagLists + `: "` + tc.listURL + `" is in SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS, is ` +
"SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL or is the CrowdSec decision list too"
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(tc.env.viper())
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestBiasedThresholdsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{})
if len(cfg.ASNLimitPercent) != 0 || len(cfg.CountryLimitPercent) != 0 ||
len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) != 0 || len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) != 0 ||
if len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) != 0 || len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) != 0 ||
cfg.UnknownLimitPercent != 100 {
t.Errorf("biased thresholds %v, %v, %v, %v and %d by default, "+
"want four empty lists and 100", cfg.ASNLimitPercent, cfg.CountryLimitPercent,
t.Errorf("biased thresholds %v, %v and %d by default, "+
"want two empty lists and 100",
cfg.ASNBytesPercent, cfg.CountryBytesPercent, cfg.UnknownLimitPercent)
}
// AS numbers and countries in either case, an AS number with leading
// zeros, 0 and 100.
cfg = fromEnvironment(t, environment{
asnLimitPercent: "AS14061:50, as16276:0,AS045102:100",
countryLimitPercent: "cn:25,RU:50",
asnBytesPercent: "as16276:75",
countryBytesPercent: "ru:10",
unknownLimitPercent: "0",
})
for name, tc := range map[string]struct{ got, want map[string]int64 }{
asnLimitPercent: {
cfg.ASNLimitPercent,
map[string]int64{"AS14061": 50, "AS16276": 0, "AS45102": 100},
},
countryLimitPercent: {cfg.CountryLimitPercent, map[string]int64{"CN": 25, "RU": 50}},
asnBytesPercent: {cfg.ASNBytesPercent, map[string]int64{"AS16276": 75}},
countryBytesPercent: {cfg.CountryBytesPercent, map[string]int64{"RU": 10}},
} {
@@ -1406,16 +1573,16 @@ func TestInvalidBiasedThresholdStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
)
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value, want string }{
{asnLimitPercent, "14061:50", `"14061"` + notASN},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS4294967296:50", `"AS4294967296"` + notASN},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS14061", `"AS14061"` + notItem},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS14061:101", `"101"` + notPercent},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS14061:50,as14061:25", `"as14061" is listed twice`},
{asnBytesPercent, "14061:50", `"14061"` + notASN},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS4294967296:50", `"AS4294967296"` + notASN},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061", `"AS14061"` + notItem},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:101", `"101"` + notPercent},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:50,as14061:25", `"as14061" is listed twice`},
{
countryLimitPercent, "nk:25",
countryBytesPercent, "nk:25",
`"nk" is not a two-letter country code such as de or kp`,
},
{countryLimitPercent, "cn:25,CN:50", `"CN" is listed twice`},
{countryBytesPercent, "cn:25,CN:50", `"CN" is listed twice`},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:-1", `"-1"` + notPercent},
{countryBytesPercent, "cn:50%", `"50%"` + notPercent},
{unknownLimitPercent, "101", `"101"` + notPercent},
@@ -1424,7 +1591,7 @@ func TestInvalidBiasedThresholdStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1442,7 +1609,7 @@ const (
asnURL = "https://lists.example/asn.txt"
)
// The actions of SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, as Config gives them.
// The actions of SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, as Config gives them.
const (
actionDeny = "deny"
actionLimit = "limit"
@@ -1521,7 +1688,7 @@ func TestInvalidReputationSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1536,9 +1703,9 @@ func TestASNLimitPercentURLThatIsABlocklistStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
blocklistURLs: dropURL + "," + asnURL, asnLimitPercentURL: asnURL,
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want := asnLimitPercentURL + `: "` + asnURL + `" is in SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS too`
want := asnLimitPercentURL + `: "` + asnURL + `" is in SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS too`
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
@@ -1663,7 +1830,7 @@ func TestInvalidDNSBLSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1731,7 +1898,7 @@ func TestDNSBLZoneKeyIsLoggedMaskedAndNeverShown(t *testing.T) {
{spamhaus + "," + otherZone, `"` + spamhausMasked + `" is listed twice`},
{spamhaus + ",,", "has an empty item in its list"},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{dnsblZones: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{dnsblZones: tc.value}.viper())
want := dnsblZones + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1784,7 +1951,7 @@ func TestInvalidAbuseIPDBSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
want := tc.name + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -1841,7 +2008,7 @@ func TestInvalidCrowdSecSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
notLAPIURL = " is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
"such as http://172.17.0.1:8080"
anotherList = `gives the decision list "` + lapi + `/v1/decisions", which is in ` +
`SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS or is SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL too`
`SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS or is SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL too`
)
for _, tc := range []struct {
@@ -1898,7 +2065,7 @@ func TestInvalidCrowdSecSettingStopsTheStartSayingWhatIsWrong(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(tc.env.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(tc.env.viper())
if err == nil || err.Error() != tc.want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, tc.want)
}
@@ -2003,23 +2170,37 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{lookupSource, "ipinfo"}, {lookupSource, "GeoJS"}, {lookupSource, ""},
{lookupTimeout, off}, {lookupTimeout, "0s"}, {lookupTimeout, "1"},
{addLookupHeaders, "yes"},
{deniedCountries, "nk"},
{deniedCountries, "kp,,ir"},
{deniedCountries, "prk"},
{deniedCountries, "408"},
{deniedCountries, "k"},
{deniedCountries, "eu"},
{deniedCountries, "un"},
{deniedCountries, "su"},
{allowedCountries, "nk"},
{allowedCountries, "kp,,ir"},
{allowedCountries, "prk"},
{allowedCountries, "408"},
{allowedCountries, "k"},
{allowedCountries, "eu"},
{allowedCountries, "un"},
{allowedCountries, "su"},
{allowedCountries, "ac"},
{allowedCountries, "uk"},
{allowedCountries, "zz"},
{allowedCountries, "de,germany"},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS14061:50,,AS16276:50"}, {asnLimitPercent, "ASX:50"},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS14061:"}, {asnLimitPercent, "AS14061 :50"},
{asnLimitPercent, "AS14061:1.5"}, {asnLimitPercent, "AS-1:50"},
{countryLimitPercent, "cn"}, {countryLimitPercent, "cn:"},
{countryLimitPercent, "cn:25:50"}, {countryLimitPercent, "china:25"},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:50,,AS16276:50"}, {asnBytesPercent, "ASX:50"},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:"}, {asnBytesPercent, "AS14061 :50"},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:1.5"}, {asnBytesPercent, "AS-1:50"},
{countryBytesPercent, "cn"}, {countryBytesPercent, "cn:"},
{countryBytesPercent, "cn:25:50"}, {countryBytesPercent, "china:25"},
{tagDeny, "a,,b"}, {tagDeny, "country=nk"}, {tagDeny, "asn=abc"},
{tagDeny, "asn="}, {tagDeny, "torexit,TOREXIT"}, {tagDeny, "torexti"},
{tagDeny, zenTag}, {tagDeny, "abuseipdb"}, {tagDeny, "crowdsec"},
{tagLimitPercent, "torexti:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "dnsbl=zen.example:50"},
{tagLimitPercent, "abuseipdb:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "crowdsec:50"},
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn :50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn"}, {tagLimitPercent, ":50"},
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn:"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn:0"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn:100"},
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn:1.5"}, {tagLimitPercent, "vpn:50,VPN:25"},
{tagLimitPercent, "exploitsignature:50"}, {tagLimitPercent, "asn=abc:50"},
{tagLists, torExitTag}, {tagLists, "=https://example.com/a.txt"},
{tagLists, "a,b=https://example.com/a.txt"},
{tagLists, "a=ftp://example.com/a.txt"},
{tagLists, "a=https://example.com/a.txt,A=https://example.com/b.txt"},
{tagLists, "a=https://example.com/a.txt,b=https://example.com/a.txt"},
{asnBytesPercent, "AS14061:101"}, {countryBytesPercent, "su:50"},
{unknownLimitPercent, ""}, {unknownLimitPercent, "-1"},
{unknownLimitPercent, "50%"},
@@ -2031,6 +2212,25 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{logLevel, "INFO"}, {logLevel, "warning"}, {logLevel, "trace"}, {logLevel, ""},
{rulesEnabled, "yes"}, {rulesEnabled, "True"},
})
wantExploitTagStopsTheStartWithRulesAndCoreRuleSetOff(t)
}
// wantExploitTagStopsTheStartWithRulesAndCoreRuleSetOff checks that with rule
// files off, and either setting turning off the Core Rule Set, the tag
// exploitsignature in SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY stops the start.
func wantExploitTagStopsTheStartWithRulesAndCoreRuleSetOff(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
for _, name := range []string{wafMode, wafAnomalyThreshold} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
tagDeny: exploitTag, rulesEnabled: disabled, name: off,
}.viper())
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), tagDeny+": ") {
t.Errorf("%s=off with rule files off gave the error %v, want one naming %s",
name, err, tagDeny)
}
}
}
func TestInvalidBanOrStateValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
@@ -2058,7 +2258,7 @@ func wantStartStopped(t *testing.T, invalid []struct{ name, value string }) {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.viper())
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("%s=%q was accepted", tc.name, tc.value)
}
@@ -2083,7 +2283,7 @@ func TestHostOrTransferEncodingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{logRequestHeaders: value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{logRequestHeaders: value}.viper())
if err == nil || err.Error() != logRequestHeaders+": "+want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s: %s", err, logRequestHeaders, want)
}
@@ -2100,7 +2300,7 @@ func TestShortTokenStopsTheStartWithoutShowingIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(name+"="+value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{name: value}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{name: value}.viper())
want := name + ": is shorter than 32 characters"
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -2156,7 +2356,7 @@ func TestSettingFromFileIsCheckedAsTheSettingItself(t *testing.T) {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
bytesLimitPerMinute + "_FILE": writeFile(t, "lots\n"),
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want := bytesLimitPerMinute + `: "lots" is not a size such as 512K, 100M or 5G, or off`
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
@@ -2167,7 +2367,7 @@ func TestSettingFromFileIsCheckedAsTheSettingItself(t *testing.T) {
logRemoteURL: remoteURL,
instanceName: instance,
logRemoteAppName + "_FILE": writeFile(t, "my app\n"),
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want = logRemoteAppName + `: "my app" is not 1 to 48 printable ASCII ` +
`characters without a space, such as blog`
@@ -2182,7 +2382,7 @@ func TestSettingAndItsFileBothSetStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
metricsToken: token,
metricsToken + "_FILE": writeFile(t, token),
}.lookupEnv)
}.viper())
want := metricsToken + ": is set, and so is " + metricsToken +
"_FILE; set only one of them"
@@ -2197,7 +2397,7 @@ func TestUnreadableSettingFileStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
for _, path := range []string{filepath.Join(dir, "missing"), dir} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{metricsToken + "_FILE": path}.lookupEnv)
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{metricsToken + "_FILE": path}.viper())
want := metricsToken + "_FILE: cannot be read: "
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), want) {
@@ -2285,11 +2485,11 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
lookupSource: defaultLookupSource,
lookupDBPath: "",
lookupTimeout: "800ms",
addLookupHeaders: "false",
deniedCountries: "",
addLookupHeaders: disabled,
allowedCountries: "",
asnLimitPercent: "",
countryLimitPercent: "",
tagLists: "",
tagDeny: "",
tagLimitPercent: "",
asnBytesPercent: "",
countryBytesPercent: "",
unknownLimitPercent: "100",
internal/config/configtest/configtest.go
+16
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
// Package configtest gives the tests of the packages that read settings the
// settings they choose.
package configtest
import "github.com/spf13/viper"
// Viper returns a viper holding each of settings, as the viper config.NewViper
// returns holds a process's environment.
func Viper(settings map[string]string) *viper.Viper {
v := viper.New()
for name, value := range settings {
v.Set(name, value)
}
return v
}
internal/config/rproxy.go
+37 -48
View File
@@ -8,38 +8,39 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
)
// RProxy is the settings of `sww rproxy`. A size or time limit of zero
// is off.
type RProxy struct {
// ListenAddr is where rproxy listens (SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR).
// ListenAddr is where rproxy listens (SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR).
ListenAddr string
// UpstreamURL is the app (SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL).
// UpstreamURL is the app (SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL).
UpstreamURL *url.URL
// TrustedProxies are the netblocks whose X-Forwarded-For is believed
// (SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES).
// (SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES).
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// WAFBackend is discriminator's URL (SWRP_WAF_BACKEND).
// WAFBackend is discriminator's URL (SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND).
WAFBackend *url.URL
// Timeout is how long rproxy waits for discriminator's answer to a question,
// and to a report (SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS). It cannot be off.
// and to a report (SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS). It cannot be off.
Timeout time.Duration
// DefaultDisposition is what is done with a request when discriminator cannot be
// connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer within Timeout:
// allow or deny (SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION).
// allow or deny (SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION).
DefaultDisposition string
// MaxRequestSize is the largest request body (SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE), and
// MaxResponseSize the largest response body (SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE).
// MaxRequestSize is the largest request body (SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE), and
// MaxResponseSize the largest response body (SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE).
MaxRequestSize int64
MaxResponseSize int64
// MaxRequestTime bounds sending the whole request: the visitor's request
// line and headers, and then, from their end, its body on its way to the
// app (SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS). MaxResponseTime bounds the answer, from
// app (SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS). MaxResponseTime bounds the answer, from
// the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor
// (SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS).
// (SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS).
MaxRequestTime time.Duration
MaxResponseTime time.Duration
@@ -58,24 +59,26 @@ var (
"is not a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as 60000, or off")
)
// RProxyFromEnvironment reads rproxy's settings with lookupEnv, normally
// os.LookupEnv. A setting that is not set takes its default, and
// SWRP_WAF_BACKEND, which has none, must be set. A setting that is set but
// invalid is an error that names it. Since rproxy never touches disk, its
// settings have no _FILE form.
func RProxyFromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*RProxy, error) {
env := &environment{lookupEnv: withoutFileForms(lookupEnv)}
// RProxyFromEnvironment reads rproxy's settings through v, normally the viper
// NewViper returns, bound to the process's environment. A setting that is not
// set takes its default, and SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND, which has none, must be
// set. A setting may instead be given as a file: the variable named by the
// setting's name with _FILE added names the file, which is read now. A setting
// that is set but invalid is an error that names it.
func RProxyFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*RProxy, error) {
env := &environment{v: v}
cfg := &RProxy{
ListenAddr: env.address("SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"),
UpstreamURL: env.appURL("SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL),
TrustedProxies: env.netblocks("SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
WAFBackend: env.wafBackend("SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"),
Timeout: env.milliseconds("SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS", "2000"),
DefaultDisposition: env.disposition("SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION", "allow"),
MaxRequestSize: env.size("SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE", "100M"),
MaxResponseSize: env.size("SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE", "1G"),
MaxRequestTime: env.millisecondsOrOff("SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS", "60000"),
MaxResponseTime: env.millisecondsOrOff("SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS", "1800000"),
ListenAddr: env.address("SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR"),
UpstreamURL: env.appURL("SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL),
TrustedProxies: env.netblocks("SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
WAFBackend: env.wafBackend("SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND"),
Timeout: env.milliseconds("SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS", "2000"),
DefaultDisposition: env.disposition("SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION", "allow"),
MaxRequestSize: env.size("SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE", "100M"),
MaxResponseSize: env.size("SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE", "1G"),
MaxRequestTime: env.millisecondsOrOff("SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS", "60000"),
MaxResponseTime: env.millisecondsOrOff(
"SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS", "1800000"),
}
if env.err != nil {
@@ -87,15 +90,15 @@ func RProxyFromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*RProxy, erro
return cfg, nil
}
// RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL reads only SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR and
// SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL. The health check in rproxy's container needs no other
// RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL reads only SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR and
// SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL. The health check in rproxy's container needs no other
// setting, so it reads no other.
func RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(
lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
v *viper.Viper,
) (string, *url.URL, error) {
env := &environment{lookupEnv: withoutFileForms(lookupEnv)}
listenAddr := env.address("SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR")
upstreamURL := env.appURL("SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL)
env := &environment{v: v}
listenAddr := env.address("SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR")
upstreamURL := env.appURL("SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL)
if env.err != nil {
return "", nil, env.err
@@ -104,20 +107,6 @@ func RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(
return listenAddr, upstreamURL, nil
}
// withoutFileForms returns lookupEnv finding no setting named with _FILE, since
// rproxy never touches disk.
func withoutFileForms(
lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
) func(string) (string, bool) {
return func(name string) (string, bool) {
if strings.HasSuffix(name, "_FILE") {
return "", false
}
return lookupEnv(name)
}
}
// LogValue makes an RProxy log as each setting's name with the value it was
// given, or its default.
func (c *RProxy) LogValue() slog.Value {
internal/config/rproxy_test.go
+36 -29
View File
@@ -10,20 +10,21 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config/configtest"
)
// rproxy's settings, by name, and their values in these tests.
const (
wafBackend = "SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"
rproxyTimeout = "SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS"
rproxyDefault = "SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION"
rproxyListen = "SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"
rproxyUpstream = "SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL"
rproxyTrusted = "SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
rproxyMaxRequest = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
rproxyMaxResponse = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
rproxyRequestTime = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
rproxyAnswerTime = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
wafBackend = "SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND"
rproxyTimeout = "SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS"
rproxyDefault = "SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION"
rproxyListen = "SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR"
rproxyUpstream = "SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL"
rproxyTrusted = "SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
rproxyMaxRequest = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
rproxyMaxResponse = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
rproxyRequestTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
rproxyAnswerTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
backendURL = "http://discriminator:8080"
rproxyDefaultAddr = ":8080"
rproxyDefaultApp = "http://127.0.0.1:8081"
@@ -32,11 +33,7 @@ const (
// rproxyConfig reads rproxy's settings from env.
func rproxyConfig(env map[string]string) (*config.RProxy, error) {
return config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := env[name]
return value, ok
})
return config.RProxyFromEnvironment(configtest.Viper(env))
}
func TestRProxyDefaults(t *testing.T) {
@@ -177,31 +174,41 @@ func TestRProxyNeedsItsBackend(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRProxyReadsNoFile(t *testing.T) {
func TestRProxySettingReadFromFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "backend")
err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("http://from-a-file:8080\n"), 0o600)
err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(backendURL+"\n"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
_, err = rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend + "_FILE": path})
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), wafBackend+": is required") {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s still required", err, wafBackend)
}
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{
wafBackend: backendURL,
rproxyTimeout + "_FILE": "/nonexistent/timeout",
})
cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend + "_FILE": path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v, with the file left unread", err)
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
if cfg.Timeout != 2*time.Second {
t.Errorf("timeout %v, want the default", cfg.Timeout)
if cfg.WAFBackend.String() != backendURL {
t.Errorf("backend %v, want %s", cfg.WAFBackend, backendURL)
}
}
func TestRProxyUnreadableSettingFileStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
for _, path := range []string{filepath.Join(dir, "missing"), dir} {
_, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{
wafBackend: backendURL,
rproxyTimeout + "_FILE": path,
})
want := rproxyTimeout + "_FILE: cannot be read: "
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), want) {
t.Errorf("%s: error %v, want one starting %s", path, err, want)
}
}
}
internal/config/viper.go
+16
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
package config
import "github.com/spf13/viper"
// NewViper returns the viper that reads the settings: each setting's
// environment variable, bound to its own name. Every setting of discriminator
// and rproxy is read through it, and none is read with os.Getenv or
// os.LookupEnv outside it. An environment variable that is set but empty is
// set, as one that holds a value is, which viper does not take for granted.
func NewViper() *viper.Viper {
v := viper.New()
v.AutomaticEnv()
v.AllowEmptyEnv(true)
return v
}
internal/config/viper_test.go
+34
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
package config_test
import (
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
)
// These tests set real environment variables, so none runs in parallel.
func TestTokenSetEmptyInTheEnvironmentStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(adminToken, "")
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(config.NewViper())
want := adminToken + ": is shorter than 32 characters"
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Fatalf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
}
func TestListSetEmptyInTheEnvironmentReplacesItsDefault(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(wafBackend, backendURL)
t.Setenv(rproxyTrusted, "")
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(config.NewViper())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
if len(cfg.TrustedProxies) != 0 {
t.Errorf("trusted proxies %v, want none", cfg.TrustedProxies)
}
}
internal/discriminator/abuseipdb.go
+13 -10
View File
@@ -1,25 +1,27 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic abuseipdb. It reads SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY,
// SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE and SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION.
// The heuristic abuseipdb. It reads SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY,
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE and SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION.
import (
"context"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// abuseIPDB notes AbuseIPDB, as noteHit does, with the score, when its score
// of the client is a hit, and refuses the request when SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION
// is deny, as dnsbl does for a zone. While SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is unset it does
// nothing. A client without a score is checked in the background, by the
// request's address, if its history counts an offence, and the request does
// not wait for the answer. The score is then used for each address of the
// client. Its figures are the score and SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE.
// abuseIPDB adds the tag abuseipdb and notes AbuseIPDB, as noteHit does, with
// the score, when its score of the client is a hit, and refuses the request
// when SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny, as dnsbl does for a zone. While
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is unset it does nothing. A client without a score is
// checked in the background, by the request's address, if its history counts
// an offence, and the request does not wait for the answer. The score is then
// used for each address of the client. Its figures are the score and
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE.
type abuseIPDB struct{}
func (abuseIPDB) name() string { return "abuseipdb" }
@@ -39,8 +41,9 @@ func (abuseIPDB) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
}
rq.abuseIPDBHit = true
rq.addTag(config.AbuseIPDBTag)
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource, Score: &score},
"scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE")
"scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE")
if rq.h.config.ReputationAction != deny {
return nil
internal/discriminator/admin.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func (rq *request) answerHealth() {
// answerAdmin answers a request for one of discriminator's own endpoints. Each
// needs a token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>: the metrics
// SWW_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without it is
// SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without it is
// refused with 401. An endpoint whose token is unset answers 404, as any other
// path does.
func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
internal/discriminator/admin_test.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ import (
)
const (
adminToken = "SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
// adminSecret is the SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN the tests set, and adminBearer
adminToken = "SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
// adminSecret is the SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN the tests set, and adminBearer
// how a request carries it.
adminSecret = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
adminBearer = "Bearer " + adminSecret
@@ -337,12 +337,12 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// adminEndpoint is a request to an endpoint SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN opens.
// adminEndpoint is a request to an endpoint SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN opens.
type adminEndpoint struct {
method, path, body string
}
// adminEndpoints returns a request to each endpoint SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN
// adminEndpoints returns a request to each endpoint SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN
// opens: listing the bans, banning otherClient for an hour, lifting the
// bans on otherClient, and asking about otherClient.
func adminEndpoints() []adminEndpoint {
internal/discriminator/alerts_test.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ import (
)
const (
alertWebhookURL = "SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertMaxPerHour = "SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
alertWebhookURL = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
alertMaxPerHour = "SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
// alertInstance is the instance every alert of these tests gives.
alertInstance = "fsn1app1/blog"
)
internal/discriminator/anomaly_test.go
+11 -11
View File
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ import (
// The anomaly thresholds: the prefix of a scope followed by the end of a
// count.
const (
anomalyClient = "SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
anomalyNet = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_"
anomalyASN = "SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_"
anomalyTotal = "SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
anomalyWatch = "SWW_WATCH_"
anomalyClient = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
anomalyNet = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_"
anomalyASN = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_"
anomalyTotal = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
anomalyWatch = "SWW_WAF_WATCH_"
requestsPerMinute = "REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE"
requestsPerHour = "REQUESTS_PER_HOUR"
@@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ const (
// The other anomaly settings.
const (
anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
watchNets = "SWW_WATCH_NETS"
anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
watchNets = "SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS"
)
const (
@@ -164,9 +164,9 @@ func TestEveryRequestIsCountedWhateverIsDoneWithIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
allowed = "192.0.2.7" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.10" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
denied = "192.0.2.20" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
allowed = "192.0.2.7" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.10" // in SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
denied = "192.0.2.20" // in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS
)
s, _, _, queue := startAppWithAlerts(t, readAndAnswer, map[string]string{
internal/discriminator/answertime_test.go
+6 -6
View File
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ import (
)
const (
// answerTimeLimit is the default of rproxy's SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS, the time
// answerTimeLimit is the default of rproxy's SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS, the time
// discriminator has to answer.
answerTimeLimit = 2 * time.Second
// defaultLookupWait is the default of SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT.
// defaultLookupWait is the default of SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT.
defaultLookupWait = 800 * time.Millisecond
// The header limits SPEC.md gives.
cookieLimit = 50
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ func TestHeaderLimitsHoldWhateverTheCoreRuleSetSettingsSay(t *testing.T) {
for _, env := range []map[string]string{
{wafMode: off},
{wafMode: "detect"},
{wafMode: block, "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS": "/"},
{wafMode: block, "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS": "/"},
} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprint(env), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ func newDiscriminatorInBubble(
) (*discriminator.Server, *output) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{deniedCountries: "KP"}
settings := map[string]string{tagDeny: "country=KP"}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now, settings)
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
action string
}{
{
name: "SWW_DENY_NETS", env: map[string]string{denyNets: client},
name: "SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS", env: map[string]string{denyNets: client},
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
},
{
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ func TestDiscriminatorAnswersWithinTheTimeLimitWhileEveryOutsideSourceHangs(
return discriminator.New(params)
}, held, time.Now, map[string]string{
deniedCountries: "KP", wafMode: block,
tagDeny: "country=KP", wafMode: block,
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: resolver.LocalAddr().String(),
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey,
blocklistURLs: held + "/drop.txt", asnLimitPercentURL: held + "/asn.txt",
internal/discriminator/bans.go
+6 -6
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic active_ban, and the code that makes bans, which several
// heuristics share. active_ban reads SWW_MODE; the bans are the ban ledger's.
// heuristics share. active_ban reads SWW_WAF_MODE; the bans are the ban ledger's.
import (
"context"
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// banResponse is a refusal answered with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, and logged
// banResponse is a refusal answered with SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and logged
// with action.
func (rq *request) banResponse(action string) *refusal {
return &refusal{status: rq.h.config.BanResponse, action: action}
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ func limitFigures(hit ratelimit.Hit) map[string]any {
// countedBytes returns the request's bytes, once it has ended, as the
// byte limits and the anomaly thresholds count them: the response's body
// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWW_BYTES_COUNT says.
// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT says.
func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
response, request := rq.out.bytes, rq.requestBytes
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
// banForLimit bans the client's netblock at now for a broken limit, the
// one hit names, notes the offence for the log line and counts the hit in
// the metrics. status is what the client was sent, or is sent:
// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over a rate limit, what the report says for
// SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over a rate limit, what the report says for
// one whose bytes broke a byte limit, the refusal for one that broke the
// error burst. The ban's notes give the client's limit percentage for a
// rate limit or a byte limit; the error burst is not lowered. The ban sets
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
// wouldAlertBan reports whether the alert for a ban on netblock for cause
// made at now would be sent. In observe mode the ban the request would
// have made is worked out only then, at most once per
// SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN and never with no webhook set: its notes count the
// SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN and never with no webhook set: its notes count the
// netblock's requests, which can mean going through every client.
func (rq *request) wouldAlertBan(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause string,
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ func (rq *request) netblockRequests(netblock netip.Prefix) int64 {
}
// netblock is the netblock a ban on client covers: its IPv4 address,
// widened to SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX, or the IPv6 group clientGroup
// widened to SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX, or the IPv6 group clientGroup
// counts it in.
func (h *handler) netblock(client netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
addr := client.Unmap()
internal/discriminator/bans_test.go
+15 -15
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ const (
userAgent = "ban-test/1.0"
// permanent is the log line's ban_expires for a permanent ban.
permanent = "permanent"
// banResponseClose is the SWW_BAN_RESPONSE that closes the connection.
// banResponseClose is the SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE that closes the connection.
banResponseClose = "close"
)
@@ -89,19 +89,19 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// A first ban lasts SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION; one within
// SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW after it ended, three times as long.
// A first ban lasts SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION; one within
// SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW after it ended, three times as long.
wantExpires(breakLimit(), 10*time.Minute)
clk.advance(10*time.Minute + time.Hour)
wantExpires(breakLimit(), 30*time.Minute)
// Later than that, SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION again.
// Later than that, SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION again.
clk.advance(30*time.Minute + time.Hour + time.Second)
wantExpires(breakLimit(), 10*time.Minute)
clk.advance(10 * time.Minute)
wantExpires(breakLimit(), 30*time.Minute)
// 90 minutes would be longer than SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION: the ban is
// 90 minutes would be longer than SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION: the ban is
// permanent.
clk.advance(30 * time.Minute)
@@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
// In the IPv4 cases, client breaks the limit; these two are next to it.
const (
allowed = "203.0.113.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "203.0.113.50" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
allowed = "203.0.113.60" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "203.0.113.50" // in SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
)
for _, tc := range []struct {
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
nil, []string{otherClient, exempt},
},
{
"the IPv4 netblock SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX sets",
"the IPv4 netblock SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX sets",
map[string]string{banScopeV4Prefix: "24"}, client,
[]string{otherClient, exempt}, []string{"203.0.112.9", allowed},
},
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
[]string{"2001:db8:5::ffff:1"}, []string{"2001:db8:5:1::1"},
},
{
"the IPv6 netblock SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets",
"the IPv6 netblock SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets",
map[string]string{ipv6GroupPrefix: "48"}, "2001:db8:7::1",
[]string{"2001:db8:7:ffff::1"}, []string{"2001:db8:8::1"},
},
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
// fromDE's ban covers otherClient, which is refused unasked about.
@@ -247,10 +247,10 @@ func TestRefusalUnderABanNamesItsHeuristicNetblockAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS
for _, tc := range []struct {
setting string // "" leaves SWW_BAN_RESPONSE at its default
setting string // "" leaves SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE at its default
status int // 0 is the connection closed without an answer
}{
{"", http.StatusForbidden},
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
}
if tc.setting != "" {
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, env)
s.get(denied, tc.status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
s.get(fromKP, tc.status, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
s.get(fromKP, tc.status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionBanned)
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
start := clk.Now()
internal/discriminator/biased.go
+43 -32
View File
@@ -17,74 +17,85 @@ type percentage struct {
}
// biasedThresholdsSet reports whether a biased threshold can lower a
// client's limits: one of its lists is not empty,
// SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is below 100, or SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL
// is set. The client's lookup is then needed before its request goes on.
// client's limits by its lookup: SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT or
// SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT is not empty, SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is
// below 100, or SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL is set. The client's lookup is
// then needed before its request goes on.
func biasedThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
return len(cfg.ASNLimitPercent) > 0 || len(cfg.CountryLimitPercent) > 0 ||
len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) > 0 || len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) > 0 ||
return len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) > 0 || len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) > 0 ||
cfg.UnknownLimitPercent < whole || cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL != ""
}
// limitPercentages returns the client's limit percentages, for the rate
// limits and for the byte limits, by its AS number and country as looked
// up, each "" when unknown, and the blocklists, DNSBL zones and AbuseIPDB
// that list it. Each is the lowest of those the settings give it, the
// first of them in the order below when several are lowest: the
// percentage SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its AS number, the one the file
// SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names gives it, the one
// SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its country, for a client without a
// country, unless its request skipped the wait for GeoJS,
// SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist lists, the
// percentage of SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and for a client
// a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is a hit, the
// percentage of SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For the byte
// limits, SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT take the
// place of the first three for an AS number or a country they list.
// limits and for the byte limits, by its tags, its AS number and country
// as looked up, each "" when unknown, and the blocklists, DNSBL zones and
// AbuseIPDB that list it. Each is the lowest of those the settings give
// it, the first of them in the order below when several are lowest: the
// percentage SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its asn= tag, the one the file
// SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names gives its AS number, the one
// SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its country= tag, the lowest it gives its
// other tags, for a client without a country, unless its request skipped
// the wait for GeoJS, SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist
// lists, the percentage of SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and
// for a client a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is
// a hit, the percentage of SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For
// the byte limits, SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT
// take the place of the first three for an AS number or a country they
// list.
func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
cfg := rq.h.config
asn, country := rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country
unknown := percentage{percent: whole}
if country == "" && !rq.skippedLookupWait {
unknown = percentage{cfg.UnknownLimitPercent, "SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"}
unknown = percentage{cfg.UnknownLimitPercent, "SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"}
}
fetched := percentage{percent: whole}
if percent, listed := rq.h.lists.ASNLimitPercent(asn); listed {
fetched = percentage{percent, "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"}
fetched = percentage{percent, "SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"}
}
blocklisted := percentage{percent: whole}
if rq.blocklisted && cfg.BlocklistAction == "limit" {
blocklisted = percentage{cfg.BlocklistLimitPercent, "SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"}
blocklisted = percentage{cfg.BlocklistLimitPercent, "SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"}
}
reputationListed := percentage{percent: whole}
if (rq.dnsblListed || rq.abuseIPDBHit) && cfg.ReputationAction == "limit" {
reputationListed = percentage{cfg.ReputationLimitPercent, "SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION"}
reputationListed = percentage{cfg.ReputationLimitPercent, "SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION"}
}
asnRequests := lowest(given(cfg.ASNLimitPercent, asn, "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"),
fetched)
countryRequests := given(cfg.CountryLimitPercent, country,
"SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT")
const tagSetting = "SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnRequests := lowest(given(cfg.TagLimitPercent, asnTag(asn), tagSetting), fetched)
countryRequests := given(cfg.TagLimitPercent, countryTag(country), tagSetting)
otherTags := percentage{percent: whole}
for _, tag := range rq.line.Tags {
if tag != asnTag(asn) && tag != countryTag(country) {
otherTags = lowest(otherTags, given(cfg.TagLimitPercent, tag, tagSetting))
}
}
asnBytes, countryBytes := asnRequests, countryRequests
if _, listed := cfg.ASNBytesPercent[asn]; listed {
asnBytes = given(cfg.ASNBytesPercent, asn, "SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT")
asnBytes = given(cfg.ASNBytesPercent, asn, "SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT")
}
if _, listed := cfg.CountryBytesPercent[country]; listed {
countryBytes = given(cfg.CountryBytesPercent, country, "SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT")
countryBytes = given(cfg.CountryBytesPercent, country,
"SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT")
}
return lowest(asnRequests, countryRequests, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed),
lowest(asnBytes, countryBytes, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed)
return lowest(asnRequests, countryRequests, otherTags, unknown, blocklisted,
reputationListed),
lowest(asnBytes, countryBytes, otherTags, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed)
}
// given returns the percentage percents, the setting named setting, gives
// code, an AS number or a country, or whole when it does not list code.
// code, an AS number, a country or a tag, or whole when it does not list code.
func given(percents map[string]int64, code, setting string) percentage {
percent, listed := percents[code]
if !listed {
internal/discriminator/biased_test.go
+45 -35
View File
@@ -22,11 +22,10 @@ import (
// The biased thresholds.
const (
asnLimitPercent = "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
countryLimitPercent = "SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnBytesPercent = "SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
countryBytesPercent = "SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
unknownLimitPercent = "SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
tagLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnBytesPercent = "SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
countryBytesPercent = "SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
unknownLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
)
const (
@@ -35,6 +34,11 @@ const (
asnDEHalf = asnDE + ":50"
asnDEQuarter = asnDE + ":25"
countryDEHalf = "de:50"
// The same, as SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT names fromDE's tags.
asnTagDEHalf = "asn=64496:50"
asnTagDEQuarter = "asn=64496:25"
countryTagDEHalf = "country=DE:50"
countryTagDEQuarter = "country=DE:25"
// noCountry is in an AS of its own, AS64500, and in no country.
noCountry = "192.0.2.80"
// fourAMinute is the rate limit these tests set: half of it is 2
@@ -54,8 +58,8 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
setting, value, from string
}{
{asnLimitPercent, asnDEHalf, fromDE},
{countryLimitPercent, countryDEHalf, fromDE},
{tagLimitPercent, asnTagDEHalf, fromDE},
{tagLimitPercent, countryTagDEHalf, fromDE},
{unknownLimitPercent, "50", unplaced},
} {
t.Run(tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -96,8 +100,8 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheByteLimits(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
setting, value, from string
}{
{asnLimitPercent, asnDEHalf, fromDE},
{countryLimitPercent, "DE:50", fromDE},
{tagLimitPercent, asnTagDEHalf, fromDE},
{tagLimitPercent, "Country=de:50", fromDE},
{unknownLimitPercent, "50", unplaced},
{asnBytesPercent, "as64496:50", fromDE},
{countryBytesPercent, countryDEHalf, fromDE},
@@ -151,13 +155,13 @@ func TestBytesPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(t *testing.T)
},
{
"raising the byte limits back",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEHalf, asnBytesPercent: asnDE + ":100"},
"50 from " + asnLimitPercent, none, "",
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEHalf, asnBytesPercent: asnDE + ":100"},
"50 from " + tagLimitPercent, none, "",
},
{
"raising the byte limits back, by country",
map[string]string{countryLimitPercent: countryDEHalf, countryBytesPercent: "de:100"},
"50 from " + countryLimitPercent, none, "",
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: countryTagDEHalf, countryBytesPercent: "de:100"},
"50 from " + tagLimitPercent, none, "",
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -184,19 +188,19 @@ func TestBytesPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(t *testing.T)
func TestZeroPercentIsAZeroAllowance(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDE + ":0"})
s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
// The first request breaks the limit, and bans the client; the log line
// gives the 0.
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
line := s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
if line.fields["limit_percent"] != float64(0) ||
line.fields["limit_percent_setting"] != asnLimitPercent {
line.fields["limit_percent_setting"] != unknownLimitPercent {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_percent %v from %v, want 0 from %s",
line.fields["limit_percent"], line.fields["limit_percent_setting"],
asnLimitPercent)
unknownLimitPercent)
}
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
@@ -211,29 +215,29 @@ func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
}{
{
"the country's",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEHalf, countryLimitPercent: "de:25"},
fromDE, "25 from " + countryLimitPercent,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEHalf + "," + countryTagDEQuarter},
fromDE, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
},
{
"the AS number's",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter, countryLimitPercent: countryDEHalf},
fromDE, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter + "," + countryTagDEHalf},
fromDE, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
},
{
"the AS number's, the first of two alike",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter, countryLimitPercent: "de:25"},
fromDE, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter + "," + countryTagDEQuarter},
fromDE, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
},
{
"that for a client without a country",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: "AS64500:50", unknownLimitPercent: "25"},
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: "asn=64500:50", unknownLimitPercent: "25"},
noCountry, "25 from " + unknownLimitPercent,
},
{
// SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is left at its default, 100.
// SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is left at its default, 100.
"the AS number's, for a client without a country",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: "AS64500:25"},
noCountry, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: "asn=64500:25"},
noCountry, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -304,8 +308,12 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
setting, value string
waits bool
}{
{asnLimitPercent, asnDEHalf, true},
{countryLimitPercent, countryDEHalf, true},
{tagLimitPercent, asnTagDEHalf, true},
{tagLimitPercent, countryTagDEHalf, true},
{tagDeny, denyKP, true},
// A tag the lookup does not give needs no answer.
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn:50", false},
{tagDeny, "vpn", false},
{asnBytesPercent, asnDEHalf, true},
{countryBytesPercent, countryDEHalf, true},
{unknownLimitPercent, "99", true},
@@ -320,7 +328,9 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), tc.setting: tc.value})
map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList, tc.setting: tc.value,
})
began := time.Now()
serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodPost, strings.NewReader("ab"))
@@ -363,15 +373,15 @@ func TestBanForALoweredLimitGivesThePercentageInItsNotesAndItsAlert(t *testing.T
{
// A quarter of 12 requests a minute is 3: the fourth breaks it.
"a rate limit",
map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "12", asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter},
map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "12", tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter},
3, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
"requests per minute over the limit of 3", "25 from " + asnLimitPercent,
"requests per minute over the limit of 3", "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
},
{
// The byte limits' percentage, not the rate limits'.
"a byte limit",
map[string]string{
bytesLimitPerMinute: twoUploads, asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter,
bytesLimitPerMinute: twoUploads, tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter,
asnBytesPercent: asnDEHalf,
},
0, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
@@ -487,7 +497,7 @@ func wantPercent(t *testing.T, what string, percent *int64, setting, want string
}
// percentText gives a limit percentage and the setting that gave it as
// text, such as "50 from SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT", or none when both are
// text, such as "50 from SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT", or none when both are
// left out.
func percentText(percent *int64, setting string) string {
switch {
internal/discriminator/blocklists.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic blocklists. It reads SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, and the blocklists
// The heuristic blocklists. It reads SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, and the blocklists
// through the reputation lists.
import (
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
)
// blocklists notes the blocklists that list the client, as noteListed does,
// and refuses the request when SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny. Being limit, it
// and refuses the request when SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny. Being limit, it
// lowers the client's limits instead (see limitPercentages), and being log, it
// does nothing more. Its figure is the blocklists that list the client.
type blocklists struct{}
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ func (blocklists) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
// refusedByBlocklists reports whether the heuristic blocklists refuses a
// client, given listedBy, the blocklists that list it: it does when one lists
// it and SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny.
// it and SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny.
func (rq *request) refusedByBlocklists(listedBy []string) bool {
return len(listedBy) > 0 && rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny
}
internal/discriminator/bytelimits.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic byte_limits. It reads SWW_BYTES_COUNT, and the byte limits
// The heuristic byte_limits. It reads SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT, and the byte limits
// and biased thresholds through the limiter and limitPercentages.
import (
internal/discriminator/bytelimits_test.go
+8 -8
View File
@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ import (
// The byte limit settings.
const (
bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
bytesLimitPerHour = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
bytesLimitPerDay = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
bytesCount = "SWW_BYTES_COUNT"
bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
bytesLimitPerHour = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
bytesLimitPerDay = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
bytesCount = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT"
)
// The values of SWW_BYTES_COUNT.
// The values of SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT.
const (
countResponse = "response"
countRequest = "request"
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ const (
// byteLimit is the byte limit these tests set, as a setting: a request
// with a body and its answer, 100 bytes, go over it.
byteLimit = "99"
// minuteBytes is limit_hit for SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE.
// minuteBytes is limit_hit for SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE.
minuteBytes = "minute_bytes"
)
@@ -227,8 +227,8 @@ func TestByteLimitsLeaveOutWhatTheRateLimitsLeaveOut(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
allowed = "192.0.2.7" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.10" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
allowed = "192.0.2.7" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.10" // in SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
)
s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{
internal/discriminator/client.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ func scheme(r *http.Request, isQuestion bool) string {
// clientGroup is the client a request is counted toward: its IPv4
// address, or its IPv6 group, the netblock its IPv6 address is in of the
// length SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets, a /64 by default, since one abuser
// length SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets, a /64 by default, since one abuser
// usually holds a whole /64. An IPv4 address in IPv6 form counts as IPv4.
func (h *handler) clientGroup(addr netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
addr = addr.Unmap()
internal/discriminator/coreruleset.go
+14 -11
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic core_rule_set. It reads SWW_WAF_MODE, SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS
// and SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
// The heuristic core_rule_set. It reads SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE,
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS and SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
import (
"context"
@@ -14,12 +14,13 @@ import (
)
// coreRuleSet inspects the request with the Core Rule Set, unless
// SWW_WAF_MODE is off or SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS exempts its path, as
// pathExempt decides, and notes the rules it matched and its score in the
// log line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD is a match: it raises the waf_block alert,
// and in block mode refuses the request with 403, which is an offence its
// client's history counts. Its figures are the score and the threshold.
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is off or SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS
// exempts its path, as pathExempt decides, and notes the rules it matched and
// its score in the log line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD is a match: it adds the tag
// exploitsignature, raises the waf_block alert, and in block mode refuses the
// request with 403, which is an offence its client's history counts. Its
// figures are the score and the threshold.
type coreRuleSet struct{}
func (coreRuleSet) name() string { return "core_rule_set" }
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ func (coreRuleSet) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
return nil
}
rq.addTag(config.ExploitSignatureTag)
rq.alertWAFBlock(result)
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect {
@@ -65,7 +67,7 @@ func (coreRuleSet) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
}
// alertWAFBlock raises the waf_block alert for the request, which the Core
// Rule Set scored at result, at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD. Its
// Rule Set scored at result, at or over SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD. Its
// detail gives the rule ids, the score, the method and the path with the
// query, and, for a request that is not refused for it, the mode: detect,
// or observe in observe mode.
@@ -92,7 +94,8 @@ func (rq *request) alertWAFBlock(result waf.Result) {
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country,
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over " +
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
})
}
internal/discriminator/coreruleset_test.go
+48 -12
View File
@@ -14,13 +14,13 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The Core Rule Set's settings the tests set, besides SWW_WAF_MODE, and
// The Core Rule Set's settings the tests set, besides SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE, and
// its two modes that inspect requests.
const (
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT"
block = "block"
detect = "detect"
)
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ const (
// formData is the type of a form's body.
const formData = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
// sizeLimit is SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies, 1K as a
// sizeLimit is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies, 1K as a
// setting.
const (
sizeLimit = 1 << 10
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ const (
// sqlInjection asks for / with an SQL injection in its query, which only
// the Core Rule Set's rule 942100 matches, with a score of 5, the default
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
const sqlInjection = "/?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"
// wantWAF checks the request log line's waf_rule_ids and waf_score, and
@@ -61,6 +61,41 @@ func wantWAF(t *testing.T, line logLine, score *int, ruleIDs ...int) {
}
}
func TestCoreRuleSetMatchAddsTheExploitSignatureTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
mode string
status int
action string
}{
{block, block, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked},
{detect, detect, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: tc.mode})
wantTags(t, s.request(client, sqlInjection, tc.status, tc.action),
"exploitsignature")
wantTags(t, s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
})
}
}
func TestDetectedAttackIsRefusedByTagDenyLast(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: detect, tagDeny: "exploitsignature",
})
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "exploitsignature"}`)
}
func TestCoreRuleSetRefusesAttacksInBlockModeAndOnlyLogsThemInDetectMode(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -135,7 +170,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
) {
t.Parallel()
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block,
@@ -144,7 +179,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
})
// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, and a path SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS
// A client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS, and a path SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS
// exempts, are not inspected.
line := s.request(allowed, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
@@ -163,7 +198,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
// With SWW_WAF_MODE off, no request is.
// With SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE off, no request is.
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: off})
line = s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWAF(t, line, nil)
@@ -478,8 +513,9 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
Host: appHost,
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(client),
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over " +
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
})
if queue.Suppressed() != 1 {
internal/discriminator/countries.go
+10 -17
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic countries. It reads SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES and
// SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
// The heuristic countries. It reads SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
import (
"context"
@@ -11,32 +10,26 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// countries refuses a request by the client's country as it was looked up. A
// client without a country, or whose country cannot be found, is refused only
// by SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES. Its figures are the country and the
// setting that refused it.
// countries refuses a request when SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES is set and
// does not hold the client's country as it was looked up. A client without a
// country, or whose country cannot be found, is refused. Its figures are the
// country and the setting that refused it.
type countries struct{}
func (countries) name() string { return "countries" }
func (countries) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
denied := rq.h.config.DeniedCountries
allowed := rq.h.config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries
country := rq.line.Country
var setting string
switch {
case slices.Contains(denied, country):
setting = "SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
case len(allowed) > 0 && !slices.Contains(allowed, country):
setting = "SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
default:
if len(allowed) == 0 || slices.Contains(allowed, country) {
return nil
}
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
figures: map[string]any{"country": country, "setting": setting},
action: requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
figures: map[string]any{
"country": country, "setting": "SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES",
},
}
}
internal/discriminator/countries_test.go
+12 -12
View File
@@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
env map[string]string
refused []string
}{
{"denied", map[string]string{deniedCountries: "kp"}, []string{fromKP}},
{
"exclusively allowed", map[string]string{allowedCountries: "DE"},
[]string{fromKP, unplaced},
},
{
"both", map[string]string{deniedCountries: "kp", allowedCountries: "de,fr"},
"with a country in SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY",
map[string]string{tagDeny: denyKP, allowedCountries: "de,fr"},
[]string{fromKP, unplaced},
},
} {
@@ -95,16 +95,16 @@ func TestCountryRefusalNamesItsHeuristicCountryAndSetting(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h", deniedCountries: "kp", allowedCountries: "de",
lookupTimeout: "1h", allowedCountries: "de",
})
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "countries",
`{"country": "KP", "setting": "SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES"}`)
`{"country": "KP", "setting": "SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"}`)
line = s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "countries",
`{"country": "", "setting": "SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"}`)
`{"country": "", "setting": "SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"}`)
}
func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
@@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
})
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
deniedCountries: "kp",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
allowedCountries: "de",
})
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("a body"))
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ func TestPrivateAddressIsNeverLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
env map[string]string
}{
{"no setting needs the lookup", nil},
{"a country list is set", map[string]string{deniedCountries: "kp"}},
{"a tag setting needs it", map[string]string{tagDeny: denyKP}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -262,11 +262,11 @@ func TestExclusiveListRefusesAPrivateAddressUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) {
action string
}{
{
"not in SWW_ALLOW_NETS", "",
"not in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS", "",
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
},
{
"in SWW_ALLOW_NETS", "10.0.0.7,fd00::/8",
"in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS", "10.0.0.7,fd00::/8",
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
},
} {
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ func TestExclusiveListRefusesAPrivateAddressUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) {
// startGeoJS starts a stand-in for GeoJS, which places fromDE and fromKP,
// each in an AS of its own, and no other address. It returns its URL, and
// what returns the addresses it has been asked about. A test that needs
// the stand-in to be asked or to answer sets SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT to an
// the stand-in to be asked or to answer sets SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT to an
// hour, whether or not a request waits for the answer: on the default, a
// hold-up of the test process can abandon the request to the stand-in, and
// leave the client unknown.
internal/discriminator/crowdsec.go
+6 -4
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic crowdsec. It reads SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL, and the decisions
// The heuristic crowdsec. It reads SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL, and the decisions
// through the reputation lists.
import (
@@ -8,14 +8,15 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// crowdSec refuses a request when a decision of the CrowdSec decision list on
// the client is in force at now. It then notes the list, as noteHit does, and
// bans the client until that decision ends. Its figures are the decision's
// scenario and when it ends.
// the client is in force at now. It then adds the tag crowdsec, notes the
// list, as noteHit does, and bans the client until that decision ends. Its
// figures are the decision's scenario and when it ends.
type crowdSec struct{}
func (crowdSec) name() string { return "crowdsec" }
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ func (crowdSec) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
return nil
}
rq.addTag(config.CrowdSecTag)
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: rq.h.config.CrowdSecDecisionsURL},
"listed by the CrowdSec decision list")
rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision)
internal/discriminator/crowdsec_test.go
+3 -2
View File
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ import (
// test puts in the copy of its decision list, at decisionsURL, that it
// needs, as reputation.json would at start.
const (
crowdSecURL = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
crowdSecURL = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
lapi = "http://crowdsec.example:8080"
decisionsURL = lapi + "/v1/decisions"
bouncerKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ func TestCrowdSecBanNamesItsHeuristicScenarioAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "crowdsec", `{"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", `+
`"expires": "`+requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(4*time.Hour))+`"}`)
wantTags(t, line, "crowdsec")
}
func TestEndedCrowdSecDecisionNoLongerBansThoughTheCopyStillHoldsIt(t *testing.T) {
internal/discriminator/denynets.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic deny_nets. It reads SWW_DENY_NETS.
// The heuristic deny_nets. It reads SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS.
import (
"context"
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// denyNets refuses a client in SWW_DENY_NETS. Its figure is the netblock of
// denyNets refuses a client in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS. Its figure is the netblock of
// the setting the client is in.
type denyNets struct{}
internal/discriminator/discriminator.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ const (
// headers and body.
DispositionDeny = "deny"
// DispositionClose tells rproxy to close the visitor's connection
// without an answer, which SWW_BAN_RESPONSE asks for when it is close.
// without an answer, which SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE asks for when it is close.
// discriminator closing the question's connection instead would read as
// discriminator being down, and rproxy would then let the request through.
DispositionClose = "close"
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ func asTheVisitorSentIt(r *http.Request, body []byte) *http.Request {
}
// allow answers a question with DispositionAllow and, while
// SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set, the client's AS number and country.
// SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set, the client's AS number and country.
func (rq *request) allow() {
rq.allowed = true
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ func (rq *request) deny(r refusal) {
rq.refused = &r
if r.status == 0 {
// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE is close. Written past rq.out, since the log line's
// SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE is close. Written past rq.out, since the log line's
// status stays 0: the visitor is sent nothing.
rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionClose)
rq.out.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
internal/discriminator/discriminator_test.go
+5 -5
View File
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ const (
// reportBodyLimit is the longest body SPEC.md lets a report have.
reportBodyLimit = 1 << 20
// anomalyClientPerMinute is the anomaly threshold these tests set.
anomalyClientPerMinute = "SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE"
anomalyClientPerMinute = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE"
)
// The fields of a report, as "discriminator" in SPEC.md names them.
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ func (s *Discriminator) history() ratelimit.History {
}
// metrics returns what the metrics endpoint answers, for a server started with
// the token as SWW_METRICS_TOKEN.
// the token as SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN.
func (s *Discriminator) metrics() string {
s.t.Helper()
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ func TestReportNeverReachesAQuestionStillBeingHandled(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, asked, release := startHeldGeoJS(t)
s := startDiscriminator(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h", deniedCountries: "kp", bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit,
lookupTimeout: "1h", tagDeny: denyKP, bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit,
})
first := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ func TestAllowCarriesTheLookupHeadersWhileTheSettingIsSet(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startDiscriminator(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
addLookupHeaders: tc.setting, lookupTimeout: "1h", deniedCountries: "kp",
addLookupHeaders: tc.setting, lookupTimeout: "1h", tagDeny: denyKP,
})
got := s.ask(fromDE, "/")
@@ -1485,7 +1485,7 @@ func TestALargeBodyAnnouncedAndLongHeadersAreNoReasonToRefuse(t *testing.T) {
func TestLogLevelHoldsBackNoRequestLine(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{"SWW_LOG_LEVEL": "error"})
s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{"SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL": "error"})
// A refused question would write a process warning, held back at error.
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
internal/discriminator/dnsbl.go
+9 -2
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic dnsbl. It reads SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION, and the DNSBL zones'
// The heuristic dnsbl. It reads SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION, and the DNSBL zones'
// verdicts through the DNSBL checker.
import (
"context"
"strings"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// dnsbl notes the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists the client, as noteListed
// does, and refuses the request when SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny. Being
// does, adds the tag dnsbl=<zone> for each, the zone's key masked, and refuses
// the request when SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny. Being
// limit, it lowers the client's limits instead (see limitPercentages), and
// being log, it does nothing more. A zone without a verdict on the client is
// asked about it in the background, and the request does not wait for the
@@ -25,6 +28,10 @@ func (dnsbl) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
rq.dnsblListed = len(listedBy) > 0
rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a DNSBL zone")
for _, zone := range listedBy {
rq.addTag(config.DNSBLTagPrefix + strings.ToLower(zone))
}
if !rq.dnsblListed || rq.h.config.ReputationAction != deny {
return nil
}
internal/discriminator/heuristics.go
+6 -1
View File
@@ -37,18 +37,21 @@ const (
)
// The lists of heuristics, each in the order its heuristics run. A client in
// SWW_ALLOW_NETS skips them all.
// SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS skips them all.
// beforeLookup are the heuristics that run before the client's AS number and
// country are looked up, so that a client they refuse is not looked up.
func beforeLookup() []heuristic {
return []heuristic{
tagLists{},
denyNets{},
activeBan{},
}
}
// afterLookup are the heuristics that run once the lookup has been made.
// tag_deny runs twice: before the rate limits, on the tags known by then, and
// last, on the tag rule_files and core_rule_set can add.
func afterLookup() []heuristic {
return []heuristic{
countries{},
@@ -56,11 +59,13 @@ func afterLookup() []heuristic {
crowdSec{},
dnsbl{},
abuseIPDB{},
tagDeny{},
rateLimits{},
trapPaths{},
ruleFiles{},
headerLimits{},
coreRuleSet{},
tagDeny{},
}
}
internal/discriminator/history_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
start := clk.Now()
internal/discriminator/lookup.go
+34 -3
View File
@@ -4,13 +4,15 @@ import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"strings"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
)
// The headers in which an answer of allow gives rproxy the client's AS number
// and country, for the app, while SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes
// and country, for the app, while SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes
// every header name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so
// X-Client-ASN arrives as X-Client-Asn; header names are not case-sensitive.
const (
@@ -19,8 +21,9 @@ const (
)
// lookUp looks up the client's AS number and country, in the lookup
// database or through GeoJS, and notes them for the log line, unless
// SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off or the client is on a private, loopback or
// database or through GeoJS, and notes them for the log line and as the
// request's asn= and country= tags, unless
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off or the client is on a private, loopback or
// link-local address, which no lookup can place. The lookup database
// answers at once. With GeoJS, while a setting needs the answer, such as a
// country list or a biased threshold, a new client's request waits for it,
@@ -47,6 +50,34 @@ func (rq *request) lookUp(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) {
rq.line.ASN = rq.lookupAnswer.ASN
rq.line.ASName = rq.lookupAnswer.ASName
rq.line.Country = rq.lookupAnswer.Country
if tag := asnTag(rq.line.ASN); tag != "" {
rq.addTag(tag)
}
if tag := countryTag(rq.line.Country); tag != "" {
rq.addTag(tag)
}
}
// asnTag returns the tag of asn, an AS number as the lookup gives it, such as
// asn=64496 for AS64496, or "" for no AS number.
func asnTag(asn string) string {
if asn == "" {
return ""
}
return config.ASNTagPrefix + strings.TrimPrefix(asn, "AS")
}
// countryTag returns the tag of country, a code as the lookup gives it, such
// as country=DE for DE, or "" for no country.
func countryTag(country string) string {
if country == "" {
return ""
}
return config.CountryTagPrefix + country
}
// addLookup adds answer, an answer about a client from the lookup
internal/discriminator/lookup_test.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import (
// and country.
type asnAndCountry struct{ asn, asName, country string }
// fileSource is the SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE that looks clients up in the
// fileSource is the SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE that looks clients up in the
// lookup database.
const fileSource = "file"
@@ -94,9 +94,9 @@ func TestRequestThatWaitedForItsLookupIsCountedWhenItGoesOn(t *testing.T) {
clk := &clock{now: time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 58, 0, time.UTC)}
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, clk.Now,
map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
deniedCountries: "kp",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
requestFromDE := func() *http.Request {
internal/discriminator/metrics_test.go
+16 -16
View File
@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ import (
)
const (
metricsToken = "SWW_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsTopN = "SWW_METRICS_TOP_N"
// token is the SWW_METRICS_TOKEN the tests set, and bearer how a
metricsToken = "SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsTopN = "SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N"
// token is the SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN the tests set, and bearer how a
// request carries it.
token = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
bearer = "Bearer " + token
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountTheTraffic(t *testing.T) {
func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS
s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
metricsToken: token,
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
maxBanDuration: "2h",
})
// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
// SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
s.get(denied, 0, requestlog.ActionDenied)
// A first broken limit bans for an hour.
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `sww_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
// A limit broken again right after would ban for three hours, longer
// than SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
// than SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
@@ -195,10 +195,10 @@ func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
})
env := map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
metricsTopN: "2",
deniedCountries: "kp",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
metricsTopN: "2",
allowedCountries: "de,fr",
}
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, time.Now, env)
@@ -322,18 +322,18 @@ func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, _, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, time.Now,
map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
deniedCountries: "kp",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
// GeoJS fails, so the client counts as coming from an unknown country,
// which SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES does not refuse.
// GeoJS fails, so the client has no country= tag, and SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY does
// not refuse it.
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
// The client stops waiting for GeoJS once SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT is up, so
// The client stops waiting for GeoJS once SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT is up, so
// GeoJS's failure can come after its request has ended.
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
internal/discriminator/observe_test.go
+5 -5
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// observe is the value of SWW_MODE for observe mode.
// observe is the value of SWW_WAF_MODE for observe mode.
const observe = "observe"
func TestObserveModeNamesTheHeuristicThatWouldHaveRefused(t *testing.T) {
@@ -30,12 +30,12 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS
banned = otherClient // under a ban read from bans.json
)
for _, tc := range []struct {
setting string // "" leaves SWW_MODE at its default
setting string // "" leaves SWW_WAF_MODE at its default
observe bool
}{
{"", false},
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
}
if tc.setting != "" {
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
for _, sent := range []struct{ from, refusal string }{
{denied, requestlog.ActionDenied},
{banned, requestlog.ActionBanned},
{fromKP, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied},
{fromKP, requestlog.ActionDenied},
{fromDE, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
} {
if !tc.observe {
internal/discriminator/proxy.go
+23 -21
View File
@@ -33,15 +33,15 @@ const adminPrefix = "/_sww/"
const HealthPath = "/_sww/healthz"
// MetricsPath is where the metrics are, for a request that carries
// SWW_METRICS_TOKEN.
// SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN.
const MetricsPath = "/_sww/metrics"
// BansPath is where an admin lists and adds bans, and, followed by / and
// a client's address, lifts them, with SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN.
// a client's address, lifts them, with SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN.
const BansPath = "/_sww/bans"
// ClientsPath is where an admin asks what discriminator knows of a client, by
// the client's address after it, with SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN.
// the client's address after it, with SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN.
const ClientsPath = "/_sww/clients/"
// Params are what New needs.
@@ -54,16 +54,16 @@ type Params struct {
// ProcessLog receives the process's own messages.
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
// GeoJSURL is where clients' AS numbers and countries are looked up
// while SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is geojs, normally lookup.URL.
// while SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is geojs, normally lookup.URL.
GeoJSURL string
// AbuseIPDBURL is where clients are checked with AbuseIPDB while
// SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set, normally reputation.AbuseIPDBURL.
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set, normally reputation.AbuseIPDBURL.
AbuseIPDBURL string
// LookupFile is the lookup database they are looked up in while
// SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, and nil otherwise.
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, and nil otherwise.
LookupFile *lookup.File
// CoreRuleSet is what NewCoreRuleSet returns: what inspects requests
// while SWW_WAF_MODE is not off, and nil while it is.
// while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is not off, and nil while it is.
CoreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
// Now tells the time by which requests are counted for the rate
// limits, bans are made and run out, and GeoJS's answers are kept,
@@ -76,14 +76,14 @@ type Params struct {
// permanent, for each count over an anomaly threshold, for each request
// whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL zone or
// AbuseIPDB lists, for each request the Core Rule Set scores at or over
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, and for GeoJS failing, a fetch of a list
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, and for GeoJS failing, a fetch of a list
// failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB failing,
// or the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
Alerts *alerts.Queue
}
// Server is the server discriminator runs, with the parts whose state the state
// files keep, the lookup database, nil unless SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the
// files keep, the lookup database, nil unless SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the
// lists fetched from URLs, which its Run fetches, the DNSBL zones' verdicts,
// AbuseIPDB's scores and checks spent, and the metrics.
type Server struct {
@@ -155,11 +155,12 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
h.geojs = lookup.New(lookup.Params{
URL: params.GeoJSURL,
Timeout: params.Config.LookupTimeout,
// The country lists, the headers and the biased thresholds act on
// the answer before the request goes on.
Wait: len(params.Config.DeniedCountries) > 0 ||
len(params.Config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries) > 0 ||
params.Config.AddLookupHeaders || biasedThresholdsSet(params.Config),
// The country list, the headers, the tag settings that name an asn=
// or country= tag and the biased thresholds act on the answer before
// the request goes on.
Wait: len(params.Config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries) > 0 ||
params.Config.AddLookupHeaders || params.Config.TagsNeedLookup() ||
biasedThresholdsSet(params.Config),
Answered: h.addLookup,
Now: params.Now,
ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
@@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
// newReputation returns the lists fetched from URLs, the DNSBL zones'
// verdicts and AbuseIPDB's scores, as the settings in params name them,
// with none fetched, asked for or checked yet, and adds their metrics to
// m, AbuseIPDB's while SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
// m, AbuseIPDB's while SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
func newReputation(
params Params, m *metrics.Metrics,
) (*reputation.Lists, *reputation.DNSBL, *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
@@ -183,6 +184,7 @@ func newReputation(
lists := reputation.New(reputation.Params{
BlocklistURLs: cfg.BlocklistURLs, Refresh: cfg.BlocklistRefresh,
ASNLimitPercentURL: cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL,
TagLists: cfg.TagLists,
CrowdSecDecisionsURL: cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL, CrowdSecKey: cfg.CrowdSecKey,
Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog, Alerts: params.Alerts,
})
@@ -207,11 +209,11 @@ func newReputation(
return lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB
}
// NewCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
// without the rules SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
// up to SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT, with the exclusions in
// SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, or nil while SWW_WAF_MODE is off. It
// reads at most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
// NewCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
// without the rules SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
// up to SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT, with the exclusions in
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, or nil while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is
// off. It reads at most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
// QuestionBodyMaxBytes may be cut short, and the Core Rule Set does not read a
// JSON or XML body over its limit. An exclusions file that waf.New refuses is
// an error in every mode. While the mode is off, a set file is loaded with the
@@ -227,7 +229,7 @@ func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) (*waf.CoreRuleSet, error) {
ExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: %w", err)
}
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff {
internal/discriminator/proxy_test.go
+44 -49
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config/configtest"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
@@ -55,33 +56,35 @@ const (
// The settings the tests set.
const (
mode = "SWW_MODE"
trustedProxies = "SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWW_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWW_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
lookupSource = "SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
deniedCountries = "SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
allowedCountries = "SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
banResponse = "SWW_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWW_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
instanceName = "SWW_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
attackBanDuration = "SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
rulesDir = "SWW_RULES_DIR"
wafMode = "SWW_WAF_MODE"
mode = "SWW_WAF_MODE"
trustedProxies = "SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
lookupSource = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
tagDeny = "SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY"
// denyKP is the value of SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY that refuses fromKP's country.
denyKP = "country=KP"
allowedCountries = "SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
banResponse = "SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
instanceName = "SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
attackBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
rulesDir = "SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR"
wafMode = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE"
)
// off is the value that switches a setting off.
@@ -294,8 +297,8 @@ func startProxyWithGeoJS(
// startProxyWithClock is startProxyWithGeoJS with requests counted and
// bans made by the time now tells, and returns discriminator's server as well, whose
// Addr is where discriminator listens. Unless env sets SWW_RULES_DIR, it is an empty
// directory, of no rules, and unless it sets SWW_INSTANCE_NAME, that is app,
// Addr is where discriminator listens. Unless env sets SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR, it is an
// empty directory, of no rules, and unless it sets SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME, that is app,
// the label instance of every metric.
func startProxyWithClock(
t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
@@ -345,25 +348,21 @@ func serve(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server) {
// startRProxy starts rproxy in front of the app at appURL, asking the discriminator
// at discriminatorAddr, with the settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns
// where it listens. What it writes is dropped. SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS is a minute unless
// env sets it, so that on a busy host SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION does not decide.
// where it listens. What it writes is dropped. SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS is a minute unless
// env sets it, so that on a busy host SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION does not decide.
func startRProxy(
t *testing.T, discriminatorAddr, appURL string, env map[string]string,
) string {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
"SWRP_WAF_BACKEND": "http://" + discriminatorAddr,
"SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
"SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS": "60000",
"SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND": "http://" + discriminatorAddr,
"SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
"SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS": "60000",
}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := settings[name]
return value, ok
})
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(configtest.Viper(settings))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", settings, err)
}
@@ -395,11 +394,11 @@ func startRProxy(
// settings in env make it. No alert is sent from the queue: they wait in it,
// for the test to look at.
// With no geojsURL, there is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and
// SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup
// database SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY. SWW_WAF_MODE is off unless
// env sets it, so that only the tests of the Core Rule Set have their requests
// inspected by it.
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup
// database SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
// at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY.
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is off unless env sets it, so that only the tests of the
// Core Rule Set have their requests inspected by it.
func newDiscriminator(
t *testing.T, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
) (*discriminator.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
@@ -424,11 +423,7 @@ func newDiscriminatorWith(
maps.Copy(settings, env)
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := settings[name]
return value, ok
})
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(configtest.Viper(settings))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", settings, err)
}
internal/discriminator/ratelimits.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic rate_limits. It reads SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS,
// SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS and SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, and the rate limits and
// The heuristic rate_limits. It reads SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS,
// SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS and SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and the rate limits and
// biased thresholds through the limiter and limitPercentages.
import (
@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ func (rq *request) overAWholeRateLimit(now time.Time) bool {
}
// countedByRateLimits reports whether the rate limits count the request: its
// client is not in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and its path is not exempt
// under SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS.
// client is not in SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and its path is not exempt
// under SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS.
func (rq *request) countedByRateLimits() bool {
cfg := rq.h.config
internal/discriminator/ratelimits_test.go
+7 -7
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// minute is the window of SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE, as a log line's
// minute is the window of SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE, as a log line's
// limit_hit names it.
const minute = "minute"
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusalNamesItsHeuristicWindowCountAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
func TestIPv6GroupPrefixSetsTheClientTheLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// With SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX at 48, the first two addresses, in two
// With SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX at 48, the first two addresses, in two
// /64s of one /48, are one client, and the second's request breaks the
// limit; the third, in the next /48, is another client.
const (
@@ -129,14 +129,14 @@ func TestIPv6GroupPrefixSetsTheClientTheLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
rateLimitExemptPaths: "/assets/,/favicon.ico",
denyNets: denied,
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
// The answers are kept before the requests, so that none waits for
@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
// /assets/, and breaks the limit.
s.request(client, "/assets", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
// A ban, SWW_DENY_NETS and the country lists still refuse a path
// under a prefix.
// A ban, SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS and SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY still refuse a path under a
// prefix.
s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(denied, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
s.request(fromKP, "/assets/app.js",
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
}
func TestRateLimitCountsPathsThatAreNotExempt(t *testing.T) {
internal/discriminator/refusallimit.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic refusal_limit. It reads SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD and
// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE.
// The heuristic refusal_limit. It reads SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD and
// SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE.
import (
"context"
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ import (
// refusalLimit counts the request once it has been answered, if discriminator
// refused it after a rule file match, a trap path or a Core Rule Set match, and
// in observe mode if enforce mode would have: more than
// SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD such refusals of the client within a minute break
// a limit, which bans the client. A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, which the
// SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD such refusals of the client within a minute break
// a limit, which bans the client. A client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS, which the
// heuristics skip, is not counted, and nothing is while the threshold is off.
// Its figures are the window, the count and the limit.
type refusalLimit struct{}
internal/discriminator/refusallimit_test.go
+6 -6
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
const errorBurstThreshold = "SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
const errorBurstThreshold = "SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
// refused is a request the tests here send, which discriminator refuses after a rule
// file match.
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ func (r refused) send(s *sender, from string) logLine {
}
// startForErrorBurst is startWithClock with testRules, the metrics token and
// SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD at threshold, and the settings in env.
// SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD at threshold, and the settings in env.
func startForErrorBurst(
t *testing.T, threshold string, env map[string]string,
) (*sender, *clock, *discriminator.Server) {
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ func TestErrorBurstIsNotLoweredForAClientWithLowerLimits(t *testing.T) {
lookupTimeout: "1h",
errorBurstThreshold: "2",
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
countryLimitPercent: countryDEHalf,
tagLimitPercent: countryTagDEHalf,
})
// Half of the threshold would be one, which the second refusal is over.
@@ -277,15 +277,15 @@ func TestErrorBurstCountsEachClientTheChecksApplyTo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
)
s, _, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "1", map[string]string{
allowNets: allowed, rateLimitExemptNets: exempt,
})
// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS is not refused, and so not counted.
// A client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS is not refused, and so not counted.
for range 3 {
s.request(allowed, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
internal/discriminator/reputation.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
)
// deny is the SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and the SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION that
// deny is the SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and the SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION that
// refuses the requests of a client a source lists.
const deny = "deny"
internal/discriminator/reputation_test.go
+67 -27
View File
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ import (
// The reputation settings.
const (
blocklistURLs = "SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS"
blocklistAction = "SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"
asnLimitPercentURL = "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"
blocklistURLs = "SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS"
blocklistAction = "SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"
asnLimitPercentURL = "SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"
)
// The actions of SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION:
// The actions of SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION:
// limitHalf gives a listed client half of every limit, and limitQuarter a
// quarter.
const (
@@ -168,16 +168,16 @@ func TestReputationRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndWhatListedTheClient(t *testing.T)
}
}
func TestBlocklistsComeAfterTheCountryListsAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
func TestBlocklistsComeAfterAllowedCountriesAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, queue := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
blocklistURLs: dropURL, deniedCountries: "kp", allowNets: fromDE,
blocklistURLs: dropURL, allowedCountries: "de", allowNets: fromDE,
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {fromDE, fromKP}})
// fromKP's country refuses it before the list is looked at, and fromDE,
// in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted, nor
// in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted, nor
// alerted.
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied))
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
@@ -211,18 +211,18 @@ func TestBlocklistLimitTakesPartInTheLowestPercentageOfEveryLimit(t *testing.T)
// percentText gives them, and limitHit its limit_hit.
want, limitHit string
}{
{limitHalf, asnDEQuarter, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent, minuteBytes},
{limitQuarter, asnDEHalf, "25 from " + blocklistAction, minuteBytes},
{limitHalf, asnTagDEQuarter, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent, minuteBytes},
{limitQuarter, asnTagDEHalf, "25 from " + blocklistAction, minuteBytes},
// The AS number's, the first of two alike.
{limitQuarter, asnDEQuarter, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent, minuteBytes},
{actionLog, asnDE + ":100", none, ""},
{limitQuarter, asnTagDEQuarter, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent, minuteBytes},
{actionLog, "asn=64511:25", none, ""},
} {
t.Run(tc.action+" "+tc.asnPercent, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
bytesLimitPerMinute: twoUploads, blocklistURLs: dropURL,
blocklistAction: tc.action, asnLimitPercent: tc.asnPercent,
blocklistAction: tc.action, tagLimitPercent: tc.asnPercent,
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {fromDE}})
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ func TestASNLimitPercentFileCountsAsTheSettingDoesTheLowerWinning(t *testing.T)
const (
fromURL = "25 from " + asnLimitPercentURL
fromSetting = "25 from " + asnLimitPercent
fromSetting = "25 from " + tagLimitPercent
)
for _, tc := range []struct {
@@ -260,21 +260,21 @@ func TestASNLimitPercentFileCountsAsTheSettingDoesTheLowerWinning(t *testing.T)
{"the file's alone", nil, asnDEQuarter, fromURL, fromURL},
{
"the file's, lower than the setting's",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEHalf}, asnDEQuarter, fromURL, fromURL,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEHalf}, asnDEQuarter, fromURL, fromURL,
},
{
"the setting's, lower than the file's",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter}, asnDEHalf,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter}, asnDEHalf,
fromSetting, fromSetting,
},
{
"the setting's, the first of two alike",
map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: asnDEQuarter}, asnDEQuarter,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter}, asnDEQuarter,
fromSetting, fromSetting,
},
{"none, for an AS number the file does not list", nil, asnKP + ":25", none, none},
{
"SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT's in place of the file's for the byte limits",
"SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT's in place of the file's for the byte limits",
map[string]string{asnBytesPercent: asnDE + ":100"}, asnDEQuarter, fromURL, none,
},
} {
@@ -362,9 +362,9 @@ func TestEachBlocklistThatListsAClientRaisesAnAlertOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
// The DNSBL settings.
const (
dnsblZones = "SWW_DNSBL_ZONES"
dnsblResolver = "SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER"
reputationAction = "SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION"
dnsblZones = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES"
dnsblResolver = "SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER"
reputationAction = "SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION"
)
// The DNSBL zones these tests name, which are never asked about the
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientADNSBLZoneLists(t *testing.T) {
for _, from := range []string{fromDE, fromKP} {
for i := range 3 {
line := s.get(from, tc.statuses[i], tc.actions[i])
// In the order SWW_DNSBL_ZONES names them.
// In the order SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES names them.
wantReputation(t, line, listedBy[from]...)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent,
line.LimitPercentSetting, tc.percent)
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ func TestDNSBLZonesComeAfterTheBlocklistsAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromKP: {dnsblZone}, fromDE: {dnsblZone}})
// The blocklist refuses fromKP before its verdict is looked at, and
// fromDE, in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted
// fromDE, in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS, is not checked at all: neither is noted
// for the zone, nor alerted, nor asked about.
wantReputation(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
dropURL)
@@ -482,6 +482,46 @@ func TestDNSBLZonesComeAfterTheBlocklistsAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestReputationSourcesTagTheRequestWhateverTheirAction(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
load func(*discriminator.Server)
want []string
}{
{
"dnsbl",
map[string]string{
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver, reputationAction: actionLog,
},
func(server *discriminator.Server) {
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {dnsblZone}})
},
[]string{"asn=64496", "country=DE", "dnsbl=" + dnsblZone},
},
{
abuseipdb,
map[string]string{abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog},
func(server *discriminator.Server) {
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{fromDE: 80})
},
[]string{abuseipdb, "asn=64496", "country=DE"},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, tc.env)
tc.load(server)
wantTags(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
tc.want...)
})
}
}
func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientADNSBLZoneDeniesAndAlertsIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -659,7 +699,7 @@ func TestRequestFromAClientWithoutAVerdictHasTheZoneAskedAboutIt(t *testing.T) {
// The AbuseIPDB settings, and accountKey, the key the tests set.
const (
abuseIPDBKey = "SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
abuseIPDBKey = "SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY"
accountKey = "abuseipdb-key-0123456789abcdef"
)
@@ -850,7 +890,7 @@ func TestEachReputationActionForAClientAbuseIPDBScoresAtOrOverTheMinimum(t *test
rateLimitPerMinute: fourAMinute, abuseIPDBKey: accountKey,
reputationAction: tc.action,
})
// At SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default, and just under it.
// At SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default, and just under it.
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{fromDE: 75, fromKP: 74})
for i := range 3 {
@@ -901,7 +941,7 @@ func TestAbuseIPDBHitRaisesAnAlertWithTheScoreOncePerCooldownAndIsCounted(
// The alert is made as a DNSBL zone's is, with the score besides.
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 1 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventReputationHit ||
waiting[0].Reason != "scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE" ||
waiting[0].Reason != "scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE" ||
waiting[0].Detail["source"] != abuseipdb || waiting[0].Detail["score"] != int64(90) ||
queue.Suppressed() != 1 {
t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, %d held back, want AbuseIPDB's reputation_hit "+
@@ -972,7 +1012,7 @@ func TestBanNotesNameEachReputationSourceThatListedTheClient(t *testing.T) {
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionLog,
})
// Every source lists client, and none otherClient, whose score is
// under SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default.
// under SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default.
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {client}})
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{client: {dnsblZone}, otherClient: nil})
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{client: score, otherClient: 74})
@@ -1021,7 +1061,7 @@ func verdictsFetched() time.Time {
}
// loadVerdicts puts into server's DNSBL, for each client listedBy names,
// a verdict of each zone SWW_DNSBL_ZONES names, fetched at
// a verdict of each zone SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES names, fetched at
// verdictsFetched, as reputation.json would at start: one that lists the
// client from each zone listedBy gives for it, and one that does not from
// each other zone.
internal/discriminator/request.go
+16 -7
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ type decision struct {
lookedUp bool
lookupAnswer lookup.Answer
// skippedLookupWait is true for a request that did not wait for GeoJS and
// found no answer kept. SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT does not apply to it,
// found no answer kept. SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT does not apply to it,
// so that not waiting never lowers its client's limits.
skippedLookupWait bool
// counted is true for a request the rate limits counted, whose bytes
@@ -138,6 +138,15 @@ func (h *handler) startRequest(
return rq
}
// addTag adds tag to the request's tags, which stay sorted and hold each tag
// once.
func (rq *request) addTag(tag string) {
at, found := slices.BinarySearch(rq.line.Tags, tag)
if !found {
rq.line.Tags = slices.Insert(rq.line.Tags, at, tag)
}
}
// requestHeaders returns the headers of r that names lists, by name in
// lower case, each with its values joined by ", ". Authorization, Cookie
// and Set-Cookie are never among them, whatever names says.
@@ -161,7 +170,7 @@ func requestHeaders(r *http.Request, names []string) map[string]string {
// check is the one place where a request can be refused. It returns nil to let
// the request through. The heuristics of checkClient decide: a request they
// refuse is answered with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, 403 for a block rule or the Core
// refuse is answered with SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE, 403 for a block rule or the Core
// Rule Set, or 431 for the header limits. In observe mode nothing is refused,
// and the log line names what enforce mode would have done. ctx is the
// request's own context.
@@ -190,7 +199,7 @@ func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
// checkClient runs the heuristics of beforeLookup on the request, then looks
// up the client's AS number and country, then runs those of afterLookup. It
// returns the first verdict, or nil when none gives one. A client in
// SWW_ALLOW_NETS skips them all, and is not looked up. ctx is the request's
// SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS skips them all, and is not looked up. ctx is the request's
// own context.
func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) *verdict {
if isInside(rq.client, rq.h.config.AllowNets) {
@@ -214,7 +223,7 @@ func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) *verdict {
}
// pathExempt reports whether r is exempt under prefixes,
// SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS or SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its
// SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS or SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its
// path as sent, the path the app receives, not percent-decoded, starts
// with one of prefixes, so that /%61ssets/x is not under /assets/ for an
// app whose router matches the path as received. A request whose decoded
@@ -316,9 +325,9 @@ func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
// countAnomalies counts the request, which has ended, and its bytes, as
// countedBytes gives them, for the anomaly thresholds, whatever was done
// with it: a request refused, one from a client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS or
// SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and one for a path in
// SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS are counted too. It is counted for its
// with it: a request refused, one from a client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS or
// SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and one for a path in
// SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS are counted too. It is counted for its
// client's AS number when answerAtTheEnd gives one. With every anomaly
// threshold off, the default, it does nothing.
func (rq *request) countAnomalies() {
internal/discriminator/requestlog_test.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import (
const (
// requestIDHeader carries the request's id.
requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
// instance is the SWW_INSTANCE_NAME a test sets.
// instance is the SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME a test sets.
instance = "fsn1app1/blog"
// ipv6Client is a client on IPv6, and ipv6Group the netblock the rate
// limits count it as.
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ func TestHasAuthorizationAndHasCookieEachComeFromTheirOwnHeader(t *testing.T) {
func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
// The pause sets the times apart; a hold-up of the test only lengthens
internal/discriminator/rulefiles.go
+6 -2
View File
@@ -1,19 +1,21 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic rule_files. It reads the rules of the rule files, which
// SWW_RULES_DIR and SWW_RULES_ENABLED name.
// SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR and SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED name.
import (
"context"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// ruleFiles checks the request against the rules of the rule files at now,
// notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, and refuses the request
// notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, adds the tag
// exploitsignature when it matches any, and refuses the request
// when the last rule it matches refuses it: with ActionRuleBlocked for a block
// rule, and ActionBanned for a ban rule. A ban rule bans the client's netblock
// for a clear sign of attack, or in observe mode raises the alert for the ban
@@ -35,6 +37,8 @@ func (ruleFiles) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
return nil
}
rq.addTag(config.ExploitSignatureTag)
// Only the last rule matched can refuse the request.
last := matched[len(matched)-1]
figures := map[string]any{"rule_id": last.ID, "rule_action": last.Action}
internal/discriminator/rulefiles_test.go
+20 -6
View File
@@ -34,14 +34,14 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted")
// A block rule refuses with 403, whatever SWW_BAN_RESPONSE is, and
// A block rule refuses with 403, whatever SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE is, and
// bans no one.
line = s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "blocked")
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// A ban rule refuses with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, and bans the client for
// A ban rule refuses with SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and bans the client for
// seven days, the default.
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "probe")
@@ -93,6 +93,20 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
func TestEachRuleActionAddsTheExploitSignatureTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/noted$\n"+testRules),
})
wantTags(t, s.request(client, "/noted", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
"exploitsignature")
wantTags(t, s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked), "exploitsignature")
wantTags(t, s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
}
func TestRuleRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndTheRule(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -116,7 +130,7 @@ func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
attackBanDuration: "1h",
})
// The first probe bans for SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION.
// The first probe bans for SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION.
line := s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour)) {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want an hour on", line.BanExpires)
@@ -137,8 +151,8 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
)
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
@@ -148,7 +162,7 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
// A client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
line := s.request(allowed, "/.env", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantRuleIDs(t, line)
internal/discriminator/staticlists_test.go
+11 -12
View File
@@ -26,19 +26,18 @@ func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheck(t *testing.T) {
calls.Add(1)
})
geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
// fromKP is in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, and in SWW_DENY_NETS too, which
// fromKP is in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS, and in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS too, which
// comes after it.
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
allowNets: "198.51.100.0/24",
denyNets: fromKP,
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
// Neither SWW_DENY_NETS, the country lists nor the limit of one
// request a minute refuses the client, and its country is not looked
// up.
// Neither SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS, SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY nor the limit of one request a
// minute refuses the client, and its country is not looked up.
wantAnswers(t, addr, out, []sentRequest{
{fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
@@ -83,9 +82,9 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
})
geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
denyNets: "203.0.113.0/24",
deniedCountries: "kp",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
denyNets: "203.0.113.0/24",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("a body"))
@@ -142,19 +141,19 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptNetsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitExemptNets: listedAddr + "," + fromKP,
deniedCountries: "kp",
tagDeny: denyKP,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
// listedAddr's requests are neither refused nor counted, so the first
// request from unlistedAddr is within the limit of one a minute. The
// country lists still refuse an exempt client.
// request from unlistedAddr is within the limit of one a minute.
// SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY still refuses an exempt client.
wantAnswers(t, addr, out, []sentRequest{
{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
{fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied},
{fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
})
}
internal/discriminator/tagdeny.go
+30
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic tag_deny. It reads SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY.
import (
"context"
"slices"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// tagDeny refuses a request that carries a tag in SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY. Its figure is
// the first such tag, in sorted order.
type tagDeny struct{}
func (tagDeny) name() string { return "tag_deny" }
func (tagDeny) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
for _, tag := range rq.line.Tags {
if slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TagDeny, tag) {
return &verdict{
action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
figures: map[string]any{"tag": tag},
}
}
}
return nil
}
internal/discriminator/tagdeny_test.go
+121
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
package discriminator_test
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
func TestTagDenyRefusesALookupTagAndNamesTheTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The setting takes a country code in either case; the request's tag is
// in capitals.
s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{tagDeny: "Country=kp"})
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "country=KP"}`)
wantTags(t, line, "asn=64511", "country=KP")
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
func TestTagDenyRefusesAnASNTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{tagDeny: "asn=64511"})
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
"tag_deny", `{"tag": "asn=64511"}`)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
func TestTagDenyRefusesAListTagBeforeTheRateLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
tagLists: "torexit=" + torList, tagDeny: "torexit", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{torList: {fromDE}})
// Each is refused for its tag: none is counted to break the limit of one.
for range 3 {
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
"tag_deny", `{"tag": "torexit"}`)
}
}
func TestTagDenyRefusesAMixedCaseZoneByItsLowerCaseTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const mixedCaseZone = "DNSBL.example"
// The zone's tag is in lower case, however SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES writes it.
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
dnsblZones: mixedCaseZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver,
reputationAction: actionLog, tagDeny: "dnsbl=" + dnsblZone,
})
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{fromDE: {mixedCaseZone}})
wantHeuristic(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied),
"tag_deny", `{"tag": "dnsbl=`+dnsblZone+`"}`)
}
func TestTagDenyRefusesAnExploitSignatureOfARuleThatOnlyLogs(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/\n"), tagDeny: "exploitsignature",
})
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
wantHeuristic(t, line, "tag_deny", `{"tag": "exploitsignature"}`)
wantTags(t, line, "exploitsignature")
}
func TestTagLimitPercentLowersALimitTheLowestWinning(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: fourAMinute,
tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList + ",tor=" + torList,
tagLimitPercent: "vpn:50,tor:25",
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromDE}, torList: {fromDE}})
// A quarter of 4 requests a minute: the second breaks the limit.
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantPercent(t, "limit_percent", line.LimitPercent, line.LimitPercentSetting,
"25 from "+tagLimitPercent)
}
func TestTagLimitPercentLowersAByteLimitByAListTag(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
bytesLimitPerMinute: twoUploads,
tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList,
tagLimitPercent: "vpn:50",
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromDE}})
// The upload's 100 bytes are over half of 199, 99.
line := s.uploadFrom(fromDE)
if line.LimitHit != minuteBytes {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want %s", line.LimitHit, minuteBytes)
}
wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting,
"50 from "+tagLimitPercent)
// fromKP, which the list does not hold, has the whole limit.
line = s.uploadFrom(fromKP)
if line.LimitHit != "" {
t.Errorf("log line for %s has limit_hit %q, want none", fromKP, line.LimitHit)
}
wantPercent(t, "bytes_percent", line.BytesPercent, line.BytesPercentSetting, none)
}
internal/discriminator/taglists.go
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic tag_lists. It reads the address lists of SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS through
// the reputation lists.
import (
"context"
"time"
)
// tagLists adds to the request one tag for each list of SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS that
// holds the client, the tag being the list's name. It refuses nothing, and runs
// first so that every refusal's log line carries these tags.
type tagLists struct{}
func (tagLists) name() string { return "tag_lists" }
func (tagLists) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
for _, name := range rq.h.lists.TagsOf(rq.client) {
rq.addTag(name)
}
return nil
}
internal/discriminator/taglists_test.go
+100
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
package discriminator_test
import (
"net/http"
"slices"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// tagLists is SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS, and vpnList and torList lists it names.
const (
tagLists = "SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS"
vpnList = "https://lists.example/vpn.txt"
torList = "https://lists.example/torexit.txt"
)
// wantTags checks the log line's tags.
func wantTags(t *testing.T, line logLine, want ...string) {
t.Helper()
got, _ := line.fields["tags"].([]any)
tags := make([]string, 0, len(got))
for _, tag := range got {
text, _ := tag.(string)
tags = append(tags, text)
}
if !slices.Equal(tags, want) {
t.Errorf("log line has tags %v, want %v", tags, want)
}
}
func TestLookupAndTagListsGiveTheRequestItsTagsSorted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
tagLists: "vpn=mullvad=" + vpnList + ",TorExit=" + torList,
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{
vpnList: {fromDE}, torList: {fromDE + "/32", fromKP},
})
wantTags(t, s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
"asn=64496", "country=DE", "torexit", "vpn=mullvad")
wantTags(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
"asn=64511", "country=KP", "torexit")
}
func TestRequestWithoutATagLeavesTheFieldOut(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// With no lookup, a client is not placed and no setting gives it a tag.
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{lookupSource: "off"})
line := s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if _, present := line.fields["tags"]; present {
t.Errorf("log line has tags %v, want none", line.fields["tags"])
}
}
func TestTagListsTagEvenARequestTheCountryListRefuses(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList, allowedCountries: "de",
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromKP}})
wantTags(t, s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied),
"asn=64511", "country=KP", "vpn")
}
func TestTagListsTagARequestRefusedBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList, denyNets: fromKP, rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {fromDE, fromKP}})
line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
if line.Heuristic != "deny_nets" {
t.Errorf("log line has heuristic %q, want deny_nets", line.Heuristic)
}
wantTags(t, line, "vpn")
// The second request breaks the limit of one a minute, which bans the client.
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
line = s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
if line.Heuristic != "active_ban" {
t.Errorf("log line has heuristic %q, want active_ban", line.Heuristic)
}
wantTags(t, line, "vpn")
}
internal/discriminator/trappaths.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
package discriminator
// The heuristic trap_paths. It reads SWW_TRAP_PATHS.
// The heuristic trap_paths. It reads SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS.
import (
"context"
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// trapPaths refuses a request for a path in SWW_TRAP_PATHS: its path as a
// trapPaths refuses a request for a path in SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS: its path as a
// path rule sees it, without the query, as sent or once percent-decoded, is one
// of them. Such a request is a clear sign of attack, as a ban rule's match is:
// it bans the client's netblock, or in observe mode raises the alert for the
internal/discriminator/trappaths_test.go
+5 -5
View File
@@ -14,14 +14,14 @@ import (
// trapPaths is the setting's name, and trapPathList what the tests set it
// to.
const (
trapPaths = "SWW_TRAP_PATHS"
trapPaths = "SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS"
trapPathList = "/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php"
)
func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
// A block rule for the same path: the trap path comes first.
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
s.request(otherClient, path, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
// A client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
s.request(allowed, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// The query is not part of the path.
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ func TestTrapPathsNeedNoRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
trapPaths: trapPathList,
"SWW_RULES_ENABLED": "false",
trapPaths: trapPathList,
"SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED": "false",
})
s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
internal/lookup/file.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ const quietTime = 2 * time.Second
// FileParams are what OpenFile needs.
type FileParams struct {
// Path is the lookup database, the IPinfo Lite file in its .mmdb form
// (SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH).
// (SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH).
Path string
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now.
Now func() time.Time
@@ -231,12 +231,12 @@ func (f *File) use(reader *maxminddb.Reader) {
func read(path string) (*maxminddb.Reader, error) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // the file the admin names
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: %w", err)
}
reader, err := maxminddb.OpenBytes(data)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH %s is not a .mmdb file: %w", path, err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH %s is not a .mmdb file: %w", path, err)
}
return reader, nil
internal/lookup/file_internal_test.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ func TestFileThatCannotBeReadIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
writeFile(t, notDatabase, "not a lookup database\n")
for path, want := range map[string]string{
missing: "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: open " + missing +
missing: "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: open " + missing +
": no such file or directory",
notDatabase: "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + notDatabase +
notDatabase: "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + notDatabase +
" is not a .mmdb file: error opening database: invalid MaxMind DB file",
} {
_, err := OpenFile(FileParams{
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ func TestReplacementThatCannotBeReadLeavesTheFileInUseWithOneAlert(t *testing.T)
Reason: "the lookup database cannot be read, and the one read before stays in use",
Detail: map[string]any{
"file": path,
"error": "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + path + " is not a .mmdb file: " +
"error": "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + path + " is not a .mmdb file: " +
"error opening database: invalid MaxMind DB file",
},
})
internal/lookup/lookup.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// Package lookup looks up each client's AS number and country, through
// the GeoJS web service or in the lookup database, the IPinfo Lite file
// SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names. GeoJS's answers are kept in memory, for at
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names. GeoJS's answers are kept in memory, for at
// most 100,000 clients and for 7 days each, and are written to
// lookups.json and read from it by the state package.
package lookup
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ type Params struct {
URL string
// Timeout is how long a request waits for its client's first answer,
// and how long a request to GeoJS may take before it is abandoned
// (SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT).
// (SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT).
Timeout time.Duration
// Wait is true when a setting needs each request's answer before the
// request goes on. Otherwise no request waits for one.
internal/metrics/busiest.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ type busiest struct {
requests *prometheus.CounterVec
requestBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
responseBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
// refused are, by country, the requests the country lists refused; nil
// refused are, by country, the requests the country list refused; nil
// by AS number.
refused *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ type busiest struct {
func newCountries(topN int) *busiest {
countries := newBusiest(topN, "country", "the client's country")
countries.refused = counterVec("sww_country_list_refusals_total",
"Requests the country lists refused, by the client's country.",
"Requests SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES refused, by the client's country.",
[]string{"country"})
return countries
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ func (b *busiest) Collect(ch chan<- prometheus.Metric) {
}
// vecs returns the metrics: by AS number, those of requests and bytes; by
// country, the refusals by the country lists as well.
// country, the refusals by the country list as well.
func (b *busiest) vecs() []*prometheus.CounterVec {
vecs := []*prometheus.CounterVec{b.requests, b.requestBytes, b.responseBytes}
if b.refused != nil {
internal/metrics/metrics.go
+10 -10
View File
@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ type Metrics struct {
// New returns the metrics, with the Go runtime's and the process's own.
// topN is how many countries and how many AS numbers get series of their
// own (SWW_METRICS_TOP_N). Every metric carries instanceName
// (SWW_INSTANCE_NAME) as its label instance.
// own (SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N). Every metric carries instanceName
// (SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME) as its label instance.
//
//nolint:funlen // a few lines for each metric, a list that grows with them
func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
offences: counterVec("sww_offences_total",
"Offences, by kind.", []string{"kind"}),
wafMatches: counterVec("sww_waf_matches_total",
"Requests that matched a rule of the Core Rule Set, by SWW_WAF_MODE "+
"Requests that matched a rule of the Core Rule Set, by SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE "+
"and the rule's id.", []string{"mode", "rule_id"}),
countries: newCountries(topN),
asns: newASNs(topN),
@@ -214,13 +214,13 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddRules(ruleFiles *rules.Files) {
}
// AddRemoteLog adds the metrics of sending the log lines to
// SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL, read from remote as the metrics are asked for: the
// SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, read from remote as the metrics are asked for: the
// lines sent, those dropped, and those waiting in the buffer.
func (m *Metrics) AddRemoteLog(remote *remotelog.Sender) {
m.registry.MustRegister(
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "sww_remote_log_lines_sent_total",
Help: "Log lines sent to SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL.",
Help: "Log lines sent to SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL.",
}, func() float64 {
return float64(remote.Sent())
}),
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddReputation(lists *reputation.Lists, dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL
// AddAbuseIPDB adds the metrics of AbuseIPDB, with the source abuseipdb,
// read from abuseIPDB as the metrics are asked for: the checks made, those
// that failed, and how many checks the day's budget has left. It is
// called once, after AddReputation, while SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
// called once, after AddReputation, while SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
func (m *Metrics) AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
source := prometheus.Labels{sourceLabel: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource}
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
m.registry.MustRegister(
prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
Name: "sww_reputation_daily_budget_remaining",
Help: "Checks of the day's SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET not yet spent.",
Help: "Checks of the day's SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET not yet spent.",
ConstLabels: source,
}, func() float64 {
return float64(abuseIPDB.BudgetLeft())
@@ -363,8 +363,8 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddAlerts(queue *alerts.Queue) {
}),
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "sww_alerts_suppressed_total",
Help: "Alerts held back: repeats within SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN, and " +
"alerts past SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary.",
Help: "Alerts held back: repeats within SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN, and " +
"alerts past SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary.",
ConstLabels: destination,
}, func() float64 {
return float64(queue.Suppressed())
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) RuleMatched(id, action string) {
}
// WAFMatched counts a request that matched the Core Rule Set's rule id,
// with SWW_WAF_MODE at mode.
// with SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE at mode.
func (m *Metrics) WAFMatched(mode string, id int) {
m.wafMatches.WithLabelValues(mode, strconv.Itoa(id)).Inc()
}
internal/ratelimit/ratelimit.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// and bytes counted over a minute, an hour and a day, as the "Counting
// method" section of SPEC.md describes, which tell when a request takes
// the client over a rate limit or a byte limit, and each client's history
// since it was first seen. At most SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS clients are
// since it was first seen. At most SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS clients are
// kept, in memory, and written to clients.json and read from it by the
// state package.
package ratelimit
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ type Request struct {
}
// New returns a Limiter for limits, with no client counted yet, whose
// table holds at most maxClients clients (SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS). Past
// table holds at most maxClients clients (SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS). Past
// it, the least recently seen client is dropped, with its history, and
// starts afresh if it comes back.
func New(limits Limits, maxClients int) *Limiter {
internal/ratelimit/ratelimit_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import (
const limit = 3
// tableSize is the most clients the tests' tables hold, the default of
// SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS.
// SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS.
const tableSize = 20000
// whole is the percentage of each limit a client gets when nothing lowers
internal/remotelog/remotelog.go
+8 -8
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
// Package remotelog sends the lines sww writes on stdout to the
// remote log endpoint, SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL, as the "Request log" section
// remote log endpoint, SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, as the "Request log" section
// of SPEC.md describes: each line as the message of an RFC 5424 syslog
// record, over UDP, TCP or TLS. Lines wait in a bounded buffer, so a slow
// or unreachable endpoint never holds up a request or stdout.
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The forms of SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL, by its scheme.
// The forms of SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, by its scheme.
const (
SchemeUDP = "syslog+udp"
SchemeTCP = "syslog+tcp"
@@ -56,18 +56,18 @@ const (
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
// URL is the endpoint (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL): SchemeUDP, SchemeTCP or
// URL is the endpoint (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL): SchemeUDP, SchemeTCP or
// SchemeTLS, a host and a port.
URL *url.URL
// RootCAs are the certificates a SchemeTLS endpoint's certificate
// must chain to (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE), nil for the host's.
// must chain to (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE), nil for the host's.
RootCAs *x509.CertPool
// Buffer is the most lines held while they wait to be sent
// (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER).
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER).
Buffer int
// Facility is the number of the records' syslog facility
// (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY), and AppName their APP-NAME
// (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME).
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY), and AppName their APP-NAME
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME).
Facility int
AppName string
}
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ func (s *Sender) send(ctx context.Context, processLog *slog.Logger) net.Conn {
}
}
processLog.Warn("sending to SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed",
processLog.Warn("sending to SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed",
"error", err.Error(), "connecting_again_in", delay.String())
select {
internal/remotelog/remotelog_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ func wantRetries(t *testing.T, logged *output, delays ...string) {
var fields map[string]any
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &fields)
if err != nil || fields["msg"] != "sending to SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed" {
if err != nil || fields["msg"] != "sending to SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed" {
t.Fatalf("logged %q", line)
}
internal/reputation/abuseipdb.go
+5 -5
View File
@@ -58,17 +58,17 @@ type Checks struct {
// AbuseIPDBParams are what NewAbuseIPDB needs.
type AbuseIPDBParams struct {
// URL is where clients are checked, normally AbuseIPDBURL, with Key,
// the account's key (SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY).
// the account's key (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY).
URL string
Key string
// MinScore is the least score that is a hit (SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE),
// MinScore is the least score that is a hit (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE),
// and DailyBudget the most checks made in a day, in UTC
// (SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET).
// (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET).
MinScore int64
DailyBudget int
// CacheTTL is how long a score is used after it was fetched
// (SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a check may take
// (SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT).
// (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a check may take
// (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT).
CacheTTL time.Duration
Timeout time.Duration
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
internal/reputation/dnsbl.go
+7 -7
View File
@@ -53,15 +53,15 @@ type Verdict struct {
// DNSBLParams are what NewDNSBL needs.
type DNSBLParams struct {
// Zones are the DNSBL zones clients are asked about in
// (SWW_DNSBL_ZONES).
// (SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES).
Zones []string
// Resolver is the resolver they are asked through
// (SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER), or, while it is the zero AddrPort, the
// (SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER), or, while it is the zero AddrPort, the
// host's, as /etc/resolv.conf names it.
Resolver netip.AddrPort
// CacheTTL is how long a verdict is used after it was fetched
// (SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a query may take
// (SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT).
// (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a query may take
// (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT).
CacheTTL time.Duration
Timeout time.Duration
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
@@ -127,13 +127,13 @@ func NewDNSBL(params DNSBLParams) *DNSBL {
}
}
// Zones returns the zones, in the order SWW_DNSBL_ZONES names them.
// Zones returns the zones, in the order SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES names them.
func (d *DNSBL) Zones() []string {
return slices.Clone(d.params.Zones)
}
// ListedBy returns the zones whose verdict on addr, a client's address,
// lists it, in the order SWW_DNSBL_ZONES names them, each with its key
// lists it, in the order SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES names them, each with its key
// masked, as config.MaskZoneKey masks it, since they go to the request
// log, the alerts and the metrics. A verdict is used until CacheTTL has
// passed since it was fetched. Each zone without one is asked about addr
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ func (d *DNSBL) Snapshot() []Verdict {
}
// Load keeps verdicts, read from reputation.json, in place of those it
// keeps, but for those of a zone SWW_DNSBL_ZONES does not name, and,
// keeps, but for those of a zone SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES does not name, and,
// past maxVerdicts, those fetched longest ago. One fetched CacheTTL ago or
// more is neither used nor written, as for any verdict.
func (d *DNSBL) Load(verdicts []Verdict) {
internal/reputation/dnsbl_test.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ const (
// zone and otherZone are the DNSBL zones the tests name.
zone = "dnsbl.example"
otherZone = "other.example"
// cacheTTL is the tests' SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL, and timeout their
// SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT: a second, the least time /etc/resolv.conf
// cacheTTL is the tests' SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL, and timeout their
// SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT: a second, the least time /etc/resolv.conf
// can have Go's resolver wait for one server, so that it is the
// DNSBL's own timeout that ends a query, whatever that file says.
cacheTTL = 24 * time.Hour
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ func TestNeitherAVerdictOfAZoneNotNamedNorOnePastItsTTLIsKept(t *testing.T) {
dnsbl := reputation.NewDNSBL(p)
// The last verdict still in use, one fetched a TTL ago, and one of a
// zone SWW_DNSBL_ZONES does not name.
// zone SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES does not name.
inUse := reputation.Verdict{
Zone: zone, Client: netip.MustParseAddr(listed), Listed: true,
Fetched: now.Add(-cacheTTL + time.Nanosecond),
internal/reputation/reputation.go
+47 -24
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
// Package reputation fetches the lists the settings name by URL: the
// blocklists of SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS, the file of AS:percent lines
// SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names, and the decision list of the CrowdSec
// engine SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL names. It keeps the last good copy of
// blocklists of SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS, the file of AS:percent lines
// SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names, the address lists of SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS, and
// the decision list of the CrowdSec engine SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL names. It
// keeps the last good copy of
// each, whole, comment lines included, which is used while a fetch fails,
// and when each was last tried. It also asks the DNSBL zones of
// SWW_DNSBL_ZONES about clients, and keeps their verdicts, and checks
// SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES about clients, and keeps their verdicts, and checks
// clients with AbuseIPDB, and keeps their scores and the checks spent
// today. The state package writes all of these to reputation.json and
// reads them from it, so that a restart keeps them too.
@@ -66,18 +67,20 @@ type List struct {
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
// BlocklistURLs are the blocklists (SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS), and
// BlocklistURLs are the blocklists (SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS), and
// ASNLimitPercentURL the file of AS:percent lines
// (SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL), "" while it is unset.
// (SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL), "" while it is unset.
BlocklistURLs []string
ASNLimitPercentURL string
// TagLists are the address lists that add a tag (SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS).
TagLists []config.TagList
// CrowdSecDecisionsURL is the CrowdSec decision list, "" while
// SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL is unset, fetched with CrowdSecKey
// (SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY).
// SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL is unset, fetched with CrowdSecKey
// (SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY).
CrowdSecDecisionsURL string
CrowdSecKey string
// Refresh is how long after a list was last fetched or tried it is
// fetched again (SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH), but for the CrowdSec decision
// fetched again (SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH), but for the CrowdSec decision
// list, which is fetched again crowdSecRefresh after.
Refresh time.Duration
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
@@ -112,11 +115,11 @@ type list struct {
failures int
}
// entries are what the lines of a copy say: for a blocklist, the netblocks
// it names, with the lengths among them, for the file of AS:percent lines,
// the percentage it gives each AS number, and for the CrowdSec decision
// list, the decision on each netblock that ends last, with the lengths
// among them.
// entries are what the lines of a copy say: for a blocklist or a tag list, the
// netblocks it names, with the lengths among them, for the file of AS:percent
// lines, the percentage it gives each AS number, and for the CrowdSec decision
// list, the decision on each netblock that ends last, with the lengths among
// them.
type entries struct {
netblocks map[netip.Prefix]bool
lengths []int
@@ -152,14 +155,18 @@ func New(params Params) *Lists {
}
// URLs returns the URL of every list: the blocklists' in the order
// SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them, then SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL, then
// the CrowdSec decision list's.
// SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them, then SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL, then the
// tag lists', then the CrowdSec decision list's.
func (l *Lists) URLs() []string {
urls := slices.Clone(l.params.BlocklistURLs)
if l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL != "" {
urls = append(urls, l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL)
}
for _, list := range l.params.TagLists {
urls = append(urls, list.URL)
}
if l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL != "" {
urls = append(urls, l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL)
}
@@ -168,7 +175,7 @@ func (l *Lists) URLs() []string {
}
// ListedBy returns the URLs of the blocklists whose copy lists addr, in
// the order SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them.
// the order SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them.
func (l *Lists) ListedBy(addr netip.Addr) []string {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
@@ -184,6 +191,22 @@ func (l *Lists) ListedBy(addr netip.Addr) []string {
return listedBy
}
// TagsOf returns the names of the tag lists whose copy holds addr.
func (l *Lists) TagsOf(addr netip.Addr) []string {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
var names []string
for _, list := range l.params.TagLists {
if l.lists[list.URL].entries.contain(addr) {
names = append(names, list.Name)
}
}
return names
}
// ASNLimitPercent returns the percentage the copy of the file of
// AS:percent lines gives asn, and whether it lists asn.
func (l *Lists) ASNLimitPercent(asn string) (int64, bool) {
@@ -481,10 +504,10 @@ func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
}
// parse reads the lines of the list at listURL, fetched at fetched: those
// of a blocklist, of the file of AS:percent lines, or of the CrowdSec
// decision list. In the first two, anything after a ; or a # on a line is
// left out, and so is a line left blank. Any other line that does not read
// is an error naming it by its number.
// of a blocklist or a tag list, of the file of AS:percent lines, or of the
// CrowdSec decision list. In all but the decision list, anything after a ; or
// a # on a line is left out, and so is a line left blank. Any other line that
// does not read is an error naming it by its number.
func (l *Lists) parse(
listURL string, lines []string, fetched time.Time,
) (entries, error) {
@@ -498,8 +521,8 @@ func (l *Lists) parse(
}
}
// parseNetblocks reads a blocklist's lines, each an address or a netblock
// as the settings take them.
// parseNetblocks reads the lines of a blocklist or a tag list, each an address
// or a netblock as the settings take them.
func parseNetblocks(lines []string) (entries, error) {
found := entries{netblocks: map[netip.Prefix]bool{}}
@@ -551,7 +574,7 @@ func parseNetblock(text string) (netip.Prefix, bool) {
}
// parsePercents reads the lines of the file of AS:percent lines, each an
// AS number, : and a percentage, as SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT takes them. An
// AS number, : and a percentage, such as AS64496:50. An
// AS number listed more than once gets the lowest of its percentages.
func parsePercents(lines []string) (entries, error) {
found := entries{percents: map[string]int64{}}
internal/reputation/reputation_test.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ const (
dropURL = "https://lists.example/drop.txt"
torURL = "https://lists.example/tor.txt"
asnURL = "https://lists.example/asn.txt"
// refresh is the tests' SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH, and cooldown their
// SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN, longer than it.
// refresh is the tests' SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH, and cooldown their
// SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN, longer than it.
refresh = 24 * time.Hour
cooldown = 48 * time.Hour
// drop is a blocklist as the Spamhaus DROP list is written, with an
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ func TestClientIsListedByEachBlocklistThatListsIt(t *testing.T) {
}}
lists := start(t, servers, params(torURL, dropURL))
// In the order SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them.
// In the order SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them.
wantListedBy(t, lists, "203.0.113.9", torURL, dropURL)
wantListedBy(t, lists, "203.0.113.8", dropURL)
})
internal/requestlog/requestlog.go
+11 -8
View File
@@ -38,16 +38,17 @@ const (
ActionRuleBlocked = "rule_blocked"
// ActionWAFBlocked is a request refused because the Core Rule Set
// scored it at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
// scored it at or over SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
ActionWAFBlocked = "waf_blocked"
// ActionDenied is a request refused because its client is in
// SWW_DENY_NETS, in a blocklist while SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny,
// SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS, in a blocklist while SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny,
// or listed by a DNSBL zone, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, while
// SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny.
// SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny, or that carries a tag in SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY.
ActionDenied = "denied"
// ActionCountryDenied is a request refused for its client's country.
// ActionCountryDenied is a request refused because its client's country
// is not in SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
ActionCountryDenied = "country_denied"
// ActionAdmin is a request discriminator answered at one of its own
// endpoints, or a question about a path under /_sww/.
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ type Line struct {
ContentType string `json:"content_type,omitempty"`
// ContentLength is the length of its body the request announced.
ContentLength int64 `json:"content_length,omitempty"`
// RequestHeaders are the headers SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS names that
// RequestHeaders are the headers SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS names that
// the request carried, by name in lower case.
RequestHeaders map[string]string `json:"request_headers,omitempty"`
HasAuthorization bool `json:"has_authorization,omitempty"`
@@ -179,6 +180,8 @@ type Line struct {
// whose verdict lists it, their keys masked, then abuseipdb when its
// score is a hit.
Reputation []string `json:"reputation,omitempty"`
// Tags are the request's tags, sorted.
Tags []string `json:"tags,omitempty"`
// Offence is the offence the request was held as, OffenceLimit.
Offence string `json:"offence,omitempty"`
// BanExpires is when the ban the request made, or was refused under,
@@ -219,7 +222,7 @@ type RProxyLine struct {
DurationRequest float64 `json:"duration_request"`
DurationResponse float64 `json:"duration_response"`
// Disposition is the valid disposition discriminator answered or, while
// DefaultDisposition is true, the value of SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION. It is ""
// DefaultDisposition is true, the value of SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION. It is ""
// when neither gave one.
Disposition string `json:"disposition,omitempty"`
DefaultDisposition bool `json:"default_disposition,omitempty"`
@@ -271,8 +274,8 @@ func Milliseconds(d time.Duration) float64 {
// NewProcessLogger returns the logger for the process's own messages:
// JSON lines on w, marked "type":"process", with the time in the same form
// as a request line's, and instanceName, SWW_INSTANCE_NAME, as instance.
// It writes only the messages at level, SWW_LOG_LEVEL, or more severe;
// as a request line's, and instanceName, SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME, as instance.
// It writes only the messages at level, SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL, or more severe;
// the request lines Write writes are never held back.
func NewProcessLogger(
w io.Writer,
internal/rproxy/bodies.go
+4 -4
View File
@@ -10,16 +10,16 @@ import (
)
// errResponseTooLarge ends an app's response body that is longer than
// SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE.
// SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE.
var errResponseTooLarge = errors.New(
"the response body is over SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE")
"the response body is over SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE")
// requestBody is the visitor's request body. rproxy first reads up to the first
// 64 KiB of it into held, and then, on its way to the app, the transport reads
// it on a goroutine of its own.
type requestBody struct {
// body is the visitor's body, ending in an *http.MaxBytesError past
// SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE.
// SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE.
body io.ReadCloser
rq *request
// held is the part read before the request goes to the app, which Read gives
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ func (b *requestBody) Close() error {
// responseBody is the app's response body on its way to the visitor.
type responseBody struct {
// body is the app's body, ending in an *http.MaxBytesError past
// SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE.
// SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE.
body io.ReadCloser
rq *request
}
internal/rproxy/discriminator.go
+5 -5
View File
@@ -65,9 +65,9 @@ func (rq *request) handleNoUsableAnswer(ctx context.Context, err error) {
rq.answer(http.StatusBadGateway)
default:
// discriminator cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer
// within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. A request that keeps discriminator busy past
// SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS, like any request while discriminator is overloaded, gets
// SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION here. deny closes this, at the cost of answering 503
// within SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS. A request that keeps discriminator busy past
// SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS, like any request while discriminator is overloaded, gets
// SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION here. deny closes this, at the cost of answering 503
// whenever discriminator is slow. Making such requests hard to send is
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf/issues/182.
rq.h.processLog.Warn("discriminator gave no answer", "error", err.Error())
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func (rq *request) handleNoUsableAnswer(ctx context.Context, err error) {
}
// ask sends discriminator the question, and returns its answer, which must have come
// whole within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. It ends when ctx does, as when the visitor goes
// whole within SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS. It ends when ctx does, as when the visitor goes
// away.
func (rq *request) ask(ctx context.Context) (*discriminatorAnswer, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, rq.h.config.Timeout)
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ func (h *handler) sendReport(ctx context.Context, report *discriminator.Report)
}
// postReport posts report to discriminator, and waits for its answer for up to
// SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS.
// SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS.
func (h *handler) postReport(ctx context.Context, report *discriminator.Report) error {
body, err := json.Marshal(report)
if err != nil {
internal/rproxy/limits_test.go
+4 -7
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config/configtest"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
@@ -33,13 +34,9 @@ func announcedLength(size int) string {
func TestServerHasTheFixedLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
if name == "SWRP_WAF_BACKEND" {
return nowhere, true
}
return "", false
})
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(configtest.Viper(map[string]string{
"SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND": nowhere,
}))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
internal/rproxy/request.go
+13 -13
View File
@@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ type request struct {
start time.Time
// disposition is what is done with the request: discriminator's valid disposition,
// or SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION. It is "" when neither gave one.
// or SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION. It is "" when neither gave one.
disposition string
// answered is true when discriminator gave disposition, which makes a report due,
// and byDefault when SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION did.
// and byDefault when SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION did.
answered bool
byDefault bool
// asn and country are discriminator's X-Client-ASN and X-Client-Country, for the
@@ -118,10 +118,10 @@ func (rq *request) answerHealth() {
}
// readFirstPartOfBody reads up to the first 64 KiB of the body into memory,
// within SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS, and reports whether the request goes on. A
// within SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS, and reports whether the request goes on. A
// visitor too slow to send it is answered 408. For a malformed chunk, or a
// visitor that went away or stopped its sending side, the connection is closed
// without an answer. A body over SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE goes on with the part
// without an answer. A body over SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE goes on with the part
// read, so that discriminator is asked first; passToApp then refuses it.
func (rq *request) readFirstPartOfBody() bool {
if rq.body == nil {
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ func (rq *request) forward(ctx context.Context) {
}
// rewrite makes the request the app receives: the visitor's request, unchanged,
// sent to SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL, with the forwarded headers and the request's id set,
// sent to SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL, with the forwarded headers and the request's id set,
// without any X-Client-ASN or X-Client-Country the visitor sent, and with
// discriminator's.
func (rq *request) rewrite(pr *httputil.ProxyRequest) {
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ func (rq *request) send(status int, body []byte) {
// prepareOwnAnswer readies the connection for an answer rproxy gives itself: the
// reading of a body that has not arrived whole ends at deadline, and the answer
// has SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS from now to reach the visitor, even when the app
// has SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS from now to reach the visitor, even when the app
// used that time up first.
func (rq *request) prepareOwnAnswer(deadline time.Time) {
rq.stopReadingBody(deadline)
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ func (rq *request) bytesEachWay() (int64, int64) {
}
// requestDeadline is when the visitor must have sent its whole request, or zero
// when SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS is off.
// when SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS is off.
func (rq *request) requestDeadline() time.Time {
limit := rq.h.config.MaxRequestTime
if limit == 0 {
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ func (rq *request) stopReadingBody(deadline time.Time) {
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(deadline)
}
// startRequestTimer starts SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS, which runs from the
// startRequestTimer starts SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS, which runs from the
// request's headers being read until the app has been sent the whole request.
func (rq *request) startRequestTimer() {
deadline := rq.requestDeadline()
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ func (rq *request) startRequestTimer() {
rq.requestTimer = time.AfterFunc(time.Until(deadline), rq.requestTimedOut)
}
// requestTimedOut is called when SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS runs out while the
// requestTimedOut is called when SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS runs out while the
// request is still on its way to the app. The answer names the side rproxy was
// waiting on at that moment: 408 when it was waiting for the visitor to send more
// of its body, 504 when it was waiting for the app to be reached or to take what
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ func (rq *request) gotFirstResponseByte() {
}
// wroteRequest is called once the app has been sent the whole request:
// SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS ends and SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS starts.
// SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS ends and SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS starts.
func (rq *request) wroteRequest(info httptrace.WroteRequestInfo) {
if info.Err != nil {
return // the transport gives up, or tries again
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ func (rq *request) wroteRequest(info httptrace.WroteRequestInfo) {
}
}
// responseTimedOut is called when SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS runs out before the
// responseTimedOut is called when SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS runs out before the
// app has sent its whole answer.
func (rq *request) responseTimedOut() {
rq.mu.Lock()
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ func (rq *request) responseTimedOut() {
// answer before the visitor has sent its whole body, as with a 404 it sends
// without reading it. The time limits then run on: until the transport's read of
// the body returns, Go's server cannot send the answer, and
// SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS is what ends that read for a visitor that stops
// SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS is what ends that read for a visitor that stops
// sending.
func (rq *request) responseReceived() {
if rq.body != nil && !rq.body.received.Load() {
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ func (rq *request) responseReceived() {
rq.stopTimers()
}
// setResponseDeadline sets SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS on the connection to the
// setResponseDeadline sets SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS on the connection to the
// visitor: the app's answer must reach the visitor within it of the end of the
// request.
func (rq *request) setResponseDeadline() {
internal/rproxy/rproxy.go
+7 -6
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
// Package rproxy is the reverse proxy in front of one app that asks discriminator
// about each request. It passes a request discriminator allows to the app and the
// app's answer back, within the size and time limits. Any other answer from
// discriminator goes to the visitor as discriminator gave it. SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION
// discriminator goes to the visitor as discriminator gave it.
// SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION
// decides only when discriminator cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or
// does not answer within SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. rproxy itself refuses a request with a
// does not answer within SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS. rproxy itself refuses a request with a
// method it does not pass on, or one it cannot put to discriminator as the visitor
// sent it. It keeps nothing between requests and never touches disk. "rproxy" in
// sent it. It keeps nothing between requests and writes nothing to disk. "rproxy" in
// SPEC.md says what it does.
package rproxy
@@ -71,7 +72,7 @@ type Server struct {
// New returns the server `sww rproxy` runs. Go's server itself refuses
// a request line and headers over requestHeaderMaxBytes, with 431, closes a
// connection idle for idleTimeout, and applies SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS while
// connection idle for idleTimeout, and applies SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS while
// the headers arrive. The handler applies the time and size limits from then
// on.
func New(params Params) *Server {
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ func New(params Params) *Server {
}
// WaitForReports returns once the reports being sent have gone or failed,
// which SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS bounds. Any report after this call is dropped: that of
// which SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS bounds. Any report after this call is dropped: that of
// a WebSocket that closes while rproxy stops, for one.
func (s *Server) WaitForReports() {
s.h.reportsMu.Lock()
@@ -212,7 +213,7 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// passToApp passes the request on to the app, unless a limit or its path keeps
// it from the app. discriminator answers a path under adminPrefix itself, so such a
// request gets here only when SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION allowed it. ctx is the
// request gets here only when SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION allowed it. ctx is the
// request's own context.
func (rq *request) passToApp(ctx context.Context) {
maxBytes := rq.h.config.MaxRequestSize
internal/rproxy/rproxy_test.go
+10 -13
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config/configtest"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
@@ -43,13 +44,13 @@ const (
// The settings the tests set.
const (
timeoutSetting = "SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS"
defaultDisposition = "SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION"
trustedProxies = "SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
maxRequestSize = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
maxResponseSize = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
maxRequestTime = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
maxResponseTime = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
timeoutSetting = "SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS"
defaultDisposition = "SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION"
trustedProxies = "SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
maxRequestSize = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
maxResponseSize = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
maxRequestTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
maxResponseTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
)
// The headers the tests set and look at.
@@ -354,15 +355,11 @@ func startServerLogging(
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
"SWRP_WAF_BACKEND": backend, "SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
"SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND": backend, "SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := settings[name]
return value, ok
})
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(configtest.Viper(settings))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", settings, err)
}
internal/rules/rules.go
+6 -6
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
// Package rules reads the rule files: the plain text files in
// SWW_RULES_DIR, one rule to a line, that each request is checked
// SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR, one rule to a line, that each request is checked
// against, as the "Rule files" section of SPEC.md describes. They are read
// at start, and again once the directory has had no change for a short
// time after one is edited, added or removed.
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ const (
// extension ends the name of every rule file.
const extension = ".rules"
// quietTime is how long SWW_RULES_DIR must go without a change before
// quietTime is how long SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR must go without a change before
// the rule files are read again, so that a file still being written, such
// as one saved in place, appended to or copied in with scp, is read only
// once whole.
@@ -100,9 +100,9 @@ type Rule struct {
// Params are what Load needs.
type Params struct {
// Dir is the directory of the rule files (SWW_RULES_DIR).
// Dir is the directory of the rule files (SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR).
Dir string
// Enabled is SWW_RULES_ENABLED: while it is false, no file is read
// Enabled is SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED: while it is false, no file is read
// and no rule loaded.
Enabled bool
// ProcessLog receives how many rules were read, and the error in a
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ func (f *Files) logRead(count int) {
func read(dir string) ([]Rule, string, error) {
entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
if err != nil {
return nil, dir, fmt.Errorf("SWW_RULES_DIR cannot be read: %w", err)
return nil, dir, fmt.Errorf("SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR cannot be read: %w", err)
}
var rules []Rule
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ func read(dir string) ([]Rule, string, error) {
// readFile appends the rules of the rule file at path to rules. places
// are where each id read so far is, and gain those of the file.
func readFile(path string, rules []Rule, places map[string]string) ([]Rule, error) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // a rule file, in SWW_RULES_DIR
data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // a rule file, in SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
internal/rules/rules_test.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ func TestDirectoryThatDoesNotExistStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rules.d")
wantRefused(t, dir, "SWW_RULES_DIR cannot be read: open "+dir+
wantRefused(t, dir, "SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR cannot be read: open "+dir+
": no such file or directory")
}
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ func TestEmptyDirectoryLoadsNoRulesAndSaysSo(t *testing.T) {
func TestRuleFilesOffReadNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// SWW_RULES_DIR does not exist, which would stop the start.
// SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR does not exist, which would stop the start.
params, _ := newParams(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rules.d"))
params.Enabled = false
internal/state/state.go
+8 -8
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
// Package state keeps sww's state in JSON files in
// SWW_STATE_DIR, as the "Persistent state" section of SPEC.md requires
// SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR, as the "Persistent state" section of SPEC.md requires
// and docs/state-files.md lists them:
// bans.json holds the bans, clients.json each client's counters and
// history, lookups.json GeoJS's answers, reputation.json the last try and
@@ -72,11 +72,11 @@ var (
// Params are what Load needs.
type Params struct {
// Dir is the directory of the state files (SWW_STATE_DIR).
// Dir is the directory of the state files (SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR).
Dir string
// WriteDelay is how long after a ban is made bans.json is written
// (SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY), and CounterInterval how often every file
// is (SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL).
// (SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY), and CounterInterval how often every file
// is (SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL).
WriteDelay time.Duration
CounterInterval time.Duration
// Ledger, Limiter, GeoJS, Lists, DNSBL, AbuseIPDB, Alerts and Anomalies
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ type stateFile interface {
func Load(params Params) (*Files, error) {
err := checkWritable(params.Dir)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_STATE_DIR cannot be written: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR cannot be written: %w", err)
}
f := &Files{params: params, sums: map[string][sha256.Size]byte{}}
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ func (f *Files) read(name string) (int, error) {
func (f *Files) readChanged(name string) ([]byte, bool, error) {
path := filepath.Join(f.params.Dir, name)
data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // a state file, in SWW_STATE_DIR
data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // a state file, in SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR
if errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
return nil, false, nil
}
@@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ func write(dir, name string, data []byte) error {
// syncDirectory syncs dir to the disk, so that a rename in it lasts.
func syncDirectory(dir string) error {
directory, err := os.Open(dir) //nolint:gosec // SWW_STATE_DIR itself
directory, err := os.Open(dir) //nolint:gosec // SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR itself
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ func syncDirectory(dir string) error {
// writeSynced writes data to the file at path, and syncs it to the disk.
func writeSynced(path string, data []byte) error {
//nolint:gosec // a state file's temporary file, in SWW_STATE_DIR
//nolint:gosec // a state file's temporary file, in SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR
file, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, fileMode)
if err != nil {
return err
internal/state/state_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ func TestUnwritableDirectoryStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing"),
notADirectory,
} {
const want = "SWW_STATE_DIR cannot be written: "
const want = "SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR cannot be written: "
_, err := state.Load(newParams(dir))
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), want) {
internal/sww/healthcheck.go
+13 -15
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ import (
"net/url"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
)
@@ -21,17 +23,17 @@ var errHealthEndpoint = errors.New("the health endpoint answered")
// HealthCheck is the container's health check. In discriminator's container, where
// SWW_COMMAND is discriminator, it returns 0 while discriminator answers its health
// endpoint on 127.0.0.1, at the port in SWW_LISTEN_ADDR. In rproxy's container,
// endpoint on 127.0.0.1, at the port in SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR. In rproxy's container,
// where SWW_COMMAND is rproxy, unset or empty, it returns 0 while rproxy
// answers its health endpoint on 127.0.0.1, at the port in SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR, and
// the app accepts connections at the address in SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL. Otherwise,
// answers its health endpoint on 127.0.0.1, at the port in SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR, and
// the app accepts connections at the address in SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL. Otherwise,
// any other value of SWW_COMMAND included, it writes why to stderr and
// returns 1. It reads no other setting, nor a file that another names, so neither
// can fail it.
// args are the arguments after `healthcheck`; it takes none, and given
// one it names it on stderr and returns 1 without checking anything.
func HealthCheck(
ctx context.Context, args []string, lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
ctx context.Context, args []string, v *viper.Viper,
stderr io.Writer,
) int {
if len(args) > 0 {
@@ -44,15 +46,15 @@ func HealthCheck(
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, healthCheckTimeout)
defer cancel()
command, err := config.Command(lookupEnv)
command, err := config.Command(v)
switch {
case err != nil:
err = fmt.Errorf("invalid setting: %w", err)
case command == "discriminator":
err = checkDiscriminator(ctx, lookupEnv)
err = checkDiscriminator(ctx, v)
default:
err = checkRProxyAndApp(ctx, lookupEnv)
err = checkRProxyAndApp(ctx, v)
}
if err != nil {
@@ -65,10 +67,8 @@ func HealthCheck(
}
// checkDiscriminator asks discriminator's health endpoint.
func checkDiscriminator(
ctx context.Context, lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
) error {
listenAddr, err := config.DiscriminatorListenAddr(lookupEnv)
func checkDiscriminator(ctx context.Context, v *viper.Viper) error {
listenAddr, err := config.DiscriminatorListenAddr(v)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid setting: %w", err)
}
@@ -82,10 +82,8 @@ func checkDiscriminator(
}
// checkRProxyAndApp asks rproxy's health endpoint, and connects to the app.
func checkRProxyAndApp(
ctx context.Context, lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
) error {
listenAddr, upstreamURL, err := config.RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(lookupEnv)
func checkRProxyAndApp(ctx context.Context, v *viper.Viper) error {
listenAddr, upstreamURL, err := config.RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(v)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid setting: %w", err)
}
internal/sww/healthcheck_test.go
+13 -19
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config/configtest"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/sww"
)
@@ -54,9 +55,9 @@ func TestHealthCheckInDiscriminatorsContainer(t *testing.T) {
// or invalid token file, or an invalid value of another setting, does not
// fail it.
for _, other := range []struct{ name, value string }{
{"SWW_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "removed")},
{"SWW_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE", writeFile(t, "too short\n")},
{"SWW_MODE", "neither"},
{"SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "removed")},
{"SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE", writeFile(t, "too short\n")},
{"SWW_WAF_MODE", "neither"},
} {
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
commandSetting: discriminatorCommand,
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ func TestHealthCheckInDiscriminatorsContainer(t *testing.T) {
}, 1, "unhealthy: ask discriminator: ")
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
commandSetting: discriminatorCommand, listenAddr: "8080",
}, 1, "unhealthy: invalid setting: SWW_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
}, 1, "unhealthy: invalid setting: SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
stop()
@@ -111,8 +112,8 @@ func TestHealthCheckInRProxysContainer(t *testing.T) {
0, "")
// Another setting does not fail it, even an invalid one, and neither does
// SWRP_WAF_BACKEND being unset.
wantHealthCheck(t, settings("SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS", "soon"), 0, "")
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND being unset.
wantHealthCheck(t, settings("SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS", "soon"), 0, "")
// Another test can take a closed server's port at once, so the app's
// address here is a multicast address, to which TCP cannot connect.
@@ -123,13 +124,14 @@ func TestHealthCheckInRProxysContainer(t *testing.T) {
// itself.
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(rproxyListenAddr, ":0"), 1, "unhealthy: ask rproxy: ")
wantHealthCheck(t, settings(rproxyListenAddr, "8080"), 1,
"unhealthy: invalid setting: SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
"unhealthy: invalid setting: SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR: ")
// No setting of rproxy's has a form given as a file.
// A setting of rproxy's can be given as a file too, here the listen
// address, which the health check reads.
wantHealthCheck(t, map[string]string{
rproxyListenAddr + "_FILE": writeFile(t, ":"+port+"\n"),
rproxyUpstreamURL: app.URL,
}, 1, "unhealthy: ask rproxy: ")
}, 0, "")
}
func TestHealthCheckFailsWithAnyOtherCommand(t *testing.T) {
@@ -145,11 +147,7 @@ func TestHealthCheckRefusesAnArgument(t *testing.T) {
var stderr bytes.Buffer
noSettings := func(string) (string, bool) {
return "", false
}
got := sww.HealthCheck(t.Context(), []string{"now"}, noSettings, &stderr)
got := sww.HealthCheck(t.Context(), []string{"now"}, configtest.Viper(nil), &stderr)
want := "sww healthcheck: unexpected argument \"now\"\n"
if got != 1 || stderr.String() != want {
@@ -166,11 +164,7 @@ func wantHealthCheck(t *testing.T, env map[string]string, status int, message st
var stderr bytes.Buffer
got := sww.HealthCheck(t.Context(), nil, func(name string) (string, bool) {
value, ok := env[name]
return value, ok
}, &stderr)
got := sww.HealthCheck(t.Context(), nil, configtest.Viper(env), &stderr)
wrote := stderr.String()
if got != status || !strings.HasPrefix(wrote, message) ||
internal/sww/rproxy.go
+3 -3
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import (
// RunRProxy is `sww rproxy`: it reads rproxy's settings, then serves
// requests until ctx is done. Then it gives the requests in progress
// shutdownTimeout to finish, and the reports being sent SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS. It
// shutdownTimeout to finish, and the reports being sent SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS. It
// returns the process's exit status, 1 when rproxy cannot start. Its process
// messages name the host's name as instance, and it writes those at info or
// more severe: rproxy has no setting for either.
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ func RunRProxy(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
hostname, _ := os.Hostname() // "" when the host has no name to give
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(params.Stdout, hostname, slog.LevelInfo)
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(params.LookupEnv)
cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(params.Viper)
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("invalid setting", "error", err.Error())
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ func RunRProxy(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(ctx, "tcp", cfg.ListenAddr)
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("cannot listen on SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR", "error", err.Error())
processLog.Error("cannot listen on SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR", "error", err.Error())
return 1
}
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