pixa/TODO.md

Workflow

• branch per issue from next
• do the work in Next Step
• move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps
• move the top item of Future Steps into Next Step
• commit (TODO.md changes in the same commit as the work)
• open a PR based on next
• an independent reviewer who did not write the change gates it
• the manager squash-merges the PR into next once review passes
• next stays green and mergeable to main at any time; only the owner merges next into main, via the single milestone PR
• push

Status

pre-1.0. No git tags exist. The 1.0.0 milestone is in progress; work lands on next, and main receives only the milestone PR that the owner merges. next is at the canonical golangci-lint v2.12.2 config and is green. Recent work extracted the internal/magic, internal/allowlist, internal/httpfetcher, and internal/signature packages. The gosec findings from the 2026-07-06 survey are resolved. The disk cache is now size-bounded with LRU eviction (cache_max_bytes), closing the unbounded disk growth DoS vector.

Next Step

P1: rate limit global concurrent upstream fetches to prevent resource exhaustion

Completed Steps

• 2026-09-28 start on a fresh upaas volume (closes #129): the image starts as root only to give /var/lib/pixa to pixad when pixad does not own it (deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh), then runs the server as pixad through su-exec, so a root-owned host directory bind-mounted there no longer stops the container at startup; README.md gains a "Running under upaas" section.
• 2026-09-28 run all linting in Docker via Dockerfile.lint + script/lint (closes #104): make lint calls script/lint, the only way the linter is run; inside a container (both Dockerfiles set container=docker) it runs golangci-lint, anywhere else it builds the hash-pinned Dockerfile.lint, whose last step runs script/lint again; the Dockerfile lint stage runs make lint; no host or nix-shell golangci-lint path remains (script/bootstrap installs no linter); a per-run CACHEBUST build-arg keeps the lint step from being served from cache, and a tmpfs mount on that step keeps Go's and golangci-lint's caches out of its layer, so a run leaves no large build cache behind; golangci-lint config verify stays out, as it fetches its schema over an unpinned live HTTPS call
• 2026-09-28 every setting as an environment variable (closes #128, also covers #99): each config key can be set by PIXA_ plus the key in upper case (. written as _), and the port by PORT; a variable present in the environment, even empty, wins over the config file, which wins over the default; the typed getters read the variable first, so every existing check applies to it and a bad value aborts startup naming the variable; lists are comma-separated, and an empty variable (or "" in the file) is an empty list; the Docker image no longer bakes in config.docker.yml or passes --config, and its HEALTHCHECK probes PORT (default 8080); the config file is looked for under /etc/pixa and ~/.config/pixa instead of the daemon name pixad; documented in README.md and config.example.yml.
• 2026-09-28 quality and fit in the URL signature (closes #60): the signed data is now host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration:quality:fit, using 85 and cover when the URL has no q or fit, so one signed URL can no longer be replayed across other quality and fit values to create unauthorized cache entries and transcodes; the known-answer vectors in internal/signature/golden_test.go and the README signature specification describe the new format.
• 2026-09-28 Docker image healthcheck (closes #111): a HEALTHCHECK in the runtime stage probing /.well-known/healthcheck.json with busybox wget; script/docker-smoke (make docker-smoke) builds the image, starts it with a throwaway PIXA_SIGNING_KEY, and passes only once Docker reports it healthy within 30 seconds, removing the container on exit; the Gitea workflow runs it after script/cibuild.
• 2026-09-21 trusted-proxy client IP resolution (closes #94): a trusted_proxies config key taking a list of CIDRs, parsed by the same net/netip list parser as blocked_networks (an invalid entry aborts startup naming the key and value; an omitted key defaults to the RFC 1918 private ranges, an explicitly empty list trusts no one, and an explicit list replaces the default); a new internal/clientip package resolves the client address by honoring X-Forwarded-For only when the direct peer is a trusted proxy, walking the chain right-to-left to the rightmost non-proxy entry, so a client connecting directly cannot spoof its address; the resolved address is stored in the request context by a new middleware and used by the request-logging middleware and the login-attempt logs in place of the raw peer address; documented in README.md and config.example.yml.
• 2026-09-21 blocked networks configuration extending SSRF protection: a blocked_networks config key taking a list of CIDRs (parsed with net/netip, an invalid entry aborts startup naming the key and value), added to the built-in blocklist rather than replacing it; the built-in ranges extended to CGNAT 100.64.0.0/10, IETF protocol assignments 192.0.0.0/24, benchmark 198.18.0.0/15, and NAT64 64:ff9b::/96 (IPv4-mapped forms covered); enforcement stays in the dial-time re-resolution so the DNS-rebinding window remains closed; documented in README.md and config.example.yml.
• 2026-09-21 validate dimensions and fit mode on the encrypted-URL route and the token generator (closes #62): imgcache.ValidateDimension alone holds the MaxDimension bound and is used by the path parser, by the new ValidateImageRequest (which also applies ValidateFitMode) and by the generator; both the /v1/image/ and /v1/e/ routes call ValidateImageRequest, so an over-limit size or an unknown fit mode is a 400 rather than an out-of-memory or a 500 from the processor; the URL generator answers 400 naming the field for a width or height that is not a number or fails the shared check, a quality that is not a number from 1 to 100, a ttl that is not a number from 0 to the largest number of seconds the expiry calculation can hold, or an unknown fit; an empty quality is 85 and an empty ttl never expires; the form's width and height inputs stop at 8192
• 2026-09-21 http.Server hardening (closes #92): added HTTPReadHeaderTimeout (10s, bounds the slowloris header dribble) and HTTPIdleTimeout (120s, bounds keep-alive reuse) alongside the existing timeouts and wired them onto the server; added a LimitBody middleware capping the two form POST bodies (POST /, POST /generate) at MaxFormBytes (1 MiB) and returning 413, applied ahead of the CSRF middleware so an oversized body is refused as 413 rather than being read as a missing CSRF token (403); left WriteTimeout at 60s unchanged
• 2026-08-07 update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 with the canonical .golangci.yml (v2 schema, default: all minus six disabled linters, lll 88, tests included): bumped the pinned golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2-alpine image in Dockerfile and the release-archive sha256 pins in script/bootstrap; fixed the findings the stricter config surfaced (notably paralleltest, wsl_v5, goconst, lll, noinlineerr, err113, errcheck, testpackage — white-box test files renamed to *_internal_test.go), including #55's code absorbed after it merged, iterating the pinned linter to 0 issues.; no single finding total is substantiable, since golangci-lint's uniq-by-line reveals new findings on a line as others there are fixed — the documented re-measurements were 81 after the #53 merge and 149 after the #55 merge; three behavior changes, so not a pure no-op: Cache.StoreVariant now takes a context.Context (noctx), so a cancelled request skips its best-effort accounting row; MetadataStorage.Store's cleanup defer was dead on main and leaked .tmp-*.json on failure, now fixed with explicit removals; and the signing_key validation error text gained value too short: ; the eviction loop's uncancellable context is deferred to #102 under a //nolint:contextcheck; three //nolint:tagliatelle directives keep the snake_case JSON wire/disk formats unchanged; make check green
• 2026-08-07 implement cache size management and eviction (closes #51): new cache_max_bytes config key validated by the startup framework (explicit values used exactly with no floor, 0 disables the disk cache entirely, omitted defaults to max(75% of free space on the filesystem containing <state_dir>/cache/, 500 MiB), logged at startup); processed variants are now tracked in the database (a new variant_content table and an LRU timestamp on source_content) so total usage is two SUMs, never a directory scan on the hot path; a background goroutine evicts globally least-recently-used entries (variants and source blobs merged) to the limit, woken by a periodic ticker and by write-pressure notifications from stores; a source blob and ALL of its source_metadata references are deleted in one transaction before the file is unlinked, so multi-referenced blobs are never removed while referenced and rows never point at deleted files; a startup and periodic reconciliation pass adopts untracked variant files, drops rows for missing files, removes unreachable source blobs, and sweeps stale temp files
• 2026-08-07 validate configuration on startup, fail fast on bad config (closes #52): a config value that is set but unparseable or invalid aborts startup naming the key and value (defaults apply only to omitted keys), unknown config keys abort startup, a malformed config file aborts instead of being skipped, and state_dir is verified creatable and writable before the listener binds
• 2026-08-07 manual test pass of the auth and encrypted URL flows against a locally built and running pixad (built from main at 6573b9d, port 18099, local throwaway config); all six checks passed, plus all nine tests in scripts/manual-test.sh (closes #49):
  • visit / and see the login form: HTTP 200, Pixa - Login page with name="key" password form
  • wrong key shows an error: POST / with key=wrong-key returned HTTP 200 login page containing "Invalid signing key"
  • correct signing key shows the generator form: POST / returned HTTP 303 to / with Set-Cookie: pixa_session=...; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict; GET / with that cookie rendered Pixa - URL Generator with the /generate form and logout link
  • a generated encrypted URL serves the image: POST /generate (ttl=3600) produced a /v1/e/<token>/img.jpeg URL that returned HTTP 200, Content-Type: image/jpeg, an 800x600 baseline JPEG of 61706 bytes
  • an expired URL (short TTL) returns 410: a ttl=1 URL fetched after 3 s returned HTTP 410 Gone with {"error":"URL has expired","status":410,...}
  • logout redirects back to login: GET /logout returned HTTP 303 to / with Set-Cookie: pixa_session=; Max-Age=0; subsequent GET / rendered the login form again
• 2026-08-07 fix the two remaining gosec findings (G124 in internal/session): session cookies now always carry Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite=Strict on both the set and clear paths; make check green (closes #47)
• 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: script/ entrypoints, Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
• 2026-04-07 extract magic byte detection into internal/magic (#42)
• 2026-03-25 extract allowlist package from internal/imgcache (#41)
• 2026-03-25 move schema_migrations table creation into 000.sql (#36)
• 2026-03-20 enforce and document exact-match-only signature verification (#40)
• 2026-03-20 bound imageprocessor.Process input read to prevent unbounded memory use (#37); consolidate appname into an internal/globals constant (#34)
• 2026-03-18 parse version prefix from migration filenames (#33)
• 2026-03-15 QA audit fixes for 1.0/MVP readiness (#25)
• 2026-03-02 split Dockerfile with pre-built golangci-lint stage for faster CI (#23)
• 2026-02-25 repo policy compliance: CI workflow, hash-pinned images, golangci-lint and gosec fixes of that date (#14); arm64 Docker build fix (#16)
• 2026-01-08 WebP and AVIF encoding support via govips (both former P0 image processing items, now done)

Future Steps

• P1: strip EXIF and other metadata from processed images (privacy)
• P2: security
  • referer blacklist
  • per-IP rate limiting
  • per-origin rate limiting
• P2: HTTP response handling
  • Last-Modified headers
  • Vary header for content negotiation
  • X-Request-ID propagation
• P2: auto format selection (format=auto based on Accept header)
• P2: configuration
  • add all configuration options from README
  • YAML config file support
• P2: operational
  • optional Sentry error reporting
  • comprehensive request logging
  • Prometheus performance metrics
  • integration tests for the image proxy flow
  • load tests to verify the 1k to 5k req/s target
• P2: documentation
  • configuration options
  • API endpoints
  • deployment guide
  • example nginx or caddy reverse proxy config