Files
pixa/internal/handlers/auth_csrf_internal_test.go
T
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Derive every key from the signing key in one place (closes #315)
seal.DeriveKeys derives the session hash and block keys, the encrypted URL
key and the CSRF key from the signing key, with their salts declared beside
it, and returns them as one seal.Keys. internal/providers calls it once at
startup and provides the value to the fx graph. The session manager, the
encrypted URL generator and the CSRF protection each take their own key.
session.NewManager, encurl.NewGenerator, newCSRFProtect and handlers.New
return no error, as nothing in them can fail now. Each key is derived as
before, with seal.DeriveKey and the same salt. The signing key itself stays
the HMAC key of signed URLs and the login password. README.md says under
signing_key what it protects.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-26 14:10:20 +01:00

265 lines
7.3 KiB
Go

package handlers
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/seal"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/session"
)
// testSigningKey is a throwaway signing key for the CSRF flow tests. It
// seeds the session manager, the encrypted-URL generator, and the CSRF
// token key, exactly as the real signing key does in production.
const testSigningKey = "test-signing-key-0123456789abcdef"
// Form field names used in the CSRF flow tests.
const (
loginKeyField = "key"
// gorilla/csrf's default form field name, not a credential.
csrfTokenField = "gorilla.csrf.Token" //nolint:gosec // G101 false positive
)
// csrfFieldPattern extracts the token rendered by csrf.TemplateField into
// the form. The field name is gorilla/csrf's default.
var csrfFieldPattern = regexp.MustCompile(
`name="gorilla\.csrf\.Token" value="([^"]+)"`)
// newCSRFTestRouter builds a router that mirrors the production wiring for
// the CSRF-protected UI routes (see server.SetupRoutes): the login and
// generator forms and their POST targets sit behind the real CSRF
// middleware. Requests are marked plaintext (Debug: true) so the flow runs
// over httptest's http transport without an https Referer.
func newCSRFTestRouter(t *testing.T) (*Handlers, http.Handler) {
t.Helper()
cfg := &config.Config{SigningKey: testSigningKey, Debug: true}
keys, err := seal.DeriveKeys(testSigningKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seal.DeriveKeys() error = %v", err)
}
h := &Handlers{
log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
config: cfg,
sessMgr: session.NewManager(keys.SessionHashKey, keys.SessionBlockKey),
encGen: encurl.NewGenerator(keys.EncryptedURLKey),
csrfProtect: newCSRFProtect(keys.CSRFKey, cfg.Debug),
}
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(h.CSRF())
r.Get("/", h.HandleRoot())
r.Post("/", h.HandleRoot())
r.Post("/generate", h.HandleGenerateURL())
})
return h, r
}
// csrfCredentials performs a GET that renders a form and returns the CSRF
// cookies the middleware set and the token embedded in the form. Passing
// the authenticated session cookie renders the generator form instead of
// the login form.
func csrfCredentials(
t *testing.T, srv http.Handler, reqCookies []*http.Cookie,
) ([]*http.Cookie, string) {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
for _, c := range reqCookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("GET / status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
match := csrfFieldPattern.FindStringSubmatch(rec.Body.String())
if match == nil {
t.Fatalf("no CSRF token field found in rendered form")
}
return rec.Result().Cookies(), match[1]
}
// postForm submits form values with the given cookies and returns the
// recorder.
func postForm(
srv http.Handler, path string,
cookies []*http.Cookie, form url.Values,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodPost, path,
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
for _, c := range cookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
return rec
}
// TestLoginPostRejectedWithoutToken verifies that POST / with no CSRF token
// is rejected. This is login CSRF: no session cookie exists yet, so the
// protection must rest on a token bound to a pre-session cookie.
func TestLoginPostRejectedWithoutToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, srv := newCSRFTestRouter(t)
rec := postForm(srv, "/", nil, url.Values{loginKeyField: {testSigningKey}})
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("POST / without token status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
}
}
// TestLoginPostRejectedWithForeignToken verifies that a token that does not
// match the request's CSRF cookie is rejected: a token minted for one
// cookie cannot authorize a request carrying a different cookie.
func TestLoginPostRejectedWithForeignToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, srv := newCSRFTestRouter(t)
cookiesA, _ := csrfCredentials(t, srv, nil)
_, tokenB := csrfCredentials(t, srv, nil)
rec := postForm(srv, "/", cookiesA, url.Values{
loginKeyField: {testSigningKey},
csrfTokenField: {tokenB},
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("POST / with foreign token status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
}
}
// TestLoginPostAcceptedWithValidToken verifies that POST / with a matching
// cookie and token succeeds: the login is processed and a session is
// established (303 redirect).
func TestLoginPostAcceptedWithValidToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, srv := newCSRFTestRouter(t)
cookies, token := csrfCredentials(t, srv, nil)
rec := postForm(srv, "/", cookies, url.Values{
loginKeyField: {testSigningKey},
csrfTokenField: {token},
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther {
t.Fatalf("POST / with valid token status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusSeeOther)
}
var authed bool
for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
if c.Name == session.CookieName && c.Value != "" {
authed = true
}
}
if !authed {
t.Error("valid login did not set a session cookie")
}
}
// TestGeneratePostRejectedWithoutToken verifies that POST /generate is
// rejected without a CSRF token even when the request carries a valid
// authenticated session. The session cookie is not sufficient; the policy
// requires a CSRF token on this cookie-authenticated form.
func TestGeneratePostRejectedWithoutToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, srv := newCSRFTestRouter(t)
sessionCookie := newSessionCookie(t, h)
rec := postForm(srv, "/generate",
[]*http.Cookie{sessionCookie},
url.Values{"url": {"https://example.com/a.jpg"}})
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("POST /generate without token status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
}
}
// TestGeneratePostAcceptedWithValidToken verifies that POST /generate
// succeeds with a valid session and a matching CSRF cookie and token.
func TestGeneratePostAcceptedWithValidToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
h, srv := newCSRFTestRouter(t)
sessionCookie := newSessionCookie(t, h)
cookies, token := csrfCredentials(t, srv, []*http.Cookie{sessionCookie})
cookies = append(cookies, sessionCookie)
rec := postForm(srv, "/generate", cookies, url.Values{
"url": {"https://example.com/a.jpg"},
"format": {"jpeg"},
csrfTokenField: {token},
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("POST /generate with valid token status = %d, want %d",
rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
}
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "/v1/e/") {
t.Error("generator response did not contain a generated URL")
}
}
// newSessionCookie creates an authenticated session cookie via the
// handler's session manager.
func newSessionCookie(t *testing.T, h *Handlers) *http.Cookie {
t.Helper()
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
err := h.sessMgr.CreateSession(rec)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateSession() error = %v", err)
}
for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
if c.Name == session.CookieName {
return c
}
}
t.Fatalf("session manager did not set a %q cookie", session.CookieName)
return nil
}