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pixa/internal/imgcache/signature.go
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Enforce and document exact-match-only for signature verification (#40)
Closes #27

Signatures are per-URL only — this PR adds explicit tests and documentation enforcing that HMAC-SHA256 signatures verify against exact URLs only. No suffix matching, wildcard matching, or partial matching is supported.

## What this does NOT touch

**The host whitelist code (`whitelist.go`) is not modified.** This PR is exclusively about signature verification, per sneak's instructions on [issue #27](#27), [PR #32](#32), and [PR #35](#35).

## Changes

### `internal/imgcache/signature.go`
- Added documentation comments on `Verify()` and `buildSignatureData()` explicitly specifying that signatures are exact-match only — no suffix, wildcard, or partial matching

### `internal/imgcache/signature_test.go`
- **`TestSigner_Verify_ExactMatchOnly`**: 14 tamper cases verifying that modifying any signed component (host, path, query, dimensions, format) causes verification to fail. Host-specific cases include:
  - Parent domain (`example.com`) does not match subdomain signature (`cdn.example.com`)
  - Sibling subdomain (`images.example.com`) does not match
  - Deeper subdomain (`images.cdn.example.com`) does not match
  - Evil suffix domain (`cdn.example.com.evil.com`) does not match
  - Prefixed host (`evilcdn.example.com`) does not match
- **`TestSigner_Sign_ExactHostInData`**: Verifies that suffix-related hosts (`cdn.example.com`, `example.com`, `images.example.com`, etc.) all produce distinct signatures

### `internal/imgcache/service_test.go`
- **`TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch`**: Integration test through `ValidateRequest` verifying that a valid signature for `cdn.example.com` is rejected when presented with a different host (parent domain, sibling subdomain, deeper subdomain, evil suffix, prefixed host)

### `README.md`
- Updated Signature Specification section to explicitly document exact-match-only semantics

Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan>
Reviewed-on: #40
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-03-20 23:56:45 +01:00

150 lines
4.0 KiB
Go

package imgcache
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"time"
)
// Signature errors.
var (
ErrSignatureRequired = errors.New("signature required for non-whitelisted host")
ErrSignatureInvalid = errors.New("invalid signature")
ErrSignatureExpired = errors.New("signature has expired")
ErrMissingExpiration = errors.New("signature expiration is required")
)
// Signer handles HMAC-SHA256 signature generation and verification.
type Signer struct {
secretKey []byte
}
// NewSigner creates a new Signer with the given secret key.
func NewSigner(secretKey string) *Signer {
return &Signer{
secretKey: []byte(secretKey),
}
}
// Sign generates an HMAC-SHA256 signature for the given image request.
// The signature covers: host + path + query + width + height + format + expiration.
func (s *Signer) Sign(req *ImageRequest) string {
data := s.buildSignatureData(req)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.secretKey)
mac.Write([]byte(data))
sig := mac.Sum(nil)
return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig)
}
// Verify checks if the signature on the request is valid and not expired.
// Signatures are exact-match only: every component of the signed data
// (host, path, query, dimensions, format, expiration) must match exactly.
// No suffix matching, wildcard matching, or partial matching is supported.
// A signature for "cdn.example.com" will NOT verify for "example.com" or
// "other.cdn.example.com", and vice versa.
func (s *Signer) Verify(req *ImageRequest) error {
// Check expiration first
if req.Expires.IsZero() {
return ErrMissingExpiration
}
if time.Now().After(req.Expires) {
return ErrSignatureExpired
}
// Compute expected signature
expected := s.Sign(req)
// Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
if !hmac.Equal([]byte(req.Signature), []byte(expected)) {
return ErrSignatureInvalid
}
return nil
}
// buildSignatureData creates the string to be signed.
// Format: "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration"
// All components are used verbatim (exact match). No normalization,
// suffix matching, or wildcard expansion is performed.
func (s *Signer) buildSignatureData(req *ImageRequest) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%d",
req.SourceHost,
req.SourcePath,
req.SourceQuery,
req.Size.Width,
req.Size.Height,
req.Format,
req.Expires.Unix(),
)
}
// GenerateSignedURL creates a complete URL with signature and expiration.
// Returns the path portion that should be appended to the base URL.
func (s *Signer) GenerateSignedURL(req *ImageRequest, ttl time.Duration) (path string, sig string, exp int64) {
// Set expiration
req.Expires = time.Now().Add(ttl)
exp = req.Expires.Unix()
// Generate signature
sig = s.Sign(req)
req.Signature = sig
// Build the size component
var sizeStr string
if req.Size.OriginalSize() {
sizeStr = "orig"
} else {
sizeStr = fmt.Sprintf("%dx%d", req.Size.Width, req.Size.Height)
}
// Build the path.
// When a source query is present, it is embedded as a path segment
// (e.g. /host/path?query/size.fmt) so that ParseImagePath can extract
// it from the last-slash split. The "?" inside a path segment is
// percent-encoded by clients but chi delivers it decoded, which is
// exactly what the URL parser expects.
if req.SourceQuery != "" {
path = fmt.Sprintf("/v1/image/%s%s%%3F%s/%s.%s",
req.SourceHost,
req.SourcePath,
url.PathEscape(req.SourceQuery),
sizeStr,
req.Format,
)
} else {
path = fmt.Sprintf("/v1/image/%s%s/%s.%s",
req.SourceHost,
req.SourcePath,
sizeStr,
req.Format,
)
}
return path, sig, exp
}
// ParseSignatureParams extracts signature and expiration from query parameters.
func ParseSignatureParams(sig, expStr string) (signature string, expires time.Time, err error) {
signature = sig
if expStr == "" {
return signature, time.Time{}, nil
}
expUnix, err := strconv.ParseInt(expStr, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid expiration: %w", err)
}
expires = time.Unix(expUnix, 0)
return signature, expires, nil
}