pixa/internal/httpfetcher/httpfetcher.go

// Package httpfetcher fetches content from upstream HTTP origins with SSRF
// protection, per-host connection limits, and content-type validation.
package httpfetcher

import (
	"context"
	"crypto/tls"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"io"
	"net"
	"net/http"
	"net/http/httptrace"
	"net/netip"
	neturl "net/url"
	"slices"
	"strings"
	"sync"
	"time"
)

// Fetcher configuration constants.
const (
	DefaultFetchTimeout          = 30 * time.Second
	DefaultMaxResponseSize       = 50 << 20 // 50MB
	DefaultTLSTimeout            = 10 * time.Second
	DefaultMaxIdleConns          = 100
	DefaultIdleConnTimeout       = 90 * time.Second
	DefaultMaxRedirects          = 10
	DefaultMaxConnectionsPerHost = 20
)

// MIME content types.
const (
	contentTypeJPEG        = "image/jpeg"
	contentTypePNG         = "image/png"
	contentTypeGIF         = "image/gif"
	contentTypeWebP        = "image/webp"
	contentTypeAVIF        = "image/avif"
	contentTypeSVG         = "image/svg+xml"
	contentTypeOctetStream = "application/octet-stream"
)

// Loopback addresses blocked by SSRF protection.
const (
	localhostIPv4 = "127.0.0.1"
	localhostIPv6 = "::1"
)

// builtinBlockedPrefixes are internal or special-use ranges that Go's
// net.IP predicates (IsPrivate, IsLinkLocalUnicast, and the like) do not
// already cover. They are always blocked, in addition to any
// operator-supplied networks. IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses are unmapped
// before matching, so these IPv4 ranges are caught in both forms.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // immutable built-in blocklist
var builtinBlockedPrefixes = []netip.Prefix{
	netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10"), // RFC 6598 CGNAT / carrier-grade NAT
	netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.0.0/24"),  // RFC 6890 IETF protocol assignments
	netip.MustParsePrefix("198.18.0.0/15"), // RFC 2544 benchmarking range
	netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b::/96"),  // RFC 6052 NAT64 (maps onto IPv4)
}

// Fetcher errors.
var (
	ErrSSRFBlocked        = errors.New("request blocked: private or internal IP")
	ErrInvalidHost        = errors.New("invalid or unresolvable host")
	ErrUnsupportedScheme  = errors.New("only HTTPS is supported")
	ErrResponseTooLarge   = errors.New("response exceeds maximum size")
	ErrInvalidContentType = errors.New("invalid or unsupported content type")
	ErrUpstreamError      = errors.New("upstream server error")
	ErrUpstreamTimeout    = errors.New("upstream request timeout")
)

// Internal fetcher errors.
var (
	errTooManyRedirects = errors.New("too many redirects")
	errConnectFailed    = errors.New("failed to connect")
)

// Fetcher retrieves content from upstream origins.
type Fetcher interface {
	// Fetch retrieves content from the given URL.
	Fetch(ctx context.Context, url string) (*FetchResult, error)
}

// FetchResult contains the result of fetching from upstream.
type FetchResult struct {
	// Content is the raw image data.
	Content io.ReadCloser
	// ContentLength is the size in bytes (-1 if unknown).
	ContentLength int64
	// ContentType is the MIME type from upstream.
	ContentType string
	// Headers contains all response headers from upstream.
	Headers map[string][]string
	// StatusCode is the HTTP status code from upstream.
	StatusCode int
	// FetchDurationMs is how long the fetch took in milliseconds.
	FetchDurationMs int64
	// RemoteAddr is the IP:port of the upstream server.
	RemoteAddr string
	// HTTPVersion is the protocol version (e.g., "1.1", "2.0").
	HTTPVersion string
	// TLSVersion is the TLS protocol version (e.g., "TLS 1.3").
	TLSVersion string
	// TLSCipherSuite is the negotiated cipher suite name.
	TLSCipherSuite string
}

// Config holds configuration for the upstream fetcher.
type Config struct {
	// Timeout for upstream requests.
	Timeout time.Duration
	// MaxResponseSize is the maximum allowed response body size.
	MaxResponseSize int64
	// UserAgent to send to upstream servers.
	UserAgent string
	// AllowedContentTypes is an allow list of MIME types to accept.
	AllowedContentTypes []string
	// AllowHTTP allows non-TLS connections (for testing only).
	AllowHTTP bool
	// MaxConnectionsPerHost limits concurrent connections to each upstream host.
	MaxConnectionsPerHost int
	// BlockedNetworks are operator-supplied CIDR ranges refused by the
	// dialer, in addition to the always-enforced built-in ranges.
	BlockedNetworks []netip.Prefix
}

// DefaultConfig returns a Config with sensible defaults.
func DefaultConfig() *Config {
	return &Config{
		Timeout:         DefaultFetchTimeout,
		MaxResponseSize: DefaultMaxResponseSize,
		UserAgent:       "pixa/1.0",
		AllowedContentTypes: []string{
			contentTypeJPEG,
			contentTypePNG,
			contentTypeGIF,
			contentTypeWebP,
			contentTypeAVIF,
			contentTypeSVG,
		},
		AllowHTTP:             false,
		MaxConnectionsPerHost: DefaultMaxConnectionsPerHost,
	}
}

// HTTPFetcher implements Fetcher with SSRF protection and per-host connection limits.
type HTTPFetcher struct {
	client    *http.Client
	config    *Config
	hostSems  map[string]chan struct{} // per-host semaphores
	hostSemMu sync.Mutex               // protects hostSems map
}

// New creates a new HTTPFetcher with SSRF protection.
func New(config *Config) *HTTPFetcher {
	if config == nil {
		config = DefaultConfig()
	}

	// Create transport with SSRF-safe dialer. The dialer re-resolves and
	// re-checks at connect time (closing the DNS-rebinding window) against
	// both the built-in ranges and the operator-supplied blocklist.
	transport := &http.Transport{
		DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
			return dialSSRFSafe(ctx, network, addr, config.BlockedNetworks)
		},
		TLSHandshakeTimeout: DefaultTLSTimeout,
		MaxIdleConns:        DefaultMaxIdleConns,
		IdleConnTimeout:     DefaultIdleConnTimeout,
	}

	client := &http.Client{
		Transport: transport,
		Timeout:   config.Timeout,
		// Don't follow redirects automatically - we need to validate each hop
		CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
			if len(via) >= DefaultMaxRedirects {
				return errTooManyRedirects
			}

			// Validate the redirect target
			err := validateURL(req.Context(), req.URL.String(), config.AllowHTTP)
			if err != nil {
				return fmt.Errorf("redirect blocked: %w", err)
			}

			return nil
		},
	}

	return &HTTPFetcher{
		client:   client,
		config:   config,
		hostSems: make(map[string]chan struct{}),
	}
}

// Fetch retrieves content from the given URL with SSRF protection.
func (f *HTTPFetcher) Fetch(ctx context.Context, url string) (*FetchResult, error) {
	// Validate URL before making request
	err := validateURL(ctx, url, f.config.AllowHTTP)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	// Extract host for rate limiting
	host := extractHost(url)

	// Acquire semaphore slot for this host
	sem := f.getHostSemaphore(host)
	select {
	case sem <- struct{}{}:
		// Acquired slot
	case <-ctx.Done():
		return nil, ctx.Err()
	}

	// If we fail before returning a result, release the slot
	success := false

	defer func() {
		if !success {
			<-sem
		}
	}()

	parsedURL, err := neturl.Parse(url)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse URL: %w", err)
	}

	req := &http.Request{
		Method: http.MethodGet,
		URL:    parsedURL,
		Header: make(http.Header),
	}

	req.Header.Set("User-Agent", f.config.UserAgent)
	req.Header.Set("Accept", strings.Join(f.config.AllowedContentTypes, ", "))

	// Use httptrace to capture connection details
	var remoteAddr string

	trace := &httptrace.ClientTrace{
		GotConn: func(info httptrace.GotConnInfo) {
			if info.Conn != nil {
				remoteAddr = info.Conn.RemoteAddr().String()
			}
		},
	}
	req = req.WithContext(httptrace.WithClientTrace(ctx, trace))

	startTime := time.Now()

	resp, err := f.client.Do(req)

	fetchDuration := time.Since(startTime)

	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
			return nil, ErrUpstreamTimeout
		}

		return nil, fmt.Errorf("upstream request failed: %w", err)
	}

	result, err := f.buildResult(resp, remoteAddr, fetchDuration, sem)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	// Mark success so defer doesn't release the semaphore
	success = true

	return result, nil
}

// getHostSemaphore returns the semaphore for a host, creating it if necessary.
func (f *HTTPFetcher) getHostSemaphore(host string) chan struct{} {
	f.hostSemMu.Lock()
	defer f.hostSemMu.Unlock()

	sem, ok := f.hostSems[host]
	if !ok {
		sem = make(chan struct{}, f.config.MaxConnectionsPerHost)
		f.hostSems[host] = sem
	}

	return sem
}

// buildResult validates the upstream response and assembles a FetchResult
// whose Content releases the host semaphore slot when closed.
func (f *HTTPFetcher) buildResult(
	resp *http.Response,
	remoteAddr string,
	fetchDuration time.Duration,
	sem chan struct{},
) (*FetchResult, error) {
	// Extract HTTP version (strip "HTTP/" prefix)
	httpVersion := strings.TrimPrefix(resp.Proto, "HTTP/")

	// Extract TLS info if available
	var tlsVersion, tlsCipherSuite string

	if resp.TLS != nil {
		tlsVersion = tls.VersionName(resp.TLS.Version)
		tlsCipherSuite = tls.CipherSuiteName(resp.TLS.CipherSuite)
	}

	// Check status code
	if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
		_ = resp.Body.Close()

		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: status %d", ErrUpstreamError, resp.StatusCode)
	}

	// Validate content type
	contentType := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type")
	if !f.isAllowedContentType(contentType) {
		_ = resp.Body.Close()

		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrInvalidContentType, contentType)
	}

	// Wrap body with size limiter and semaphore releaser
	limitedBody := &limitedReader{
		reader:    resp.Body,
		remaining: f.config.MaxResponseSize,
	}

	return &FetchResult{
		Content:         &semaphoreReleasingReadCloser{limitedBody, resp.Body, sem},
		ContentLength:   resp.ContentLength,
		ContentType:     contentType,
		Headers:         resp.Header,
		StatusCode:      resp.StatusCode,
		FetchDurationMs: fetchDuration.Milliseconds(),
		RemoteAddr:      remoteAddr,
		HTTPVersion:     httpVersion,
		TLSVersion:      tlsVersion,
		TLSCipherSuite:  tlsCipherSuite,
	}, nil
}

// isAllowedContentType checks if the content type is in the allow list.
func (f *HTTPFetcher) isAllowedContentType(contentType string) bool {
	// Extract the MIME type without parameters
	mediaType := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(contentType, ";")[0])

	for _, allowed := range f.config.AllowedContentTypes {
		if strings.EqualFold(mediaType, allowed) {
			return true
		}
	}

	return false
}

// validateURL checks if a URL is safe to fetch (not internal/private).
func validateURL(ctx context.Context, rawURL string, allowHTTP bool) error {
	if !allowHTTP && !strings.HasPrefix(rawURL, "https://") {
		return ErrUnsupportedScheme
	}

	// Parse to extract host
	host := extractHost(rawURL)
	if host == "" {
		return ErrInvalidHost
	}

	// Remove port if present
	h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host)
	if err == nil {
		host = h
	}

	// Block obvious localhost patterns
	if isLocalhost(host) {
		return ErrSSRFBlocked
	}

	// Resolve the host to check IP addresses
	addrs, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrInvalidHost, host)
	}

	private := slices.ContainsFunc(addrs, func(addr net.IPAddr) bool {
		return isPrivateIP(addr.IP)
	})
	if private {
		return ErrSSRFBlocked
	}

	return nil
}

// extractHost extracts the host from a URL string.
func extractHost(rawURL string) string {
	// Simple extraction without full URL parsing
	url := rawURL
	if idx := strings.Index(url, "://"); idx != -1 {
		url = url[idx+3:]
	}

	if idx := strings.Index(url, "/"); idx != -1 {
		url = url[:idx]
	}

	if idx := strings.Index(url, "?"); idx != -1 {
		url = url[:idx]
	}

	return url
}

// isLocalhost checks if the host is localhost.
func isLocalhost(host string) bool {
	host = strings.ToLower(host)

	return host == "localhost" ||
		host == localhostIPv4 ||
		host == localhostIPv6 ||
		host == "[::1]" ||
		strings.HasSuffix(host, ".localhost") ||
		strings.HasSuffix(host, ".local")
}

// isPrivateIP checks if an IP is private, loopback, or otherwise internal.
func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
	if ip == nil {
		return true
	}

	// Check for loopback
	if ip.IsLoopback() {
		return true
	}

	// Check for private ranges
	if ip.IsPrivate() {
		return true
	}

	// Check for link-local
	if ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
		return true
	}

	// Check for unspecified (0.0.0.0 or ::)
	if ip.IsUnspecified() {
		return true
	}

	// Check for multicast
	if ip.IsMulticast() {
		return true
	}

	// Additional checks for IPv4
	if ip4 := ip.To4(); ip4 != nil {
		// 169.254.0.0/16 - Link local
		if ip4[0] == 169 && ip4[1] == 254 {
			return true
		}
		// 0.0.0.0/8 - Current network
		if ip4[0] == 0 {
			return true
		}
	}

	// Special-use ranges the net.IP predicates above do not cover.
	addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
	if !ok {
		return true
	}

	addr = addr.Unmap()

	return slices.ContainsFunc(builtinBlockedPrefixes, func(prefix netip.Prefix) bool {
		return prefix.Contains(addr)
	})
}

// isBlockedIP reports whether ip is refused, either by the built-in
// internal-range check or by one of the operator-supplied prefixes.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP, blocked []netip.Prefix) bool {
	if isPrivateIP(ip) {
		return true
	}

	addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
	if !ok {
		return true
	}

	addr = addr.Unmap()

	return slices.ContainsFunc(blocked, func(prefix netip.Prefix) bool {
		return prefix.Contains(addr)
	})
}

// ssrfSafeDialer validates IP addresses against the built-in blocked ranges
// before connecting. New wraps dialSSRFSafe with the operator-supplied
// blocklist; this entry point enforces the built-in ranges alone.
func ssrfSafeDialer(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
	return dialSSRFSafe(ctx, network, addr, nil)
}

// dialSSRFSafe re-resolves addr and refuses to connect to any built-in
// internal range or operator-supplied blocked prefix, closing the
// DNS-rebinding window at connect time.
func dialSSRFSafe(
	ctx context.Context,
	network, addr string,
	blocked []netip.Prefix,
) (net.Conn, error) {
	host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	// Resolve the address
	ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIP(ctx, "ip", host)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrInvalidHost, host)
	}

	// Check all resolved IPs
	for _, ip := range ips {
		if isBlockedIP(ip, blocked) {
			return nil, ErrSSRFBlocked
		}
	}

	// Connect using the first valid IP
	var dialer net.Dialer

	for _, ip := range ips {
		addr := net.JoinHostPort(ip.String(), port)

		conn, err := dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
		if err == nil {
			return conn, nil
		}
	}

	return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w to %s", errConnectFailed, host)
}

// limitedReader wraps a reader and limits the number of bytes read.
type limitedReader struct {
	reader    io.Reader
	remaining int64
}

func (r *limitedReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
	if r.remaining <= 0 {
		return 0, ErrResponseTooLarge
	}

	if int64(len(p)) > r.remaining {
		p = p[:r.remaining]
	}

	n, err := r.reader.Read(p)
	r.remaining -= int64(n)

	return n, err
}

// semaphoreReleasingReadCloser releases a semaphore slot when closed.
type semaphoreReleasingReadCloser struct {
	*limitedReader

	closer io.Closer
	sem    chan struct{}
}

func (r *semaphoreReleasingReadCloser) Close() error {
	err := r.closer.Close()
	<-r.sem // Release semaphore slot

	return err
}