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pixa/TODO.md
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feat: validate configuration on startup, fail fast on bad config (closes #52)
A config value that is set but unparseable or invalid now aborts
startup with an error naming the offending key and value; defaults
apply only to omitted keys. Unknown top-level config keys and unknown
metrics subkeys abort startup naming each unknown key, so typos like
whitelist_hosts fail immediately instead of being silently ignored. A
config file that exists at a standard location but fails to parse is
now a fatal error instead of being skipped with a warning. state_dir
is verified creatable and writable with a probe file before the
listener binds. Port must be in 1-65535 (fractional values are
rejected, not truncated), upstream_connections_per_host must be at
least 1, allowlist_hosts entries must be bare hostnames, sentry_dsn
must be a valid URL when set, and metrics credentials must be set
together. The stale signing_key comment in config.example.yml (keyless
mode was never implemented) now states the actual requirement.
TODO.md records the completed step per its Workflow section.
2026-08-07 16:37:30 +00:00

3.7 KiB

Workflow

  • branch (from main)
  • do the work in Next Step
  • move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps
  • move the top item of Future Steps into Next Step
  • commit (TODO.md changes in the same commit as the work)
  • merge to main if the branch is not protected, otherwise open a PR
  • push

Status

pre-1.0. No git tags exist. Recent work extracted the internal/magic, internal/allowlist, internal/httpfetcher, and internal/signature packages. The gosec findings from the 2026-07-06 survey are resolved: the last two open findings (G124, session cookie attributes in internal/session) are fixed as of this change, so make check is green on main.

Next Step

P0: manual test pass of the auth and encrypted URL flows, then commit the checked-off results to TODO.md: visit / and see the login form; wrong key shows an error; correct signing key shows the generator form; a generated encrypted URL serves the image; an expired URL (short TTL) returns 410; logout redirects back to login

Completed Steps

  • 2026-08-07 validate configuration on startup, fail fast on bad config (closes #52): a config value that is set but unparseable or invalid aborts startup naming the key and value (defaults apply only to omitted keys), unknown config keys abort startup, a malformed config file aborts instead of being skipped, and state_dir is verified creatable and writable before the listener binds
  • 2026-08-07 fix the two remaining gosec findings (G124 in internal/session): session cookies now always carry Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite=Strict on both the set and clear paths; make check green (closes #47)
  • 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: script/ entrypoints, Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
  • 2026-04-07 extract magic byte detection into internal/magic (#42)
  • 2026-03-25 extract allowlist package from internal/imgcache (#41)
  • 2026-03-25 move schema_migrations table creation into 000.sql (#36)
  • 2026-03-20 enforce and document exact-match-only signature verification (#40)
  • 2026-03-20 bound imageprocessor.Process input read to prevent unbounded memory use (#37); consolidate appname into an internal/globals constant (#34)
  • 2026-03-18 parse version prefix from migration filenames (#33)
  • 2026-03-15 QA audit fixes for 1.0/MVP readiness (#25)
  • 2026-03-02 split Dockerfile with pre-built golangci-lint stage for faster CI (#23)
  • 2026-02-25 repo policy compliance: CI workflow, hash-pinned images, golangci-lint and gosec fixes of that date (#14); arm64 Docker build fix (#16)
  • 2026-01-08 WebP and AVIF encoding support via govips (both former P0 image processing items, now done)

Future Steps

  • P0: implement cache size management and eviction so the disk cannot fill up
  • P1: implement blocked networks configuration to extend SSRF protection
  • P1: rate limit global concurrent upstream fetches to prevent resource exhaustion
  • P1: strip EXIF and other metadata from processed images (privacy)
  • P2: security
    • referer blacklist
    • per-IP rate limiting
    • per-origin rate limiting
  • P2: HTTP response handling
    • Last-Modified headers
    • Vary header for content negotiation
    • X-Request-ID propagation
  • P2: auto format selection (format=auto based on Accept header)
  • P2: configuration
    • add all configuration options from README
    • environment variable overrides
    • YAML config file support
  • P2: operational
    • optional Sentry error reporting
    • comprehensive request logging
    • Prometheus performance metrics
    • integration tests for the image proxy flow
    • load tests to verify the 1k to 5k req/s target
  • P2: documentation
    • configuration options
    • API endpoints
    • deployment guide
    • example nginx or caddy reverse proxy config