Refuse local-use NAT64 addresses, and IPv4-compatible ones in blocked_networks (closes #299) #300
@@ -694,7 +694,10 @@ Key settings in more detail:
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and generator pages. Default: empty
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- `blocked_networks` — list of CIDR ranges to refuse for SSRF protection, added
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to the always-enforced built-in ranges (loopback, private, link-local, CGNAT,
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benchmark, NAT64, and the like); an invalid CIDR aborts startup
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benchmark, NAT64, and the like); an invalid CIDR aborts startup. An IPv6
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address in the IPv4-mapped form (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) is matched only as the IPv4
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address it holds, so an IPv6 range such as `::/0` refuses neither it nor a
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plain IPv4 address
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- `trusted_proxies` — list of CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies in front of
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pixa. `X-Forwarded-For` is believed only when the direct peer falls inside one
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of these ranges; the logged and login-recorded client address is then the
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@@ -32,17 +32,16 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
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- 2026-10-16 P1 security bug: the check that keeps pixa from fetching internal
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addresses refuses the local-use NAT64 range (`64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) as it
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refuses `64:ff9b::/96`, and refuses an IPv6 address that holds an IPv4
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address, in the IPv4-compatible form (`::/96`) or the mapped form
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(`::ffff:a.b.c.d`), when `blocked_networks` contains either the address as
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written or the IPv4 address it holds (closes #299). A source host such as
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refuses `64:ff9b::/96`, and refuses an IPv6 address in the IPv4-compatible
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form (`::/96`) when `blocked_networks` contains either the address as written
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or the IPv4 address it holds (closes #299). A source host such as
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`[64:ff9b:1::a00:1]` was fetched, which on a network that runs NAT64 on that
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range reaches the IPv4 address it holds, here `10.0.0.1`; with
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range reaches the IPv4 address it holds, here `10.0.0.1`; and with
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`203.0.113.0/24` in `blocked_networks`, `[::ffff:203.0.113.5]` was refused but
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`[::203.0.113.5]` was fetched; and with `::ffff:0:0/96` listed,
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`[::ffff:203.0.113.5]` was fetched. All now answer 403. Go keeps a plain IPv4
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address in the mapped form, so an IPv6 entry covering `::ffff:0:0/96`, such as
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`::/0`, now refuses every IPv4 address too.
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`[::203.0.113.5]` was fetched. Both now answer 403. The mapped form
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(`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) is still matched only as the IPv4 address it holds: Go
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keeps a plain IPv4 address in that form, and an IPv6 entry such as `::/0` must
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not refuse every IPv4 address.
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- 2026-10-16 P1 security bug: the check that keeps pixa from fetching internal
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addresses judges an IPv6 address in the IPv4-compatible form (`::/96`), such
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as `::127.0.0.1` or `::10.0.0.1`, by the IPv4 address in its last four bytes
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@@ -599,39 +599,32 @@ func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
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}
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// isBlockedIP reports whether ip is refused, either by the built-in
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// internal-range check or by one of the operator-supplied prefixes. An IPv6
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// address that holds an IPv4 address is refused when a prefix contains the
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// address as written or the IPv4 address it holds.
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// internal-range check or by one of the operator-supplied prefixes. An
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// IPv4-compatible address (in ::/96) is refused when a prefix contains the
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// address as written or the IPv4 address it holds. An IPv4-mapped address (in
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// ::ffff:0:0/96) is matched only as the IPv4 address it holds: Go keeps a
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// plain IPv4 address in that form too, and an IPv6 prefix such as ::/0 must
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// not refuse every IPv4 address.
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func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP, blocked []netip.Prefix) bool {
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if isPrivateIP(ip) {
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return true
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}
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asIPv6, asIPv4 := ipv6AndIPv4Forms(ip)
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if !asIPv6.IsValid() {
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addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
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if !ok {
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return true
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}
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return slices.ContainsFunc(blocked, func(prefix netip.Prefix) bool {
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return prefix.Contains(asIPv6) || prefix.Contains(asIPv4)
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})
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}
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// ipv6AndIPv4Forms returns ip as an IPv6 address and, when it holds an IPv4
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// address in the IPv4-mapped form (::ffff:0:0/96) or the IPv4-compatible form
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// (::/96), that IPv4 address. Otherwise the IPv4 form is the zero netip.Addr,
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// which no prefix contains. Go keeps a plain IPv4 address in the mapped form,
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// so the IPv6 form of 203.0.113.5 is ::ffff:203.0.113.5. An ip that is not 4
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// or 16 bytes long gives two zero addresses.
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func ipv6AndIPv4Forms(ip net.IP) (netip.Addr, netip.Addr) {
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asIPv6, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip.To16())
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if !ok {
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return netip.Addr{}, netip.Addr{}
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}
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addr = addr.Unmap()
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// ip read as IPv4 where it is or holds an IPv4 address, otherwise the
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// zero netip.Addr, which no prefix contains. It differs from addr only
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// for an IPv4-compatible address.
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asIPv4, _ := netip.AddrFromSlice(ipv4CompatibleToIPv4(ip).To4())
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return asIPv6, asIPv4
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return slices.ContainsFunc(blocked, func(prefix netip.Prefix) bool {
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return prefix.Contains(addr) || prefix.Contains(asIPv4)
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})
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}
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// ipv4CompatibleToIPv4 returns the IPv4 address that an IPv4-compatible IPv6
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