2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak a663669286 fix: validate dimensions and fit mode on encrypted URLs (closes #62)
check / check (push) Successful in 2m30s
The encrypted /v1/e/ route built its image request straight from the
decrypted payload, so a token could request an over-limit dimension
(reaching libvips and exhausting memory) or an unknown fit mode
(surfacing as a 500 from the processor). The token generator discarded
every strconv.Atoi error, silently turning non-numeric width, height,
quality, or ttl into 0 and applying no upper bound on dimensions.

Add a shared ValidateImageRequest in internal/imgcache enforcing the
MaxDimension bound and ValidateFitMode, and apply it on both the plain
image route and the encrypted route so both reject an over-limit size or
an unrecognized fit mode with 400. The generator now parses each numeric
field explicitly and returns 400 naming the field for non-numeric or
out-of-range input, with width and height bounds-checked so an unusable
token cannot be minted.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-21 20:17:08 +00:00
sneak 6d380fbf98 test: cover encrypted-URL and generator validation gaps (#62)
Failing tests for the missing validation on the encrypted-URL path and
the token generator: an encrypted token carrying an over-limit dimension
or an unrecognized fit mode must be rejected with 400, and POST /generate
with a non-numeric or over-limit width must return 400 rather than
minting a token. Also covers the shared imgcache validator directly.

Model: opus-4-8
2026-09-21 20:17:08 +00:00
15 changed files with 391 additions and 424 deletions
-4
View File
@@ -122,10 +122,6 @@ Configured via YAML file (`--config`). Key settings:
- `access_control_allow_origin` — CORS origin
- `allowlist_hosts` — list of allowed upstream hosts
- `blocked_networks` — list of CIDR ranges to refuse for SSRF protection,
added to the always-enforced built-in ranges (loopback, private,
link-local, CGNAT, benchmark, NAT64, and the like); an invalid CIDR
aborts startup
- `upstream_fetch_timeout` — timeout for origin requests
- `upstream_max_response_size` — max origin response size
- `downstream_timeout` — client response timeout
+14 -11
View File
@@ -25,20 +25,21 @@ The disk cache is now size-bounded with LRU eviction
# Next Step
P1: rate limit global concurrent upstream fetches to prevent resource
exhaustion
P1: implement blocked networks configuration to extend SSRF protection
# Completed Steps
- 2026-09-21 blocked networks configuration extending SSRF protection: a
`blocked_networks` config key taking a list of CIDRs (parsed with
`net/netip`, an invalid entry aborts startup naming the key and value),
added to the built-in blocklist rather than replacing it; the built-in
ranges extended to CGNAT `100.64.0.0/10`, IETF protocol assignments
`192.0.0.0/24`, benchmark `198.18.0.0/15`, and NAT64 `64:ff9b::/96`
(IPv4-mapped forms covered); enforcement stays in the dial-time
re-resolution so the DNS-rebinding window remains closed; documented in
`README.md` and `config.example.yml`.
- 2026-09-21 validate dimensions and fit mode on the encrypted-URL
route and the token generator (closes #62): added a shared
`ValidateImageRequest` in `internal/imgcache` enforcing the
`MaxDimension` bound and `ValidateFitMode`, applied by both the
`/v1/image/` and `/v1/e/` routes, so an over-limit size or an unknown
fit mode is a 400 rather than an out-of-memory or a 500 from the
processor; the URL generator now checks every numeric form field and
rejects a non-numeric or out-of-range `width`, `height`, `quality`,
or `ttl` with a 400 naming the field instead of coercing it to `0`,
and `width`/`height` are bounds-checked so an unusable token cannot be
minted
- 2026-09-21 http.Server hardening (closes #92): added
`HTTPReadHeaderTimeout` (10s, bounds the slowloris header dribble) and
`HTTPIdleTimeout` (120s, bounds keep-alive reuse) alongside the
@@ -140,6 +141,8 @@ exhaustion
# Future Steps
- P1: rate limit global concurrent upstream fetches to prevent
resource exhaustion
- P1: strip EXIF and other metadata from processed images (privacy)
- P2: security
- referer blacklist
-9
View File
@@ -22,15 +22,6 @@ allowlist_hosts:
- github.com
- user-images.githubusercontent.com
# Additional CIDR ranges to refuse when fetching upstream, extending the
# SSRF protection. These are added to the always-enforced built-in ranges
# (loopback, RFC 1918 private, link-local, CGNAT, benchmark, NAT64, and
# similar), never replacing them. Each entry must be a valid CIDR in IPv4
# or IPv6 form; an invalid entry aborts startup.
# blocked_networks:
# - 100.64.0.0/10
# - 2001:db8::/32
# Allow HTTP upstream (only for testing, always use HTTPS in production)
allow_http: false
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
package config
import (
"testing"
)
// TestBlockedNetworksParsed loads a valid blocked_networks list and checks
// each CIDR is parsed into the resolved prefixes in order.
func TestBlockedNetworksParsed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
yamlContent := signingKeyLine + `blocked_networks:
- 203.0.113.0/24
- 2001:db8::/32
`
c, err := configFromYAML(t, yamlContent)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("valid blocked_networks should load, got error: %v", err)
}
want := []string{"203.0.113.0/24", "2001:db8::/32"}
if len(c.BlockedNetworks) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("BlockedNetworks = %v, want %d entries", c.BlockedNetworks, len(want))
}
for i, w := range want {
if got := c.BlockedNetworks[i].String(); got != w {
t.Errorf("BlockedNetworks[%d] = %q, want %q", i, got, w)
}
}
}
// TestBlockedNetworksOmittedIsEmpty confirms an omitted key leaves the
// operator list empty; the built-in defaults still apply in the fetcher.
func TestBlockedNetworksOmittedIsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("minimal config should be valid, got error: %v", err)
}
if len(c.BlockedNetworks) != 0 {
t.Errorf("BlockedNetworks = %v, want empty", c.BlockedNetworks)
}
}
// TestBlockedNetworksInvalidAbortsStartup checks that malformed values abort
// startup with an error naming the key and the offending value.
func TestBlockedNetworksInvalidAbortsStartup(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
runAbortCases(t, []abortCase{
{
name: "not-a-cidr",
yaml: signingKeyLine + `blocked_networks:
- not-a-cidr
`,
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyBlockedNetworks, "not-a-cidr"},
},
{
name: "bare-address-without-prefix",
yaml: signingKeyLine + `blocked_networks:
- 10.0.0.1
`,
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyBlockedNetworks, "10.0.0.1"},
},
{
name: "empty-entry",
yaml: signingKeyLine + `blocked_networks:
- ""
`,
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyBlockedNetworks},
},
{
name: "non-string-entry",
yaml: signingKeyLine + `blocked_networks:
- 42
`,
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyBlockedNetworks},
},
{
name: "null-value",
yaml: signingKeyLine + `blocked_networks:
`,
wantErrSubstrings: []string{keyBlockedNetworks, nullValueText},
},
})
}
+3 -101
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"math"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -43,7 +42,6 @@ const (
keyAllowHTTP = "allow_http"
keyUpstreamConnectionsPerHost = "upstream_connections_per_host"
keyCacheMaxBytes = "cache_max_bytes"
keyBlockedNetworks = "blocked_networks"
)
// placeholderSigningKey is the dummy signing_key shipped in
@@ -62,7 +60,6 @@ var (
errNotAnInteger = errors.New("not an integer")
errNotABoolean = errors.New("not a boolean")
errNotAStringList = errors.New("not a list of strings")
errNotAValidCIDR = errors.New("not a valid CIDR network")
errNotAMetricsMap = errors.New("not a map of metrics settings")
errEmptyListEntry = errors.New("list contains an empty entry")
errEmptyEntry = errors.New("contains an empty entry")
@@ -112,11 +109,6 @@ type Config struct {
AllowHTTP bool // Allow non-TLS upstream (testing only)
UpstreamConnectionsPerHost int // Max concurrent connections per upstream host
// BlockedNetworks are operator-supplied CIDR ranges to refuse in
// addition to the built-in SSRF blocklist. Enforced by the upstream
// fetcher's dialer; the built-in ranges always apply.
BlockedNetworks []netip.Prefix
// CacheMaxBytes is the disk cache size limit in bytes. Zero
// disables the disk cache entirely. When cache_max_bytes is
// omitted from the configuration, this holds the computed default
@@ -185,11 +177,6 @@ func newFromSmartConfig(sc *smartconfig.Config) (*Config, error) {
}
}
blockedNetworks, err := getBlockedNetworks(sc)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
loader := &strictLoader{sc: sc}
c := &Config{
@@ -205,8 +192,7 @@ func newFromSmartConfig(sc *smartconfig.Config) (*Config, error) {
AllowHTTP: loader.boolVal(keyAllowHTTP, false),
UpstreamConnectionsPerHost: loader.intVal(
keyUpstreamConnectionsPerHost, DefaultUpstreamConnectionsPerHost),
CacheMaxBytes: loader.int64Val(keyCacheMaxBytes, 0),
BlockedNetworks: blockedNetworks,
CacheMaxBytes: loader.int64Val(keyCacheMaxBytes, 0),
}
// The computed default for cache_max_bytes needs a validated
@@ -238,7 +224,7 @@ func newFromSmartConfig(sc *smartconfig.Config) (*Config, error) {
return nil, loader.err
}
err = c.validate()
err := c.validate()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -322,7 +308,7 @@ func isKnownConfigKey(key string) bool {
switch key {
case keyDebug, keyMaintenanceMode, keyPort, keyStateDir, keySentryDSN,
keyDBURL, keyMetrics, keySigningKey, keyAllowlistHosts, keyAllowHTTP,
keyUpstreamConnectionsPerHost, keyCacheMaxBytes, keyBlockedNetworks, "env":
keyUpstreamConnectionsPerHost, keyCacheMaxBytes, "env":
return true
}
@@ -816,87 +802,3 @@ func getStringSlice(sc *smartconfig.Config) []string {
return nil
}
// getBlockedNetworks parses the blocked_networks value into CIDR prefixes,
// or returns nil if the key is omitted. It accepts a YAML list of strings
// or a comma-separated string. An explicitly null value, a wrong type, an
// empty entry, a non-string entry, or an unparseable CIDR aborts startup
// naming the key and the offending value; a default (the built-in
// blocklist alone) applies only to an omitted key.
func getBlockedNetworks(sc *smartconfig.Config) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
if sc == nil {
return nil, nil
}
raw, ok := sc.Get(keyBlockedNetworks)
if !ok {
return nil, nil
}
if raw == nil {
return nil, errNullConfigValue(keyBlockedNetworks)
}
entries, err := blockedNetworkEntries(raw)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(entries))
for _, entry := range entries {
prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(entry)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("config key %q: value %q is %w",
keyBlockedNetworks, entry, errNotAValidCIDR)
}
prefixes = append(prefixes, prefix)
}
return prefixes, nil
}
// blockedNetworkEntries extracts the raw blocked_networks entries as
// trimmed, non-empty strings, from either a YAML list of strings or a
// comma-separated string. Any other shape is a configuration error.
func blockedNetworkEntries(raw any) ([]string, error) {
switch val := raw.(type) {
case []any:
entries := make([]string, 0, len(val))
for _, item := range val {
str, ok := item.(string)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("config key %q: list entry %v (%T) is %w",
keyBlockedNetworks, item, item, errNotAString)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(str) == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("config key %q: %w",
keyBlockedNetworks, errEmptyListEntry)
}
entries = append(entries, strings.TrimSpace(str))
}
return entries, nil
case string:
entries := make([]string, 0)
for part := range strings.SplitSeq(val, ",") {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(part)
if trimmed == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("config key %q: value %q %w",
keyBlockedNetworks, val, errEmptyEntry)
}
entries = append(entries, trimmed)
}
return entries, nil
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("config key %q: value %v (%T) is %w",
keyBlockedNetworks, raw, raw, errNotAStringList)
}
}
+98 -17
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package handlers
import (
"crypto/subtle"
"errors"
"fmt"
"html/template"
"net/http"
"net/url"
@@ -13,6 +15,11 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/templates"
)
// errInvalidFormField reports a generator form field whose value is
// non-numeric or out of range. The offending field name is wrapped in so the
// response can name it.
var errInvalidFormField = errors.New("invalid")
// HandleRoot serves the login page or generator page based on authentication state.
func (s *Handlers) HandleRoot() http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -98,18 +105,26 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleGenerateURL() http.HandlerFunc {
// Validate source URL
parsed, err := url.Parse(sourceURL)
if err != nil || parsed.Host == "" {
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, r, "Invalid source URL", r.Form)
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, r, "Invalid source URL", r.Form,
http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
payload, expiresAt, ttl := buildGeneratePayload(parsed, r.Form)
payload, expiresAt, ttl, err := buildGeneratePayload(parsed, r.Form)
if err != nil {
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, r, err.Error(), r.Form,
http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Generate encrypted token
token, err := s.encGen.Generate(payload)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to generate encrypted URL", "error", err)
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, r, "Failed to generate URL", r.Form)
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, r, "Failed to generate URL", r.Form,
http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
@@ -137,17 +152,38 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleGenerateURL() http.HandlerFunc {
}
// buildGeneratePayload parses the numeric form fields and assembles the
// encrypted URL payload. ttl=0 means never expires (ExpiresAt stays 0).
// encrypted URL payload. ttl=0 means never expires (ExpiresAt stays 0). A
// non-numeric or out-of-range field, or an unrecognized fit mode, is a client
// error naming the offending field, so an unusable token is never minted.
func buildGeneratePayload(
parsed *url.URL, form url.Values,
) (*encurl.Payload, time.Time, int) {
width, _ := strconv.Atoi(form.Get("width"))
height, _ := strconv.Atoi(form.Get("height"))
quality, _ := strconv.Atoi(form.Get("quality"))
ttl, _ := strconv.Atoi(form.Get("ttl"))
) (*encurl.Payload, time.Time, int, error) {
width, err := parseFormDimension(form, "width")
if err != nil {
return nil, time.Time{}, 0, err
}
if quality <= 0 {
quality = 85
height, err := parseFormDimension(form, "height")
if err != nil {
return nil, time.Time{}, 0, err
}
quality, err := parseFormCount(form, "quality", encurl.DefaultQuality)
if err != nil {
return nil, time.Time{}, 0, err
}
ttl, err := parseFormCount(form, "ttl", 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, time.Time{}, 0, err
}
fitMode := imgcache.FitMode(form.Get("fit"))
err = imgcache.ValidateFitMode(fitMode)
if err != nil {
return nil, time.Time{}, 0,
fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", imgcache.ErrInvalidFitMode, form.Get("fit"))
}
var (
@@ -168,11 +204,45 @@ func buildGeneratePayload(
Height: height,
Format: imgcache.ImageFormat(form.Get("format")),
Quality: quality,
FitMode: imgcache.FitMode(form.Get("fit")),
FitMode: fitMode,
ExpiresAt: expiresAtUnix,
}
return payload, expiresAt, ttl
return payload, expiresAt, ttl, nil
}
// parseFormDimension reads an optional width or height form field. An empty
// value means "original size" (0). A non-numeric, negative, or over-limit
// value is rejected with an error naming the field.
func parseFormDimension(form url.Values, field string) (int, error) {
raw := form.Get(field)
if raw == "" {
return 0, nil
}
value, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
if err != nil || value < 0 || value > imgcache.MaxDimension {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w %s", errInvalidFormField, field)
}
return value, nil
}
// parseFormCount reads an optional non-negative integer form field, returning
// def when the field is empty and an error naming the field when the value is
// non-numeric or negative.
func parseFormCount(form url.Values, field string, def int) (int, error) {
raw := form.Get(field)
if raw == "" {
return def, nil
}
value, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
if err != nil || value < 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w %s", errInvalidFormField, field)
}
return value, nil
}
// generatorData holds template data for the generator page.
@@ -212,6 +282,15 @@ func (s *Handlers) renderLogin(
func (s *Handlers) renderGenerator(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data *generatorData,
) {
s.renderGeneratorStatus(w, r, data, http.StatusOK)
}
// renderGeneratorStatus renders the generator page with an explicit HTTP
// status. The status is written before the body so both it and the
// Content-Type header take effect; a rejected form uses 400.
func (s *Handlers) renderGeneratorStatus(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data *generatorData, status int,
) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
@@ -221,17 +300,19 @@ func (s *Handlers) renderGenerator(
data.CSRFField = csrfField(r)
w.WriteHeader(status)
err := templates.Render(w, "generator.html", data)
if err != nil {
s.log.Error("failed to render generator template", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
}
func (s *Handlers) renderGeneratorWithForm(
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, errorMsg string, form url.Values,
w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, errorMsg string,
form url.Values, status int,
) {
s.renderGenerator(w, r, &generatorData{
s.renderGeneratorStatus(w, r, &generatorData{
Error: errorMsg,
FormURL: form.Get("url"),
FormWidth: form.Get("width"),
@@ -240,7 +321,7 @@ func (s *Handlers) renderGeneratorWithForm(
FormQuality: form.Get("quality"),
FormFit: form.Get("fit"),
FormTTL: form.Get("ttl"),
})
}, status)
}
func (s *Handlers) buildGeneratedURL(r *http.Request, token, format string) string {
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
package handlers
import (
"maps"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// generatePost submits the /generate form with a valid session and CSRF token
// plus the caller's extra fields, returning the recorder.
func generatePost(
t *testing.T, extra url.Values,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
h, srv := newCSRFTestRouter(t)
sessionCookie := newSessionCookie(t, h)
cookies, token := csrfCredentials(t, srv, []*http.Cookie{sessionCookie})
cookies = append(cookies, sessionCookie)
form := url.Values{
sourceURLField: {testSourceURL},
csrfTokenField: {token},
}
maps.Copy(form, extra)
return postForm(srv, "/generate", cookies, form)
}
// TestGeneratePostRejectsNonNumericWidth verifies that a non-numeric width is
// rejected with 400 naming the field rather than being coerced to 0 and
// minting a 0-width token.
func TestGeneratePostRejectsNonNumericWidth(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rec := generatePost(t, url.Values{"width": {"abc"}})
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "/v1/e/") {
t.Error("a token was generated for non-numeric width")
}
}
// TestGeneratePostRejectsOverLimitWidth verifies that a width beyond
// MaxDimension is rejected at generation time so an unusable token cannot be
// minted.
func TestGeneratePostRejectsOverLimitWidth(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rec := generatePost(t, url.Values{"width": {"100000"}})
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "/v1/e/") {
t.Error("a token was generated for an over-limit width")
}
}
-2
View File
@@ -111,8 +111,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) initImageService() error {
fetcherCfg.MaxConnectionsPerHost = s.config.UpstreamConnectionsPerHost
}
fetcherCfg.BlockedNetworks = s.config.BlockedNetworks
// Create the service
svc, err := imgcache.NewService(&imgcache.ServiceConfig{
Cache: cache,
+12 -7
View File
@@ -110,13 +110,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) parseImageRequest(
if fit := query.Get("fit"); fit != "" {
req.FitMode = imgcache.FitMode(fit)
fitErr := imgcache.ValidateFitMode(req.FitMode)
if fitErr != nil {
s.respondError(w, "invalid fit mode: "+fit, http.StatusBadRequest)
return nil, false
}
}
// Default quality if not set
@@ -129,6 +122,18 @@ func (s *Handlers) parseImageRequest(
req.FitMode = imgcache.FitCover
}
// Enforce dimension and fit-mode bounds, shared with the encrypted-URL
// route. Dimensions are already bounded by the path parser above; this
// also rejects an unrecognized fit mode with 400 instead of letting it
// reach the processor as a 500.
err = imgcache.ValidateImageRequest(req)
if err != nil {
s.respondError(w, "invalid image request: "+err.Error(),
http.StatusBadRequest)
return nil, false
}
return req, true
}
+13
View File
@@ -50,6 +50,19 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleImageEnc() http.HandlerFunc {
// Convert payload to ImageRequest
req := payload.ToImageRequest()
// Apply the same dimension and fit-mode bounds as the plain image
// route: a sealed payload is trusted for its origin, not for staying
// within limits, so an over-limit size or unknown fit mode is a 400
// here rather than an out-of-memory or a 500 from the processor.
err = imgcache.ValidateImageRequest(req)
if err != nil {
s.log.Debug("encrypted URL failed validation", "error", err)
s.respondError(w, "invalid encrypted URL: "+err.Error(),
http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Log the request
s.log.Debug("encrypted image request",
"host", req.SourceHost,
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
package handlers
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
)
// newEncTestServer builds a router serving the encrypted-URL route with a
// generator seeded by the shared test signing key. The image service is left
// nil: these tests exercise validation that rejects a token before any image
// is fetched, so the handler must never reach the service.
func newEncTestServer(t *testing.T) (*encurl.Generator, http.Handler) {
t.Helper()
encGen, err := encurl.NewGenerator(testSigningKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encurl.NewGenerator() error = %v", err)
}
h := &Handlers{
log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
encGen: encGen,
}
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/v1/e/{token}/*", h.HandleImageEnc())
return encGen, r
}
// getEncToken issues a GET for the given token and returns the recorder.
func getEncToken(srv http.Handler, token string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/v1/e/"+token+"/img.jpg", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
return rec
}
// TestHandleImageEnc_OverLimitDimension_Returns400 verifies that a decrypted
// token requesting a dimension beyond MaxDimension is rejected with 400
// instead of reaching the image processor and libvips.
func TestHandleImageEnc_OverLimitDimension_Returns400(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
encGen, srv := newEncTestServer(t)
token, err := encGen.Generate(&encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photo.jpg",
Width: 100000,
Height: 100000,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Generate() error = %v", err)
}
rec := getEncToken(srv, token)
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
}
// TestHandleImageEnc_InvalidFitMode_Returns400 verifies that a decrypted token
// carrying an unrecognized fit mode is rejected with 400 rather than surfacing
// as a 500 from the image processor's default branch.
func TestHandleImageEnc_InvalidFitMode_Returns400(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
encGen, srv := newEncTestServer(t)
token, err := encGen.Generate(&encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: "cdn.example.com",
SourcePath: "/photo.jpg",
Width: 800,
Height: 600,
FitMode: imgcache.FitMode("bogus"),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Generate() error = %v", err)
}
rec := getEncToken(srv, token)
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
}
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
package httpfetcher
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"testing"
)
// TestIsPrivateIPBlocksSpecialRanges covers the internal and special-use
// ranges added to the built-in blocklist, in IPv4, IPv6, and IPv4-mapped
// forms, alongside public controls that must stay reachable.
func TestIsPrivateIPBlocksSpecialRanges(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
ip string
want bool
}{
{"cgnat-low", "100.64.0.1", true},
{"cgnat-high", "100.127.255.254", true},
{"ietf-protocol", "192.0.0.1", true},
{"benchmark-low", "198.18.0.1", true},
{"benchmark-high", "198.19.255.254", true},
{"nat64", "64:ff9b::1", true},
{"nat64-embeds-private", "64:ff9b::a00:1", true}, // maps 10.0.0.1
{"ipv4-mapped-private", "::ffff:10.0.0.1", true},
{"cloud-metadata", "169.254.169.254", true},
{"public-v4", "8.8.8.8", false},
{"test-net-1-public", testPublicHost, false}, // TEST-NET-1, stays public
{"public-v6", "2001:4860:4860::8888", false},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ip := net.ParseIP(tc.ip)
if ip == nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to parse IP %q", tc.ip)
}
got := isPrivateIP(ip)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("isPrivateIP(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.ip, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
// transportOf returns the *http.Transport backing a fetcher, so a test can
// exercise the SSRF-safe dialer New installed with the operator blocklist.
func transportOf(t *testing.T, f *HTTPFetcher) *http.Transport {
t.Helper()
transport, ok := f.client.Transport.(*http.Transport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("transport is %T, want *http.Transport", f.client.Transport)
}
return transport
}
// TestDialerEnforcesBlockedNetworks proves an operator-supplied
// blocked_networks entry is enforced by the dialer, in addition to the
// built-in ranges, while an address outside both stays dialable.
func TestDialerEnforcesBlockedNetworks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := DefaultConfig()
// TEST-NET-2 (198.51.100.0/24) is public to the built-in check, so
// blocking it can only come from the operator-supplied list.
cfg.BlockedNetworks = []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")}
transport := transportOf(t, New(cfg))
blocked := []string{
"198.51.100.5:80", // operator-supplied range
"10.0.0.5:80", // built-in RFC 1918, still enforced
"100.64.0.1:80", // built-in CGNAT range
}
for _, addr := range blocked {
t.Run("blocked/"+addr, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := transport.DialContext(context.Background(), "tcp", addr)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrSSRFBlocked) {
t.Errorf("DialContext(%q) = %v, want ErrSSRFBlocked", addr, err)
}
})
}
t.Run("public-not-blocked", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A cancelled context makes the dial fail without touching the
// network; the point is only that a public literal outside every
// blocked range is not SSRF-blocked.
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
_, err := transport.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", testPublicHost+":80")
if errors.Is(err, ErrSSRFBlocked) {
t.Errorf("public target SSRF-blocked with operator list set: %v", err)
}
})
}
+6 -72
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptrace"
"net/netip"
neturl "net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
@@ -47,20 +46,6 @@ const (
localhostIPv6 = "::1"
)
// builtinBlockedPrefixes are internal or special-use ranges that Go's
// net.IP predicates (IsPrivate, IsLinkLocalUnicast, and the like) do not
// already cover. They are always blocked, in addition to any
// operator-supplied networks. IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses are unmapped
// before matching, so these IPv4 ranges are caught in both forms.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // immutable built-in blocklist
var builtinBlockedPrefixes = []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10"), // RFC 6598 CGNAT / carrier-grade NAT
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.0.0/24"), // RFC 6890 IETF protocol assignments
netip.MustParsePrefix("198.18.0.0/15"), // RFC 2544 benchmarking range
netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b::/96"), // RFC 6052 NAT64 (maps onto IPv4)
}
// Fetcher errors.
var (
ErrSSRFBlocked = errors.New("request blocked: private or internal IP")
@@ -122,9 +107,6 @@ type Config struct {
AllowHTTP bool
// MaxConnectionsPerHost limits concurrent connections to each upstream host.
MaxConnectionsPerHost int
// BlockedNetworks are operator-supplied CIDR ranges refused by the
// dialer, in addition to the always-enforced built-in ranges.
BlockedNetworks []netip.Prefix
}
// DefaultConfig returns a Config with sensible defaults.
@@ -160,13 +142,9 @@ func New(config *Config) *HTTPFetcher {
config = DefaultConfig()
}
// Create transport with SSRF-safe dialer. The dialer re-resolves and
// re-checks at connect time (closing the DNS-rebinding window) against
// both the built-in ranges and the operator-supplied blocklist.
// Create transport with SSRF-safe dialer
transport := &http.Transport{
DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
return dialSSRFSafe(ctx, network, addr, config.BlockedNetworks)
},
DialContext: ssrfSafeDialer,
TLSHandshakeTimeout: DefaultTLSTimeout,
MaxIdleConns: DefaultMaxIdleConns,
IdleConnTimeout: DefaultIdleConnTimeout,
@@ -473,53 +451,11 @@ func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
}
}
// Special-use ranges the net.IP predicates above do not cover.
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
if !ok {
return true
}
addr = addr.Unmap()
return slices.ContainsFunc(builtinBlockedPrefixes, func(prefix netip.Prefix) bool {
return prefix.Contains(addr)
})
return false
}
// isBlockedIP reports whether ip is refused, either by the built-in
// internal-range check or by one of the operator-supplied prefixes.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP, blocked []netip.Prefix) bool {
if isPrivateIP(ip) {
return true
}
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
if !ok {
return true
}
addr = addr.Unmap()
return slices.ContainsFunc(blocked, func(prefix netip.Prefix) bool {
return prefix.Contains(addr)
})
}
// ssrfSafeDialer validates IP addresses against the built-in blocked ranges
// before connecting. New wraps dialSSRFSafe with the operator-supplied
// blocklist; this entry point enforces the built-in ranges alone.
// ssrfSafeDialer is a custom dialer that validates IP addresses before connecting.
func ssrfSafeDialer(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
return dialSSRFSafe(ctx, network, addr, nil)
}
// dialSSRFSafe re-resolves addr and refuses to connect to any built-in
// internal range or operator-supplied blocked prefix, closing the
// DNS-rebinding window at connect time.
func dialSSRFSafe(
ctx context.Context,
network, addr string,
blocked []netip.Prefix,
) (net.Conn, error) {
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -532,10 +468,8 @@ func dialSSRFSafe(
}
// Check all resolved IPs
for _, ip := range ips {
if isBlockedIP(ip, blocked) {
return nil, ErrSSRFBlocked
}
if slices.ContainsFunc(ips, isPrivateIP) {
return nil, ErrSSRFBlocked
}
// Connect using the first valid IP
+17
View File
@@ -59,6 +59,23 @@ func ValidateFitMode(fit FitMode) error {
}
}
// ValidateImageRequest checks that a request's dimensions are within
// MaxDimension and its fit mode is recognized. Both the plain /v1/image/
// route and the encrypted /v1/e/ route validate through this function so a
// request from either source enforces identical bounds, regardless of how it
// was constructed. A width or height of 0 means "original size" and is valid.
func ValidateImageRequest(req *ImageRequest) error {
if req.Size.Width < 0 || req.Size.Height < 0 {
return ErrInvalidSize
}
if req.Size.Width > MaxDimension || req.Size.Height > MaxDimension {
return ErrDimensionTooLarge
}
return ValidateFitMode(req.FitMode)
}
// ImageRequest represents a request for a processed image
type ImageRequest struct {
// SourceHost is the origin host (e.g., "cdn.example.com")
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
package imgcache
import (
"errors"
"testing"
)
func TestValidateImageRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
req ImageRequest
wantErr error
}{
{
name: "within bounds",
req: ImageRequest{Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600}, FitMode: FitCover},
},
{
name: "original size and empty fit",
req: ImageRequest{Size: Size{Width: 0, Height: 0}},
},
{
name: "width over limit",
req: ImageRequest{Size: Size{Width: MaxDimension + 1, Height: 600}},
wantErr: ErrDimensionTooLarge,
},
{
name: "height over limit",
req: ImageRequest{Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: MaxDimension + 1}},
wantErr: ErrDimensionTooLarge,
},
{
name: "negative width",
req: ImageRequest{Size: Size{Width: -1, Height: 600}},
wantErr: ErrInvalidSize,
},
{
name: "invalid fit mode",
req: ImageRequest{Size: Size{Width: 800, Height: 600}, FitMode: "bogus"},
wantErr: ErrInvalidFitMode,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := ValidateImageRequest(&tt.req)
if tt.wantErr == nil {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ValidateImageRequest() error = %v, want nil", err)
}
return
}
if !errors.Is(err, tt.wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("ValidateImageRequest() error = %v, want %v", err, tt.wantErr)
}
})
}
}