6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 9a97dfc299 Scale both sides of a fit=cover image by the same amount (part of #282)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
cropCentreAndResize cut the centre to whole source pixels and forced
that to the requested size, so the two sides were scaled by different
amounts: a 16x16 source at 100x60 came out squashed by 4%. It now
widens the centre to whole source pixels and lets thumbnail with a
centre crop scale that by the one amount next uses and cut the output
from it. thumbnail copies the scaled image into memory, which is larger
than the output by less than one scaled source pixel on each side.
TODO.md says so.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 23:36:42 +00:00
sneak aa05436869 Test that fit=cover keeps the source's proportions (part of #282)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
A grey square in the centre of the source must come out square: a
16x16 source at 100x60, a 10x10 one at 100x35 and a 64x64 one at
300x100, and each turned on its side. The square's width and height
are measured where its blurred edges cross the grey halfway between
the square's and the background's, read to a fraction of a pixel.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 23:24:48 +00:00
sneak eec20001ed Drop the fit=cover test cases that fill memory without the fix (part of #282)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
Without the fix, the 8192x64 and 64x8192 cases each made libvips ask for
about 24 GiB, so a return of the bug would take the build host's memory
instead of failing the test. The cases left fail at once without the fix.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 22:40:18 +00:00
sneak 3792e97d20 Test that fit=cover serves a source whose centre is under a pixel wide (part of #282)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
An 8192x1 source at 1x8192, or the same turned on its side, has a centre
with the requested proportions 1/8192 of a pixel wide. The crop must keep
at least one pixel of it, or the request fails. The test's cases are now
named by source and requested size.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 22:38:03 +00:00
sneak e664a37e0d Crop the centre first for fit=cover (closes #282)
libvips' thumbnail with a centre crop scales the whole source to cover
the requested size and copies that into memory before it crops: 8192x64
at 8192x8192 made it allocate about 24 GiB, and 8192x1 failed with 500.
resize now cuts the centre of the source to the requested size's
proportions first and resizes that, so no image larger than the source
or the output is made. The crop is the same centre as before. TODO.md
says so.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 22:33:31 +00:00
sneak 8038712ca6 Test that fit=cover serves a thin source and keeps its centre (part of #282)
An 8192x64 or 8192x1 source, or one turned on its side, requested at
8192x8192 with fit=cover must be served at that size, and fit=cover must
keep the centre of an ordinary source.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-15 22:33:16 +00:00
15 changed files with 67 additions and 1464 deletions
+21 -64
View File
@@ -323,28 +323,13 @@ first `/`, the size and format after the last `/`, and between them the source
path up to the first `?` and the source query after it. So the `?` before the
query, any `?` in the query, and every `%` in the source path or query must be
percent-encoded, as `%3F` and `%25`. Any other character may be written as
itself or percent-encoded: `/`, `;`, `,`, `=` and `&` work either way. Neither
the source path nor the source query may hold a `#`, and an image URL that
writes one as `%23` is refused with 400. For example,
itself or percent-encoded: `/`, `;`, `,`, `=` and `&` work either way. For
example,
`https://cdn.example.com/img?url=https://origin.example.com/my%20cat.jpg` at
800x600 WebP is
`/v1/image/cdn.example.com/img%3Furl=https://origin.example.com/my%2520cat.jpg/800x600.webp`,
signed as shown under Signature Specification.
The source path is the path with its percent-escapes decoded, and pixa fetches
it percent-encoded again: every character other than letters, digits, `-`, `.`,
`_`, `~`, `/`, `$`, `&`, `+`, `,`, `:`, `;`, `=` and `@` is sent as a
percent-escape. So `my%20cat.jpg` in the image URL is the source path
`/my cat.jpg`, fetched as `/my%20cat.jpg`; `my%2520cat.jpg` is the source path
`/my%20cat.jpg`, fetched as `/my%2520cat.jpg`; and `100%25.png` is fetched as
`/100%25.png`. The source query is the source URL's query as that URL writes it,
its percent-escapes included, and is sent as it is, except that the characters a
browser percent-encodes in a query (a space, `"`, `'`, `<`, `>`, control
characters and characters outside ASCII) and a `%` that does not begin a
percent-escape are percent-encoded. pixa signs and caches the query in that
form, so `img%3Fname=my%20cat` and `img%3Fname=my%2520cat` in the image URL are
the same source query, `name=my%20cat`.
A size with one side `0` has that side scaled to keep the source's proportions,
and is refused with 400 when that side would come out above 8192, the most
either side may be; so is a size with `fit=outside`, which scales the image to
@@ -459,13 +444,7 @@ nor change what it asks for.
sent with an empty format, or none, also makes a JPEG XL URL. Width and
height both empty or `0` keep the original size; if only one of them is empty
or `0`, that side is scaled to keep the image's proportions. A URL whose
scaled side would come out above 8192 answers 400, and so does a source URL
whose path holds a `..` segment. So does a source URL that the image URL
would fetch written another way, and the page then shows the URL pixa would
fetch: one with a user name and password, which pixa does not send, or one
whose path holds `%2F`, fetched as `/`, or `(`, fetched as `%28`, as pixa
keeps the source path decoded and fetches it percent-encoded again (see
Routes).
scaled side would come out above 8192 answers 400.
3. The page shows the URL, `https://<host>/v1/e/<token>/img.<format>`, and when
it expires. `<host>` is the host the page was opened on, and the URL starts
with `http` instead while `debug` is on. The name after the token is ignored
@@ -473,11 +452,9 @@ nor change what it asks for.
`jxl` for a form with no format.
The token holds the source's host, path and query and the size, format, quality,
fit and expiry, encrypted with a key derived from `signing_key`. The host is
kept in lower case and an empty path as `/`, as for `/v1/image/`, so
`https://CDN.Example.com` and `https://cdn.example.com/` are one source image,
fetched and cached once. The source URL's scheme is not kept: the image is
fetched like any other (see Routes), and the blocked networks still apply.
fit and expiry, encrypted with a key derived from `signing_key`. The source
URL's scheme is not kept: the image is fetched like any other (see Routes), and
the blocked networks still apply.
How long the URL lasts is chosen on the page, from 1 minute to 1 year, or never.
The expiry is fixed in the token when the URL is made and cannot be changed or
@@ -529,20 +506,13 @@ Where:
- `host` — source host as the URL writes it up to the first `/`, in lower case,
keeping an IPv6 address's brackets and any `:` and port after it (e.g.
`cdn.example.com`, `cdn.example.com:8443`, `[2001:db8::1]:8443`)
- `path` — source path, with its percent-escapes decoded as under Routes (e.g.
`/photos/cat.jpg`, or `/photos/my cat.jpg` for `/photos/my%20cat.jpg`), with
each `%` written as `%25` and each `:` as `%3A`, so `/photos/a:b.jpg` is
signed as `/photos/a%3Ab.jpg`
- `query` — source query string as under Routes, empty string if none, with `%`
and `:` written as in `path`; neither then holds a `:`, so path `/a:b` with no
query and path `/a` with query `b:` are signed differently
- `width` — requested width in pixels, or `0`: the width is then worked out from
the source's proportions and the requested height, rounded down but at least
1, or is the source's own width when the height is `0` too (the `orig` size)
- `height` — requested height in pixels, or `0`: the height is then worked out
from the source's proportions and the requested width, rounded down but at
least 1, or is the source's own height when the width is `0` too (the `orig`
size)
- `path` — source path (e.g. `/photos/cat.jpg`), with each `%` written as `%25`
and each `:` as `%3A`, so `/photos/a:b.jpg` is signed as `/photos/a%3Ab.jpg`
- `query` — source query string, empty string if none, with `%` and `:` written
as in `path`; neither then holds a `:`, so path `/a:b` with no query and path
`/a` with query `b:` are signed differently
- `width` — requested width in pixels, `0` for original
- `height` — requested height in pixels, `0` for original
- `format` — output format, one of those listed under Routes, with `original`
signed as `orig`, `jpg` as `jpeg`, and no format as `jxl`, so a URL with no
format has the signature of the same URL ending in `.jxl`; `auto` is signed as
@@ -555,10 +525,7 @@ Where:
with 400
- `fit` — the URL's `fit` query parameter (cover, contain, fill, inside,
outside), or `cover` when the URL has no `fit`; a request whose `fit` is
anything else, an empty `fit=` included, is refused with 400. `outside` scales
the image to cover the requested size, keeping its proportions, so it can come
out larger than that size on one side: an 8192x1 source at `100x0`, which is
100x1 by its proportions, comes out at 8192x1
anything else, an empty `fit=` included, is refused with 400
The URL's `sig` is the HMAC-SHA256 result in base64url (the URL-safe alphabet of
RFC 4648) with the trailing `=` padding kept, 44 characters in all. pixa
@@ -608,11 +575,7 @@ pixa lower-cases the host of a `/v1/image/` URL before anything else uses it, so
`CDN.Example.com` is matched, fetched, cached and counted against
`upstream_connections_per_host` as `cdn.example.com`. Such a URL whose host has
a port, as in `cdn.example.com:8443`, or a `:` with no port, needs a signature
even when the host is allowlisted. The host must be a host name or an IPv4
address (letters, digits, hyphens, underscores and dots) or an IPv6 address in
brackets, either one optionally followed by `:` and a port. Any other host, such
as one holding `@`, or a `?`, `#`, `%`, `\` or space written percent-encoded, is
refused with 400.
even when the host is allowlisted. A host holding `@` is refused with 400.
### Configuration
@@ -694,10 +657,7 @@ Key settings in more detail:
and generator pages. Default: empty
- `blocked_networks` — list of CIDR ranges to refuse for SSRF protection, added
to the always-enforced built-in ranges (loopback, private, link-local, CGNAT,
benchmark, NAT64, and the like); an invalid CIDR aborts startup. An IPv6
address in the IPv4-mapped form (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) is matched only as the IPv4
address it holds, so an IPv6 range such as `::/0` refuses neither it nor a
plain IPv4 address
benchmark, NAT64, and the like); an invalid CIDR aborts startup
- `trusted_proxies` — list of CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies in front of
pixa. `X-Forwarded-For` is believed only when the direct peer falls inside one
of these ranges; the logged and login-recorded client address is then the
@@ -728,14 +688,11 @@ Key settings in more detail:
- `signing_key` — HMAC secret for URL signatures
- `db_url` — the SQLite database to open; omitted, it is
`file:<state_dir>/state.sqlite3?_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)`, which keeps the
database in WAL mode. `state_dir` is percent-encoded in it, so a `%`, `?` or
`#` in the name is written as `%25`, `%3F` or `%23`. For a `state_dir` of `/`
or one starting with `//` it starts `file:////`, so SQLite does not read the
first name in the path as a host. pixa opens one connection to it, so its own
reads and writes run one at a time. pixa adds `_pragma=busy_timeout(5000)` to
any `db_url`, so a write that finds another program writing to the file waits
up to five seconds for it instead of failing. WAL mode comes only from the
URL: keep `_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)` in one you set
database in WAL mode. pixa opens one connection to it, so its own reads and
writes run one at a time. pixa adds `_pragma=busy_timeout(5000)` to any
`db_url`, so a write that finds another program writing to the file waits up
to five seconds for it instead of failing. WAL mode comes only from the URL:
keep `_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)` in one you set
- `cache_max_bytes` — disk cache size limit in bytes; `0` disables the disk
cache entirely; omitted defaults to 75% of the sum of the free space on the
filesystem containing `<state_dir>/cache/` and the bytes of source and
-82
View File
@@ -30,72 +30,6 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
# Completed Steps
- 2026-10-16 P1 security bug: the check that keeps pixa from fetching internal
addresses refuses the local-use NAT64 range (`64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) as it
refuses `64:ff9b::/96`, and refuses an IPv6 address in the IPv4-compatible
form (`::/96`) when `blocked_networks` contains either the address as written
or the IPv4 address it holds (closes #299). A source host such as
`[64:ff9b:1::a00:1]` was fetched, which on a network that runs NAT64 on that
range reaches the IPv4 address it holds, here `10.0.0.1`; and with
`203.0.113.0/24` in `blocked_networks`, `[::ffff:203.0.113.5]` was refused but
`[::203.0.113.5]` was fetched. Both now answer 403. The mapped form
(`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) is still matched only as the IPv4 address it holds: Go
keeps a plain IPv4 address in that form, and an IPv6 entry such as `::/0` must
not refuse every IPv4 address.
- 2026-10-16 P1 security bug: the check that keeps pixa from fetching internal
addresses judges an IPv6 address in the IPv4-compatible form (`::/96`), such
as `::127.0.0.1` or `::10.0.0.1`, by the IPv4 address in its last four bytes
(closes #297). It read only the mapped form (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) as IPv4, so a
source host such as `[::127.0.0.1]` was checked as a public IPv6 address and
fetched, which on a network that routes it reaches the internal IPv4 host; it
is now refused with 403. The NAT64 form (`64:ff9b::/96`) was already refused
as a whole, as one of the built-in blocked ranges, and still is.
- 2026-10-16 a source host that is an IPv6 address in brackets with no port,
such as `[2001:db8::a]`, is fetched like one with a port, through `/v1/image/`
and through an encrypted URL (closes #295). The fetcher's check of the source
URL kept the brackets when no port followed them, could not look the host up,
and the request answered 500. It now checks the address without brackets, so a
private one is refused with 403, as with a port.
- 2026-10-16 a `state_dir` whose name holds `%`, `?` or `#` keeps its database
at `state.sqlite3` in that directory (closes #290): the `db_url` derived from
it put the name into a `file:` URL as it was, so SQLite read `%41` as `A`, a
`?` or `#` ended the path early, and the journal mode parameter was lost. The
derived `db_url` is now built with Go's `net/url`, which writes those
characters as `%25`, `%3F` and `%23`. For a `state_dir` of `/` or one starting
with `//` it starts `file:////`, so SQLite no longer reads the first name in
the path as a host.
- 2026-10-16 a size with one side `0` keeps the side computed from the source's
proportions at 1 or more (closes #283): it was rounded down, so for a thin
source it came out at 0, and libvips then made the size square. An 8192x1
source at `100x0` came out at 100x100, and at `1300x0` with `fit=cover` made
libvips ask for about 39 GB at once; an 8192x2 source at `100x0` answered 500.
`fit=contain` and `fit=inside` work both sides out again from the smaller of
the two scales and `fit=outside` from the larger, and each keeps both sides at
1 or more too, so a 1x8192 source at `0x100` with `fit=contain`, and a 49x8192
source at `0x100` or a 49x49 source at `1x1` with `fit=outside`, no longer
answer 500. An 8192x1 source at `1300x0` now comes out at 1300x1, and the
process running it alone peaked at about 34 MiB resident. With `fit=outside`
the image is scaled to cover the size, so that source at `100x0` comes out at
8192x1. `README.md` now says this under Signature Specification, and says how
a `0` side is worked out where it said `0` meant the original.
- 2026-10-16 the generator page lower-cases the source host and writes an empty
source path as `/` before it makes the encrypted URL, as `/v1/image/` does
(closes #293). A host written in upper and in lower case, or a source URL with
no path and with the path `/`, made two cache keys and two upstream requests
for one image.
- 2026-10-16 the source URL a request fetches is built with `net/url` from the
source host, path and query, not joined as text (closes #288). The source
path, decoded, is fetched percent-encoded again, so `100%25.png` fetches
`/100%25.png` where it answered 401, and `my%20cat.png` and `my%2520cat.png`
fetch different paths where both fetched `/my%20cat.png` under two cache keys.
The source query stays as the source URL writes it; the characters a browser
percent-encodes in a query, such as `'` or a space, which was sent raw and
answered 502, are percent-encoded when the image URL is read, so the query is
signed and cached as it is sent. The generator page answers 400, showing the
URL pixa would fetch, for a source URL its image URL would fetch written
another way, such as with `%2F` in the path, whatever else the path holds, or
with a user name and password. It also answers 400 for a source path holding a
`..` segment, as `/v1/image/` refuses one.
- 2026-10-15 a thin source requested with `fit=cover` no longer makes libvips
build a huge image (closes #282): libvips' thumbnail scaled the whole source
to cover the requested size and copied that into memory before it cut out the
@@ -108,22 +42,6 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
resident memory peaked at about 242 MiB for the 8192x64 source and 431 MiB for
the 8192x1 one. The output can sit a fraction of an output pixel from where it
was.
- 2026-10-15 a `/v1/image/` URL whose source path or source query holds a `#`,
written as `%23`, is refused with 400 (closes #286): the source URL built from
it ended at the `#` when fetched, so each text after it fetched the same
upstream image, without a signature for an allowlisted host, and cached it
under keys of its own. `README.md` says neither may hold a `#`.
- 2026-10-15 the host of a `/v1/image/` URL must be a host name or an IPv4
address (letters, digits, hyphens, underscores and dots) or an IPv6 address in
brackets, either one optionally followed by `:` and a port, and any other host
is refused with 400 (closes #275): only `@` was refused, so a `?` written as
`%3F` gave the host `cdn.example.com?x=1`, which Go's URL parser reads as
`cdn.example.com` with a query. Such a URL passed the allowlist, and each text
after the `?` fetched the host's root path and cached the answer under keys of
its own. A `#`, `%`, `\` or space written percent-encoded is refused the same
way, and so is an IPv6 address without brackets, which needed a signature
before. Underscores are kept because `allowlist_hosts` accepts host names
holding them.
- 2026-10-15 the README says how a source URL with a query is written into an
image URL, and the image route accepts it (closes #255): the query follows the
source path after `%3F`. pixa now reads the image URL's path decoded once, so
+2 -25
View File
@@ -338,7 +338,8 @@ func newFromSmartConfig(sc *smartconfig.Config) (*Config, error) {
settingName(keyDBURL), errValueEmpty)
}
c.DBURL = defaultDBURL(c.StateDir)
// The driver sets the journal mode only through a _pragma parameter.
c.DBURL = fmt.Sprintf("file:%s/state.sqlite3?_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)", c.StateDir)
}
if loader.err != nil {
@@ -353,30 +354,6 @@ func newFromSmartConfig(sc *smartconfig.Config) (*Config, error) {
return c, nil
}
// defaultDBURL returns the db_url used when db_url is omitted: the file
// state.sqlite3 in stateDir, in WAL mode, which the driver sets only
// through a _pragma parameter. String() percent-encodes any %, ? or # in
// the directory name, which SQLite decodes back, so the URL names exactly
// this file. OmitHost writes file:/var/lib/pixa/... instead of
// file:///var/lib/pixa/..., and keeps a relative stateDir from being read
// as a host name. The path written into the URL is stateDir followed by
// /state.sqlite3; when it starts with //, as it does for a stateDir of /
// or one starting with //, the empty host is kept, so the URL starts
// file://// and SQLite does not read the first name in the path as a
// host.
func defaultDBURL(stateDir string) string {
dbPath := stateDir + "/state.sqlite3"
dbURL := url.URL{
Scheme: "file",
OmitHost: !strings.HasPrefix(dbPath, "//"),
Path: dbPath,
RawQuery: "_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)",
}
return dbURL.String()
}
// validateKnownKeys rejects configuration files containing keys the
// application does not understand, so typos fail at startup instead of
// being silently ignored, and rejects keys that are explicitly set to
@@ -135,104 +135,6 @@ func TestDefaultDBURLOpensTheDatabaseInWALMode(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestDerivedDBURLOpensStateDirHoldingURLCharacters opens the db_url
// derived from a state_dir whose name holds %41, ? and #, and checks that
// the database is state.sqlite3 in that directory, in WAL mode. Put into
// a file: URL as it is, the name would lose its meaning: %41 is read as
// A, and the path ends at the ?, which also loses the journal mode.
func TestDerivedDBURLOpensStateDirHoldingURLCharacters(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
stateDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a%41b?c#d")
err := os.Mkdir(stateDir, 0o750)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create %q: %v", stateDir, err)
}
// Quoted so YAML takes the whole name as it is.
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+"state_dir: '"+stateDir+"'\n")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("config with state_dir %q should be valid, got: %v", stateDir, err)
}
t.Logf("state_dir %q gives db_url %q", stateDir, c.DBURL)
checkDBURLOpensFileInWALMode(t, c.DBURL, filepath.Join(stateDir, "state.sqlite3"))
}
// TestDerivedDBURLOpensStateDirStartingWithTwoSlashes opens the db_url
// derived from a state_dir that starts with //, and checks that the
// database is state.sqlite3 in that directory, in WAL mode. Written right
// after file:, such a name gives a URL starting file://, and SQLite reads
// the first directory name as a host and refuses to open it.
func TestDerivedDBURLOpensStateDirStartingWithTwoSlashes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
stateDir := "/" + dir
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+"state_dir: "+stateDir+"\n")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("config with state_dir %q should be valid, got: %v", stateDir, err)
}
t.Logf("state_dir %q gives db_url %q", stateDir, c.DBURL)
checkDBURLOpensFileInWALMode(t, c.DBURL, filepath.Join(dir, "state.sqlite3"))
}
// TestDerivedDBURLForRootStateDir checks the db_url derived from a
// state_dir of /. The path written into the URL is then
// //state.sqlite3, and written right after file: it gives a URL starting
// file://, where SQLite reads state.sqlite3 as a host and refuses to open
// it. The test only checks the URL, since it cannot write to /.
func TestDerivedDBURLForRootStateDir(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
c, err := configFromYAML(t, signingKeyLine+"state_dir: /\n")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("config with state_dir / should be valid, got: %v", err)
}
t.Logf("state_dir / gives db_url %q", c.DBURL)
wantDBURL := "file:////state.sqlite3?_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)"
if c.DBURL != wantDBURL {
t.Errorf("DBURL = %q, want %q", c.DBURL, wantDBURL)
}
}
// checkDBURLOpensFileInWALMode opens dbURL with the SQLite driver pixad
// uses, and checks that the database is in WAL mode and is the file
// dbFile.
func checkDBURLOpensFileInWALMode(t *testing.T, dbURL, dbFile string) {
t.Helper()
db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dbURL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to open %q: %v", dbURL, err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
var journalMode string
err = db.QueryRowContext(t.Context(), "PRAGMA journal_mode").Scan(&journalMode)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to read the journal mode of %q: %v", dbURL, err)
}
if journalMode != "wal" {
t.Errorf("journal mode of %q = %q, want wal", dbURL, journalMode)
}
_, err = os.Stat(dbFile)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("opening %q did not create %q: %v", dbURL, dbFile, err)
}
}
func TestExplicitValidValuesAreUsed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+1 -68
View File
@@ -9,9 +9,7 @@ import (
"math"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/clientip"
@@ -127,7 +125,7 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleGenerateURL() http.HandlerFunc {
sourceURL := r.FormValue("url")
// Validate source URL
parsed, err := parseSourceURL(sourceURL)
parsed, err := url.Parse(sourceURL)
if err != nil || parsed.Host == "" {
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, r, "Invalid source URL", r.Form,
http.StatusBadRequest)
@@ -135,16 +133,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleGenerateURL() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
// /v1/image/ refuses a ".." segment in the source path, and so does
// the generator. The path is decoded, so %2e%2e counts too
if slices.Contains(strings.Split(parsed.Path, "/"), "..") {
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, r,
"Source URL path cannot hold a .. segment", r.Form,
http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
payload, expiresAt, ttl, err := buildGeneratePayload(parsed, r.Form)
if err != nil {
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, r, err.Error(), r.Form,
@@ -153,19 +141,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleGenerateURL() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
// The image URL must fetch the source URL as it was written
sourceRequest := payload.ToImageRequest()
sourceRequest.AllowHTTP = s.config.AllowHTTP
fetchURL := sourceRequest.SourceURL()
if !fetchedAsWritten(parsed, fetchURL) {
s.renderGeneratorWithForm(w, r, "Source URL cannot be fetched as "+
"written: pixa would fetch "+fetchURL,
r.Form, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Generate encrypted token
token, err := s.encGen.Generate(payload)
if err != nil {
@@ -198,48 +173,6 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleGenerateURL() http.HandlerFunc {
}
}
// parseSourceURL parses the source URL entered on the generator page with its
// host lower-cased and an empty path written as "/", as /v1/image/ reads a
// source URL, so that each spelling of one source URL makes one cache key and
// one upstream request.
func parseSourceURL(sourceURL string) (*url.URL, error) {
parsed, err := url.Parse(sourceURL)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
parsed.Host = strings.ToLower(parsed.Host)
if parsed.Path == "" {
parsed.Path = "/"
}
return parsed, nil
}
// fetchedAsWritten reports whether fetchURL, the URL pixa fetches for an
// image URL made from the source URL source, is source as it was written,
// apart from the scheme, which the token does not keep. It is not when source
// holds a user name and password, which the token does not keep either, or a
// "?" with no query after it. The token keeps the source path decoded and
// pixa fetches it percent-encoded again, so a path written another way, such
// as with %2F, is fetched as another path. url.URL keeps the path as written
// in RawPath when it is not the decoded path percent-encoded again.
// EscapedPath ignores RawPath when it also holds a character net/url encodes,
// such as a space, so RawPath is compared itself.
func fetchedAsWritten(source *url.URL, fetchURL string) bool {
writtenPath := source.RawPath
if writtenPath == "" {
writtenPath = source.EscapedPath()
}
fetched, err := url.Parse(fetchURL)
return err == nil && source.User == nil && !source.ForceQuery &&
fetched.EscapedPath() == writtenPath &&
fetched.RawQuery == source.RawQuery
}
// buildGeneratePayload parses the numeric form fields and assembles the
// encrypted URL payload. ttl=0 means never expires (ExpiresAt stays 0). A
// non-numeric or out-of-range width, height, quality or ttl, or an
@@ -264,127 +264,3 @@ func TestHandleImage_AllowlistOrSignature(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// TestHandleImage_InvalidHost_Returns400 sends image URLs whose host no URL
// host can be, and checks that each is refused with 400 naming the host as
// decoded: allowlistedHost with a character after it that a URL host cannot
// hold, percent-encoded, an IPv6 address without brackets, and brackets
// around something that is not an IPv6 address. A "?" or "#" after
// allowlistedHost would otherwise end the host when the source URL is read,
// so the request would pass the allowlist and be fetched and cached under a
// host that is not the one fetched.
func TestHandleImage_InvalidHost_Returns400(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
photos := newPhotoFetcher(t, allowlistedHost)
tests := []struct {
name string
writtenHost string
decodedHost string
}{
{"? written as %3F", allowlistedHost + "%3Fx=1", allowlistedHost + "?x=1"},
{"# written as %23", allowlistedHost + "%23x", allowlistedHost + "#x"},
{"% written as %25", allowlistedHost + "%253F", allowlistedHost + "%3F"},
{`\ written as %5C`, allowlistedHost + "%5Cx", allowlistedHost + `\x`},
{"space written as %20", allowlistedHost + "%20", allowlistedHost + " "},
{"IPv6 address without brackets", "2001:db8::1", "2001:db8::1"},
{"IPv4 address in brackets", "[203.0.113.5]", "[203.0.113.5]"},
{"no address in brackets", "[abc]", "[abc]"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rec := sendGet(t, newImageRoute(t, photos), photoURL(tt.writtenHost))
checkErrorBody(t, rec, http.StatusBadRequest,
fmt.Sprintf("invalid image URL: invalid source host: %q",
tt.decodedHost))
})
}
}
// TestHandleImage_HostForms_Served checks that the image route serves, with
// a valid signature, the image at photoPath on a host name, an IPv4 address,
// an IPv6 address in brackets, and a host followed by ":" with or without a
// port.
func TestHandleImage_HostForms_Served(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
hosts := []string{
allowlistedHost,
"img_1.example.com",
"203.0.113.5",
"[2001:db8::1]",
allowlistedHost + ":8443",
"[2001:db8::1]:8443",
allowlistedHost + ":",
}
photos := newPhotoFetcher(t, hosts...)
exp := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
for _, host := range hosts {
t.Run(host, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
sig := photoSignature(testSigningKey, host, exp)
rec := sendGet(t, newImageRoute(t, photos),
photoURLWithSig(host, sig, exp))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d: %s",
rec.Code, http.StatusOK, rec.Body)
}
})
}
}
// TestHandleImage_HashInSourcePathOrQuery_Returns400 sends image URLs whose
// source path or source query holds a "#", written as %23, and checks that
// each is refused with 400, the one signed for that source path included. The
// source URL would otherwise end at the "#" when it is fetched, so each text
// after it would fetch the image at photoPath and cache it under keys of its
// own.
func TestHandleImage_HashInSourcePathOrQuery_Returns400(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
photos := newPhotoFetcher(t, allowlistedHost, signedHost)
exp := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
sig := signature.New(testSigningKey).Sign(&signature.Request{
SourceHost: signedHost,
SourcePath: photoPath + "#x",
Width: 50,
Height: 50,
Format: string(imgcache.FormatJPEG),
Quality: 85,
FitMode: string(imgcache.FitCover),
Expires: exp,
})
tests := []struct {
name string
target string
}{
{"# in the source path",
"/v1/image/" + allowlistedHost + photoPath + "%23x/50x50.jpeg"},
{"# in the source query",
"/v1/image/" + allowlistedHost + photoPath + "%3Fv=1%23x/50x50.jpeg"},
{"# in the source path, signed",
fmt.Sprintf("/v1/image/%s%s%%23x/50x50.jpeg?sig=%s&exp=%d",
signedHost, photoPath, sig, exp.Unix())},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
rec := sendGet(t, newImageRoute(t, photos), tt.target)
checkErrorBody(t, rec, http.StatusBadRequest,
`invalid image URL: invalid image path: `+
`the source path or query holds a "#"`)
})
}
}
+16 -43
View File
@@ -59,17 +59,15 @@ const (
// builtinBlockedPrefixes are internal or special-use ranges that Go's
// net.IP predicates (IsPrivate, IsLinkLocalUnicast, and the like) do not
// already cover. They are always blocked, in addition to any
// operator-supplied networks. IPv4-mapped and IPv4-compatible IPv6
// addresses are read as the IPv4 address they hold before matching, so
// these IPv4 ranges are caught in all three forms.
// operator-supplied networks. IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses are unmapped
// before matching, so these IPv4 ranges are caught in both forms.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // immutable built-in blocklist
var builtinBlockedPrefixes = []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10"), // RFC 6598 CGNAT / carrier-grade NAT
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.0.0/24"), // RFC 6890 IETF protocol assignments
netip.MustParsePrefix("198.18.0.0/15"), // RFC 2544 benchmarking range
netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b::/96"), // RFC 6052 NAT64 (maps onto IPv4)
netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b:1::/48"), // RFC 8215 local-use NAT64 (maps onto IPv4)
netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10"), // RFC 6598 CGNAT / carrier-grade NAT
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.0.0/24"), // RFC 6890 IETF protocol assignments
netip.MustParsePrefix("198.18.0.0/15"), // RFC 2544 benchmarking range
netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b::/96"), // RFC 6052 NAT64 (maps onto IPv4)
}
// Fetcher errors.
@@ -475,18 +473,18 @@ func validateURL(ctx context.Context, rawURL string, allowHTTP bool) error {
return ErrUnsupportedScheme
}
parsedURL, err := neturl.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrInvalidHost, err)
}
// Hostname drops any port, and the brackets of an IPv6 address whether
// or not a port follows them
host := parsedURL.Hostname()
// Parse to extract host
host := extractHost(rawURL)
if host == "" {
return ErrInvalidHost
}
// Remove port if present
h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host)
if err == nil {
host = h
}
// Block obvious localhost patterns
if isLocalhost(host) {
return ErrSSRFBlocked
@@ -545,9 +543,6 @@ func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return true
}
// An IPv4-compatible IPv6 address is judged as the IPv4 address it holds
ip = ipv4CompatibleToIPv4(ip)
// Check for loopback
if ip.IsLoopback() {
return true
@@ -599,12 +594,7 @@ func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
}
// isBlockedIP reports whether ip is refused, either by the built-in
// internal-range check or by one of the operator-supplied prefixes. An
// IPv4-compatible address (in ::/96) is refused when a prefix contains the
// address as written or the IPv4 address it holds. An IPv4-mapped address (in
// ::ffff:0:0/96) is matched only as the IPv4 address it holds: Go keeps a
// plain IPv4 address in that form too, and an IPv6 prefix such as ::/0 must
// not refuse every IPv4 address.
// internal-range check or by one of the operator-supplied prefixes.
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP, blocked []netip.Prefix) bool {
if isPrivateIP(ip) {
return true
@@ -617,28 +607,11 @@ func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP, blocked []netip.Prefix) bool {
addr = addr.Unmap()
// ip read as IPv4 where it is or holds an IPv4 address, otherwise the
// zero netip.Addr, which no prefix contains. Matching asIPv4 as well as
// addr refuses more only for an IPv4-compatible address.
asIPv4, _ := netip.AddrFromSlice(ipv4CompatibleToIPv4(ip).To4())
return slices.ContainsFunc(blocked, func(prefix netip.Prefix) bool {
return prefix.Contains(addr) || prefix.Contains(asIPv4)
return prefix.Contains(addr)
})
}
// ipv4CompatibleToIPv4 returns the IPv4 address that an IPv4-compatible IPv6
// address (in ::/96, such as ::127.0.0.1) holds in its last four bytes, and
// any other address unchanged.
func ipv4CompatibleToIPv4(ip net.IP) net.IP {
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
if ok && netip.MustParsePrefix("::/96").Contains(addr) {
return ip[12:]
}
return ip
}
// ssrfSafeDialer validates IP addresses against the built-in blocked ranges
// before connecting. New wraps dialSSRFSafe with the operator-supplied
// blocklist; this entry point enforces the built-in ranges alone.
@@ -186,44 +186,6 @@ func TestIsPrivateIP(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestIsPrivateIPJudgesEmbeddedIPv4Address checks IPv6 addresses that hold an
// IPv4 address in their last four bytes: the IPv4-compatible form (::/96) and
// the NAT64 form (64:ff9b::/96). One holding a loopback, private or
// link-local IPv4 address is refused as that address is, and one holding a
// public IPv4 address in the IPv4-compatible form passes.
func TestIsPrivateIPJudgesEmbeddedIPv4Address(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
ip string
want bool
}{
{"::127.0.0.1", true}, // loopback
{"::10.0.0.1", true}, // private
{"::169.254.169.254", true}, // link-local
{"64:ff9b::7f00:1", true}, // NAT64 form of 127.0.0.1
{"::8.8.8.8", false}, // public
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.ip, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ip := net.ParseIP(tc.ip)
if ip == nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to parse IP %q", tc.ip)
}
got := isPrivateIP(ip)
t.Logf("isPrivateIP(%s) = %v", ip, got)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("isPrivateIP(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.ip, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidateURL_RejectsNonHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -50,69 +50,3 @@ func TestImageProcessor_RefusesComputedSideAboveMaximum(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// TestImageProcessor_ComputedSideIsAtLeastOne verifies that, for a size with
// one side 0, the side computed from the input's proportions is 1 where it
// would round down to 0, and that Process makes that size in every fit mode
// but FitOutside, which scales the input to cover the size and so can make
// it longer. Each case checks the size targetDimensions gives before it
// calls Process: with that side at 0, an 8192x1 input at 1300x0 makes
// libvips ask for about 39 GB with FitCover.
func TestImageProcessor_ComputedSideIsAtLeastOne(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
inputWidth, inputHeight int
size Size
wantWidth, wantHeight int
}{
{"8192x1 at 100x0", 8192, 1, Size{Width: 100}, 100, 1},
{"8192x1 at 1300x0", 8192, 1, Size{Width: 1300}, 1300, 1},
{"8192x2 at 100x0", 8192, 2, Size{Width: 100}, 100, 1},
{"1x8192 at 0x100", 1, 8192, Size{Height: 100}, 1, 100},
{"1x8192 at 0x1300", 1, 8192, Size{Height: 1300}, 1, 1300},
{"2x8192 at 0x100", 2, 8192, Size{Height: 100}, 1, 100},
}
fits := []FitMode{FitCover, FitContain, FitFill, FitInside, FitOutside}
for _, tt := range tests {
for _, fit := range fits {
t.Run(tt.name+" "+string(fit), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
width, height, err := targetDimensions(tt.size,
tt.inputWidth, tt.inputHeight)
if err != nil || width != tt.wantWidth || height != tt.wantHeight {
t.Fatalf("targetDimensions() = %dx%d, %v, want %dx%d",
width, height, err, tt.wantWidth, tt.wantHeight)
}
input := createTestJPEG(t, tt.inputWidth, tt.inputHeight)
result, err := New(Params{}).Process(t.Context(),
bytes.NewReader(input),
&Request{Size: tt.size, Format: FormatJPEG, FitMode: fit})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = result.Content.Close() }()
t.Logf("Process() made %dx%d", result.Width, result.Height)
ok := result.Width == tt.wantWidth && result.Height == tt.wantHeight
if fit == FitOutside {
ok = result.Width >= tt.wantWidth && result.Height >= tt.wantHeight
}
if !ok {
t.Errorf("Process() made %dx%d, want %dx%d (at least, for %s)",
result.Width, result.Height, tt.wantWidth, tt.wantHeight,
FitOutside)
}
})
}
}
}
@@ -60,45 +60,3 @@ func TestImageProcessor_RefusesFitOutsideAboveMaximum(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// TestImageProcessor_FitOutsideSideIsAtLeastOne verifies that FitOutside
// keeps each side at 1 or more when it works both sides out again from the
// larger scale. A side of 49 scaled to 1 is 49 times 1/49, which in floating
// point is just under 1 and so rounded down to 0, a width libvips refuses.
func TestImageProcessor_FitOutsideSideIsAtLeastOne(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
inputWidth, inputHeight int
size Size
wantWidth, wantHeight int
}{
{"49x8192 at 0x100", 49, 8192, Size{Height: 100}, 1, 167},
{"49x49 at 1x1", 49, 49, Size{Width: 1, Height: 1}, 1, 1},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
input := createTestJPEG(t, tt.inputWidth, tt.inputHeight)
result, err := New(Params{}).Process(t.Context(),
bytes.NewReader(input),
&Request{Size: tt.size, Format: FormatJPEG, FitMode: FitOutside})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Process() error = %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = result.Content.Close() }()
t.Logf("Process() made %dx%d", result.Width, result.Height)
if result.Width != tt.wantWidth || result.Height != tt.wantHeight {
t.Errorf("Process() made %dx%d, want %dx%d",
result.Width, result.Height, tt.wantWidth, tt.wantHeight)
}
})
}
}
+12 -20
View File
@@ -311,10 +311,8 @@ func (p *ImageProcessor) Process(
// targetDimensions calculates the output dimensions for a requested size,
// scaling proportionally when only one dimension is given and keeping the
// original dimensions when both are zero. A side scaled proportionally is
// rounded down but kept at 1 or more, as for a thin image it would round
// down to 0, a side of no pixels. It can come out above MaxOutputDimension,
// which is ErrOutputTooLarge.
// original dimensions when both are zero. A side scaled proportionally can
// come out above MaxOutputDimension, which is ErrOutputTooLarge.
func targetDimensions(size Size, origWidth, origHeight int) (int, int, error) {
width, height := size.Width, size.Height
@@ -324,10 +322,10 @@ func targetDimensions(size Size, origWidth, origHeight int) (int, int, error) {
return origWidth, origHeight, nil
case width == 0:
// Only height specified: calculate width proportionally
width = max(1, origWidth*height/origHeight)
width = origWidth * height / origHeight
case height == 0:
// Only width specified: calculate height proportionally
height = max(1, origHeight*width/origWidth)
height = origHeight * width / origWidth
}
if width > MaxOutputDimension || height > MaxOutputDimension {
@@ -481,16 +479,13 @@ func (p *ImageProcessor) resize(
return cropCentreAndResize(img, width, height)
case FitContain:
// Resize to fit within dimensions, maintaining aspect ratio. Scaled
// by the smaller scale, the short side of a thin image can round
// down to 0, which libvips refuses as a width, so each side is at
// least 1.
// Resize to fit within dimensions, maintaining aspect ratio
imgW, imgH := img.Width(), img.Height()
scaleW := float64(width) / float64(imgW)
scaleH := float64(height) / float64(imgH)
scale := min(scaleW, scaleH)
newW := max(1, int(float64(imgW)*scale))
newH := max(1, int(float64(imgH)*scale))
newW := int(float64(imgW) * scale)
newH := int(float64(imgH) * scale)
return img.Thumbnail(newW, newH, vips.InterestingNone)
@@ -508,22 +503,19 @@ func (p *ImageProcessor) resize(
scaleW := float64(width) / float64(imgW)
scaleH := float64(height) / float64(imgH)
scale := min(scaleW, scaleH)
newW := max(1, int(float64(imgW)*scale))
newH := max(1, int(float64(imgH)*scale))
newW := int(float64(imgW) * scale)
newH := int(float64(imgH) * scale)
return img.Thumbnail(newW, newH, vips.InterestingNone)
case FitOutside:
// Resize so smallest dimension fits, may exceed target on other
// dimension. A side scaled to 1 can come out just under 1 in
// floating point, as 49 times 1/49 does, and round down to 0, which
// libvips refuses as a width, so each side is at least 1.
// Resize so smallest dimension fits, may exceed target on other dimension
imgW, imgH := img.Width(), img.Height()
scaleW := float64(width) / float64(imgW)
scaleH := float64(height) / float64(imgH)
scale := max(scaleW, scaleH)
newW := max(1, int(float64(imgW)*scale))
newH := max(1, int(float64(imgH)*scale))
newW := int(float64(imgW) * scale)
newH := int(float64(imgH) * scale)
// The dimension that exceeds the target is held to the maximum too
if newW > MaxOutputDimension || newH > MaxOutputDimension {
+8 -16
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"net/url"
"time"
)
@@ -87,11 +86,9 @@ func ValidateImageRequest(req *ImageRequest) error {
type ImageRequest struct {
// SourceHost is the origin host (e.g., "cdn.example.com")
SourceHost string
// SourcePath is the path on the origin with its percent-escapes decoded,
// as url.URL's Path holds it (e.g., "/photos/my cat.jpg")
// SourcePath is the path on the origin (e.g., "/photos/cat.jpg")
SourcePath string
// SourceQuery is the optional query string for the origin URL as the URL
// writes it, percent-escapes included, as url.URL's RawQuery holds it
// SourceQuery is the optional query string for the origin URL
SourceQuery string
// Size is the requested output dimensions
Size Size
@@ -110,25 +107,20 @@ type ImageRequest struct {
AllowHTTP bool
}
// SourceURL returns the full upstream URL to fetch: the source path
// percent-encoded again, as net/url writes a path, so each source path is one
// upstream path, and the source query as it is, with the characters
// escapeQuery encodes percent-encoded. Uses http:// scheme when AllowHTTP is
// true, otherwise https://.
// SourceURL returns the full upstream URL to fetch.
// Uses http:// scheme when AllowHTTP is true, otherwise https://.
func (r *ImageRequest) SourceURL() string {
scheme := "https"
if r.AllowHTTP {
scheme = "http"
}
sourceURL := url.URL{
Scheme: scheme,
Host: r.SourceHost,
Path: r.SourcePath,
RawQuery: escapeQuery(r.SourceQuery),
url := scheme + "://" + r.SourceHost + r.SourcePath
if r.SourceQuery != "" {
url += "?" + r.SourceQuery
}
return sourceURL.String()
return url
}
// ImageResponse represents a processed image ready to serve
+7 -60
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package imgcache
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"strconv"
@@ -29,9 +28,7 @@ var (
const MaxDimension = imageprocessor.MaxOutputDimension
// ValidateDimension checks one requested width or height; name ("width" or
// "height") appears in the error. 0 is valid: that side is then worked out from
// the source's proportions and the other requested side, rounded down but at
// least 1, or is the source's own side when the other side is 0 too.
// "height") appears in the error. 0 means "original size" and is valid.
func ValidateDimension(name string, value int) error {
if value < 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is negative", ErrInvalidSize, name)
@@ -53,21 +50,6 @@ var sizeFormatRegex = regexp.MustCompile(
// percentEscapeRegex matches one percent-escape, such as "%2e"
var percentEscapeRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`%[0-9A-Fa-f]{2}`)
// queryEscapeRegex matches a percent-escape, or one character that a browser
// percent-encodes in the query of an http or https URL: one outside the
// printable ASCII characters "!" to "~", such as a space, a control character
// or a character outside ASCII, or one of `"#'<>`. A "%" that does not begin a
// percent-escape matches too.
var queryEscapeRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`%[0-9A-Fa-f]{2}|[^!-~]|["#'<>%]`)
// hostRegex matches the forms the host of an image URL may take: a host name
// or an IPv4 address (letters, digits, "-", "_" and "."), or an IPv6 address
// in brackets (hex digits, ":" and "."), either one optionally followed by ":"
// and a port, which may be empty. Its one group holds the text in brackets,
// which parseImageComponents also checks is an IPv6 address.
var hostRegex = regexp.MustCompile(
`^(?:[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+|\[([0-9A-Fa-f:.]+)\])(?::[0-9]*)?$`)
// ParsedURL contains the parsed components of an image proxy URL.
type ParsedURL struct {
// Host is the source origin host (e.g., "cdn.example.com")
@@ -159,20 +141,10 @@ func parseImageComponents(remainder string) (*ParsedURL, error) {
return nil, ErrMissingHost
}
// Only the forms hostRegex describes are accepted. A "?", "#" or "@" in
// the host would make Go's URL parser, which the allowlist check and the
// fetcher use, read a different host from the one allowlisted and cached
hostMatch := hostRegex.FindStringSubmatch(host)
if hostMatch == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrInvalidHost, host)
}
// Go's URL parser refuses brackets around anything but an IPv6 address
if inBrackets := hostMatch[1]; inBrackets != "" {
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(inBrackets)
if err != nil || !addr.Is6() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrInvalidHost, host)
}
// A URL reads what comes before "@" as a user name and password, and the
// rest as the host
if strings.Contains(host, "@") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q holds @", ErrInvalidHost, host)
}
// Host names do not depend on letter case, so the allowlist, the upstream
@@ -180,20 +152,9 @@ func parseImageComponents(remainder string) (*ParsedURL, error) {
// host
host = strings.ToLower(host)
// Go's URL parser, which the fetcher uses, reads a "#" as the start of a
// fragment and drops the rest, so each text after it would be another
// spelling, cached under its own keys, of one upstream request
if strings.Contains(path, "#") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
`%w: the source path or query holds a "#"`, ErrInvalidPath)
}
// Extract query string if present in path. It is the source URL's query
// as that URL writes it. A character a URL's query cannot hold as it is,
// such as a space written %20 in the image URL, is percent-encoded here,
// so the query is signed and cached as it is sent upstream
// Extract query string if present in path
if qIndex := strings.Index(path, "?"); qIndex != -1 {
query = escapeQuery(path[qIndex+1:])
query = path[qIndex+1:]
path = path[:qIndex]
}
@@ -282,20 +243,6 @@ func decodePercentEscapes(s string) string {
})
}
// escapeQuery returns a source query as a URL's query holds it: each
// character that queryEscapeRegex names, such as a space, percent-encoded,
// and the rest, the query's percent-escapes included, kept as they are. The
// result is unchanged by a second escapeQuery.
func escapeQuery(query string) string {
return queryEscapeRegex.ReplaceAllStringFunc(query, func(match string) string {
if percentEscapeRegex.MatchString(match) {
return match
}
return url.PathEscape(match)
})
}
// parseSizeFormat parses strings like "800x600.webp", "orig.png" or "800x600"
func parseSizeFormat(s string) (Size, ImageFormat, error) {
matches := sizeFormatRegex.FindStringSubmatch(s)
@@ -14,12 +14,10 @@ import (
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"go.uber.org/fx"
"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
@@ -185,57 +183,6 @@ func startImageProxy(
return s, db.DB(), stateDir
}
// startImageProxyWithBlockedNetworks starts the components pixad's fx app
// builds, from a config with a fresh state directory and blockedNetworks as
// blocked_networks. Unlike startImageProxy it provides no upstream fetcher, so
// the handlers build the one pixad uses, which checks every address it
// connects to against the built-in blocked ranges and blocked_networks. It
// returns the server with its routes.
func startImageProxyWithBlockedNetworks(
t *testing.T, blockedNetworks []netip.Prefix,
) *Server {
t.Helper()
stateDir := t.TempDir()
cfg := &config.Config{
SigningKey: testSigningKey,
StateDir: stateDir,
DBURL: "file:" + filepath.Join(stateDir, "state.sqlite3"),
BlockedNetworks: blockedNetworks,
// A fetch that gets past the checks and finds nothing at the address
// fails within this time at the latest.
UpstreamFetchTimeout: 2 * time.Second,
// With no connection slots, the fetch would fail before connecting.
UpstreamConnections: config.DefaultUpstreamConnections,
DownstreamTimeout: config.DefaultDownstreamTimeout,
}
var (
h *handlers.Handlers
mw *middleware.Middleware
)
app := fxtest.New(t,
fx.Supply(cfg),
fx.Provide(
globals.New,
logger.New,
database.New,
healthcheck.New,
handlers.New,
middleware.New,
),
fx.Populate(&h, &mw),
)
app.RequireStart()
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
s := &Server{config: cfg, mw: mw, h: h}
s.SetupRoutes()
return s
}
// getImage sends a GET for target to s and fails unless it answers 200.
func getImage(t *testing.T, s *Server, target string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
-665
View File
@@ -1,665 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/session"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/signature"
)
// percentSignPath is a source path holding a "%", which a URL writes %25.
const percentSignPath = "/100%25.png"
// generateFormPattern extracts the CSRF token rendered into the generator
// page's form.
var generateFormPattern = regexp.MustCompile(
`(?s)action="/generate".*?name="gorilla\.csrf\.Token" value="([^"]+)"`)
// generatedURLPattern extracts the path of the encrypted URL the generator
// page shows.
var generatedURLPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`value="[^"]*(/v1/e/[^"]+)"`)
// recordingUpstream is a test upstream that answers every request with a PNG
// and records the request target, the path and query as sent, of each request
// it receives.
type recordingUpstream struct {
*httptest.Server
mu sync.Mutex
received []string
}
// startRecordingUpstream starts a recordingUpstream, which is closed when the
// test ends.
func startRecordingUpstream(t *testing.T) *recordingUpstream {
t.Helper()
source := encodeTestPNG(t, 64, 48)
upstream := &recordingUpstream{}
upstream.Server = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
upstream.mu.Lock()
upstream.received = append(upstream.received, r.RequestURI)
upstream.mu.Unlock()
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "image/png")
_, _ = w.Write(source)
}))
t.Cleanup(upstream.Close)
return upstream
}
// requestTargets returns the request targets the upstream has received, in
// the order it received them.
func (u *recordingUpstream) requestTargets() []string {
u.mu.Lock()
defer u.mu.Unlock()
return slices.Clone(u.received)
}
// pageOrigin is the origin of the login and generator pages below, opened
// over HTTPS; httptest gives every request the host example.com.
const pageOrigin = "https://example.com"
// openRoot sends GET / to s over HTTPS, with cookie when it is not nil, and
// returns the page: the login page, or the generator page for a login session.
func openRoot(
t *testing.T, s *Server, cookie *http.Cookie,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
pageOrigin+"/", nil)
if cookie != nil {
req.AddCookie(cookie)
}
page := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.ServeHTTP(page, req)
return page
}
// submitForm posts form to path on s as a browser submits it from page over
// HTTPS: with the CSRF token tokenPattern finds in page, the cookies page set,
// cookie when it is not nil, and a Referer naming the page, which pixa needs
// while debug is off, as it is in startImageProxy's config.
func submitForm(
t *testing.T, s *Server, page *httptest.ResponseRecorder,
tokenPattern *regexp.Regexp, path string, form url.Values,
cookie *http.Cookie,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
match := tokenPattern.FindStringSubmatch(page.Body.String())
if match == nil {
t.Fatalf("the page has no form for %s with a CSRF token", path)
}
form.Set("gorilla.csrf.Token", match[1])
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodPost,
pageOrigin+path, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
req.Header.Set("Referer", pageOrigin+"/")
for _, c := range page.Result().Cookies() {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
if cookie != nil {
req.AddCookie(cookie)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
return rec
}
// postGenerate logs in to s with the signing key, submits the generator page's
// form with sourceURL, and returns the response.
func postGenerate(
t *testing.T, s *Server, sourceURL string,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
login := submitForm(t, s, openRoot(t, s, nil), csrfFieldPattern, "/",
url.Values{"key": {testSigningKey}}, nil)
var sessionCookie *http.Cookie
for _, c := range login.Result().Cookies() {
if c.Name == session.CookieName {
sessionCookie = c
}
}
if sessionCookie == nil {
t.Fatalf("logging in answered %d and set no session cookie", login.Code)
}
rec := submitForm(t, s, openRoot(t, s, sessionCookie), generateFormPattern,
"/generate", url.Values{"url": {sourceURL}}, sessionCookie)
t.Logf("POST /generate with url %s: %d", sourceURL, rec.Code)
return rec
}
// TestImageURLFetchesItsSourcePathAndQuery requests image URLs whose source
// query holds a space, written percent-encoded, or a "'", and whose source
// path holds a "%", written percent-encoded, and checks the one request the
// upstream receives: the source path percent-encoded again, and the source
// query with the space written %20 and the "'" written %27, as a browser
// writes them in a query.
func TestImageURLFetchesItsSourcePathAndQuery(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
// pathAndQuery is the source path and query as the image URL writes
// them
pathAndQuery string
// wantRequest is the path and query the upstream must receive
wantRequest string
}{
{"space in the query", "/photo.png%3Fname=my%20cat",
"/photo.png?name=my%20cat"},
{"apostrophe in the query", "/photo.png%3Fname=it's",
"/photo.png?name=it%27s"},
{"percent sign in the path", percentSignPath, percentSignPath},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
upstream := startRecordingUpstream(t)
s, _, _ := startImageProxy(t, upstream.Server)
getImage(t, s, "/v1/image/"+upstreamHost+tt.pathAndQuery+"/orig.png")
got := upstream.requestTargets()
t.Logf("upstream received %q", got)
if !slices.Equal(got, []string{tt.wantRequest}) {
t.Errorf("upstream received %q, want [%q]", got, tt.wantRequest)
}
})
}
}
// TestSourcePathsHoldingSpaceAndPercent20AreFetchedApart requests twice each
// of the source paths /my cat.png and /my%20cat.png, which the image URL
// writes my%20cat.png and my%2520cat.png. Each is fetched once, as a request
// of its own, and its second request is served from the cache.
func TestSourcePathsHoldingSpaceAndPercent20AreFetchedApart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
upstream := startRecordingUpstream(t)
s, _, _ := startImageProxy(t, upstream.Server)
imageURLs := []string{
"/v1/image/" + upstreamHost + "/my%20cat.png/orig.png",
"/v1/image/" + upstreamHost + "/my%2520cat.png/orig.png",
}
for _, imageURL := range imageURLs {
getImage(t, s, imageURL)
}
for _, imageURL := range imageURLs {
cacheStatus := getImage(t, s, imageURL).Header().Get("X-Pixa-Cache")
if cacheStatus != string(imgcache.CacheHit) {
t.Errorf("second GET %s: X-Pixa-Cache = %q, want HIT",
imageURL, cacheStatus)
}
}
got := upstream.requestTargets()
t.Logf("upstream received %q", got)
want := []string{"/my%20cat.png", "/my%2520cat.png"}
if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("upstream received %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
// TestSourceQueryWrittenTwoWaysIsOneUpstreamRequest requests the source query
// name=my%20cat written as the README says, name=my%2520cat, and with the
// space written %20, name=my%20cat. Both are one source query: the upstream
// receives one request, and the second image URL is served from the cache.
func TestSourceQueryWrittenTwoWaysIsOneUpstreamRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
upstream := startRecordingUpstream(t)
s, _, _ := startImageProxy(t, upstream.Server)
getImage(t, s, "/v1/image/"+upstreamHost+"/photo.png%3Fname=my%2520cat/orig.png")
second := getImage(t, s,
"/v1/image/"+upstreamHost+"/photo.png%3Fname=my%20cat/orig.png")
if got := second.Header().Get("X-Pixa-Cache"); got != string(imgcache.CacheHit) {
t.Errorf("second X-Pixa-Cache = %q, want HIT", got)
}
got := upstream.requestTargets()
t.Logf("upstream received %q", got)
want := []string{"/photo.png?name=my%20cat"}
if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("upstream received %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
// TestGeneratedURLFetchesTheSourceURLAsEntered makes an encrypted URL on the
// generator page for source URLs holding %20, %25 and %23 in the path or the
// query, requests it, and checks that the upstream receives the path and
// query exactly as entered.
func TestGeneratedURLFetchesTheSourceURLAsEntered(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The names hold no "%": each test's state directory is named after it
// and goes into the database URL, which decodes percent-escapes
tests := []struct {
name string
pathAndQuery string
}{
{"space in the path", "/my%20cat.png"},
{"percent sign in the path", percentSignPath},
{"number sign in the path", "/a%23b.png"},
{"all three in the query", "/photo.png?name=my%20cat%25%23"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
upstream := startRecordingUpstream(t)
s, _, _ := startImageProxy(t, upstream.Server)
rec := postGenerate(t, s, "https://"+upstreamHost+tt.pathAndQuery)
match := generatedURLPattern.FindStringSubmatch(rec.Body.String())
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || match == nil {
t.Fatalf("POST /generate: %d with no encrypted URL; body %s",
rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
getImage(t, s, match[1])
got := upstream.requestTargets()
t.Logf("upstream received %q", got)
if !slices.Equal(got, []string{tt.pathAndQuery}) {
t.Errorf("upstream received %q, want [%q]", got, tt.pathAndQuery)
}
})
}
}
// TestGeneratorMakesOneImageURLForTwoSpellingsOfASourceURL enters two
// spellings of one source URL on the generator page, requests the encrypted
// URL made for each, and checks that the upstream receives one request and
// that the second encrypted URL is served from the cache. One pair writes the
// host in upper and in lower case, which /v1/image/ lower-cases. The host is
// an IPv6 address, whose hex digits have letter case, because the fetcher
// would look a host name up in DNS. It has a port, as the fetcher refuses an
// IPv6 address written without one. The other pair is a source URL with no
// path and with the path "/", both of which fetch "/".
func TestGeneratorMakesOneImageURLForTwoSpellingsOfASourceURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
// sourceURLs are the two spellings, after "https://"
sourceURLs []string
// wantRequest is the path the upstream must receive
wantRequest string
}{
{"host in upper and in lower case",
[]string{"[2001:DB8::A]:8443/a.png", "[2001:db8::a]:8443/a.png"},
"/a.png"},
{"no path and the path written as a slash",
[]string{upstreamHost, upstreamHost + "/"}, "/"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
upstream := startRecordingUpstream(t)
s, _, _ := startImageProxy(t, upstream.Server)
var imageURLs []string
for _, sourceURL := range tt.sourceURLs {
rec := postGenerate(t, s, "https://"+sourceURL)
match := generatedURLPattern.FindStringSubmatch(rec.Body.String())
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || match == nil {
t.Fatalf("POST /generate: %d with no encrypted URL; body %s",
rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
imageURLs = append(imageURLs, match[1])
}
getImage(t, s, imageURLs[0])
second := getImage(t, s, imageURLs[1])
if got := second.Header().Get("X-Pixa-Cache"); got != string(imgcache.CacheHit) {
t.Errorf("second X-Pixa-Cache = %q, want HIT", got)
}
got := upstream.requestTargets()
t.Logf("upstream received %q", got)
if !slices.Equal(got, []string{tt.wantRequest}) {
t.Errorf("upstream received %q, want [%q]", got, tt.wantRequest)
}
})
}
}
// TestGeneratorRefusesSourceURLItCannotFetchAsWritten submits source URLs the
// generator page must make no encrypted URL for, and checks that it answers
// 400 and shows why. pixa keeps the source path decoded and fetches it
// percent-encoded again, so a path holding %2F would be fetched with a "/"
// there, whatever else the path holds. pixa sends no user name or password,
// and no "?" with no query after it. For these the page shows the URL pixa
// would fetch. A source path holding a ".." segment is refused, as
// /v1/image/ refuses it.
func TestGeneratorRefusesSourceURLItCannotFetchAsWritten(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The test config sets allow_http, so pixa would fetch over plain HTTP
const fetchedFrom = "http://" + upstreamHost
tests := []struct {
name string
// sourceURL is the source URL after "https://"
sourceURL string
// wantShown is what the page must show: the URL pixa would fetch, or
// why it makes no encrypted URL
wantShown string
}{
{"encoded slash", upstreamHost + "/a%2Fb.png",
fetchedFrom + "/a/b.png"},
{"encoded slash and a space", upstreamHost + "/a%2Fb c.png",
fetchedFrom + "/a/b%20c.png"},
{"encoded slash and a bar", upstreamHost + "/a%2Fb|c.png",
fetchedFrom + "/a/b%7Cc.png"},
{"encoded slash and a letter outside ASCII", upstreamHost + "/café%2Fx.png",
fetchedFrom + "/caf%C3%A9/x.png"},
{"user name and password", "user:pass@" + upstreamHost + "/a.png",
fetchedFrom + "/a.png"},
{"question mark with no query", upstreamHost + "/a.png?",
fetchedFrom + "/a.png"},
{"two-dot segment", upstreamHost + "/a/../b.png",
"cannot hold a .. segment"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startImageProxy(t, startRecordingUpstream(t).Server)
rec := postGenerate(t, s, "https://"+tt.sourceURL)
body := rec.Body.String()
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if strings.Contains(body, "/v1/e/") {
t.Error("the page shows an encrypted URL")
}
if !strings.Contains(body, tt.wantShown) {
t.Errorf("the page does not show %s; body %s", tt.wantShown, body)
}
})
}
}
// ipv6SourcePath is the source path of the image URLs signedImageURL and
// encryptedImageURL make.
const ipv6SourcePath = "/ipv6.png"
// TestImageRoutesFetchIPv6SourceHostWithOrWithoutPort requests ipv6SourcePath
// on an IPv6 source host, written with and without a port, through a
// /v1/image/ URL with a signature and through an encrypted URL. The public
// address 2001:db8::a, a documentation address (RFC 3849) the fetcher accepts
// as public, answers 200, and the upstream receives the request for
// ipv6SourcePath. The private address fd00::1 answers 403, and the upstream
// receives no request: the test's fetcher connects every address to the test
// upstream, so only the fetcher's check of the source URL can refuse it.
func TestImageRoutesFetchIPv6SourceHostWithOrWithoutPort(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tests := []struct {
name string
sourceHost string
wantStatus int
// wantRequests are the request targets the upstream must receive
wantRequests []string
}{
{"public address without a port", "[2001:db8::a]",
http.StatusOK, []string{ipv6SourcePath}},
{"public address with a port", "[2001:db8::a]:8443",
http.StatusOK, []string{ipv6SourcePath}},
{"private address without a port", "[fd00::1]",
http.StatusForbidden, nil},
{"private address with a port", "[fd00::1]:8443",
http.StatusForbidden, nil},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
imageURLs := map[string]string{
"image URL with a signature": signedImageURL(t, tt.sourceHost),
"encrypted URL": encryptedImageURL(t, tt.sourceHost),
}
for route, imageURL := range imageURLs {
t.Run(tt.name+" "+route, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
upstream := startRecordingUpstream(t)
s, _, _ := startImageProxy(t, upstream.Server)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, imageURL, nil))
t.Logf("GET %s: %d", imageURL, rec.Code)
if rec.Code != tt.wantStatus {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d; body %s",
rec.Code, tt.wantStatus, rec.Body.String())
}
got := upstream.requestTargets()
t.Logf("upstream received %q", got)
if !slices.Equal(got, tt.wantRequests) {
t.Errorf("upstream received %q, want %q", got, tt.wantRequests)
}
})
}
}
}
// signedImageURL returns the /v1/image/ URL of ipv6SourcePath on sourceHost at
// its original size as PNG, with a signature made with the test signing key,
// which a host not on the allowlist needs. The URL has no q or fit, so it is
// signed with the quality 85 and the fit cover.
func signedImageURL(t *testing.T, sourceHost string) string {
t.Helper()
path, sig, exp := signature.New(testSigningKey).GenerateSignedURL(
&signature.Request{
SourceHost: sourceHost,
SourcePath: ipv6SourcePath,
Format: string(imgcache.FormatPNG),
Quality: 85,
FitMode: string(imgcache.FitCover),
}, time.Hour)
return path + "?sig=" + sig + "&exp=" + strconv.FormatInt(exp, 10)
}
// encryptedImageURL returns the encrypted URL of ipv6SourcePath on sourceHost
// at its original size as PNG, made with the test signing key.
func encryptedImageURL(t *testing.T, sourceHost string) string {
t.Helper()
generator, err := encurl.NewGenerator(testSigningKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encurl.NewGenerator: %v", err)
}
token, err := generator.Generate(&encurl.Payload{
SourceHost: sourceHost, SourcePath: ipv6SourcePath,
Format: imgcache.FormatPNG,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encurl Generate: %v", err)
}
return "/v1/e/" + token + "/img.png"
}
// TestImageRoutesRefuseIPv6SourceHostHoldingInternalIPv4Address requests
// ipv6SourcePath on IPv6 source hosts that hold a loopback or private IPv4
// address in their last four bytes, in the IPv4-compatible form (::/96) or the
// NAT64 form (64:ff9b::/96), through a /v1/image/ URL with a signature and
// through an encrypted URL. Each answers 403, and the upstream receives no
// request: the test's fetcher connects every address to the test upstream, so
// only the fetcher's check of the source URL can refuse it.
func TestImageRoutesRefuseIPv6SourceHostHoldingInternalIPv4Address(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
upstream := startRecordingUpstream(t)
s, _, _ := startImageProxy(t, upstream.Server)
sourceHosts := []string{
"[::127.0.0.1]", // IPv4-compatible form of a loopback address
"[::10.0.0.1]", // IPv4-compatible form of a private address
"[64:ff9b::7f00:1]", // NAT64 form of 127.0.0.1
}
for _, sourceHost := range sourceHosts {
imageURLs := []string{
signedImageURL(t, sourceHost),
encryptedImageURL(t, sourceHost),
}
for _, imageURL := range imageURLs {
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, imageURL, nil))
t.Logf("GET %s (source host %s): %d", imageURL, sourceHost, rec.Code)
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("source host %s: status = %d, want %d; body %s",
sourceHost, rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Body.String())
}
}
}
if got := upstream.requestTargets(); len(got) != 0 {
t.Errorf("upstream received %q, want no request", got)
}
}
// TestImageRoutesCheckIPv4AddressInIPv6SourceHost requests ipv6SourcePath on
// source hosts that hold an IPv4 address, through a /v1/image/ URL with a
// signature and through an encrypted URL, with the fetcher pixad uses.
// [64:ff9b:1::a00:1], in the local-use NAT64 range (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215),
// answers 403. [::203.0.113.5] holds the public address 203.0.113.5 in the
// IPv4-compatible form (::/96) and answers 403 when blocked_networks lists
// 203.0.113.0/24 or ::/96. [::ffff:203.0.113.5] holds it in the IPv4-mapped
// form (::ffff:0:0/96) and answers 403 when blocked_networks lists
// 203.0.113.0/24. Go keeps the plain address 203.0.113.5 in the mapped form
// too, and an IPv6 range must not refuse it: with ::/0 listed it is not
// refused. Neither is [::203.0.113.5] with blocked_networks empty. Where a
// host is not refused, the fetcher tries to connect to it, finds nothing
// there, and the request fails with another status.
func TestImageRoutesCheckIPv4AddressInIPv6SourceHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
ipv4CompatibleHost = "[::203.0.113.5]"
ipv4MappedHost = "[::ffff:203.0.113.5]"
)
tests := []struct {
name string
sourceHost string
blockedNetworks []netip.Prefix
wantForbidden bool
}{
{"local-use NAT64 form of 10.0.0.1", "[64:ff9b:1::a00:1]", nil, true},
{"IPv4-compatible form of an address in blocked_networks",
ipv4CompatibleHost,
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")}, true},
{"IPv4-compatible form with ::/96 in blocked_networks",
ipv4CompatibleHost,
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("::/96")}, true},
{"IPv4-mapped form of an address in blocked_networks",
ipv4MappedHost,
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")}, true},
{"plain IPv4 address with ::/0 in blocked_networks",
"203.0.113.5",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("::/0")}, false},
{"IPv4-compatible form of an address with blocked_networks empty",
ipv4CompatibleHost, nil, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
imageURLs := map[string]string{
"image URL with a signature": signedImageURL(t, tt.sourceHost),
"encrypted URL": encryptedImageURL(t, tt.sourceHost),
}
for route, imageURL := range imageURLs {
t.Run(tt.name+" "+route, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startImageProxyWithBlockedNetworks(t, tt.blockedNetworks)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
s.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, imageURL, nil))
t.Logf("GET %s: %d", imageURL, rec.Code)
forbidden := rec.Code == http.StatusForbidden
if tt.wantForbidden && !forbidden {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d; body %s",
rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Body.String())
}
if !tt.wantForbidden && forbidden {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want any other status; body %s",
rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
})
}
}
}