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78fe6957de
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
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78fe6957de | ||
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339c149a4e | ||
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afe000fb0f | ||
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c593eae603 | ||
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d104d5d936 | ||
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a997ede32b |
@@ -694,10 +694,7 @@ Key settings in more detail:
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and generator pages. Default: empty
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and generator pages. Default: empty
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- `blocked_networks` — list of CIDR ranges to refuse for SSRF protection, added
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- `blocked_networks` — list of CIDR ranges to refuse for SSRF protection, added
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to the always-enforced built-in ranges (loopback, private, link-local, CGNAT,
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to the always-enforced built-in ranges (loopback, private, link-local, CGNAT,
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benchmark, NAT64, and the like); an invalid CIDR aborts startup. An IPv6
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benchmark, NAT64, and the like); an invalid CIDR aborts startup
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address in the IPv4-mapped form (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) is matched only as the IPv4
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address it holds, so an IPv6 range such as `::/0` refuses neither it nor a
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plain IPv4 address
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- `trusted_proxies` — list of CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies in front of
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- `trusted_proxies` — list of CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies in front of
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pixa. `X-Forwarded-For` is believed only when the direct peer falls inside one
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pixa. `X-Forwarded-For` is believed only when the direct peer falls inside one
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of these ranges; the logged and login-recorded client address is then the
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of these ranges; the logged and login-recorded client address is then the
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@@ -30,32 +30,6 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
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# Completed Steps
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# Completed Steps
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- 2026-10-16 P1 security bug: the check that keeps pixa from fetching internal
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addresses refuses the local-use NAT64 range (`64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) as it
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refuses `64:ff9b::/96`, and refuses an IPv6 address in the IPv4-compatible
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form (`::/96`) when `blocked_networks` contains either the address as written
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or the IPv4 address it holds (closes #299). A source host such as
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`[64:ff9b:1::a00:1]` was fetched, which on a network that runs NAT64 on that
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range reaches the IPv4 address it holds, here `10.0.0.1`; and with
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`203.0.113.0/24` in `blocked_networks`, `[::ffff:203.0.113.5]` was refused but
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`[::203.0.113.5]` was fetched. Both now answer 403. The mapped form
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(`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) is still matched only as the IPv4 address it holds: Go
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keeps a plain IPv4 address in that form, and an IPv6 entry such as `::/0` must
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not refuse every IPv4 address.
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- 2026-10-16 P1 security bug: the check that keeps pixa from fetching internal
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addresses judges an IPv6 address in the IPv4-compatible form (`::/96`), such
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as `::127.0.0.1` or `::10.0.0.1`, by the IPv4 address in its last four bytes
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(closes #297). It read only the mapped form (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) as IPv4, so a
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source host such as `[::127.0.0.1]` was checked as a public IPv6 address and
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fetched, which on a network that routes it reaches the internal IPv4 host; it
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is now refused with 403. The NAT64 form (`64:ff9b::/96`) was already refused
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as a whole, as one of the built-in blocked ranges, and still is.
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- 2026-10-16 a source host that is an IPv6 address in brackets with no port,
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such as `[2001:db8::a]`, is fetched like one with a port, through `/v1/image/`
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and through an encrypted URL (closes #295). The fetcher's check of the source
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URL kept the brackets when no port followed them, could not look the host up,
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and the request answered 500. It now checks the address without brackets, so a
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private one is refused with 403, as with a port.
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- 2026-10-16 a `state_dir` whose name holds `%`, `?` or `#` keeps its database
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- 2026-10-16 a `state_dir` whose name holds `%`, `?` or `#` keeps its database
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at `state.sqlite3` in that directory (closes #290): the `db_url` derived from
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at `state.sqlite3` in that directory (closes #290): the `db_url` derived from
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it put the name into a `file:` URL as it was, so SQLite read `%41` as `A`, a
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it put the name into a `file:` URL as it was, so SQLite read `%41` as `A`, a
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@@ -59,17 +59,15 @@ const (
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// builtinBlockedPrefixes are internal or special-use ranges that Go's
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// builtinBlockedPrefixes are internal or special-use ranges that Go's
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// net.IP predicates (IsPrivate, IsLinkLocalUnicast, and the like) do not
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// net.IP predicates (IsPrivate, IsLinkLocalUnicast, and the like) do not
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// already cover. They are always blocked, in addition to any
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// already cover. They are always blocked, in addition to any
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// operator-supplied networks. IPv4-mapped and IPv4-compatible IPv6
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// operator-supplied networks. IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses are unmapped
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// addresses are read as the IPv4 address they hold before matching, so
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// before matching, so these IPv4 ranges are caught in both forms.
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// these IPv4 ranges are caught in all three forms.
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//
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//
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//nolint:gochecknoglobals // immutable built-in blocklist
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//nolint:gochecknoglobals // immutable built-in blocklist
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var builtinBlockedPrefixes = []netip.Prefix{
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var builtinBlockedPrefixes = []netip.Prefix{
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netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10"), // RFC 6598 CGNAT / carrier-grade NAT
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netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10"), // RFC 6598 CGNAT / carrier-grade NAT
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netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.0.0/24"), // RFC 6890 IETF protocol assignments
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netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.0.0/24"), // RFC 6890 IETF protocol assignments
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netip.MustParsePrefix("198.18.0.0/15"), // RFC 2544 benchmarking range
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netip.MustParsePrefix("198.18.0.0/15"), // RFC 2544 benchmarking range
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netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b::/96"), // RFC 6052 NAT64 (maps onto IPv4)
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netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b::/96"), // RFC 6052 NAT64 (maps onto IPv4)
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netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b:1::/48"), // RFC 8215 local-use NAT64 (maps onto IPv4)
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}
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}
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// Fetcher errors.
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// Fetcher errors.
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@@ -475,18 +473,18 @@ func validateURL(ctx context.Context, rawURL string, allowHTTP bool) error {
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return ErrUnsupportedScheme
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return ErrUnsupportedScheme
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}
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}
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parsedURL, err := neturl.Parse(rawURL)
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// Parse to extract host
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if err != nil {
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host := extractHost(rawURL)
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrInvalidHost, err)
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}
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// Hostname drops any port, and the brackets of an IPv6 address whether
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// or not a port follows them
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host := parsedURL.Hostname()
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if host == "" {
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if host == "" {
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return ErrInvalidHost
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return ErrInvalidHost
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}
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}
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// Remove port if present
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h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host)
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if err == nil {
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host = h
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|
}
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|
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// Block obvious localhost patterns
|
// Block obvious localhost patterns
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if isLocalhost(host) {
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if isLocalhost(host) {
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return ErrSSRFBlocked
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return ErrSSRFBlocked
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@@ -545,9 +543,6 @@ func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
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return true
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return true
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}
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}
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// An IPv4-compatible IPv6 address is judged as the IPv4 address it holds
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ip = ipv4CompatibleToIPv4(ip)
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// Check for loopback
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// Check for loopback
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if ip.IsLoopback() {
|
if ip.IsLoopback() {
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return true
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return true
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@@ -599,12 +594,7 @@ func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
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}
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}
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// isBlockedIP reports whether ip is refused, either by the built-in
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// isBlockedIP reports whether ip is refused, either by the built-in
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// internal-range check or by one of the operator-supplied prefixes. An
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// internal-range check or by one of the operator-supplied prefixes.
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// IPv4-compatible address (in ::/96) is refused when a prefix contains the
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// address as written or the IPv4 address it holds. An IPv4-mapped address (in
|
|
||||||
// ::ffff:0:0/96) is matched only as the IPv4 address it holds: Go keeps a
|
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||||||
// plain IPv4 address in that form too, and an IPv6 prefix such as ::/0 must
|
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||||||
// not refuse every IPv4 address.
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func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP, blocked []netip.Prefix) bool {
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func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP, blocked []netip.Prefix) bool {
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if isPrivateIP(ip) {
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if isPrivateIP(ip) {
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return true
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return true
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@@ -617,28 +607,11 @@ func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP, blocked []netip.Prefix) bool {
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addr = addr.Unmap()
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addr = addr.Unmap()
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// ip read as IPv4 where it is or holds an IPv4 address, otherwise the
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// zero netip.Addr, which no prefix contains. Matching asIPv4 as well as
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// addr refuses more only for an IPv4-compatible address.
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asIPv4, _ := netip.AddrFromSlice(ipv4CompatibleToIPv4(ip).To4())
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return slices.ContainsFunc(blocked, func(prefix netip.Prefix) bool {
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return slices.ContainsFunc(blocked, func(prefix netip.Prefix) bool {
|
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return prefix.Contains(addr) || prefix.Contains(asIPv4)
|
return prefix.Contains(addr)
|
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})
|
})
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// ipv4CompatibleToIPv4 returns the IPv4 address that an IPv4-compatible IPv6
|
|
||||||
// address (in ::/96, such as ::127.0.0.1) holds in its last four bytes, and
|
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// any other address unchanged.
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func ipv4CompatibleToIPv4(ip net.IP) net.IP {
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addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
|
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if ok && netip.MustParsePrefix("::/96").Contains(addr) {
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return ip[12:]
|
|
||||||
}
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|
||||||
|
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||||||
return ip
|
|
||||||
}
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||||||
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||||||
// ssrfSafeDialer validates IP addresses against the built-in blocked ranges
|
// ssrfSafeDialer validates IP addresses against the built-in blocked ranges
|
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// before connecting. New wraps dialSSRFSafe with the operator-supplied
|
// before connecting. New wraps dialSSRFSafe with the operator-supplied
|
||||||
// blocklist; this entry point enforces the built-in ranges alone.
|
// blocklist; this entry point enforces the built-in ranges alone.
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -186,44 +186,6 @@ func TestIsPrivateIP(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestIsPrivateIPJudgesEmbeddedIPv4Address checks IPv6 addresses that hold an
|
|
||||||
// IPv4 address in their last four bytes: the IPv4-compatible form (::/96) and
|
|
||||||
// the NAT64 form (64:ff9b::/96). One holding a loopback, private or
|
|
||||||
// link-local IPv4 address is refused as that address is, and one holding a
|
|
||||||
// public IPv4 address in the IPv4-compatible form passes.
|
|
||||||
func TestIsPrivateIPJudgesEmbeddedIPv4Address(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
tests := []struct {
|
|
||||||
ip string
|
|
||||||
want bool
|
|
||||||
}{
|
|
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{"::127.0.0.1", true}, // loopback
|
|
||||||
{"::10.0.0.1", true}, // private
|
|
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{"::169.254.169.254", true}, // link-local
|
|
||||||
{"64:ff9b::7f00:1", true}, // NAT64 form of 127.0.0.1
|
|
||||||
{"::8.8.8.8", false}, // public
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for _, tc := range tests {
|
|
||||||
t.Run(tc.ip, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
ip := net.ParseIP(tc.ip)
|
|
||||||
if ip == nil {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatalf("failed to parse IP %q", tc.ip)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
got := isPrivateIP(ip)
|
|
||||||
t.Logf("isPrivateIP(%s) = %v", ip, got)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if got != tc.want {
|
|
||||||
t.Errorf("isPrivateIP(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.ip, got, tc.want)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestValidateURL_RejectsNonHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
|
func TestValidateURL_RejectsNonHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -14,12 +14,10 @@ import (
|
|||||||
"net"
|
"net"
|
||||||
"net/http"
|
"net/http"
|
||||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||||
"net/netip"
|
|
||||||
"os"
|
"os"
|
||||||
"path/filepath"
|
"path/filepath"
|
||||||
"sync/atomic"
|
"sync/atomic"
|
||||||
"testing"
|
"testing"
|
||||||
"time"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
"go.uber.org/fx"
|
"go.uber.org/fx"
|
||||||
"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
|
"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
|
||||||
@@ -185,57 +183,6 @@ func startImageProxy(
|
|||||||
return s, db.DB(), stateDir
|
return s, db.DB(), stateDir
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// startImageProxyWithBlockedNetworks starts the components pixad's fx app
|
|
||||||
// builds, from a config with a fresh state directory and blockedNetworks as
|
|
||||||
// blocked_networks. Unlike startImageProxy it provides no upstream fetcher, so
|
|
||||||
// the handlers build the one pixad uses, which checks every address it
|
|
||||||
// connects to against the built-in blocked ranges and blocked_networks. It
|
|
||||||
// returns the server with its routes.
|
|
||||||
func startImageProxyWithBlockedNetworks(
|
|
||||||
t *testing.T, blockedNetworks []netip.Prefix,
|
|
||||||
) *Server {
|
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
stateDir := t.TempDir()
|
|
||||||
cfg := &config.Config{
|
|
||||||
SigningKey: testSigningKey,
|
|
||||||
StateDir: stateDir,
|
|
||||||
DBURL: "file:" + filepath.Join(stateDir, "state.sqlite3"),
|
|
||||||
BlockedNetworks: blockedNetworks,
|
|
||||||
// A fetch that gets past the checks and finds nothing at the address
|
|
||||||
// fails within this time at the latest.
|
|
||||||
UpstreamFetchTimeout: 2 * time.Second,
|
|
||||||
// With no connection slots, the fetch would fail before connecting.
|
|
||||||
UpstreamConnections: config.DefaultUpstreamConnections,
|
|
||||||
DownstreamTimeout: config.DefaultDownstreamTimeout,
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var (
|
|
||||||
h *handlers.Handlers
|
|
||||||
mw *middleware.Middleware
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
app := fxtest.New(t,
|
|
||||||
fx.Supply(cfg),
|
|
||||||
fx.Provide(
|
|
||||||
globals.New,
|
|
||||||
logger.New,
|
|
||||||
database.New,
|
|
||||||
healthcheck.New,
|
|
||||||
handlers.New,
|
|
||||||
middleware.New,
|
|
||||||
),
|
|
||||||
fx.Populate(&h, &mw),
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
app.RequireStart()
|
|
||||||
t.Cleanup(app.RequireStop)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
s := &Server{config: cfg, mw: mw, h: h}
|
|
||||||
s.SetupRoutes()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return s
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// getImage sends a GET for target to s and fails unless it answers 200.
|
// getImage sends a GET for target to s and fails unless it answers 200.
|
||||||
func getImage(t *testing.T, s *Server, target string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
|
func getImage(t *testing.T, s *Server, target string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
t.Helper()
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -3,20 +3,15 @@ package server
|
|||||||
import (
|
import (
|
||||||
"net/http"
|
"net/http"
|
||||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||||
"net/netip"
|
|
||||||
"net/url"
|
"net/url"
|
||||||
"regexp"
|
"regexp"
|
||||||
"slices"
|
"slices"
|
||||||
"strconv"
|
|
||||||
"strings"
|
"strings"
|
||||||
"sync"
|
"sync"
|
||||||
"testing"
|
"testing"
|
||||||
"time"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
|
|
||||||
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
|
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
|
||||||
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/session"
|
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/session"
|
||||||
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/signature"
|
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// percentSignPath is a source path holding a "%", which a URL writes %25.
|
// percentSignPath is a source path holding a "%", which a URL writes %25.
|
||||||
@@ -438,228 +433,3 @@ func TestGeneratorRefusesSourceURLItCannotFetchAsWritten(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// ipv6SourcePath is the source path of the image URLs signedImageURL and
|
|
||||||
// encryptedImageURL make.
|
|
||||||
const ipv6SourcePath = "/ipv6.png"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestImageRoutesFetchIPv6SourceHostWithOrWithoutPort requests ipv6SourcePath
|
|
||||||
// on an IPv6 source host, written with and without a port, through a
|
|
||||||
// /v1/image/ URL with a signature and through an encrypted URL. The public
|
|
||||||
// address 2001:db8::a, a documentation address (RFC 3849) the fetcher accepts
|
|
||||||
// as public, answers 200, and the upstream receives the request for
|
|
||||||
// ipv6SourcePath. The private address fd00::1 answers 403, and the upstream
|
|
||||||
// receives no request: the test's fetcher connects every address to the test
|
|
||||||
// upstream, so only the fetcher's check of the source URL can refuse it.
|
|
||||||
func TestImageRoutesFetchIPv6SourceHostWithOrWithoutPort(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
tests := []struct {
|
|
||||||
name string
|
|
||||||
sourceHost string
|
|
||||||
wantStatus int
|
|
||||||
// wantRequests are the request targets the upstream must receive
|
|
||||||
wantRequests []string
|
|
||||||
}{
|
|
||||||
{"public address without a port", "[2001:db8::a]",
|
|
||||||
http.StatusOK, []string{ipv6SourcePath}},
|
|
||||||
{"public address with a port", "[2001:db8::a]:8443",
|
|
||||||
http.StatusOK, []string{ipv6SourcePath}},
|
|
||||||
{"private address without a port", "[fd00::1]",
|
|
||||||
http.StatusForbidden, nil},
|
|
||||||
{"private address with a port", "[fd00::1]:8443",
|
|
||||||
http.StatusForbidden, nil},
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
||||||
imageURLs := map[string]string{
|
|
||||||
"image URL with a signature": signedImageURL(t, tt.sourceHost),
|
|
||||||
"encrypted URL": encryptedImageURL(t, tt.sourceHost),
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for route, imageURL := range imageURLs {
|
|
||||||
t.Run(tt.name+" "+route, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
upstream := startRecordingUpstream(t)
|
|
||||||
s, _, _ := startImageProxy(t, upstream.Server)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
||||||
s.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
|
|
||||||
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, imageURL, nil))
|
|
||||||
t.Logf("GET %s: %d", imageURL, rec.Code)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if rec.Code != tt.wantStatus {
|
|
||||||
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d; body %s",
|
|
||||||
rec.Code, tt.wantStatus, rec.Body.String())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
got := upstream.requestTargets()
|
|
||||||
t.Logf("upstream received %q", got)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if !slices.Equal(got, tt.wantRequests) {
|
|
||||||
t.Errorf("upstream received %q, want %q", got, tt.wantRequests)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// signedImageURL returns the /v1/image/ URL of ipv6SourcePath on sourceHost at
|
|
||||||
// its original size as PNG, with a signature made with the test signing key,
|
|
||||||
// which a host not on the allowlist needs. The URL has no q or fit, so it is
|
|
||||||
// signed with the quality 85 and the fit cover.
|
|
||||||
func signedImageURL(t *testing.T, sourceHost string) string {
|
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
path, sig, exp := signature.New(testSigningKey).GenerateSignedURL(
|
|
||||||
&signature.Request{
|
|
||||||
SourceHost: sourceHost,
|
|
||||||
SourcePath: ipv6SourcePath,
|
|
||||||
Format: string(imgcache.FormatPNG),
|
|
||||||
Quality: 85,
|
|
||||||
FitMode: string(imgcache.FitCover),
|
|
||||||
}, time.Hour)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return path + "?sig=" + sig + "&exp=" + strconv.FormatInt(exp, 10)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// encryptedImageURL returns the encrypted URL of ipv6SourcePath on sourceHost
|
|
||||||
// at its original size as PNG, made with the test signing key.
|
|
||||||
func encryptedImageURL(t *testing.T, sourceHost string) string {
|
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
generator, err := encurl.NewGenerator(testSigningKey)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatalf("encurl.NewGenerator: %v", err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
token, err := generator.Generate(&encurl.Payload{
|
|
||||||
SourceHost: sourceHost, SourcePath: ipv6SourcePath,
|
|
||||||
Format: imgcache.FormatPNG,
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatalf("encurl Generate: %v", err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return "/v1/e/" + token + "/img.png"
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestImageRoutesRefuseIPv6SourceHostHoldingInternalIPv4Address requests
|
|
||||||
// ipv6SourcePath on IPv6 source hosts that hold a loopback or private IPv4
|
|
||||||
// address in their last four bytes, in the IPv4-compatible form (::/96) or the
|
|
||||||
// NAT64 form (64:ff9b::/96), through a /v1/image/ URL with a signature and
|
|
||||||
// through an encrypted URL. Each answers 403, and the upstream receives no
|
|
||||||
// request: the test's fetcher connects every address to the test upstream, so
|
|
||||||
// only the fetcher's check of the source URL can refuse it.
|
|
||||||
func TestImageRoutesRefuseIPv6SourceHostHoldingInternalIPv4Address(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
upstream := startRecordingUpstream(t)
|
|
||||||
s, _, _ := startImageProxy(t, upstream.Server)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
sourceHosts := []string{
|
|
||||||
"[::127.0.0.1]", // IPv4-compatible form of a loopback address
|
|
||||||
"[::10.0.0.1]", // IPv4-compatible form of a private address
|
|
||||||
"[64:ff9b::7f00:1]", // NAT64 form of 127.0.0.1
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for _, sourceHost := range sourceHosts {
|
|
||||||
imageURLs := []string{
|
|
||||||
signedImageURL(t, sourceHost),
|
|
||||||
encryptedImageURL(t, sourceHost),
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for _, imageURL := range imageURLs {
|
|
||||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
||||||
s.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
|
|
||||||
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, imageURL, nil))
|
|
||||||
t.Logf("GET %s (source host %s): %d", imageURL, sourceHost, rec.Code)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
|
|
||||||
t.Errorf("source host %s: status = %d, want %d; body %s",
|
|
||||||
sourceHost, rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Body.String())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if got := upstream.requestTargets(); len(got) != 0 {
|
|
||||||
t.Errorf("upstream received %q, want no request", got)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestImageRoutesCheckIPv4AddressInIPv6SourceHost requests ipv6SourcePath on
|
|
||||||
// source hosts that hold an IPv4 address, through a /v1/image/ URL with a
|
|
||||||
// signature and through an encrypted URL, with the fetcher pixad uses.
|
|
||||||
// [64:ff9b:1::a00:1], in the local-use NAT64 range (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215),
|
|
||||||
// answers 403. [::203.0.113.5] holds the public address 203.0.113.5 in the
|
|
||||||
// IPv4-compatible form (::/96) and answers 403 when blocked_networks lists
|
|
||||||
// 203.0.113.0/24 or ::/96. [::ffff:203.0.113.5] holds it in the IPv4-mapped
|
|
||||||
// form (::ffff:0:0/96) and answers 403 when blocked_networks lists
|
|
||||||
// 203.0.113.0/24. Go keeps the plain address 203.0.113.5 in the mapped form
|
|
||||||
// too, and an IPv6 range must not refuse it: with ::/0 listed it is not
|
|
||||||
// refused. Neither is [::203.0.113.5] with blocked_networks empty. Where a
|
|
||||||
// host is not refused, the fetcher tries to connect to it, finds nothing
|
|
||||||
// there, and the request fails with another status.
|
|
||||||
func TestImageRoutesCheckIPv4AddressInIPv6SourceHost(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const (
|
|
||||||
ipv4CompatibleHost = "[::203.0.113.5]"
|
|
||||||
ipv4MappedHost = "[::ffff:203.0.113.5]"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
tests := []struct {
|
|
||||||
name string
|
|
||||||
sourceHost string
|
|
||||||
blockedNetworks []netip.Prefix
|
|
||||||
wantForbidden bool
|
|
||||||
}{
|
|
||||||
{"local-use NAT64 form of 10.0.0.1", "[64:ff9b:1::a00:1]", nil, true},
|
|
||||||
{"IPv4-compatible form of an address in blocked_networks",
|
|
||||||
ipv4CompatibleHost,
|
|
||||||
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")}, true},
|
|
||||||
{"IPv4-compatible form with ::/96 in blocked_networks",
|
|
||||||
ipv4CompatibleHost,
|
|
||||||
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("::/96")}, true},
|
|
||||||
{"IPv4-mapped form of an address in blocked_networks",
|
|
||||||
ipv4MappedHost,
|
|
||||||
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")}, true},
|
|
||||||
{"plain IPv4 address with ::/0 in blocked_networks",
|
|
||||||
"203.0.113.5",
|
|
||||||
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("::/0")}, false},
|
|
||||||
{"IPv4-compatible form of an address with blocked_networks empty",
|
|
||||||
ipv4CompatibleHost, nil, false},
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
||||||
imageURLs := map[string]string{
|
|
||||||
"image URL with a signature": signedImageURL(t, tt.sourceHost),
|
|
||||||
"encrypted URL": encryptedImageURL(t, tt.sourceHost),
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for route, imageURL := range imageURLs {
|
|
||||||
t.Run(tt.name+" "+route, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
s := startImageProxyWithBlockedNetworks(t, tt.blockedNetworks)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
||||||
s.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
|
|
||||||
t.Context(), http.MethodGet, imageURL, nil))
|
|
||||||
t.Logf("GET %s: %d", imageURL, rec.Code)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
forbidden := rec.Code == http.StatusForbidden
|
|
||||||
if tt.wantForbidden && !forbidden {
|
|
||||||
t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d; body %s",
|
|
||||||
rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Body.String())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if !tt.wantForbidden && forbidden {
|
|
||||||
t.Errorf("status = %d, want any other status; body %s",
|
|
||||||
rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user