Compare commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
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6ebb6ed618 | ||
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40387e90bb |
@@ -198,9 +198,11 @@ path under `/v1/` answers 200, in maintenance mode too.
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redirects to, is `localhost`, ends in `.localhost` or `.local`, or has an
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address in a blocked network (see `blocked_networks`); 429 over
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`image_requests_per_minute` (below); 415 when the upstream answers with a
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`Content-Type` that is not one of the source formats (below), or with an image
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whose first bytes libvips reads as another format; 502 when the upstream
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answered with an error status, and for 5 minutes after that for the same
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`Content-Type` that is not one of the source formats (below), with a body
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whose first bytes are not those of the format its `Content-Type` names, or
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with an image whose first bytes libvips reads as another format; 502 when the
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upstream answered with an error status, and for 5 minutes after that, or after
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a body whose first bytes are not those of its `Content-Type`, for the same
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source URL; 503 when pixa is busy or in maintenance mode; 500 for any other
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failure.
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- `GET` or `HEAD` `/v1/e/<token>/<name>` — an image through an encrypted URL
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@@ -279,8 +281,12 @@ above 8192.
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The source image may be JPEG, PNG, GIF, WebP, AVIF or JPEG XL. The upstream's
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`Content-Type` must name its format, and the image's first bytes must match it.
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An upstream answering with any other `Content-Type`, SVG included, is refused
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with 415, and so is an image whose first bytes libvips reads as another format,
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such as an SVG whose first bytes pass the check for AVIF.
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with 415. So is a body whose first bytes are not those of the format its
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`Content-Type` names, such as a JPEG sent as `image/png`, text sent as an image,
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or an empty body. pixa then does not fetch that source URL again for 5 minutes,
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and answers 502 for it meanwhile, as after an upstream error status. An image
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whose first bytes libvips reads as another format, such as an SVG whose first
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bytes pass the check for AVIF, is refused with 415 too.
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With the format `auto`, pixa chooses the format for each request from its
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`Accept` header, in this order:
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@@ -418,9 +424,7 @@ HMAC-SHA256(secret, "host:path:query:width:height:format:expiration:quality:fit"
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Where:
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- `host` — source host as the URL writes it up to the first `/`, in lower case,
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keeping an IPv6 address's brackets and any `:` and port after it (e.g.
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`cdn.example.com`, `cdn.example.com:8443`, `[2001:db8::1]:8443`)
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- `host` — source origin hostname (e.g. `cdn.example.com`)
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- `path` — source path (e.g. `/photos/cat.jpg`), with each `%` written as `%25`
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and each `:` as `%3A`, so `/photos/a:b.jpg` is signed as `/photos/a%3Ab.jpg`
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- `query` — source query string, empty string if none, with `%` and `:` written
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@@ -475,12 +479,6 @@ entry that is neither a host name (letters, digits, hyphens, underscores and
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dots, with at most one leading dot) nor an IP address, such as one with a port
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or a `*.` wildcard, aborts startup.
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pixa lower-cases the host of a `/v1/image/` URL before anything else uses it, so
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`CDN.Example.com` is matched, fetched, cached and counted against
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`upstream_connections_per_host` as `cdn.example.com`. Such a URL whose host has
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a port, as in `cdn.example.com:8443`, or a `:` with no port, needs a signature
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even when the host is allowlisted. A host holding `@` is refused with 400.
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### Configuration
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Every setting can be given as an environment variable, in a YAML config file
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@@ -30,17 +30,15 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
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# Completed Steps
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- 2026-10-15 the host of a `/v1/image/` URL is lower-cased, and one with a port
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needs a signature (closes #246): with `cdn.example.com` allowlisted,
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`CDN.Example.com` and `cdn.example.com:8443` passed the allowlist too, and
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each spelling was fetched and cached on its own and had connections of its own
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under `upstream_connections_per_host`. The image URL parser now lower-cases
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the host and refuses one holding `@`, which a URL reads as a user name and
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password, with 400. A host with a port, or with a `:` and no port, needs a
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signature even when it is allowlisted. That is checked in the image service,
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not in `allowlist.IsAllowed`, which also matches `referer_blocklist`, where a
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`Referer` is blocked whatever its port. A URL is signed over its host as it
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writes it, in lower case, with any IPv6 brackets, `:` and port kept.
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- 2026-10-15 a source whose first bytes do not match its `Content-Type` answers
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415 (closes #253): a body whose first bytes are not those of the format its
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`Content-Type` names, such as a JPEG sent as `image/png`, text, or a body
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under 12 bytes, answered 500 on both image routes and was logged as an error
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of pixa's, and each request for it fetched the whole body again. Both routes
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now answer 415, and the image service logs it at warning level as a refused
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source. It also gets a negative cache entry, as an upstream error status does,
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so the source URL is not fetched again for 5 minutes and answers 502
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meanwhile.
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- 2026-10-15 a `:` in the source path or query no longer moves where the path
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ends and the query begins (closes #247): the signed data and the cache key
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joined host, path and query with `:` and no escaping, so a URL signed for
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@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
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package handlers
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/json"
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"image/color"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"slices"
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"testing"
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"testing/fstest"
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"time"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/encurl"
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"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
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"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
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)
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// mismatchedSourcePath is the path of the source that
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// TestFirstBytesNotMatchingContentType serves on allowlistedHost. The mock
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// fetcher names a file's Content-Type from its extension, so the source is
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// sent as image/png.
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const mismatchedSourcePath = "/images/source.png"
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// newRoutesFetchingThrough returns both image routes, and the Handlers behind
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// them, whose image service fetches through fetcher and has allowlistedHost on
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// its allowlist. The handlers and the image service log to log.
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func newRoutesFetchingThrough(
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t *testing.T, fetcher httpfetcher.Fetcher, log *slog.Logger,
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) (*Handlers, http.Handler) {
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t.Helper()
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cache, err := imgcache.NewCache(setupTestDB(t), imgcache.CacheConfig{
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StateDir: t.TempDir(),
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NegativeTTL: 5 * time.Minute,
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("imgcache.NewCache() error = %v", err)
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}
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svc, err := imgcache.NewService(&imgcache.ServiceConfig{
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Cache: cache,
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Fetcher: fetcher,
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SigningKey: testSigningKey,
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Allowlist: []string{allowlistedHost},
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Logger: log,
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("imgcache.NewService() error = %v", err)
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}
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encGen, err := encurl.NewGenerator(testSigningKey)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("encurl.NewGenerator() error = %v", err)
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}
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h := &Handlers{log: log, imgSvc: svc, encGen: encGen}
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r := chi.NewRouter()
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r.Get("/v1/image/*", h.HandleImage())
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r.Get("/v1/e/{token}/*", h.HandleImageEnc())
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return h, r
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}
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// mismatchedSourcePlainURL returns the /v1/image/ URL of mismatchedSourcePath
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// on allowlistedHost at 50x50 as a JPEG.
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func mismatchedSourcePlainURL(*testing.T, *Handlers) string {
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return "/v1/image/" + allowlistedHost + mismatchedSourcePath + "/50x50.jpeg"
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}
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// mismatchedSourceEncURL returns an encrypted /v1/e/ URL, made with h's
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// generator, of mismatchedSourcePath on allowlistedHost at 50x50 as a JPEG.
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func mismatchedSourceEncURL(t *testing.T, h *Handlers) string {
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t.Helper()
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token, err := h.encGen.Generate(&encurl.Payload{
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SourceHost: allowlistedHost,
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SourcePath: mismatchedSourcePath,
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Width: 50,
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Height: 50,
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Format: imgcache.FormatJPEG,
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Generate() error = %v", err)
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}
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return "/v1/e/" + token + "/img.jpg"
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}
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// loggedLevels reads the JSON log lines in logs and returns the messages
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// logged at each level.
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func loggedLevels(t *testing.T, logs *bytes.Buffer) map[string][]string {
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t.Helper()
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t.Logf("logged:\n%s", logs.String())
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messages := make(map[string][]string)
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dec := json.NewDecoder(logs)
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for dec.More() {
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var line struct {
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Level string `json:"level"`
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Msg string `json:"msg"`
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}
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err := dec.Decode(&line)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decoding log line: %v", err)
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}
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messages[line.Level] = append(messages[line.Level], line.Msg)
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}
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return messages
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}
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// TestFirstBytesNotMatchingContentType checks that both image routes answer
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// 415 for an upstream body whose first bytes are not those of the format its
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// Content-Type names, and log it as a refused source, not as an error of
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// pixa's. The next request for that source must answer 502 without fetching
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// it again, as after an upstream error status.
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func TestFirstBytesNotMatchingContentType(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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bodies := map[string][]byte{
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"JPEG sent as image/png": generateTestJPEG(t, 10, 10, color.Black),
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"text sent as image/png": []byte("This is just text, not a PNG"),
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"body too short to name a format": []byte("short"),
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}
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// The source's URL on each image route.
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sourceURLs := map[string]func(*testing.T, *Handlers) string{
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"plain URL": mismatchedSourcePlainURL,
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"encrypted URL": mismatchedSourceEncURL,
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}
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for bodyName, body := range bodies {
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for urlName, sourceURL := range sourceURLs {
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t.Run(urlName+", "+bodyName, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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fetcher := &countingFetcher{
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Fetcher: httpfetcher.NewMock(fstest.MapFS{
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allowlistedHost + mismatchedSourcePath: &fstest.MapFile{
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Data: body,
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},
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}),
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}
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var logs bytes.Buffer
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h, routes := newRoutesFetchingThrough(t, fetcher,
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slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logs, nil)))
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target := sourceURL(t, h)
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checkErrorBody(t, sendGet(t, routes, target),
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http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType, "unsupported source format")
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levels := loggedLevels(t, &logs)
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if len(levels[slog.LevelError.String()]) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("logged at error level: %q",
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levels[slog.LevelError.String()])
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}
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if !slices.Contains(levels[slog.LevelWarn.String()], "source refused") {
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t.Error(`no "source refused" line logged at warning level`)
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}
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checkErrorBody(t, sendGet(t, routes, target),
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http.StatusBadGateway, "upstream error")
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if n := fetcher.fetches.Load(); n != 1 {
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t.Errorf("upstream fetched %d times, want 1", n)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
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"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
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"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imageprocessor"
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"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
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"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/magic"
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)
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// HandleImage handles the main image proxy route:
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@@ -220,6 +221,18 @@ func (s *Handlers) HandleTooManyRequests() http.HandlerFunc {
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func (s *Handlers) respondImageError(
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w http.ResponseWriter, req *imgcache.ImageRequest, err error,
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) {
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// An upstream body whose first bytes are not those of the format its
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// Content-Type names is the upstream's error, not pixa's: the image
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// service has logged it as a refused source.
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if errors.Is(err, magic.ErrMagicByteMismatch) ||
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errors.Is(err, magic.ErrUnknownFormat) ||
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errors.Is(err, magic.ErrNotEnoughData) {
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s.respondError(w, "unsupported source format",
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http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType)
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return
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}
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s.log.Error("failed to get image",
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"host", req.SourceHost,
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"path", req.SourcePath,
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@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
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"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/httpfetcher"
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"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imageprocessor"
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"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/imgcache"
|
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"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/magic"
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)
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// HandleImageEnc handles requests to /v1/e/{token}/* for encrypted
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@@ -162,7 +163,10 @@ func (s *Handlers) handleImageError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
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s.respondError(w, "server busy, try again later",
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http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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case errors.Is(err, httpfetcher.ErrInvalidContentType),
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errors.Is(err, imageprocessor.ErrUnsupportedInputFormat):
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errors.Is(err, imageprocessor.ErrUnsupportedInputFormat),
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errors.Is(err, magic.ErrMagicByteMismatch),
|
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errors.Is(err, magic.ErrUnknownFormat),
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errors.Is(err, magic.ErrNotEnoughData):
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s.respondError(w, "unsupported source format",
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http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType)
|
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case errors.Is(err, imageprocessor.ErrOutputTooLarge):
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@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
|
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"log/slog"
|
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"net/url"
|
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"runtime/debug"
|
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"strings"
|
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"time"
|
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|
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"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
|
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@@ -219,16 +218,7 @@ func (s *Service) ValidateRequest(req *ImageRequest) error {
|
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid source URL: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
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|
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// An allowlist entry names no port, so a host followed by ":", with or
|
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// without a port, needs a signature. The port is read from the parsed
|
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// URL, as the fetcher reads it: in an IPv6 address written without
|
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// brackets, such as 2001:db8::1:8443, it is what follows the last ":".
|
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// This is checked here and not in allowlist.IsAllowed, which also matches
|
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// referer_blocklist, where a Referer must be blocked whatever its port.
|
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hostHasPort := parsedURL.Port() != "" ||
|
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strings.HasSuffix(parsedURL.Host, ":")
|
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|
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if !hostHasPort && s.allowlist.IsAllowed(parsedURL) {
|
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if s.allowlist.IsAllowed(parsedURL) {
|
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return nil
|
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}
|
||||
|
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@@ -448,13 +438,7 @@ func (s *Service) fetchAndProcess(
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
// Store negative cache for certain errors
|
||||
if isNegativeCacheable(err) {
|
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statusCode := extractStatusCode(err)
|
||||
|
||||
storeErr := s.cache.StoreNegative(ctx, req, statusCode, err.Error())
|
||||
if storeErr != nil {
|
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s.log.Warn("failed to store negative cache entry",
|
||||
"host", req.SourceHost, "path", req.SourcePath, "error", storeErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.storeNegative(ctx, req, extractStatusCode(err), err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("upstream fetch failed: %w", err)
|
||||
@@ -500,9 +484,16 @@ func (s *Service) fetchAndProcess(
|
||||
"cipher", fetchResult.TLSCipherSuite,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate magic bytes match content type
|
||||
// Validate magic bytes match content type. A body that does not is the
|
||||
// upstream's error, so it gets a negative cache entry, as an upstream
|
||||
// error status does.
|
||||
err = magic.ValidateMagicBytes(sourceData, fetchResult.ContentType)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
s.log.Warn("source refused", "request_id", middleware.GetReqID(ctx),
|
||||
"host", req.SourceHost, "path", req.SourcePath,
|
||||
"content_type", fetchResult.ContentType, "error", err)
|
||||
s.storeNegative(ctx, req, httpStatusUnsupportedMediaType, err)
|
||||
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("content validation failed: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -518,6 +509,19 @@ func (s *Service) fetchAndProcess(
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// storeNegative stores a negative cache entry for req's source, whose fetch
|
||||
// failed with err, so the source is not fetched again until the entry
|
||||
// expires. A failure to store the entry is only logged.
|
||||
func (s *Service) storeNegative(
|
||||
ctx context.Context, req *ImageRequest, statusCode int, err error,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
storeErr := s.cache.StoreNegative(ctx, req, statusCode, err.Error())
|
||||
if storeErr != nil {
|
||||
s.log.Warn("failed to store negative cache entry",
|
||||
"host", req.SourceHost, "path", req.SourcePath, "error", storeErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// processedVariant is a variant as processAndStore made it. Each request that
|
||||
// shared its processing serves it through a reader of its own.
|
||||
type processedVariant struct {
|
||||
@@ -628,6 +632,7 @@ func signatureRequest(req *ImageRequest) *signature.Request {
|
||||
const (
|
||||
httpStatusBadGateway = 502
|
||||
httpStatusInternalError = 500
|
||||
httpStatusUnsupportedMediaType = 415
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// isNegativeCacheable returns true if the error should be cached.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -250,97 +250,6 @@ func TestService_ValidateRequest_SignatureExactHostMatch(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestService_ValidateRequest_HostWithPortNeedsSignature verifies that a host
|
||||
// followed by a port, or by a colon with no port, matches no allowlist entry,
|
||||
// so that a request for it without a signature is refused, while the same
|
||||
// host with no port is allowlisted.
|
||||
func TestService_ValidateRequest_HostWithPortNeedsSignature(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
svc, _ := SetupTestService(t,
|
||||
WithSigningKey(testSigningKey),
|
||||
WithAllowlist(testHostCDN, "203.0.113.5", "2001:db8::1"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
tests := []struct {
|
||||
host string
|
||||
allowlisted bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{testHostCDN, true},
|
||||
{"cdn.example.com:8443", false},
|
||||
{"cdn.example.com:443", false},
|
||||
{"cdn.example.com:", false},
|
||||
{"203.0.113.5", true},
|
||||
{"203.0.113.5:8080", false},
|
||||
{"[2001:db8::1]", true},
|
||||
{"[2001:db8::1]:8443", false},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tt := range tests {
|
||||
t.Run(tt.host, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
req := &ImageRequest{
|
||||
SourceHost: tt.host,
|
||||
SourcePath: testPathCat,
|
||||
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
|
||||
Format: FormatJPEG,
|
||||
Quality: 85,
|
||||
FitMode: FitCover,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
|
||||
t.Logf("ValidateRequest() for host %q with no signature: %v",
|
||||
tt.host, err)
|
||||
|
||||
if allowlisted := err == nil; allowlisted != tt.allowlisted {
|
||||
t.Errorf("host %q served without a signature = %v, want %v",
|
||||
tt.host, allowlisted, tt.allowlisted)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestService_ValidateRequest_UnbracketedIPv6PortNeedsSignature verifies that
|
||||
// an allowlisted IPv6 address written without brackets and followed by a
|
||||
// port, or by a colon with no port, needs a signature. Go's URL parser, which
|
||||
// the fetcher uses, reads 2001:db8::1:8443 as the host 2001:db8::1 with the
|
||||
// port 8443.
|
||||
func TestService_ValidateRequest_UnbracketedIPv6PortNeedsSignature(
|
||||
t *testing.T,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
svc, _ := SetupTestService(t,
|
||||
WithSigningKey(testSigningKey),
|
||||
WithAllowlist("2001:db8::1"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, host := range []string{"2001:db8::1:8443", "2001:db8::1:"} {
|
||||
t.Run(host, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
req := &ImageRequest{
|
||||
SourceHost: host,
|
||||
SourcePath: testPathCat,
|
||||
Size: Size{Width: 50, Height: 50},
|
||||
Format: FormatJPEG,
|
||||
Quality: 85,
|
||||
FitMode: FitCover,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err := svc.ValidateRequest(req)
|
||||
t.Logf("ValidateRequest() for host %q with no signature: %v",
|
||||
host, err)
|
||||
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("host %q served without a signature, want refused",
|
||||
host)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestService_Get_InvalidFile(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import (
|
||||
var (
|
||||
ErrInvalidPath = errors.New("invalid image path")
|
||||
ErrMissingHost = errors.New("missing source host")
|
||||
ErrInvalidHost = errors.New("invalid source host")
|
||||
ErrMissingSize = errors.New("missing size specification")
|
||||
ErrInvalidSize = errors.New("invalid size format")
|
||||
ErrInvalidFormat = errors.New("invalid or unsupported format")
|
||||
@@ -144,17 +143,6 @@ func parseImageComponents(remainder string) (*ParsedURL, error) {
|
||||
return nil, ErrMissingHost
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A URL reads what comes before "@" as a user name and password, and the
|
||||
// rest as the host
|
||||
if strings.Contains(host, "@") {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q holds @", ErrInvalidHost, host)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Host names do not depend on letter case, so the allowlist, the upstream
|
||||
// connection limits, the cache and the signature see one spelling of each
|
||||
// host
|
||||
host = strings.ToLower(host)
|
||||
|
||||
// Extract query string if present in path
|
||||
if qIndex := strings.Index(path, "?"); qIndex != -1 {
|
||||
query = path[qIndex+1:]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -234,49 +234,6 @@ func TestParseImagePath(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestParseImagePath_LowerCasesHost verifies that the host is lower-cased, so
|
||||
// that every spelling of its letter case is the same host to the allowlist,
|
||||
// the upstream connection limits and the cache, and that the path keeps its
|
||||
// case.
|
||||
func TestParseImagePath_LowerCasesHost(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
got, err := ParseImagePath("CDN.Example.COM/Photos/Cat.jpg/800x600.webp")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("ParseImagePath() error = %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
t.Logf("parsed host %q, path %q", got.Host, got.Path)
|
||||
|
||||
if got.Host != testHostCDN {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Host = %q, want %q", got.Host, testHostCDN)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if got.Path != "/Photos/Cat.jpg" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Path = %q, want %q", got.Path, "/Photos/Cat.jpg")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestParseImagePath_RefusesUserinfo verifies that a host holding "@" is
|
||||
// refused: a URL reads what comes before the "@" as a user name and password
|
||||
// and the rest as the host.
|
||||
func TestParseImagePath_RefusesUserinfo(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
for _, input := range []string{
|
||||
"user@cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp",
|
||||
"user:password@cdn.example.com/photos/cat.jpg/800x600.webp",
|
||||
} {
|
||||
got, err := ParseImagePath(input)
|
||||
t.Logf("ParseImagePath(%q) = %+v, error = %v", input, got, err)
|
||||
|
||||
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidHost) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ParseImagePath(%q) error = %v, want %v",
|
||||
input, err, ErrInvalidHost)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestParsedURL_ToImageRequest(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user