Name the cause on the page for a refused form (closes #358)

The CSRF middleware answered a refused login or generator form with the
library's bare text, such as "Forbidden - origin invalid". It now answers
403 with a page that names the cause and what to do, and logs a warning
with the request ID and the library's reason. A page opened over plain
HTTP with debug off and a form from another host both fail the origin
check; the page tells them apart by the host in the Origin or Referer
header.

Model: opus-5-5

README.md

@@ -376,6 +376,10 @@ instead. Plain HTTP is for development on the browser's own machine. The login
 session cookie is always marked `Secure`. Over plain HTTP a browser keeps such a
 cookie only for its own machine (`localhost`), if at all.
 
+A form refused with 403 gets a page that names the cause and what to do about
+it. pixa logs a `form refused` warning with the request ID and the form-token
+library's reason, such as `origin invalid`.
+
 The image routes answer the errors listed for them with a JSON body holding
 `error`, `status` and `timestamp`.
 

go.mod

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.23.2
 	github.com/slok/go-http-metrics v0.13.0
 	github.com/spf13/cobra v1.10.2
+	go.uber.org/dig v1.19.0
 	go.uber.org/fx v1.24.0
 	golang.org/x/crypto v0.41.0
 	golang.org/x/sync v0.19.0
@@ -126,7 +127,6 @@ require (
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel v1.36.0 // indirect
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/metric v1.36.0 // indirect
 	go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.36.0 // indirect
-	go.uber.org/dig v1.19.0 // indirect
 	go.uber.org/multierr v1.11.0 // indirect
 	go.uber.org/zap v1.27.0 // indirect
 	go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.2 // indirect

internal/app/app.go

@@ -2,13 +2,16 @@
 package app
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"fmt"
+	"io"
 	"os"
 	"os/signal"
 	"syscall"
 
 	"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+	"go.uber.org/dig"
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/database"
@@ -53,7 +56,10 @@ func run(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) {
 	// A write to a closed stdout or stderr must not end the process.
 	signal.Ignore(syscall.SIGPIPE)
 
-	fx.New(
+	app := fx.New(
+		// pixad logs with slog only; runApp prints a startup or shutdown
+		// error itself.
+		fx.NopLogger,
 		fx.Provide(
 			config.New,
 			database.New,
@@ -71,5 +77,40 @@ func run(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) {
 			func(log *logger.Logger) { log.Identify() },
 			func(*server.Server) {},
 		),
-	).Run()
+	)
+
+	exitCode := runApp(app, os.Stderr)
+	if exitCode != 0 {
+		os.Exit(exitCode)
+	}
+}
+
+// runApp starts app, waits for a signal or a shutdown request, stops app,
+// and returns the status pixad exits with, as fx.App.Run does. It prints
+// a start or stop error to stderr, once, as the error that caused it:
+// dig.RootCause drops the frames fx and dig wrap around it.
+func runApp(app *fx.App, stderr io.Writer) int {
+	startCtx, cancelStart := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), app.StartTimeout())
+	defer cancelStart()
+
+	err := app.Start(startCtx)
+	if err != nil {
+		_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, dig.RootCause(err))
+
+		return 1
+	}
+
+	shutdown := <-app.Wait()
+
+	stopCtx, cancelStop := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), app.StopTimeout())
+	defer cancelStop()
+
+	err = app.Stop(stopCtx)
+	if err != nil {
+		_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, dig.RootCause(err))
+
+		return 1
+	}
+
+	return shutdown.ExitCode
 }

internal/app/app_internal_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"testing"
+
+	"go.uber.org/fx"
+)
+
+var errTestStopFailed = errors.New("test stop hook failed")
+
+// TestRunAppPrintsStopErrorOnce checks that when a stop hook fails, runApp
+// prints the hook's error once and returns exit status 1.
+func TestRunAppPrintsStopErrorOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	app := fx.New(
+		fx.NopLogger,
+		fx.Invoke(func(lifecycle fx.Lifecycle, shutdowner fx.Shutdowner) {
+			lifecycle.Append(fx.Hook{
+				// Ask to shut down as soon as the app has started, so
+				// that runApp goes on to stop it.
+				OnStart: func(context.Context) error { return shutdowner.Shutdown() },
+				OnStop:  func(context.Context) error { return errTestStopFailed },
+			})
+		}),
+	)
+
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+
+	exitCode := runApp(app, &stderr)
+	if exitCode != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("runApp() = %d, want 1", exitCode)
+	}
+
+	want := errTestStopFailed.Error() + "\n"
+	if stderr.String() != want {
+		t.Errorf("stderr = %q, want %q", stderr.String(), want)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRunAppReturnsShutdownExitCode checks that runApp returns the exit
+// code a shutdown request names.
+func TestRunAppReturnsShutdownExitCode(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	app := fx.New(
+		fx.NopLogger,
+		fx.Invoke(func(lifecycle fx.Lifecycle, shutdowner fx.Shutdowner) {
+			lifecycle.Append(fx.Hook{
+				OnStart: func(context.Context) error {
+					return shutdowner.Shutdown(fx.ExitCode(3))
+				},
+			})
+		}),
+	)
+
+	exitCode := runApp(app, io.Discard)
+	if exitCode != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("runApp() = %d, want 3", exitCode)
+	}
+}

internal/app/app_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+package app_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"strconv"
+	"syscall"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/app"
+)
+
+// These tests run pixad in a child process: the test binary itself,
+// started again with runPixadInChildEnvVar set, which makes TestMain run
+// pixad instead of the tests.
+const runPixadInChildEnvVar = "TEST_RUN_PIXAD_IN_CHILD"
+
+const validTestSigningKey = "test-signing-key-for-app-tests-0123456789"
+
+func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
+	if os.Getenv(runPixadInChildEnvVar) == "1" {
+		os.Args = []string{"pixad"}
+
+		app.Run("test")
+		os.Exit(0)
+	}
+
+	os.Exit(m.Run())
+}
+
+// pixadCommand returns a command that runs pixad with only the given
+// environment, in an empty directory with an empty HOME, so that no
+// config file is found.
+func pixadCommand(t *testing.T, env ...string) (*exec.Cmd, *bytes.Buffer) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	testBinary := os.Args[0]
+	cmd := exec.CommandContext(t.Context(), testBinary) //nolint:gosec // not tainted
+	cmd.Dir = t.TempDir()
+	// A test binary built with -cover warns on stderr at exit when
+	// GOCOVERDIR is not set.
+	cmd.Env = append([]string{
+		runPixadInChildEnvVar + "=1",
+		"HOME=" + t.TempDir(),
+		"GOCOVERDIR=" + t.TempDir(),
+	}, env...)
+
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+
+	cmd.Stderr = &stderr
+
+	return cmd, &stderr
+}
+
+// TestRunPrintsStartupErrorOnce checks that an invalid setting is
+// printed once, as the line that names it, and nothing else goes to
+// stderr.
+func TestRunPrintsStartupErrorOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cmd, stderr := pixadCommand(t, "PIXA_SIGNING_KEY=short")
+
+	err := cmd.Run()
+
+	var exitErr *exec.ExitError
+	if !errors.As(err, &exitErr) || exitErr.ExitCode() != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("pixad: got %v, want exit status 1; stderr:\n%s", err, stderr)
+	}
+
+	want := `config key "signing_key" (environment variable PIXA_SIGNING_KEY): ` +
+		"value too short: must be at least 32 characters, got 5\n"
+	if stderr.String() != want {
+		t.Errorf("stderr:\n%s\nwant:\n%s", stderr, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRunWritesNothingToStderrOnStartAndStop starts pixad, waits until
+// it answers its health check, stops it with SIGTERM, and checks that it
+// wrote nothing to stderr.
+func TestRunWritesNothingToStderrOnStartAndStop(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	port := freePort(t)
+	cmd, stderr := pixadCommand(t,
+		"PORT="+strconv.Itoa(port),
+		"PIXA_STATE_DIR="+t.TempDir(),
+		"PIXA_SIGNING_KEY="+validTestSigningKey,
+	)
+
+	err := cmd.Start()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("starting pixad: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	waitForHealthCheck(t, cmd, port, stderr)
+
+	err = cmd.Process.Signal(syscall.SIGTERM)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("signalling pixad: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	err = cmd.Wait()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("pixad: got %v, want exit status 0; stderr:\n%s", err, stderr)
+	}
+
+	if stderr.Len() != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("stderr is not empty:\n%s", stderr)
+	}
+}
+
+// freePort returns a TCP port on the loopback address that nothing
+// listens on.
+func freePort(t *testing.T) int {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var listenConfig net.ListenConfig
+
+	listener, err := listenConfig.Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("finding a free port: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	addr, ok := listener.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("listener address %v is not a TCP address", listener.Addr())
+	}
+
+	err = listener.Close()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("closing listener: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	return addr.Port
+}
+
+// waitForHealthCheck waits up to 30 seconds for pixad, started as cmd, to
+// answer its health check on port. If it does not, it stops pixad and
+// fails the test with what pixad wrote to stderr.
+func waitForHealthCheck(t *testing.T, cmd *exec.Cmd, port int, stderr *bytes.Buffer) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	url := fmt.Sprintf("http://127.0.0.1:%d/.well-known/healthcheck.json", port)
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(30 * time.Second)
+
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, url, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("health check request: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+		if err == nil {
+			_ = resp.Body.Close()
+
+			if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
+				return
+			}
+		}
+
+		time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+
+	// Stop pixad first: stderr is complete, and safe to read, only once
+	// cmd.Wait has returned.
+	_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
+	_ = cmd.Wait()
+
+	t.Fatalf("pixad did not answer its health check on port %d; stderr:\n%s",
+		port, stderr)
+}

internal/handlers/auth_csrf_internal_test.go

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ func newCSRFTestRouter(t *testing.T) (*Handlers, http.Handler) {
 		config:      cfg,
 		sessMgr:     session.NewManager(keys.SessionHashKey, keys.SessionBlockKey),
 		encGen:      encurl.NewGenerator(keys.EncryptedURLKey),
-		csrfProtect: newCSRFProtect(keys.CSRFKey, cfg.Debug),
+		csrfProtect: newCSRFProtect(keys.CSRFKey, cfg.Debug, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)),
 	}
 
 	r := chi.NewRouter()

internal/handlers/bodylimit_internal_test.go

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ func newBodyLimitTestRouter(
 		config:      cfg,
 		sessMgr:     session.NewManager(keys.SessionHashKey, keys.SessionBlockKey),
 		encGen:      encurl.NewGenerator(keys.EncryptedURLKey),
-		csrfProtect: newCSRFProtect(keys.CSRFKey, cfg.Debug),
+		csrfProtect: newCSRFProtect(keys.CSRFKey, cfg.Debug, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)),
 	}
 
 	r := chi.NewRouter()

internal/handlers/csrf.go

@@ -1,18 +1,43 @@
 package handlers
 
 import (
+	"bytes"
+	"errors"
 	"html/template"
+	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
 
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
 	"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/seal"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/templates"
+)
+
+// The causes the form-refused page names, each with what to do about it.
+const (
+	causePlainHTTP = "This page was opened over plain HTTP while debug is " +
+		"off. Open it over HTTPS, or turn debug on to use plain HTTP on " +
+		"your own machine."
+	causeHTTPSWithDebug = "This page was opened over HTTPS while debug is " +
+		"on. Turn debug off, or open the page over plain HTTP."
+	causeOtherHost = "The form was sent from another host than the one in " +
+		"the request's Host header. A reverse proxy in front of pixa must " +
+		"pass the Host header on unchanged."
+	causeNoReferer = "The browser sent neither an Origin nor a Referer " +
+		"header, and over HTTPS pixa needs one to check where the form " +
+		"came from. Let the browser send the Referer header to this site."
+	causeStaleToken = "The form token is missing or out of date. Reload " +
+		"the page and submit the form again."
 )
 
 // newCSRFProtect builds the CSRF-protection middleware for the
 // state-mutating HTML form routes. The token lives in its own cookie,
 // independent of the session cookie, so it also protects the login POST
-// where no session exists yet (login CSRF). key signs that cookie.
+// where no session exists yet (login CSRF). key signs that cookie. A
+// refused form is answered by the handler that handleFormRefused returns.
+// log gets a warning with the library's reason, such as "origin invalid".
 //
 // When plaintext is true (local HTTP development), requests are marked
 // plaintext so the library neither demands an https Referer nor sets a
@@ -20,13 +45,14 @@ import (
 // service runs behind a TLS-terminating proxy, so plaintext is false and
 // the library enforces its https Referer origin check.
 func newCSRFProtect(
-	key [seal.KeySize]byte, plaintext bool,
+	key [seal.KeySize]byte, plaintext bool, log *slog.Logger,
 ) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	protect := csrf.Protect(
 		key[:],
 		csrf.Path("/"),
 		csrf.Secure(!plaintext),
 		csrf.SameSite(csrf.SameSiteStrictMode),
+		csrf.ErrorHandler(handleFormRefused(plaintext, log)),
 	)
 
 	if !plaintext {
@@ -42,6 +68,84 @@ func newCSRFProtect(
 	}
 }
 
+// handleFormRefused returns the handler the CSRF middleware calls when it
+// refuses a request. It logs the library's reason with the request ID and
+// answers 403 with a page naming the cause and what to do. A reason that is
+// not a refusal, such as a failure to make a token, answers 500.
+func handleFormRefused(plaintext bool, log *slog.Logger) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		reason := csrf.FailureReason(r)
+		requestID := middleware.GetReqID(r.Context())
+
+		cause := formRefusedCause(r, reason, plaintext)
+		if cause == "" {
+			log.Error("CSRF middleware failed",
+				"request_id", requestID, "error", reason)
+			http.Error(w, "Internal server error",
+				http.StatusInternalServerError)
+
+			return
+		}
+
+		log.Warn("form refused", "request_id", requestID, "reason", reason)
+
+		var page bytes.Buffer
+
+		err := templates.Render(&page, "form_refused.html",
+			struct{ Cause string }{Cause: cause})
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Error("failed to render form refused template", "error", err)
+			http.Error(w, "Internal server error",
+				http.StatusInternalServerError)
+
+			return
+		}
+
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
+
+		_, err = page.WriteTo(w)
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Error("failed to write form refused page", "error", err)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// formRefusedCause returns the cause the form-refused page names for the
+// CSRF middleware's reason, or "" when the reason is not a refusal.
+func formRefusedCause(r *http.Request, reason error, plaintext bool) string {
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(reason, csrf.ErrNoToken), errors.Is(reason, csrf.ErrBadToken):
+		return causeStaleToken
+	case errors.Is(reason, csrf.ErrNoReferer):
+		return causeNoReferer
+	case errors.Is(reason, csrf.ErrBadOrigin):
+		return pageAddressCause(r.Header.Get("Origin"), r.Host, plaintext)
+	case errors.Is(reason, csrf.ErrBadReferer):
+		return pageAddressCause(r.Referer(), r.Host, plaintext)
+	default:
+		return ""
+	}
+}
+
+// pageAddressCause returns the cause for a form whose page address, the
+// Origin or Referer header, the CSRF middleware refused. The middleware
+// expects the request's own host, with https when plaintext is false and
+// http when it is true. So on the request's own host, only the scheme was
+// wrong.
+func pageAddressCause(pageAddress, host string, plaintext bool) string {
+	page, err := url.Parse(pageAddress)
+	if err != nil || page.Host != host {
+		return causeOtherHost
+	}
+
+	if plaintext {
+		return causeHTTPSWithDebug
+	}
+
+	return causePlainHTTP
+}
+
 // CSRF returns the CSRF-protection middleware for the login and generator
 // form routes.
 func (s *Handlers) CSRF() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {

internal/handlers/csrf_refused_internal_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+package handlers
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"html/template"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
+	"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/seal"
+)
+
+// refusedFormRequestID is the request ID of the requests postRefusedForm
+// sends, which the warning for a refused form must carry.
+const refusedFormRequestID = "test-request-id"
+
+// TestFormRefusedNamesCause verifies that a form the CSRF middleware refuses
+// answers 403 with a page naming the cause, and logs a warning with the
+// request ID and the middleware's reason.
+func TestFormRefusedNamesCause(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name       string
+		debug      bool
+		origin     string
+		referer    string
+		wantCause  string
+		wantReason error
+	}{
+		{
+			name:       "plain HTTP origin with debug off",
+			origin:     "http://example.com",
+			wantCause:  causePlainHTTP,
+			wantReason: csrf.ErrBadOrigin,
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "plain HTTP referer with debug off",
+			referer:    "http://example.com/",
+			wantCause:  causePlainHTTP,
+			wantReason: csrf.ErrBadReferer,
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "origin on another host",
+			origin:     "https://proxy.example.net",
+			wantCause:  causeOtherHost,
+			wantReason: csrf.ErrBadOrigin,
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "referer on another host",
+			referer:    "https://proxy.example.net/",
+			wantCause:  causeOtherHost,
+			wantReason: csrf.ErrBadReferer,
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "HTTPS origin with debug on",
+			debug:      true,
+			origin:     "https://example.com",
+			wantCause:  causeHTTPSWithDebug,
+			wantReason: csrf.ErrBadOrigin,
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "no origin or referer with debug off",
+			wantCause:  causeNoReferer,
+			wantReason: csrf.ErrNoReferer,
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "missing token",
+			debug:      true,
+			origin:     "http://example.com",
+			wantCause:  causeStaleToken,
+			wantReason: csrf.ErrNoToken,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			rec, logLine := postRefusedForm(t, tt.debug, tt.origin, tt.referer,
+				nil, "")
+			checkFormRefused(t, rec, logLine, tt.wantCause, tt.wantReason)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestFormRefusedNamesCauseForForeignToken verifies that a form whose token
+// does not match its CSRF cookie answers 403 with a page naming
+// causeStaleToken, and logs a warning with the request ID and the
+// middleware's reason.
+func TestFormRefusedNamesCauseForForeignToken(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// The router and postRefusedForm derive their CSRF key from
+	// testSigningKey, so cookiesA is valid there and only tokenB is wrong.
+	_, router := newCSRFTestRouter(t)
+	cookiesA, _ := csrfCredentials(t, router, nil)
+	_, tokenB := csrfCredentials(t, router, nil)
+
+	rec, logLine := postRefusedForm(t, true, "http://example.com", "",
+		cookiesA, tokenB)
+	checkFormRefused(t, rec, logLine, causeStaleToken, csrf.ErrBadToken)
+}
+
+// postRefusedForm sends a POST with the given cookies to the CSRF
+// middleware built for debug. It adds the form token and the Origin and
+// Referer headers when they are not empty. It returns the response and the
+// one JSON log line the middleware wrote.
+func postRefusedForm(
+	t *testing.T, debug bool, origin, referer string,
+	cookies []*http.Cookie, token string,
+) (*httptest.ResponseRecorder, map[string]any) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	keys, err := seal.DeriveKeys(testSigningKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seal.DeriveKeys() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	var logs bytes.Buffer
+
+	log := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logs, nil))
+	reached := http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		t.Error("the refused form reached the handler behind the middleware")
+	})
+	srv := newCSRFProtect(keys.CSRFKey, debug, log)(reached)
+
+	form := url.Values{loginKeyField: {"x"}}
+	if token != "" {
+		form.Set(csrfTokenField, token)
+	}
+
+	ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(),
+		middleware.RequestIDKey, refusedFormRequestID)
+	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost,
+		"http://example.com/", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
+
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		req.AddCookie(c)
+	}
+
+	if origin != "" {
+		req.Header.Set("Origin", origin)
+	}
+
+	if referer != "" {
+		req.Header.Set("Referer", referer)
+	}
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	var logLine map[string]any
+
+	err = json.Unmarshal(logs.Bytes(), &logLine)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decoding log line %q: %v", logs.String(), err)
+	}
+
+	return rec, logLine
+}
+
+// checkFormRefused checks that rec is a 403 page naming wantCause and that
+// logLine is a warning carrying the request ID and wantReason.
+func checkFormRefused(
+	t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, logLine map[string]any,
+	wantCause string, wantReason error,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Errorf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
+	}
+
+	body := rec.Body.String()
+	t.Logf("body: %s", body)
+
+	if !strings.Contains(body, template.HTMLEscapeString(wantCause)) {
+		t.Errorf("page does not name the cause %q", wantCause)
+	}
+
+	t.Logf("log line: %v", logLine)
+
+	if logLine["level"] != "WARN" || logLine["msg"] != "form refused" {
+		t.Errorf("log line = %v, want a WARN \"form refused\"", logLine)
+	}
+
+	if logLine["request_id"] != refusedFormRequestID {
+		t.Errorf("logged request_id = %v, want %q",
+			logLine["request_id"], refusedFormRequestID)
+	}
+
+	if logLine["reason"] != wantReason.Error() {
+		t.Errorf("logged reason = %v, want %q", logLine["reason"], wantReason)
+	}
+}

internal/handlers/handlers.go

@@ -56,14 +56,16 @@ type Handlers struct {
 
 // New creates a new Handlers instance.
 func New(_ fx.Lifecycle, params Params) *Handlers {
+	log := params.Logger.Get()
+
 	return &Handlers{
-		log:              params.Logger.Get(),
+		log:              log,
 		hc:               params.Healthcheck,
 		config:           params.Config,
 		imgSvc:           params.ImageService,
 		sessMgr:          params.SessionManager,
 		encGen:           params.EncryptedURLGenerator,
-		csrfProtect:      newCSRFProtect(params.Keys.CSRFKey, params.Config.Debug),
+		csrfProtect:      newCSRFProtect(params.Keys.CSRFKey, params.Config.Debug, log),
 		signer:           signature.New(params.Config.SigningKey),
 		allowlist:        allowlist.New(params.Config.AllowlistHosts),
 		refererBlocklist: allowlist.New(params.Config.RefererBlocklist),

internal/templates/form_refused.html

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+    <meta charset="UTF-8">
+    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
+    <title>Pixa - Form Refused</title>
+    <link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/style.css">
+</head>
+<body class="login">
+    <div class="card">
+        <h1>Form Refused</h1>
+
+        <div class="error">
+            {{.Cause}}
+        </div>
+
+        <p>
+            <a href="/">Back to the start page</a>
+        </p>
+    </div>
+</body>
+</html>