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2
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
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6241c6a425 | ||
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d67b6d5051 |
@@ -191,10 +191,10 @@ path under `/v1/` answers 200, in maintenance mode too.
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redirects to, is `localhost`, ends in `.localhost` or `.local`, or has an
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address in a blocked network (see `blocked_networks`); 429 over
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`image_requests_per_minute` (below); 415 when the upstream answers with a
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`Content-Type` that is not one of the source formats (below), or for `orig` of
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a source pixa cannot save in its own format; 502 when the upstream answered
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with an error status, and for 5 minutes after that for the same source URL;
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503 when pixa is busy or in maintenance mode; 500 for any other failure.
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`Content-Type` that is not one of the source formats (below), or with an image
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libvips would not load as one of them; 502 when the upstream answered with an
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error status, and for 5 minutes after that for the same source URL; 503 when
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pixa is busy or in maintenance mode; 500 for any other failure.
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- `GET` or `HEAD` `/v1/e/<token>/<name>` — an image through an encrypted URL
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(see Encrypted URLs). Needs: nothing but the URL. Answers: 200; 304 when
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`If-None-Match` matches the image's `ETag`; 400 for a token that does not
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@@ -265,7 +265,8 @@ once, is refused with 400.
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The source image may be JPEG, PNG, GIF, WebP, AVIF or JPEG XL. The upstream's
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`Content-Type` must name its format, and the image's first bytes must match it.
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An upstream answering with any other `Content-Type`, SVG included, is refused
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with 415.
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with 415, and so is an image that libvips would not load as one of these
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formats, such as an SVG whose first bytes pass the check for AVIF.
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With the format `auto`, pixa chooses the format for each request from its
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`Accept` header, in this order:
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@@ -34,12 +34,16 @@ P2: security: per-origin rate limiting
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of the source's own format (closes #68): the upstream fetch no longer accepts
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`image/svg+xml`, which libvips would render. Both image routes answer 415 for
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an upstream `Content-Type` that is not one of the source formats, SVG
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included, where they answered 500. `orig` of a source in a format the image
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processor cannot name is `ErrUnsupportedInputFormat`, also answered 415, where
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it was saved as JPEG. `README.md` no longer lists SVG. The SVG detection in
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included, where they answered 500. Before decoding, the image processor
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refuses with `ErrUnsupportedInputFormat`, also answered 415, any input that
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govips' `DetermineImageType`, which picks the libvips loader, does not name as
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a source format. That catches an SVG whose first bytes pass the first-bytes
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check for another type, as an XML comment can make them do for AVIF; an SVG
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whose first bytes do not pass that check answers 500, as before. `orig` is
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always the source's own format, where a source the processor could not name
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was saved as JPEG. `README.md` no longer lists SVG. The SVG detection in
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`internal/magic` stays: the request path does not call it, and it goes with
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the unused code of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/pixa/issues/168. An SVG sent
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under another image type still fails the first-bytes check and answers 500.
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the unused code of https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/pixa/issues/168.
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- 2026-10-12 per-client limit on the image routes (closes #236): the new setting
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`image_requests_per_minute` (`PIXA_IMAGE_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`), default 600,
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is how many `GET` and `HEAD` requests one client may send to `/v1/image/` and
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@@ -137,9 +137,8 @@ var ErrInputDataTooLarge = errors.New("input data exceeds maximum allowed size")
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// not supported.
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var ErrUnsupportedOutputFormat = errors.New("unsupported output format")
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// ErrUnsupportedInputFormat is returned when the requested format is orig and
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// the input is in a format the processor cannot name, so it cannot be saved
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// in that format.
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// ErrUnsupportedInputFormat is returned, before the input is decoded, when
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// libvips would not load it as one of the source formats.
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var ErrUnsupportedInputFormat = errors.New("unsupported input format")
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// ErrTooManyImages is returned when MaxConcurrentProcessing images are being
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@@ -224,6 +223,16 @@ func (p *ImageProcessor) Process(
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return nil, ErrInputDataTooLarge
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}
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// govips picks the libvips loader with DetermineImageType. Input it
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// would not load as a source format, such as SVG, which librsvg would
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// render, is refused before libvips reads it.
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inputFormat := p.detectFormat(vips.DetermineImageType(data))
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sourceFormat, err := p.formatFromString(inputFormat)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// Decode image
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img, err := vips.NewImageFromBuffer(data)
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if err != nil {
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@@ -242,9 +251,6 @@ func (p *ImageProcessor) Process(
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origWidth := img.Width()
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origHeight := img.Height()
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// Detect input format
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inputFormat := p.detectFormat(img)
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// Validate input dimensions to prevent DoS via decompression bombs
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if origWidth > MaxInputDimension || origHeight > MaxInputDimension {
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return nil, ErrInputTooLarge
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@@ -261,14 +267,10 @@ func (p *ImageProcessor) Process(
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}
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}
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// orig is the source's own format, and an error when the processor
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// cannot name it; encode refuses an empty format
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// orig is the source's own format; encode refuses an empty format
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outputFormat := req.Format
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if outputFormat == FormatOriginal {
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outputFormat, err = p.formatFromString(inputFormat)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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outputFormat = sourceFormat
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}
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// Encode to target format
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@@ -412,10 +414,9 @@ func (p *ImageProcessor) acquireSlot(ctx context.Context) (func(), error) {
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}
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}
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// detectFormat returns the format string from a vips image.
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func (p *ImageProcessor) detectFormat(img *vips.ImageRef) string {
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format := img.Format()
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switch format {
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// detectFormat returns the format string for a govips image type.
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func (p *ImageProcessor) detectFormat(imageType vips.ImageType) string {
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switch imageType {
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case vips.ImageTypeJPEG:
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return "jpeg"
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case vips.ImageTypePNG:
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@@ -38,14 +38,7 @@ func TestImageProxyRefusesSVGServedAsAVIF(t *testing.T) {
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t.Fatalf("encurl.NewGenerator: %v", err)
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}
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targets := []string{
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"/v1/image/" + upstreamHost + "/drawing.avif/32x24.png",
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"/v1/image/" + upstreamHost + "/drawing.avif/64x48.orig",
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}
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for _, format := range []imgcache.ImageFormat{
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imgcache.FormatPNG, imgcache.FormatOriginal,
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} {
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encryptedURL := func(format imgcache.ImageFormat) string {
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token, err := generator.Generate(&encurl.Payload{
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SourceHost: upstreamHost, SourcePath: "/drawing.avif",
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Width: 32, Height: 24, Format: format,
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@@ -54,10 +47,15 @@ func TestImageProxyRefusesSVGServedAsAVIF(t *testing.T) {
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t.Fatalf("encurl Generate: %v", err)
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}
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targets = append(targets, "/v1/e/"+token+"/drawing."+string(format))
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return "/v1/e/" + token + "/drawing." + string(format)
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}
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for _, target := range targets {
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for _, target := range []string{
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"/v1/image/" + upstreamHost + "/drawing.avif/32x24.png",
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"/v1/image/" + upstreamHost + "/drawing.avif/64x48.orig",
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encryptedURL(imgcache.FormatPNG),
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encryptedURL(imgcache.FormatOriginal),
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} {
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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s.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
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t.Context(), http.MethodGet, target, nil))
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