seal.DeriveKeys derives the session hash and block keys, the encrypted URL
key and the CSRF key from the signing key, with their salts declared beside
it, and returns them as one seal.Keys. internal/providers calls it once at
startup and provides the value to the fx graph. The session manager, the
encrypted URL generator and the CSRF protection each take their own key.
session.NewManager, encurl.NewGenerator, newCSRFProtect and handlers.New
return no error, as nothing in them can fail now. Each key is derived as
before, with seal.DeriveKey and the same salt. The signing key itself stays
the HMAC key of signed URLs and the login password. README.md says under
signing_key what it protects.
Model: opus-5-5
Accumulating milestone branch. One squashed commit per closed issue; `next` is kept green and mergeable to `main` at any time without notice.
Landed so far:
- `chore: update golangci-lint to v2.12.2 with canonical config` (#54) — canonical v2-schema `.golangci.yml`, pins bumped in `Dockerfile` and `script/bootstrap`, tree at `0 issues.`. Three behaviour deltas are recorded in that PR's body: `Cache.StoreVariant` takes a context, `MetadataStorage.Store` no longer leaks temp files on failure, and the `signing_key` too-short error text gained a `value too short:` prefix.
Sequencing for the milestone is tracked in #103.
Reviewed-on: #105
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
closes#47
Fixes the two remaining `gosec` findings on `main`, both `G124`
(http.Cookie missing or has insecure `Secure`, `HttpOnly`, or
`SameSite` attribute):
- `internal/session/session.go:84` (`CreateSession`, the login
set-cookie path)
- `internal/session/session.go:128` (`ClearSession`, the logout
delete-cookie path)
## What changed
- Both cookie-writing paths now unconditionally set `Secure: true`,
`HttpOnly: true`, and `SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode`.
- The `secure` field (previously wired to `!config.Debug`) and the
`sameSite` field are removed from `session.Manager`, and the dead
secure-toggle parameter is removed from `session.NewManager`, which
now takes only the signing key (reviewer-directed; the mechanical
call-shape updates in `session_test.go` leave every assertion
untouched).
- TDD per repo rules: the first commit adds
`TestSessionCookieAttributesAlwaysSecure` (failing), asserting that
every cookie emitted by the session manager carries `HttpOnly`,
`Secure`, and `SameSite` of Lax or stricter, for both write paths.
The second commit makes it pass.
- `TODO.md` updated per its Workflow section (Next Step completed,
next Future Step promoted, stale "10 open findings" Status text
corrected).
## Attribute choices and reasoning
- `Secure: true` always: the `G124` analyzer only accepts a constant
`true` store, and there is no legitimate configuration in which the
authentication cookie should be sent over plaintext HTTP. The old
behavior disabled `Secure` whenever `debug` was on. Local development
over `http://localhost` keeps working: browsers treat `localhost` as
a trustworthy origin and accept `Secure` cookies there. Any
plain-HTTP flow on a non-localhost host will no longer keep a
session, which is the point of the fix.
- `SameSite: Strict` (unchanged from current production behavior, and
stricter than the Lax minimum): the login form is a same-origin POST
to `/` followed by a same-site redirect, so `Strict` breaks nothing.
- `HttpOnly: true` (unchanged).
## Verification
`make check` (tests, golangci-lint, fmt-check) is fully green on the
branch head `cb9e14e`: all tests pass and the linter reports 0 issues,
independently confirmed by the reviewer in a fresh worktree. Commit
history: `ca15f52` (failing test) → `02ca16a` (fix + TODO.md, closes
#47) → `cb9e14e` (drop the dead `NewManager` parameter).
Co-authored-by: sneak <sneak@sneak.berlin>
Reviewed-on: #48
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
clawbot
