CSRF protection on the login and URL-generator forms (closes #93)
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Adds CSRF protection to the two cookie-authenticated form posts, POST / (login) and POST /generate, using github.com/gorilla/csrf, the recorded default for this job.

The token key is derived from signing_key with its own HKDF salt, so it needs no new config and survives restarts. The token cookie is separate from the session cookie, which also covers login CSRF, where no session exists yet. Both templates carry the hidden token field.

What a reader would trip over: outside debug mode the library enforces its https Referer origin check, so the TLS-terminating proxy must preserve the Host and Referer headers from the browser or form posts are rejected.

Disclosure: one nolint:gosec on a test constant holding the library field name (G101 false positive).

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation, review); fable-5-1 (landing message)
This commit was merged in pull request #117.
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-21 19:26:18 +02:00
parent 04b5db6fbf
commit a96eba8083
9 changed files with 397 additions and 31 deletions
+65
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package handlers
import (
"html/template"
"net/http"
"github.com/gorilla/csrf"
"sneak.berlin/go/pixa/internal/seal"
)
// csrfKeySalt provides domain separation for the CSRF authentication key,
// derived from the signing key so tokens survive restarts without extra
// configuration and never reuse the session or encrypted-URL key material.
const csrfKeySalt = "pixa-csrf-v1"
// newCSRFProtect builds the CSRF-protection middleware for the
// state-mutating HTML form routes. The token lives in its own cookie,
// independent of the session cookie, so it also protects the login POST
// where no session exists yet (login CSRF).
//
// When plaintext is true (local HTTP development), requests are marked
// plaintext so the library neither demands an https Referer nor sets a
// Secure cookie the browser would withhold over http. In production the
// service runs behind a TLS-terminating proxy, so plaintext is false and
// the library enforces its https Referer origin check.
func newCSRFProtect(
signingKey string, plaintext bool,
) (func(http.Handler) http.Handler, error) {
key, err := seal.DeriveKey([]byte(signingKey), csrfKeySalt)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
protect := csrf.Protect(
key[:],
csrf.Path("/"),
csrf.Secure(!plaintext),
csrf.SameSite(csrf.SameSiteStrictMode),
)
if !plaintext {
return protect, nil
}
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
protected := protect(next)
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
protected.ServeHTTP(w, csrf.PlaintextHTTPRequest(r))
})
}, nil
}
// CSRF returns the CSRF-protection middleware for the login and generator
// form routes.
func (s *Handlers) CSRF() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return s.csrfProtect
}
// csrfField returns the hidden form input carrying the CSRF token for the
// given request, to be embedded verbatim in a rendered form.
func csrfField(r *http.Request) template.HTML {
return csrf.TemplateField(r)
}